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Primary-market auctions for event tickets: eliminating the rents of "Bob the broker"
... Together with scale and matching economies, these innovations have fueled a massive growth in resale. It has been argued that about 20% of tickets appear on secondary sites (Bhave and Budish 2017) although this figure varies from event to event (Schneiderman 2016). ...
... Pricing below market price has fueled academic controversies with some arguing that sellers sometimes have ulterior profit-maximizing interests, which certainly happens, and others appealing to higher motives (Bhave and Budish 2017;Sandel 2012;Roth 2007). Drawing the line between profit motives and sincere and deliberate gifts to the public is not the issue here. ...
The fair price ticketing curse occurs when an event organizer sells tickets at prices that do not correspond to underlying demand conditions and does not want resellers to profit from resale opportunities. The curse has been exacerbated with the advent of online ticketing. The challenge is to facilitate genuine ticket exchange while eliminating resale for profit. None of the attempted public or private solutions solve the problem. We propose a simple mechanism, identify a key set of necessary conditions for it to work, and discuss recent technological innovations that facilitate its implementation.
... In this plan, the price was only allowed to go down as the game date approaches, and the fans were refunded the difference if the prices went down (Trahan 2013). Bhave and Budish (2017) combine primary market auction data from Ticketmaster with secondary market resale data from eBay and show that auctions roughly doubled performer revenues and eliminated arbitrage profits associated with underpriced tickets. ...
Though the sports markets have been growing rapidly, the growth rate of ticket revenues has trailed other revenue streams. With the push for use of analytics in recent years, sports organizations have opportunities to develop insights from data and improve overall revenues. In this paper, we illustrate sports ticket market dynamics, discuss the state-of-the-art technologies and data-related issues, present new pricing strategies, and suggest topics for future research.
... In this plan, the price was only allowed to go down as the game date approaches, and the fans were refunded the difference if the prices went down (Trahan 2013). Bhave and Budish (2017) combine primary market auction data from Ticketmaster with secondary-market resale data from eBay and show that auctions roughly doubled performer revenues and eliminated arbitrage profits associated with underpriced tickets. ...
... The usual focus of this literature is on arbitrage, with a recent empirical contribution by Leslie and Sorensen (2014). More related to this paper is the contribution by Bhave and Budish (2018), which leveraged an experiment to show how the use of auctions in the primary market for tickets can be an effective tool to mitigate arbitrage opportunities. While this paper's setting is a secondary market for event tickets, it does not explicitly address issues related to arbitrage or resale. ...
This paper assesses the value of the availability of menus of different selling mechanisms to agents in an online platform in the context of scarce perishable goods. By analyzing the choice between auctions and posted prices in the context of National Football League tickets offered on eBay, it estimates a structural model in which heterogeneous, forward-looking sellers optimally choose which selling mechanism to use and its features. Counterfactual results suggest that sellers would experience an average 87.37% decrease in expected revenues if auctions were removed and just a 4.34% decrease if posted prices were. In turn, buyers would benefit from an auction-only platform since the expected number of transactions would increase and expected transaction prices would decrease. These results suggest that while sellers benefit from menus of different selling mechanisms, the same does not hold for buyers. Thus, the implications for a platform, which should take into account both sides of the market, are ambiguous.
... In the model, trades take place between a selection of buyers with particularly high valuations and sellers with particularly low valuations. This pattern is consistent with the literature on the resale market of tickets where trades are observed (Bhave and Budish, 2018;Leslie and Sorensen, 2013) and where search costs are relatively small. ...
Black markets can reduce the effects of distortionary regulations by reallocating scarce resources toward consumers who value them most. The illegal nature of black markets, however, creates transaction costs that reduce the gains from trade. We take a partial identification approach to infer gains from trade and transaction costs in the black market for Beijing car license plates, which emerged following their recent rationing. We find that at least 11% of emitted license plates are illegally traded. The estimated transaction costs suggest severe market frictions: between 61% and 82% of the realized gains from trade are lost to transaction costs.
Economists have long been puzzled by event-ticket underpricing: underpricing reduces revenue for the performer and encourages socially wasteful rent-seeking by ticket brokers. What about using an auction? This paper studies the introduction of auctions into this market by Ticketmaster in the mid-2000s. By combining primary-market auction data from Ticketmaster with secondary-market resale value data from eBay, we show that Ticketmaster’s auctions “worked”: they substantially improved price discovery, roughly doubled performer revenues, and, on average, nearly eliminated the potential arbitrage profits associated with underpriced tickets. We conclude by discussing why, nevertheless, the auctions failed to take off. (JEL D44, D47, L82)
This paper investigates how bidders in an auction become antagonized over their successful bid. Using data from a large‐scale sales campaign on eBay shows that auction buyers use the platform's feedback system to punish the seller when they discover that the same item is later offered for a lower fixed price. Specifically, it finds that (i) the probability of receiving unfavorable feedback is four times larger for auction sales than when the same item is sold by the same seller for the fixed price and (ii) that this probability is increasing in the auction price, even though reviewing bidders shape this price themselves. Exploiting a temporal variation in how salient the fixed‐price offer was and using text analysis tools on buyer comments shows that these effects on feedback are best explained by ex post reference‐price shifts. An additional survey experiment with exogenous variation in reference prices provides further evidence for this channel.
Günümüz teknolojisinin ortaya koyduğu ve iş yapış biçimlerini yeniden şekillendirdiği
alanlardan biri online dağıtım kanallarıdır. Online dağıtım, somut ve sanal ürünlerin
dağıtımında etkin olarak kullanılmaktadır. Bu anlamda online dağıtıma uygun ürünlerden biri
de rekreasyon etkinlikleri için internet üzerinden satılan etkinlik biletleridir. Etkinlik
organizasyonları ve etkinlik katılımcısı arasında aracı konumunda yer alan Biletix, farklı
etkinlikler ile ilgili hedef kitleyi haberdar etmek ve etkinlik katılımı için gerekli olan bilet satışını
gerçekleştirmektedir. Bu çalışmada, biletix.com sitesinden hizmet alanların şikâyet davranışları
ve konularını tespit ederek, biletix.com için şikâyet yönetim sürecine önerilerle katkı sağlamak
amaçlanmıştır. Veriler, 2017 Ocak -2018 Mart ayı içerisinde şikayetvar.com sitesinde Biletix
başlığı altında bulunan şikâyetlerden oluşmaktadır. Şikayetlerin analizi sonucunda; hizmet, fiyat,
web sitesi, müşteri hizmetleri, mekân, bilgilendirme, dağıtım ve promosyon-tanıtım ana temaları
ortaya çıkmıştır.
In den ersten drei Kapiteln konnten für den analytisch-deduktiven Teil der Forschung Erkenntnisse gesammelt und die Forschungsziele Z1, Z2 und Z3 erreicht werden (vgl. Abschnitt 1.4.1).
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