No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
A impulsividade e o time preference The teenager and his masks in the transition to adulthood
Abstract
O presente trabalho procura englobar a área da psicologia com a psicologia económica, mais concretamente as escolhas do consumidor através dos processos impulsivos. A escala da impulsividade de Barratt é um dos ques-tionários mais utilizadas para medir a impulsividade e, utilizamo-la para avaliar em que medida a preferência intertemporal está associada à temá-tica em causa. Consideramos que temas como esse podem contribuir com a compreensão de investigações ligadas ao comportamento dos sujeitos, face aos seus hábitos de consumo e poupança, uma vez que, se averiguado em que medida a impulsividade está associada à preferência intertemporal, podemos predizer com maior facilidade o comportamento dos sujeitos (relativamente às suas escolhas intertemporais). Esta investigação é descri-tiva, uma vez que não pressupõe a existência de causalidade, mas sim de uma correlação entre as variáveis e os questionários utilizados (Scholten 2010, Barratt BIS-11). Os resultados encontrados vão ao encontro da bibli-ografia e serão discutidos ao longo do texto.
Palavras-chave: Impulsividade, Impaciência, Preferência intertemporal.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
The purpose of the present study was to revise the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale Version 10 (BIS-10), identify the factor structure of the items among normals, and compare their scores on the revised form (BIS-11) with psychiatric inpatients and prison inmates. The scale was administered to 412 college undergraduates, 248 psychiatric inpatients, and 73 male prison inmates. Exploratory principal components analysis of the items identified six primary factors and three second-order factors. The three second-order factors were labeled Attentional Impulsiveness, Motor Impulsiveness, and Nonplanning Impulsiveness. Two of the three second-order factors identified in the BIS-11 were consistent with those proposed by Barratt (1985), but no cognitive impulsiveness component was identified per se. The results of the present study suggest that the total score of the BIS-11 is an internally consistent measure of impulsiveness and has potential clinical utility for measuring impulsiveness among selected patient and inmate populations.
According to the normative model of intertemporal choice, the Discounted Utility Model (Samuelson, 1937), the utility of a future outcome is discounted exponentially as a function of its delay. There is ample evidence that people do not comply with this proposition. In this study, 280 subjects performed a matching task in order to verify a new anomaly to exponential discounting, as well as four well known anomalies in the literature: The delay effect, the magnitude effect, the sign effect, and the delay-speedup asymmetry. The new anomaly is an interaction between the framing, sign, and delay to the outcomes: In gains, the delay effect is more pronounced in the delay frame than in the speedup frame; in losses, the reverse occurs. All anomalies were verified. We advance an explanation of the interaction effect in terms of diminishing sensitivity to delays.
Impulsive aggressive behavior was assessed in a group of 214 college students through self-report. All subjects completed the Anger Attack Questionnaire, Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory (BDHI) and the Barratt Impulsiveness Questionnaire (BIS-11). Fifty-one subjects (24%) were classified as impulsive aggressive. Analysis of the BDHI and BIS-11 found that impulsive aggressive subjects scored significantly higher than nonaggressives on impulsiveness (BIS-11) and all subscales of the BDHI with the exception of Negativism and Suspicion. Correlation analysis demonstrated that impulsiveness and BDHI Irritability were significantly correlated with number of impulsive aggressive episodes in the previous month, while BDHI Assault was not. Impulsiveness was also found to be significantly related to BDHI Irritability but not to BDHI Assault. Irritability assesses an explosive, uncontrolled type of hostility; assault on the other hand assesses more of a provoked or retaliatory type of hostility which is not likely to be related to impulse control or impulsive aggression. The results of this study clearly demonstrate the usefulness of self-report data in the assessment of impulsive aggressive behavior. BDHI Irritability and BIS-11 impulsiveness both appear to be measuring similar aspects of behavioral control. It is suggested that the BDHI Irritability and BIS-11 scales may be useful in the identification of impulsive aggressive individuals early in their contact with the criminal justice and/or mental health systems.
The present, subjective value of a delayed reward is a decreasing function of the duration of the delay. This phenomenon is
termed temporal discounting. To determine whether the amount of the reward influences the rate of temporal discounting, we
had subjects choose between immediate and delayed hypothetical rewards of different amounts (100,100, 2,000, 25,000, and25,000, and 100,000
delayed rewards). As predicted by psychological models of the choice process, hyperbolic functions described the decrease
in the subjective value of the delayed reward as the time until its receipt was increased (R2s from .86 to .99). Moreover,
hyperbolic functions consistently provided more accurate descriptions of the data than did exponential functions predicted
by an economic model of discounted utility. Rate of discounting decreased in a negatively accelerated fashion as the amount
of the delayed reward increased, leveling off by approximately $25,000. These findings are interpreted in the context of different
psychological models of choice, and implications for procedures to enhance self-control are discussed.
Although consumer researchers have investigated impulse buying for nearly 50 years, almost no research has empirically examined its normative aspects. This article presents conceptual and empirical evidence that consumers' normative evaluations (i.e., judgments about the appropriateness of engaging in impulse buying behavior) moderate the relationship between the impulse buying trait and consumers' buying behaviors. Specifically, the relationship between the buying impulsiveness trait and realted buying behaviors is significant only when consumers believe that acting on impulse is appropriate. The findings from two studies across student and retail customer samples converge and support the hypothesized moderating role of consumers' normative evaluations. Copyright 1995 by the University of Chicago.
In a choice among assured, familiar outcomes of behavior, impulsiveness is the choice of less rewarding over more rewarding alternatives. Discussions of impulsiveness in the literature of economics, sociology, social psychology, dynamic psychology and psychiatry, behavioral psychology, and "behavior therapy" are reviewed. Impulsiveness seems to be best accounted for by the hyperbolic curves that have been found to describe the decline in effectiveness of rewards as the rewards are delayed from the time of choice. Such curves predict a reliable change of choice between some alternative rewards as a function of time. This change of choice provides a rationale for the known kinds of impulse control and relates them to several hitherto perplexing phenomena: behavioral rigidity, time-out from positive reinforcement, willpower, self-reward, compulsive traits, projection, boredom, and the capacity of punishing stimuli to attract attention. (31/2 p ref)
The authors discuss the relationship of impulsivity to psychiatric disorders and present selected hypotheses regarding the reasons for these relationships.
Previous research has shown significantly higher levels of impulsivity among patients with conduct disorder, personality disorders, substance use disorders, and bipolar disorder, compared to other psychiatric patients or healthy comparison subjects. A literature review of the theoretical bases of the relationship between these disorders and impulsivity is presented. Measurements of impulsivity and treatment options are discussed in relation to the physiology of impulsivity and the disorders in which it is a prominent feature.
Impulsivity, as defined on the basis of a biopsychosocial approach, is a key feature of several psychiatric disorders. Behavioral and pharmacological interventions that are effective for treating impulsivity should be incorporated into treatment plans for these disorders.
The high comorbidity of impulsivity and selected psychiatric disorders, including personality disorders, substance use disorders, and bipolar disorder, is in a large part related to the association between impulsivity and the biological substrates of these disorders. Before treatment studies on impulsivity can move forward, measures of impulsivity that capture the core aspects of this behavior need to be refined and tested on the basis of an ideologically neutral model of impulsivity.
Impulsivity is associated with different psychiatric disorders. The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale version 11 is one of the scales mostly used to measure impulsivity and it does not have a validated version for Brazilian Portuguese. The objective of this study is to adapt and conduct the construct validation of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale version 11 for adolescents.
The scale was translated and adapted into Portuguese and then back-translated into English. The psychometric proprieties, factor analysis and construct validity were evaluated in two samples: 18 bilingual undergraduate medical students and 464 male adolescents between 15 and 20 years old from a well-delimited geographical area in the city of Canoas, southern Brazil.
The adolescent sample had a mean age of 17.3 +/- 1.7 years. Intra-class correlation coefficient achieved a value of 0.90, and internal consistency had a of 0.62. Factor analysis did not identify the 3 factors of the original scale. Impulsivity scores from the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale version 11 had a correlation with scores for attention deficit/hyperactive disorder and oppositional defiant disorder and with number of symptoms of conduct disorder, suggesting an appropriate construct validity of the scale.
Even considering some limitations in the Portuguese version, Barratt Impulsiveness Scale version 11 can be used in male adolescents and should be tested in other populations.
Studies about the characteristics, assessment, and treatment of impulsive children are reviewed and summarized from the viewpoint of their application to school settings. Research has indicated that impulsive children often display such characteristics as global search-and-scan strategies, poor selective attention, low anxiety over errors, aggressive social behavior, immaturity of moral reasoning, externalized behavior problems, and deficient reading skills. Impulsivity has typically been assessed with visual discrimination tests and behavioral ratings by teachers. Treatment of impulsivity has included cognitive training such as modeling and self-instructional training, and behavioral methods such as positive reinforcement and response cost. Specific recommendations about the assessment and treatment of impulsivity in school are emphasized.
Recent research has demonstrated that choices between gambles are systematically influenced by the way they are expressed. Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory (Kahneman, D., A. Tversky. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2) 363--391.) explains many of these "framing" effects as shifts in the point of reference from which prospects are evaluated. This paper demonstrates the applicability of the reference point concept to intertemporal choice. Three experiments demonstrate that when people choose between immediate and delayed consumption, the reference point used to evaluate alternatives can significantly influence choice. The first study elicited relative preference for immediate and delayed consumption using three methods, each of which differently framed choices between alternatives offering identical end-state consumption. The conventional discounted utility model predicts that the three methods of elicitation should yield similar estimates of time preference, but preferences were found to differ in accordance with a reference point model. The second and third studies extend and replicate the results from the first, the third using real rather than hypothetical choices.
Hyperbolic and exponential discounting functions were compared as models of subjects′ present valuations of delayed rewards. Previous comparisons have been limited by relying on the assumption that discounting rate is independent of reward size; we avoided this limitation by making all comparisons within reward sizes. In Experiment 1, using real rewards in a simulated auction, and in Experiment 2, using hypothetical rewards, we offered subjects five monetary rewards at six delays each and asked them to indicate the smallest amount that they would accept immediately in exchange for those rewards. Both discounting functions were then fit to the six reported amounts for each reward using nonlinear regressions. In both experiments, although both functions fit the data very well, the hyperbolic function fit better for all of the delayed rewards. Furthermore, the hyperbolic function better described the data for 20 of 21 and 14 of 18 subjects in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively.
We explore the extent to which elicited discount rates and self-reported impulsivity measure the same behavioral characteristic. We elicit discount rates using monetary rewards and a self-reported measure of impulsiveness (the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, BIS-11). Although researchers have utilized these measures to infer aspects of intertemporal preferences, we find no significant correlation between discount rates and the BIS-11 except when discount rates were elicited after individuals were primed with negative feedback.
JEL#: A12, B49, C70, D11, D60, D74, D91, E21
Keywords: choice, naivete, partial naivete, present-biased preferences, procrastination, self control, sophistication, time inconsistency
Recent models of procrastination due to self-control problems assume that a procrastinator considers just one option and is unaware of her self-control problems. We develop a model where a person chooses from a menu of options and is partially aware of her self-control problems. This menu model replicates earlier results and generates new ones. A person might forego completing an attractive option because she plans to complete a more attractive but never-to-be-completed option. Hence, providing a non-procrastinator additional options can induce procrastination, and a person may procrastinate worse pursuing important goals than unimportant ones.
June 2000
Three questionnaire studies are reported in which sets of items traditionally used to measure impulsiveness were intercorrelated were correlated with measures of the major personality dimensions E (extraversion), N (neuroticism) and P (psychoticism), and also with the L (lie; dissimulation) scale. It It was found that impulsiveness in the broad sense (ImpB) breaks down into four factors (narrow impusliveness or ImpN, risk-taking, non-planning and liveliness) which are replicable from sample to sample and from males to females. These factors are positively correlated with each other and also with sociability to varying degrees. ImpB correlates quite well with extraversion, but even better with psychoticism; ImpN correlates positively with N and P, suggesting that this trait is somewhat pathological. It is suggested that the distinction between ImpB and ImpN is crucial for the discussion of the nature and measurement of extraversion and also for future experimental work on the causal background and experimental testing of impulsive behaviour patterns.
Human subjects indicated their preference between a hypothetical 1,000 reward had the same general shape (hyperbolic) as the function found by Mazur (1987) to describe pigeons' delay discounting. The function relating the certain-immediate amount of money subjectively equivalent to the probabilistic 1,000 reward and a probabilistic $1,000 reward, delay was proportional to the same odds-against transformation of the probability to which it was subjectively equivalent.
A group of 641 delinquent subjects at a detention centre were given a 63-item questionnaire purporting to measure Impulsiveness, Venturesomeness and Empathy. Of these, 614 subjects also completed a Personality Questionnaire measuring Psychoticism, Extraversion, Neuroticism and Social Desirability. Factor analysis of the 63-item questionnaire confirmed that the three factor structure obtained for normal subjects also held for an offender group. Furthermore, the relations between Impulsivity and the other variables obtained in a previous study on normal subjects were confirmed in this prison population. The identification of Impulsiveness with Psychoticism and Venturesomeness with Extraversion was found somewhat more clearly in the offender group. Though confirming the positive relationship of Empathy with Neuroticism, a significant negative correlation was obtained for Empathy with Psychoticism in the offender group only. (This latter finding seems in accord with results in a study of Impulsiveness in children.) Finally, of the seven variables measured offenders differed from normals significantly on means for all but Venturesomeness. They were higher on Psychoticism, Extraversion, Neuroticism, Social Desirability and Impulsiveness but lower on Empathy.
Two orthogonal personality traits or predispositions, impulsiveness and anxiety, have been invariant in five separate factor analyses. One of these analyses is presented here along with an item analysis of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) which has a high loading on the impulsiveness factor. The BIS has never significantly correlated with any of the various anxiety or emotional stability measures in over 50 administrations of the scale, further evidence for the invariance of these two second-order factors.
Intertemporal choices are decisions with consequences that play out over time. These choices range from the prosaic--how much food to eat at a meal--to life-changing decisions about education, marriage, fertility, health behaviors and savings. Intertemporal preferences also affect policy debates about long-run challenges, such as global warming. Historically, it was assumed that delayed rewards were discounted at a constant rate over time. Recent theoretical and empirical advances from economic, psychological and neuroscience perspectives, however, have revealed a more complex account of how individuals make intertemporal decisions. We review and integrate these advances. We emphasize three different, occasionally competing, mechanisms that are implemented in the brain: representation, anticipation and self-control.
This paper discusses the discounted utility (DU) model: its historical development, underlying assumptions, and "anomalies"--the empirical regularities that are inconsistent with its theoretical predictions. We then summarize the alternate theoretical formulations that have been advanced to address these anomalies. We also review three decades of empirical research on intertemporal choice, and discuss reasons for the spectacular variation in implicit discount rates across studies. Throughout the paper, we stress the importance of distinguishing time preference, per se, from many other considerations that also influence intertemporal choices.
This paper addresses whether households save enough for their retirement. For successive date-of-birth cohorts the authors analyze income and expenditure patterns around the time of retirement. They find a fall in consumption as household heads retire which cannot be fully explained by a forward-looking consumption-smoothing model that accounts for expected demographic changes and mortality risk. Controlling for labor-market participation explains part, but not all, of this dip. The authors argue that the only way to reconcile fully the fall in consumption with the life-cycle hypothesis is with the systematic arrival of unexpected adverse information. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.
This paper explores the consequences of cognitive dissonance, coupled with time-inconsistent preferences, in an intertemporal decision problem with two distinct goals: acting decisively on early information (vision) and adjusting flexibly to late information (flexibility). The decision maker considered here is capable of manipulating information to serve her self-interests, but a tradeoff between distorted beliefs and distorted actions constrains the extent of information manipulation. Building on this tradeoff, the present model provides a unified framework to account for the conformity bias (excessive reliance on precedents) and the confirmatory bias (excessive attachment to initial perceptions).
This paper explores some of the ways that economists can incorporate insights from recent research combining psychology and economics to help understand risky behavior by adolescents.
Impulsiveness, venturesomeness and sexual risk-taking among heterosexual GUM clinic attenders. Personality and Individual Differences
- S Clift
- J Wilkins
- E Davidson
Clift, S., Wilkins, J., & Davidson, E.
(1993). Impulsiveness, venturesomeness and sexual risk-taking
among heterosexual GUM clinic
attenders. Personality and Individual Differences, 15, 403-410.
http://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(93)90068-E
Impulse Control Disorders. Handbook of Forensic Psychology
- J S Hucker
Hucker, J. S. (2005). Impulse Control Disorders. Handbook of Forensic Psychology, 471-487.
http://doi.org/10.1016/B978-012524196-0/50021-8
Correlates of delay-discount rates: Evidence from Tsimane -Amerindians of the Bolivian rain forest
- K N Kirby
- B R Godoy
- V Reyesgarc
- E Byron
- L Apaza
- W Leonard
- E Perez
- V Vadez
- D Wilkie
Kirby, K. N., Godoy, B. R., ReyesGarc, V., Byron, E., Apaza, L.,
Leonard, W., Perez, E., Vadez, V.,
& Wilkie, D. (2002). Correlates of
delay-discount rates: Evidence
from Tsimane -Amerindians of
the Bolivian rain forest. Journal of
Economic Psychology, 23, 291-3
16. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-4870(02)00078-8
Animal spirits: affective and deliberative processes in economic behavior
- G Loewenstein
- T Donoghue
Loewenstein, G., & O'Donoghue,
T. (2004). Animal spirits: affective and deliberative processes in
economic behavior. Carnegie Mellon University Social and Decision Sciences Working Paper.
The effect of sexual arousal on sexual forcefulness
- G Loewenstein
- D Nagin
- R Paternoster
Loewenstein, G., Nagin, D., & Paternoster, R. (1997). The effect of
sexual arousal on sexual forcefulness. Journal of Research in
Crime and Delinquency, 34(4),
443-473.
http://doi.org/10.1177/002242789
Análise estatís-tica com utilização do SPSS
- J Maroco
Maroco, J. (2003). Análise estatís-tica com utilização do SPSS (2nd
ed.). Lisboa: Edições Sílabo.
Time and Decision: Economic and psychological perspectives on intertemporal choice
- W Mischel
- O Ayduk
- R Mendoza-Denton
Mischel, W., Ayduk, O., & Mendoza-Denton, R. (2003). Sustaining delay of gratification over
time: A hot-cool systems perspective. In Loewenstein, G., Read,
D., & Baumeister, R. F. (Eds).
Time and Decision: Economic
and psychological perspectives on
intertemporal choice. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation.
Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making
- D Read
Read, D. (2003). Intertemporal
choice. In D. J. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of
judgment and decision making,
424-443.
http://doi.org/10.1002/978047075
2937.ch21
A Note on Measurement of Utility. The Review of Economic Studies
- P Samuelson
Samuelson P. (1937). A Note on
Measurement of Utility. The Review of Economic Studies, 4(2),
155-161.
http://doi.org/10.2307/2967612
Is there a daily discount rate? Evidence from the food stamp nutrition cycle
- M E P Seligman
- E F Walker
- D L Rosenhan
Seligman, M. E. P., Walker, E. F.,
& Rosenhan, D. L. (2001). Abnormal psychology (4th ed.) New
York: W.W. Norton e Company,
Inc.
Shapiro, J. M. (2005). Is there a
daily discount rate? Evidence
from the food stamp nutrition cycle. Journal of Public Economics,
89(2-3),303-325.
Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency
- R Thaler
Thaler, R. (1981). Some Empirical
Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency. Economic Letters, 8(3),
201-207.
http://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765
(81)90067-7