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China’s Economic Presence in the Arctic: Realities, Expectations and Concerns
... President Xi Jinping is said to regard the region as "a crucial element of his country's geopolitical vision" (Spohr and Hamilton 2020, 24). As early as 1999, China sent its icebreaking research vessel, Xue Long, on (Hsiung 2016, Stepien et al. 2020. Chinese stateowned shipping company COSCO began experimenting with limited seasonal shipping using the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the only non-Russian company to do so on a regular annual basis. ...
... In addition to the Arctic states comprising Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the USA, a growing number of global organizations and non-Arctic states, including China, are showing an increased interest in this region (Rowe 2018). While China's stance in Arctic affairs has raised some socio-economic concerns (Lasserre et al. 2017;Stepien et al. 2020), it is also imperative to appreciate the dynamic nature of the Arctic and demand a nuanced and comprehensive governance approach (Prip 2022). With the surge in commercial interest, the potential for conflicts over maritime shipping rights looms, necessitating comprehensive legal frameworks. ...
In the past decade, global climate change and the rapid melting of polar ice have dramatically transformed the Arctic landscape from a vast ice-covered area to a seasonally navigable sea. This accessibility has sparked increased commercial activity, posing a threat from various pollutants, particularly from vessel sources. Given China’s profound interests in Arctic shipping, its involvement may face resistance from Arctic states, and therefore, it is important for China to ensure that its presence benefits local communities and states. This study explores China’s role in shaping the international legal landscape to protect the Arctic from vessel-source pollutions. The intricate interplay between China’s economic interests, maritime security concerns, and environmental commitments in the Arctic underscores China’s potential role. By aligning with existing international legal structures, such as UNCLOS and MARPOL, China has already started to demonstrate its commitment to preserving the Arctic environment. This study assesses and discusses the potentially strategic importance of China’s involvement in influencing legal regimes, offering a crucial contribution to global efforts to preserve this vital region.
... This manifests at various scales. Authors in this volume provide nuanced insight into economic relations between China and specific Arctic states, revealing how China and Chinese actors are active differently in different parts of the Arctic (see also Stepien et al., 2020). For example, what strategies will China use to secure its share of the global resource market, as Li and Bertelsen ask? ...
The authors in this volume of articles, compiled from the
Arctic Yearbook, illustrate how China’s approach to the Arctic
serves a dual purpose that reflects burgeoning Chinese
influence beyond its borders in a global context. As China
advances its relationships with Russia and Greenland to ensure
Chinese energy security, access to raw materials, and
emerging transportation routes, commentators continue to
debate what this means for Arctic security. Will China eventually
become a challenger to the Arctic’s regional political
norms? What does China’s growing influence in the region
mean for the return of great power competition elsewhere in
the world?
... This manifests at various scales. Authors in this volume provide nuanced insight into economic relations between China and specific Arctic states, revealing how China and Chinese actors are active differently in different parts of the Arctic (see also Stepien et al., 2020). For example, what strategies will China use to secure its share of the global resource market, as Li and Bertelsen ask? ...
In recent years, the growing exploration of natural resources and development of transport routes have reemerged in the Arctic as scenes for political and economic collaboration between Nordic and non-regional states. Being a non-Arctic country, China nevertheless has played an active role in the elaboration of international regulations and the establishment of governance mechanisms in the Arctic. The country has recently released a White Paper on Arctic Policy and thus prioritized scientific research; underscored the importance of environmental protection, rational utilization, law-based governance, and international cooperation; and committed itself to maintaining a peaceful, secure, and stable Arctic order. Diversified transportation routes and economic corridors are of paramount importance to such global trading nations as China. However, an extension of the economic corridors to the Arctic is viable only in the case of development of satellite trade, production, and research opportunities along the potential transport routes. In this study, the authors discuss the critical points in the implementation of China’s paradigm of collaboration and connectivity in the Arctic, as well as focus on the promotion of bilateral win-to-win investment and trade projects with the countries along the potential Arctic Blue Economic Corridor (ABEC). The authors conclude that the ABEC may be efficiently incorporated into China’s Belt and Road network but emphasize that specific technological and economic challenges must be considered and met before a sustainable connectivity between the markets of Asia and Europe is established in the Arctic.
... This manifests at various scales. Authors in this volume provide nuanced insight into economic relations between China and specific Arctic states, revealing how China and Chinese actors are active differently in different parts of the Arctic (see also Stepien et al., 2020). For example, what strategies will China use to secure its share of the global resource market, as Li and Bertelsen ask? ...
Currently, about 80% of globally traded cargo is carried by maritime transport, including increasingly along the routes in the North, which have not been secured previously due to heavy ice conditions and extreme temperatures. In recent decades, however, climate change has been affecting the reduction of ice coverage in the Arctic Ocean and thus providing opportunities for the development of commercial navigation. Many countries are becoming increasingly interested in the exploration of opening maritime routes. With the incorporation of the Polar Silk Road into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) network, China has rapidly emerged as the major non-Arctic actor in the region. Contributing to the development of commercial shipping in the North, China aims at the diversification of its trade routes and linking itself with Arctic countries by a network of maritime corridors. The implementation of the Polar Silk Road initiative requires first and foremost the improvement of the navigation safety and passability of Northern routes, primarily through the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The existing network of operable routes along the Russian coastline of the Arctic Ocean allows commercial shipping during summer and autumn only. Due to the prevailing shallow depths, the operation of icebreakers is limited. The extension of the secured navigation window is hindered by the lack of icebreaking and underdeveloped navigational infrastructure in Russia. In this paper, the authors discuss how China may collaborate with Russia to ensure the development of secure navigable routes by determining the areas suitable for the development of deep-water shipping and allowing the operation of large-tonnage tankers and icebreakers. The paper presents an analysis of water areas in the NSR suitable for the development of deep-water routes and operation of large-tonnage vessels with high categories of ice reinforcements. The authors provide an overview of the current condition of the shipbuilding industry in Russia in relation to the construction of vessels and marine equipment for the Arctic in such segments as icebreaking, transport, port, and dredging fleet. In the conclusion, the existing obstacles and opportunities for China and Russia are summarized in light of the establishment of more secure and stable navigation along the NSR
... This manifests at various scales. Authors in this volume provide nuanced insight into economic relations between China and specific Arctic states, revealing how China and Chinese actors are active differently in different parts of the Arctic (see also Stepien et al., 2020). For example, what strategies will China use to secure its share of the global resource market, as Li and Bertelsen ask? ...
... While Chinese investments have been and to some extent continue to be welcome, from the Arctic countries' perspective, the main concerns in turn have been the perceived Chinese economic and political influence gained through investments, the environmental policy of China, and the social performance related to Chinese companies. 16 What then is the reality? The New York Times wrote in 2019 that "China is trying to pour money into nearly every Arctic country", describing the Arctic as "Latest Arena for China's Global Ambitions", 17 but the concrete success stories are not very visible. ...
The article discusses China's policies in and towards the Arctic and Africa within a comparative perspective. To what extent is China's policy adaptable to different conditions? What does this adaptability tell us about China's ascendant great-power role in the world in general? What is the message to the Arctic and Africa respectively? The article concludes that China's regional strategies aptly reflect the overall grand strategy of a country that is slowly but surely aiming at taking on the role of leading global superpower. In doing so, Chinese foreign policy has demonstrated flexibility and adaptive tactics, through a careful tailoring of its so-called core interests and foreign policy principles, and even identity politics, to regional conditions. This implies that regions seeking autonomy in the context of great power activism and contestation should develop their own strategies not only for benefiting from Chinese investment but also in terms of managing dependency on China and in relation to China and great power competition.
This research considers the Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic from a neoclassical realist perspective. The goal is to show that although current international pressures push Russia and China closer to each other, Chinese companies are reluctant in making investments in the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), and the Chinese interests in the Russian Arctic energy are still modest. In the growing pressures between the West and Russia, the Arctic is a strategic region where states are close to each other, NATO states and Russia. It is of great importance to understand the Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic and the prospects of that partnership as the main challengers to US hegemony. This chapter sought to answer the following research question: How do Chinese companies influence the dependence of Russia on Chinese investments to develop the Arctic? My conclusion is that Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic are evolving in a slow rhythm. Even if the Russian isolation from the West pushes Russia and China to a stronger partnership, Chinese companies are after all commercial entities that evaluate the risks and costs of investments. The Arctic still poses harsh climate conditions and Russia must develop crucial infrastructure to attract more investments. The Russian dependence on China will depend on China’s will to invest in the Arctic, which currently is not a top priority. This research was based on qualitative methods, namely the document-based method, where qualitative data was collected from first and second sources documents. Quantitative data was also valuable to strengthen our argument by comparing the number of total voyages and transits from Chinese shipping companies on the Northern Sea Route.
The Arctic Ocean Region is experiencing a transformation and is remoulding abruptly from an ice-covered region to an economic zone, influenced by the rising Global temperatures. This transformation has unplugged new avenues for maritime activities as well as intensified the Geopolitical dynamics. This study investigates and analyzes the rising tensions prompted by the increasing presence and activities of China in the Arctic region and the potential implications for the USA. Adopting a Qualitative approach, this research analyzes and examines the PRC's involvement and activities in the region along with the Arctic Policies of the PRC and the United States. The study explores the complex interplay of interests and motives of both powers and potential implications and challenges arising from the growing Chinese presence of the USA in the strategically important region.
Though narwhal have survived multiple ice ages, including 2.5 Ma and the last interglacial period with warming temperatures, Arctic climate change during the Anthropocene introduces new challenges. Despite their evolutionary connection to Arctic Pleistocene fossils, narwhal archeocete ancestors from the Pliocene ( Bohaskaia monodontoides ) and Miocene ( Denebola and Odobenocetopsidae) inhabited warm waters. Narwhal Arctic adaptation holds valuable insights into unique traits, including thin skin; extreme diving capacity; and a unique straight, spiraled, and sensory tooth organ system. Inaccessible weather, ice conditions, and darkness limit scientific studies, though Inuit knowledge adds valuable observations of narwhal ecology, biology, and behavior. Existing and future studies in myriad fields of physical, chemical, biological, and genetic science, combined and integrated with remote sensing and imaging technologies, will help elucidate narwhal evolution, biology, and adaptation. When integrated with Qaujimajatuqangit, “the Inuit way of knowing,” these studies help describe interesting biologic expressions of the narwhal.
This chapter uses the case of the Arctic and China’s engagement in the Arctic to contribute to a better understanding of the potential and limitations of the power transition, not only in the Arctic, but also more generally. First, it outlines the key characteristics of Arctic politics and governance, with special attention to the Arctic Council. It then reviews the ways in which China’s growing role in the Arctic stands to shape the regional settings orchestrated by the eight Arctic states. It concludes that due to climate change, globalisation and power transition, the Arctic has become deeply intertwined with global governance processes, and it will be increasingly difficult for the Arctic Council to maintain its position as a principal secondary institution in the Arctic.
This chapter discusses the role of the Arctic in China’s global vision, which seeks to reposition the country as a primary node of global flows of energy, goods, technology, data, and knowledge. The chapter begins by introducing the flow-centric lens through which China’s global economic outreach and its region-based execution are interpreted. In particular, it proposes an alternative approach of China’s functional economic regions, a novel conceptual framework challenging the Euro-centric reading of space that dominates most analyses of China’s global engagement. The chapter continues by providing an overview of the political goals of China’s primary node vision, setting the scene for the following empirical section that investigates the make-up of the China– Arctic functional economic region. This is done by tracing flows of (1) natural resources, (2) seaborne goods, and (3) technology, knowledge, and data, and discussing their role in China’s economic development and goals of the primary node vision. As China’s Arctic engagement is as much about future potential as about actual developments, the empirical analysis also takes into account possible and probable developments that carry the potential to shape China–Arctic flows. Finally, the conclusion elaborates on the future prospects and implications of the emerging China– Arctic functional economic region.
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