Politicization of the Bureaucracy across and within Administrative Traditions

Abstract

It is frequently claimed within the politicization literature that while governments around the world are increasingly politicizing senior public service appointments, the nature and extent of this politicization varies across administrative traditions. To date, however, differences across administrative traditions have received little empirical scrutiny; research tends to be more comparable than comparative. Using data from an expert survey systematically measuring the merit-, political-, and personal-recruitment of senior public servants in 20 countries, this article examines differences across and within the Nordic, Westminster, Germanic and Napoleonic administrative traditions, in addition to the alternative Anglo-American and Southern European traditions. Various tests show meaningful variation in politicization across administrative traditions, with the starkest differences found between the Nordic and Napoleonic traditions. The results also show less variation among the countries comprising the Nordic tradition than that found within the other traditions.

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Politicization of the Bureaucracy across and within Administrative Traditions
International Journal of Public Administration
Christopher A. Cooper
Professional Website
Email: Christopher.Cooper@uOttawa.ca
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1423-3668
Abstract: It is frequently claimed within the politicization literature that while governments
around the world are increasingly politicizing senior public service appointments, the nature and
extent of this politicization varies across administrative traditions. To date, however, differences
across administrative traditions have received little empirical scrutiny; research tends to be more
comparable than comparative. Using data from an expert survey systematically measuring the
merit-, political-, and personal-recruitment of senior public servants in 20 countries, this article
examines differences across and within the Nordic, Westminster, Germanic and Napoleonic
administrative traditions, in addition to the alternative Anglo-American and Southern European
traditions. Various tests show meaningful variation in politicization across administrative
traditions, with the starkest differences found between the Nordic and Napoleonic traditions. The
results also show less variation among the countries comprising the Nordic tradition than that
found within the other traditions.

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Introduction
The politicization of public service appointments is presently experiencing a resurgence of interest
from public administration scholars (Christensen, Klemmensen, & Opstrup, 2014; Dahlström &
Niklasson, 2013; Kim & Hong, 2019; Lee, 2018). A frequent claim within this literature is that the
nature and extent of this politicization varies across countries because of differences in their
administrative tradition—the formal and informal institutions that define the nature of the public
service, as well as the relationship that the public service has with the government, the state, and
its citizens. Scholars tend to support these claims, however, by comparing the findings of separate
studies using different methodologies. Research studying politicization across administrative
traditions thus tends to be more “comparable than comparative” (Derlien, 1992, p. 279). This
article advances this literature by empirically examining politicization across, as well as within,
administrative traditions.
This article uses data from an expert survey measuring senior public servants’ recruitment
on the basis of merit, political connections and personal connections in 20 countries that
encompass the Nordic, Westminster, Germanic and Napoleonic administrative traditions, as well
as the alternative Anglo-American and Southern European traditions. The results from various
statistical tests suggest that there are indeed important differences across these traditions. In the
Nordic and Westminster traditions, merit recruitment is the highest, while recruitment based on
political and personal connections are the lowest. Conversely, in the Germanic and Napoleonic
traditions, merit recruitment is the lowest, while recruitment based on political and personal
connections are the highest.
Overall, the findings in this study empirically support claims that levels of politicization
vary according to the larger social context of a country’s administrative tradition. While the desire
to control the bureaucracy may be ubiquitous in the contemporary era of governance, the results

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suggest that a country’s underlying administrative tradition influences, but does not determine, the
extent to which governments politicize public service appointments. Specifically, politicization is
less likely to be a chosen method of control in countries whose administrative tradition has
historically had little tolerance for political appointments to the bureaucracy.
The remainder of this article is organized into four sections. After reviewing the concepts
of politicization and administrative tradition, the first section explains the theoretical reasons why
politicization may vary across, but also within, administrative traditions. The second section
outlines the data and methods used to measure the merit-, political- and personal-based recruitment
of senior public servants in 20 countries comprising six administrative traditions. The third section
interprets the results from various statistical tests. The conclusion identifies the contributions this
article makes to research studying politicization and comparative public administration, as well as
identifies some questions for future research.
Theory: Politicization and Administrative Tradition
What is Politicization? To speak about a “politicization of the bureaucracy” necessities a minimum
belief in the politics-administration dichotomy. As proclaimed by Woodrow Wilson (1887):
...administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not
political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered
to manipulate its offices. (p. 210 emphasis in the original)
At its most essential meaning, politicization is any intrusion of politics into administration.
This rudimentary meaning leads us to be aware of the various ways that politics can enter the
impartial realm of bureaucracy (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2008; Husted & Salomonsen, 2014; Peters,
2013), including political actions by public servants themselves (Boräng, Cornell, Grimes, &
Schuster, 2018; Saint-Martin, 2003).

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A central type of politicization is the prioritization of political criteria when appointing
administrative officials. In their oft-cited book Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative
Perspective, Peters and Pierre (2004) define politicization as the “substitution of political criteria
for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of
members of the public service” (p. 2). Although some scholars use alternative terms to describe
this behaviour, such as “patronage as governance” (Flinders, Felicity, & Eason, 2012) or
“patronage as an organizational resource” (Kopecký & Mair, 2012), the appointment of senior
public servants receives the most scholarly attention. There are two good reasons for this.
First, a growing body of research shows a positive relationship between merit recruitment
and the quality of government. Hiring senior public servants according to merit has been tied to
socioeconomic development (Evans & Rauch, 1999), organizational efficiency (Fuenzalida &
Riccucci, 2018), expertise (Richardson, 2019), low levels of corruption (Dahlström & Lapuente,
2017) and voicing frank and fearless advice (Cooper, 2018a).
Second, appointing senior public servants has long been seen as a central means through
which governments can control the bureaucracy. Many of the earliest and most seminal
publications in public administration, such as Wilson’s (1887) The Study of Administration and
Britain’s Northcote-Trevelyan Report (Northcote & Trevelyan, 1954), were concerned with the
extent to which administrative officials were being hired on the basis of political criteria, and
professed that hiring officials according to merit would improve the quality of the bureaucracy.
Accordingly, in many countries the creation of independent civil service commissions during the
late 19th and early 20th centuries tapered the practice of awarding administrative offices in return
for partisan support (Dreyfus, 2000; Silberman, 1993). Yet importantly, these reforms generally
did not make their way to the bureaucracy’s top offices, instead, remaining under the control of

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the government. Thus historically, as a growing wave of distrust in the intentions of public servants
swept across many industrialized countries in the 1980s (Aucoin, 1990), the search for the best
and the brightest yielded to the need for administrative allies committed to the government’s policy
agenda.
During this time, some scholars began to speak about an increasing politicization of senior
public service appointments (Bourgault & Dion, 1989; Derlien, 1988). Importantly, research
suggests that ongoing transformations in the nature of governance since the 1980s, including the
24/7 news cycle, social media, and the permanent electoral campaign, have further amplified
governments’ desire to control the bureaucracy (Aucoin, 2012; Marland, Lewis, & Flanagan,
2016).
Accordingly, over the last 20 years a growing number of studies have sought to measure,
and better understand the political dynamics—such as a change in government—that push
governments to politicize senior public service appointments (Boyne, James, John, & Petrovsky,
2010; Bach & Veit, 2017; Cooper, 2019; Dahlstrom & Holmgren, 2019; Derlien, 2003; Ennser-
Jedenastik, 2016; Kim & Hong, 2019; Lewis & Waterman, 2013; Meyer-Sahling & Mikkelsen,
2017; Park & Kim, 2013; Petrovsky et al., 2017). A notable feature of this literature is that the
majority of studies examine a single polity. While employing different methodologies, most
studies do find evidence of increased politicization. Importantly, it is also commonly claimed
within this literature that the nature and extent of politicization varies across countries, in large
part, because of differences in their administrative tradition (Dahlström, Peters, & Pierre, 2011;
Gherghina & Kopecký, 2016; Neuhold, Vanhoonacker, & Verhey, 2013; Peters & Pierre, 2004).

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What is an Administrative Tradition? Painter and Peters (2010) define an administrative tradition
as a “more or less an enduring structure pattern in the style and substance of public administration
in a particular country or group of countries” (p. 6). The nature of an administrative tradition is
manifested in both a country’s formal and informal institutions, and includes the beliefs about the
proper rapport between politics and administration as well as the relationship between politicians
and bureaucrats (Yesilkagit, 2010). In this sense, an administrative tradition defines the contours
of the “public service bargain” concerning the appropriate behaviour of politicians and senior
officials (Hood & Lodge, 2006).
While governments in most industrialized countries appear to desire more control over the
bureaucracy, administrative traditions may influence the extent to which governments seek this
control by prioritizing political criteria when appointing senior public servants. The theoretical
reason for this is a sociological institutionalist explanation of politics (Jenson & Mérand, 2010):
while individuals pursue their interests, they do so through the prism of social context. This social
context influences not only the nature of an actor’s preferences (such as control over the
bureaucracy), but also the judgments about how these preferences are best realized (such as the
politicization of senior public service appointments). According to March and Olsen (1998),
individuals approach:
opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice
dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations. Action involves evoking an
identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation. The
pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more than with interests. (p. 949)
By influencing the strategic actions of governments and bureaucrats, comparative public
administration scholars often focus on administrative traditions to understand patterns of

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behaviour, most particularly, administrative reforms (Greve, Ejersbo, Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2019;
Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2019; Orelli, Padovani, & Katsikas, 2016).
Administrative traditions vary in several respects including the legal foundation of the
public service (Pierre, 2011), the public service’s autonomy from the government (Heper, 1985;
Knill, 1999) as well as the educational and professional background of senior officials (Painter &
Peters, 2010). Critically, one defining feature of an administrative tradition is where politics and
administration find equilibrium. Norms concerning the appropriate relationship between politics
and administration differ, as does the acceptability of prioritizing political criteria when appointing
senior bureaucrats (Peters, 2008, p. 123; Rouban, 2004). This is how an administrative tradition
influences politicization: while a high desire for control may be ubiquitous in the contemporary
era of governance, the degree to which prioritizing political criteria when recruiting senior
personnel is acceptable within the larger administrative tradition, tempers the extent to which
governments politicize public service appointments. Politicization is more likely to be noticed,
criticized, and even resisted, in countries whose administrative tradition has historically had little
tolerance for politically motivated appointments to the bureaucracy. Specifically, the literature
frequently claims that tolerance towards political appointments has historically been lower within
the Nordic and Westminster administrative traditions than in the Germanic and Napoleonic.
Politics and Administration: Nordic, Westminster, Germanic and Napoleonic Traditions. Various
case studies examining countries from the Nordic—encompassing Sweden, Denmark, Finland and
Norway—and the Westminster tradition—encompassing the UK, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand
and Canada—claim that a core tenet of their tradition is the absence of political appointments to
the public service.

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Studying Sweden, Pierre (2004) claims that increased efforts to politicize the bureaucracy
are a rupture to the norm of having a strong separation between politics and administration. Pierre
(2004) observes, “it is almost a faux pas to mention politicization in the heart of a state’s political
and administrative spheres” (p. 41). Examining Denmark, Christiansen (2004) claims that the
embedded norm of non-political appointments to the public service has protected it against
politicization: “the very sensitivity of the politicization issue allows for the civil service...to operate
politically to defend merit principles” (p. 22-23). Claims that have been repeated in the literature,
including studies of Norway and Finland (Allern, 2012; Christiansen, Niklasson, & Öhberg, 2016;
Lægreid, Roness, & Rubecksen, 2007).
Scholarship examining Westminster countries also note that historically, there has been a
low tolerance for political appointments to the public service. This is found in the notion of the
Scafferian public service bargain, in which public servants are hired according to merit and given
tenure, and in return, bureaucrats provide governments with impartial and frank advice (Hood &
Lodge, 2006). In fact, as governments began to politicize public service appointments, scholars
spoke of such acts as “Breaking the Bargain” (Savoie, 2003) and constituting “The End of
Whitehall” (Campbell & Wilson, 1995). Studying politicization in the Canadian province of New
Brunswick, Cooper (2018b) found that norms of merit recruitment and impartiality led senior
bureaucrats to resist initial attempts of politicization because they “viewed [it] as an attack against
their professional identity and financial interests, as well as a larger affront to the professional
integrity of the career civil service” (p. 32).
One issue of debate is over whether the United States should be included alongside
Westminster countries to constitute an Anglo-American tradition (Halligan, 2010; 2015). In one
respect, according to the Wilsonian tradition of public administration, the United States shares

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with the Westminster tradition a stark ideational distinction between politics and administration
(Kettl, 2002; Peters, 2010). However, American presidents also appoint approximately 4,000
individuals to the public service on the basis of political criteria (Lewis, 2008), which is far greater
than the number available to first ministers from Westminster countries. In short, the inclusion of
the United States among Westminster countries remains an open and contested matter.
In contrast to the Nordic and Westminster traditions, the politicization of senior public
service appointments has not led scholars studying countries from the Germanic—comprising
Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Netherlands—and the Napoleonic—comprising France,
Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece—traditions to decry the breaking of any bargain. This
is because the separation between politics and administration has historically been less stark in
these traditions, where political appointments to some elite public service positions have long been
practised (Peters, 2008, p. 124; Rouban, 2004; Yesilkagit, 2010)
For instance, in the Napoleonic tradition, cabinets ministèriels are staffed according to the
minister’s discretion (Dierickx, 2003; Diez, 2004; Rouban, 2015). While there are no ministerial
cabinets in the Germanic tradition, a number of senior public service positions are appointed by
ministers, which are temporarily retired from the public service following a change in government
(Schröter, 2004; Van der Meer, 2004; Veit & Scholz, 2016).Some scholars further distinguish the
countries of Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece within the Napoleonic tradition as constituting a
distinct Southern European administrative tradition (Painter & Peters, 2010, p. 22). These
countries are seen as having an even higher acceptance of political-based appointments throughout
the public service, including middle- and lower-level positions (Sotiropoulos, 2004). Overall, in
the Napoleonic and Germanic traditions, politicization of senior appointments has historically been

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accepted to a greater degree than in the Nordic and Westminster traditions (Peters, 2008;
Dahlström et al., 2011).
To date, claims that politicization varies across administrative traditions have generally
been supported by comparing the findings of two or more studies. Although focusing on
differences across countries rather than differences between administrative traditions, a few recent
studies using systematically collected data measuring public service appointments provide some
evidence that politicization may vary across traditions.
Kopecký et al. (2016) use an expert survey to measure the extent to which political parties
appoint bureaucrats in 22 countries from West and East Europe, Latin America and Africa. The
results show that some of the lowest levels of political appointments are in countries that belong
to the Westminster and Nordic tradition. Similarly, using data gathered from a survey of executive
public servants from several West European countries, Bach, Hammerschmid and Löffler (2018),
as well as Van de Walle (2018), find lower levels of politicization in some countries belonging to
Nordic tradition and higher levels in countries belonging to the Napoleonic or Germanic tradition.
While the results from these studies show differences across some of the countries belonging to
different administrative traditions, they do not directly compare levels of politicization across
administrative traditions, nor do they examine all of the countries that comprise each tradition.
This article advances the literature by doing just this.
Data and Methods
Data. This article investigates levels of politicization between and within the Nordic, Westminster,
Germanic and Napoleonic administrative traditions using the Second Wave of the Quality of
Government Expert Survey (Dahlström et al., 2015). Conducted by the Quality of Government

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Institute, this survey measures the quality of public bureaucracies in over 120 countries and
includes variables measuring the merit, political and personal recruitment of senior public servants.
The Second Wave of the Quality of Government Expert Survey was conducted in 2014
and 2015. Potential respondents were identified from the United Nations Public Administration
Network, peer-reviewed journals, university websites as well as the professional networks of
scholars in the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. A total of 7,096
potential respondents were sent an electronic questionnaire asking them to self-identify their
country of expertise and 1,294 respondents completed the survey, for a response rate of 18%
(Dahlström et al., 2015). By systematically measuring the recruitment of senior public servants
across a large number of countries, the Quality of Government Expert Survey offers a good means
to investigate differences across and within administrative traditions. Despite this advantage, as a
perception-based survey, one potential limitation is that the data may suffer from respondent bias.
Post-survey tests, however, found little evidence of systematic bias stemming from respondents’
country of residence, education, age or gender (Dahlström et al. 2015, p. 13).
Admittedly, an administrative tradition is what Gallie (1955) calls a “contested concept”
and debate exists over what countries are classified within each tradition. This work follows the
consensus within the literature when classifying countries into the Nordic, Westminster, Germanic
and Napoleonic traditions, but it also takes a look at two of the most common alternative traditions:
the Anglo-American and Southern European traditions. Table 1 outlines the countries and the
number of surveyed experts in each tradition.
[Table 1 approximately here]
Methods. The recruitment criteria prioritized when appointing senior public servants are measured
with three separate questions. Respondents were asked to answer each question on a seven-point

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scale, where 1 is “hardly ever” and 7 is “almost always.” Merit recruitment is measured using the
question, “When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants decide
who gets the job.” Political recruitment is measured using the question, “When recruiting public
sector employees, the political connections of the applicants decide who gets the job.” In addition
to these questions, the analysis also examines a third question, “When recruiting public sector
employees, the personal connections of the applicants (for example kinship or friendship) decide
who gets the job.” Although this question does not directly measure political influence, hiring
individuals on the basis of who they know goes against the impersonal application of merit
recruitment. Hiring individuals because of their connections to persons of influence, nonetheless,
reduces the extent to which a public service is exclusively merit-based. Because administrative
traditions are believed to vary in the extent to which merit-based recruitment is a defining
characteristic, administrative traditions may also display variation in this nonpolitical but
nepotistic recruitment.
Overall, the data analyzed in this study comprises 372 observations. In the aggregate of all
observations, the means and standard deviations of the three recruitment criteria are: merit
recruitment (mean, 5.61; standard deviation, 1.32); political connections (mean, 2.89; standard
deviation, 1.32); and personal connections (mean, 2.78; standard deviation, 1.57).
The empirical analysis is conducted in two steps. The first step uses descriptive statistics
and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to investigate whether there are differences in the
recruitment criteria of senior public servants across, as well as within, administrative traditions.
Because the dependent variables are interval, a one-way analysis of variance is used. As a
robustness test, additional analysis used a nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of
variance. This alternative analysis produced results suggesting similar conclusions to those

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reported in the text. The second step of the empirical analysis uses OLS regression to investigate
the direction and effect size of the relationship between administrative tradition and the criteria
prioritized when appointing senior officials. In three separate models, merit recruitment, political
recruitment, and personal recruitment are respectively regressed against administrative tradition.
Results and Discussion
Figures 1, 2 and 3 display the mean value of merit recruitment, political recruitment and personal
recruitment, respectively, within each administrative tradition along with 95 percent confidence
intervals. The results show meaningful differences across administrative traditions. As the
literature suggests, the Nordic and Westminster traditions exhibit higher levels of merit-
recruitment and lower levels of recruitment based on political connections than that found in the
Germanic and Napoleonic traditions. The Napoleonic tradition, however, is particularly notable
with even lower levels of merit recruitment, and higher levels of political connections, than in the
Germanic tradition.
[Figure 1 approximately here]
[Figure 2 approximately here]
[Figure 3 approximately here]
Figures 1, 2 and 3 also show a similar relationship between recruitment based on political
connections and recruitment based on personal connections. In the Nordic and Westminster
traditions, where merit recruitment is high, appointments based on political and personal
connections are low. Conversely, in the Germanic and Napoleonic traditions, where merit
recruitment is lower, both political and personal connections are higher. The results from a one-
way ANOVA in Table 2 show that the differences in the merit, political and personal recruitment

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of senior public servants across these traditions are statistically significant (probability value less
than .0001).
[Table 2 approximately here]
Finally, the results from Figures 1, 2 and 3 also show, as some researchers suggest
(Halligan, 2010; Painter & Peters, 2010; Sotiropoulos, 2004), that merit recruitment is slightly
lower, and political and personal connections slightly higher, in the Anglo-American and Southern
European traditions than in their counterparts, the Westminster and Napoleonic traditions,
respectively.
Importantly, an administrative tradition is not theorized to be the sole factor influencing
levels of politicization, but an important institution influencing the degree to which governments
engage in such behaviour. Accordingly, there may be differences in politicization between the
countries that makeup each tradition. Figures 4, 5 and 6 examine whether there are differences in
the recruitment criteria of senior public servants across the countries of each tradition with
descriptive statistics displaying the mean value along with the 95 percent confidence intervals. The
results show intra-tradition variation in levels of merit-, political- and personal-based recruitment.
[Figure 4 approximately here]
[Figure 5 approximately here]
[Figure 6 approximately here]
Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 display the results from one-way ANOVA tests that examine whether
differences between each tradition’s member countries are statistically significant. The results
show that in some traditions differences in merit recruitment, political- and personal connections
across countries are statistically significant, meanwhile in other traditions, they are not. The

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countries belonging to the Nordic tradition display the least variation in hiring criteria: only
differences in political connections is statistically significant. Meanwhile, differences among the
countries in the Napoleonic tradition are found in all three recruitment criteria.
[Table 3 approximately here]
[Table 4 approximately here]
[Table 5 approximately here]
[Table 6 approximately here]
The relationship between administrative tradition and the recruitment criteria of senior
public servants is finally examined with OLS regression. Models 1, 2 and 3 regress merit-,
political-, and personal-based recruitment, respectively, against the Nordic (reference category),
Westminster, Germanic and Napoleonic traditions. Models 4, 5 and 6 regress merit-, political-,
and personal-based recruitment, respectively, against the Nordic (reference category), Anglo-
American, Germanic and Southern European traditions. The results are shown in Table 7.
[Table 7 approximately here]
Models 1, 2 and 3 show that there is no statistically significant difference in the levels of
recruitment criteria between the Nordic and the Westminster tradition. Meanwhile the Germanic
and Napoleonic tradition both have statistically significant lower levels of merit recruitment and
higher levels of political recruitment than the Nordic tradition. Equally notable is that although
administrative tradition is the only predictor in the models, the R-squared is relatively high
(especially for the model examining merit recruitment), thus indicating that a sizeable amount of
variation in the recruitment criteria prioritized, is explained by administrative traditions.

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Models 4, 5 and 6, substitute the Anglo-American and Southern European traditions in
place of the Westminster and Napoleonic traditions. The results, when compared to Models 1, 2
and 3 add further insight into the differences that these two alternative traditions have with their
counterparts. Specifically, whereas there is no significantly significant difference in recruitment
criteria between the Nordic and Westminster administrative traditions, there is a significantly
significant difference between the Nordic tradition and the Anglo-American tradition, specifically
a lower level of merit recruitment and a higher level of political recruitment. Meanwhile, although
the Southern European tradition has the same statistical significance with recruitment criteria as
the Napoleonic tradition, the size of the coefficients are slightly larger, thus suggesting that this
tradition has an association with an even lower level of merit recruitment and even higher levels
of political- or personal-based recruitment.
Conclusion
A growing body of research suggests that since the 1980s, governments have sought to increase
their control over the bureaucracy, and that a common tactic to do so has been to prioritize political
considerations when appointing elite public servants (Aucoin, 2012). However, it is also frequently
claimed that levels of politicization are strongly influenced by a country’s underlying
administrative tradition (Dahlström et al., 2011; Gherghina & Kopecký, 2016; Neuhold et al.,
2013; Peters & Pierre, 2004). To date, however, little research has used systematic measures to
investigate empirically differences across and within traditions.
Using expert survey data that systematically measures the criteria prioritized when
recruiting senior public servants in 20 countries, this article investigated differences across and
within the Nordic, Westminster, Germanic and Napoleonic traditions, as well as the alternative

17
Anglo-American and Southern European traditions. Analyses using descriptive statistics, one-way
ANOVA, and OLS regression, showed important differences in levels of merit-, political- and
personal-based recruitment across these administrative traditions. Merit recruitment is higher—
and recruitment based on political and personal connections are lower—in the Nordic and
Westminster traditions than in the Germanic and Napoleonic traditions. However, while there are
important differences in the merit and non-merit criteria prioritized across administrative
traditions, the results also found differences between the countries that comprise each tradition in
at least some of the hiring criteria. This intra-tradition variation, however, is not the same among
each tradition. In particular, there is less variation among the countries belonging to the Nordic
tradition than in the other traditions. This intra-tradition variation suggests that while
administrative traditions are indeed an important factor in understanding different levels of
politicization across countries, scholars should be wary of overemphasizing their influence.
Institutions influence actors’ behaviour, they do not determine it. Future research could improve
our understanding of the influence of administrative traditions on governments’ behaviour by
investigating empirically cases when administrative traditions have deterred governments from
politicizing senior public service appointments.
The results also shows that in each tradition the level of recruitment based on political
connections is similar to the level of recruitment based on personal connections. One possible
reason for this may be that the embeddedness of merit recruitment within an administrative
tradition not only keeps political based hiring at bay, but that it may also reduce (ostensibly non-
political) nepotistic practices.
The results also speak to the usefulness of setting apart the alternative Anglo-American
and Southern European traditions when analyzing politicization. Regression analysis showed that

18
the Anglo-American tradition had a relationship with politicization that was different than the
Westminster tradition, whereas the Southern European tradition had the same, but slightly stronger
relationship with political recruitment than the Napoleonic tradition. This suggests that including
the United States alongside the Westminster countries is problematic when analyzing the
politicization of senior bureaucrats, but that excluding France and Belgium to speak of a Southern
European tradition is not.
Overall, this study adds to a growing body of comparative public administration research
using systematically collected data to identify and understand differences across countries,
including levels of politicization (Bach et al., 2018; Kopecký et al., 2016). While these studies
have found variation across countries belonging to different administrative traditions, they have
not systematically examined differences between and within them. By investigating these
differences, this study adds empirical weight to claims that administrative traditions are an
important factor in understanding trajectories of public administration. As rational choice
approaches focusing on the strategic behaviour of governments become increasingly common
among research seeking to explain politicization, it is important to be mindful that politicians and
public servants are embedded in an institutional social context, which, while not determinate, does
influence their strategic behaviour.

19
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25
Table 1. Administrative traditions
Number of experts surveyed per country in parentheses.
Nordic
Westminster
Germanic
Napoleonic
Anglo-American
Southern
European
Sweden (13)
UK (35)
Germany (35)
France (11)
UK (35)
Spain (23)
Norway (16)
Ireland (11)
Austria (7)
Belgium (7)
Ireland (11)
Portugal (17)
Finland (6)
Australia (24)
Netherlands (26)
Spain (23)
Australia (24)
Italy (21)
Denmark (22)
New Zealand (14)
Switzerland (5)
Portugal (17)
New Zealand (14)
Greece (15)
Canada (18)
Italy (21)
Canada (18)
Greece (15)
United States (61)
N
57
102
73
94
163
76

26
Table 2. Hiring criteria across administrative traditions, one-way ANOVA
Reporting percentage of respondents
Nordic
Westminster
Germanic
Napoleonic
Merit recruitment
1—Hardly ever
0
0
0
2.22
2
0
1.02
0
13.33
3
1.82
0
4.17
16.67
4
0
4.08
4.17
12.22
5
9.09
12.24
18.06
24.44
6
54.55
41.84
45.83
21.11
7—Almost always
34.55
40.82
27.78
10.00
Mean
6.2
6.16
5.89
4.47
F(3,311)=42.17, p=.0001
Political connection
1—Hardly ever
38.18
34.69
19.44
9.78
2
41.82
34.69
30.56
16.30
3
10.91
13.27
22.22
21.74
4
3.64
8.16
11.11
19.57
5
3.64
4.08
11.11
16.30
6
1.82
3.06
4.17
11.96
7—Almost always
0
2.04
1.39
4.35
Mean
1.98
2.30
2.82
3.70
F(3,313)=20.76, p=.0001
Personal connection
1—Hardly ever
20.37
29.29
23.94
12.09
2
46.30
35.35
30.99
15.38
3
14.81
14.14
19.72
25.27
4
11.11
8.08
7.04
16.48
5
5.56
5.05
11.27
10.99
6
1.85
5.05
7.04
14.29
7—Almost always
0
3.03
0
5.49
Mean
2.41
2.51
2.71
3.64
F(3,311)=10.74, p=.0001

27
Table 3. Hiring criteria across Nordic tradition, one-way ANOVA
Reporting percentage of respondents
Sweden
Norway
Finland
Denmark
Merit recruitment
1—Hardly ever
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
3
7.69
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
5
7.69
6.67
33.33
4.76
6
61.54
46.67
33.33
61.90
7—Almost always
23.08
46.67
33.33
33.33
Mean
5.92
6.4
6.0
6.29
F(3,51)=1.18, p=.328
Political connection
1—Hardly ever
30.77
26.67
0
61.90
2
53.85
60.00
33.33
23.81
3
7.69
6.67
33.33
9.52
4
7.69
0
0
4.76
5
0
0
33.33
0
6
0
6.67
0
0
7—Almost always
0
0
0
0
Mean
1.92
2.07
3.33
1.57
F(3,51)=4.58, p=.007
Personal connection
1—Hardly ever
23.08
20.00
33.33
15.00
2
30.77
73.33
16.67
45.00
3
15.38
6.67
16.67
20.00
4
15.38
0
33.33
10.00
5
15.38
0
0
5.00
6
0
0
0
5.00
7—Almost always
0
0
0
0
Mean
2.69
1.87
2.5
2.6
F(3,50)=1.47, p=.235

28
Table 4. Hiring criteria across Westminster tradition, one-way ANOVA
Reporting percentage of respondents
UK
Ireland
Australia
New Zealand
Canada
Merit recruitment
1—Hardly ever
0
0
0
0
0
2
2.94
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
5
17.59
0
17.39
7.69
11.76
6
52.17
36.36
52.17
38.46
35.29
7—Almost always
30.43
63.64
30.43
53.85
52.94
Mean
5.79
6.63
6.13
6.46
6.41
F(4,93)=3.01, p=.022
Political connection
1—Hardly ever
15.15
54.55
17.39
71.43
52.94
2
36.36
27.27
43.48
28.57
29.41
3
21.21
9.09
17.39
0
5.88
4
15.15
0
8.7
0
5.88
5
3.03
9.09
8.7
0
0
6
9.09
0
0
0
0
7—Almost always
0
0
4.35
0
5.88
Mean
2.81
1.82
2.65
1.29
1.94
F(4,93)=4.13, p=.004
Personal connection
1—Hardly ever
17.65
36.36
26.09
50.00
35.29
2
29.41
36.36
43.48
35.71
35.29
3
23.53
9.09
8.70
7.14
11.76
4
14.71
0
4.35
7.14
5.88
5
5.88
9.09
8.70
0
0
6
8.82
0
4.35
0
5.88
7—Almost always
0
9.09
4.35
0
5.88
Mean
2.88
2.45
2.57
1.71
2.41
F(4,94)=1.39, p=.245

29
Table 5. Hiring criteria across Germanic tradition, one-way ANOVA
Reporting percentage of respondents
Germany
Austria
Netherlands
Switzerland
Merit recruitment
1—Hardly ever
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
3
14.29
5.71
0
0
4
14.29
2.86
4.00
0
5
28.57
20.00
12.00
20.00
6
42.86
40.00
56.00
40.00
7—Almost always
0
31.43
28.00
40.00
Mean
5.89
5.00
6.08
6.2
F(3,68)=2.45, p=.071
Political connection
1—Hardly ever
17.65
0
26.92
20.00
2
38.24
0
34.62
0
3
20.59
14.29
23.08
40.00
4
11.76
14.29
3.85
40.00
5
11.76
28.57
7.69
0
6
0
42.86
0
0
7—Almost always
0
0
3.85
0
Mean
2.62
5.00
2.46
3.00
F(3,68)=7.18, p=.000
Personal connection
1—Hardly ever
31.43
0
24.00
0
2
31.43
16.67
36.00
20.00
3
20.00
0
12.00
80.00
4
5.71
16.67
8.00
0
5
5.71
33.33
16.00
0
6
33.33
33.33
4.00
0
7—Almost always
0
0
0
0
Mean
2.4
4.68
2.68
2.8
F(3,67)=4.21, p=.009

30
Table 6. Hiring criteria across Napoleonic tradition, one-way ANOVA
Reporting percentage of respondents
France
Belgium
Spain
Portugal
Italy
Greece
Merit recruitment
1—Hardly ever
0
0
0
6.25
5.00
0
2
0
0
4.35
6.25
30.00
26.67
3
11.11
0
13.04
12.50
35.00
13.33
4
0
0
13.04
25.00
15.00
6.67
5
22.22
42.86
21.74
37.50
5.00
33.33
6
44.44
42.86
39.13
6.25
0
13.33
7—Almost always
22.22
14.29
8.70
6.25
10.00
6.67
Mean
5.67
5.71
5.04
4.25
3.25
4.13
F(5,84)=6.03, p=.0001
Political connection
1—Hardly ever
27.27
14.29
8.70
6.25
5.00
6.67
2
27.27
42.86
21.74
6.25
0
20.00
3
27.27
0
34.78
12.50
15.00
26.67
4
0
14.29
17.39
18.75
45.00
6.67
5
9.09
28.57
13.04
18.75
20.00
13.33
6
9.09
0
4.35
25.00
10.00
20.00
7—Almost always
0
0
0
12.5
5.00
6.67
Mean
2.64
3.00
3.17
4.63
4.25
3.87
F(5,86)=3.56, p=.006
Personal connection
1—Hardly ever
30.00
42.86
13.04
0
5.00
6.67
2
20.00
28.57
21.74
0
10.00
20.00
3
20.00
14.29
30.43
31.25
25.00
20.00
4
0
0
17.39
25.00
15.00
26.67
5
20.00
14.29
4.35
12.50
15.00
6.67
6
0
0
13.04
18.75
25.00
13.33
7—Almost always
10.00
0
0
12.50
5.00
6.67
Mean
3.00
2.14
3.17
4.56
4.20
3.73
F(5,85)=3.34, p=.008

31
Table 7. OLS regression, traditions and appointment criteria
Model
1
2
3
4
5
6
Merit recruitment
Political connection
Personal connection
Merit recruitment
Political connection
Personal connection
Nordic (reference)
Westminster
-.037
(.137)
.314
(.211)
.108
(.229)
Germanic
-.311*
(156)
.838***
(.233)
.311
(.245)
-.311*
(.155)
.838***
(.232)
.311
(.245)
Napoleonic
-1.73***
(.201)
1.71***
(.230)
1.23***
(.245)
Anglo-American
-.271*
(.128)
.525***
(.191)
.298
(.206)
Southern European
-2.00***
(.216)
1.982***
(.15211)
1.457***
(.252)
Constant
6.2***
(.102)
1.98***
(.152)
2.41***
(.164)
6.2***
(.101)
1.98***
(.158)
2.41***
(.163)
R2
.29
.17
.09
.30
.16
.10
N
315
317
315
356
355
355
*** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
Robust standard error in parentheses