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Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Relations During the Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych – “Honeymoon Period” or “Coercion to Marriage”

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Abstract

The victory of Viktor Yanukovych in the presidential election seemed to have normalized the relations between official Kyiv and Moscow. Yet, a number of strategic issues in bilateral relations were not solved. The Ukrainian leaders were deeply concerned about the Russia’s rigid position in the energy sector. The Russian leadership made little concession in Ukraine’s moving toward European integration. Moreover, at the turn of the summer and autumn of 2013, the Russian Federation totally blocked the movement of goods between the two countries for an uncertain period of time, thus forcing official Kyiv to refuse to sign the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. The growing Russian pressure initially provoked resistance from Viktor Yanukovych. The steps he took proved that the pro-European statements of the Ukrainian leadership were about to be carried out. However, the aggravating tension and increasing pressure from Russia and, to some extent, the reluctance of EU leaders to provide financial guarantees to the corrupt Ukrainian leadership, pushed Yanukovych to abandon the European integration altogether.
DOI: 10�17951/m�2016�1�103
ANNALES
UNIVERSITATIS MARIAE CURIE-SKŁODOWSKA
LUBLIN – POLONIA
SECTIO MVOL. I 2016
Ihor Hurak
Vas yl Stef anyk Prec arpath ian Nat ional Univer sity
Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Relations During the Presidency of
Viktor Yanukovych – “Honeymoon Period”
or “Coercion to Marriage”
1. Introduction
e Orange Revolution was apowerful blow to the ambitious foreign policy
strategy of the leadership of the Russian Federation and, undoubtedly, viewed
by the Russian political elite as athreat to its national interests�
On the one hand, the defeat of Viktor Yanukovych who was openly supported
by the Russian government during the presidential race, was clearly anegative
signal to Moscow� It seemed “the lesser evil”, though� From the perspective of
the Kremlin, it was the possible impact of the Orange Revolution on the situa-
tion in Belarus, Moldova, Caucasus and Central Asia that appeared much more
dangerous�
At the same time, political analysts expressed fears that changes in Ukraine
might threaten the Russian political system by triggering another “colour” rev-
olution in the Russian Federation itself� Consequently, from 2005 on, taking
various actions against the new Ukrainian government1 was alogical reaction
of Russia�
1
A� Szeptycki, Ukraina wobec Rosji. Studium zależności, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu
Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2013, pp� 168–170�
104 Ihor Hurak
Despite the fact that it was Moscow president Viktor Yushchenko paid his
first official visit to
2
, he remained imprinted in the minds of the Russian political
elite as an anti-Russian leader3
It was only natural that in such asituation, the Kremlin anxiously awaited
the Yushchenko’s presidency to come to an end and hoped that his successor
would be able to establish amore favourable dialogue� Afew months before the
next presidential elections in Ukraine, Dmitry Medvedev openly expressed his
opinion on the issue� On August 11, 2009, in his “Message to Viktor Yushchenko,
the President of Ukraine”, he noted: “In Russia, we hope that the new political
leadership of Ukraine will be ready to build the relations between our countries,
which actually will meet the real aspirations of our peoples and the interests of
strengthening of the European security”4
2. “Honeymoon period” of Ukrainian–Russian relations
Both foreign and domestic political analysts regarded Viktor Yanukovych as
apro-Russian politician� During the election campaign in 2009–2010, he clearly
declared his desire to restore “friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the
Russian Federation and the CIS countries”5, by which confirmed his reputation�
Strengthening of the Ukrainian-Russian relations at all levels, implementa-
tion of the pre-election statements, was definitely observable at the very begin-
ning of Yanukovych’s presidency� e nature of apolitical and diplomatic dia-
logue as well as information support changed dramatically in bilateral relations�
e full-scale work of Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Commission was unblocked�
At the highest level meetings, anumber of interstate, intergovernmental and
interdepartmental agreements in various spheres6 were signed�
Ukrainian-Russian interstate relations were especially active throughout the
year 2010� On 21 April, 2010, in Kharkiv Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych
and Russian President Dymitry Medvedev signed “e Agreement between
Ukraine and Russia on the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine” whereby the Russian lease
2 Сайт радіостанції “Голос Столиці”, http://newsradio�com�ua, “Перший візит Порошенка:
куди і навіщо”, p� X, access: 13 VI 2014�
3 Сайт Телевізійної служби новин телеканалу “1+1”, http://tsn�ua, “Хто помирить
Україну і Росію?”, p� X, access: 4 XII 2008
4 Офіційний сайт Президента Російської Федерації, http://kremlin�ru, “Послание
Президенту Украины Виктору Ющенко”, p� X, access: 11 VIII 2009�
5 Сайт журнала “Фокус”, https://focus�ua, “Программа Януковича «Украина – для
людей!»”, p� X, access: 17 XII 2009�
6 Відносини ЄС – Україна – Росія: проблеми і перспективи (Аналітична доповідь
Центру Размкова), “Національна безпека і оборона”, 2012, no� 4–5, pp� 6–7�
105Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Relations During the Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych…
on the Black Sea Fleet at the naval base in Sevastopol was extended beyond 2017
by 25 years “with an additional five-year renewal option (to 2042–47) unless one
of the party notifies in awritten form the other party about their termination,
no later than one year before the expiry of agreement”7
On 27 April, 2010, at abriefing in Strasbourg, Viktor Yanukovych publicly
questioned the expediency to continue Ukraine’s membership in the Organiza-
tion for Democracy and Economic Development GUAM which Moscow viewed
as akind of alternative to the Russian regional project in the post-Soviet space�
On the other hand, some members of the new president’s team publicly stated
about the possible participation of Ukraine in the integrational associations
initiated by Russia� us, on May 20, the Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykola
Azarov said that Ukraine was ready to consider the integration to the Common
Economic Space of CIS8
On July 1, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine “On
the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policies” according to which one of the
basic principles of our country in foreign policy was “Ukraine’s compliance
with the policy of non-alignment”, which meant Ukraine’s non-participation
in military-political alliances
9
� e document also called for amending the Law
of Ukraine “On National Security of Ukraine”� In particular, some provisions
referring the Euro-Atlantic integration
10
were removed from Articles 6 and 8 of
the abovementioned law�
3. Challenges for Kyiv within the framework of the
renewed Ukrainian-Russian partnership
ese and anumber of other steps in various areas during the first year
of Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency demonstrated asignificant revision of the
Ukrainian priorities in the direction of their unification with the national in-
terests of the Russian Federation� Under those circumstances, there was an
impression of radical and long-term improvement in Ukrainian-Russian rela-
tions� However, adetailed analysis of those facts and processes confirmed the
7 Інтернет-видання “Резонанс� Волинь”, http://rezonans�volyn�net, “Харківська угода:
повний текст”, p� X, access: 28 IV 2010�
8 А� Бульвінський, Новий політичний курс Віктора Януковича та російські страте-
гічні інтереси, “Віче”, 2010, no� 20, p� 11�
9
Офіційний портал Верховної Ради України, http://zakon2�rada�gov�ua, “Закон України
«Про засади внутрішньої і зовнішньої політики»”, p� X, access: 1 VII 2010�
10 Сайт Військового інституту Київського національного університету імені Тараса
Шевченка, www�mil�univ�kiev�ua, “Закон України «Про основи національної безпеки
України»”
106 Ihor Hurak
correctness of the thesis expressed in 2012 in one of the analytical reports of
the Razumkov Centre�
It is in particular about the fact that the “optimization” of relations was
achieved mainly at the price of unilateral concessions on the part of Ukraine
including the surrender of Ukrainian interests in joining NATO; extension of
the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation basing in Crimea; the rejection
of the Ukraine’s interpretation of anumber of historical events; removal of the
issue ensuring national-cultural needs of Ukrainians in the Russian Federation
from the agenda of bilateral relations; the presence and growing influence of
Russia in key sectors of the national economy; Ukraine’s support of some of the
Kremlin’s political initiatives
11
; suspension of negotiations on the distribution
of property of the former USSR abroad12, etc�
However, these concessions did not change the attitude of Russian political
elite to Ukraine which considered the neighboring country mostly as afacility
of its own geopolitical interests, mainly as an important part of their integration
structures� On the contrary, concessions of Kyiv only intensified the Ukrainian
vector in Russian activity
13
� Accordingly, the year 2011 witnessed the decline of
the Ukrainian-Russian “honey year” or “honeymoon”14 as seen in both Ukrain-
ian and Russian political discourses� In this way, the Deputy General Director
of Razumkov Center while mentioning “the improvement in the atmosphere of
the dialogue” remarked, that the compromise expected by Russia on the part of
Ukraine had come to ared line� He emphasized the fact that for the Ukrainian
government and its closest circle there was nothing left to hand over as the next
step was the direct threat to their own interests� Expert of the Finnish Insti-
tute of International Relations Andrey Moshes expressed the same opinion� He
noted the improvement of climate between Moscow and Kyiv after the so-called
“Kharkiv agreements” but at the same time, he stated that Ukrainian-Russian in-
terstate relations “had failed to come to the constructive path of improvement”
15
us, the willingness of the parties to the mutual rapprochement did not
mean the complete elimination of differences� ere remained anumber of
unsettled issues in the bilateral relations, mainly: the territorial delimitation in
11 Відносини ЄС – Україна – Росія: проблеми і перспективи (Аналітична доповідь
Центру Размкова), “Національна безпека і оборона”, 2012, no� 4–5, p� 7�
12
О� Крамар, Батогом по прянику, http://www�ukrrudprom�com, p� X, access: 27 IV 2011
13
Відносини ЄС – Україна – Росія: проблеми і перспективи (Аналітична доповідь
Центру Размкова), “Національна безпека і оборона”, 2012, no� 4–5, p� 7�
14
Інформаційний портал “Обозреватель”, http://ukr�obozrevatel�com, “Медовий рік
скінчився”, p� X, access: 17 II 2011; М� Сірук, Рік після Харківських угод, http://www�day�kiev�
ua, p� X, access: 10 VI 2011�
15 Ibidem
107Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Relations During the Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych…
the Azov-Kerch water area; the settlement of claims related to the allocation
of property rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union; adaptation of
economic relations between Ukraine and Russia after the establishment of the
Customs Union with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus; and extremely painful
for Ukraine – gas issue16
From the point of view of the interests of Ukraine, the biggest rejection in
Yanukovych-Azarov team was caused by the Russian position on the gas issue�
e abovementioned concessions, along with the Law of Ukraine “On principles
of state language policy” from July 3, 2012 and other “curtseys toward the Krem-
lin” by the ruling elite did not give the expected results� Numerous promises
of the new Ukrainian leadership regarding the normalization of relations with
Russia without solving the gas issue seemed unconvincing�
e Kharkiv agreement, offering adiscount for Ukraine gas price (100 USD
per thousand cubic meters of gas), was interpreted by the Ukrainian govern-
ment as asignificant success� Prime Minister Mykola Azarov declared that for
Ukraine it was afavourable period of low gas prices, which should be used for
modernizing of the economy and reducing its energy consumptions� e then
Prime Minister also suggested that the period might last for 7–8 years�
Yet, only ayear later the situation proved catastrophic for Ukraine� On Feb-
ruary 25, 2011, ayear after the inauguration, Viktor Yanukovych said that “the
price for gas doesn’t hit the heart, just close to it, which was very eloquent� In
the last quarter of 2011, the price of natural gas supplied for Ukraine, even be-
ing discounted, reached 400 dollars per thousand cubic meters, while Germany
paid 319 dollars per thousand cubic meters17
4. Growing pressure of Russia
e Ukrainian leaders made chaotic attempts to change the existing arrange-
ments, whereas the Russian side was trying to make the most of the situation
in its favor� In August 2010, the head of Russian gas monopoly Alexei Miller
said that Ukraine might expect gas at Russian prices only in case of “Naftogaz”
and the union of “Gazprom”� is proposal actually meant the two companies
being merged into one under “Gazprom” auspices� In practice, this would allow
Russia to control not only selling, but also the transportation of natural gas18
16
С� Толстов, Українсько-російський діалог: від пошуку форми до визначення змісту,
“Зовнішні справи”, 2010, no� 7, p� 13�
17
П� Герасименко, Українсько-російське газове протистояння: серіал триває, http://
zaxid�net, p� X, access: 3 XI 2011�
18 Ibidem
108 Ihor Hurak
us, unlike the poorly thought-out tactics and non-consistent behavior of
Ukrainian leadership, Russia implemented its sophisticated multi-strategy� At
the beginning of 2013, Ukrainian energy experts Michael Gonchar and Maxim
Alenov suggested that due to claims of “Gazprom” to “Naftogaz” the Kremlin
hoped to force Ukraine to agree on the surrendering of gas transport system at
the least, or to do even better by making GTS surrender in the package of acces-
sion to the EurAsEC and the Customs Union19� erefore, the gas issue, which
was apriority for the Ukrainian side in the dialogue between Kyiv and Moscow,
was associated by Russian party with integration issues as being of primary
importance� Russian leadership actively tried to bring Ukraine to afull-scale
participation in the “Integration triad” Customs Union – the Single Economic
Space – Eurasian Union� Cooperation formula “3 + 1” proposed by Ukrainian
side did not suit the Russian Federation 20
Fundamental problems in the Ukrainian-Russian relations in the period
preceding the “Revolution of dignity” proved that mere participation of Ukraine
in the CIS free trade zone was not enough for Russia’s ambitions� On October 18,
2011, Mykola Azarov signed the CIS free-trade zone agreement with seven other
former Soviet republics in St� Petersburg which came into force in September
the following year
21
� However, there were no fundamental changes in the rela-
tions between the countries� Furthermore, “trade wars” were used as means of
pressure on official Kyiv
ere is every reason to think that when Moscow had gained its strategic
goal – blocking Ukraine`s membership in NATO, Russia directed its efforts at its
threefold perspective: block the European integration of Ukraine; force Ukraine
to join Putin’s Eurasian integration project; undermine the efforts of the EU in
the framework of Eastern Partnership Energy community 22
Quite clearly expressed his opinion on this issue Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev during the press conference on May 18, 2011� In particular, he said:
“[…] if Ukraine, for example, chooses the European vector, it will certainly
be much more difficult to find her way within the Common Economic Space
and the Customs Union (Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus) as it is adifferent
integration association […] Well, you cannot be everywhere� You can’t have
19 М� Гончар, М� Алінов, Справа – труба?, “Дзеркало тижня”, 2013, no� 4, 2�02, p� 1�
20 Відносини ЄС – Україна – Росія: проблеми і перспективи (Аналітична доповідь
Центру Размкова), “Національна безпека і оборона”, 2012, no� 4–5, p� 7�
21 Сайт журналу “Тиждень�ua”, http://tyzhden�ua, “Азаров підписав безстрокову угоду
про зону вільної торгівлі СНД”, p� X, access: 11 XI 2011; Офіційний портал Верховної Ради
України, http://zakon3�rada�gov�ua, “Договір про зону вільної торгівлі”, p� X, access: 18 X 2011�
22 М� Гончар, М� Алінов, op. cit., p� 1�
109Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Relations During the Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych…
it both ways� You cannot simultaneously sit on two chairs, you need to make
achoice”23
At the same time, Russia launched apurposeful and systematic campaign
aiming at convincing Ukraine’s leadership of accepting the fact that there was
no alternative to Ukraine’s integration into the structures of the CIS� e more
Ukraine moved towards signing an Association Agreement with the EU, the
severer became the pressure from Moscow
Along with the gas issue, the Kremlin continuously used trade war as the
main tool for pressure on the Ukrainian leadership� Such practice was not new,
though� In 2005, after having been repeatedly criticized by the President of
Poland Lech Kaczynski, the Kremlin banned imports of Polish meat� In 2006,
Georgian security forces detained four Russian saboteurs on its territory� In
response, the Kremlin banned selling “Borjomi” and all Georgian wine� Sanc-
tions against Ukrainian dairy products
24
were imposed in the same 2006 and
then in 2008�
Trade provided apowerful lever for Russia to influence Ukraine’s policies
throughout the entire period of Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency� In fact, there
was an increasing economic pressure by Kremlin hitting the most important
sectors of the Ukrainian industry� On January 31, 2011, the Russian government
approved adecision to extend (up to January 2016) prohibitive rates of duties on
import of steel pipes from Ukraine� Moreover, in late December 2010, quota for
the supply of pipes to Russia in 2011 was reduced to 300 thousand tons, while
during the “confrontation” period in 2009 this number was 428 thousand tons,
and in the years 2007–2008, 411–419 thousand tons respectively25
From time to time, the Kremlin initiated steps that told detrimentally on
dairy products, in consequence of which Ukrainian producers and exporters
suffered great losses� At the beginning of February, 2012, the Federal Service for
Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being (Rospot-
rebnadzor) banned the import from several Ukrainian cheese factories� Within
the month, the ban already concerned approximately half of the Ukrainian
producers� Despite the fact that at the end of April, after talks in Moscow with
participation of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine
23 Л� Чекаленко, Україна перед вибором, “Науковий вісник Дипломатичної академії
України”, 2011, no� 17, p� 55�
24
Сайт Центру Разумкова, http://www�razumkov�org�ua/ukr/expert�php?news_id=3368,
“Торговими війнами Росія хоче виторгувати політичні поступки”, p� X, access: 20 III 2012;
Сайт Телевізійної служби новин телеканалу “1+1”, http://tsn�ua, “Росія вже 8 років забороняє
українські продукти, а Київ не заборонив ввезення ще жодного”, p� X, access: 3 IX 2014�
25
Информационно-аналитический ресурс “УкрРудПром”, http://www�ukrrudprom�
com, “Батогом по прянику”, p� X, access: 27 IV 2011�
110 Ihor Hurak
and chief state sanitary doctor of the Russian Federation Gennady Onishchenko
most of restrictions were lifted, export of Ukrainian cheese to the Russian mar-
ket decreased by 20%
26
compared to the previous year� e results of Russian
inspections conducted at the Ukrainian plants recorded “numerous violations”,
as stated in the final documents, palm oil the cause of the “cheese war”, was
not found27, though�
From that time on, “cheese wars” became acommon occurrence in the
Ukrainian-Russian trade relations� Various kinds of meat and fish products
were added to the list making their supplies to Russia more and more compli-
cated� As aresult, according to the information of International Trade Center,
pig breeding products exports from Ukraine to Russia dropped by almost five
times28 during the years 2012–2014�
Ukrainian automakers were also put under fierce pressure during the pres-
idency of Viktor Yanukovych� On August 31, 2012, Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev signed the law drafted by the Transport Ministry of the Russian
Federation determining utilization fee for motor cars� Accordingly, due to the
introduction of the utilization fee, the price for Ukrainian vehicles on the Rus-
sian market increased by 10–30%� It should be noted that on August 23 Russia
joined the WTO� In this regard, the rate of customs duty on imported vehicles
in Russia decreased from 30% to 25%� According to then executive director of
the Association of National Automobile Manufacturers “Ukravtoprom” Yefim
Khazan, the introduction of utilization fee was akind of compensatory measures
taken for strategic investors in the Russian automobile industry
29
� By making
pressure on Ukraine, the initiators of the resolution, on the other hand, offered
an alternative� In particular, the document clearly indicated that utilization
fee did not refer to motor vehicles imported to the Russian Federation from
26 Сайт Информационного агентства “Інтерфакс-Україна”, http://interfax�com�ua,
“У Онищенко есть вопросы к двум украинским сырзаводам”, p� X, access: 11 VI 2012;
Інтернет-видання “IPress�ua”, http://ipress�ua, “Заборона на імпорт: які українські товари
може втратити Росія”, p� X, access: 16 VIII 2013�
27
Сайт Информационно-аналитического еженедельника “Зеркало Недели� Украина”,
http://zn�ua, “«Сырная война» России с Украиной официально завершена”, p� X, access:
20 IV 2012�
28 Сайт журналу “Тиждень�ua”, http://tyzhden�ua, “Росія вводить обмеження на
українське м’ясо та молоко”, p� X, access: 26 IX 2012; В� Кравченко, Продуктові санкції Росії
мають ефект бумеранга, http://forbes�net�ua, p� X, access: 10 IX 2014; Сайт веб-ресурсу “dec-
laration�com�ua”, http://declaration�com�ua, “Росія: тимчасова заборона на ввезення свинини
з України”, p� X, access: 5 I 2016�
29 Інтернет-видання “IPress�ua”, http://ipress�ua, “Україна все ж платитиме Росії
утилізаційний збір”, p� X, access: 31 VIII 2012; http://ipress�ua, “Експорт українських
автомобілів до Росії подорожчав на 30%”, p� X, access: 4 IX 2012
111Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Relations During the Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych…
the territories of the Customs Union member states which the status of the
Customs Union’s goods30
e Ukrainian government tried to find the way out� e Prime Minister
of Ukraine Mykola Azarov assured that acompromise would undoubtedly be
reached and the fees regarding Ukraine would not be introduced� In this respect,
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine developed four
alternative schemes to reclaim the fees� However, neither offers nor threats from
the representatives of the Ukrainian government, along with the introduction
of corresponding steps in response31 had any impact�
In the course of time, “stakes in the Ukrainian-Russian game” were raised�
In 2013, it became apparent that there were favourable conditions for the
Ukrainian leadership to sign the EU Association Agreement, containing the
provision of the comprehensive free trade
32
� is prompted the Kremlin to
even more drastic steps with the aim of demonstrating the vulnerability of
Ukraine’s economy
In the first half of 2013 duty-free supplies of Ukrainian pipes to the Russian
Federation were limited to 120 000 tons, accounting for less than half the volume
of the previous year� Moreover, in mid-July 2013, e Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev declared about the full elimination of quotas on duty-free supply of
Ukrainian pipes to Russian market
33
� us, the Russian government hit the en-
terprises belonging to influential Ukrainian businessmen Viktor Pinchuk and
Serhiy Taruta
34
� In late July, Russia banned the products of confectionery com-
pany “Roshen” run by then businessman and current President of Ukraine Petro
Poroshenko� Interestingly enough, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova
30 Інтернет-видання “IPress�ua”, http://ipress�ua, “Україна все ж платитиме Росії
утилізаційний збір”, p� X, access: 31 VIII 2012�
31
Інтернет-видання “IPress�ua”, http://ipress�ua, “Азаров погрожує Росії економічними
санкціями”, p� X, access: 16 VIII 2012; Інтернет-видання “IPress�ua”, http://ipress�ua, “Україна
все ж платитиме Росії утилізаційний збір”, p� X, access: 31 VIII 2012; Інтернет-видання
“IPress�ua”, http://ipress�ua, “Україна ввела податок на російські автомобілі”, p� X, access: 12
IX 2009�
32 e experts and politicians were expressed confident, that the EU was ready to sign
the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU without the implementation by the
Ukrainian side all its commitments, including the release of Yulia Tymoshenko from the prison
[in:] Ю� Мостова, Т� Силіна, Російський план, осмислений і нещадний, http://gazeta�dt�ua, p�
X, access: 16 VIII 2013; Интернет-ресурс “Podrobnosti�ua”, http://podrobnosti�ua, “Главной
темой недели в Раде была евроинтеграция”, p� X, access: 8 IX 2013�
33
Інтернет-видання “IPress�ua”, http://ipress�ua, “Заборона на імпорт: які українські
товари може втратити Росія”, p� X, access: 16 VIII 2013�
34
Ю� Мостова, Т� Силіна, Російський план, осмислений і нещадний, http://gazeta�dt�ua,
p� X, access: 16 VIII 2013�
112 Ihor Hurak
and Tajikistan influenced by Russia announced checking on Ukrainian candies,
however, they did not find any violations35
After targeted attacks against many Ukrainians, who had previously dared
to speak in favour of European integration and criticize the Customs Union
36
,
sanctions against Ukrainian exporters and producers started to gain more mo-
mentum� On August 14, the Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation
listed each and every Ukrainian exporter as “risky”� In practice, such actions
led to astrict inspection of the vehicles transporting the products of Ukrainian
producers on the Russian border� e procedure included unloading, weighing
and reloading of goods37� us, Russia almost completely blocked the supply of
goods from Ukraine38 for an uncertain period of time�
During the following months, Russia demonstrated, as noted by Russian
politician and director of the CIS Institute Konstantin Zatulin, “how things
would work, if Ukraine’s free- trade deal with the EU came into effect”
39
� In
fact, Russia managed its borders “in manual mode” alternating relaxation and
gain control4 0
5. e attempt of the Ukrainian authorities to play
their “own role” and surrender of Yanukovych
Ukraine was forced to take vigorous steps in response� It should be noted that
after the Revolution of Dignity, scientists and experts, both home and abroad,
suggested that for President Viktor Yanukovych the path to European integra-
tion was like agame, an attempt to maneuver between the EU and Russia41� We
believe that several factors may clearly prove the fact that, at least for acertain
35 О� Попович, Торговельні війни Росії. Чи вистоїть Україна на шляху до ЄС?, http://
naszwybir�pl, p� X, access: 8 X 2013�
36
Ю� Мостова, Т� Силіна, Російський план, осмислений і нещадний, http://gazeta�dt�ua,
p� X, access: 16 VIII 2013�
37 Сайт журналу “Тиждень�ua”, http://tyzhden�ua, “Без оголошення війни� Втрати
України від російської торговельної блокади не перевищать 1% ВВП”, p� X, access: 14 VIII 2013�
38
Сайт Інформаційно-аналітичного тижневика “Дзеркало Тижня� Україна”, http://
dt�ua, “Україна поскаржиться у Євразійську комісію на «торговельну блокаду» Росії”, p� X,
access: 15 VIII 2013�
39 Сайт інформаційної служби “Радіо Свобода”, http://www�radiosvoboda�org, “Європа
стала на захист України в економічній війні з Росією”, p� X, access: 21 VIII 2013�
40
В� Сич, Постачання українських товарів до Росії нормалізувалися – Мунтіян,
http://newsar�ukrinform�com, p� X, access: 20 IX 2013; Інтернет-видання “Українська правда”,
http://www�pravda�com�ua, “На кордоні з Росією черги з фур через нові норми МС”, p� X,
access: 31 X 2013�
41
Przegląd sytuacji strategicznej – aspekty regionalne, “Rocznik Strategiczny”, 2013–2014,
2014, p� 31, Інтернет-ресурс “Korrespondent�net”, http://ua�korrespondent�net, “Корреспондент:
113Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Relations During the Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych…
period of time, Viktor Yanukovych intended to sign the Association Agreement
between Ukraine and the EU� Such period was September and October of 2013�
As is known, in early September, the situation in the parliamentary fraction
of the then ruling Party of Regions was rather complicated� Among the MPs
there was agroup of individuals who eagerly supported Ukraine’s joining the
Customs Union and were against rapprochement with the EU42 � In such cir-
cumstances, on September 4, Viktor Yanukovych held atwo-hour meeting with
representatives of the Party of Regions� At the meeting, he was quite critical of
the Kremlin’s policy and declared that the European choice for Ukraine had no
alternative� e fourth President of Ukraine also emphasized that Russia had
failed to fulfill obligations undertaken by its leadership� He stressed the fact
that Ukraine with the discount of $ 100 per thousand cubic meters of gas had
to pay ahigher price than Austria, Germany and Italy, who did not have such
discounts� At the end of the meeting, Viktor Yanukovych asked those who were
of different opinion to leave the meeting43� Naturally, nobody left the meeting�
One of the participants, Alexander Volkov, said that Yanukovych had the way
of convincing each and every member present at the meeting, so “having come
with their own opinions, they left accepting that of the President’s”44
e logical consequence of all that was the fact that the Party of Regions
supported the so-called “European integration” laws in the parliament� e
“Regionals” together with representatives of the opposition parties voted for the
law that would promote Ukraine’s signing the Association Agreement
45
� In mid-
October, among all political forces represented in the parliament, the Party of
Regions did it most eagerly46e approval of the draft agreement by the Cabi-
net of Ministers of Ukraine (18 September 2013
47
) was also an important step
Ілюзія бажання� Українська влада лише імітує прагнення до євроінтеграції”, p� X, access:
19 XII 2011�
42 Інтернет-видання “NEWSru�ua”, http://www�newsru�ua, “У Партії регіонів розкол:
Шуфрич створює «російську фракцію»”, p� X, access: 3 IX 2013�
43
Сайт Информационно-аналитического еженедельника “Зеркало Недели� Украина”,
http://zn�ua, “Янукович на встрече с регионалами сообщил, что выбор сделан: ассоциация
с ЕС”, p� X, access: 7 IX 2013�
44
Интернет-ресурс “Podrobnosti�ua”, http://podrobnosti�ua/928806-glavnoj-temoj-nedeli-
v-rade-byla-evrointegratsija�html, “Главной темой недели в Раде была евроинтеграция”, p�
X, access: 8 IX 2013�
45 Сайт Української служби BBC, http://www�bbc�com/ukrainian/politics/2013/09/130905_
parliament_eu_law_vc, “Євродень у парламенті: розглянули перші закони”, p� X, access:
5 IX 2013�
46
Інтернет-видання «Pravda�IF�UA”, http://pravda�if�ua, “Прикарпатський нардеп-тушка
не голосував за 3 євроінтеграційні закони”, p� X, access: 15 X 2013�
47 Інтернет-видання “NEWSru�ua”, http://www�newsru�ua, “Уряд України схвалив
проект Угоди про асоціацію з ЄС”, p� X, access: 18 IX 2013�
114 Ihor Hurak
forward, as it meant signing of the Association Agreement with the EU that
included provisions for acomprehensive free trade zone�
However, the then Ukrainian leadership failed to keep to the course, which
showed the Vilnius Summit� On November 21, the Ukrainian government headed
by the Prime Minister Mykola Azarov adopted aresolution halting the prepara-
tions for signing the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement at the Eastern Partner-
ship Summit in Vilnius� He explained the decision by saying that Kyiv was bound
to carefully evaluate the potential “cost” of integration to the European market
to compensate it for possible losses on the Russian market, with the countries of
the Moscow-led Customs Union and the CIS�
During the Vilnius Summit on the 28–29 November 2013, Viktor Yanuko-
vych actually demanded from Brussels the providing for Ukraine multibillion
loans and proposed starting three-way talks between Russia, Ukraine and the
EU� e EU rejected trilateral and declared Ukrainian’s claims inadmissible and
unfounded� In response, Yanukovych refused to sign the Association Agreement
between Ukraine and the EU� Furthermore, on the same evening, the “Berkut”,
following Yanukovich’s orders, brutally beat students who gathered on Euro-
maidan in peaceful protest against sudden changes in foreign policy vector of
the state leaders48
In this context, quite notable are the reasons why the then leadership of
Ukraine took such astep� It is worth mentioning that already on November
21 Vice Prime Minister Yuriy Boyko, describing the situation of the Ukrainian
economy at apress conference, said: “Since August of the current year, our coun-
try has lost 15–20 thousand of jobs, and approximately 30–40 billion of trade
turnover”
49
� e “Russian’s imprint” in Ukraine’s economic hardship was obvious�
On November 22, during the conversation with President of Lithuania Dalia
Grybauskaite, Viktor Yanukovych stated that there was no possibility to sign
the EU – Ukraine Association agreement at the Vilnius summit because of the
pressure from the Russian Federation
50
� Simultaneously, on the same day, the
Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykola Azarov in his speech in the Parliament said
that the Ukrainian delay of the Association Agreement was urged exclusively
48
И� Петерс, В� Ивахненко, Надежды и интриги саммита, http://www�svoboda�org,
p� X, access: 28 XI 2013; Інтернет ресурс “Новини Країни”, http://www�newskraine�com�ua,
Два роки тому Янукович не підписав угоду про асоціацію з ЄС у Вільнюсі”, p� X, access:
29 XI 2015�
49 И� Коцина, А� Артазей, И� Голотюк, А� Галух, Виктор Янукович: «Украина не может
подписать Соглашение об ассоциации из-за экономического давления и шантажа со
стороны России», http://fakty�ua, p� X, access: 23 XI 2013�
50 Медиа веб-сайт Левый Берег”, http://lb�ua, “Янукович заявил, что не может подписать
ассоциацию с ЕС из-за шантажа России”, p� X, access: 22 XI 2013�
115Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Relations During the Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych…
because of the economic reasons and was merely atactical decision� However,
he slightly moved the accent� In particular, explaining the position of the gov-
ernment, he focused on the unreasonable prices for imported gas, debt to the
International Monetary Fund, and unacceptable conditions announced by the
government about new credit lines51
Having found refuge in the Russian Federation, Viktor Yanukovych gave
other reasons for having refused to sign the agreement at the Vilnius Sum-
mit� Diverting attention from the Russian position, Yanukovych said that in
October 201352 there emerged an evidence that the signing of the Association
Agreement could have led to extremely negative ramifications for the entire
agricultural sector, Ukrainian machine-building, transport engineering, energy
and military-industrial complex� He also pointed out that terms of getting
aloan announced by IMF on the eve of the Vilnius summit were absolutely
unacceptable for Ukraine53
Undoubtedly, the mentioned factors had asignificant impact on the deci-
sion� But apart from them, there were quite anumber of other reasons, in-
cluding ones we can only guess about� It is known that on 27 October and 9
November 2013, semi-official meetings of Viktor Yanukovych and Vladimir
Putin took place� e first meeting was held in Sochi, the following at amilitary
airfield near Moscow 54
e lack of transparent information about the results of the visits of the
Ukrainian president (let alone the fact that the discussion at the first meeting
lasted more than 5 hours)55, as well as the further actions of the Ukrainian state
leadership indicate in no uncertain terms that their position coincided with that
of the Yanukovych’s at the Vilnius Summit�
Some of the Ukrainian and foreign politicians and experts suggest that
Russian President used pressure and blackmailing tactics� Chairman of the
51
И� Коцина, А� Артазей, И� Голотюк, А� Галух, Виктор Янукович: «Украина не может
подписать Соглашение об ассоциации из-за экономического давления и шантажа со
стороны России», http://fakty�ua, p� X, access: 23 XI 2013�
52
Considering the facts, that in June 2012 the economic part of the Association Agree-
ment was initialed, and in the middle of September 2013 its draft was approved by the Cabinet
of Ministers of Ukraine, this explanation undoubtedly was absurd�
53 Сайт Інформаційного агенства “УНІАН”, http://www�unian�ua, “Янукович пояснив,
чому не підписав угоду з ЄС”, p� X, access: 28 III 2014�
54 Інтернет-портал «Цензор�Нет”, http://censor�net�ua, “Янукович встречался с Пути-
ным на военной базе в России, – источник в АП”, p� X, access: 11 XI 2013�
55
Интернет-издание “Главред”, http://glavred�info, “Стало известно, о чем Янукович
с Путиным говорили в Сочи”, p� X, access: 29 X 2013; Інтернет-портал “Цензор�Нет”, http://
censor�net�ua, “У Януковича и Путина упорно молчат о результатах встречи президентов”,
p� X, access: 10 XI 2013�
116 Ihor Hurak
Transcarpathian Regional State Administration Gennady Moskal claimed that
he had spoken to aperson who participated in Yanukovych’s closed meetings in
late 2013, during which the President announced that Putin had threatened to
annex Crimea with eastern and southern Ukraine to follow56 in case of signing
the Association Agreement� In October 2014, Radosław Sikorski
57
expressed the
same opinion about Putin’s blackmailing Yanukovych� AUkrainian politician
Taras Chornovil claimed that Putin had threatened Yanukovych with physical
liquidation58 by one of the Ukrainian President’s bodyguards�
Apparently, to confirm the objectivity of such information by providing di-
rect evidence is unlikely possible� Yet, Yanukovych’s behavior before and during
the Vilnius summit indirectly indicates the likelihood of such scenario� ere
are reasons to assume that Yanukovych arrived in the capital of Lithuania with
the clear awareness of the situation having no intention of signing the Agree-
ment� European politicians turned ablind eye on Yulia Tymoshenko‘s not having
been released�
Despite the statement of the Ukrainian government on November 21, Presi-
dent of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel, President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė and European Commissioner
for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Fule tried to per-
suade Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement59According to Aleksander
Kwaśniewski, during talks in Vilnius Yanukovych was offered the $ 15 billion
aid package and guaranteed support from Germany� However, the Ukrainian
president was not open to any suggestions� It is easy to assume that Yanukovych
arrived in Vilnius without even considering any possibility of signing the As-
sociation Agreement60
us, Russian leadership managed to implement their plan, whereas the pro-
posed by Ukrainian an alternative version of negotiations in the EU – Ukraine
56
Интернет-издания “Vlasti�net”, http://vlasti�net, “Чем Путин угрожал Януковичу
перед Майданом”, p� X, access: 29 IV 2015�
57 Інформаційне агентство “ZIK”, http://zik�ua, “Путин угрожал Януковичу забрать
Крым в случае ассоциации с ЕС, – Сикорский”, p� X, access: 20 X 2014�
58 Інтернет-видання “Главк�info”, http://glavk�info, “Чим Путін погрожував Януковичу:
нові подробиці”, p� X, access: 25 IV 2015�
59 Z� Parafianowicz, M� Potocki, Aby dobrze kłamać, trzeba mieć dobrą pamięć. Janukowycz
jej nie miał [ fragment książki “Wilki żyją poza prawem”], http://wiadomosci�dziennik�pl, p� X,
access: 18 IV 2015�
60 Интернет-издания “РИА Новости Украина”, http://rian�com�ua, “Квасьневский:
Януковичу за Соглашение с ЕС гарантировали $15 млрд от МВФ”, p� X, access: 10 IV 2015;
С�Сидоренко, Кваснєвський: ця війна, якщо станеться, буде страшною, в тому числі за
кількістю жертв, http://www�eurointegration�com�ua, p� X, access: 9 IV 2015�
117Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Relations During the Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych…
– Russia
61
format and the request for $160 billion aid to modernize the Ukrainian
economy failed as Brussels considered such proposals unacceptable�
6. Conclusions
After pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych’s election as president of Ukraine
in 2010 there were positive changes in the relations between Kiev and Mos-
cow� However, it soon became clear that the intensification of the dialogue was
mainly due to concessions from Ukraine� Strategic national losses in exchange
for tactical gains was the usual way of conducting Ukrainian-Russian relations�
During four years of Yanukovych’s tenure, his team failed to solve any single
vital problem in the relations with the Russian Federation�
Using primarily economic leverages, the Russian leadership gradually in-
creased the pressure on the Ukrainian ruling elite, encouraging to participate
in integration processes in the CIS and pointing out that focusing on the EU
was irrational� In March 2012, the political provisions were signed followed
by the signing of the economic part of the Association Agreement between
Ukraine and the EU, which provoked increasing pressure from the Kremlin�
Since there were no official statements from the Ukrainian leadership about
abandoning European integration path, the Russian Federation actually blocked
the Ukrainian-Russian border in August 2013� Bilateral relations appeared even
at alower level than they had been during the presidency of the pro-Western
Viktor Yushchenko�
In response, Yanukovych took political steps which made Euro-integration
feasible� us, signing of the Association Agreement with the EU during the
Summit in Vilnius seemed areal perspective for Ukraine�
Yet, Yanukovych failed to stand his ground till the victorious end� reats
and blackmail from the Russian Federation, as well as the reluctance of the Eu-
ropean Union to provide the then corrupt government considerable financial
support, determined further steps of the then Ukrainian elites� On 29 November,
2013, Viktor Yanukovych withdrew from signing the Ukraine-EU Association
Agreement in Vilnius on the offered terms, citing economic and political pres-
sure from Russia�
On the evening of the same day, he ordered to clear up Independence Square
from asmall number of peaceful students who had spent aweek on Maid-
an expressing their disagreement with the decision taken by the Ukrainian
61
И� Петерс, В� Ивахненко, Надежды и интриги саммита, http://www�svoboda�org,
p� X, access: 28 XI 2013�
118 Ihor Hurak
government on 21 November� us, the Kremlin succeeded not only to prevent
Yanukovych’s team from progressing on the path towards European integration,
but also to contribute to freezing the integration for an uncertain period of time�
e phenomenon that did not fit into the plans of the Russian leadership
and completely leveled the results of the continuous work of Russia regarding
Ukraine became the Ukrainian Euromaidan that turned into the Revolution
of Dignity�
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lianuly pershi zakony”�
Website of the Information Agency “Interfaks-Ukraina”, http://interfax�com�ua,
“UOnishchenko yest voprosy k dvum ukrainskim syrzavodam”�
Website of the Information Agency “UNIAN”, http://www�unian�ua, “Yanukovych
poiasnyv, chomu ne pidpysav uhodu zYeS”�
Website of the Information Service “Radio Svoboda”, http://www�radiosvoboda�org,
“Yevropa stala na zkhyst Ukrainy v ekonomichnii viini zRosiieiu”
Website of the Informational-analytical Weekly “Zierkalo Nedeli� Ukraina”, http://
zn�ua, “«Syrnaia voina» Rosii s Ukrainoi ofitsialno zavershena”
Website of the Informational-analytical Weekly “Zierkalo Nedeli� Ukraina”, http://
dt�ua, “Ukraina poskarzhytsia uYevraziisku komisiiu na «torhovelnu blokadu»” Rosii”�
Website of the Informational-analytical Weekly “Zierkalo Nedeli� Ukraina”,
http://zn�ua, “Yanukovych na vstriechie s riegionaslami soobshchil, chto vybor
sdelan:assotsiatsiia s YeS”�
Website of the journal “Fokus”, https://focus�ua, “Programma Yanukovicha «Ukraina
– dlia liudej!»”�
Website of the journal “Tyzhden�ua”, http://tyzhden�ua, “Azarov pidpysav bezstrokovu
uhodu pro zonu vilnoi tohivli SND”�
Website of the journal “Tyzhden�ua”, http://tyzhden�ua, “Bez oholoshennia viiny�
Vtraty Ukrainy vid rosiiskoi torhovelnoi blokady ne perevyshchat 1% VVP”�
Website of the journal “Tyzhden�ua, http://tyzhden�ua, “Rosiia vvodyt obmezhennia
na ukrinske miaso to moloko”�
Website of the Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University, www�
mil�univ�kiev�ua, “Zakon Ukrainy «Pro osnovy natsionalnoi bezpeky Ukrainy»”
Website of the radio station “Holos Stolytsi”, http://newsradio�com�ua, “Pershyi wizyt
Poroshenko: kudy inavishcho”
Website of the Razumkov Centre, http://www�razumkov�org�ua, “Torhovymy viinamy
Rosiia khoche vytorhuvaty polityczni postupky”�
Website of the resource “declaration�com�ua”, http://declaration�com�ua, “Rosiia:
tymchasova zaborona na vvezebbia svynyny zUkrainy”�
Website of the Television News, Channel “1+1” http://tsn�ua, “Khto pomyryt Ukrainu
iRosiu?”
Website of the Television News, Channel “1+1”, http://tsn�ua, “Rosiia vzhe 8 rokiv
zaboroniaie ukrainski produkty, aKyiv ne zaboronyv vvezennia shche zhodnoho”�
121Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Relations During the Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych…
Summary: e victory of Viktor Yanukovych in the presidential election seemed to have normal-
ized the relations between official Kyiv and Moscow� Yet, anumber of strategic issues in bilateral
relations were not solved� e Ukrainian leaders were deeply concerned about the Russia’s rigid
position in the energy sector� e Russian leadership made little concession in Ukraine’s moving
toward European integration� Moreover, at the turn of the summer and autumn of 2013, the
Russian Federation totally blocked the movement of goods between the two countries for an
uncertain period of time, thus forcing official Kyiv to refuse to sign the Association Agreement
between Ukraine and the EU� e growing Russian pressure initially provoked resistance from
Viktor Yanukovych� e steps he took proved that the pro-European statements of the Ukrain-
ian leadership were about to be carried out� However, the aggravating tension and increasing
pressure from Russia and, to some extent, the reluctance of EU leaders to provide financial
guarantees to the corrupt Ukrainian leadership, pushed Yanukovych to abandon the European
integration altogether�
Keywords: foreign policy of Ukraine, Ukrainian-Russian relations, European integration, As-
sociation Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, integration projects the former Soviet space
Relacje bilateralne Ukraina–Rosja w trakcie prezydentury Wiktora Janukowycza –
miesiąc miodowy czy przymusowe małżeństwo?
Streszczenie: Zwycięstwo wwyborach prezydenckich Wiktora Janukowycza sprzyjało normali-
zacji stosunków między oficjalnym Kijowem aMoskwą� Jednak wiele strategicznych zagadnień
wstosunkach dwustronnych nie zostało rozwiązanych� Przywódcy Ukrainy byli niezadowole-
ni ze sztywnego stanowiska Rosji wsektorze energetycznym� Rosyjskim przywódcom, wprze-
ciwieństwie do tego, nie odpowiadał realny postęp Ukrainy wdziedzinie integracji europejskiej�
Na przełomie lata–jesieni 2013 roku Federacja Rosyjska faktycznie całkowicie zablokowała na
jakiś czas wymianę gospodarczą między dwoma państwami, zmuszając oficjalny Kijów do tego,
aby odmówił podpisania Umowy Stowarzyszeniowej między Ukrainą aUE� Rosnąca presja ro-
syjska początkowo spowodowała opór ze strony Wiktora Janukowycza� Inicjowane przez pre-
zydenta kroki wskazywały, że proeuropejskie deklaracje ukraińskiego kierownictwa mogą zo-
stać zrealizowane wpraktyce� Jednak wzmocnienie idywersyfikacja presji ze strony Rosji, ado
pewnego stopnia niechęć przywódców UE do przyznania skorumpowanym władzom ukraiń-
skim gwarancji znacznej pomocy finansowej, popchnęły Janukowycza do odejścia od kierun-
ku europejskiego�
Słowa kluczowe: polityka zagraniczna Ukrainy, stosunki ukraińsko-rosyjskiej, integracja eu-
ropejska, Umowa Stowarzyszeniowa między Ukrainą aUE, projekty integracyjne na przestrzeni
postsowieckiej
... Additionally, Hurak (2017), brings out the presidential reasoning behind the disagreement, which was publicly stated in order to justify the refusal of signature. Yanukovych's office claimed that the main reason for the change of hearts on signing was the fact that the EU refused to agree to the loan conditions for Ukraine that were offered by Yanukovych, but as Hurak (2017) mentions, those were unrealistic and the proposal for three-way talks in the format Ukraine-Russia-EU that Yanukovych suggested to the EU negotiation side, was quite an illogical request. ...
Thesis
Full-text available
This research is focused on the exploration of Ukraine-Russia and Ukraine-EU relationships based on the political and economic shelters that were shaped and changed throughout the time of Ukraine gaining independence from the USSR in 1991 and developments that preceded the 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine. The core framework of this research is the Theory of Shelter by Baldur Thorhallsson (2019), complemented by the Security Dilemma that maps out the motivations of the shelter. The central perceptions and backgrounds of the shelter-type relationships are taken from the positioning of the smaller state, which is the role of Ukraine in this research, while the political and economic transitions are investigated based on the case study of Ukraine-Russia political and economic historical transformations. The results of such research have shown that the relationship between Ukraine and Russia is indeed fitting under the realms of Shelter Theory as well as the transitions from Russia to the EU that Ukraine is undergoing since 2013. Moreover, the research was able to map the main reasons of shelter transitioning and core ideas behind the falling Russian influence in Ukraine.
Rosiia vvodyt obmezhennia na ukrinske miaso to moloko"� -Website of the Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University, www� mil�univ�kiev�ua
  • Website Of The
  • Bbc Ukrainian
-Website of the BBC Ukrainian, http://www�bbc�com, "Yevroden u parlamenti: rozhlianuly pershi zakony"� -Website of the Information Agency "Interfaks-Ukraina", http://interfax�com�ua, "U Onishchenko yest voprosy k dvum ukrainskim syrzavodam"� -Website of the Information Agency "UNIAN", http://www�unian�ua, "Yanukovych poiasnyv, chomu ne pidpysav uhodu z YeS"� -Website of the Information Service "Radio Svoboda", http://www�radiosvoboda�org, "Yevropa stala na zkhyst Ukrainy v ekonomichnii viini z Rosiieiu"� -Website of the Informational-analytical Weekly "Zierkalo Nedeli� Ukraina", http:// zn�ua, "«Syrnaia voina» Rosii s Ukrainoi ofitsialno zavershena"� -Website of the Informational-analytical Weekly "Zierkalo Nedeli� Ukraina", http:// dt�ua, "Ukraina poskarzhytsia u Yevraziisku komisiiu na «torhovelnu blokadu»" Rosii"� -Website of the Informational-analytical Weekly "Zierkalo Nedeli� Ukraina", http://zn�ua, "Yanukovych na vstriechie s riegionaslami soobshchil, chto vybor sdelan:assotsiatsiia s YeS"� -Website of the journal "Fokus", https://focus�ua, "Programma Yanukovicha «Ukraina -dlia liudej!»"� -Website of the journal "Tyzhden�ua", http://tyzhden�ua, "Azarov pidpysav bezstrokovu uhodu pro zonu vilnoi tohivli SND"� -Website of the journal "Tyzhden�ua", http://tyzhden�ua, "Bez oholoshennia viiny� Vtraty Ukrainy vid rosiiskoi torhovelnoi blokady ne perevyshchat 1% VVP"� -Website of the journal "Tyzhden�ua", http://tyzhden�ua, "Rosiia vvodyt obmezhennia na ukrinske miaso to moloko"� -Website of the Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University, www� mil�univ�kiev�ua, "Zakon Ukrainy «Pro osnovy natsionalnoi bezpeky Ukrainy»"� -Website of the radio station "Holos Stolytsi", http://newsradio�com�ua, "Pershyi wizyt Poroshenko: kudy i navishcho"� -Website of the Razumkov Centre, http://www�razumkov�org�ua, "Torhovymy viinamy Rosiia khoche vytorhuvaty polityczni postupky"� -Website of the resource "declaration�com�ua", http://declaration�com�ua, "Rosiia: tymchasova zaborona na vvezebbia svynyny z Ukrainy"� -Website of the Television News, Channel "1+1" http://tsn�ua, "Khto pomyryt Ukrainu i Rosiu?"� -Website of the Television News, Channel "1+1", http://tsn�ua, "Rosiia vzhe 8 rokiv zaboroniaie ukrainski produkty, a Kyiv ne zaboronyv vvezennia shche zhodnoho"�