Afghans in Iran. Migration patterns and aspirations.

Abstract

More than 3 million Afghans—refugees, regular migrants and irregular migrants—reside in Iran. They are a significant community whose migration and migration aspirations are of international, national and local interest and impact.

The research “Afghans in Iran: Migration Patterns and Aspirations” was conducted in cooperation with the University of Turku (Finland), the Shahid Beheshti University (Iran) and the Sharif Policy Research Institute’s Iran Migration Observatory at the Sharif University of Technology (Iran). Important support from Iran’s Ministry of the Interior, the Dean of the Sharif Policy Research Institute and the International Affairs Office of the Sharif University of Technology is acknowledged, as is the financial support of the Strategic Research Council at the Academy of Finland (URMI research consortium, www.urmi.fi) and the Geography Section of the University of Turku.

The study’s main research questions are as follows: What are the migration patterns of Afghans in Iran, and what are the migration aspirations of Afghans—refugees, regular migrants and irregular migrants in Iran—inside Iran, to Afghanistan and to third countries?
The analysis is based on earlier research findings, as well as on specific surveys and interviews conducted for this research in Iran in October 2017 and June–September 2019. In total, 2,009 persons with Afghan backgrounds (refugees, regular migrants and irregular migrants aged 15 years and older) responded to the surveys, and 116 Afghans and 54 stakeholders related to Afghans were interviewed.

In 2017, 644 persons with Afghan backgrounds from the Kerman, Razavi Khorasan and Khuzestan provinces responded anonymously to the survey. Of these Afghans, 546 lived in the Bani Najjar, Bardsir, Rafsanjan and Torbat-e Jam refugee guest settlements, and 98 lived elsewhere in the Kerman and Razavi Khorasan provinces. In addition, 72 Afghan refugees and irregular migrants were interviewed.

In 2019, 1,365 persons with Afghan backgrounds from the Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan and Kerman urban regions responded to the survey. In addition, 44 Afghans active in sociocultural and economic issues in Iran, such as students, businesspersons and NGO managers, were interviewed.

Furthermore, in 2017, interviews were also conducted with 54 stakeholders, such as representatives of the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs (BAFIA; located in Razavi Khorasan and Khuzestan) of the Ministry of the Interior and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR; office in Mashhad), as well as public authorities in districts, municipalities and villages of the study areas, managers and council members in the four studied refugee guest settlements and other public authorities and private sector representatives.

All ethical research guidelines were followed rigorously, and all survey respondents remained anonymous. We are grateful to all the people who responded to our survey and allowed us to interview them. Research assistants helped collect and analyse the research material. The main researchers responsible for this report are Professor Jussi S. Jauhiainen (University of Turku), Dr Davood Eyvazlu (Sharif Policy Research Institute at the Sharif University of Technology) and Dr Bahram Salavati Sarcheshmeh (Sharif Policy Research Institute at the Sharif University of Technology).

According to the survey results, Afghans’ intentions regarding living in Iran for the rest of their lives vary: two out of five Afghan refugees in guest settlements, three out of ten refugees living elsewhere in Iran, and one out of four regular and irregular Afghan migrants intended to stay. Among the respondents who aspired to stay in Iran, most were 50–64-year-old Afghans who came to Iran from Afghan villages more than 20 years prior and who have family members in Iran; young Afghan adults who lived in guest settlements with their spouses and children and who have spent 10–20 years in Iran; and the oldest regular and irregular migrants.

A slight majority of respondents intended to migrate within Iran, mostly to Mashhad or Tehran. Almost all respondents from Mashhad in the Razavi Khorasan province wanted to remain in their current location, as did five out of six respondents living in the Tehran urban region. However, international sanctions on Iran, which have resulted in the devaluation of the national currency, made almost two out of three Afghans in Iran think about migrating from Iran.

Roughly two out of five Afghan refugee respondents in guest settlements and one out of four Afghan refugee respondents elsewhere in Iran would like to migrate to Afghanistan. This is also the case for one out of three respondents among Afghan regular migrants and half of Afghan irregular migrants. However, fewer actually plan to return. In particular, the oldest employed and married irregular migrants aspire to migrate to Afghanistan. Those who least aspire to migrate to Afghanistan included unmarried, 30–49-year-olds and women refugees living in guest settlements.

Roughly one out of three Afghans hoped to move from Iran to Europe—typically single, employed Afghan men from Iranian cities—but such migration aspirations might not result in actual migration. Very few mentioned Turkey as their preferred destination. Younger Afghans in Iran are more likely to desire to migrate abroad, but very few young Afghan adults want to migrate to Afghanistan, which they perceive as insecure.

Among Afghans in Iran, around 1.6–1.85 million (including 0.4–0.5 million children) are likely to remain in Iran or did not express plans to leave Iran. Among Afghans in Iran (aged 15 years and older), about 0.85–1 million plan to migrate out of Iran. About 0.6 million would like to migrate to Afghanistan, and 0.28–0.4 million intend to migrate to the EU. Many of these potential migrants have young children in Iran whose migration depends on what their parents do. However, whether such plans lead to actual migration from Iran depends on many external factors.

International geopolitical tensions have grown in Iran in 2020, especially following the actions of the United States in Iraq in January 2020. The growing geopolitical and economic pressures on in Iran may make the country increasingly challenging and insecure for Afghans. This would decrease labour-related irregular migration from Afghanistan to Iran. The challenges in Iran increase the migration aspirations of Afghans to leave Iran. The potential migration destinations depend on Afghans’ (perceived) opportunities. If Afghanistan is considered a viable option, more will aim to (return) migrate there. If Afghanistan is (perceived) economically and politically insecure, more Afghans—especially younger adults—will opt for migration through Turkey to the EU.

These research-based results about Afghans in Iran can support the design of efficient evidence-based policies that successfully impact individuals, communities and Iranian society as a whole, so research about the migration and migration aspirations of Afghans should be continued.

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TURUN YLIOPISTON MAANTIETEEN JA GEOLOGIAN LAITOKSEN JULKAISUJA
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Afghans in Iran: Migration Patterns and Aspirations Jussi S. Jauhiainen, Davood Eyvazlu & Bahram Salavati Sarcheshmeh
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AFGHANS IN IRAN:
MIGRATION PATTERNS
AND ASPIRATIONS
Jussi S. Jauhiainen, Davood Eyvazlu & Bahram Salavati Sarcheshmeh
ΕήΟΎϬϣΕϼϳΎϤΗϭΎϫϮ̴ϟ΍ϥ΍ήϳ΍έΩ̶ϧΎΘδϧΎϐϓ΍ϥ΍ήΟΎϬϣ
Afgaanit Iranissa: muuttoliike ja muuttohalukkuus
Afghans in Iran: Migration Patterns and Aspirations
ΓέΟϬϟ΍ρΎϣϧ΃ϥ΍έϳ·ϲϓϥΎϐϓϷ΍ϥϭέΟΎϬϣϟ΍ϭΎϬόϓ΍ϭΩ

AFGHANS IN IRAN:
MIGRATION PATTERNS
AND ASPIRATIONS
Jussi S. Jauhiainen, Davood Eyvazlu
& Bahram Salavati Sarcheshmeh
Turku 2020
University of Turku
Department of Geography and Geology
Division of Geography

ISBN 978-951-29-7933-2 (printed)
ISBN 978-951-29-7934-9 (Internet)
ISSN 2489-2319 (printed)
ISSN 2324-0369 (Internet)
Painosalama Oy – Turku, Finland 2020

CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................5
1.1 Research project .................................................................................5
1.2 Research questions, material and methods ........................................6
1.3 Migration-related concepts ................................................................9
1.4 Research highlights .......................................................................... 13
2. MIGRATION OF AFGHANS IN IRAN .......................................................... 16
2.1 From ‘open doors’ to focused refugee policies .................................. 18
2.2 Repatriation vs. separation or integration policies ...........................20
2.3 Impact of international regimes and policies ...................................26
3. RESEARCH RESULTS ABOUT AFGHANS IN IRAN ...................................... 29
3.1 Afghan respondents’ backgrounds ...................................................29
3.2 Afghan respondents’ migration to and within Iran ...........................33
3.3 Afghan respondents’ (return) migration and migration aspira-
tions to Afghanistan .......................................................................... 45
3.4 Afghan respondents’ migration and migration aspirations to
elsewhere than Afghanistan or Iran .................................................. 52
4. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................58
5. REFERENCES ............................................................................................ 61
6. AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS ..............65
7. AFGAANIT IRANISSA: MUUTTOLIIKE JA MUUTTOHALUKKUUS .............68
8.  .............................................. 71
9.  ......................................................... 74

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 7
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research project
The research project Afghans in Iran: Migration Patterns and Aspirations focuses on
migration patterns and aspirations of the Afghan population in the Islamic Re-
public of Iran (later, Iran). In addition, the national and international policies
and contexts are discussed related to this migration.
During the past few decades, Iran has become a key area hosting Afghans.
Through the years, the number has been smaller and larger than 3 million and
has consisted of people with different legal statuses in Iran, including registered
refugees recognized by the government of Iran and the UNHCR (United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees). In the early 2000s, the number was approx-
imately one million, and this official number (951,142 Afghans) has remained
without many changes for more than one decade (UNHCR 2019). Globally, Iran
is one of the top countries hosting refugees.
Other Afghans also legally reside in Iran. Some are students or employees in
various activities. Their movement to Iran is a common global example of migra-
tion from a poorer country to a wealthier neighbouring country. In recent years,
many former Afghan refugees in Iran have changed their statuses to migrants
with residence permits. There are also many legally residing Afghans who re-
main outside the active labour market, for example, taking care of their children
and having an already advanced age. Usually, all these residents need an Afghan
passport and a visa to remain in Iran. The number of Afghans with passport and
valid visa in Iran has varied during the 2010s, but according to Iranian and Af-
ghan authorities, official estimations are approximately half a million (450,000)
persons (UNHCR 2018, 27), depending on the year and circumstances, as we will
explain in detail in Chapter 2.
There are also Afghans who stay in Iran without proper permission to do so.
Some of them do not bother to start the administrative processes to get work-re-
lated visas and pay for such processes. Others do not possess Afghan passports
or other required documents needed for obtaining visas. There are also Afghans
who enter Iran knowing they will never get visas to reside or work in Iran. These
irregular Afghan migrants are many kinds of people from seasonal workers in
agriculture to low-skilled labourers in specific economic activities, such as con-
struction and clothing, as well as and high-skilled migrants in specific fields.
Among irregular Afghans are also people who conduct activities in the grey
shadows of societies. Their activities would not be tolerated by the Iranian au-
thorities or even by the legally residing Afghan population in Iran. In total, the
amount of irregular Afghan migrants in Iran has been estimated to be more than
one and half a million (1.5–2 million Afghans, see IOM & UNHCR 2019)—more in
the high season of agriculture and less in winter.

8 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
The research about Afghans in Iran uses empirical field material collected in
Iran in October 2017 and in June–September 2019. Furthermore, information
from earlier studies and policy documents regarding Afghans in Iran are uti-
lized. This report is part of a broader research about urbanization and migration
in Iran. The first report, based on the fieldwork in 2017, focused on Afghan mi-
grants in less-central areas, including refugee guest towns (refugee settlements),
and rural areas in the Kerman, Razavi Khorasan and Khuzestan provinces (see
Jauhiainen & Eyvazlu 2018).
The research in 2017 was conducted in cooperation between the University of
Turku (UTU, Finland) and the Shahid Beheshti University (Iran). The research in
2019 was conducted in cooperation between UTU and the Sharif Policy Research
Institute’s Iran Migration Observatory at the Sharif University of Technology
(SPRI, Iran). The main researchers were Professor Jussi S. Jauhiainen (UTU), Dr.
Bahram Salavati Sarcheshmeh (SPRI) and Dr. Davood Eyvazlu (SPRI). In addition,
research assistants were engaged with the collection, processing and analysis of
the material. In particular, MA Ekaterina Vorobeva (UTU) conducted analyses
for this research report.
To conduct the research in 2019 in Iran, the important support from Dean of
the Sharif Policy Research Institute Dr. Ali Maleki and the International Affairs
Office of SUT is acknowledged, as well as the financial support from the Strate-
gic Research Council at the Academy of Finland (research consortium URMI). In
addition, important support for the fieldwork was received from several insti-
tutes and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including IMA (NGO in Is-
fahan City), AVA (Afghan Voice News Agency) and Tebyan (Socio-cultural Center,
Mashhad Office). The Geography Section at UTU contributed financially to the
analysis and publication of the research. The authors are thankful to all the
people who responded to our survey and let us interview them. This research
report briefly illustrates the key findings from the survey, especially regarding
migration patterns and the aspirations of Afghans. However, detailed analyses
will continue.
The research results and conclusions presented derive from the authors, as
it is the case always in the academic research, and therefore they do not nec-
essarily represent the broader viewpoints of their background institutions or
those organizations that were interviewed during the research. Afghans in Iran
responded according to their own views; the results indicate both their perspec-
tives and our interpretation of them.
1.2 Research questions, material and methods
The main questions of the research are:
1. What have been the migration patterns by Afghans in Iran?

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 9
2. What are the migration aspirations by Afghans in Iran—in detail those of ref-
ugees, regular migrants and irregular migrants—as regard migration in Iran,
to Afghanistan and to third countries?
The research report is based on our empirical field research about Afghans in
Iran in 2017 and 2019 and on earlier studies and information about Afghan mi-
gration and populations in Iran (e.g., Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005; Hugo et al. 2012;
Mahmoudian & Ghassemi-Ardahaee 2014; Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi 2015; Ab-
basi-Shavazi et al. 2016; UNHCR 2017b; Grawert & Mielke 2018; and Jauhiainen &
Eyvazlu 2018).
The empirical material from the Kerman, Razavi Khorasan and Khuzestan
provinces was collected in October 2017 and from the Tehran, Kerman, Isfahan
and Mashhad urban regions from June–September 2019. In 2017, the main focus
was on guest settlements, rural areas and semi-urban areas. In 2019, the main
focus was on larger urban areas and neighbourhoods in the core and periphery
of larger cities.
The notion of guest settlements requires a small explanation. In Iran, the
specific settlements for refugees (in Farsi  ) are usually translated in Eng-
lish as ‘guest cities.’ These locations are rather small and compact areas, up to a
few square kilometres, hosting up to a few thousand Afghan refugees and usu-
ally substantially less people. The access to these sites and the residency are reg-
ulated by the Iranian authorities. Over the years, these sites have been called
by various names, including refugee camps. In this publication, the term ‘guest
settlements’ is used for these sites.
In the field research, a survey in the Farsi language was utilized. In 2017, the
survey comprised of 79 questions, of which 50 were structural, 17 were semi-
open and 12 were open questions. In 2019, most of the 79 survey questions were
same. However, a small modification to the questionnaire was made to include
the most recent changes in Iran. In the end, the survey had 42 structural, 12
semi-open and 25 open questions.
The survey was responded in total by 2,009 Afghans. In 2017, 644 persons (at
least 15 years old) with Afghan background responded to the survey. Of the par-
ticipants, 546 (85%) lived in one of the four studied guest settlements of Bani
Najjar, Bardsir, Rafsanjan and Torbat-e-Jam, and the remaining 98 (15%) lived in
urban areas and villages in the provinces of Kerman and Razavi Khorasan (Fig-
ure 1.1). In 2019, 1,365 persons (at least 15 years old) with Afghan background re-
sponded to the survey. Of the participants, 590 (43% of total respondents) were
from Tehran, 240 (18%) from Mashhad, 346 (25%) from Isfahan and 189 (14%)
from Kerman. More precisely, the Afghan migrant respondents in the Tehran
province lived in the Tehran City and several other areas (Shahr-e Rey, Qar-
chak, Pishva, Varamin, Pakdasht, Rudehen, Islam Shahr and Shahriar regions)
in the Tehran metropolitan area. In Mashhad City, surveys were conducted in

10 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
several neighbourhoods, such as Golshahr, Tollab, Panjtan. In Isfahan, surveys
were conducted in several neighbourhoods in the city, such as Zeinabiye, Has-
seh, Sabzeh Meidan, as well as in an industrial area in the north of Isfahan City
and in several metropolitan areas of Isfahan City, such as Rahnan, Dolat Abad,
Qahjavarestan, Marchin. In Kerman, the respondents were from several neigh-
bourhoods, such as Sar-Asiyab, Sarbaz, Modiriyat as well as in the Sharf-Abad
semi-urban area in the northwest of Kerman City (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1. Study areas in Iran.
The research ethics issues were followed rigorously. All survey respondents re-
mained anonymous, and they did not become identifiable. The scope and ethi-
cal background of the research were explained on the first page of the question-

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 11
naire. If the person agreed, then the questionnaire was provided to be filled. If
necessary, a pen was also given. If the person was not willing, he or she was not
pressured to take part in the research. The person could also withdraw from fill-
ing the questionnaire at any moment he or she wished or to leave unanswered
the questions he or she did not want to answer.
Besides the survey, interviews were also conducted. During the fieldwork
in 2017, 72 Afghan refugees and irregular migrants were interviewed in differ-
ent sites of the study areas. Each interview took 5–20 minutes. Interviews had
themes that were connected to the survey and facilitated a more in-depth un-
derstanding of the issues. In 2019, interviews were conducted with 44 Afghans
in Iran. The interviewees were active in Afghan-related sociocultural and eco-
nomic issues in Iran, such as students, businesspersons, NGO managers, et ce-
tera. The interview topics took into account the respondents’ backgrounds and
covered different aspects of the Afghan migrants’ lives in Iran. In the interviews,
the names of the interviewed were sometimes known, especially by the organ-
izations. However, this report does not provide such information to strictly re-
spect confidentiality and anonymity.
Furthermore, in 2017, interviews were conducted with 54 official stakehold-
ers related to Afghan refugees and irregular migrants. These included regional
authorities, such as representatives of the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immi-
grant Affairs (BAFIA; located in Razavi Khorasan and Khuzestan) of the Ministry
of Interior and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR,
office located in Mashhad); public authorities in districts, municipalities and vil-
lages within the study areas; managers and council members in the four studied
guest settlements; other public authorities; and private-sector representatives.
All respondents are thanked for helping us.
Following the fieldwork, all survey responses were coded directly or through
the N-Vivo program, and then inserted into the SPSS (Statistical Package for Social
Scientists) program, and a database was created. The data were analysed quanti-
tatively with descriptive statistics and cross tables. The interviews were analysed
qualitatively in the N-Vivo program with content analysis. The research assistants
are thanked for their help in the analyses, especially MA Ekaterina Vorobeva (UTU).
1.3 Migration-related concepts
As mentioned above and as will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, Afghans in Iran
consist of many kinds of people. In general, Afghans are considered immigrants
in Iran (i.e., people who do not belong to the titular nation, Iranians). Some of
them were born in Afghanistan and migrated to Iran, but many were born in
Iran and lived in Iran for their entire lives. There are already several generations
of Afghans in Iran. Nevertheless, they are considered immigrants—or at least
people with an immigration background.

12 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
Migration means a permanent change of locality (i.e., moving from one place
in which one lives to another place to live there for a longer period), usually
for more than one year. Globally, most migration takes place due to economic,
family or study reasons, and this voluntary migration is influenced by pushing and
pulling factors. Nevertheless, there is also forced migration, in which the migrant
is obliged to leave his or her place of residence because of insecurity and hope-
lessness about continuing to live there.
In practice, the contemporary migration types are increasingly mixed (see
Scheel & Squire 2014). The earlier rigid division between voluntary and forced
dimensions of migration has blurred, reflecting the spectrum of the experienc-
es of the migrants. To leave or remain is a very complex issue among migrants
and those seeking migration. In addition, while the initial start can be voluntary
(or forced), the subsequent choices along the migration journey(s), consisting
of stages of mobility and immobility, might be of different character than the
initial choice (Olsaretti 1998; Collyer 2007; Erdal & Oeppen 2018). Forced and
voluntary are poles of a continuum with economic, political, environmental and
social factors shaping people’s decisions to migrate. In addition, people with dif-
ferent migration reasons often use the same routes (Scheel & Squire 2014).
Similarly, the factors influencing people’s migration decisions and migration
processes combine to become various drivers that enable and constrain the ac-
tivities of social actors (i.e., individual migrant’s freedom of choice within the so-
cial environment and structural conditions). The drivers shape the broader con-
text within which the migrants’ aspirations and desires to migrate are formed
and in which people become (or do not become) migrants (i.e., they migrate or
remain immobile). Despite some commonalities in details, the drivers operate
differently in different locations, timeframes and scales (Van Hear et al. 2018).
There are ‘root causes’ (both real and perceived push and pull factors) for migra-
tion, such as social and political conditions inducing migration, and more nu-
anced mechanisms that produce migration outcomes (Carling & Talleraas 2016).
Usually, the place of residence and its change require a formal registration by
the authorities (i.e., the formal change of one’s official street address). The actu-
alization of individual migration leads into a migration pattern. While migration
patterns can be identified and discussed as regards an entire population, such
as Afghans in Iran, migration is diverse when looking at individual levels in de-
tail, as well as inside the whole population. Various background factors (gender,
education, skills, family and employment status, as well as local, national and
international contexts and structures, are influences.
Migration has evolved in the early 21st century, resulting in various kinds of
mobility that no longer easily fit the traditional definition of migration as a per-
manent change of residence. People might simultaneously live and share their
main activities in many places. They might also move more often than just once

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 13
per year and remain undefined periods in one place. In addition, not all people
register their changes of residence. Therefore, it is less and less possible to cover
migration by following regular migration, which is the formal registered migra-
tion based on changes in an individual’s formal registration in one place (and
address where one is registered and lives).
An increasing share of migration is irregular migration, in which the authori-
ties are not (entirely) aware of the mobility of people. An irregular migrant is a
person who resides in a country without the full legal right to do so and whose
presence the country’s authorities do not accept: the entry or the stay has be-
come unauthorized. International irregular migration means people cross the
border of the destination country without the proper consent of the authori-
ties or the legal entry becomes unauthorized residency because of breaking the
rules of stay. These irregular migrants are thus, in some aspects, illegally in the
territory of a foreign country. These migrants are called by various terms, such
as illegal migrants, unauthorized migrants, undocumented migrants, clandes-
tine migrants, et cetera (Gonzales 2019). Irregular migration is a permanent
phenomenon in all countries, and it cannot be entirely avoided. The illegality of
such migration is the result of changing policies and practices.
Migration aspirations and motivations for migration are also becoming in-
creasingly blurred. Earlier, it was easier to recognize the individual’s main (and
often only) motivation to migrate (leaving is better than staying) and to cate-
gorize the migrants along such motivations. The subjects’ relation to migration
possibilities were economic (such as employment), political (such as asylum) or
social (such as family-related). The categorized determinants, causes or drivers
(with nuanced differences in the meaning of these words) can also be amended
with other aspects, for example, environmental causes (such as drought, pollu-
tion, etc.) that usually connect to some of the earlier mentioned main aspects.
People, thus, seek migration connected to real and imagined push and pull fac-
tors. Nowadays, various pushing (triggering to leave one’s country) and pulling
(triggering to arrive at another country) factors combine. Economic, social and
political issues are increasingly connected with aspirations resulting in mixed mi-
gration (van Hear et al. 2018). Collins (2018) argued an individual’s interest in mi-
gration only exists within a particular social context. Mobility, as such, is rarely
the main motivation to migrate, but the migration is a tool to achieve something
when the actual mobility ends (Carling & Collins 2018).
Currently, asylum-related migration mix many real and perceived political,
economic and social issues at micro-, meso- and macro-levels. The above-men-
tioned blurring of reasons and aspirations is also seen in the international mi-
gration of Afghans. Many Afghans who arrive at the EU ask for asylum (i.e., po-
litical reason), but they have many kinds of economic, social and environmental
reasons, and these are not all strictly related to political threads. These Afghans

14 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
can be defined as asylum-related migrants, that is, people who have left their
country of origin (Afghanistan) or permanent residence (Iran) due to political,
economic and/or social (such as religious, cultural and ethnic aspects) insecurity
to seek safety in another country (see Jauhiainen et al. 2019). The current defini-
tions of migrants, irregular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees are dichoto-
mized and reinforce the problematic foundations of these categories (Crawley
& Skleparis 2018).
Furthermore, in some cases migrants may express one reason over another
because of the potential advantage. For example, many non-EU migrants, such
as Afghans, who arrive at the EU ask for asylum because they cannot directly
get a visa, residence permit or working permit. An asylum seeker, a person who
is officially seeking asylum, safety and protection from authorities of a country
other than that of his or her nationality or habitual residence, has the right to
remain in that country. Usually she or he receives the right to work after a few
months of arrival. Later, this person can try to get a residence permit through
this employment. Meanwhile, during the asylum process, she or he receives help
and subsidies for accommodations and a monthly subsidy for running costs (the
amount varies amongst the EU member states). In this case, the asylum process
is used as an entry instrument to get inside the EU, and then the person tries to
fulfil the initial motivation by gaining access to employment, for example. The
manipulation of the asylum system and the self-resettlement of asylum seekers
(or irregular migrants or refugees) are part of the activities of asylum-related
migrants, even if they are in precarious conditions during several stages of their
journeys (see Collyer 2010; Ehrkamp 2017; Triandafyllidou 2017). Such manipu-
lation of the asylum system makes asylum-related migrants (at least some) active
agents in their everyday lives.
A straight-forward linear migration from place ‘A’ (country of origin in the case
of international migration) to place ‘B’ (destination country in the case of in-
ternational migration) still exists. However, in many cases the migration trajec-
tory consists of breaks—lengthier stays along the migration journeys (in plural,
to indicate their variety) in the so-called transit countries. Iran or Turkey can
be a transit country, in which an Afghan stays for a few months along the tra-
jectory to the EU (Dimitriadi 2018). However, instead of such transit migration,
some will continue to remain in the initial transit country that then transforms
to their destination country. Furthermore, this linear model of migration is
one-directional. In many cases, people might return to the country of origin or
move to another country, and then move back to the initial destination coun-
try. Especially in forced migration (i.e., migration that is not voluntary), the mi-
grant sometimes returns back (pushed back or deported by the authorities of
the destination country) to the initial place (the country of origin), but she or he
might soon again start another journey either to the initial destination country

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 15
or another country practicing circular migration. From 2015–2016, the EU received
an exceptionally many asylum seekers, of whom the majority did not receive
asylum or residence permit in the EU member states. Some of these rejected asy-
lum-related migrants returned voluntarily to their countries of origin, support-
ed technically and financially by the International Organization of Migration
(IOM). Nevertheless, these people might restart their migration journeys, for
example, towards the EU. Other migrants were sent back by force and received
a temporary ban of entry to the EU for some period. However, many refused to
return and remained hidden in the EU countries as irregular (undocumented)
migrants.
1.4 Research highlights
• More than 3 million Afghans were in Iran in 2019. They included officially
recognized refugees (around 1 million people), authorized regular immi-
grants with visas and residence permits in Iran (around 0.5 million people)
and unauthorized irregular immigrants (around 1.5–2 million people) with-
out the proper right to reside in Iran. The number of Afghan refugees has
remained stable in Iran, but the number of regular migrants has grown (be-
cause some former refugees become migrants) and the number of irregular
migrants varies considerably depending on the seasons (e.g., agriculture)
and the economic conditions in Afghanistan and Iran.
• Afghans in Iran are a significant community, whose migration patterns and
aspirations (to and in Iran, to Afghanistan and on to third countries, includ-
ing those of the EU) are of local, national and international interests.
• The migration aspirations and the actual migration of Afghans in, to and
from Iran are influenced by many drivers, such as (in)security in Afghani-
stan; economic conditions in Afghanistan and Iran; possibilities for reasona-
ble employment, education and life career in Iran and the access of Afghans
to Turkey and the EU.
• The majority of Afghans in Iran live in urban areas, including large urban
regions, such as Tehran, Mashhad and Isfahan—however, Afghans are also in
rural areas, especially seasonal labour migrants.
• The intention to remain in Iran varies among Afghans: of the Afghan re-
spondents, two out of five Afghan refugees in guest settlements, three out of
10 refugees living elsewhere in Iran and one out of four regular and irregular
Afghan migrants thought they would most likely live the rest of their lives
in Iran. The desire to stay in Iran was higher if the respondents were satis-
fied with their current accommodations and social networks and if they had
good relations with their neighbours.

16 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
• Those Afghan respondents who stated that they would likely stay the rest of
their lives in Iran were often 50–64 years old (usually they came to Iran more
than 20 years prior from Afghan villages and had family members in Iran);
younger Afghans (particularly from towns and cities, had been in Iran for
10–20 years and lived in refugee guest settlements with their spouses and
children); or the oldest regular and irregular migrants.
• A slight majority of responding Afghans intended to migrate within Iran: the
most preferred locations were Mashhad and Tehran; almost all Afghan re-
spondents currently in Mashhad in Razavi Khorazan would like to remain
there.
• Roughly two out of five Afghan refugee respondents in guest settlements
and one out of four Afghan refugee respondents elsewhere in Iran agreed
that they would like to go back to Afghanistan, and so answered one out of
three Afghan regular migrant respondents and half of the Afghan irregular
migrants—however, fewer actually plan to return. Those who particularly
aspire migration to Afghanistan were the oldest, employed and married ir-
regular migrants. Those who least wished to migrate to Afghanistan were
unmarried, 30–49 years old and women refugees from guest settlements.
• One out of eight Afghan refugee and regular migrant respondents and one
out of five irregular migrant respondents—especially young adult single
men—plan to migrate from Iran to Turkey, however, such aspirations may
not be realized. Very few consider Turkey as their destination country but
see it as a transition country to migrate to the EU.
• Roughly one out of three Afghan respondents plan to migrate from Iran to
the EU—typically they are single employed men from cities—but such aspira-
tion might not result in actual migration.
• The younger an Afghan in Iran is, the more likely she or he wants to mi-
grate abroad, but very few younger Afghans want to migrate to Afghanistan,
which they perceive as insecure. Of the Afghan respondents who have at-
tended university, three out of four see themselves outside Iran in the next
three years: for many, the EU is a more attractive destination than Afghani-
stan or Turkey.
• International geopolitical issues also influence the migration and migra-
tion aspirations of Afghans. International sanctions on Iran in 2018 (result-
ing in a loss of the value of Iran’s national currency) created challenges for
Afghans in Iran. In 2019, almost two out of three (62–64%) Afghan respond-
ents were affirmative (fully or partly) that, after the currency devaluation,
they started to think of migrating from Iran to another country. However, a
higher salary would be a significant pulling factor to stay in Iran, especially

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 17
for married Afghan respondents with an urban background and family and
friends in Iran.
• It is challenging to extrapolate the actual migration potential of all Afghans
in Iran from the migration aspirations of Afghans in Iran expressed in the
survey results. Afghans’ have desires, aspirations and plans to migrate but
from them cannot be straightforward claimed that they will migrate. How-
ever, of the current 640,000 (at least 15 years old) Afghan refugees in Iran,
about 84,000 (13%) plan to migrate to Afghanistan (3,200 from refugee
camps and 80,600 from elsewhere in Iran), and of the remaining Afghan
refugees in Iran (i.e., excluding those who plan to migrate to Afghanistan),
143,000 plan to migrate to the EU (2,300 from refugee camps and 140,700
from elsewhere in Iran). Of the current (at least 15 years old) 350,000 regular
Afghan migrants in Iran, about 80,500 (23%) plan to migrate to Afghanistan,
and of the remaining regular Afghan migrants in Iran, 66,200 plan to mi-
grate to the EU. Of the current 1.2 million (at least 15 years old) irregular Af-
ghan migrants in Iran, about 428,000 (36%) plan to migrate to Afghanistan,
and of the remaining irregular Afghan migrants in Iran, at least 203,200 plan
to migrate to the EU.
• In conclusion, about 0.85–1 million of all 2.2 million (at least 15 years old)
Afghans in Iran plan to migrate out of Iran. Of them, about 0.6 million plan
to migrate to Afghanistan and a further 0.28–0.4 million to the EU, and their
children’s migration depends on them. However, whether plans lead to
actual migration of Afghans from Iran depends on many external factors.
Around 1.6–1.85 million Afghans (including their 0.4–0.5 million children)
are more prone to remain in Iran, or they do not express plans to leave Iran.
• In 2020, besides economic pressures, also geopolitical tensions have grown
in Iran. Their joint impact on Afghans’ migration aspirations and migration
is still to be seen. However, if political tensions rise and the economic situ-
ation in Iran becomes more challenging for Afghans, it will decrease their
labour-related irregular migration from Afghanistan to Iran. In addition,
Afghans may increasingly start to migrate from Iran. If Afghanistan is (per-
ceived) economically and politically insecure among Afghans in Iran, they—
especially younger adults—try to migrate through Turkey to the EU.
• The research-based results about the Afghans in Iran can support Iranian
officials in designing efficient evidence-based policies that have a success-
ful impact on Afghan individuals, communities and the Iranian society as a
whole; thus, research about the migration and migration aspirations of Af-
ghans should be continued.

18 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
2. MIGRATION OF AFGHANS IN IRAN
Iran is, after Pakistan, the largest country hosting Afghan migrants—more than 3
million inhabitants. The majority of Afghans in Iran live in larger cities (such as
Tehran and Mashhad) but also in many smaller towns and rural areas. According
to the Iran’s Population Census of 2016, almost four out of five (78.5%) Afghans
lived in urban areas, and the remaining fifth (21.5%) lived in rural areas (Sta-
tistical Centre of Iran 2016). Regulations prevent Afghans from living in many
provinces and sites in Iran.
Iran, with almost 1 million (973,000 people) refugees, is globally one of the
countries with the highest number of refugees (UNHCR 2019). Afghans—70% of
them are Hazara and Tajik populations (Westerby et al. 2013, 58)—make up al-
most 98% of these refugees. Few (3%, approximately 30,000 people) refugees re-
side in 19 guest settlements in different parts of the country (UNHCR 2017b). The
remaining 900,000 (or more) registered refugees (97%) live elsewhere in Iran,
mostly in urban areas but some are also in the countryside.
In addition, about 0.5 million Afghan passport holders are legal temporary
residents in Iran, 30,000 Afghans as otherwise legal permanent residents and
1.5–2 million are irregular Afghan migrants. Based on UNHCR (2019) and IOM
and UNHCR (2019) references to Iran’s governmental sources, “according to the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, there are 1.5 to 2 million undocu-
mented Afghans in the country at any given time, including 850,000 persons
who participated in a headcount exercise [for registration of undocumented Af-
ghans in Iran] in 2017” (IOM & UNHCR 2019, 4). The exact number of irregular
(undocumented) Afghan migrants in Iran is a continuous subject of debate.
In Chapter 2 is discussed the contemporary migration of Afghans in relation
to Iran and its connection to national and international contexts (Fig. 2.1). The
initiation of this migration took place in the late 1970s when the political regime
of Afghanistan changed, and the Soviet troops invaded the country. At the same
period, political and religious changes took place in Iran. These two processes
resulted in a situation in which the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran
welcomed Afghan migrants (mohajerin) to stay in Iran—soon there were millions
of Afghans in Iran. This ‘open door’ policy later developed into a more focused
refugee policy.
The early 21st century has witnessed different approaches on Afghans in Iran.
On the one hand, there have been continuous attempts to repatriate Afghans
from Iran to Afghanistan, often supported by the UNCHR and other interna-
tional organizations. This policy has also included the forced deportation of un-
authorized Afghan irregular migrants from Iran to Afghanistan. On the other
hand, policies have been targeted to those Afghans who have opted to stay in
Iran. There have been attempts to separate and segregate Afghans in the Iranian
society. More recently, policies and practices have appeared that facilitate their

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 19
Figure 2.1. Timeline of the contemporary migration between Iran and Afghanistan.

20 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
economic and social integration to the Iranian society. International political re-
gimes play a substantial role in the migration of Afghans as well. These include
political and military interventions and withdrawals in Afghanistan, as well as
imposed international sanctions on Iran that negatively influence the economic
development of the country. Various drivers influence, push and pull Afghans to
and from Iran and the aspirations behind such migration.
2.1 From ‘open doors’ to focused refugee policies
Afghan refugees have been hosted in Iran for decades. Following the 1978 coup
d’état in Afghanistan, the establishment of a communist regime there and the
military invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979, Afghans started to
escape to Iran in large numbers. War and insecurity pushed for such migration.
Afghans were welcomed by the government of Iran. The early arrival of Afghan
refugees was connected to the ongoing political, religious and economic issues
and the ‘open door’ policy of the recently established Islamic Republic of Iran.
In practice, Afghans had the same access as Iranian citizens to subsidized food,
healthcare and free primary and secondary education in Iran. However, the
right to work of Afghans was mostly limited to low-wage positions in agriculture
and construction (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008). Besides religious issues pulling Af-
ghans’ migration to Iran, a more advanced economy in Iran and possibilities to
have employment and services were influences as well. Therefore, the migration
of Afghans to Iran had elements of mixed migration combined with political and
economic reasons. However, for many it was linear migration from one country
to another.
By the mid-1980s (i.e., in less than a decade), the number of Afghan immi-
grants in Iran rose from 0.5 to 2 million (Hugo et al. 2012, 265). Before and after
1978, there were also Afghans migrating to Iran for economic reasons, such as
when a drought in the 1970s devastated agriculture in Afghanistan and when the
growing oil extraction boom in Iran necessitated a labour force (Stigter 2006;
Saito 2009). Subsequently, in the 1980–1990s, the Afghan migrants in Iran mostly
belonged to the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara ethnic groups mostly from rural areas
in the west and north of Afghanistan (UNHCR 2000; Turton & Marsden 2002,
11). Most Afghan Pashtuns fled from Afghanistan to Pashtun-dominated regions
in Pakistan and settled there in 300 refugee camps and Afghan Refugee Villages
created by the UNHCR (Saito 2009, 3–4). In 1990, more than 6.3 million Afghan
refugees were in Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries, including 3.3 million in
Pakistan and 3 million in Iran (UNHCR 2000).
Until the early 1990s, most Afghan refugees entering Iran were called mohajer-
in, and they were given the right to remain in Iran indefinitely. Mohajerin means
a religious Muslim migrant and “recalls the flight of the Prophet Muhammad
from Mecca to Medina in order to escape prosecution” (Yarbakhsh 2018). Until

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 21
1992, Iran provided ‘blue cards’ for Afghans who entered the country, indicating
their status as involuntary migrants (mohajerin) and not refugees (panahandegan;
Rajaee 2000). Furthermore, ‘white cards’ had been issued in the pre-revolution-
ary period (before 1979) for refugees (panahandegan). White cards offered greater
advantages than blue cards, such as exemption from taxes, the right to work
and to obtain Convention travel documents (issued to a person in difficulties
in gaining a travel document from their country of origin). However, after the
Islamic Revolution, white cards were issued mostly to highly educated individu-
als, in particular to Iraqis (Frelick 1999). Many Afghans were integrated into the
Iranian labour market, occupying low-qualification jobs in construction, indus-
trial mills, quarries and agriculture (Monsutti & Balci 2014).
After the 1992 fall of the pro-Soviet Najibullah government of Afghanistan,
the ‘open door’ policy of Iran (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005) changed. The earlier
policy of welcoming mohajerin Afghans transformed into a more focused refu-
gee policy in which Afghans were defined as panahandegan (Rajaee 2000, 56–58).
The government of Iran no longer automatically granted Afghans permanent
residence rights and refugee statuses. Such change and the consequent consid-
eration of Afghans as guests, visitors, refugees, resident foreigners and irregular
unauthorized migrants have been discussed by Yarkbakhsh (2018) and Kasimis
(2019). They point out the complexity of providing long-term unconditional
hospitality and practicing particular forms of (un)hospitality that sustain the
differences between hosts and guests and between hosts and other people who
are not considered either hosts or guests (see also Dimitriadi 2018, 140–145). Ac-
cording to Naseh et al. (2018), there were also more practical reasons such as
financial and security costs of maintaining nearly two million refugees in the
aftermath of Iran's baby boom, the expensive war with Iraq, and economic sanc-
tions (see also Rajaee 2000).
In the 1990s, up to 300,000 Afghans were in refugee camps, and the remain-
ing 2.5 million mostly lived in urban areas. The policy in Iran was to accommo-
date Afghans mostly outside of specific refugee camps (Strand et al. 2004). Addi-
tionally, the relocation of Afghans to some geographic areas, such as northeast
Iran, was encouraged by the government of Iran (Rajaee 2000). In addition, Iran
started to restrict the Afghans’ access to public services, especially education-
al and medical services (Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi 2015, 24). Furthermore, the
government of Iran “started to issue temporary registration cards” for undocu-
mented and documented Afghan migrants (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008, 15).
New Afghan migrants who came to Iran were granted with refugee status
(Strand et al. 2004, 2). However, the government of Iran started to encourage
Afghans to return to Afghanistan to redevelop their country of origin. Concur-
rently, through a tripartite agreement between Afghanistan, Iran and the UN-
HCR, the government of Iran negotiated the immediate repatriation of up to

22 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
700,000 Afghans. The repatriation policy from 1993–2001 faced a large challenge
due to conflicts between the returning mohajerin groups and the rise of the fun-
damentalist Taliban movement. The unrest in Afghanistan led to a civil war, and
later, the Taliban controlled most of Afghanistan. In addition, there was not
enough financial support to operationalize the repatriation to the extent it had
been planned (Calabrese 2016, 138). The Afghans continued to arrive in Iran,
which the Iranian authorities tolerated. However, the initial straight linear mi-
gration from Afghanistan to Iran started to have features of transit migration
when some Afghans migrated to third countries. Also, circular migration existed
between Afghanistan and Iran.
2.2 Repatriation vs. separation or integration policies
In the 21st century, Iran has implemented, in principle, two policies regarding
Afghans. The first policy is to repatriate Afghans from Iran to Afghanistan. The
aim is to reduce the amount of Afghans in Iran. The second policy is to design
the position of those Afghans who remain in Iran. This latter policy has gone
through various stages. In general, policies were implemented in the early 2000s
to separate Afghans from Iranians. However, in the 2010s, policies enhanced the
integration of Afghans to the Iranian society.
As regards the ‘internal policy’ towards Afghans, Iran started in 2000 to reg-
ulate foreign nationals in Iran, based on Iran’s Third Development Plan 2000–
2004. According to article 180, the Executive Coordination Council for For-
eign Nationals was established in the Ministry of Interior to coordinate foreign
national affairs. In 2001, Iran’s government ratified a law which restricted the
movement and residency of foreign nationals (including Afghans) in Iran. The
reasons mentioned were national security, public interest and health (Farzin &
Jadali 2013). Of the 31 provinces in Iran, 17 became full no-go areas (NGA) for
foreigners (including Afghans), and 11 became partial NGAs (see also Figure 3.2
in Section 3.2). This policy has been implemented since 2007. These areas have
been called ‘Afghan-free zones’, in which Afghans (as well as other foreign na-
tionals) were prohibited from residing or visiting, or where their presence was
strongly regulated and restricted.
Afghans were authorized to move freely within their designated provinces of
residence. This also necessitated the establishment of new refugee settlements
where Afghans were clustered in many provinces. Being constrained to live in
such settlements caused trouble and unhappiness for some Afghans, who had
earlier lived rather freely in Iran. The mobility of Afghans also became regulat-
ed. To travel to other provinces, Afghan refugees were required to inform the
authorities and obtain travel permits before their travel. In addition, Afghan
refugees were only allowed to work within their areas of residence and in spe-
cific jobs. The limitations in the free spatial and occupational mobility of Afghan

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 23
refugees in Iran were implemented as if they were agreed upon internationally
in the 1951 Convention on the status of refugees. Iran made reservations in the
Convention’s Articles 17 (employment) and 26 (freedom of movement of refu-
gees; Farzin & Jadali 2013).
Furthermore, in the early 2000s, Iran restricted services for Afghans, includ-
ing their access to Iranian schools. Then, Afghan pupils continued their educa-
tions in self-regulated schools, generally managed by Afghans. A few years lat-
er, this policy changed, and documented Afghan regular migrants could attend
public Iranian schools; but, irregular undocumented Afghan pupils had to study
in self-regulated schools. Abbasi Shavazi et al. (2008, 19) argued that, in 2002,
the self-regulated schools were declared illegal by the government of Iran to
encourage Afghans to return to Afghanistan (Hoodfar 2010, 146). Subsequently,
hundreds of self-regulated schools closed in several cities in Iran.
In 2003, Iran established a new integrated ‘Amayesh’ registration system for
Afghans. The Amayesh card was issued for all Afghans who had been granted res-
idency rights in Iran based simply on their Afghan nationality in the 1980s and
1990s (i.e., during the ‘open door’ policy). These Afghans were granted short-
term residence permits they needed to extend regularly by the authorities, pay-
ing for such services. These registration cards replaced all other previously is-
sued documents for Afghans and became the only valid refugee documentation
in Iran (Naseh et al. 2018). The new arriving Afghans no longer receive refugee
status. Only new born Afghans, whose parents have refugee statuses in Iran,
are granted an Amayesh card and the related refugee status. Subsequently, the
number of refugees in Iran has been approximately 1 million. Therefore, Yar-
bakhsh (2018, 6) claims that despite “Iran has obligations under international
law to process asylum claims, in practice few number of Afghans could be able
to lodge such claims.” Amayesh is a census conducted by BAFIA for identifying
refugees in Iran. Consequently, an Amayesh card is issued for refugees and such
card needs to be extended annually (in 2019 was issued the Amayesh number 14).
Furthermore, Iran approved the policy document entitled “regulations about
accelerating repatriating of Afghans” in 2003. This regulation emphasizes the re-
patriation of Afghan migrants through the strict control of Iran’s eastern borders
and roads (article 1); combat against smuggling and strict penalty for smugglers
(article 2); restrictions on hiring Afghan workers without working permission
and punishment for employers who hire them (article 3); restrictions on access
to specific public services for Afghans (except Afghans with passports and valid
visas), which include services that extend their presence in Iran, such as prohi-
bition of all social, cultural and political activities of Afghan groups and parties,
prohibition of opening new bank accounts and restriction in insurance services
(article 4); encouraging of repatriation and warning Iranian employers to avoid
hiring Afghans without working permission through Iran’s national TV pro-

24 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
grams (article 5); restriction in renting houses for Afghans (except for Afghans
with passport and valid visa), and they should ask permission from provincial
BAFIA Offices (article 8); and focus on budget devoted to rebuild Afghanistan
with projects that facilitate the resettlement of returnees in Afghanistan (article
9). It was considered that such limitations in the everyday life of Afghans in Iran
would make Afghans think of migrating to Afghanistan or on third countries.
However, in the 2010s, the number of returning Afghan refugees from Iran to
Afghanistan has remained small, 2,000–10,000 persons annually. In 2018, under
the UNHCR’s facilitated voluntary repatriation program, around 2,000 Afghan
refugees returned from Iran to Afghanistan and around 800 Afghans in January–
June, 2019 (UNHCR 2019b).
As regards the ‘external policy’ towards Afghans in Iran, the voluntary and
forced repatriation of Afghans became a significant activity. As mentioned, Af-
ghanistan, Iran and the UNHCR signed an agreement in 2002 for the repatri-
ation of Afghans. Since then, the UNHCR has assisted in repatriating almost 1
million Afghan refugees from Iran. Most returned in 2002–2005 (UNHCR 2017a),
and also hundreds of thousands of Afghans returned without the assistance of
the UNHCR. However, the worsening security in Afghanistan substantially di-
minished the number of Afghan refugee returners down to a few thousand
annually. In 2012, the governments of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan and the
UNHCR adopted the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees to Support Voluntary Re-
patriation, Sustainable Reintegration and Assistance to Host Countries (SSAR). The SSAR
outlines the need for increased voluntary repatriation and also for enhanced
resettlement (Westerby et al. 2013, 57). Again, the fragility of security in Afghani-
stan prevented many Afghans migrating from Iran to Afghanistan. At the end of
the 2010s, 88% of Afghan refugees live in Pakistan and Iran (UNHCR 2018).
The majority of Afghan refugees and other migrants reside in Iran and Paki-
stan; thus, the majority of returnees originated from these countries. Different
factors affect migrants’ decisions to return to Afghanistan. “Fears of deportation
and uncertain legal status in the case of Pakistan and economic difficulty and in-
tegration concerns in the case of Iran” (The Mixed Migration Centre 2019) have
been the most important factors in the past few years. The UNHCR facilitates the
voluntary repatriation of Afghan migrants but “does not promote returns due to
the prevailing security situation in Afghanistan” (IOM & UNHCR 2019).
According to the IOM (2019), from 2012–2018, there were 1.9 million volun-
tary returns by undocumented Afghan migrants from Iran to Afghanistan and
1.8 million deportations of undocumented Afghans from Iran to Afghanistan; in
total 3.7 million migrations crossed the border (Table 2.1). The number of irreg-
ular Afghan returnees from Iran have varied considerably in the 2010s. Accord-
ing to IOM (2016), “The decrease in returns from Iran in 2016 can be partially
attributed to an overall decrease in [Afghans’] arrivals in Europe compared with

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 25
2015. In addition, the decrease can be linked to an improvement in the Iranian
economy following the relaxing of international financial sanctions, resulting in
the need for more Afghan laborers”. In total, 75% of returnees from Iran in 2016
were men, while 25% were women (IOM 2016). The lowest number of voluntary
Afghan returnees was 194,000 in 2017, and the highest was 356,000 in 2018. The
lowest number of deported undocumented irregular Afghans from Iran was
195,000 in 2016, and the highest number was 412,000 in 2018 (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1. Voluntary returns and forced deportations of Afghan irregular migrants from Iran, 2012–
2018.
Spontaneous returnees Deportees Total
2012 279 012 250 731 529 743
2013 217 483 220 846 438 329
2014 286 222 218 565 504 791
2015 316 415 227 601 544 016
2016 248 764 194 763 443 527
2017 194 321 271 982 466 303
2018 355 523 412 140 767 663
Total 1 897 740 1 796 628 3 694 368
Source: IOM (2015); IOM (2016); IOM (2017); IOM (2018).
In 2018, the number of voluntary returns and forced deportations of irregular
Afghan migrants rose rapidly in Iran. This was driven by “recent political and
economic issues in Iran including massive currency devaluation … as Afghans
primarily work in the informal economy in Iran the demand for this type of
work is drastically reduced.” The geographical distribution of returnees shows
that “29% of the undocumented Afghans returning from Iran returned from
Tehran, 25% from Fars, 16% from Razavi Khorasan and the remaining [30%] from
other provinces”. On the other hand, irregular migrant returnees from Iran
went mostly to the northern provinces of Afghanistan, including Badakhshan,
Badghis, Baghlan, Balkh and Bamyan. Based on IOM’s weekly report on return-
ees, 2019, the number of Afghan irregular migrant returnees from Iran to Af-
ghanistan decreased by 39% compared with 2018. This is, again, an average an-
nual number of returnees in the 2010s (IOM 2018; IOM 2019).
Voluntary or forced returning from Iran to Afghanistan can be a challenge
for Afghans. However, much of the ‘returning’ is actually an exercise of cyclical
migration (i.e., people travel back and forth between Afghanistan and Iran). In
fact, UNHCR and IOM (2019) declare in their report that most Afghans “move
back and forth between neighboring countries, particularly Iran for employ-
ment, trade or other temporary reasons and it is unclear to estimate how much
of these returnees represent sustainable returns or it is ongoing cross border

26 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
movement”. Generally, “return patterns from Iran tend to be cyclical in nature,
with the same individual crossing the border and returning multiple times in
one year”(IOM 2016). Therefore, the migration between Iran and Afghanistan
could be seen as more of a cyclical cross-border mobility than migration. A per-
manent return to Afghanistan can be challenging, if not dangerous. Many recent
returnees to Afghanistan face challenges in “food insecurity, shelter, land, live-
lihoods and access to services including civil documentation” (IOM & UNHCR
2019). There are also psychological problems (well-being) and lack of support
and access to aid after Afghans return (The Mixed Migration Centre 2019). Fur-
thermore, Majidi (2018) notes that “deportees may find themselves in situations
of greater threat in Afghanistan than they experienced before their migration,
so it adds to their reasons to leave again”.
Nevertheless, to facilitate the repatriation policy, Iran focused on ‘changing
refugee status to passport’ and ‘exit and return program’. The first is to reduce
the number of Afghan refugees (Amayesh card holders) through providing some
services only for regular Afghan migrants (i.e., those with Afghan passports and
valid visas), particularly for Afghans who want to study at university. In the early
years of this policy, Afghan students with refugee statuses, who had graduated
from an Iranian university, had to leave Iran (presumably to Afghanistan) af-
ter graduation. The current policy is that Afghan students with Amayesh cards
can get extendable ‘normal visas’, but they have to change their statuses from
refugees to Afghan nationals (Afghan passport holders). For this, male Afghan
refugee students residing in Iran have to leave Iran and get passports and visas
in Afghanistan. Female Afghan students can visit Kish Island in southern Iran
to get visas or receive the visas in Afghanistan, similar to the male students (BA-
FIA Tehran 2019). Some of these practices provide a chance for the second- and
third-generation Afghans in Iran to visit Afghanistan. Furthermore, as Afghans
are restricted to work in few specific employment fields in Iran, some Afghan
students cannot work in Iran in their fields of study, and they are encouraged to
return to Afghanistan.
Changing the refugee status to a regular migrant position with an Afghan
passport and visa is also followed by administrative procedures regarding mar-
riage. According to the interviews, an Afghan refugee (Amayesh card holder)
who wants to marry an Afghan migrant (holder of an Afghan passport) should
renounce his or her refugee status and become a regular migrant. In addition,
most second- and third-generation Afghans who need to travel to other coun-
tries (including pilgrims to Mecca-Hajj) or need to move more freely inside Iran
prefer to change their statuses from refugees to regular migrants, particularly
persons dealing with business.
The second aspect is to facilitate visiting Afghanistan by the ‘exit and return’
policy. From 2018, Afghan refugees (Amayesh card holders), as well as regular

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 27
Afghan migrants (Afghan passport holders with temporary 6-month valid visas),
can visit Afghanistan for one month and then return to Iran. This provides a
chance for Afghan refugees to visit their relatives in Afghanistan or to do their
administrative works there without losing their refugee statuses in Iran (Em-
bassy of Afghanistan in Tehran 2018). Again, this also provides an opportunity to
consider return migration to Afghanistan. For almost all younger Afghans, this
would not be a true return migration because they have never lived in Afghan-
istan. It would be migration to a country of which they have heard but of which
they do not have any first-hand experience.
It does not seem plausible that all Afghans would migrate from Iran to Af-
ghanistan (see Section 1.4 and Chapter 4). A strong divisive policy leading into
segregation of Afghans in Iran could limit the beneficial opportunities emerging
from millions of Afghans in Iran. It seems the policies in the early 2000s that
focused on the separation and segregation of Afghans were gradually changing
in the 2010s into policies also considering integration aspects (see also Yark-
bahksh 2018; Kasimis 2019). For instance, several regulations passed to facilitate
Afghans’ (holders of Amayesh cards or Afghan passports) social and economic
integrations to Iran. For example, access to services for regular Afghan migrants
was expanded in 2010s. The general access to public schools for all Afghan chil-
dren, including irregular undocumented Afghan migrants, started in 2015, af-
ter Iran’s Supreme Leader’s decree (see NRC 2017). Many Afghans had studied in
self-regulated schools, and they had to attend the entrance exams before being
able to enter public schools. The Iranian education system does not accept the
quality of education and documents issued by self-regulated schools. Further-
more, due to the lack of basic documents for Afghan students, the poor eco-
nomic conditions of the families and cultural barriers, some could not study in
schools or had to dropout from school, particularly Afghan girls. The Afghans’
access to basic education is crucial because, according to the Iran Population
Census in 2016, of 1.3 million (over 10 years old) foreign nationals, more than a
third (37%; 480,000 persons) were illiterate (Ministry of Cooperatives, Labour,
and Social Welfare 2018).
Irregular Afghans have also been legalized through a ‘headcount program’.
Each undocumented family receives a common code entitled ‘headcount code’
and each family member a separate code entitled ‘dedicated code’. It is the simi-
lar to the Amayesh card holders’ family or household codes. The refugees’ family
or household codes are the same for all family members, and the dedicated code
is specific for each Amayesh card holder.
Two headcount practices were conducted in 2017. Based on BAFIA’s announce-
ment, in the first headcount exercise, three groups of irregular Afghans could
be registered (UNHCR 2019), including families who have pupils registered in
school (in accordance with the Iran’s Supreme Leader’s decree in 2015, as men-

28 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
tioned above); undocumented foreign nationals who married Iranian nation-
als; and spouses and children of documented Afghan refugees (holders of valid
Amayesh cards). Through registration of their children in a school, an irregular
Afghan could receive a headcount code (in Farsi: ) that allows the pu-
pil and his or her family members to stay in Iran. These families should register
their children in school annually after receiving a permission letter from Ke-
falat offices. In July 2017, another headcount program was conducted for those
irregular Afghans who could not attend the first phase. This phase focused on
undocumented Afghans, including holders of invalid Amayesh cards (Amayesh
number 1 to 9) and Afghan passport holders with expired visas or other invalid
documents, as well as Afghans who missed the first phase of registration (BAFIA
2019). In the 2010s, Iran has implemented a relaxed policy to extend Amayesh
cards to refugees who forgot or missed the deadline of extending their cards.
Also, other practical relaxations of earlier regulations have taken place. For
example, the access of Afghans (both Afghan passport and Amayesh card hold-
ers) to obtain a driving license has recently been relaxed. In addition, Afghan
refugees’ access to online bank services is another supportive policy change for
Afghan refugees in Iran. Before, Afghan refugees were not allowed to use online
or electronic services of their bank accounts. Furthermore, from 2019 onward,
children born in Iran from mixed marriages between Afghan husbands and Ira-
nian wives have legal rights to acquire the citizenship of Iran before they are
18 years old age. In the earlier law, it was possible to acquire citizenship after
they were 18 years old. This influences the lives of thousands of children born
from Iranian mothers and non-Iranian (e.g., Afghan) fathers (Parliament of Iran
2019).
2.3 Impact of international regimes and policies
The contemporary (since the 1970s) migration between Afghanistan and Iran
is partly a regional issue. The two neighbouring countries have certain cultur-
al similarities, but Iran is wealthier, more developed and more stable than Af-
ghanistan. Therefore, the traditional push and pull factors explain part of the
migration of Afghans to Iran; that is, Afghans can get access to better livelihoods
in Iran and support themselves in Iran and potentially also their families and
relatives in Afghanistan through remittances. Monsutti (2008) claims that, for
Afghans, back-and-forth movements between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and
beyond is a key mobility-based livelihood strategy.
However, international politics have also had a significant impact on migra-
tion. As discussed, the Soviet invasion and the support for the communist re-
gime in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and 1980s triggered the massive migration
from Afghanistan to Iran. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the country’s
tension with the United States and the West exacerbated, which “probably ex-

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 29
plains why Iran did not, at least initially, seek international assistance in dealing
with the influx of refugees” (Turton & Marsden 2002, 11). Compared with Paki-
stan, Iran only received a little international support (Kamal 2010, 188). The UN-
HCR refers explicitly to the unfair distribution of international funds devoted to
Pakistan and Iran for the Afghan refugee issue (UNHCR 2000, 117–119):
The level of international assistance provided to the refugees in Pakistan
and Iran also differed markedly. While donors contributed vast sums of
money to assist Afghan refugees in Pakistan during the 1980s, they pro-
vided little for Afghans in Iran—even though the Afghan refugees in Iran
comprised one of the world’s largest refugee populations at the time.
The disparity in expenditures between Pakistan and Iran remained sub-
stantial throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Between 1979 and 1997, UNHCR
spent more than US$1 billion on Afghan refugees in Pakistan, but only
US$150 million on those in Iran.
In Iran, a similar project was set up in the late 1980s in the South Kho-
rasan rangeland … as with other projects in Iran, however, donors were
less willing to provide funds for the project. Of the US$18 million initially
requested by UNHCR and IFAD [International Fund for Agricultural Devel-
opment] for this project, only a third was forthcoming during the project’s
first five years.
Political and military interventions of the United States, the NATO and the EU
in Afghanistan in the early 21st century had an impact, for example, establishing
and destructing political and military stability in Afghanistan. The political (in)
stability, especially the impact of the Taliban, created and constrained opportu-
nities for development in Afghanistan. Afghans had to move from their home
areas to other parts of Afghanistan, to the neighbouring countries of Iran and
Pakistan and further to the third countries, including those in the EU. However,
the Afghan refugee resettlements to the United States have been limited due to
political reasons (Micinski 2018).
As mentioned, since the early 21st century, the mobility of Afghans between
Afghanistan and Iran has been an efficient livelihood strategy, allowing for many
to send remittances from Iran to Afghanistan. This has been a key contribution
to the economy of Afghanistan and has also helped the lives of many families in
Afghanistan (Stigter & Monsutti 2005). Such mobility is affected by the economic
situations in Afghanistan and Iran, as discussed with the example of the recent
international sanctions on Iran.
The lives of Afghans have been affected by sanctions imposed by the Unit-
ed States and the EU, particularly in the 2010s. According to Christiansen (2016,
23), since 2012, the United States and the EU’s imposed “economic sanctions [on
Iran] have affected the Afghan refugees tremendously; both in terms of their fi-

30 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
nancial situation, and in terms of levels of discrimination and the amount of in-
ternational aid and humanitarian assistance they have been able to receive”. The
Joint Comprehensive Plan for Action (JCPOA) agreement between Iran and the
P5+1 countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the
United States) in 2015 resulted in the withdrawal of sanctions against Iran, and
the economic condition of Iran improved. This led to a “decrease in the number
of Afghan undocumented returnees from Iran to Afghanistan in 2016 due to re-
laxing of international financial sanctions” (IOM 2016). The growing economy
in Iran created a demand for labour, including in construction which is a field
occupied by many Afghans. Improved employment opportunities for Afghans in
Iran also supported the labour-related migration.
However, political changes took place after the presidential elections in the
United States in 2016. The United States withdrew from the agreement in mid-
2018 and launched new economic sanctions against Iran. This led to an econom-
ic downturn in Iran and a significant devaluation of the national currency. It
affected Afghans in Iran, and it was an especially challenging situation for those
Afghans who had come to Iran to send remittances to Afghanistan. A particularly
large number of Afghans returned from Iran to Afghanistan in 2018 (see, e.g.,
IOM & UNHCR 2019). The consequences of the economic sanctions for the mi-
gration of Afghans in Iran are discussed more in detail in Section 3.2.
International geopolitical tensions, initiated by the actions of the United
States, have grown in 2020 in the Middle East, and especially in Iran. The joint
impact of growing geopolitical and economic pressures on Afghans’ migration
aspirations and migration is still to be seen. However, the situation in Iran may
become increasingly challenging and insecure for Afghans. This would decrease
their labour-related irregular migration from Afghanistan to Iran, especially in
the fields affected by these tensions, however, to a lesser extent in agriculture
in which many irregular Afghans work in rural areas. Growing tensions may ac-
celerate the outmigration of Afghans from Iran. The migration destinations de-
pend on (perceived) opportunities and possibilities to cross the borders—mostly
either to Afghanistan or toward the EU through Turkey.

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 31
3. RESEARCH RESULTS ABOUT AFGHANS IN IRAN
Chapter 3 discusses the survey respondents’ backgrounds and analyses Afghan
refugees, regular migrants and irregular migrants’ migration to and within Iran,
as well as their migration aspirations to Afghanistan and third countries. Ap-
proximately three out of four Afghans have experienced some form of displace-
ment during their lifetimes (IOM 2016b). Therefore, migration is part of life for
many Afghans. Over the last few decades, millions of Afghans have migrated to
Iran. Some have remained there, while others have moved to third countries.
Many also returned to Afghanistan.
In 2019, more than 3 million Afghans lived in Iran. All Afghans in Iran have
a connection to the Afghan culture that varies over time among them. Living in
Iran for extended periods has distanced some from Afghanistan, a country that
many younger Afghans have never visited. They have heard many old stories and
more recent pessimistic information about Afghanistan. Therefore, for many,
‘returning’ to Afghanistan would mean moving to a new country. If Iran is not
the country in which they desire to spend the rest of their lives, and if Afghani-
stan is not perceived as having a secure future, where do Afghans in Iran aim to
migrate? Their migration aspirations are of international interest. Migration is
challenging, so many Afghans aspire to migrate within Iran. Difficulties in every-
day life can be relieved by thinking about migration without the need to move
away. However, migration aspirations can trigger decisive actions such as mov-
ing to another country.
As discussed in Section 1.3, straightforward, linear migration is transform-
ing into various kinds of mobility. Many Afghans utilised and continue to uti-
lise cross-border mobility to gain the advantages of moving to Iran, returning
to Afghanistan and continuing such back-and-forth mobility. Often, the same
people and families engage in this practice (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005; Glaze-
brook & Abbasi-Shavazi 2007; Saito 2009). Bagheri and Fluri (2019) claimed that
the circular migration of young Afghan men to Iran is, besides a form of func-
tional economic migration, also a rite of passage in the process of becoming a
man within one’s home community. However, if perceived and real conditions
change in Afghanistan or Iran, such back-and forth mobility can quickly become
migration with permanent move from one country to another.
3.1 Afghan respondents’ backgrounds
The survey respondents comprised 2,009 Afghans in Iran who were at least 15
years old. The respondents included 1,207 (60%) officially designated Afghan ref-
ugees (Amayesh card holders recognised by the Iranian authorities and the UN-
HCR), 445 (23%) authorised Afghan regular migrants (Afghan passport holders
with the required Iranian residency visa) and 344 (17%) unauthorised irregular

32 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
Afghan migrants (those living in Iran without the required documents or the
consent of the Iranian authorities). The analysis mainly utilised the following
categories: Afghan refugees in refugee settlements, Afghan refugees outside ref-
ugee settlements in large urban regions, Afghan regular migrants and Afghan
irregular migrants.
Of the respondents, 1,365 persons (68%) lived in the larger urban regions
of Tehran (590 persons, 43%), Mashhad (240 persons, 18%), Isfahan (346 per-
sons, 25%) and Kerman (189 persons, 14%). These sites are referred to in the
report as ‘larger cities’. In addition, 546 persons (27%) lived in the refugee
guest settlements of Bani Najjar, Bardsir, Rafsanjan and Torbat-e Jam (called
‘guest settlements’ in this report), and 98 persons (5%) lived in villages and
suburban areas in Kerman and Razavi Khorasan provinces (called ‘other are-
as’ in this report). The precise location of the sites is explained in Section 1.2
(see also Figure 1.1).
However, the respondents’ categorisation as Afghan refugees, regular mi-
grants or irregular migrants is not fixed. Some respondents possessed Amayesh
cards that had expired or temporarily lost their validity. They still counted as
refugees but could not necessarily use all refugee services. Some current regu-
lar migrants were previously refugees, and some former regular migrants had
received legal permission to enter Iran and reside there. However, for various
reasons, they failed to extend their residence permits or did so too late, so they
temporarily became irregular migrants whose presence in Iran was unauthor-
ised. In addition, recent changes to Iranian law meant that some respondents,
such as children born to Iranian mothers and Afghan fathers or specific talented
Afghans, could apply for Iranian citizenship. Thereafter, they would become Ira-
nian citizens with Afghan backgrounds.
Irregular migrants’ situations might change as well. Irregular Afghan mi-
grants included many kinds of people, such as Afghans who entered Iran illegal-
ly for seasonal work (often in agriculture) or for long-term work (often in con-
struction, clothing or industries). Some planned to stay only for a few months,
then return to Afghanistan. Others had lived in Iran for several years and in-
tended to remain in Iran permanently. Some, however, planned to leave Iran
for the EU. In the forthcoming ‘Afghan headcount’ processes, some irregular
migrants might be regularised.
As discussed above, no reliable, detailed information about all Afghans in
Iran exists. The 2016 census covered 1.6 million Afghans. Roughly one third (35%)
of Afghans were younger than 15 years old, another third (33%) were 15–29 years
old and the remaining third (33%) were 30 years old or older (Table 3.1). In other
words, two thirds of all Afghans counted in Iran’s 2016 census were younger than
30 years of age. However, the census probably covered only half of Afghans in
Iran, and especially few irregular Afghan migrants. The census did not ask about

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 33
the resident status of foreign nationals, including that of Afghans, so it is impos-
sible to distinguish Afghan refugees, regular migrants and irregular migrants
based on census data.
Table 3.1. Iran’s 2016 Population Census of 1.6 million Afghans in Iran.
Gender Total Men Women Urban areas Rural areas
Age Number % Number % Number % Number % Number %
0–14 550,470 34.8 283,191 33.5 267,279 36.2 432,712 34.8 117,718 34.5
15–29 515,156 32.5 268,725 31.8 246,431 33.4 401,905 32.4 112,868 33.1
30–44 304,529 19.2 167,166 19.8 137,363 18.6 239,624 19.3 64,740 19.0
45–59 150,377 9.5 86,029 10.2 64,348 8.7 118,672 9.6 31,624 9.3
60–74 51,610 3.3 32,412 3.8 19,198 2.6 40,169 3.2 11,435 3.4
75+ 11,837 0.7 7,744 0.9 4,093 0.6 9,250 0.7 2,583 0.8
Total 1,583,979 100 845,267 100 738,712 100 1,242,332 100 340,968 100
Source: Statistical Center of Iran (2016)
As regards the gender of Afghan survey respondents, slightly more than half
(52%) were male, and slightly fewer than half (48%) were female. These num-
bers resemble those of the 2016 Iran Population Census, in which 53% of Afghans
were men and 47% were women (Statistical Center of Iran 2016). However, ir-
regular Afghan migrants were not covered entirely by the census. In the survey,
men outnumbered women among regular and irregular migrants (Table 3.2). In
2018, among irregular Afghan migrants who returned from Iran to Afghanistan,
75% were men and 25% were women. Male irregular Afghan immigrants engage
in much more back-and-forth and circular migration than Afghan women do
(IOM 2018). However, the genders are more balanced among irregular migrants
who remain in Iran than among those who frequently cross the border between
Iran and Afghanistan illegally. Such travel can be very demanding, and it is not
always suitable for women travelling alone.
The survey respondents’ age distribution was as follows: 15–18 years of age
(10%); 19–29 years (43%); 30–49 years (33%); 50–64 years (11%); and 65 years or
older (3%; see Table 3.2). According to the 2016 Iran Population Census, among
Afghans ages 15 and older, 15–29-year-olds made up 49.8% of the popula-
tion; 30–44-year-olds accounted for 29.5%; 45–59-year-olds made up 14.6%;
60–74-year-olds represented 5.0%; and at those least 75 years old comprised
1.1% (see Table 3.1; Statistical Center of Iran 2016). In general, among irregu-
lar Afghan migrants, the vast majority are younger adults, and the proportion
of older individuals is smaller than among regular Afghan migrants and ref-
ugees. The share of young adults (less than 30 years of age) is slightly higher
among Afghan migrants compared with Afghan refugees. Likewise, the share
of older (over 50 years of age) Afghans is lower among migrants compared with
refugees.

34 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
Table 3.2. Demographic backgrounds of Afghan respondents (%).
Refugees in
guest settlement
Refugees
elsewhere
Regular
migrants
Irregular
migrants
All
respondents
man
wom-
an all man
wom-
an all man
wom-
an all man
wom-
an all man
wom-
an all
15–18 years 15 10 13 6 12 9 5 11 8 10 12 10 9 11 10
19–29 years 24 34 29 38 54 46 49 57 53 47 43 46 39 48 43
30–49 years 36 45 40 35 27 30 34 27 30 30 29 30 34 32 33
50–64 years 16 9 12 17 6 12 8 3 6 11 14 12 13 7 11
65– years 9 2 6 4 1 3 4 2 3 2 2 2 5 2 3
Total 50 50 100 48 52 100 48 52 100 69 31 100 52 48 100
In the 2016 Iran Population Census, 78% of Afghans in Iran lived in urban areas,
and 22% lived in rural areas (Statistical Center of Iran 2016). There is a consid-
erable difference in urban–rural distribution among Afghans in Iran. According
to the 2016 Iran Population Census, the proportion of Afghans in urban areas
was the highest in South Khorasan (93%), Qom (92%) and Isfahan (91%) provinc-
es and lowest in Golestan (47%), West Azerbaijan (54%), Sistan and Baluchistan
(54%) and Mazandaran (54%) provinces. The latter provinces are also those with
lowest urbanisation rates in Iran(Statistical Centre of Iran 2016).
Two out of three survey respondents (68%) lived in larger Iranian cities. A
further one out of four (27%) lived in urban or semi-urban refugee guest set-
tlements that were usually located a bit further from the existing towns. The
remaining few (5%) respondents lived in rural or semi-rural areas. In all, the
survey sample represents the gender and age distribution of Afghans in Iran, as
well as their urban–rural and geographical distribution.
The urban–rural distribution of Afghans in Iran can also be explored based
on their origins and where they have lived most of their lives. Some Afghans in
Iran originate from urban areas, and others come from rural areas. About two
thirds (69%) of all respondents had lived most of their lives in towns, cities or
urban areas, and about one third (31%) had lived in rural areas or villages. Three
out of five (62%) Afghanistan-born respondents originated from cities, as did
four out of five (81%) Iran-born Afghans. Two groups with the largest share of re-
spondents with urban backgrounds were married, employed men over 30 years
old who came to Iran before 2003 and young, single women born in Iran. Those
with rural backgrounds are often employed men born in Afghanistan who have
low education levels and families in Iran.
Urban–rural differences exist regarding the status of Afghans in Iran. Among
Afghan refugee respondents born in Afghanistan, almost two out of five (38%)
had lived most of their lives in rural areas or villages, and slightly over three out
of five (62%) lived in towns, cities and urban areas. Far fewer Afghan refugees
born in Iran (one out of five, 19%) mentioned that they had lived most of their
lives in rural areas or villages, and four out of five (81%) reported living in towns,

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 35
cities and urban areas. Large differences exist also among Afghan migrant re-
spondents in terms of their country of origin. Of Afghan regular migrants (45%
born in Afghanistan and 55% born in Iran), two out of five (20%) had lived most
of their lives in rural areas or villages, and four out of five (80%) lived in towns,
cities and urban areas. Many more (over two out of five, 45%) irregular Afghan
migrants (65% born in Afghanistan and 35% born in Iran) had lived most of their
lives in rural areas or villages, and, consequently, far fewer (a slight majority,
55%) lived in towns, cities and urban areas. The respondents’ backgrounds vary
among larger groups of Afghans such as refugees, regular migrants and irregu-
lar migrants.
3.2 Afghan respondents’ migration to and within Iran
3.2.1. Migration of Afghans to Iran
Some Afghan respondents had stayed in Iran for decades, whereas others had
arrived only recently (see Table 3.3). Two out of three respondents (67%) were
born in Afghanistan, and one out of three (33%) were born in Iran. As discussed
in Chapter 2, most Afghans could obtain refugee status in Iran until 2003. Al-
most all refugee respondents born in Afghanistan (97%) came to Iran prior to
2003. In other words, most have stayed in Iran for decades. After 2003, in prac-
tice, new Afghan refugees in Iran are limited to children born to Afghan refugees
already in Iran. Afghan refugees have been ‘stuck’ in Iran because they were not
allowed travel abroad until 2018, when they were granted the legal right to make
short visits to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, a few refugees have travelled without
the proper consent of the Iranian authorities between Iran and Afghanistan or
even to third countries, including those in the EU, without losing their refugee
status. Refugees must renew their Amayesh cards annually, so they can stay out-
side Iran for almost two years without losing their status if their travel goes un-
noticed by the Iranian authorities.
Three out of four regular migrants (73%) came to Iran before 2003. These in-
clude also Afghans who previously had refugee status in Iran but later obtained
Afghan passports and Iranian residence permits and thus became regular mi-
grants. In general, irregular migrants came to Iran later than Afghan refugees
and regular migrants. One out of four (25%) irregular migrant respondents came
to Iran before 2003. They may have had refugee status previously, but later lost
it, or they may have been regular migrants who failed to extend their legal stay
in Iran. After almost two decades in Iran, they are not yet regularised. Among ir-
regular migrants living in large cities, substantially more (over one out of three,
35%) came to Iran less than five years ago (2015–2019). Far fewer regular migrants
living in large cities (9%) came to Iran less than five years ago, and almost no ref-
ugees did so (see Table 3.3).

36 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
Table 3.3. Afghan respondents’ time of migration to Iran (%).
Refugees in
guest settlement
Refugees
elsewhere
Regular
migrants
Irregular
migrants
all N all N all N all N
2018–2019 0 0 8 9 10 22
2015–2017 0 0 1 1 4 5 28 59
2010–2014 1 1 3 6 8 9 26 54
2004–2009 2 5 1 1 6 7 10 20
1990–2003 21 53 54 110 47 55 16 34
1979–1989 69 172 35 71 21 24 8 16
Before 1979 7 17 6 13 6 7 2 4
Total 100 248 100 202 100 116 100 209
Afghans’ arrival years and age relate to the development of different generations
of Afghans in Iran, of which four already exist. The first generation of Afghans
came to Iran as adults, mostly in the 1980s and 1990s, during the ‘open door’
policy. Many were from rural Afghanistan and had rather modest educational
backgrounds. Some had children, often young ones, who were born in Afghan-
istan. Later, while staying in Iran, many first-generation Afghans had children
who became the second-generation Afghans, almost all of whom were initially
refugees (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2012).
Most second-generation Afghans were born to Afghan parent(s) in Iran dur-
ing the period 1977–1992. In other words, they were 27–42 years old in 2019.
These second-generation Afghans could receive refugee status in Iran because
they were born in Iran to recognised refugees. In recent years, some younger
second-generation Afghans changed their status to that of regular Afghan mi-
grants to study at Iranian universities. Some also preferred to acquire Afghan
passports to be able to visit other countries.
According to Abbasi-Shavazi et al. (2008), the values and economic aspira-
tions of first- and second-generation Afghans in Iran differ. First-generation Af-
ghans had direct experiences in Afghanistan in the 1970s and even several dec-
ades before that. Many came to Iran in the 1980s and 1990s when the situation of
Afghans and attitudes towards them were different in Iran compared with the
situations in the early 21st century. Second-generation Afghans were brought up
in Iran. In general, they experienced a more liberal social and religious environ-
ment than the first generation, but exceptions exist (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2012).
Nevertheless, second-generation Afghans in Iran seldom have direct experienc-
es of life in Afghanistan. If they do, it is often connected to years of major conflict
in Afghanistan.
Third- and fourth- generation Afghans already reside in Iran. The third gen-
eration of Afghan migrants comprises the children of those Afghans who were
very young when they came to Iran (usually with their parents or relatives) or
who were born in Iran to Afghan parents. Third-generation Afghans were all

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 37
born in Iran between 1993 and 2015 and their parents were also born in Iran in
some cases. In 2019, the oldest third-generation Afghans were around 25 years
old, but the majority were younger, and the youngest were pre-school age. Some
had direct connections to Afghanistan, and a few had visited the country, but the
majority had not. As discussed above, to study in Iran, refugees must become
regular migrants, so an increasing number of third-generation Afghans do so.
Some third-generation Afghans, specifically those born to mixed marriages be-
tween Afghans and Iranians, can and have become Iranian citizens.
Looking forward to the 2020s, the fourth generation of Afghan migrants in
Iran are the grandchildren of those Afghans who were very young in the late 1970s
or who were born in Iran in the 1980s. Fourth-generation Afghans were born in
the 2010s in Iran, so in 2019, they were babies or very young children. They were
born into a world with widespread Internet access, so they will grow up with dig-
ital access to Afghanistan and other countries. This might make their experiences
and attitudes different than those of the earlier generations of Afghans in Iran.
Afghans’ intentions in coming to Iran also differed. Some aimed from the be-
ginning to remain in Iran permanently. Others aimed to stay in Iran for a period
and return to Afghanistan later. Some Afghans also intended to transit through
Iran to a third country. In general, in all studied groups, a slight majority (51–58%
of respondents) initially intended to stay in Iran for a time and then to return to
Afghanistan (see Table 3.4). These respondents included individuals who arrived
in Iran during the period 1979–2003 and thus could easily receive refugee status.
However, after several decades, they remain in Iran. Almost two out of five (38%)
current refugees who decided to migrate to Iran before 2003 intended to remain
permanently in Iran from the beginning. In general, few respondents came to
Iran with the intention of moving to a third country (i.e. not Iran or Afghan-
istan). If such migrants did come to Iran, many had probably already left the
country by 2019. The proportion of such respondents was largest (22%) among
irregular migrants consider moving further—and many of these migrants came
to Iran only recently.
Table 3.4. Afghan respondents’ migration intentions after deciding to come to Iran (%).
Refugees in
guest settlement
Refugees
elsewhere
Regular
migrants
Irregular
migrants
all N all N all N all N
To stay in Iran 38 82 28 44 28 54
To stay in Iran
and then return
to Afghanistan
51 110 58 92 52 105
To move to other
country than Iran 12 27 16 26 22 45
In an open question, almost half (46%) of respondents mentioned war and in-
security in Afghanistan as their main reasons for coming to Iran. Other main

38 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
reasons included unemployment, poverty and Afghanistan’s generally unfa-
vourable financial situation (13%); the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (10%); and
family-related issues (4%). Political reasons drove most Afghans to move to Iran.
However, some Afghans indicated mixed reasons for migration, including polit-
ical, economic and social factors. Economic reasons for migrating to Iran were
most common among the majority (52%) of irregular migrants.
Afghans expressed various economic, social and political reasons for choos-
ing Iran over other countries when asked about this topic in a structural ques-
tion (see Table 3.5). All Afghan groups described the same most significant fac-
tors (having very much or much importance) for migrating to Iran: war and
insecurity in Afghanistan. The family’s decision to move to Iran was very signif-
icant for three out of five (60%) Afghan refugees. However, compelling reasons
to migrate to Iran differed among Afghan groups. For refugees living outside the
guest settlements in Iran, the most significant factors were cultural and linguis-
tic similarities between Afghanistan and Iran, which facilitated their migration
and residence in Iran. For regular migrants, factors included having the same
religion as Iranians. This was a very important topic for the majority of current
refugees living in large cities in Iran. For irregular migrants, the most significant
factor was the possibility of earning better salaries in Iran. Cultural or religious
similarities had less importance for a much larger share (23–31%) of irregular
migrants than for regular migrants (8–15%) or refugees (7–8%). Access to more
amenities or better education opportunities also had less importance among ir-
regular migrants compared with regular migrants and refugees.
Table 3.5. Importance of reasons for Afghan respondents’ migration to Iran instead of an-
other country (%).
Refugees in
guest settlement
Refugees
elsewhere
Regular
migrants
Irregular
migrants
VM M S No VM M S No VM M S No VM M S No
Have better earning
possibilities 24 23 26 27 31 21 26 22 39 26 21 14
Access amenities,
better education 29 26 24 21 27 27 27 19 17 20 23 40
Same religion with
Iranians 58 22 12 8 45 25 15 15 31 17 21 31
Cultural and
linguistic similarities 53 28 12 7 43 29 20 8 29 24 24 23
Having family or
relatives in Iran 35 24 19 22 32 22 20 26 23 21 30 26
Family decided to
move to Iran 60 17 10 13 54 17 10 19 29 14 10 47
Unemployment in
Afghanistan 24 16 21 39 24 22 20 34 38 22 14 26
War and insecurity
in Afghanistan 82 15 2 1 69 17 7 7 67 13 6 14
VM = very much important; M = much important; S = slightly important; No = not important

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 39
Thinking about remaining in Iran or aspiring to migrate elsewhere did not
necessarily lead to action. However, these attitudes reflect Afghan migrants’
thoughts as regards the continuity of their presence in Iran at the time of the
survey (in 2019 for Afghans living in large cities and in 2017 for Afghans living in
the guest settlements and other areas).
The respondents had different thoughts regarding whether to remain in Iran
for the rest of their lives. Among all respondents, almost one out of three (30%)
agreed that they will likely live in Iran for the rest of their lives, one out of three
(34%) did not know how to answer this question and slightly more than one
out of three (36%) disagreed with this statement. Answers also varied by gen-
der, age, employment, legal status in Afghanistan, etc. (see Table 3.6). Compar-
ing respondents (in 2019) agreeing to stay for the rest of their lives in Iran with
those who did not agree on it, those who agreed had more often at least one
Iranian friend among their close friends (65% vs. 59%), felt more often Iranians
friendly toward him/her (49% vs. 31%) and well-treated in his/her current place
in Iran (40% vs. 19%). Furthermore, comparing those respondents who agreed
with those who did not agree to stay in Iran, of those, whose aim was to stay for
the rest of their lives in Iran, more (30% vs. 12%) searched from the Internet and
social media about places where to live in the future in Iran. Of these who think
to stay in Iran, substantially fewer (27% vs. 56%) searched about places to live
in Europe through the Internet and social media and fewer (42% vs. 57%) used
these tools to follow the current situation in Afghanistan.
However, economic reasons were important. Grawert and Mielke (2018)
highlighted how mobility and migration are unnecessary for those lower-class
Afghans who can rely on translocal networks in Iran as a livelihood option. Var-
ious activities such as remittances, information exchanges about local (labour
market) circumstances, hosting relatives and guiding them through necessary
administrative and other activities help migrants’ maintain their way of life in
Iran without the need to migrate abroad.
To believe to remain in Iran for the rest of their lives (40% of refugees in guest
settlements; 29% of refugees elsewhere; 25% of regular migrants; 24% of irregu-
lar migrants) was most commonly answered among employed but poorly edu-
cated refugees who came to Iran before 2003 and who did not leave immediate
family members behind in Afghanistan. In addition, among the oldest (65 years
or older) respondents, almost all refugees (94–97%) think they will remain in
Iran, as do a great many (83%) of the oldest regular migrants. Furthermore, hav-
ing friends, feeling treated well and considering Iranians friendly also matters
for Afghans thinking to stay or not to stay in Iran.
Those who disagreed that they would remain in Iran for the rest of their lives
(and therefore think that they will migrate away from Iran) comprised 25% of
refugees in the guest settlements, 32% of refugees elsewhere, 41% of regular mi-

40 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
grants, and 53% of irregular migrants. They were most often relatively young,
employed irregular male migrants who resided in large cities and had fam-
ily in Afghanistan. Another group was young, single, childless Afghan women
who originated in cities and had no family in Afghanistan. Many of them were
employed, one third attended university and most came to Iran before 2003.
Among irregular young adult immigrants, five out of six (83%) did not think they
would remain in Iran. Most such respondents intended to travel either to Af-
ghanistan (see Section 3.2.2) or to the EU (see Section 3.2.3).
Table 3.6. Afghan respondents who think they will live in Iran for the rest of their lives (%).
Refugees in
guest settlement
Refugees
elsewhere
Regular
migrants
Irregular
migrants
A DK D N A DK D N A DK D N A DK D N
Total 40 35 25 503 29 39 32 652 25 34 41 433 24 23 53 338
Men 40 32 28 255 28 39 33 309 26 33 41 210 22 18 60 231
Women 40 37 23 248 28 41 31 338 24 35 41 222 28 35 37 105
15–18 years 23 42 35 65 21 39 40 57 20 51 29 35 19 26 55 38
19–29 years 36 33 31 146 21 41 38 301 22 28 50 230 23 20 57 153
30–49 years 37 36 27 198 32 42 26 197 24 41 35 130 19 29 52 99
50–64 years 61 32 7 62 47 28 25 76 48 28 24 25 45 22 33 40
65– years 68 29 3 31 61 33 6 18 58 25 17 12 0 17 83 6
Unmarried 32 47 31 202 22 36 42 288 17 33 50 221 18 21 61 143
Married 46 26 22 287 34 42 24 360 32 36 32 211 28 25 47 193
With children in Iran 48 31 21 258 39 38 23 163 29 41 30 59 45 22 33 78
With family in
Afghanistan 26 44 30 196 21 37 42 164 13 23 64 208
Employed 37 33 30 279 26 39 35 344 24 32 44 238 24 22 54 230
Unemployed /
inactive 32 39 29 282 25 36 39 176 18 26 56 93
Only elementary
education 34 39 27 143 31 38 31 78 19 21 60 101
Attended university 32 34 34 35 17 46 37 65 19 27 54 177 11 29 60 28
A = agree; DK = don’t know; D = disagree; N = number of respondents
In the 2019 survey, respondents were asked whether higher salaries than they
currently receive would make them want to stay in Iran. In general, a higher
salary was not a key trigger for the majority of Afghans to remain in Iran. Slightly
more than two out of five (43%) employed respondents agreed that a higher sal-
ary would make them want to stay in Iran, one out of four (24%) did not know to
answer this question and one out of three (33%) disagreed with this statement.
Those for whom a higher salary would be a significant compelling factor to stay
in Iran included married Afghan respondents with urban backgrounds and
family, friends and education in Iran.
Almost half of refugees living outside the refugee settlements (48%) agreed
that a higher than salary would make them want to stay in Iran; one out of four
(25%) did not know, and one out of four (27%) disagreed with this statement.
Among regular migrants, slightly more than two out of five (43%) agreed, one

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 41
out of four (26%) did not know and almost one out of three (31%) disagreed.
Among irregular migrants, slightly more than two out of five (44%) agreed, one
out of six (17%) did not know and two out of five (39%) disagreed.
The Iranian currency lost value against the Afghan currency in 2018. In Jan-
uary 2018, one Afghan Afghani was worth 630 Iranian Rial, but the rate was one
to 1,440 in December 2018 and one to 1,700 in December 2019–then the worth
of Rial was 37% of that of Afghani two years before. The currency devaluation
impacted many Afghans living in Iran rather strongly because it became more
difficult to earn enough to send remittances from Iran to Afghanistan. In 2019,
almost two out of three (total 64%; 37% fully; 27% partly) refugee respondents
agreed that they considered moving from Iran to another country after the cur-
rency devaluation. Opinions were similar among regular migrants (total 64%;
fully 35%; partly 29%) and irregular migrants (total 62%; fully 39%; partly 23%).
The currency devaluation in 2018 had the largest impact on consideration
of outmigration from Iran among unmarried young adult employed Afghans
originating from cities. Another group consisted of married Afghan men over
30 years of age who came to Iran before 2003 and had low education levels. The
currency devaluation had the least impact on married, childless Afghan refugees
who were born in Iran, lived in large Iranian cities and had low education lev-
els. Another such group consisted of employed regular and irregular migrants
who were younger than 50 years old and lived in Iran without children. Many of
them had attended university.
Some Afghans decided to migrate from Iran eventually. They described var-
ious different reasons and impacts when making their migration decisions (see
Table 3.7). However, their decisions have not yet been actualised, i.e. all respond-
ents still live in Iran. For Afghan irregular migrants who decided to migrate from
Iran, the most commonly expressed reason (85% yes; 10% partly) for leaving Iran
was difficulty securing an Iranian residence permit. Finding a job with a better
salary in a new destination country was a compelling factor expressed by many
(83% yes; 8% partly) such respondents. Many current irregular Afghans would
like to become permanently regularised in Iran and have sufficient employment
to sustain their lives in Iran. The least important reason for them was having im-
mediate family in the country abroad (26%, supposedly most did not have family
there).
For Afghan regular migrants who decided to migrate from Iran, the most
commonly expressed important reason for doing so (77% yes; 18% partly) was
difficulty in securing an Iranian residence permit. Having higher income in the
destination country was mentioned by many (80% yes, 13% partly) such respond-
ents. The least important reason was having immediate family in that country
(27%, i.e. they most likely did not have family there). For Afghan refugees who
decided to migrate from Iran, the most commonly expressed important reason

42 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
(80% yes; 13% partly) was to provide a better future for their children in the des-
tination country. Half of them also mentioned having immediate family in the
destination country (34% yes; 18% partly). The least important reason was having
friends and relatives in the destination country (32% yes; 29% partly).
Table 3.7. Importance of reasons for Afghan respondents’ decision to migrate from Iran (%).
Refugees in
guest settlement
Refugees
elsewhere
Regular
migrants
Irregular
migrants
Ye s
Partly
No
N
Ye s
Partly
No
N
Ye s
Partly
No
N
Ye s
Partly
No
N
Diculties
in residence
permit in Iran
80 14 6 598 77 18 5 410 85 10 5 240
Better future for
my children in
the destination
country
80 13 7 589 81 11 8 407 74 14 12 236
Find a job
with better
revenue in the
destination
country
81 13 6 598 80 13 7 407 83 8 9 236
My immediate
family (parents,
brother/sister
or children) in
the destination
country
34 18 48 586 27 18 55 402 26 17 57 236
Having friends
and relatives in
the destination
country
32 29 39 577 31 24 45 391 28 21 51 236
Yes = important; Partly = partially important; No = not important; N = number of respondents
3.2.2. Migration of Afghans within Iran
A major structural condition that regulates the location of all Afghans in Iran is
the designation of provinces and areas in which Afghans can and cannot reside
(see Figure 3.1). Furthermore, general national policies direct the Afghan pop-
ulation’s migration, creating factors that push and pull them towards specific
urban and rural areas. Afghan refugees and regular migrants can choose their
location in Iran, but only within areas designated by the law. In addition, the
migration of Afghan refugees living in guest settlements is strongly regulated.
For example, in some guest settlements, refugees need permission to move in
or out. In others, the inhabitants can leave the settlement freely but need per-
mission to leave the province or Iran (usually to travel to Afghanistan). However,
Afghans living in guest settlements account for only 2–3% of all Afghans in Iran.

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 43
It is challenging to study the actual migration of all Afghans in Iran because
the majority are irregular migrants about whom the authorities have less in-
formation. Seasonal labour migrants (workers) from Afghanistan migrate for
weeks to months to specific sites in Iran where their workforce is in demand—for
example, during harvest seasons. Migration also affects areas in need of workers
in heavy industries and construction, such as large cities.
1. Alborz
2. Ardabil
3. Bushehr
4. Chaharmahal &
Bakhtiari
5. East Azarbaijan
6. Isfahan
7. Fars
8. Gilan
9. Golestan
10. Hamadan
11. Hormozgan
12. Ilam
13. Kerman
14. Kermashah
15. Khuzestan
16. Kohgiluyeh &
Boyer-Ahmad
17. Kurdistan
18. Lorestan
19. Markazi
20. Mazandaran
21. North Khorasan
22. Qazvin
23. Qom
24. Razavi Khorasan
25. Semnan
26. Sistan &
Baluchestan
27. South Khorasan
28. Tehran
29. West Azarbaijan
30. Yazd
31. Zanjan
No-Go Areas
Partially restricted
Unrestricted
Figure 3.1. Restricted areas (“no-go areas”) in Iran, in which Afghans and other foreign
nationals are not entitled to live or travel without specic permission.
According to the 2016 Iran Population Census, the Afghan population accounted
for 2.0% of Iran’s total population and 95.7% of all foreigners in Iran (see Table 3.8).
The largest Afghan population lived in Tehran province (515,567; 33% of all Afghans

44 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
and 31% of those younger than 15 years old counted in the census). This was fol-
lowed by Razavi Khorasan (219,442; 14% of all Afghans and 13% of young Afghans
in Iran), Isfahan (183,124; 12% of all Afghans and 13% of young Afghans in Iran) and
Kerman (125,411; 8% of all Afghans and 9% of young Afghans in Iran). The remaining
third (33%) of Afghans lived in other provinces (Statistical Center of Iran 2016). Due
to regulations restricting the presence of foreign nationals in many areas of Iran,
almost no Afghans lived in 13 out of 31 provinces. The share of Afghans counted in
the census was 1–3% in seven provinces and over 3% in six provinces; the propor-
tion was highest in Qom (7.5%; Table 3.8). Qom hosts a Shia Muslim holy shrine and
religious schools (Hawza) in which some Afghans study. According to the 2016 Iran
Population Census, from 2011 to 2016, the number of Afghans in Iran rose by 9.1%
(131,466 persons), including an 11.3% increase in Tehran (52,377 persons). However,
this census probably accounts for less than half of all Afghans in Iran. In addition, it
does not provide information about the migration of Afghans within Iran.
Table 3.8. Afghans in Iran according to Iran’s Population Census of 2016.
Province
Total
population
Foreign
nationals
Afghan
nationals
Afghans’
share of
population
Afghans’
share of
foreigners
Alborz 2,712,400 84,805 84,321 3.1 99.4
Ardabil 1,270,420 74 35 0.0 47.3
Bushehr 1,163,400 30,286 29,691 2.6 98.0
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari 947,763 106 91 0.0 85.8
East Azarbaijan 3,909,652 342 139 0.0 40.6
Fars 4,851,274 110,098 109,247 2.3 99.2
Gilan 2,530,696 425 309 0.0 72.7
Golestan 1,868,819 18,782 18,273 1.0 97.3
Hamedan 1,738,234 444 217 0.0 48.9
Hormozgan 1,776,415 26,107 24,195 1.4 92.7
Ilam 580,158 1734 29 0.0 1.7
Isfahan 5,120,850 186,390 183,124 3.6 98.2
Kerman 3,164,718 126,106 125,411 4.0 99.4
Kermanshah 1,952,434 883 47 0.0 5.3
Khuzestan 4,710,509 11,432 6,290 0.1 55.0
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad 713,052 1,559 1,503 0.2 96.4
Kurdistan 1,603,011 450 18 0.0 4.0
Lorestan 1,760,649 331 99 0.0 29.9
Markazi 1,429,475 29,650 29,257 2.0 98.7
Mazandaran 3,283,582 2,749 2,623 0.1 95.4
North Khorasan 863,092 127 93 0.0 73.2
Qazvin 1,273,761 18,686 18,401 1.4 98.5
Qom 1,292,283 120,028 96,367 7.5 80.3
Razavi Khorasan 6,434,501 232,671 219,442 3.4 94.3
Semnan 702,360 35,544 35,409 5.0 99.6
Sistan and Baluchestan 2,775,014 29,676 26,846 1.0 90.5
South Khorasan 768,898 5,075 5,045 0.7 99.4
Tehran 13,267,637 525,033 515,567 3.9 98.2
West Azarbaijan 3,265,219 951 107 0.0 11.3
Yazd 1,138,533 53,643 51,743 4.5 96.5
Zanjan 1,057,461 201 40 0.0 19.9
Total 79,926,270 1,654,388 1,583,979 2.0 95.7
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran (2016).

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 45
Among all survey respondents, few Afghans did not plan to migrate to Afghanistan
or elsewhere abroad. Three groups were keen on staying in Iran. One consisted of
Afghans who have settled their lives firmly in Iran. These respondents were 50–64
years old, came to Iran more than 20 years ago from Afghan villages, and had fam-
ily members in Iran. Another group consisted of younger family-oriented Afghans
with spouses and children in Iran. Most originated from cities and had spent 10–20
years in Iran. The third group consisted of irregular migrants who came to Iran
after 2003, had low education levels and had immediate family in Afghanistan
whom they needed to support by being (working) in Iran.
Despite strong regulations regarding the provinces and areas in which Af-
ghans can reside, Afghans migrate and aspire to migrate within Iran. Only a
slight majority (54%) of respondents preferred to remain in the Iranian province
in which they lived at the time of survey (2017 or 2019). The survey analysed the
migration aspirations of Afghans in Iran in various ways.
First, the migration aspirations from one Iranian province to another were
measured by counting the share of respondents who preferred to live in the
same or a different province than where they lived at the time of the survey. The
smallest outmigration potential of Afghans (by respondents’ preferred provinc-
es) was in the Razavi Khorasan province, which three out of four (77%) respond-
ents mentioned is their most preferred province in Iran. The largest outmigra-
tion potential was among respondents who lived in the Kerman province, with
three out of four (77%) respondents indicating a province other than Kerman as
their most preferred province in Iran.
Second, respondents indicated their most-preferred provinces and cities.
For the provinces in Iran, one out of three (34%) respondents mentioned Teh-
ran, followed by Razavi Khorasan (33%) and Isfahan (11%). For the cities in Iran,
one out of three (33%) mentioned Tehran, followed by Mashhad (31%) and Isfa-
han (10%). Refugees living in guest settlements most often mentioned Mashhad
(36%), followed by Tehran (16%), Isfahan (6%) and Ahvaz (6%). The respondents
living in large Iranian cities most often mentioned Tehran (41%), Mashhad (29%)
and Isfahan (11%). The respondents living in other areas (mostly rural regions)
most often mentioned Mashhad (38%), followed by Tehran (14%).
Third, the Afghans responded where they would like to be in three years (i.e.,
2020 for the 2017 respondents in guest settlements and mostly rural places and
2022 for the 2019 respondents in large cities). This was a question about their
near-term futures. Of all the Afghans who responded to this question, two out
of five (38%) mentioned Iran. Those who mentioned a particular destination in
Iran, most often named Mashhad: it was the preferred future destination for
one out of three (33%).
Fourth, Afghans selected from a list of Iranian cities as potential living plac-
es (Table 3.9). The most-desired cities for living (answering “yes” to the ques-

46 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
tion) were Mashhad (64%), Tehran (55%) and Isfahan (33%). The cities most often
mentioned as places the respondents would not like to live (answer “no”) were
Birjand (73%), Semnan (69%) and Tabriz (68%; see Table 3.9). The respondents’
current provinces impacted the answers because many mentioned cities that
were in the same provinces where they lived.
For Afghan refugees in guest settlements, the cities they most wished to live
in Iran were Mashhad (73%), Tehran (45%) and Shiraz (42%). For Afghan refugees
elsewhere in Iran, these were Mashhad (59%), Tehran (58%) and Isfahan (34%).
For regular Afghan migrants, these were Mashhad (63%), Tehran (62%) and Is-
fahan (36%). For irregular Afghan migrants, these were Mashhad (61%), Tehran
(60%) and Isfahan (32%). Of those respondents who lived in the Mashhad urban
region, almost all (94%) a wish to live in Mashhad. Of those respondents who lived
in the Tehran urban region, six out of seven (85%) expressed a wish to live in Teh-
ran. Of those respondents who lived in the Isfahan urban region, four out of five
(79%) expressed a wish to live in Isfahan. Of those respondents who lived in the
Kerman urban region, two out of five (41%) expressed a wish to live in Kerman.
Table 3.9. Afghan respondents’ wishes to live in selected cities in Iran (%).
Refugees in
guest settlement
Refugees
elsewhere
Regular
migrants
Irregular
migrants
Y M No DK N Y M No DK N Y M No DK N Y M No DK N
Mashhad 73 4 21 2 513 59 15 21 5 594 63 15 18 4 400 61 11 21 7 318
Tehran 45 12 38 5 501 58 16 23 3 610 62 16 21 1 407 60 10 27 3 325
Isfahan 32 13 46 9 492 34 13 46 8 567 36 17 39 8 374 32 11 46 11 304
Shiraz 42 8 41 9 497 17 14 55 14 561 22 18 48 12 374 24 10 53 13 305
Karaj 18 13 54 15 488 16 16 58 10 554 23 19 47 11 378 14 12 59 15 301
Kerman 22 9 60 9 493 8 6 72 14 569 9 7 71 13 373 21 4 60 15 299
Tabriz 10 12 62 16 492 6 8 73 13 555 8 10 68 14 376 4 7 71 18 300
Ahvaz 28 11 46 15 490 5 5 76 14 553 4 6 76 14 371 6 4 72 18 299
Yazd 4 6 75 15 536 5 7 75 13 374 6 6 71 17 230
Saveh 5 9 69 17 534 5 11 70 14 373 4 10 69 17 231
Semnan 23 9 55 13 498 4 6 76 14 554 3 7 76 14 374 4 6 70 20 301
Birjand 8 7 66 19 490 2 6 76 16 553 2 6 77 15 375 4 7 70 19 298
Y = yes; M = maybe; No = No; DK = don’t know; N=number of respondents
Fifth, the respondents answered whether they would like to move to the capi-
tal, Tehran. Large capital cities usually attract immigrants. Of all the Afghan re-
spondents living outside Tehran, one out of three (31%) agreed they would like
to move to Tehran, whereas a half of the respondents (50%) disagreed. Young
adults (19–29 years old) aspired migration to Tehran slightly more than other age
groups. In particular, 50–64 and 19–29-year-old refugees from guest settlements
wished to migrate to Tehran. Those who least wished to move to Tehran were
the oldest regular migrants and the refugees living elsewhere than in guest set-
tlements (see Table 3.10). Again, migration aspirations do not necessarily mean
that the respondents would move to Tehran.

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 47
Thus, Afghans living in Mashhad did not aspire to move to other places in
Iran and very few of those living in the Tehran urban region. The majority of
Afghans living outside Tehran did not aspire to migrate to Tehran. However, the
major Afghan migration potential to Tehran was from the smaller Iranian cities,
towns and rural areas but not from Mashhad and not much from Isfahan.
Table 3.10. Afghan respondents wishing to move to Tehran (%).
Refugees in
guest settlement
Refugees
elsewhere
Regular
migrants
Irregular
migrants
A DK D N A DK D N A DK D N A DK D N
15–18 years 38 14 48 69 21 21 58 33 30 5 65 20 33 15 52 27
19–29 years 44 14 42 153 20 30 50 180 27 22 51 133 32 16 52 99
30–49 years 39 12 49 203 20 19 61 113 25 20 55 69 29 31 40 67
50–64 years 53 12 35 60 26 19 55 42 42 25 33 12 19 19 62 26
65– years 37 10 53 30 9 36 55 11 0 80 20 5 25 50 25 4
Total 42 13 45 515 21 25 54 379 27 21 52 239 30 21 49 223
A = agree; DK = don’t know; D = disagree; N = number of respondents
3.3 Afghan respondents’ (return) migration and migration
aspirations to Afghanistan
3.3.1. Migration to Afghanistan
Afghans living in Iran make 3–4% of the total population in Iran and they would be
8–9% of that in Afghanistan. It is nationally and locally important to consider their
migration aspirations (i.e., whether refugee, regular or irregular Afghan migrants
in Iran migrate and/or aspire to migrate to Afghanistan). For Afghans in Iran, mi-
gration to Afghanistan is one possibility when considering migration out of Iran.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Afghans’ migration from Iran to Afghanistan takes
place in various authorised and unauthorised ways, which are influenced by
their legal categories in Iran. Overall, in recent years, around half a million Af-
ghans have migrated annually from Afghanistan to Iran and almost the same
amount of Afghans from Iran to Afghanistan (IOM 2019). Most of this is irreg-
ular migration, and some is repetitive cross-border mobility. Some is linear
straight-forward migration from one country to another. Other, especially ir-
regular migration, is circular, consisting of migration back and forth between
Iran and Afghanistan.
As regards Afghan refugees in Iran, only a few thousand have migrated an-
nually from Iran to Afghanistan in recent years assisted by the UNHCR program
(UNHCR 2019b). Yearly, this is less than 1% of all Afghan refugees in Iran. So far
such outmigration, 5–20 persons daily on average, had no major impact on their
numbers in Iran. A larger impact on the number of Afghan refugees has been
the current situation in which Afghan refugees acquire Afghan passports and
change their statuses in Iran from refugees to regular migrants. The reason usu-

48 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
ally relates to the better possibilities to study in Iran, to be employed in Iran or
Afghanistan or to get married in Iran. The balance between the factors to remain
in Iran or to move to Afghanistan favours staying in Iran.
In practice, those Afghans who have migrated from Afghanistan to Iran after
2003 have not received refugee statuses. Therefore, by the time of the survey in
2019, the Afghan refugees in Iran who had lived in Afghanistan were at least 16
years of age. The majority of Afghanistan-born refugees in Iran were 35–55 years
of age. The Afghan refugee return migrants must be at least 16 years old, and the
majority are middle-aged or older. Other Afghan refugee (those born in Iran)
migrants from Iran to Afghanistan are not return migrants because they have
never lived in Afghanistan.
Until recently, it was not possible for Afghan refugees to officially visit Af-
ghanistan from Iran without the fear of losing their refugee statuses. Therefore,
only a very few risked their stable refugee positions by visiting Afghanistan. If
they visited Afghanistan, they preferred to do it without notifying the authori-
ties. Limited contacts and possibilities to gain direct knowledge and experiences
of the current life in Afghanistan influence migration aspirations and constrain
the migration decisions of these Afghans. With the new legislation, visits by Af-
ghan refugees from Iran to Afghanistan are now possible. In general and until
recently, only a few pushing factors have triggered such migrations.
Regular migration due to functional purposes takes place between Iran and
Afghanistan as between many other neighbouring countries. An Afghan can mi-
grate to Iran to study or work there and return to Afghanistan when studies and
employment are over or when the temporary residence permit expires. It can
be estimated that during the 2010s, more Afghans with residence permits have
arrived in Iran than left the country. However, only very limited public informa-
tion exists about such migration. In March 2017–March 2018, Iran issued 7,900
work-related visas for all foreign nationals (Ministry of Cooperatives, Labour,
and Social Welfare 2018). On average, this would make 20–30 daily work-related
arrivals by foreign nationals (including Afghans) with visas in Iran.
While the regular migrations of Afghans and the migrations of Afghan refu-
gees have been very small, a considerable forced or voluntary migration of ir-
regular Afghans has taken place during recent years, approximately 400,000–
500,000 annually. On average, 1,000–1,500 irregular Afghan migrants leave Iran
daily, roughly equally between voluntary return migrants and migrants deport-
ed by the authorities. From 2012–2018, 3.7 million migrations occurred by ir-
regular Afghans from Iran to Afghanistan (see Table 2.1; IOM 2015; IOM 2016;
IOM 2017; IOM 2018). This does not mean the same number of Afghans would
have migrated because some migrated from Iran to Afghanistan (and back to
Iran) several times during these years. Nevertheless, the overall number of ir-
regular Afghan migrants did not fundamentally change in these years. There is

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 49
a considerable unauthorised immigration of Afghans to Iran, on the average of
1,000–1,500 persons daily.
3.3.2. Migration aspirations to Afghanistan
As regards Afghans’ migration aspirations, the respondents answered whether,
when and where they would like to migrate (go back) to Afghanistan and wheth-
er they planned it. They also expressed their migration intentions, for example,
their most preferred country and potential pushing and pulling factors for mi-
gration. The respondents living in larger cities in 2019 also mentioned whether
the loss of Iran’s currency value from 2018–2019 had an impact on their migra-
tion intentions.
Of the respondents, more than one out of three (36%) would like to go back
to Afghanistan, one out of four (26%) did not know about it and more than one
out of three (38%) preferred not to go back to Afghanistan. The oldest, employed
and married irregular migrants most commonly agreed with a wish to go back to
Afghanistan. Most respondents who disagreed were refugees from guest settle-
ments: unmarried, 30–49 years old and/or women (see Table 3.11).
From the refugee respondents living in guest settlements, those who most
agreed with a wish to go back to Afghanistan (38% of respondents) were em-
ployed, married men having spouses and child(ren). Usually they had rural ori-
gins, low education levels and they did not like to live in their current provinces
in Iran. Of refugees living elsewhere in Iran (outside the refugee settlements),
those who most agreed with a wish to migrate to Afghanistan (28% of respond-
ents) were unemployed young women of urban origins, who were without chil-
dren and who came to Iran before 2003. Another group consisted of employed
married men more than 30 years of age, who came to Iran before 2003. Initially,
they did not come to Iran to move to a third country or stay in Iran but to return
to Afghanistan—however, they still lived in Iran.
Regular migrants usually need to go back to Afghanistan because of tempo-
rary residence permits in Iran. However, many can extend their residence per-
mitting visas for nearly unlimited times. Of regular migrants, those who most
agreed with a wish to go back to Afghanistan (35% of respondents) were well-ed-
ucated, unmarried young adults (female and male) with urban backgrounds.
They do not want to stay in Iran and also might consider the EU as a migration
destination. Of the irregular migrants, those who most agreed with a wish to go
back to Afghanistan (50% of respondents) were relatively young employed men,
the majority of whom originated from villages in Afghanistan and who came to
Iran after 2003. They had family back in Afghanistan, and, initially, they came to
Iran with motivations to return home (see Table 3.11).
On the contrary, from the refugee respondents living in guest settlements,
those who most disagreed with a wish to go back to Afghanistan (i.e., they would

50 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
not like to migrate to Afghanistan; 46% of respondents) were usually women
from urban backgrounds without relatives in Afghanistan. They were satisfied
with the Iranian provinces where they lived. Their initial ideas to migrate to Iran
were to settle down, facilitated by a similar culture and religion in Iran. Of the
refugees living elsewhere in Iran, those who most disagreed with a wish to go
back to Afghanistan (39% of respondents) were young, single, childless adults
without families in Afghanistan. They equally considered Iran and the EU as pos-
sible future destinations. Of regular migrants, most disagreed with a wish to go
back to Afghanistan (34% of respondents) were young childless Afghans born in
Iranian cities—a third of them had attended university in Iran. Of irregular mi-
grants, those who most disagreed with a wish to go back to Afghanistan (28% of
respondents) were young, employed, Afghanistan-born men, who had immedi-
ate family back in Afghanistan and who came to Iran after 2003 (see Table 3.11).
Table 3.11. Afghan respondents who would like to go back to Afghanistan (%).
Refugees in
guest settlement
Refugees
elsewhere
Regular
migrants
Irregular
migrants
A DK D N A DK D N A DK D N A DK D N
Total 38 16 46 516 28 33 39 645 35 31 34 413 50 22 28 338
Men 43 13 44 261 28 33 39 304 34 30 36 205 54 19 27 233
Women 34 19 47 255 28 33 39 335 36 31 33 207 40 29 31 103
15–18 years 42 21 37 65 28 28 44 58 21 32 47 34 50 13 37 38
19–29 years 36 20 44 152 28 33 39 298 38 29 33 219 48 21 31 155
30–49 years 34 16 50 206 27 32 41 193 35 33 32 124 53 27 20 97
50–64 years 47 7 46 61 32 33 35 75 22 39 39 23 52 23 25 40
65– years 53 7 40 30 39 39 22 18 42 25 33 12 83 17 0 6
Unmarried 30 19 51 208 28 32 40 284 37 31 32 215 43 22 34 143
Married 45 13 42 293 20 32 38 357 33 30 37 197 55 22 23 193
With children in Iran 43 12 45 263 28 28 44 159 33 29 38 55 48 25 27 77
With children in
Afghanistan 38 35 27 190 43 29 28 156 49 26 25 207
Employed 38 16 46 285 26 34 40 337 33 34 33 233 55 20 25 230
Unemployed /
inactive 31 32 37 282 39 26 35 168 40 29 31 94
Only elementary
education 34 32 34 139 31 29 40 70 51 21 28 99
Attended university 50 28 22 36 28 46 26 65 42 30 28 174 24 35 41 29
A = agree; DK = don’t know; D = disagree; N = number of respondents
Planning to migrate to Afghanistan is a further step towards actual migration.
From the Afghan refugee respondents in guest settlements, almost one out of
three (31%) planned to return to Afghanistan, while just under half (48%) did not.
Much fewer (one out of seven, 14%) of the refugee respondents living elsewhere
in Iran planned to return to Afghanistan, while the majority (56%) did not. Of
the regular migrants, one out of four (24%) planned to return to Afghanistan,
while two out of five (43%) did not. From the irregular migrants, more than a
third (36%) planned to return to Afghanistan, and the same amount (36%) did

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 51
not. From the respondents in Tehran, one out of five (19%) planned to return to
Afghanistan, while a half (48%) did not. Finally, from those in Mashhad, one out
of seven (14%) planned to return to Afghanistan, while three out of five (59%) did
not. The Internet and social media are tools connected to migration aspirations
and planning. There is a slight difference among the Internet-using respond-
ents as regards their migration aspirations to Afghanistan (i.e., between those
who plan vs. do not plan to migrate to Afghanistan). Of those respondents, who
plan to migrate to Afghanistan, substantially more (63% vs. 41%) agreed that they
search information from the Internet and social media about the current situ-
ation in Afghanistan (23% vs. 36% disagreed to search such information and 14%
vs. 23% did not know how to answer on this).
From the refugee respondents in guest settlements, those who most often
planned to return to Afghanistan were married women with children in Iran.
They originated from the countryside and were unsatisfied with the Iranian
provinces in which they lived. Of the refugees living elsewhere in Iran, men with
especially high education levels and originating from cities planned to go back
to Afghanistan. They were pushed to Iran by war and family-related reasons,
having initial ideas to later return to Afghanistan. They did not want to migrate
to the EU nor stay in Iran, but higher salaries might motivate them to remain
in Iran. Of the regular migrants, those who most often planned the return to
Afghanistan were Iranian-born, employed, childless, young adults originat-
ing from cities and having high education levels. Very few considered staying
the rest of their lives in Iran. Of the irregular migrants, Afghanistan-born, em-
ployed, married men, who originated from the countryside, most often planned
to return to Afghanistan. They came to Iran due to unemployment in Afghani-
stan and possibilities of better earnings in Iran. They had families in Afghanistan
and did not wish to remain in Iran or migrate to the EU (see Table 3.12).
On the contrary, from the refugee respondents living in guest settlements,
those who did not plan to return to Afghanistan were employed men, who were
more than 30 years old with low education levels. They thought to stay in Iran
or migrate further to the EU. Of the refugees living elsewhere in Iran, those with
such thoughts were most often childless, employed, urban-origin women with
low to medium education levels. They were satisfied with their current provinc-
es and did not have families in Afghanistan. Of the regular migrants, the fewest
who planned to return to Afghanistan were Iran-born, employed, young adult
refugees with high education levels. They were satisfied with their provinces
and considered Iran and the EU as possible options for the future. Of the ir-
regular migrants, the fewest who planned to return to Afghanistan were young,
employed men originating from cities. They came to Iran to remain there or to
migrate to another country, especially the EU. They were highly satisfied with
their provinces, such as Mashhad and Tehran (see Table 3.12).

52 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
Table 3.12. Afghan respondents who plan to return to Afghanistan (%).
Refugees in
guest settlement
Refugees
elsewhere
Regular
migrants
Irregular
migrants
Y M No N Y M No N Y M No N Y M No N
Total 32 21 47 276 14 30 56 648 24 33 43 430 36 28 36 309
Men 28 22 50 144 15 30 55 308 24 31 45 208 41 25 34 216
Women 36 20 44 132 12 30 58 334 23 36 41 222 25 33 42 91
15–18 years 44 33 22 9 15 26 59 58 14 29 57 35 27 15 58 33
19–29 years 36 15 49 47 13 33 53 297 25 34 41 228 42 24 34 135
30–49 years 27 21 52 141 14 25 61 197 26 33 41 130 37 33 30 92
50–64 years 33 22 45 54 16 36 48 75 20 32 48 25 22 34 44 41
65– years 33 34 33 24 17 11 72 18 10 45 45 11 50 50 0 6
Unmarried 20 15 65 80 14 28 58 283 23 36 41 219 33 27 40 129
Married 36 24 40 186 14 31 55 361 24 31 45 210 38 28 34 178
With children in Iran 34 23 43 177 14 26 60 162 17 37 46 57 20 45 35 69
With children in
Afghanistan 18 40 42 194 26 38 36 163 38 28 34 209
Employed 24 20 56 168 15 29 56 343 25 31 44 235 41 27 32 206
Unemployed /
inactive 14 32 54 281 23 37 40 176 26 30 44 92
Only elementary
education 16 29 55 143 25 19 56 75 41 21 38 101
Attended university 56 16 28 18 23 31 46 64 23 42 35 179 27 38 35 26
Y=Yes plan to return; M=maybe plan to return; No=Not plan to return; N=number of respondents
If an Afghan respondent planned to go back to Afghanistan, she or he also more
often liked such a return. Of those respondents who planned to go back to Afghan-
istan, five out of six (84%) also agreed with a wish to go back to Afghanistan; a few
(7%) disagreed, and the remaining few (9%) did not know his or her feeling about
it. On the other hand, of those respondents who agreed with wanting to go back to
Afghanistan, slightly more than half (53%) planned such a return, one out of three
(32%) maybe considered it and one out of six (15%) did not plan to go back to Af-
ghanistan. Many would have liked to migrate to Afghanistan, but fewer planned it.
Migrating to Afghanistan connects to one’s preferences. Of all the respondents,
one out of five (19%) mentioned Afghanistan as the country in which he or she
would most prefer to live in the world. Of the respondents with such opinions,
four out of five (78%) agreed with a wish to go back to Afghanistan, and every sec-
ond (51%) respondent planned to do so. Those, to whom Afghanistan was the most
preferred country and who planned to return there, were most often irregular
migrants or refugees. Typically, they were employed men, who were more than
30 years old and originated from the countryside. Many were married and had
immediate family in Afghanistan. Most came to Iran with the intention to one day
return to Afghanistan and did not consider remaining in Iran or migrating to the
EU. The majority of them were unsatisfied with the provinces in which they lived.
The aspirations to stay in Iran or to migrate to Afghanistan also relate to dif-
ferent generations of Afghans in Iran, but there are also differences inside gener-

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 53
ations. Of the second- or third-generation Afghans, much fewer were interested
in moving to Afghanistan. In general, of the young Afghan adult (15–29 years old)
respondents, one out of seven mentioned Iran (13%) or Afghanistan (15%) as their
most preferred country. Of these young Afghan adults, even fewer of those born
in Iran mentioned Iran (10%) or Afghanistan (11%) as their preferred country.
They were also less interested in migrating to Afghanistan or remaining in Iran,
but three out of four (74%) considered, or may consider, the EU as a possible des-
tination for living in the future.
However, of the respondents older than 50 years, approximately one out of
three preferred Iran (31%) or Afghanistan (35%)—substantially more than the
younger respondents. The majority were men, who originated from the coun-
tryside. They were often married, had children, and (part of) immediate families
were in Afghanistan. Many were employed, and three out of four had very low
education levels. Nevertheless, four out of five (81%) of these older respondents
thought they would possibly—or for sure—stay the rest of their lives in Iran.
Of the respondents (in 2019) who planned to return to Afghanistan, few (35%)
said exactly when they would return, which indicates they have not concretely
thought about it or the return depends on many issues upon which they cannot
decide. Of those, one out of five (19%) thought they would return to Afghanistan
within one year, three out of five (60%) within 1–5 years and one out of five (21%)
after 5 years.
Migration aspirations also connected the Afghan respondents’ visits to Af-
ghanistan in recent years. Of the respondents living in large urban areas in Iran,
very few had visited Afghanistan more than twice (5%) in the last five years. One
out of five (21%) had visited the country once, and three out of four (74%) had not
visited Afghanistan in the past five years at all. The more often the respondent
had visited Afghanistan, the more likely she or he planned to return to Afghani-
stan. Of those who had visited Afghanistan more than five times in the past five
years, the majority (56%) planned to return to Afghanistan, and one out of four
(25%) did not plan to return there. Of those who had not visited Afghanistan in
the past five years, one out of five (19%) planned to return to Afghanistan, and
the majority (52%) did not plan to return there (see Table 3.13).
Table 3.13. Migration aspirations of Afghans vs. visits to Afghanistan (%).
Visit to Afghanistan
in the past 5 years
Migration
to Afghanistan
Migration
to the EU
Migration
outside Iran
Ye s Maybe No N Ye s Maybe No N Ye s D know No N
Over 5 times 56 19 25 16 35 30 35 20 63 26 11 19
2-5 times 40 34 26 62 36 32 32 62 59 29 12 63
Once 27 37 36 267 29 39 32 268 50 33 17 266
No 19 29 52 957 34 30 36 967 36 36 27 965
Total 22 31 47 1302 33 32 35 1317 24 35 41 1313

54 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
3.4 Afghan respondents’ migration and migration aspirations to
elsewhere than Afghanistan or Iran
Afghans’ migration from Iran to other countries than Afghanistan is complex.
For most countries, Afghans need visas that are difficult to obtain. Therefore,
Afghans’ migrations to third countries are mostly irregular. There is, though,
considerable (regular and irregular) migration of Afghans from Iran to Pakistan
and back. Such circular migration (also between Iran and Afghanistan) is com-
mon as a survival strategy for many low-skilled Afghans in these mostly remote
and peripheral areas (Mirlofti & Jahantigh 2016). Besides such mobility between
neighbouring countries, Afghans are involved in asylum-related migration, es-
pecially to the EU. Scalettaris et al. (2019) argue that international (asylum-relat-
ed) migration of Afghan young adults has become, among their community, a
respected passage to adulthood.
Globally, Afghans are among the nations having a proportionally large share
of population living outside the titular country. As mentioned, most live in Iran
(approximately 3 million persons) and Pakistan (2.5 million persons). Howev-
er, according to various sources and estimations, they also live in other nearby
countries, such as the United Arab Emirates (0.3 million persons), Turkey (0.2
million persons) and Russia (0.15 million persons) and in many EU member
states (0.5 million persons, including 0.26 million in Germany) and North Amer-
ica (0.2 million persons). Therefore, it is relevant to study the migration aspira-
tions of Afghans in Iran, as regards Turkey, the EU and other Western countries.
In 2015–2018, 445,600 asylum applications were presented in the EU member
states by Afghans, making them the second largest group in the EU (Eurostat
2016; Eurostat 2019). It is unclear how many of them were Afghans from Iran.
Since the large asylum migration to the EU in 2015–2016, Afghans’ migration
experiences in their journeys to Europe have been addressed in many studies
(see, e.g., IMO 2016b; Dimitriadi 2018; Scalettaris et al. 2019). The journeys of Af-
ghans from Iran to the EU are very complex. Afghans have to illegally cross bor-
ders, and many have to use smugglers and subject themselves to various dangers
(Dimitriadi 2018). Their intentions might be linear migration, for example, from
Tehran to Berlin. Many kinds of migrants use the same routes to Turkey, and
some continue further to Greece. However, many have immobile stages along
the journeys. The initial transit country (such as Turkey) might become a desti-
nation, even for years (Jauhiainen & Vorobeva 2020). In these journeys, there are
different Afghans mixed: those from Afghanistan with those from Iran or Paki-
stan. Some flee war and insecurity, others aim for better livelihoods and there
are also migrants wishing to join their families and friends who already made
the journeys, for example, to the EU. Some fail in the asylum process, return to
Iran and later restart the journey. Others manage to do this journey within 1–2

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 55
years without losing their refugee statuses in Iran and finally decide to remain in
Iran due to the impossibility of receiving asylum or residence permits in the EU.
In the latter 2010s, people of Afghan origin became the second-largest group
of asylum seekers in the EU (Eurostat 2016; Eurostat 2019). Estimations and spec-
ulations have been presented about the migration potential of Afghans from
Iran to the EU. For example, Iran’s Minister of Interior, Rahmani-Fazli, claimed
in September 2016 that, based on the surveys conducted by the ministry, 60% of
Afghans in Iran wanted to migrate to European countries (Mehr News Agency
2016). It is unclear how wide and representative this survey was and whether it
considered all kinds of Afghans in Iran, namely refugees, regular migrants and
irregular migrants.
In another study, Abbasi Shavazi et al. (2016) studied the intention of irregular
migration to Europe among Afghans in Iran in 2010 and 2015. Based on a sample
of 1,201 respondents, they claimed that “35% of them did not have any inten-
tion to migrate to other countries and preferred either to stay in Iran or return
to Afghanistan. Around 39% of respondents considered European Countries
for migration followed by Australia (22%)”. Based on a survey in 2017 with 644
Afghan refugees and irregular migrants in Iran, Jauhiainen and Eyvazlu (2018)
mentioned almost half of them hoped to migrate abroad, mainly to Europe and,
to a lesser extent, Australia or Canada. However, their study focused mostly on
Afghans in refugee settlements in Iran.
Leaving out the potential migration to Pakistan or other poorer countries
close to Iran, Turkey could be a migration target for Afghans in Iran. In fact, in
the latter 2010s, many Afghans migrated to Turkey. Some went there having Tur-
key as their migration destination, others considered it as a transit country to-
wards on-migration to the EU. In 2019, of the Afghan refugee respondents living
in Iran outside the refugee settlements, one out of eight (12%) planned to mi-
grate to Turkey, one out of four (27%) maybe considered it and three out of five
(61%) were not planning it (see Table 3.14). Of the regular Afghan migrants, the
same amount (12%) planned to migrate to Turkey, three out of ten (30%) maybe
considered it and three out of five (60%) were not planning it. Irregular migrants
had the largest (one out of five; 20%) share of planning to migrate to Turkey; one
out of four (25%) maybe considered it and slightly more than half (55%) were not
planning it.
From all the survey respondents in 2019, approximately two out of five (43%)
considered migration to Turkey (19% yes, 24% maybe, 40% no and 17% did not
answer). Young, unmarried irregular migrants were the most keen to migrate to
Turkey; whereas, very few of the respondents 50 years or older would migrate
to Turkey. Of those who planned to migrate to Turkey, three out of five (61%)
had family or friends in Turkey. Of those Afghan respondents who had family
or friends in Turkey, one out of five (20%) for sure planned to move there, more

56 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
than one out of three (36%) maybe considered it and more than two out of five
(44%) did not plan to move there even if they had family or friends there.
However, the abovementioned answers do not directly indicate if Turkey
is the aspired destination because the main route to the EU for Afghans goes
through Turkey. Of those respondents who were definitely planning to migrate
to Turkey, more than three out of four (78%) planned for sure to migrate to the
EU, one out of eight (13%) maybe considered it and a few (9%) did not plan to mi-
grate to the EU. The overwhelming majority (91%) expressed that they could use
Turkey as a transit country to the EU. Of those who maybe planned to migrate to
Turkey, two out of four (39%) planned for sure to migrate to the EU, more than
half (53%) maybe considered it and a few (9%) did not plan to migrate to the EU.
Of all the Afghan respondents, only a few (4%) planned to migrate to Turkey and
to remain there for sure.
Table 3.14. Afghan respondents planning to migrate to Turkey (%).
Refugees in
guest settlement
Refugees
elsewhere
Regular
migrants
Irregular
migrants
Y M No N Y M No N Y M No N Y M No N
Total 12 27 61 627 12 30 58 433 20 25 55 268
Men 11 29 60 294 13 29 58 209 21 23 56 181
Women 12 26 62 328 11 31 58 223 19 28 53 85
15–18 years 14 22 64 58 17 36 47 36 33 15 52 27
19–29 years 14 31 55 297 14 29 57 229 28 28 44 116
30–49 years 8 28 64 184 8 34 58 130 15 28 57 82
50–64 years 12 18 70 68 8 24 68 25 6 14 80 36
65– years 0 18 82 17 0 0 100 12 0 17 83 6
Unmarried 13 31 56 286 12 34 54 221 29 26 45 113
Married 10 25 65 337 11 27 62 211 14 23 63 153
With children in Iran 14 16 70 139 8 33 59 58 10 28 62 47
With family in
Afghanistan 14 27 59 196 13 34 53 163 20 26 54 208
Employed 12 31 57 319 16 31 53 237 19 27 54 166
Unemployed /
inactive 11 25 64 285 7 28 65 176 22 21 57 94
Only elementary
education 13 24 63 142 14 31 55 77 16 27 57 100
Attended university 11 25 64 63 9 34 57 178 31 27 42 26
Y = Yes plan to migrate; M = maybe plan to migrate; No = Not plan to migrate; N = number of respondents
The migration of Afghans to the EU has been on the international agenda, espe-
cially from 2015 onward, when 1.26 million asylum applications were presented
in the EU member states. Most Afghans travelled through Turkey to Greece, and
many continued further to Germany. In 2015, in 13 of the 28 EU member states—
including Germany, Finland and Sweden—Afghans were among the three largest
groups to arrive (Eurostat 2016). In 2018, Afghans were among the three largest
groups to arrive in nine EU member states, and the second largest group in the
EU in total (Eurostat 2019).

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 57
Of the Afghan refugee respondents living in the refugee settlements in Iran,
slightly more than one out of three (36%) planned (in 2017) to migrate to the EU,
one out of five (20%) maybe considered doing so and more than two out of five
(44%) were not planning to do so. Of the refugee respondents living elsewhere
in Iran, almost one out of three (31%) planned (in 2019) to migrate to the EU
(32% maybe; 37% not). Of regular migrant respondents, one out of three (34%)
planned (in 2019) to migrate to the EU (37% maybe; 29% not). Of irregular mi-
grant respondents, one out of three (33%) planned (in 2019) to migrate to the
EU (20% maybe; 47% not; see Table 3.15). In all, about one out three Afghans thus
planned to migrate to the EU; however, the future will show if these plans trans-
form into a real migration.
In general, the largest share of those planning to migrate to the EU was among
refugees and irregular migrants with high education levels, and young unmar-
ried adults, as well as middle-aged men in guest settlements. The lowest share
was among respondents 50 years or older, irregular migrants having children
in Iran and refugees with high education levels living outside guest settlements.
The intention to work in the EU is a main target for many who aspire to migrate
there.
Table 3.15. Afghan respondents planning to migrate to the European Union (%).
Refugees in
guest settlement
Refugees
elsewhere
Regular
migrants
Irregular
migrants
Y M No N Y M No N Y M No N Y M No N
Total 36 20 44 523 31 32 37 654 34 37 29 430 33 20 47 337
Men 40 21 39 261 34 35 32 309 34 35 31 208 35 19 46 231
Women 33 18 49 262 28 31 41 340 34 38 28 221 28 22 50 104
15–18 years 36 15 49 66 36 31 33 58 31 40 29 35 33 11 56 36
19–29 years 36 27 37 150 34 36 30 300 39 39 22 228 45 21 34 154
30–49 years 44 21 35 211 28 29 43 200 31 36 33 129 23 27 50 100
50–64 years 22 9 69 64 23 31 46 75 24 32 44 25 15 13 72 39
65– years 17 3 80 30 17 17 66 18 0 8 92 12 0 17 83 6
Unmarried 40 18 42 209 36 35 29 287 36 43 21 218 44 19 37 140
Married 33 21 46 297 27 30 43 363 31 31 38 211 25 21 54 195
With children in Iran 35 15 50 269 28 24 48 162 28 36 36 58 20 13 67 80
With children in
Afghanistan 27 33 40 197 33 35 32 162 35 22 43 206
Employed 39 25 36 289 31 34 35 341 38 36 26 236 32 22 46 228
Unemployed /
inactive 31 30 39 286 32 38 30 175 35 18 47 94
Only elementary
education 29 28 43 143 30 30 40 76 33 21 46 100
Attended university 46 28 26 35 21 43 36 63 32 48 20 178 54 32 14 28
Y = Yes plan to migrate; M = maybe plan to migrate; No = Not plan to migrate; N = number of respondents
Comparing respondents agreeing to plan to migrate to the EU with those who
did not agree on it, those who plan the migration to the EU felt less often that
Iranians are friendly toward him/her (26% vs. 46%) and well-treated in his/her

58 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
current place in Iran (20% vs. 33%). However, both groups had almost equally at
least one Iranian friend among their close friends (61% vs. 60%). Of the respond-
ents, who plan to migrate to the EU, almost two out of three (64%) agreed that
they search information from the Internet and social media about places to live
in future in Europe (12% disagreed to search such information and 24% did not
know how to answer on this). Of the respondents, who use the Internet but disa-
greed to plan to migrate to the EU, much fewer (one out of five, 19%) agreed that
they search information from the Internet and social media about places to live
in future in Europe (58% disagreed to search such information and 23% did not
know how to answer on this). The Internet and social media are thus important
for many Afghans in considering the potential migration to the EU.
The Afghan respondents said where they would like to be in three years from
the time of the survey (i.e., in 2020 for refugees in refugee settlements and in
2022 for refugees elsewhere in Iran, regular migrants and irregular migrants).
Of those who responded, almost two out of three (63%) mentioned a locality or
country outside of Iran. Such locality or country was mentioned by over two out
of three (71%) irregular migrants and slightly less refugees in guest settlements
(60%), refugees elsewhere (61%) and regular migrants (62%).
Of those respondents who wanted to be abroad after three years (but not in
Afghanistan), almost every second (46%) wanted to move to Europe (39% of the
refugees in guest settlements, 48% of the refugees elsewhere, 50% of the regular
migrants and 54% of the irregular migrants), one out of ten (10%) to Australia
(20% of the refugees in guest settlements, 7% of the refugees elsewhere, 6% of the
regular migrants and 5% of the irregular migrants), a few (8%) to North America
(3% of the refugees in guest settlements, 11% of the refugees elsewhere, 13% of the
regular migrants and 5% of the irregular migrants) and the rest, one out of four
(26%), to another location abroad (34% of the refugees in guest settlements, 26%
of the refugees elsewhere, 22% of the regular migrants and 18% of the irregular
migrants). By another location abroad, the respondents mentioned geographi-
cally unspecified locations such as “an Islamic country”, “away from the current
location”, “where I would have a job”, “anywhere”, etc.
Afghan respondents also indicated if they would seek residence permits in
Finland, where Afghans make up the second-largest refugee community (see
Table 3.16). Of all the respondents, almost one out of three (31%) answered yes
to this question, more than two out of five (44%) said maybe, one out of five
(21%) said no and a few (4%) did not answer. The respondents, who most often
responded in the affirmative, were young, employed, Afghan men with some
education levels. Half of them preferred European countries as destinations and
planned migrations to the EU. Two out of five, nevertheless, said higher sala-
ries would motivate them to stay in Iran. Of those who would potentially seek
residence permits in Finland, five out of six (84%) hoped to work in Europe. In

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 59
addition, three out of five (62%) had at least some command of English, and a
third (33%) had studied at universities. Furthermore, two out of five (40%) used
the Internet on a daily basis in Iran, one out of five (21%) did so at least weekly but
one out of five (22%) did not use the Internet in Iran at all, especially in the guest
settlements. Those who did not consider seeking residence permits in Finland
were married men with immediate family in Afghanistan. Of them, one out of
two would like to return back to Afghanistan, and one out of three planned it.
Nevertheless, more than two out of five (44%) considered staying in Iran and
only one out of six (16%) wanted to migrate to the EU. Iran (33%) and Afghanistan
(31%) were among the most preferred countries. The majority stated that higher
salaries could motivate them to stay in Iran.
Table 3.16. Finland is a country in which the respondent might seek a resident permit (%).
Refugees in
guest settlement
Refugees
elsewhere
Regular
migrants
Irregular
migrants
A DK D N A DK D N A DK D N A DK D N
Total 44 36 20 511 27 53 20 645 31 53 16 426 26 39 35 338
Men 50 32 18 261 30 50 20 305 32 55 13 208 28 35 37 232
Women 38 41 21 250 26 55 19 334 31 51 18 217 22 46 32 104
15–18 years 36 46 18 67 36 41 23 58 43 46 11 35 14 46 40 37
19–29 years 50 35 15 151 29 51 20 299 31 55 14 225 30 38 32 155
30–49 years 49 35 16 203 25 60 15 193 31 50 19 129 29 34 37 98
50–64 years 38 30 32 60 22 55 23 74 25 63 12 24 15 50 35 40
65– years 21 38 41 29 17 39 44 18 16 42 42 12 0 33 67 6
Unmarried 42 41 17 209 33 51 16 287 33 53 14 219 30 38 32 142
Married 47 32 21 286 23 55 23 354 30 52 18 206 22 40 38 194
With children in Iran 43 34 23 258 21 57 22 161 35 44 21 57 26 34 40 78
With children in
Afghanistan 27 50 23 194 32 51 17 158 25 42 33 206
Employed 45 38 17 285 30 52 18 338 33 53 14 236 27 40 33 232
Unemployed /
inactive 25 54 21 280 29 54 17 172 26 33 41 92
Only elementary
education 24 55 21 141 31 55 14 75 26 44 30 99
Attended university 67 22 11 36 34 43 23 62 32 54 14 176 32 36 32 28
A = agree; DK = don’t know; D = disagree; N = number of respondents

60 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
4. CONCLUSIONS
Afghans in Iran are of international, national and local interest. They include
approximately 1 million officially recognised refugees, around 0.5 million au-
thorised regular immigrants with visas and residence permits in Iran and
around 1.5–2 million unauthorised irregular immigrants without proper rights
to reside in Iran (UNHCR 2019). These Afghans make 3–4% of the population in
Iran and would be 8–9% of the population in Afghanistan. It is important to con-
sider whether refugee, regular and irregular Afghan migrants in Iran aspire to
migrate and eventually migrate inside Iran, to Afghanistan or to third countries.
This research analysed the migration patterns of Afghan refugees, regular
migrants and irregular migrants in Iran and their migration aspirations inside
Iran, to Afghanistan and to third countries. The empirical research is based on
surveys with 2,009 Afghans in large urban regions, semi-urban and rural areas
in Iran, as well as in guest settlements for Afghan refugees. The research was
conducted by the scholars at the University of Turku (Finland), the Shahid Be-
heshti University (Iran) and the Sharif Policy Research Institute’s Iran Migration
Observatory at the Sharif University of Technology (Iran).
During the past few decades, the policies regarding Afghans have varied in
Iran. The ‘open door’ policy welcomed Afghans to Iran since the late 1970s, but it
later changed to a more selective refugee policy. In the early 2000s, the policies
emphasising separation and segregation of Afghans in Iran evolved towards the
policies in the 2010s supporting the Afghans’ presence and integration into Ira-
nian society and the access to public services in Iran.
International and national policies stabilised the number of Afghan refugees
in Iran during the last two decades. However, the number of regular migrants
has grown, mainly because former Afghan refugees became regular migrants
with Afghan passports and visas for Iran. The number of irregular migrants
considerably depends on the seasons (e.g., agriculture) and years (security and
employment opportunities in Afghanistan and economy and employment op-
portunities in Iran). Much of the irregular migration is cyclical—people cross the
border between Afghanistan and Iran and travel back and forth.
The migration of Afghans in Iran is mostly unknown because it is not properly
documented. The population census measures the number of Afghans in Irani-
an provinces. However, the census does not indicate the Afghans’ origins—Iran,
Afghanistan or third countries—and which legal statuses these Afghans have in
Iran. The 2016 Iran Population Census counted 1.6 million Afghans in Iran, while
they might have been twice as many.
The majority of Afghans in Iran live in urban areas, such as the large urban
regions of Tehran and Mashhad. The number of Afghans has grown substantial-
ly in the Tehran urban region. However, Afghans are also in rural areas, espe-
cially irregular seasonal labour migrants. A slight majority of the Afghans who

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 61
responded to the survey intended to migrate within Iran. Their most preferred
locations were Mashhad and Tehran. Almost all Afghan respondents in Mash-
had and Razavi Khorazan would like to remain there. From a list of major cities
in Iran, the respondents were least interested to live in Birjand, Semnan and
Tabriz.
Two out of five Afghan refugees in guest settlements thought they would live
the rest of their lives in Iran, as did three out of ten refugees elsewhere in Iran
and one out of four regular and irregular Afghan migrants. They were often 50–
64 years old (usually they had family members in Iran and came to Iran from Af-
ghan villages more than 20 years prior); young Afghan adults (particularly those
with urban origins, living in refugee guest settlements with their spouses and
children and having been in Iran for 10–20 years) or older regular and irregular
migrants.
If Afghans aspire or need to migrate from Iran, they can consider Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Turkey and wealthier countries in the EU and elsewhere as migration
destinations. However, such migration is challenging. Of the Afghan refugees in
guest settlements, about two out of five and one out of four elsewhere in Iran
would like to migrate to Afghanistan, and so answered one out of three Afghan
regular migrants and a half of the Afghan irregular migrants. However, fewer re-
spondents planned to migrate to Afghanistan, and even fewer will actualise this
migration. The younger an Afghan in Iran is, the more likely she or he wants to
migrate abroad, but very few younger Afghans want to migrate to Afghanistan,
which they perceive as insecure.
The migration of Afghans to the EU is of international interest. Afghans have
been the second largest community asking for asylum in the EU in recent years.
Approximately one out of three Afghan respondents agreed that they plan to
migrate to the EU, while slightly fewer did not agree with planning to migrate
and the rest did not know about their plans. Proportionally, a high share of Af-
ghan refugees and irregular migrants with high education levels, young unmar-
ried adults and middle-aged men in guest settlements planned the migration
to the EU. Very few wished to migrate to Turkey as their final destination coun-
try. Again, these migration aspirations and plans might not result in actual mi-
gration. Aspirations are time and place sensitive: positive developments in Iran
reduce the migration of Afghans from Iran. Restrictive migration and asylum
policies in Turkey, and especially in the EU, reduce the migration of Afghans and
also how many of them reach the EU.
In conclusion, about 0.85–1 million (of all 2.2 million at least 15 years of age)
Afghans in Iran plan to migrate out of Iran. About 0.6 million plan to migrate to
Afghanistan and a further 0.28–0.4 million to the EU. Many of them have young
children in Iran who will follow their parents’ migration patterns. However,
whether their plans will lead to actual migration from Iran depends on many

62 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
external factors, such as security and economic situations in Afghanistan, eco-
nomic development in Iran and possibilities of reaching the EU. Around 1.6–1.85
million Afghans (including their 0.4–0.5 million children) are more prone to re-
main in Iran, or they do not express plans to leave Iran.
However, external factors push many Afghans to migrate out of Iran. For
example, in 2018–2019, the international sanctions on Iran led to a substantial
loss in the value of Iran’s currency and created economic challenges for many
Afghans in Iran. In 2019, almost two out of three (62–64%) Afghan respondents
were fully or partly affirmative that the currency devaluation outcomes made
them think of migrating from Iran to another country. The devaluation had the
largest pushing impact to outmigration among young, unmarried, employed
Afghan adults originating from cities. Those, to whom higher salaries would be a
significant pulling factor to stay in Iran, were married Afghans with urban back-
grounds and family, friends and education in Iran. Furthermore, the growing
geopolitical tensions in Iran in 2020 have an impact on Afghans migration aspi-
rations, and eventually on their migration if these geopolitical situations aggra-
vate.
The research-based results about Afghans in Iran are important to support
Iranian authorities when designing efficient evidence-based policies that have a
successful impact on enhancing the situations of Afghan individuals, their com-
munities and the Iranian society as a whole; thus, research about the migration
and migration aspirations of Afghans should be continued.

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 63
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sofreh. Humanities 7:1, 21

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 67
6. AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND
ASPIRATIONS
Jussi S. Jauhiainen, Davood Eyvazlu
& Bahram Salavati Sarcheshmeh (jusaja@utu.fi)
More than 3 million Afghans—refugees, regular migrants and irregular mi-
grants—reside in Iran. They are a significant community whose migration and
migration aspirations are of international, national and local interest and im-
pact.
The research “Afghans in Iran: Migration Patterns and Aspirations” was con-
ducted in cooperation with the University of Turku (Finland), the Shahid Be-
heshti University (Iran) and the Sharif Policy Research Institute’s Iran Migration
Observatory at the Sharif University of Technology (Iran). Important support
from Iran’s Ministry of the Interior, the Dean of the Sharif Policy Research Insti-
tute and the International Affairs Office of the Sharif University of Technology
is acknowledged, as is the financial support of the Strategic Research Council at
the Academy of Finland (URMI research consortium, www.urmi.fi) and the Ge-
ography Section of the University of Turku.
The study’s main research questions are as follows: What are the migration
patterns of Afghans in Iran, and what are the migration aspirations of Afghans—
refugees, regular migrants and irregular migrants in Iran—inside Iran, to Af-
ghanistan and to third countries?
The analysis is based on earlier research findings, as well as on specific sur-
veys and interviews conducted for this research in Iran in October 2017 and
June–September 2019. In total, 2,009 persons with Afghan backgrounds (refu-
gees, regular migrants and irregular migrants aged 15 years and older) respond-
ed to the surveys, and 116 Afghans and 54 stakeholders related to Afghans were
interviewed.
In 2017, 644 persons with Afghan backgrounds from the Kerman, Razavi Kho-
rasan and Khuzestan provinces responded anonymously to the survey. Of these
Afghans, 546 lived in the Bani Najjar, Bardsir, Rafsanjan and Torbat-e Jam refu-
gee guest settlements, and 98 lived elsewhere in the Kerman and Razavi Kho-
rasan provinces. In addition, 72 Afghan refugees and irregular migrants were
interviewed.
In 2019, 1,365 persons with Afghan backgrounds from the Tehran, Mashhad,
Isfahan and Kerman urban regions responded to the survey. In addition, 44 Af-
ghans active in sociocultural and economic issues in Iran, such as students, busi-
nesspersons and NGO managers, were interviewed.
Furthermore, in 2017, interviews were also conducted with 54 stakeholders,
such as representatives of the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs
(BAFIA; located in Razavi Khorasan and Khuzestan) of the Ministry of the Inte-

68 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
rior and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR; office in
Mashhad), as well as public authorities in districts, municipalities and villages of
the study areas, managers and council members in the four studied refugee guest
settlements and other public authorities and private sector representatives.
All ethical research guidelines were followed rigorously, and all survey re-
spondents remained anonymous. We are grateful to all the people who respond-
ed to our survey and allowed us to interview them. Research assistants helped
collect and analyse the research material. The main researchers responsible for
this report are Professor Jussi S. Jauhiainen (University of Turku), Dr Davood Ey-
vazlu (Sharif Policy Research Institute at the Sharif University of Technology) and
Dr Bahram Salavati Sarcheshmeh (Sharif Policy Research Institute at the Sharif
University of Technology).
According to the survey results, Afghans’ intentions regarding living in Iran
for the rest of their lives vary: two out of five Afghan refugees in guest settle-
ments, three out of ten refugees living elsewhere in Iran, and one out of four
regular and irregular Afghan migrants intended to stay. Among the respondents
who aspired to stay in Iran, most were 50–64-year-old Afghans who came to Iran
from Afghan villages more than 20 years prior and who have family members
in Iran; young Afghan adults who lived in guest settlements with their spouses
and children and who have spent 10–20 years in Iran; and the oldest regular and
irregular migrants.
A slight majority of respondents intended to migrate within Iran, mostly to
Mashhad or Tehran. Almost all respondents from Mashhad in the Razavi Kho-
rasan province wanted to remain in their current location, as did five out of six
respondents living in the Tehran urban region. However, international sanc-
tions on Iran, which have resulted in the devaluation of the national currency,
made almost two out of three Afghans in Iran think about migrating from Iran.
Roughly two out of five Afghan refugee respondents in guest settlements and
one out of four Afghan refugee respondents elsewhere in Iran would like to mi-
grate to Afghanistan. This is also the case for one out of three respondents among
Afghan regular migrants and half of Afghan irregular migrants. However, fewer
actually plan to return. In particular, the oldest employed and married irregular
migrants aspire to migrate to Afghanistan. Those who least aspire to migrate to
Afghanistan included unmarried, 30–49-year-olds and women refugees living
in guest settlements.
Roughly one out of three Afghans hoped to move from Iran to Europe—typi-
cally single, employed Afghan men from Iranian cities—but such migration aspi-
rations might not result in actual migration. Very few mentioned Turkey as their
preferred destination. Younger Afghans in Iran are more likely to desire to mi-
grate abroad, but very few young Afghan adults want to migrate to Afghanistan,
which they perceive as insecure.

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 69
Among Afghans in Iran, around 1.6–1.85 million (including 0.4–0.5 million
children) are likely to remain in Iran or did not express plans to leave Iran.
Among Afghans in Iran (aged 15 years and older), about 0.85–1 million plan to
migrate out of Iran. About 0.6 million would like to migrate to Afghanistan, and
0.28–0.4 million intend to migrate to the EU. Many of these potential migrants
have young children in Iran whose migration depends on what their parents do.
However, whether such plans lead to actual migration from Iran depends on
many external factors.
International geopolitical tensions have grown in Iran in 2020, especially
following the actions of the United States in Iraq in January 2020. The growing
geopolitical and economic pressures on in Iran may make the country increas-
ingly challenging and insecure for Afghans. This would decrease labour-related
irregular migration from Afghanistan to Iran. The challenges in Iran increase
the migration aspirations of Afghans to leave Iran. The potential migration des-
tinations depend on Afghans’ (perceived) opportunities. If Afghanistan is con-
sidered a viable option, more will aim to (return) migrate there. If Afghanistan
is (perceived) economically and politically insecure, more Afghans—especially
younger adults—will opt for migration through Turkey to the EU.
These research-based results about Afghans in Iran can support the design
of efficient evidence-based policies that successfully impact individuals, com-
munities and Iranian society as a whole, so research about the migration and
migration aspirations of Afghans should be continued.

70 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
7. AFGAANIT IRANISSA: MUUTTOLIIKE JA
MUUTTOHALUKKUUS
Jussi S. Jauhiainen, Davood Eyvazlu
& Bahram Salavati Sarcheshmeh (jusaja@utu.fi)
Yli kolme miljoonaa afgaania (pakolaisia, maahanmuuttajia ja ilman viran-
omaisten lupaa oleskelevia siirtolaisia) asuu Iranissa. He muodostavat merkittä-
vän yhteisön, jonka muuttoliikkeellä ja muuttohalukkuudella on kansainvälistä,
kansallista ja paikallista mielenkiintoa ja merkitystä.
Tutkimus “Afghans in Iran: Migration Patterns and Aspirations” (Afgaanit
Iranissa: muuttoliike ja muuttohalukkuus) toteutettiin yhteystyössä Turun yli-
opiston (Suomi), Shahid Beheshti yliopiston (Iran) and Sharif teknologiayliopis-
ton politiikan tutkimuslaitoksen Iranin muuttoliikeobservatorion (Iran) välillä.
Hanketta tukivat Iranin sisäministeriö, Sharif teknologiayliopiston politiikan
tutkimuslaitoksen dekaani ja Sharif teknologiayliopiston kansainvälisten asioi-
den osasto sekä taloudellista tukea antoivat Suomen Akatemian strategisen tut-
kimuksen neuvosto (tutkimuskonsortio URMI www.urmi.fi) ja Turun yliopiston
maantieteen osasto.
Tutkimuksen pääkysymyksinä olivat: mitkä ovat afgaanien muuttoliikkeen
muodot Iranissa ja mikä on Iranissa olevien afgaanien (pakolaiset, maahan-
muuttajat ja luvattomat siirtolaiset) muuttohalukkuus Iranin sisällä, Afganista-
niin ja kolmansiin maihin?
Analyysi perustuu aiempiin tutkimuksiin sekä kyselyihin ja haastatteluihin,
jotka tehtiin tätä tutkimusta varten Iranissa lokakuussa 2017 ja kesä-syyskuussa
2019. Yhteensä 2009 taustoiltaan erilaista afgaania (vähintään 15-vuotiaat pa-
kolaiset, maahanmuuttajat ja luvattomat siirtolaiset) vastasi kyselyyn, ja lisäksi
haastateltiin 116 afgaania ja 54 muuta toimijaa, joiden toimenkuvaan afgaanit
Iranissa kuuluivat.
Vuonna 2017 644 afgaania vastasi nimettöminä kyselyyn kolmessa Iranin
maakunnassa (Kerman, Razavi Khorasan ja Khuzestan). Vastanneista 546 asui
pakolaisille suunnatuissa erityisissä asuinpaikoissa (Bani Najjar, Bardsir, Rafsan-
jan ja Torbat-e Jam) ja 98 asui muualla Kermanin ja Razavi Khorasanin maakun-
nissa. Lisäksi haastateltiin 72 afgaanipakolaista ja luvatonta siirtolaista.
Vuonna 2019 kyselyyn vastasi 1365 afgaania Iranin suurilta kaupunkiseuduil-
ta (Teheran, Mashhad, Isfahan ja Kerman). Lisäksi haastateltiin 44 afgaania, jot-
ka ovat aktiivisia afgaanien yhteiskunnallisissa ja taloudellisissa asioissa Iranissa,
kuten opiskelijoita, yrittäjiä ja järjestöjen edustajia.
Lisäksi vuonna 2017 haastateltiin myös 54 viranomaista ja muuta afgaaneihin
liittyvää toimijaa. Heitä olivat muun muassa edustajat organisaatioista BAFIA
(Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs: yksiköt Razavi Khorasanissa
ja Khuzestanissa), UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,

AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS 71
yksikkö Mashhadissa) sekä julkisen ja yksityisen sektorin edustajia, pakolaiskes-
kusten johtajia ja niiden valtuuston jäseniä.
Tutkimuksessa noudatettiin tarkasti kaikkia eettisiä ohjeita, ja kaikki vasta-
sivat kyselyyn nimettöminä. Olemme kiitollisia kyselyyn vastanneille ja haas-
tatelluille. Tutkimusavustajat auttoivat aineiston keräämisessä ja analyysissa.
Päätutkijoina tätä raporttia varten olivat professori Jussi S. Jauhiainen (Turun
yliopisto), tohtori Davood Eyvazlu (Sharif teknologiayliopisto, politiikan tutki-
muslaitos) ja tohtori Bahram Salavati Sarcheshmeh (Sharif teknologiayliopisto,
politiikan tutkimuslaitos).
Kyselymme mukaan afgaanien halukkuus jäädä Iraniin loppuiäkseen vaih-
telee. Tätä haluaa kaksi viidestä afgaanipakolaisesta pakolaiskeskuksissa, kolme
kymmenestä pakolaisesta muualla Iranissa, ja joka neljäs afgaanimaahanmuut-
taja tai luvaton siirtolainen. Ne afgaanit, jotka aikovat jäädä Iraniin loppuelä-
mäkseen ovat useimmin 50–64-vuotiaita, jotka tulivat Iraniin Afganistanin
maaseudulta yli 20 vuotta sitten ja joilla on nykyään perhe ja sukulaisia Iranissa.
Toinen ryhmä koostuu afgaaneista, jotka ovat useimmin kotoisin kaupungeista,
jotka ovat olleet Iranissa 10–20 vuotta ja elävät vaimon ja lasten kanssa pakolais-
keskuksissa. Kolmantena ryhmänä ovat iäkkäät maahanmuuttajat ja luvattomat
siirtolaiset.
Hienoinen enemmistö vastaajista aikoo muuttaa Iranin sisällä, eniten suur-
kaupunkeihin Mashhadiin tai Teheraniin. Lähes kaikki vastaajat halusivat pysyä
nykyisillä asuinalueillaan Mashhadissa Razavi Khorasanin maakunnassa ja näin
toivoi viisi kuudesta vastanneesta Teheranin kaupunkiseudulta. Iraniin kohdis-
tuneet kansainväliset pakotteet ovat aiheuttaneet Iranin valuutan arvon alene-
misen, minkä seurauksena lähes kaksi kolmesta afgaanista Iranissa on alkanut
miettiä muuttoa pois Iranista.
Noin kaksi viidestä vastaajasta pakolaiskeskuksissa ja yksi neljästä pakolai-
sesta muualla Iranissa halusi muuttaa Afganistaniin. Näin toivoi joka kolmas
afgaanimaahanmuuttaja ja joka toinen luvattomista siirtolaisista. Vastanneista
vähemmän kuitenkin suunnittelee muuttoa Afganistaniin. Erityisesti iäkkäät,
työssäkäyvät ja avioituneet laittomat siirtolaiset haluavat muuttaa Afganistaniin.
Vähiten muuttoa Afganistaniin halusivat pakolaiskeskuksissa asuvat naimatto-
mat, 30–49-vuotiaat ja afgaaninaiset.
Noin joka kolmas afgaani haluaisi muuttaa Iranista Eurooppaan. Tyypillisesti
he olivat naimattomia työssäkäyviä afgaanimiehiä Iranin kaupungeista. Muutto-
halukkuus ei välttämättä johda muuttoon pois Iranista. Hyvin harvat mainitsivat
Turkin toivottuna muuttokohteena. Afgaaneista nuoret aikuiset haluavat muita
ryhmiä enemmän muuttaa pois Iranista, mutta harvoin turvattomaksi miellet-
tyyn Afganistaniin.
Noin 1,6–1,85 miljoonaa (mukaan lukien 0,4–0,5 miljoonaa heidän lastaan) af-
gaania Iranissa aikoo jäädä Iraniin tai he eivät ainakaan ilmaise suunnitelmiaan

72 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
muuttaa pois sieltä. Iranissa asuvista vähintään 15-vuotiaista afgaaneista noin
0,85–1,0 miljoonaa henkilöä suunnittelee muuttoa pois Iranista. Heistä noin 0,6
miljoonaa haluaisi muuttaa Afganistaniin ja 0,28–0,4 miljoonaa pyrkii muutta-
maan Euroopan unioniin. Monilla mahdollisista muuttajista on lapsia Iranissa,
ja heidän muuttoonsa vaikuttaa se, mitä heidän vanhempansa tekevät. Yleises-
tikin muuttosuunnitelmien toteutumiseen vaikuttavat monet ulkoiset tekijät.
Tutkimustulokset koskien afgaaneja Iranissa auttavat suunnittelemaan tutki-
mustuloksiin tukeutuvaa tehokasta politiikkaa, jonka tuloksilla on myönteinen
vaikutus afgaaniyksilöihin ja -yhteisöihin ja laajemmin Iranin yhteiskuntaan,
joten tutkimusta koskien afgaanien muuttoliikettä ja muuttohalukkuutta tulee
jatkaa.
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
(jusaja@utu.fi(
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               
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     
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8. FARSI 8 . 
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              
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     








               
      
     



NGO

74 AFGHANS IN IRAN: MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ASPIRATIONS
    

UNHCR 
              
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

  

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
      
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   
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   

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    
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              
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