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Ideologia versus Capacidade: Dilma Rousseff, as Forças Armadas, e o Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento
Abstract
Este capítulo propõe uma teoria da delegação política aos militares e, em seguida, vincula essa escolha aos resultados das políticas. Ao contrário de muitos modelos de delegação que assumem uma capacidade institucional uniformemente alta e um único agente burocrático, o capítulo argumenta que a maior parte da delegação burocrática envolve múltiplos agentes possíveis—incluindo agentes fora da jurisdição como o Exército e alta variação na capacidade dessas agências. Em jogo há uma troca entre eficiência e ideologia. Assumindo que os políticos possuam informações suficientes para avaliar as capacidades de suas agências com um grau razoável de fidelidade, os resultados das políticas têm maior probabilidade de serem bem-sucedidos quando o principal político favorece os primeiros em relação aos últimos.
No caso do Brasil, argumento que, dado um Ministério dos Transportes, Portos e Aviação Civil de baixa capacidade e um setor privado não confiável, a Presidente Dilma Rousseff delegou vários projetos importantes para o DEC do Exército com base em sua percepção da capacidade organizacional superior da unidade em comparação ao setor privado e ao Estado dispostos a fazer um compromisso ideológico para o fazer. Além disso, os dados do PAC apoiam a alegação de que o DEC foi mais eficiente do que as contrapartes do setor privado e do estado na implementação dos referidos projetos, em parte porque é extraordinariamente adequado para executar as tarefas específicas que compõem o PAC.
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Which factors determine support for the armed forces? What is the effect of agency politicization on confidence? Existing studies, which draw largely from bureaucratically neutral militaries, find that interpersonal trust and demographic variables play significant roles in determining public confidence in the armed forces. I argue that this is different for a politicized agency. A loss of bureaucratic neutrality activates voters' partisan attachments, inducing individuals to judge the agency on the basis of their ties to the governing party or leader. Using survey data from Venezuela, I show that government evaluation has a salient and bifurcated effect on respondents' perceptions of their armed forces. Respondents sympathetic to the governing leader are more likely to have a favorable view of the military while those identifying as opposition are more likely to have a negative view. The results suggest that politicization of public agencies may impose an upper limit on public support regardless of institutional performance, undermine their representativeness and legitimacy, and weaken their mandates.
Responding to recent articles in Governance highlighting the need for improved measurement of bureaucratic characteristics, this article describes efforts to map Brazil's federal agencies on three dimensions—capacity, autonomy, and partisan dominance—derived from data on more than 326,000 civil servants. The article provides a “proof of concept” about the utility of agency-level measures of these variables, demonstrating how they relate to an output common to all agencies: corruption. The article provides a first step in the direction of building a comparative research program that offers objective evaluation of bureaucracies within nation-states, with the intent of better disentangling their impact on governance outcomes.
Brazilian presidents have had considerable success in getting their agendas approved in the congress, contrary to the conventional wisdom regarding the functioning of the Brazilian multiparty presidential system. They have succeeded by relying on the support of disciplined parties. The agenda powers held by the president and party leaders allow them to neutralize the personal vote and to obtain disciplined political support. An analysis of legislative output and roll call votes supports these conclusions.
The conclusion of the Cold War and the re-emergence of democracy in South America has removed principal enemies, both internal and external, while economic integration has softened contentious border disputes. This changed environment has led the military to rethink its role and search for new missions. While many purportedly `new' missions were not unheard of in the past, they have recently taken on greater importance. Are some of these activities intrinsically more detrimental than others for the development of civilian control over the military? Most scholars have customarily thought so, assuming that internal, role expansive operations would allow the armed forces undue political influence and erode the base of civilian supremacy. In our examination of 23 missions and 33 operations across 7 South America countries, we find sufficient grounds to question these assumptions. The evidence suggests that the character of the military mission alone does not dictate the fate of civilian control. Rather, only by revealing the principal decision-makers behind the military campaigns can we assess the longer-term impact of military activity upon political overseers.
Despite the abundance of recent studies on divided government, no clear consensus has emerged as to whether divided partisan control has an appreciable impact on policy outcomes. In this article we take a new perspective on the divided government debate by emphasizing the important role that the federal bureaucracy plays in shaping policy. We present a game theoretic model of the policy-making process in which legislators design administrative procedures, the president appoints agency heads, and bureaucrats collect information and promulgate regulations. The model predicts that during times of divided control Congress delegates less discretionary authority to the executive branch, and that these changes in authority have significant policy consequences. We then test the implications of our model with data drawn from U.S. trade policy between 1890 and 1990. Our central finding is that divided government influences policy indirectly, through the procedures that Congress designs to control the bureaucracy.
For the last decade we have been using double-blind survey techniques and randomized sampling to construct management data on over 10,000 organizations across twenty countries. On average, we find that in manufacturing American, Japanese, and German firms are the best managed. Firms in developing countries, such as Brazil, China and India tend to be poorly managed. American retail firms and hospitals are also well managed by international standards, although American schools are worse managed than those in several other developed countries. We also find substantial variation in management practices across organizations in every country and every sector, mirroring the heterogeneity in the spread of performance in these sectors. One factor linked to this variation is ownership. Government, family, and founder owned firms are usually poorly managed, while multinational, dispersed shareholder and private-equity owned firms are typically well managed. Stronger product market competition and higher worker skills are associated with better management practices. Less regulated labor markets are associated with improvements in incentive management practices such as performance based promotion.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
How do presidents win legislative support under conditions of extreme multipartism? Comparative presidential research has offered two parallel answers, one relying on distributive politics and the other claiming that legislative success is a function of coalition formation. We merge these insights in an integrated approach to executive-legislative relations while also considering dynamism and particular bargaining contexts. We find that the two presidential “tools” – pork and coalition goods – function as substitutes. Coalition goods establish an exchange baseline, while pork covers the ongoing costs of operation. Pork expenditures also depend upon a president’s bargaining leverage and the distribution of legislative seats.
Unlike most other emerging South American democracies, Venezuela has not succumbed to a successful military coup d'etat during four decades of democratic rule. What drives armed forces to follow the orders of elected leaders? And how do emerging democracies gain that control over their military establishments? The author of this book answers these questions in an examination of Venezuela's transition to democracy following military rule and its attempts to institutionalize civilian control of the military over the past sixty years, a period that included three regime changes. He focuses first on the strategic choices democratizers make about the military and how these affect the internal civil-military balance of power in a new regime. He then analyzes a regime's capacity to institutionalize civilian control, looking specifically at Venezuela's failures and successes in this arena during three periods of intense change: the October revolution (1945–48), the Pact of Punto Fijo period (1958–98), and the Fifth Republic under President Hugo Chávez (1998 to the present). Placing Venezuela in comparative perspective with Argentina, Chile, and Spain, he identifies the bureaucratic mechanisms democracies need in order to sustain civilian authority over the armed forces.
Although a large literature on delegation exists, few models have pushed beyond a core set of canonical assumptions. This approach may be justified on grounds of tractability, but the failure to grasp the significance of different assumptions and push beyond specific models has limited our understanding of the incentives for delegation. Consequently, the justifications for delegation that have received recent scrutiny and testing differ from some of the more plausible justifications offered by informal studies of delegation. We show that surprisingly few results in the literature hinge on risk aversion, and surprisingly many turn on the ignored, though equally canonical, technological assumption that uncertainty is fixed (relative to policies). Relaxing the key assumptions about dimensionality and functional forms provides a clearer intuition about delegation-one that is closer to classical treatments. The theory allows us to relate different institutional features (commitment, specialization costs, monitoring, multiple principals) to delegation's observable properties.
We analyze a model of delegation and policymaking in polities where bureaucratic capacity is low. Our analysis suggests that low bureaucratic capacity diminishes incentives for bureaucrats to comply with legislation, making it more difficult for politicians to induce bureaucrats to take actions that politicians desire. Consequently, when bureaucratic capacity is low, standard principles in the theoretical literature on delegation no longer hold. We also use the model to examine the issue of political reform in polities with low bureaucratic capacity. The model indicates that politicians in such polities will be trapped in a situation whereby they have little incentive to undertake reforms of either the bureaucracy or other institutions (such as courts) that are crucial for successful policymaking.
O presente artigo visa analisar a coordenação das políticas públicas de infraestrutura econômica logística no interior da Administração Pública Federal no Brasil durante o período de 2003 a 2010, com base nos programas governamentais de investimento em infraestrutura, notadamente o Projeto Piloto de Investimento e o Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento I. Esses programas tiveram sua coordenação centralizada na Casa Civil da Presidência da República e nos Ministérios do Planejamento e da Fazenda. Essa estrutura colocou o Ministério dos Transportes numa posição secundária de coordenação das políticas de infraestrutura logística. Isso, segundo nossa explicação, é devido às características institucionais do presidencialismo de coalizão.
Wendy Hunter explores civil-military relations in Brazil following the transition to civilian leadership in 1985. She documents a marked, and surprising, decline in the political power of the armed forces, even as they have remained involved in national policy making. To account for the success of civilian politicians, Hunter invokes rational-choice theory in arguing that politicians will contest even powerful forces in order to gain widespread electoral support. Many observers expected Brazil's fledgling democracy to remain under the firm direction of the military, which had tightly controlled the transition from authoritarian to civilian rule. Hunter carefully refutes this conventional wisdom by demonstrating the ability of even a weak democratic regime to expand its autonomy relative to a once-powerful military, thanks to the electoral incentives that motivate civilian politicians. Based on interviews with key participants and on extensive archival research, Hunter's analysis of developments in Brazil suggests a more optimistic view of the future of civilian democratic rule in Latin America.
Studies of the link between state capacity and development often utilize national-level governance indicators to explain fine-grained development outcomes. As capacity in some bureaucratic agencies matters more for these outcomes than capacity in others, this work proxies for capacity within the set of relevant agencies by using a measure of ‘mean’ capacity across all agencies in a polity. This practice is problematic for two reasons: (1) within-country, cross-agency diversity in capacity often overwhelms the variation encountered across public sectors considered in their entireties; (2) national-level reputations for capacity are not particularly informative about differences in capacity in functionally equivalent agencies in different countries. The article draws on the author's survey of public employees in Bolivia, Brazil and Chile to establish these points.
Venezuela, one of few Latin American countries that did not have to democratize during the Third Wave, veered hardest to the left at the turn of the century. Now, this country, despite its democratic tradition, apparently has most to fear with respect to continued civilian control of the military. This article shows how Venezuela’s democracia pactada (democracy-by-pact) and its Bolivarian Revolution both permitted fusing of military with political power across policy areas. However, the emergence of a coordinate system for civilian control of the military protects Hugo Chávez even as it places certain constraints on the anti-American president. Moreover, this form of civilian control matches elements of the U.S. example. Accurate description, or coding, of Venezuela opens an avenue for improved military-to-military relations, which could, in turn, lay the foundation for constructive U.S.-Venezuelan engagement in the Western Hemisphere.
Congressional choices about administrative procedures affect an agency's political responsiveness and the technical accuracy of its decisions. Legislators would like to design procedures so that agencies make technically sound decisions and balance the needs of competing interests in the way intended. In practice, agency procedures designed to promote technical competence often allow for political drift, and those that promote political control provide little new technical information about the consequences of policy decisions. The trade-off between technical competence and political control is captured in a model of a legislative coalition's decision about agency procedures. The choice variables are the agency's expected preferences and independence. Depending on exogenous levels of technical and political uncertainty, optimal agency procedures can maximize technical competence, maximize political control, or achieve a combination of the two.
Scholars have often remarked that Congress neglects its oversight responsibility. We argue that Congress does no such thing: what appears to be a neglect of oversight really is the rational preference for one form of oversight--which we call fire-alarm oversight--over another form--police-patrol oversight. Our analysis supports a somewhat neglected way of looking at the strategies by which legislators seek to achieve their goals.
The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.
All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.
This article draws lessons from a set of innovative programs carried out by a state government in Brazil, now widely acclaimed for excellence in public management. Key to the high performance was strong worker commitment to the job, and what the state did to elicit — a topic of little note in the development literature but of central importance in the literature of industrial performance and workplace transformation in the industrialized countries. The state created an unusual sense of “calling” among the program's workers, new prestige in the communities where they worked, and an informed citizenry that both monitored the workers and trusted them.
In Brazil, an era of military confusion and dissatisfaction that followed the end of the Cold War has largely dissipated since the mid-1990s. Despite scarce federal resources under current economic policies, the Cardoso government has managed to eliminate the most immediate budgetary causes of military unrest. Military authoritarian influence remains, moreover, in areas such as Amazonia. The military's own efforts, the president's moral and economic support, and the legislature's traditional apathy toward relevant issues have fostered a new form of military influence in the Brazilian democracy.
Estudio sobre las fructíferas prácticas realizadas por los gobiernos estatales de Ceará, en el nordeste brasileño, a lo largo de los años 1987-1994, por medio de la creación emergente de puestos de trabajo en el sector público para el desarrollo de programas de salud preventiva, apoyo a la pequeña empresa, obra pública y del sector agrícola.
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