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MEXICO_Protest for a future Report-climate protest on 20-September-2019

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The climate strikes in Mexico. During the Global Week for Future (20-27 September, 2019), Mexico’s most important protest event took place on Friday, 20 September (20S) in Mexico City.
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Mexico
Alice Poma, Tommaso Gravante
31
Background
In Mexico, environmental protests arise mostly in local socio-environmental conflicts. The
defence for the territory encountered by communities or social collectives in face of the
threats posed by megaprojects, the exploitation of natural resources by the agroindustry,
mines, among others, are inserted in a country where activism runs high risks. Environmental
activism is characterised by a high repression by either the institutional police apparatuses or
paramilitary groups employed by corporations and interest groups in order to displace
communities and repress protest. With over 800 socio-environmental conflicts in the past
twelve years,
32
Mexico actually represents one of the most dangerous countries for territory
defenders, with over 15 murders only in 2018.
33
As if that were not enough, protests are
continuously criminalised by the mainstream media.
Despite this high degree of social unease discontent with respect to socio-environmental
issues, there is not a structured ecologist movement in Mexico. The Mexican ecologist
movement emerged and achieved its maximum visibility and cohesion in the late 1980s,
campaigning against Laguna Verde nuclear power station located in the state of Veracruz.
Successively, with the creation of the Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM), the movement
collapsed and the term ecologist” lost legitimacy and fell in disuse to such an extent that
most pro-environmental activists not only do not call themselves ecologists, but also deplore
this term. In addition, the 1990s saw the adoption of neoliberal policies, and the presidents
implementing them would be the first ones in promoting neoliberal environmental policies,
thus institutionalising a series of environmental problems.
Neoliberalism brought with it an increase in local discontent regarding a series of socio-
environmental problems which were confronted only by local groups in the rural and urban
contexts and by farming and/or indigenous communities. These conflicts have been
characterised not only by their local nature, but also for affecting the most vulnerable
populations such as indigenous communities or marginalised neighbourhoods in cities. As a
result, environmental protests in Mexico have been led by popular sectors who are directly
threatened with losing their territory, lifestyle and livelihoods without the support of a
structured ecologist movement that so far has not been able to withstand the impact of the
31
Research in Mexico has been developed by a team coordinated by the authors of this report and members of
the Laboratory for the Analysis of Organizations and Social Movements (LAOMS), led by Dr. Jorge Cadena-Roa,
and UNAM-PAPIIT Project <IA300419> coordinated by Dr. Poma. Database creation and collection was
conducted thanks to the collaboration of Roberto Holguín Carrillo (LAOMS).
32
https://conversingwithgoli.wixsite.com/misitio/datos-y-mapas
33
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/enemies-state/
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Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM), which compared to other parties in the world scene
maintains an unusual centre-right position and is linked to neoliberal interest groups. All of
this goes hand in hand left-wing parties, such as the Democratic Party Revolution (PRD) and
the most recent National Regeneration Party (MORENA, originally founded by Mexico’s
current president López Obrador) which is associated with the Marxist ideology, bearing a
nationalist and developmental discourse, based on the exploitation of fossil fuels rich in
the country. In this landscape it was not possible to develop a national environmental culture.
Consequently, problems such as air pollution, labor mobility, lack of public green spaces, or
in general the effects of the climate crisis in urban areas, if addressed, are subjected to non-
governmental organisations’ campaigns such as Greenpeace. Local government campaigns
such as Mexico City’s, constrain to promoting pro-individual environmental actions such as
household water saving or the use of public transport; yet, they do not guarantee accessible
and safe infrastructure to most people, let alone deal with the main actors responsible for
such environmental problems. On the other hand, rural movements such as Sin maíz no hay
país (WIthout corn, there is no country) address food sovereignty issues while also attending
ecologic dynamics.
Bearing this in mind, the first climate action of the Fridays For Future movement (FFF) held
on 15 March 2019 in Mexico City represented a breakthrough in the scenario of Mexican
contentious politics. In only a few weeks the organisers (most of whom are university
students) accomplished to gather a thousand youth and adults to march together to the
Monument of Revolution. In spite of the organisers’ satisfaction at this first achievement, it
became evident that in Mexico these actions did not enjoy the same congregation than in
other cities around the world. Furthermore, conspicuously absent was the collective
participation of high school students and Mexico City’s major public university students as
leading actors in this new wave of climate activism.
Irrespective of the number of participants, the 15 March strike together with the 14 May
strike where approximately 1,400 people participated, launched FFF to the national public
scene on the one hand, and on the other, served to gather round this young movement the
most experienced organisations and groups already present in Mexican territory, such as
System Change, not Climate Change! Mexico, Greenpeace, and the Mexican Alliance against
Fracking, in addition to the collaboration with the recently formed climate movement,
Extinction Rebellion Mexico (XR). Also, other FFF and XR groups were formed in other cities
across the country.
So far, it can be argued that this new wave of climate movements may be an opportunity to
reactivate ecologism in Mexico, eventually paving the way to a generational turnaround that
only a few months ago was inconceivable.
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The climate strikes in Mexico
During the Global Week for Future (20-27 September, 2019), Mexico’s most important
protest event took place on Friday, 20 September (20S) in Mexico City.
The strike’s start point was the Angel of Independence roundabout. At mid-morning, this
monument was the meeting point for youth, children and parents, and adults. A little after 2
pm, protesters began to move and organised in different contingents, although most strikers
marched on their own or in small groups, exactly as they had arrived at the strike. It is
estimated that around 6,000 people attended this strike, which lasted four hours marching
along Paseo de la Reforma Avenue to turn at the Palace of Fine Arts into 5 de Mayo Street
towards Mexico City’s main square, the event’s end point. Around 6 pm, a tropical storm
interrupted the polls conducted by the organisers, where in addition to FFF Mexico, activists
of socio-environmental conflicts in Mexico City and rural areas and other organisations also
participated.
Most banners held by the participants were made of recycled cardboard and hand-painted.
Some of the most prominent mottos were: “We want to breathe”, “There’s no planet B”, “We
only have one planet. Let’s care for it!”, “Climate emergency now!, and “If climate is changing,
why aren’t we?.” As a plus, collectives in defence of the territory participated with slogans
such as “No to fracking”, “No more budget to gas and oil”, “Water is life and life is defended”,
among others.
In addition to the main strike of 20S in Mexico City, 69 protest events were recorded across
the country during the Global for Future Week from 20 to 27 September. Along with asking
the government to declare the climate emergency FFF’s main demand in these locations
protesters included local demands against large undesired works such as the thermal power
station in the state of Morelos, the Dos Bocas refinery in the state of Veracruz, the wind power
stations in the state of Oaxaca, and the mining corporations’ projects spread across the
Mexican territory.
1. Who participated?
34
Most participants in the 20S strike were youth. 58.83% of the participants surveyed (data
confirmed by participant observation), were young people between 20 and 35 years old
(Figure 1). In contrast, younger protesters between 15 and 19 years old represented a
mere 14.38%. This figure differs from the rest of countries where the mean in the younger
34
Technical information: In Mexico City, we handed out 450 flyers and completed 450 face-to-face (F2F)
interviews. 38 online surveys were collected, which means we had a response rate of 38/450=8%. Given the very
low response rates, comparing these results with face-to-face data is essential to test data representativeness.
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group under 19 years old has been around 45%.
35
Despite this difference that may be
attributed to both the differences in education systems and insecurity that characterises
Mexico, 75.01% of participants are under 36 years old, which confirms young people’s interest
in the climate crisis.
On the contrary, the “productive” segment of the population only accounts for 22.80% of
strikers, coinciding with the rest of countries where the climate crisis is not perceived by adult
workers as threatening enough to join the strike and engage in this type of events. Another
noteworthy factor is labour conditions, which are extremely different between Mexican
workers and workers abroad. Finally, as experienced in the other countries, the involvement
of retired people was remarkably poor.
Figure 1: Youth and adults in the demonstrations (N=450)
With relation to gender distribution, it seems that the actions promoted by FFF involve more
women (64.02%) than men (35.53%) (Figure 2). This confirms the results in the rest of climate
strikes where young women have developed a profile as leaders of the movement.
35
In order to conduct a comparison consistent with the report of prior demonstrations in the rest of countries
involved in the project, we have maintained the same age range; although it is worth mentioning that in Mexico
there are substantial differences in the education system, labour conditions and pensions.
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Figure 2: Gender distribution (N=450)
Figure 3: Rate of students in Mexico
(N=450)
This brief analysis is followed by further discussion on the profile of interest in this paper:
youths.
Only 51.21% of young participants were students (Figure 3). This figure shows another
difference between Mexico and the rest of countries that participated in the project, where
virtually there is a correlation between youth and students. Most students were taking a
major and only 15.22% were in high school (Figure 4). These data reverse in the other
countries, confirming an international presence of very young students in FFF (higher or lower
secondary school).
Figure 4: Distribution of students in Mexico
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In Mexico, the climate movement of the 20S strike substantially comprised university
students pursuing an undergraduate degree. Gender student distribution reports a majority
of women (Figure 5). This information confirms the female presence in this new wave of
climate activism.
Figure: Gender distribution of students (N=450)
2. Prior experiences of political participation and formally organised activities
The 20S strike was characterised by a significant component of first-time participants (first
timers), and overall, participants who did not have any background of having participated in
protest activities. While this may not be surprising considering younger participants and their
minor political experience, it is really interesting to prove this is also the case of adults (over
36 years old), who do not have a high participation in protest events (Figure 6). This might
well be related to the fact that adults belong to a middle-high class that is usually absent in
the Mexican political contest, characterised by a higher participation of lower social classes.
Figure 6: Previous demonstration participation (ever)
The lack of prior political experience is reflected in the participants’ political behaviour for the
past 12 months (Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Participant’s political behaviour
Youths show a more active behaviour in comparison to adults, especially when assuming a
pro-environmental behaviour such as changing their diets (53.57%), saving energy (57.14%),
reusing products like plastic bottles (64.29%), or purchasing or boycotting certain products,
which reveals a link between environmental practices and values.
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Youths political participation in the past 12 months prior to the strike displayed an increase
in terms of individual pro-environmental practices; yet, political participation in the public
sphere, for example, seeking to contact political representatives, is rather insignificant. This
pattern also matches data from the rest of countries, indicating that new generations strongly
tend to distrust and lack representation at public institutions in addition to having little or no
participation in associations of various kinds. None of the survey respondents have
approached a political party for the past 12 months, furthermore, hardly 40% of participants
have declared to be active members of an environmental organisation over the same span
(Figure 8).
Figure 8: Engagement in an environmental organisation (for the past 12 months)
No survey respondent claimed to have participated in a political party or youth organisation
for the past 12 months; not surprisingly, however, adults evince a higher interest in politics
(Figure 9), although this figure is lower than the mean results of other countries engaged in
the survey.
Figure 9: Interest in politics
As to when strikers decided to participate in the 20S strike, it is interesting to see that there
is a similar trend in ‘over a month ago’ (24.21%) and ‘a few days ago’ (22.65%) responses
given by youths, whereas most adult participants made such a decision over a month prior to
the strike (Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Decision to participate in the 20S strike
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3. Why did they protest?
Overall, respondents have expressed various motivations to participate in the strike called by
FFF. Having a pre-selected number of motivations available, most participants (around 80%
on average) totally agreed with participating in the strike to “express solidarity”, sensitise
the public” and “push politicians to make things change” (Figure 10). It is interesting to see
how in Mexico between the two main motivations, first comes solidarity towards the
worldwide FFF movement, and second, the possibility of sensitising the public opinion. The
response claiming that the strike seeks to push politicians, a motivation that in the rest of
countries is ranked first comes in third place in Mexico, which proves to what extent
Mexican political institutions are not trusted.
Another contrastive figure between Mexico and the rest of countries is the motivation of
feeling morally compelled (“because I felt morally obliged to do so”), usually ranked in the
first places in countries such as Sweden. In our country, moral obligation is one of the lowest
motivations. With regard to “defending my interests”, it appeared to be one of the lowest
motivations as well, as occurred in the rest of countries involved in the project.
Figure 10: Motivations to participate in the 20S strike
While participants in general were not invited to participate in the 20S strike, it is worth noting
that around 60% of them requested another person to participate (Figure 11). This aspect is
of great importance as a factor for participation and commitment since supporting a cause
only by participating in a demonstration is substantially different from publicly and openly
asking others to participate in something you support.
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Figures 11: Interpersonal recruitment, % being asked and % asking others to participate
4. Emotions and the Greta effect
If we look at other motivational aspects such as the emotional dimension, it can be observed
that the main emotions related to climate change felt by Mexican protesters, especially youth,
are: worry, frustration and anxiety. In contrast with other research showing that in the Global
South a central emotion related to climate change is rage
36
, in Mexico concern comes first,
followed by frustration, anxiety and helplessness. Anger and fear are listed among the last
emotions. Although despair is not among the first choices, it maintains important values in
the “very much” response. As shown in Figure 12, there are significant differences between
youth and adults; however, both groups claim to feel moderately helplessness, angry and
fearful with relation to climate change.
In the F2F surveys, we decided to slightly modify the original survey by inserting a series of
questions regarding the emotional dimension. The 450 responses obtained during the 20S
strike provide a broader landscape, particularly in terms of the role of some mobilising
emotions (Figure 13)
37
. By comparing the two databases, it can be observed that in addition
to being an emotion linked to “thinking about climate change”, worry is also one of the main
mobilising emotions, although hope comes first in our F2F survey. These data confirm that,
also in Mexico, worry, without fear but together with hope, mobilises
38
, and that this new
wave of climate movements is perceived as a driving force for change. This brings hope, an
emotion that in other movements has been linked to processes such as empowerment
39
,
although this is yet to be confirmed in terms of the FFF movement.
36
Jochen Kleres and Åsa Wettergren (2017). “Fear, hope, anger, and guilt in climate activism”. Social Movement
Studies, 16(5), 507-519.
37
One of the questions we made was, “What emotions motivated you to be here today?”
38
Smith, N. and Leiserowitz, A. (2014). “The Role of Emotion in Global Warming Policy Support and Opposition”.
Society for Risk Analysis, 34(5), 937-948. doi:10.1111/risa.12140
39
Poma, A., and Gravante, T. (2019). “Nunca seremos las mismas de antes. Emociones y empoderamiento
colectivo en los movimientos sociales: el Colectivo Mujer Nueva (Oaxaca, Mexico)”. Desafíos, 31(2), 231-265.
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


170
Figure 12: Emotions and climate change
Figure 13: Mobilising emotions in 20S (N=450)
One of the survey’s goal was to observe Greta Thunberg’s impact on strikers. Charts in Figure
14 illustrate how a large proportion of participants agree that Greta Thunberg prompted both
the decision to participate in the strike and climate change to become a topic of interest.
None of the survey respondents answered, “I don’t know who Greta Thunberg is”, indicating
they know about the dynamics and leaders that characterise this new wave of climate
movements.
If we observe the same data in terms of age groups (Figure 15), we can see that concerning
Greta’s impact on the decision to participate in the strike, there is a similar distribution
between youth and adults, but in youth’s responses the percentage is almost consistent,
which consequently shows that, relatively speaking, Greta’s impact was more decisive for
adults in order to participate in the strike, whereas her impact on becoming more interested
in climate change issues is more evident in youth.













































171
Figure 14: Greta Thunberg’s impact
Figure 15: Greta Thunberg’s impact according to age groups
5. What do they want and who should do it?
The main demand of the Mexican FFF movement in the 20S strike was for the government to
declare a climate emergency in Mexico (98%), although 60% do not expect the current
government will accept this initiative. In line with this, protesters expressed their distrust in
the government and other political institutions. As far as Mexico is concerned, it can be
asserted that the perception of the government not declaring a climate emergency is
associated with the manner in which the current government is addressing the series of
environmental problems in the country. Promoting various controversial projects such as a
new refinery or the Maya train in southeastern Mexico as well as some thermal power
stations across the country reinforces the trend towards a Mexican developmental economic
model still betting on fossil fuels.





























 






































172
Figure 15: Importance of climate emergency
in Mexico (N=450)
Figure 16: Declaration of a climate
emergency (N=450)
With relation to supporting different solutions to the climate change issue, Mexican
protesters are inclined to changes essentially promoted by the political sphere, although
strong consensus highlights the importance of individual changes (Figure 17.1). Also relevant
is the significance that strikers give to environmental protection (over 90%) to the detriment
of any eventual economic growth. This position runs entirely contrary to the economic growth
measures promoted by the current Mexican government, as mentioned above. This sheds
light on why 50% of respondents said they did not agree at all with the statement claiming,
“Governments can be trusted to resolve our environmental problems”.


 

 






 







173
Figure 17.1: Solutions to climate change
While there is little trust in the government to deal with environmental problems (although
it must address these, according to survey respondents), there is even a higher level of
distrust in corporations and the market as actors capable of resolving socio-environmental
problems (Figure 17.2).
Figure 17.2
  
 
























 
  








174
To Mexican protesters, health and in general social wellbeingdoes not represent a
priority. When enquired about this, the opinion of survey respondents is distributed in all the
options without a clear trend from one another (Figure 17.3). Contrastively, there is a high
level of agreement on trusting in modern science to tackle our environmental problems
(almost 90%).
Figure 17.3
Relevant differences among age groups in this type of topics addressed in the survey were
not observed.
Finally, with respect to trusting in decision-making institutions so as to implement climate
change-related policies, the trend suggests protesters are highly confident (over 60%) in
universities and environmental organisations. On the contrary, there is profound distrust
(around 60%) in local and national institutions such as the federal government, the city’s
government, the police, the congress, and political parties not to mention the conventional
media. Supranational organisations such as the United Nations are regarded as moderately
to poorly trusted institutions. Age groups do not reveal significant changes in the
respondents’ opinions.
The negative viewpoint that participants have expressed of the government once more
reveals their distrust in institutions (Figure 18.1).
  
  











175
Figure 18.1: Democracy score in Mexico (N=450)
Over 60% of respondents (N=450) disapprove of the current government. Observing the
variation of responses in terms of age groups (Figure 18.2), it is adults who give a more
positive opinion whereas as seen in data shown before youths maintain a distant and
negative political stance.










 


 







176
Figure 18.2: Democracy score in Mexico (N=450)
In conclusion, it can be asserted that the climate movement that expressed itself during the
20S strike comprises university students (mainly undergraduate), with a prominent presence
of women, all of whom have very little previous political experience.
These youth are willing to make changes in their life by adopting pro-environmental
behaviours, although they consider the government must be the main actor promoting
solutions to the on-going climate crisis. Despite this, there is no trust in the country’s
democratic institutions, political parties, corporations and market. Greater trust is given to
universities in conjunction with environmentalist organisations as agents of change.
These young people are filled with worry about their future, an emotion that, together with
hope for change, represents one of the major mobilising emotions. These youth have a strong
perception of climate change in comparison with Mexican adults and consider environmental
protection as a priority to the detriment of economic growth, which proves there is a close
relation between values and political commitment.




 
 
 
 
 









 

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