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‘Propaganda Fights’ and ‘Disinformation Campaigns’: the discourse on information warfare in Russia-West relations
Abstract
This article scrutinises the role of discourses on the manipulative use of information for Russia–West relations. Debates on so-called information warfare have gained prevalence both in the West and in Russia. Applying a poststructuralist framework, the comparative analysis discusses how these discourses work, respectively, how they interact, and what this interaction implies for Russia–West relations. While the contemporary discourses facilitate a confrontational stance of both Russia and the West towards the respective Other, it is argued, first, that these dispositions are malleable. On the long run, Russia–West relations are thus not condemned to remain hostile. Secondly, both sides still speak to some extent the same language. However, if the current cooldown prevails, this common discursive ground may fade and give way to more fundamental confrontational stances. Finally, by revealing each other's contingency, discourses in both countries make it appear less natural which interpretation is ‘true’ or ‘right’.
... More than that, the given research issue is, on the one hand, a matter of contention in East-West relations (Wesolowsky, 2022), while, on the other hand, a problem in EU-Serbia relations as well, up to the point of some voices in the EU Parliament calling for the suspension of accession talks with Belgrade (Radosavljević, 2022). It is important to note that (Russian) propaganda, and not only in the European context, has indeed been treated in academic literature so far (see, among others, Gregor and Mlejnková, 2021;Baumann, 2020;Pomerantsev, 2019;Van Herpen, 2015) with these publications not addressing the conflict in Ukraine, covering the period before the start of the Russian invasion. It is on these and related publications, as will be argued in the following sections in more detail, that this volume draws on by communicating with, developing arguments that help uncover, and shedding light on the many faces of Russian propaganda in Serbia. ...
... This is also discussed in an edited volume by Baines, O'Shaughnessy, and Snow (2022). • The issue of differing discourses with respect to information manipulation in the East-West standoff before the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Baumann, 2020;Shekhovtsov, 2023). • The effectiveness of the Russian propaganda and its anti-Western narratives (Gerber and Zavisca, 2016). ...
... (Ikodinović, 2022e) This is where the fundamentals of the discourses on Russia as the power for good get recycled, shifting the blame for the conflict to both the West and Ukraine, for both actors have engaged in activities deemed as terrorist, targeting the civilian population. The image of Russia created herein is exactly the opposite to the ones offered in the Western discourses that approach the Russian state as a rogue state, engaged, among other things, in war crimes and sponsoring terrorism 22 (see, for instance, Baumann, 2020). ...
The Many Faces of the Contemporary Russian Propaganda in the Balkans: Sputnik Srbija analyzes information published by the news website Sputnik Srbija during the first year of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This book provides an overview of the contemporary Serbian media sphere and the dire conditions that Serbian journalists face to explore how Russian propaganda has flourished in the region. This volume establishes a framework to understand the ideological core of Russian propaganda that, above all, aims to reconstruct societal reality through anti-Western rhetoric. This framework helps to explore the relationship between Russian propaganda and Serbian nationalism, expanding on the significance of their mutual ties and confronting the implications of their close-knit connections.
... Over the past several centuries, Russian politics and culture have been in a 'tug of war' between Westernising or Europhile tendencies and anti-Westernising or Eurosceptic tendencies (Kaempf 2010;Korosteleva and Paikin 2021). While, in the Russian narrative, the West is frequently depicted as an offensive opponent (Baumann 2020), the Western 'other', on the other hand, has also played an important role as a prism through which to build a self-understanding of what Russia is. As such, the question of Russian identity has been caught up in its relationship with the West (Kaempf 2010). ...
... The perception of such a division between East and West has had consequences insofar as migrants are hopeful that they have been able to influence perceptions. Because the West is frequently depicted as an offensive immoral opponent (Baumann 2020), then ideas, values and information transmitted from Finland may also be rejected. According to the interviewees, the association of the European lifestylewith its disapproved-of liberal values in particularcan lead to the rejection of social remittances from migrants. ...
... Since the onset of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, multiple studies show how mainstream media disseminates narratives favoring the Kremlin's agenda with dissenting voices almost absent (e.g. Grigor and Pantti, 2021;Khaldarova, 2021;Khaldarova and Pantti, 2016;Oates, 2016) and how Russian media narratives win over public opinion despite the fact that the media environment does not create well-informed citizenry inside Russia (Hoskins and Shchelin, 2018;Szostek, 2016). 2 The narratives crafted by Russian political elites, imbued with historical myths, portraying Russia as a great power, and emphasizing the significance of strong leadership in preventing times of turmoil, especially during Vladimir Putin's tenure, and disseminated through state-owned media, have influenced Russia's foreign policy standing and its relations with the West (Baumann, 2020;Claessen, 2021;. Returning to Anderson's (1998) concept of 'imagined communities' -the idea that individuals within a nation may share common ideals and opinions through shared narratives, despite lacking personal connections -narratives disseminated through various channels play a pivotal role in shaping Russian identity (Hinck et al., 2018;Szostek, 2017). ...
... The Russian elite reframe Russia's role in conflict against Western policies to bolster national unity and inform foreign policy (Claessen, 2021;. Such media narratives exploit anti-Western sentiments, historically leveraged in Russia's domestic politics (Shiraev and Zubok, 2000), and may exacerbate West-Russia tensions (Baumann, 2020). The elites could use this strategy to advance Russia's regional and global ambitions. ...
This article scrutinizes Russian state-run TV narratives over critical junctures-before the 2013 Euromaidan protests, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the periods leading up to and following the 2022 invasion-to illuminate how political agendas, historical narratives, and public perception intersect. The authors reveal the Russian political elite's strategic shaping of narratives, influencing collective memory and swaying public opinion on the Ukraine crisis. The significance of the conflict narrative and Russia's position is underscored, as reflected in the evolving structure of news broadcasts. The image of Russian leaders as capable and reliable is amplified during conflicts, while Ukrainian counterparts are persistently portrayed negatively. The media constructs an identity narrative that elevates Russian leaders and disparages Western counterparts post-crisis, mirroring geopolitical tensions. The framing of Ukraine's narrative with WWII terminology is analyzed, highlighting attempts to deflect blame onto the West. This comprehensive study elucidates the subtle complexities of media narratives and their pivotal role in geopolitics and international relations.
... Chernobrov and Briant (2022) demonstrate that following the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014 and Russia's attempts to meddle with the 2016 US election, Russian and American international broadcasters RT and RFE/RL adopted identical approaches blaming each other for strategically spreading disinformation to distort the truth and antagonise domestic politics in respective countries. Baumann (2020) demonstrates the same interactive process of mutual adoption between Russian and German newspapers. ...
... However, being 'an extreme case' (Flyvbjerg, 2011), Putin's regime's use of disinformation discourse can help us better understand the potential of this propaganda tool. In addition, as the U.S. and a number of European democracies followed suit, mirroring this strategy (Baumann, 2020;Chernobrov & Briant, 2022), this choice of the case makes the results relevant for states at conflict in a new, saturated media environment beyond the conceptual boundaries of democracy and autocracy. ...
Following the rise of disinformation spread via social media, references to disinformation have also become a ubiquitous feature of elite discourse. From Donald Trump to Viktor Orbán, populist leaders across the world have been relying on accusations of spreading disinformation to discredit political rivals. Authoritarian leaders worldwide have adopted the same rhetoric. To explore the effect of disinformation discourse on citizens’ perceptions of news in an authoritarian environment, this study focuses on Russia in the context of the invasion of Ukraine, an example of a regime which turned disinformation discourse into a prominent propaganda strategy. We argue that disinformation discourse represents an effective response to the threat posed by contemporary saturated media environments to authoritarian rule. While it is impossible to isolate citizens from alternative information in saturated media environments, disinformation discourse allows the autocrat to respond to this challenge by pre-emptively debunking narratives that challenge the regime. To demonstrate this process, we present the findings of a pre-registered online experiment conducted in Russia (N=2,949). We expose all subjects to war-related or economy-related news stories with pro-regime or anti-regime framing. Subjects in treatment groups are additionally exposed to matching debunking claims with pro-regime or anti-regime framing containing disinformation discourse. In line with our pre-registered expectations, we find that disinformation discourse allows regime propaganda to undermine the credibility of discredited information and confuse citizens, preventing them from attributing responsibility for the regime’s policies. Against our pre-registered expectations, we also discover the backfiring effect of anti-regime messaging which shifts subjects’ attitudes in the opposite direction with regards to its intended effect and in line with pro-regime propaganda. The results contribute to the research on authoritarian propaganda in new saturated media environments, but also the instrumentalisation of disinformation discourse in democracies. In addition, the findings have important policy implications and highlight potential unintended consequences of counter-disinformation campaigns.
... Thus, gaining the opportunity to influence Warsaw's political decision-making process allows influencing Brussels and Washington's foreign policy, leading to mutual animosities or the non-conflicting pursuit of specific interests. In the pessimistic variant, taking control of Warsaw would significantly weaken American influence in this part of Europe and guarantee the possibility of a strong influence on Brussels' internal decision-making process (Baumann 2020;Götz 2016;Götz 2017). ...
... It should be added that the model of informational influence by evoking and increasing extreme (most often negative) emotional states is a tool of psychological influence that has been used continuously and improved for decades and has been Radosław Bielawski,Marcin Górnikiewicz,Mieczysław Magierski,Mariusz Kubiak,Olga Niewiada 31 used first by Soviet and later Russian information centers (Baumann, 2020;Hejlová and Klimeš, 2019;Myers, 2015). There were many scientific centers in the Soviet Union improving so-called social control engineering to evoke and direct social moods and, if necessary, the behavior of crowds (Monica, Nicolae, and Breban, 2010). ...
... the manipulation of public opinion is a constant among the main strategies of the participants in each conflict and their allies globally promoting their particular self-interested discourses (lewandowsky et al., 2013;Marquis, 1978), and in recent and ongoing war conflicts it has diversified to all media, and especially with the use of technologies and social media particulares (chesney & citron, 2019; Zannettou et al., 2019). Both at the local level, to promote nationalist ideas and patriotism (Weiss & Dafoe, 2019;Zhao, 1998), and in specific situations of conflict between global powers or territorial disputes and interventions (Western, 2005) wars are, wars are also information wars (Baumann, 2020). ...
In this research, we deal with the use and effects for press news around images provided by unmanned aerial systems in conflict environments and, in particular, with the verification work that has been carried out to determine their validity, or in broad terms, their ‘objectivity’ and relationship with ‘reality’. To this end, we selected a sample of verification reports that detected and analyzed the dissemination of false images in the press recorded or related by drones in order to characterize the type of manipulation that has been carried out in the pictures and the procedures of detection used. We conclude that the use of this technology is becoming a perceived threat to public opinion because of its notoriety in the news, which currently focuses mainly on its use in military conflicts, overshadowing its usefulness for civilian and peaceful purposes.
... Wspólnie te dwa czynniki tworzą imperatyw rosyjskiego myślenia elit, jak i rosyjskiego społeczeństwa. Manipulacja informacją w relacjach Rosja-Zachód oraz Rosja-państwa globalnego Południa stała się częścią wojny informacyjnej mającej na celu dezawuować rosyjskich przeciwników oraz posługiwać się kłamstwem w przypadku własnych działań (Baumann, 2020). Ponadto Rosja chciała wpływać na opinię publiczną w państwach Zachodu poprzez wzmacnianie istniejących w nich podziałów politycznych i kulturowych oraz podsycanie niezadowolenia, a także strachu. ...
The second phase of Russia's war against Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022, prompts us to take up the issues of "lessons learned" for NATO, as an alliance, and for the Member States in the context of ensuring collective defense and preparing armed forces for it. In addition, to verify the ways of generating readiness of the societies of the broadly defined West, with the participation of South Korea and Japan, to confront the challenges related to the efforts of the Russian Federation and China to revise the existing international security architecture, and to adapt NATO to new conditions. It concerns the fundamental conclusions from strategic, operational and tactical activities related to the use by the Russian Federation of its armed forces as a tool of policy against Ukraine and the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. The aim of the study is to analyze strategic, operational and tactical activities in terms of the identified solutions that the parties to the war have carried out and implemented against each other, indicating those that should potentially be adapted by NATO.
... As outlined above, all types of information disorders are complex, thus having the potential to generate equally complex effects. While we are entering an era of "information warfare" (Baumann 2020;Guadagno & Guttieri 2021), in which digital media platforms have become "weapons" and started to run complex disinformation campaigns, the impact of disinformation, created and spread with the intention to cause harm, should be carefully considered because it can be devastating for every aspect of life (Kapantai et al. 2021). In this context, the aim of this section is to shed light on the important consequences of disinformation at both individual and societal levels. ...
This chapter provides an overview of the main information disorders within the current media landscape. It explores concepts such as disinformation, misinformation and “fake news”. Then, it examines the individual-level impact of exposure to various information disorders on political attitudes such as (in)efficacy, alienation and political cynicism. Furthermore, it discusses potential societal implications of information disorders in the erosion of trust in the media, the emergence of a poorly informed citizenry, the election outcomes and being a threat to democracy as a whole. Buturoiu, Corbu and Boţan pay specific attention to the study of COVID-19-related information disorders. Finally, the authors discuss potential solutions to combat disinformation, at both the national and European level.
... In this regard, since the Cold War, Russia has been identified as one of the main agents in the use of disinformation campaigns, both internally and externally (Scott 2022;Yablokov 2022;Treyger et al. 2022). Between Russia and Ukraine, the discourse around information warfare has increased since 2014, with the war in Donbass, namely through the use of disinformation as a weapon by Russia to shape political outcomes and to encourage military mobilisations (Treyger et al. 2022;Baumann 2020). ...
The beginning of the war in Ukraine generated a wave of disinformation in Europe. Our research intends to cognise the reaction of disinformation agents to the outbreak of war, analysing publications checked by Iberian fact-checkers during the first ten days of the conflict. Specifically, we used Voyant Tools online software to perform a quantitative textual analysis, which allowed us to survey the most relevant topics, formats for spreading disinformation and media platforms. We also analysed the presence of political leaders, countries and military terminologies. Our findings indicate that video is the most common format to disseminate disinformation content, namely, to illustrate war scenarios. In addition, our research also showed that online video platforms, especially YouTube, are closer to terms that portray military actions. This may have implications for fostering a warmongering feeling. Finally, we found that the fake content checked was mostly favourable to Ukraine, which raises new poignant arguments for the contemporary debate about disinformation in war.
... It is closely linked to the "Russian hybrid warfare" narrative (Daniel and Eberle 2021), giving the impression that it is spread by organized armies of Russian-paid "trolls" with the aim of dismantling the Czech democracy from within. In this way, "disinformation" associates a mythical battle between the West and the East, the "Elves" (as the Czech fact-checkers call themselves) and the "Trolls", between democracy and autocracy, order and disorder, truth and lies, reason and irrationality (Baumann 2020). This gives particular weight to all the disinformation charges. ...
The paper argues that one of the reasons the suppression of scientific dissent during the Covid pandemic has been so severe was because the dominant scientific Covid narrative has been turned into a political myth, i.e. a narrative mobilizing groups in support of key moral values. Taking the example of Covid vaccination, I show the key values with which it became linked in Czechia. Questioning vaccination came to be seen as endangering these values, which made scientific dissent appear as particularly dangerous. I further analyse how this schematic discourse dealt with “free-vax” scientists, who were not against Covid vaccination as such but only against its blanket application. I show that their discreditation was mainly carried out by various fact-checking NGOs or social media influencers, who attempted to delegitimize them not by scientific arguments but rather by associating them with more dubious groups of social actors, or labelling their views as “disinformation”. This discrediting strategy was largely successful, but it also had some undesirable social and political backfire effects, in that it pushed some of the free-vaxxers out of the liberal democratic mainstream and forced them to seek alliance with more anti-systemic segments of the population in attempts at political resistance.
... De hecho, una de las claves de la desinformación en política internacional, según Baumann (2020), son los discursos antagónicos que difuminan el valor objetivo, siendo cada vez menos natural discernir entre correcto/incorrecto y verdadero/falso (p. 303). ...
Since the September 11 attacks, security issues have been embedded in the media routines of the world's mainstream media reporting on international affairs. This way of dealing with, managing and exposing information to the public is easily visible when the media report on the development of armed conflicts. In other words, several authors argue that there is a phenomenon of media securitization. Likewise, no one doubts that the information dimension of war conflicts has played an important role in their evolution. However, if we go to the specialized literature, we find two well-differentiated approaches. On the one hand, research framed within political communication, with a strong empirical component, which address issues such as the dehumanization of victims, the demonization of political leaders or the concordance between media discourses. And, on the other hand, works of international relations and strategic studies that pose information as a strategic entity on which one of the pillars of the relative power of state and non-state actors is based. However, it is still necessary to develop more applied studies with multidisciplinary theoretical frameworks in which both research areas converge. Therefore, the general objective of this doctoral thesis is to analyze whether this securitization process is also present within the Spanish media system. Specifically, this research aims to: (i) study and compare the incidence of security and human drama frames in reference newspapers in Spain; (ii) compare the use of frames in the media with different editorial lines and divergent ideological currents to clarify whether the ideology of the medium is a determining variable; (iii) explore whether the media securitization process is also identifiable within the so-called new media (specifically Twitter and YouTube); (iv) compare traditional media coverage with alternative media. The selected case studies represent some of the armed conflicts that have attracted the most media attention in the Spanish press in recent years: The civil conflict in Yemen (2015-2019), the war in the Donbass (2015-2019), the dynamics of violence within the Palestinian- Israeli conflict (2000-2019), the war in Syria (2011-2020), the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan (2015-2020), the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno- Karabakh (2020) and the Libyan conflict (2018-2020). To achieve the different specific objectives and hypotheses, a multidisciplinary theoretical framework has been designed based on the postulates of framing theories (political communication) and the premises of the Copenhagen School (international relations). Regarding the methodological design, automated processing models have been used, specifically the supervised model SVM (Vector Support Machines) and the unsupervised model LDA (Latent Dirichlet Allocation). In short, techniques of the socalled Natural Language Processing. This doctoral thesis aims, in turn, to incorporate the use of computational science into the studies of media and conflicts, that are giving such good results in other areas of the social sciences. The main findings indicate that the security frame is predominant within the media routines of the Spanish media; leaving the news that refers to humanitarian issues in a very secondary place. Therefore, we can establish that the Spanish press has undergone a process of securitization when it reports on war. Likewise, it has been detected that the editorial line of the medium is not a determining variable in any case study except in the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Also, it is evident how this securitization is rooted within other communication channels (YouTube and Twitter) and how the use of frames allows to establish if there is an unconventional behavior. This last aspect has made it possible to detect how certain media (foreign public property) do not follow the classic media routines of what is known as traditional media.
... The goal here is to channel all national energies including those of academic institutions, military and private players to fasten the country's military modernisation as well as economic growth (Pecotic, 2019). In the military sphere, AI is central to the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) 'intelligentization doctrine' (Bassler & Noon, 2022). This accords for the technology an important role in helping commanders with strategic decision-making through analysing volumes of data including satellite imagery and GPS locations of troops that they are expected to manoeuvre. ...
The fast-paced diffusion of technologies broadly falling under the umbrella of artificial intelligence (AI) is said to be shaping the emerging world order in international relations (IR). It is expected that the global AI race will pave the way for another rise and fall of great powers in the international system, similar to the impact caused by the three industrial revolutions of the past. The literature in IR identifies three major powers – namely, the United States of America (USA), China, and Russia, as the leading contenders in this AI race. The ongoing AI-enabled fourth industrial revolution is all the more unique due to the markedly different approaches these three powers have adopted for integrating AI into their military, political, and socio-economic spheres. The AI strategies of these countries further reflect their capabilities and intentions towards how they plan on employing the technology to elevate their prestige and power status in the international system. This paper draws from a historiography of the First, Second, and Third Industrial Revolutions to study how technological innovations have altered relative power capabilities of nations, triggering a re-ordering of power hierarchies at a systemic level. Drawing from this understanding, it analyses the nature of AI as an emerging technology and assesses whether it can cause systemic alterations. It critically examines and compares the AI strategies of the USA, China, and Russia as leading contenders in the global AI race and outlines their strengths and weaknesses. It further draws from the Adoption Capacity Theory to argue that the AI race may well be determined by the relative capacity of the major institutions in each of these countries to manage and adapt to the disruptions this technology is bound to bring to the fore.
... While this contestation had supposedly ended with the Cold War in the 1990s, its discursive legacies endure. In the past decade, some Western analysts have ushered in a "new" Cold War, while research and policy debates have grappled with concerns about Russian "influence operations," and "information warfare" (Baumann 2020). Scholars have also noted an escalation in this confrontation since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. ...
Two months after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Ukraine’s government launched a major nation-branding initiative, which has come to be known as the Brave Campaign. This is, arguably, the first instance of a state using brand communication as a strategic tool in a war. The campaign also marks a significant departure from Ukraine’s previous nation-branding messages. Drawing on critical discourse theory, this essay considers why this change in messaging strategies was possible and what it signals about the larger geopolitical and ideological context within which the Russia–Ukraine war is being fought. The essay concludes by posing a set of new questions for future research on public diplomacy and nation branding, prompted by the events of this war.
... It produces frequent analyses on the disinformation strategies and messages that Russia promotes both within the EU member states and within its own borders or the post-Soviet space more broadly. Even though the East Stratcom Task Force explicitly states that the EUvsDisinfo database does not represent official EU positions, it is widely seen to reflect different perspectives held by EU actors (Baumann 2020). Moreover, it is aimed primarily at empowering individuals in Russia and the post-Soviet space to identify and become immune to the Kremlin's disinformation strategy. ...
The literature on relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia has proliferated during the last decade. However, little attention has been afforded to the role of public diplomacy (PD). Studies have generally focused on the gradual breakdown of the relationship between the two international actors in the background of the Ukraine crisis, but also on Russia’s gradual disenchantment with the Western-led liberal world order. The underlying assumption has been that Russia and the EU have gradually become engaged in a dialogue of the deaf, where PD does not serve a meaningful role, if any. With the breakdown of the current EU-Russia relations, the emphasis on cooperation is rather muted, which opens the space for questioning the role of PD in this dynamic. In this context, the article analyses the way in which EU PD (directed towards Russia) represents and perpetuates the conflict and cooperation dichotomy. It finds that, developed primarily from a monological perspective, the EU’s PD framing is rather ineffective in addressing in appealing to the Russian general public or changing the Kremlin’s behaviour.
... In recent years, awareness of Russian disinformation activities and disinformation efforts has been growing both in the West and in Central and Eastern Europe (Baumann, 2020;Kuczy nska-Zonik & Tatarenko, 2019). Russian disinformation is considered to have achieved some success even in the most developed western countries, where it is presumed to have interfered in the election campaign in the USA (Golovchenko et al., 2020), harassed and impeded independent investigations in Western Europe (Aro, 2016), sought to impair public support for Western assistance to former Soviet countries (Richey, 2018), and significantly affected the election campaign in France (Makhashvili, 2017). ...
The present study embarks on a scientific quantitative assessment of Russian disinformation effects in Baltic States. A cross-sectional survey and the partial least squares structural equation modeling were employed as research tools. It was found that Russian disinformation is aimed at increasing the perceived distrust of governments, perceived lack of career possibilities , perceived lack of justice, and perceived imminence of military actions in the region. These are also echoed in the decrease in citizens' incentives for investment activities. The largest of the Baltic States, Lithuania, served as an empirical basis for the research.
... The first group of studies deals with the Russian disinformation campaigns in Western countries during elections (Alandete, 2017;Bastos & Mercea, 2017;Bessi & Ferrara, 2016;Grassegger & Krogerus, 2017;. The second group of studies deals with the Russian-West conflict, particularly the Russian-Ukraine conflict (Baumann, 2020;Frolova, 2015;Golovchenko et al., 2018;Makhortykh & Bastian, 2020;Tanchak, 2017;Thornton, 2015). The third of studies discuss the propaganda strategies of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Fahmy, 2019;Farwell, 2014;Gohdes, 2018;Simons, 2019). ...
In this study, we analyze the state of information warfare on Twittersphere between India and Pakistan in the wake of Pulwama attack in Kashmir region and the subsequent surgical strikes by Indian forces inside Pakistan. We selected two leading Twitter hashtags on the conflict from the two countries each. A total of 20,000 tweets were manually analyzed. Contrary to the existing scholarship on digital information warfare, we found citizens from both countries produced most of the content. Among the citizens, those Twitter handles that showed affiliations with the heads of governments that we consider as trolls were the leading contributors. Moreover, the study found that contributors from the two countries mainly posted on their own hashtags and did not engage in counter-arguments with the contributors from other country. This resulted in overwhelming support for the two countries in their own assorted hashtags and outright criticism in the hashtags originating from the other country.
... The methodology of social influence concerning Russian thought goes back to the genesis of so-called "social engineering", whose personal product was described as technologists or social engineers/social influence (Baumann, 2020). Under these peculiarly technical-sounding names is simply the propaganda methodology still being developed in the Soviet Union (Amelina, 2007). ...
... Previous research has sought to provide a clearer picture by studying the threat, focusing directly on practices: cases of disinformation, (antagonistic) strategic narratives and fake news (e.g. Mejias andVokuev 2017, Ziegler 2018), or the practice of "information warfare" (Baumann 2020) or "hybrid warfare" (Jonson and Seeley 2015, Renz 2016). We instead propose a bottom-up approach, focusing on threat perceptions in a democratic society. ...
Scholars, states and organisations have warned that authoritarian regimes and other hostile actors are projecting information to inflict harm upon others. Yet, there is little agreement on the nature of this threat. This is mirrored in the plethora of labels in use, ranging from “disinformation” to “sharp power” and “information warfare”. In order to investigate this menace further, we turn our focus to ordinary people’s anxieties, since a better understanding of threat perceptions will also provide a better understanding of the problem. We conducted a comprehensive case study comprising focus group discussions (n: 97) and an extensive survey (n: 2046) among Swedish citizens. We asked: To what extent do people worry about information influence and why? What can this tell us about the nature of this problem or threat? The empirical results suggest that respondents were first and foremost worried about societal cohesion and democracy. They also identified a risk that information influence can undermine trust in societal institutions and the EU. Based on our findings, we suggest that “malign information influence” is an appropriate label to be used in future research. Finally, we propose directions for future systematic research on how malign information infuence is received and processed in different national contexts.
This study investigates the perceived importance of regional partnerships and the extent of electoral interference by major powers in Czechia, Poland, and Slovakia. Grounded in Bauman’s liquid modernity, which emphasizes fluidity, instability, and fragmentation in modern societies, it explores how socio-demographic characteristics and political party preferences influence these perceptions. Using a comprehensive survey conducted by a professional agency, our unique data set includes responses from 3075 participants across the three countries. Regression analysis reveals that age and education significantly affect perceived partnership importance, while sex shows minimal variation. The study also identifies political parties with high and low odds of perceived electoral interference by major powers such as China, Russia, Germany, the United States and the European Union. The findings underscore the complexity of public opinion on foreign influence and the necessity for enhanced digital literacy to mitigate vulnerabilities in democratic processes. This research provides valuable insights for policymakers and experts in security.
Este livro reúne análises de pesquisadores brasileiros e estrangeiros sobre a guerra iniciada pela Rússia contra a Ucrânia em fevereiro de 2022, discutindo as causas e a natureza do conflito, além de seus impactos para as relações internacionais no século XXI. A partir de múltiplas perspectivas teóricas, a obra reflete sobre temas diversos, entre os quais as razões que levaram a Rússia a invadir a Ucrânia, as características das operações militares no conflito, os efeitos humanitários da guerra, e a questão da responsabilização criminal internacional de atores envolvidos. A obra conta ainda com um conjunto de capítulos focados na posição de países do Sul Global em face da invasão russa, além de uma parte inteira dedicada às perspectivas de longo prazo abertas pelo conflito no sistema internacional, com destaque para os âmbitos da segurança internacional, da economia política internacional e das relações China-EUA e Rússia-EUA.
The first victim of the war is truth. During armed conflicts, disinformation is particularly dangerous, and attempts to manipulate public opinion – whether in the form of a limited set of information or even fake news – should be expected on each side of the ongoing conflict. In this situation, the ability to verify information distributed in the media space is of great importance, especially in the context of the contemporary omnipresence of social media. The purpose of the article is to present, in a form of case study, the strategies for debunking false information on the conflict in Ukraine on the example of the fact-checking portal Demagog.org.pl. This analysis allowed drawing conclusions on the functions of fact-checking in the media system, among which the most important are control, educational and alarm functions. The research contributes to the media studies literature by shedding some light on fact-checking initiatives’ role in the media system.
This article analyzes the reception of Russian strategic narratives to understand which discursive elements contribute to their success, and especially to their adoption in the discourse emerging from far-right online outlets employing a qualitative approach. The analysis of a textual corpus of several hundred website-based articles from Italian far-right outlets revealed how Russia is imagined as an ideal and alternative political model, described as a harbinger of morality, independence, and culture, and it is juxtaposed to a weak and culturally decadent West. The result of the analysis shows how themes pertaining to the grievances of the cultural backlash majorly contribute to the themes informing the discourse summarized above, thus uncovering an important feature contributing to the success of such propaganda efforts among disenfranchised domestic publics.
The symposium is motivated by the question of how the war in Ukraine is ‘framed’ and ‘narrated’ in media outside the West. It aims to shed light on the diverse ways in which information is manipulated and disseminated to serve political interests. The emphasis on developing an interdisciplinary conceptual prism is particularly noteworthy. Integrating insights from International Relations, Geopolitics, and Media and Communication studies offers a holistic understanding of the complex dynamics at play. Moreover, by highlighting the influence of foreign propaganda and disinformation campaigns, the symposium underscores the importance of critically analysing media representations in shaping public perceptions and potentially influencing foreign policies. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for mitigating the impact of misinformation and fostering informed public discourse on global conflicts. The symposium promises to contribute significantly to the scholarly understanding of the nexus between conflict and communication, while also offering valuable insights for policymakers and media practitioners alike.
The fast-paced diffusion of technologies broadly falling under the umbrella of artificial intelligence (AI) is said to be shaping the emerging world order in international relations (IR). It is expected that the global AI race will pave the way for another rise and fall of great powers in the international system, similar to the impact caused by the three industrial revolutions of the past. The literature in IR identifies three major powers – namely, the United States of America (USA), China, and Russia, as the leading contenders in this AI race. The ongoing AI-enabled fourth industrial revolution is all the more unique due to the markedly different approaches these three powers have adopted for integrating AI into their military, political, and socio-economic spheres. The AI strategies of these countries further reflect their capabilities and intentions towards how they plan on employing the technology to elevate their prestige and power status in the international system. This paper draws from a historiography of the First, Second, and Third Industrial Revolutions to study how technological innovations have altered relative power capabilities of nations, triggering a re-ordering of power hierarchies at a systemic level. Drawing from this understanding, it analyses the nature of AI as an emerging technology and assesses whether it can cause systemic alterations. It critically examines and compares the AI strategies of the USA, China, and Russia as leading contenders in the global AI race and outlines their strengths and weaknesses. It further draws from the Adoption Capacity Theory to argue that the AI race may well be determined by the relative capacity of the major institutions in each of these countries to manage and adapt to the disruptions this technology is bound to bring to the fore.
The growing interconnection of technology and politics and the enactment of particular political goals (technopolitics) has been closely articulated with emotions and the building of foreign policy narratives. In the current context of change in the communication paradigm, global and disintermediated, bringing together in the same digital space distinct actors, and having wide diffusion and reach, the challenges to international politics are diverse. Digital and media literacy are, in this regard, key to address the implications of these changes, avoiding the spreading of disinformation, fake news and distorted practices that might have profound effects at societal and political level. In this context, this paper aims at providing a basis for understanding the emerging and increasingly clear connection between political communication, polarization, disinformation, and emotions in social networks and digital literacy as a central factor explaining misuse or alleviating deficiencies, on the one hand, and how this context is affecting the reconfiguration of international relations and politics, on the other hand. The case of the war in Ukraine is illustrative of these trends and dynamics.
The article deals with the problem of media displaying strategic narratives in the context of the domination of the antagonistic discourse in the relations between Russia and the West. The issue is becoming ever more urgent since the conflict component is being intensified on the global stage, which prompts the eagerness of a number of countries to impose their interpretation of what is happening as the only correct version, by means of promoting public agreement. On the example of several foreign online media the specific features of the narrative of confrontation are shown. Its structural elements are indicated, its particular properties are revealed. It is argued that the content of the constructed narrative is accusatory rhetoric, lying on the plane of foreign policy interstate relations. Several models of media representation of strategic narratives are characterized. The narrative of confrontation is revealed to have involved, besides the states and political leadership, people criticizing government, as the oppressed. It is emphasized that the main tool for constructing the narrative of confrontation is the use of discursive practices of constructing the “Other”, characterized by negative and evaluative semantics, which actualizes the image of the “alien” as an external enemy. Some topics are defined as the “framework” of the narrative in question; due to significant differences in the interpretation of events related to them, they sharpen the contradictions with the “Other” as with the discursive target. It was found that important conditions favorable to the functioning of the narrative of confrontation in the media are the elitist-official nature of the majority of news, as well as the declaration of the information war. It is concluded that the reliance on the same strategic narratives in journalistic materials acts as a factor of discursive limitation of the spectrum of evaluations of socially significant events, phenomena and processes, and the state of conflict of interpretations intensifies the antagonistic nature of the narratives broadcast in the media, activating the symbolic struggle between them for the exercise of discursive power.
Recent years have seen a growing contestation of the liberal international information order and an increasingly aggressive pushback by Global North governments. The pushback has been accompanied by burgeoning research on the contentious politics of international political communication. Reviewing this research, I find and critique that it fails to embed the Global North’s war against disinformation in the global matrix of the coloniality of knowledge. I elaborate Mignolo’s conceptual couplet dewesternisation/rewesternisation in relation to political epistemology to develop the claim that braided into the Global North’s counter-disinformation campaigns are discursive practices that entrench international epistemic privilege anchored to the global geopolitical hierarchy of knowledges. To substantiate my argument, I zoom in on the European Union’s counter-disinformation campaign against Russia. I end by reflecting on the broader take-away of my paper for decolonial thought and practice.
A discourse analytical approach in the study of propaganda can help to examine not only the content of the propaganda but also the influence of the context in which the propaganda was created. This article aims to discuss how propaganda is perceived when combining the terms of propaganda and discourse and in which research topics, interpretative contexts and with which methods such a connection is used. The article is based on a semi-systematic literature review and a deductive thematic analysis. The findings show that researchers often understand propaganda as a critical phenomenon by using a discourse analytical approach to propaganda, and a critical analysis of discourse is often used to analyse it. Also the findings show that some researchers use the terms of propaganda and discourse in their research as synonyms without developing the term of propagandistic discourse. The combination of the terms propaganda and discourse is used more and more often in scientific research. Such a connection is especially used for the analysis of propaganda messages that polarise society. However, the connection between propaganda and discourse is only sometimes properly developed.
In 2013, the Kremlin resourced and launched a multiyear global operation to subvert democracy. The operation’s main weapon was intentionally harmful information—disinformation—spread through networks of paid trolls, bot networks, and users around the world. The information was aimed at sowing division within democracies and between democracies, particularly in NATO and the European Union. Some governments chose stronger responses than others. What explains the variation in government responses? I argue that each democracy’s combination of will and capability determined its response and that states with similar endowments of will and capability chose similar policies. I conduct an in depth cross-national of thirteen Western democracies supported by two case studies of specific states: Finland and the United States. My findings show that Kremlin disinformation has repeatedly adapted to changing contexts over the last century, is likely to continue adapting, and that Kremlin tactics having shown effectiveness, have spread to more state governments and even domestic actors. Future attacks will likely follow similar themes and patterns, so the lessons learned in this dissertation can help inform future responses.
Este artículo analiza los mensajes de Twitter, en español e inglés, durante el desarrollo delúltimo conflicto entre Armenia y Azerbaiyán por la región histórica de Nagorno Karabaj.Este conflicto, junto con las cuestiones de Abjasia y Osetia del Sur, supone una de las crisismás importantes del Cáucaso Sur. Para ello se han utilizado dos algoritmos diseñados parael procesamiento de grandes volúmenes de información, concretamente LDA (no supervisado) y SVM (supervisado). A partir de la teoría de encuadres se ha llegado a la conclusión de que ambas audiencias se posicionan mayoritariamente con la postura armenia. Asimismo, el artículo muestra cómo los mensajes ponen su foco en otros asuntos fuera de la propia guerra, como el papel de Turquía, la responsabilidad del Gobierno israelí en la venta de armamento al ejército de Azerbaiyán o la orientación religiosa de ambos países. Los resultados muestran cómo las explicaciones humanitarias son muy minoritarias entre ambas audiencias, ya que centran sus mensajes en elementos conflictivos. En definitiva, el presente trabajo intenta identificar no solo los elementos que envuelven el debate público en torno al conflicto, sino también subrayar el potencial de técnicas propias de la ciencia computacional en estudios de comunicación política.
Following the Russian meddling in the 2016 US elections, disinformation and fake news became popular terms to help generate domestic awareness against foreign information operations globally. Today, a large number of politicians, diplomats, and civil society leaders identify disinformation and fake news as primary problems in both domestic and foreign policy contexts. But how do security institutions define disinformation and fake news in foreign and security policies, and how do their securitization strategies change over years? Using computational methods, this article explores 238,452 tweets from official NATO and affiliated accounts, as well as more than 2,000 NATO texts, news statements, and publications since January 2014, presenting an unsupervised structural topic model (stm) analysis to investigate the main thematic and discursive contexts of these texts. The study finds that NATO's threat discourse and securitization strategies are heavily influenced by the US' political lexicon, and that the organization's word choice changes based on their likelihood of mobilizing alliance resources and cohesion. In addition, the study suggests that the recent disinformation agenda is, in fact, a continuity of NATO's long-standing Russia-focused securitization strategy and their attempt to mobilize the Baltic states and Poland in support of NATO's mission.
This article analyzes Twitter messages, in Spanish and English, during the development of the last conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the historical Nagorno-Karabakh region. This conflict, along with the issues about Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is one of the most important crises in the South Caucasus. Two algorithms designed for processing large volumes of information have been used, namely LDA (unsupervised) and SVM (supervised). Based on the framing theory, a conclusion has been reached that both audiences are mostly positioned with the Armenian stance. The article also shows that the messages focus on other issues different from the war, such as Turkey’s role, the Israeli government’s responsibility for saling weapons to Azerbaijan’s army, or the religious orientation of both countries. The results show that humanitarian explanations are rarely used by both audiences whose messages are rather focused on conflicting elements. In short, this work does not only seek to identify the elements of the public debate around conflict but it also highlights the potential of computer science techniques in political communication studies.
In light of the growing concern about the potential for Russian state sponsored media to be used as a propaganda tool, this study uses the Yandex News algorithm to show the differences in Russian news generated for the United States, Estonia, and Russia. The authors apply and build on the traditional studies of news framing in order to (1) identify cases where headlines and articles are framed differently, (2) determine the relationship between the topic and frame used, (3) compare these findings across three countries, and (4) generate discussion surrounding the reasons for similarities and differences in each case. The use of the Yandex news algorithm, which has been a subject of speculation when it comes to Russian news media, sheds light on how the tool displays information in different country contexts and shows that there is a statistical difference in the issues that appear in the algorithm-generated headlines for each country.
This chapter introduces the poststructuralist perspective on international relations (IR). It outlines the epistemological and ontological fundament of post- structuralist thinking and introduces key concepts, notably discourse.
This chapter aims to show that the way we talk about the world, about ourselves and others matters. It employs a particular focus on issues and examples that relate to the military – a domain that for long has been dealt with from more traditional IR perspectives. It seeks to encourage to look at those issues from a different, more critical, angle. It touches upon questions like: Can we ever be fully secure or do we need threats? How did the Global War on Terror become thinkable? What is the relationship between humanitarian interventions and identity?
By presenting key contributions to the poststructuralist body of literature in IR, this chapter traces a poststructuralist perspective on issues of international rela- tions, notably the state and foreign policy, security and threats. It encourages to scrutinize them critically and gives an overview of how to employ this theoretical perspective for empirical discourse analyses in practice.
The aim of this study is to develop a theoretical and conceptual
basis for studying structural cyber asymmetry and to examine
the strategic effects of the Russian national segment of the
Internet. Methodologically this study is a theory-driven
qualitative case study based on content analysis and abduction.
This study demonstrates that cyber power can be studied as a
means to shape cyberspace. This approach offers a new
perspective on studying the effects of national cyber strategies
and the asymmetric power relationships between states.
Freedom of action, common situation picture, command and
control, and resilience are useful concepts for studying the
relationship between closed and open national networks.
These these concepts can be combined with the model of a
System of National Information Defence and Security to
examine and compare the management and control of national
networks in a novel way which takes into account the way the
governance of the Internet is currently changing.
The structural cyber asymmetry caused by the creation of a
national segment of the Internet sets significant premises and
frames of reference on the states’ use of force in cyberspace.
Structural cyber asymmetry also shapes the effects of the use
force. The construction of a national segment of the Internet
can be compared to the strategic level preparation of a cyber
battlefield. The Russian national segment of the Internet can,
if successfully completed, change the global balance of power
in cyberspace. However, the national segment, as currently
envisioned, has serious vulnerabilities. Moreover, its
construction will increase the interdependencies between
domains, great power competition, risks of escalation, and the
rationality of conducting a preventive or even pre-emptive
strike. The national segment of the Internet increases the
fragmentation of cyberspace and strengthens the norm of
cyber sovereignty.
What do we speak of when we speak of ‘hybrid warfare’, a notion that has become prominent in discussions of European security? The article shows that this question is difficult to answer, as the hybrid warfare discourse is not only vague, but also consists of multiple, and at times contradictory, narratives. While talking and writing about supposedly the same thing, participants in the hybrid warfare debate often suggest markedly different ideas about the precise nature and target of the threat, offer different responses and draw upon different expertise. Grounding our argument in critical scholarship on narratives, security knowledge and hybrid warfare, we build a framework for studying security narratives around the four elements of threat, threatened value, response and underlying knowledge. This framework is utilised in a case study of Czechia, a country that has played a pioneering and outsized role in European hybrid warfare debates. We identify three narratives of hybrid warfare – defence, counterinfluence and education – which present markedly different understandings of ‘hybrid warfare’, and ways to defend against it. Our intervention hopes to contribute to disentangling the contradictions of the hybrid warfare discourse, itself a necessary precondition for both sound state policy and an informed public debate.
Polish-Russian relations are an extremely dynamic and changeable phenomenon, especially after Poland’s accession to NATO. Despite the fact that the Russian Federation was established only in 1991, the relations discussed in this article have also been influenced by the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union, whose successor was Russia. The aim of this study is to analyse changes in the Polish-Russian relations after 2010. Not only does the paper present the causes of conflicts that have influenced mutual relations, but it also indicates areas that need changing and that may contribute to the warming of relations between Warsaw and Moscow. The method of comparative analysis was applied in the study. The conducted analysis allows stating a significant impact of the Smolensk disaster on the Polish-Russian relations.
There is broad agreement among commentators and analysts that Russia seeks to undermine the US-led liberal international order. At the same time, there is considerable disagreement over the nature and extent of the challenge Moscow poses, the underlying drivers of Russian revisionism, and how the West should respond. In this article, we argue that it is possible to distinguish between three major perspectives. In brief, the first suggests that Russia is a ‘revanchist power’ that seeks to overturn the very foundations of the liberal world order. The second perspective holds that Russia is a ‘defensive power’ that works for incremental changes within the existing order. The third perspective contends that Russia is an ‘aggressive isolationist’, meaning that the Putin regime deliberately plays a spoiler role in international affairs to boost its domestic legitimacy. This article describes in detail the arguments of the three perspectives; it shows that each suffers from explanatory shortcomings and defects; and it outlines how the contributions to this special issue address the identified shortcomings.
This article looks at various theoretical approaches to Russia–EU relations and ways to explain the evolution and current rupture of the relationship. The article’s purpose is to assess the relevance of different explanatory factors and to what extent they are complementary rather than competitive. It is argued that the best way of assessing and organizing the various explanations is through a contrastive, counterfactual approach to causation. Moreover, the article suggests that pragmatic interests of knowledge should guide studies of Russia–EU relations and that scholars ought to strike a middle ground between parsimony and holism.
This study examines the strategic narratives embedded in Russia broadcast and news media to determine how the country advances a narrative framework portraying the Kremlin’s world view as propagated through Russian media. We argue these narratives help construct Russian identity in building domestic cohesion while fending off criticisms by Western nations. The study furthers our theoretical understanding of public diplomacy and global narratives by drawing from the work of rhetoricians and IR scholars in addressing how domestic and international narratives become tied together for strategic purposes and their reception by local actors. We analyzed 1016 broadcast and online news segments from 17 different sources representing governmental and official news sites, oppositional sites, and independent news sources. Two studies were conducted focusing on one particular ‘contour’ of the Russian worldview: Russian multilateral engagement through BRICS, SCO, and Iranian nuclear negotiations as well as media portrayals of NATO. The study concludes by discussing strategies for effective messaging.
Russia defines itself as a Great Power in relation to Europe and the West. The first part of the article traces how, since 1991, a story about greatness centred on being part of contemporary European civilization has given way to a story of how Russia is great by being superior to a Europe that is now seen as rotten and decadent. The former story spelled cooperation with Europe and the West, where the latter spells confrontation. The second part argues that Russia’s superiority complex is unsustainable. It is hard to see how, in the face of the formative structural pressure of the state system, Russia will be able to sustain its superiority complex. A state that does not order itself in such a way that it may either gain recognition as a Great Power by forcing its way and/or by being emulated by others, is unlikely to maintain that status. The costs of maintaining Great-Power status without radical political and economic change seem to be increasing rapidly. If Russia wants to maintain its status, an about-turn is needed. Such a turn may in itself be no solution, though, for if Russia does not do anything about the root causes of its perceived inferiority to Europe, then the Russian cyclical shifting from a Westernizing to a xenophobic stance will not be broken.
The article presents a comparative stylistic analysis of the political narrative of Russia and the United States during two historical periods: the Cold War (1950-1980) and the year 2015. The authors choose the cognitive theory of narrative analysis as their research methodology. Political narrative is understood as a single story uniting multiple journalistic materials over a certain historical period of up to several decades, reflecting the state ideology with an arbitrary name, permanent positive or negative characters, and verbally presented via recurrent lexical units, stylistic and manipulation techniques. It is established that the Soviet narrative of the Cold War period had clearly defined villains - capitalists, while the role of victims belonged to ordinary citizens of the capitalist countries, and Communists were their saviors. The following specific features characterized the narrative: the formation of a clear opposition "us - them"; selective coverage of events occurring in the "hostile" countries, a tendency to the exclusion of anything positive; a one-sided, strongly biased view of the political, economic and cultural events (promoting the positive sides in this country and greatly exaggerating the negative ones in Western countries); an emotionally loaded image of "them" created by employing appropriate linguistic and non-linguistic means; the formation of a persistent negative image of "them" by the use of initially false causality (innuendo, false presuppositions, provocation); reframing cognitive representations of world events, when the same event is interpreted differently in different countries by the virtue of the existing ideology; declaration of one's own values as moral, and "their" values as immoral. The Russian political narrative of last year supports a script called "We don't care - we are not afraid of 'the sanction masters'", that is, the US President and leaders of European countries - "puppets, powerless heads of their states". The scenario of the narrative, which is now being created in the English-language media concerning relations with Russia, is that Putin/Russia is aggressive, hostile to the United States; it is a source of military conflicts, uncompromising and unpredictable. The US defends democratic values, seeks de-escalation of the existing armed confrontations, and fears the wild unpredictability of Putin/Russia. The Russian narrative is dominated by the methods of irony, sarcasm, ridicule, and direct use of obscene language against its opponents; in the English narrative intimidation dominates, when the notion of "them" is referred to as an aggressor and unpredictable barbarian.
In light of the frequent, yet often divergent, uses of the term ‘discourse analysis’ and the recurrent misunderstandings associated with it, this article seeks to clarify the central postulates of poststructuralist discourse theory and to raise critical methodological issues associated with it. More specifically, this article explores the usefulness of discourse theory for the analysis of policy (discourses) by way of discussing the conceptual relation between discourse and institutional practice. Reflecting on empirical research in the field of European food safety policy, the article calls for a broader methodological horizon and argues that those who engage in policy discourse analysis need not shy away from comparative approaches, but instead, should take advantage of the specific tools that discourse theory offers. In sum, this article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of discourse theory both as a theoretical program and a pool of methods, while encouraging those who identify with the term to respond to more recent methodological challenges, such as those resulting from processes of Europeanization.
One important critique of the “West’s” hegemony in international relations (IR) theory has been this theory’s inability to come to terms with the problem of difference or the Self/Other dialectic. To further highlight the importance of the Self/Other relations, this article proposes to analyze Russian theoretical discourse of relating to Europe and the West. For centuries, Russia has participated in intense interactions among European, Asian and Middle Eastern regions, and it has developed a language and theories for relating to its various Others. Studying Russian debates can assist us in the task of reflecting on problematic epistemological and ethical assumptions behind IR scholarship, as well as suggest some paths to a genuinely diverse and global IR theory. To research both continuity and progression of Russian arguments, I draw cases from imperial and post-Soviet historical periods and analyze their debates—Eurocentrism and Eurasia—in terms of assumptions their participants held about interacting with the Other. Although moving beyond viewing the East/West interaction as something mutually exclusive has been a challenge to Russian thinkers, some of them have found ways to conceptualize the two cultural entities as in dialogue with one another and to learn from opposing perspectives.
While the concept of `the national interest' has long been central to theories of international politics, its analytical usefulness has also been seriously challenged. I argue that, to be useful in accounting for state action, this concept should be reconceptualized in constructivist terms. I begin with a brief discussion of the conventional, realist notion of the national interest, lodging two criticisms against it. Then, starting from Wendt's recent constructivist interventions, I provide a constructivist reconceputalization of `the national interest'. I argue that national interests are produced in the construction, through the dual mechanisms of articulation and interpellation, of representations of international politics. This process of national interest construction is illustrated with a sketch of the production of the US national interest during the so-called `Cuban missile crisis'.
Genealogy "opposes itself to the search for "origins"".
"The development of humanity is a series of interpretations. The role of genealogy is to record its history: the history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts, the history of the concept of liberty or the ascetic life".
"Among the philosophers idiosyncrasies is a complete denial of the body".
"Where religions once demanded the sacrifice of bodies, knowledge now calls for experimentation on ourselves, calls us to the sacrifice of the subject of knowledge. The desire for knowledge has been transformed among us into a passion which fears no sacrifice, which fears nothing but its own extinction. It may be that mankind will eventually perish from this passion for knowledge. If not through passion, than through weakness."
This article applies Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power to European Union (EU)–Russia relations aiming to understand power in its complexity and without a priori theoretical assumptions. Four different types of power – compulsory, institutional, structural and productive – feature simultaneously. It is argued that non-compulsory forms of power are key to understanding the logic of competition in EU–Russia relations in the decade preceding the 2014 Ukraine crisis, despite receiving limited scholarly attention. First, a struggle over institutional power, the capacity to control the conditions of the other actor indirectly, appeared from rivalling integration projects and competing norm diffusion. Secondly, power relations were strongly characterised by constitutive forms of power – structural and productive – in particular the capacity to produce and recognise identities, such as Europeanness. In both fields, the EU held a hegemonic position, which Russia increasingly challenged. The geopolitical reading of the change in regime in Ukraine in 2014 prompted Moscow to a radical change of strategy, by shifting the emphasis in the confrontation to compulsory power. Attempts at direct control, from annexation to sanctions, now dominate relations. Where Russia seeks to prevent the Euro-Atlantic community from gaining effective control over Ukraine through destabilisation, this can be labelled ‘negative’ compulsory power.
To understand the gradual worsening of EU–Russia relations in the decade preceding the Ukraine crisis, it is essential to understand the dynamics of their interaction. This article divides EU–Russia relations into three stages on the basis of changing intergroup dynamics: asymmetrical cooperation (1992–2003), pragmatic but increasing competition (2004–2013) and conflict (2013–present). It draws on the concept of ‘attributional bias’ to explain the escalating logic of competition during the second stage. The EU and Russia started to attribute each other negative geopolitical intentions up to the point where these images became so dominant that they interpreted each other’s behaviour almost exclusively in terms of these images, rather than on the basis of their actual behaviour. With the Ukraine crisis, EU–Russia relations changed from competition over institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood and over normative hegemony to conflict over direct control.
During the last decade there has been mounting interest in various kinds of discourse theory and discourse analysis within what we can broadly define as the social sciences. This is evidenced by the growing number of publications, workshops, conference panels, university courses, and dissertations that draw on the intellectual resources of discourse theory. Some countries and subdisciplines have been more susceptible than others to the influence of the new theories of discourse. In some places, discourse theory has almost become the dominant paradigm, while in other places it has remained marginal. However, very few areas of research have been able to withstand the impact of its new ideas.
Vor einem halben Jahrhundert veröffentlichte der französische Philosoph Gaston Bachelard ein kleines Buch über den radikalen Wandel herkömmlicher Denkweisen innerhalb wie außerhalb der Wissenschaften durch das, was er den „neuen wissenschaftlichen Geisti“2 nannte. Obwohl Bachelard sich vor allem mit Mathematik, Physik und Chemie befaßte, nahm seine Interpretation der Veränderungen in diesen Bereichen zugleich viele der Tendenzen voraus, die seit zwei Jahrzehnten auch das Denken, die Lehre und die Arbeitsweisen in den Geisteswissenschaften und besonders in den Literaturwissenschaften beeinflussen. Eine kurze Erörterung von Bachelards Analysen vermag daher sowohl alternative Arbeitsweisen des Schreibens und Lesens vorzustellen, als auch zu zeigen, daß sich die darin wirksamen Kräfte nicht auf die einzelnen Disziplinen beschränkten, wo sie, zunächst jedenfalls, zu arbeiten gezwungen sind. Was bei der Auseinandersetzung zwischen traditionellen Denkweisen, sei es in den Erfahrungswissenschaften oder anderswo, und der wachsenden Zahl intellektueller Arbeitsweisen, die dieser Tradition nicht mehr einfach integriert oder von ihr verstanden werden können, auf dem Spiel steht, ist nichts weniger als die Idee und das Ideal des Wissens, welche auf einem als adaequatio intellectus et rei gedachten Begriff der Wahrheit gründen. Aber während der ‚Übereinstimmungs‘-Begriff der Wahrheit sowohl die Trennung des Denkens von seinem Objekt als auch den Vorrang des letzteren vor dem ersteren voraussetzt, hat das Vorgehen des ‚neuen wissenschaftlichen Geistes‘ gerade diese Unterscheidung zunehmend problematisch werden lassen.
Russia is in relative terms, a marginal actor for Spain, a fact which is easily understandable given both the country's geographic position and its limited historical ties. It seems thus reasonable that the National Security Strategy 2013 does not devote much attention to Russia, and that it adopts both NATO's and the EU's cooperative discourse, as found in the strategies by the two organizations. We may state that this condition is achieved both in the strategy of 2011 and in that of 2013 which is analyzed here. However, in spite of finding the limited space devoted to Russia as justified, it is hardly understandable that the latest strategy unnecessarily hardens its stance while it does not introduce any clear proper contribution. The Spanish strategy limits herself to expose in order of importance each of the world regions, trying to span too much and failing to link the strategy with both Spain's interests and the threats to its national security strategy. Meanwhile, it forgets to mention the bilateral strategic relation with Russia and does not set the basis for overcoming the tendency to restrict Spain-Russia relations to mere punctual initiatives - As the 2011 "Dual Year" or the Strategic Association itself -. The shortcomings show that Russia is not seen as one of the long-term strategic vectors of our foreign and security policy.
This article undertakes a reading of political identifications in Europe from the security perspective. Who or what exist politically in Europe? This is investigated through the test of whether and how different units are able to carry out the move characteristic of 'security': that is, to say 'our survival is threatened, therefore we have a right to use extraordinary measures against this particular threat'. Europe as an area is marked by a complex presence of different overlapping political subjectivities - security can be carried out most importantly with nation, state, Europe or the environment as referent object. 'Europe' itself is a security referent in a truly original way, where integration through a security argument becomes a matter of survival for 'Europe'. Europe, security, integration and identity have been tied together in a specific narrative. Strikingly, the seemingly purely academic term 'security identity' has a political appearance exactly at this intersection.
Critical Security Studies introduces students of Politics and International Relations to the sub-field through a detailed yet accessible survey of emerging theories and practices. Written in an accessible and clear manner, this textbook: offers a comprehensive and up-to-date introduction to critical security studies, locates critical security studies within the broader context of social and political theory, evaluates fundamental theoretical positions in critical security studies against a backdrop of new security challenges. The book is divided into two main parts. The first part, 'Approaches', surveys the newly extended and contested theoretical terrain of critical security studies, and the different schools within the subdiscipline, including Feminist, Postcolonial, and Poststructuralist viewpoints. The second part, 'Issues', then offers examples of how these various theoretical approaches have been put to work against the backdrop of a diverse range of issues in contemporary security practices, from environmental, human, and homeland security to border security and the War on Terror. The historical and geographical scope of the book is deliberately broad and readers will be introduced to a number of key illustrative case studies. Each of the chapters in Part II will act to illustrate concretely one or more of the approaches discussed in Part I, with clear internal referencing allowing the text to act as a holistic learning tool for students. This book will be essential reading for upper-level students of Critical Security Studies, and an important resource for students of International/Global Security, Political Theory, and IR in general. © 2010 Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams. All rights reserved.
The attitude of Russia towards climate change is extremely important for the success of climate change control policies worldwide, as Russia, with its cold climate and vast resources of carbon fuels, is one of the world's biggest polluters. Moreover, Russia frequently comes across as not being very interested in containing environmental pollution. This book explores how issues to do with climate change are handled by the Russian media. It discusses how the state and economic elites have influenced Russia's environmental communication, with the state's control of the media strengthening since Putin came to power, and with control being exercised in some cases by ignoring or silencing the key issues. However, the book also shows how, recently, elites and the state in Russia have begun to realise that it is in the state's best interest to pursue more climate-oriented policies. The book concludes by examining how the communication of climate change issues in Russia could be improved and by assessing the extent to which a recent change in state climate policy could mean that media coverage of climate change in Russia will keep increasing.
The end of the Soviet system and the transition to the market in Russia, coupled with the inexorable rise of nationalism, has brought to the fore the centuries-old debate about Russia's relationship with Europe. In Russia and the Idea of Europe Iver Neumann discusses whether the tensions between self-referencing romantic nationalist views and Europe-orientated liberal views can ever be resolved.
Drawing on a wide range of Russian sources, Neumann outlines the argument as it has unfolded over the last two hundred years, showing how Russia is caught between the attraction of an economically, politically and socially more developed Europe, and the attraction of being able to play a European -style inperial role in less-developed Asia.
Neumann argues that the process of delineating a European "other" from the Russian self is an active form of Russian identity formation. The Russian debate about Europe is also a debate about what Rusia is and should be.
The Field of Discourse Analysis The Field of Discourse Analysis Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory Critical Discourse Analysis Discursive Psychology Across the Approaches Critical Social Constructionist Research
Problems of European integration and governance are increasingly analysed from a discursive perspective. This article reviews the merits of such an approach. Two analytical strands, the Copenhagen and the Governance School, are discussed in depth, both of which in their own ways look at the possibility of legitimately articulating a particular conception of Europe (and governance). Out of this discussion, and taking on board the ideas of German `radical constructivists' as well as discourse analysts Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, the article develops the analytical concept of `discursive nodal points'. This concept helps in addressing the problems of the status of European policy in relation to discourse, the national focus in many discourse analyses, and the limitations of conceptualizing change. Throughout the article, this theoretical and methodological discussion is illustrated with examples taken from an analysis of British European policy since World War II. It is argued that a discursive nodal point approach can contribute significantly to our understanding of the multiple positions within the British debate and of the changes within the dominant conceptions of European governance over time, as well as assist us in a critical assessment of these conceptions.
In this article I examine some significant problems found in current discussions of the `agent-structure' problem in international relations, suggesting that they result in serious gaps and silences. However, I also argue that important openings can be found that point to a more critical, if unsettling, way of conceptualizing agents and structures and the relations between them. Specifically, I interrogate the issues of practices, discourse, and contexts of meanings that are implicit in existing approaches and argue that taking seriously the indeterminancy and undecidability of practice has important implications for the agent-structure problem both in terms of ontological assumptions as well as concrete empirical research.
The article provides an analysis of Russia's image that the Kremlin has been projecting in Western countries in the years of Vladimir Putin's presidency. The negative character of Russia's image in the West was recognised as one of the major security threats for the country, and an energetic public relations campaign was launched to improve it. The article explores the core elements of this ‘constructed’ image, and examines how they are related to the self-images of Russia held by Russian political elites. Finally, it considers the implications of the ambition to create this ‘desired’ image for Russian foreign policy.
As modern democracies need the politically informed citizen and as politics nearly cannot be experienced and judged without the help of the mass media, there is growing concern for a tabloidisation process affecting the political news discourse within the media culture. This may be explained by both the consequences deriving from the symbiotic relationship between the media and the political system and the commercialisation of the media system since the opening of the television market in the mid 1980s in Germany. German research analyses of the phenomenon of tabloidisation have mainly been restricted to the audio- visual media. The paper intends to give a clearer insight into the nature of ìtabloidisedî political coverage in the press by describing its potential extreme forms. The prototypical representative of tabloid journalism in Germany is the Bild-Zeitung. Taking the Bild as a prototype for tabloid journalism in Germany the manifest and traditional political content of its news discourse has been analysed using framing-analytical techniques. Frames combine a pragmatical, semantical and syntactical dimension, as they serve as internalised guides for information processing and as they convey thematically consonant meanings constructed from and embodied in the keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols and other lexical or visual ìbricksî of a given news discourse.
The view of identities as always situated in a relationship with the Other underlies contemporary constructivist social theory. Taking a step further, and combining constructivist approaches to identity with insights from post-colonial studies, this article argues that the Other, far from being a mere presence, often plays an active role in identity politics. By tracing the historically varying ways in which Turkey and Russia have engaged in European identity construction, it demonstrates that this is an interactive process of negotiation between the European Self and its external Others in which agency of the Other is revealed. In particular, Russia and Turkey exercise agency by challenging, each in its own manner, the EU’s power to define the normative meaning of Europe. While Turkey has contributed to a decentring of European identity by challenging the self-perception of Europe as a multicultural space, Russia’s uncompromising stance tends to consolidate the EU-centred image of Europe as a political community based on liberal democratic values.
The article traces the emergence and development of conservative discourse in Russian politics from its initial articulation in the late 1990s to its present hegemony in Russian political space. Approaching conservatism in Foucauldian terms as a discursive ‘system of dispersion’, Russian conservative discourse is analysed not as a coherent ideological doctrine but as a space of discursive self-definition of its practitioners. From this perspective, a dualism is articulated between ‘liberal’ and ‘left’ conservative strands in contemporary Russian discourse. While liberal conservatism accords with the main tendencies of the Putin presidency in seeking to reinscribe the gains of the anticommunist revolution of the early 1990s as a secure foundation of the new political order, ‘left conservatism’ is characterised by an irreconcilable opposition to the order that descends from that revolution and a consequent attempt to ‘repoliticise’ the foundations of the existing regime. The article concludes with an interpretation of the problematic relation that both strands of the conservative discourse establish with the ‘moment of the political’ that characterised Russian politics in the 1990s.
The case of the EU points to the need to re-conceptualise the relationship between self and other in the IR literature. I argue that the literature forces us into an artificial choice between the liberal constructivist approach of disregarding the constitutive role of difference in identity formation and the critical constructivist approach of assuming a behavioural relationship between self and other, and therefore cannot account for the diversity in the EU's interactions with various states on its periphery. I identify three constitutive dimensions along which self/other relationships vary to produce or not produce relationships of Othering: nature of difference, social distance, and response of other. I analyse how the EU's interactions with Morocco, Turkey, and Central and Eastern European states are situated differently on these dimensions, and evaluate the question of whether the EU is a postmodern collectivity based on these analyses.
The article focuses on the interplay of the narratives of ‘exclusion’ and ‘self-exclusion’ in the Russian discourse on EU–Russian relations. Since the late 1990s, this discourse has acquired an increasingly conflictual orientation, whereby the official foreign policy objectives of ‘strategic partnership’ with the EU and Russia's ‘integration with Europe’ are increasingly problematised across the entire Russian political spectrum. In the analysis of the Russian conflict discourse we shall identify two at first glance opposed narratives. Firstly, the EU enlargement has raised the issue of the expansion of the Schengen visa regime for Russian citizens, travelling to Europe. Particularly acute with regard to Kaliningrad Oblast', this issue has also generated a wider identity-related discourse on the EU's exclusionary policies towards Russia. Secondly, the perception of Russia's passive or subordinate status in EU–Russian cooperative arrangements at national, regional and local levels resulted in the problematisation of the insufficiently reciprocal or intersubjective nature of the EU–Russian ‘partnership’ and the increasing tendency towards Russia's ‘self-exclusion’ from integrative processes, grounded in the reaffirmation of state sovereignty that generally characterises the Putin presidency. This article concludes with the interpretation of the two conflict narratives in the wider context of debates around the project of European integration.
Examines identity politics in the context of international relations.
The field of international relations has recently witnessed a tremendous growth of interest in the theme of identity and its formation, construction, and deconstruction. In Uses of the Other, Iver B. Neumann demonstrates how thinking about identity in terms of the self and other may prove highly useful in the study of world politics.
This article undertakes a reading of political identifications in Europe from the security perspective. Who or what exist politically in Europe? This is investigated through the test of whether and how different units are able to carry out the move characteristic of 'security': that is, to say 'our survival is threatened, therefore we have a right to use extraordinary measures against this particular threat'. Europe as an area is marked by a complex presence of different overlapping political subjectivities - security can be carried out most importantly with nation, state, Europe or the environment as referent object. 'Europe' itself is a security referent in a truly original way, where integration through a security argument becomes a matter of survival for 'Europe'. Europe, security, integration and identity have been tied together in a specific narrative. Strikingly, the seemingly purely academic term 'security identity' has a political appearance exactly at this intersection. Copyright 1996 BPL.
O Nastupatel''noy Strategii Rossii v Usloviyakh Sovremennoy Informatsionnoy Voyny [On the offensive strategy of Russia under the conditions of the contemporary information war
- E S Alekseyeva
Alekseyeva, E. S. (2016). O Nastupatel''noy Strategii Rossii v Usloviyakh Sovremennoy
Informatsionnoy Voyny [On the offensive strategy of Russia under the conditions of the contemporary information war]. Journal of Public Administration, 4, 7-24.
The struggle for the West. A divided and contested legacy
- C S Browning
- M Lehti
Browning, C. S., & Lehti, M. (2010). The West: Contested, narrated and clustered. In C. S. Browning & M.
Lehti (Eds.), The struggle for the West. A divided and contested legacy (pp. 15-32). Abingdon,
New York: Routledge.
European Parliamentary Research Service Blog
- Eprs
EPRS. (2015). European Parliamentary Research Service Blog. Retrieved from https://epthinktank.eu/
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The Russian Dawn. How Russia contributed to the emergence of ‘the West’ as a concept
- P Heller
Heller, P. (2010). The Russian Dawn. How Russia contributed to the emergence of 'the West' as a
concept. In C. S. Browning & M. Lehti (Eds.), The struggle for the West. A divided and contested
legacy (pp. 33-52). Abingdon: Routledge.
Independent media live on in Putin’s Russia
- M Lipman
Lipman, M. (2017). Independent media live on in Putin's Russia. Russian Analytical Digest, 197, 2-4.
Post-crimea shift in EU-Russia relations: From fostering interdependence to managing vulnerabilities
- S Meister
Meister, S. (2019). From Ostpolitik to EU-Russia interdependence: Germany's perspective. In K. Raik &
A. Rácz (Eds.), Post-crimea shift in EU-Russia relations: From fostering interdependence to managing
vulnerabilities (pp. 25-44). Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security.
V poiskakh Evropy: rossiyskiy politicheskiy diskurs i okruzhayushchiy mir
- V Morozov
Morozov, V. (2003). V poiskakh Evropy: rossiyskiy politicheskiy diskurs i okruzhayushchiy mir [Russian political discourse and the outside world]. Retrieved from https://www.eurozine.com/в-поискахевропы-российский-политиче/
Western hegemony, global democracy and the Russian challenge
- V Morozov
Morozov, V. (2010). Western hegemony, global democracy and the Russian challenge. In C. S.
Browning & M. Lehti (Eds.), The struggle for the West. A divided and contested legacy (pp. 185-200). Abingdon: Routledge.
Russia's postcolonial identity. A subaltern empire in a Eurocentric world
- V Morozov
Morozov, V. (2015). Russia's postcolonial identity. A subaltern empire in a Eurocentric world.
Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Issue brief: Distinguishing disinformation from propaganda, misinformation, and "Fake News
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official_texts_156624.htm
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News". Retrieved from https://www.ned.org/issue-brief-distinguishing-disinformation-frompropaganda-misinformation-and-fake-news/
July 16). I monomira stalo malo
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