From Velvet Revolution to Purple Dissolution: Dismantling of Czechoslovakia From Above

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From Velvet Revolution to Purple Dissolution: Dismantling of Czechoslovakia From
Above
Tomas Dumbrovsky and Kristyna Urbanova
Introduction
The demise of Czechoslovakia after seventy-five years of turbulent history is a curious case
that challenges routine categories of secession and their dynamics. From the many variables
involved, one stands out: the Czech political elite elected in 1992 preferred the dissolution of
the federation over an arrangement that would cripple their single-minded vision of economic
transformation. The Slovak leaders, left with little choice and manoeuvred into nationalistic
rhetoric, acquiesced. In defiance of the opinion of the Czech and Slovak citizens, the 1992
victors dismantled the common state within months.
1
Czechoslovakia had already had its share of experience with rapid disintegration. In 1939,
Slovakia seceded from the common state to avoid annexation by Hungary and the Czech lands
became a German protectorate. In 1992, the Czech and Slovak political elites were particularly
vested in dissolving Czechoslovakia through a constitutional agreement backed by the federal
parliament to avoid the charge of secession on either side. In order to signal their readiness to
join the Western institutions both the Czech and Slovak Republics applied the (not yet binding)
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties
2
.
I. Founders’ Puzzle and First Disintegration of Czechoslovakia
The roots of the tensions between Czechs and Slovaks trace back to the inception of the
common state in 1918. The tenth point of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points offered “[t]he
peoples of Austria-Hungary … the freest opportunity to autonomous development.”
3
For the
non-Germans in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire this was an invitation to form their own nation-
states. The Czech lands (Bohemia and Silesia in particular) were the industrial powerhouse of
1
The 1992 dissolution of Czechoslovakia could not have been more contrary to the values and dynamics of the
Velvet Revolution. If any sobriquet comes to mind, ‘purple dissolution’ might fit best. Before the industrial
revolution, the purple colour, being expensive to produce, had been traditionally associated with elite.
2
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (adopted 23 August 1978, entered into force
6 November 1996) UNTC reference C.N.354.2008.
3
Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points Address, House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, 8 January 1918.
John Milton Cooper, Jr., Woodrow Wilson (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2009) 422-424. President Wilson
was careful to avoid any reference to a general right to self-determination.

2
the Empire and one of the most advanced regions in Europe. Their economic viability was
beyond doubt; their projected national composition was, however, an issue. Among the six and
a half million Czechs there were also three million Germans. In order to persuade the victorious
powers to sanction an independent Czech state in its historic borders,
4
Tomáš Garrigue
Masaryk’s strategy was to incorporate into the new state the linguistically and ethnically akin
Slovak minority living in the Hungarian part of the Empire. By conceptualizing a Czechoslovak
nation, the German minority’s share of the population within the new state fell below 30 per
cent. In the Cleveland
5
and Pittsburgh Agreements,
6
Masaryk promised the Slovaks an equal
status and autonomy.
7
However, he did not intent to deliver on his promises. If two million
Slovaks were recognized as a separate nation and given autonomy, the Czechoslovakism would
be unmasked as a sham and the new state would have been under constant pressure from the
(larger) German minority to be granted the same status.
The creation of a unitary state by the 1920 Constitution
8
became seen in Slovakia as the break
of the promise of constitutional equality made by Masaryk in Pittsburgh. This provided an
opportunity for Slovak nationalist politicians to carve out their electorate. In particular, Andrej
Hlinka, a Slovak priest, skilfully mixed nationalism with Catholicism, which distinguished
Slovaks from Protestant Czechs. By the 1930s Hlinka’s party became the dominant political
force in Slovakia and one to the drivers of Slovak eventual secession in 1939. For the Czech
cosmopolitan elite, Slovak clericalism was a confirmation of backwardness. The government’s
program to reform the Slovak economy and society – which included the replacing of the
Hungarian bureaucracy with pro-Prague Protestant Slovaks, secularization of primary and
secondary schools and large agrarian reforms that affected most the possessions of the Catholic
Church – further alienated the Slovaks.
9
At the same time corrections of abysmal economic
differences were left to laissez-faire capitalism professed in Prague, which meant little or no
preferential treatment or state investments in the Slovak economy. With the further economic
4
The borderline regions, where the German minority was concentrated, contained large deposits of coal and
accompanied industrial infrastructure crucial for the new state.
5
The Cleveland Agreement was a declaration of cooperation signed by the Slovak League of America and the
Czech National Association at a conference held in Cleveland on 22-23 October 1915. For the text (in Czech) see
Ján Gronský and Jiří Hřebejk, Dokumenty k ústavnímu vývoji Československa, vol I (Karolinum 1997) 16.
6
The Pittsburgh Agreement was a memorandum of understanding between associations of American immigrants
from Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia signed, under Masaryk chairmanship, on 30 May 1918. For the text
(in Czech) see ibid.
7
Point 2 of the Pittsburgh Agreement read: “Slovakia will have its own administration, its Diet and its courts.”
8
Constitutional Act No. 121/1920 Coll., the Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic. English tr. Jiří
Hoetzel (ed) The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic (Édition de la Société l'effort de la tchécoslovaquie
1920), available at <https://archive.org/details/cu31924014118222/page/n1.> accessed 13 August 2019.
9
Abby Innes, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (Yale University Press 2001) 7.

3
shock brought by the Great Depression, the Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party’s (HSPP) rhetoric
became more extreme. After the victory of the Nazi-funded Henlein’s Sudeten German Party
in general elections in 1935, the Prague government, under attack from both the German
minority and the Hlinka’s party, attempted to negotiate Slovak autonomy with the HSPP. The
failure of the talks and the race for succession after Hlinka’s death further radicalized the HSPP,
which sought cooperation with Henlein.
The constitutional disintegration escalated after the Munich Agreement in September 1938.
Slovaks were granted autonomy and the state was renamed to Czecho-Slovakia. As Hitler was
preparing military intervention to seize the rest of Czech lands, the Nazi gave the leader of the
HSPP Jozef Tiso an ultimatum – either he would proclaim Slovakia’s independence under
German tutelage or be left to face territorial claims by Hungary and Poland. On 14 March, the
Slovaks seceded from Czechoslovakia. The day after, Germany created a Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia in the rest of the state.
II. Second Disintegration of Czechoslovakia: Political and Constitutional
Dynamics
1. Towards a Federation
In autumn 1944, the Slovak Resistance mounted a major insurgency, which despite its defeat
re-legitimized Slovak demands for national recognition. The Resistance coordinating organs
transformed into the Slovak National Council, an autonomous parliament. However, after the
coup d’état in February 1948, the Moscow-backed Communist leadership in Prague
subordinated all the institutions to the centralized rule of the Party and in a series of purges
eliminated both non-Communist and Communist advocates of Slovak autonomy.
The Constitution of 1948 abandoned the concept of the Czechoslovak nation in favour of a
window-dressing phrase that the Czechoslovak Republic was a state of “two Slav nations
possessing equal rights.”
10
Forced expulsion of Germans and Hungarians simplified the
national structure. The unified state that disintegrated in 1939 was hammered back not through
a constitution, but the top-down rule of the Communist Party. As in 1918 when Masaryk
10
Constitutional Act No. 150/1948 Coll., the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic. English tr.
Czechoslovakia, The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic (Czechoslovak Ministry of Information and Public
Culture 1948).

4
ignored his Cleveland and Pittsburgh promises, the guarantees made to the Slovaks in 1945 in
order to renew Czechoslovakia were lifted once the aim was achieved.
The Soviet-modelled Constitution of 1960 repeated the equality proclamations of the 1948
Constitution and retained the nominal Slovak ‘autonomous’ institutions.
11
This institutional
asymmetry, where the impotent Slovak institutions lingered in the unitary state without their
Czech equivalent, reinforced the vision that the Czechoslovak institutions belonged to the
Czechs, excluding, in effect, the Slovaks from a decision-making.
12
The de-Stalinization program after Nikita Khrushchev’s Secret Speech in 1961 and the
slowdown of the Czechoslovak economy in 1963 opened a space for reformers.
13
They emerged
from among the Slovak Communists that had been side-lined during the 1950s purges for their
disagreement with centralization of power in Prague. Alexander Dubček rose to lead the Slovak
Communists and openly challenged the Prague hard-liners around President Novotný. The
Slovak reformers called for institutional changes and meaningful Slovak representation in the
state and the Party. The public discussion in Slovakia became increasingly opened. The
demands for federalization of Czechoslovakia resurfaced. With the weakening of Novotný’s
hard-liners, the intra-party as well as popular reception of Dubček’s criticism of Prague’s
leadership stirred the wider process of liberalization and democratization (within the limits of
the Communist regime) leading eventually to the Prague Spring of 1968.
14
The movement was
crushed by Warsaw Pact military intervention. However, the program of federalization went
ahead, as the Moscow leadership agreed to remove one of the causes of the upheaval.
15
The 1968 Constitutional Act
16
created a federal state. Conceptually, the reform was far-
reaching. The preamble to the Constitutional Act recognised “the unalienable right [of Czechs
11
Constitutional Act No. 100/1960 Coll., the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. English tr.
<http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Czechoslovakia-Const1960.pdf.> accessed 20 June 2019.
12
This experience has not been unique to Czechoslovakia, of course. Any grant of autonomy to a region may
produce the same psychological effect. What causes the feeling that the common institutions serve the traditionally
dominant nationality rather than the entire population is a centre-periphery narrative that develops over time. For
instance, the process of devolution in the United Kingdom has created such institutional asymmetry with England
lacking its own institutions. Some among the Scottish, the Welsh and the Northern Irish then perceive the
Westminster institutions as belonging to the English rather than to the Union. Cf. the chapters on Scotland and
Brexit in this volume. We are grateful to Lea Raible for pointing out this parallel.
13
For a detailed analysis of the rise of the reform movement see Galia Golan, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement:
Communism in Crisis 1962-1968 (Cambridge University Press 1971).
14
Innes A, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (Yale University Press 2001) 26-27. For an opposite view that
the democratization process was distinctively Czech and that the Slovak demands for federalization only weakened
the democratization process see Petr Pithart, Osmašedesátý (Rozmluvy 1990).
15
Cf. Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968-1970 (Cambridge
University Press 1997).
16
Constitutional Act No. 143/1968 Coll. (the Federation Act).

5
and Slovaks] to self-determination as far as secession.”
17
Article 1 of the Act emphasized that
“[t]he Czechoslovak Federation is an expression of the will of two individual sovereign nations,
the Czechs and the Slovaks, to live in a common federative state.” The act enumerated exclusive
federal powers and powers shared with the republics; the remaining powers belonged to the
republics.
18
The exclusive federal powers contained the bare minimum – foreign policy,
national defence, federal material reserves and federal legislation
19
The shared competences,
on the other hand, included most of the activities of state – fiscal and monetary policy, economic
planning and pricing, industry, transport, science, telecommunications, agriculture, social
affairs, internal order, and control of the press.
20
The strongest guarantee of Slovak autonomy,
that would dictate the disintegration dynamics after the 1989 revolution, was a transformation
of the bicameral parliament into a tricameral one when it came to voting on constitutional
amendments. A constitutional act required a three-fifth majority in the lower Chamber of the
People and a three-fifth majority of each, the Czech and the Slovak, representations in the upper
Chamber of Nations voting separately.
In practice, however, the neo-Stalinists installed by the Soviet occupiers made every effort to
water down the consequences of this federal structure. The doctrine of ‘democratic centralism’,
centralizing the decision-making in the Party leadership, made the bottom-up constitutional
hierarchy between the republics and the federation irrelevant. The 1970 constitutional
amendment and accompanied implementation laws further weakened the competences of the
republics.
21
They emphasized single economic planning and primacy of Czechoslovak
citizenship. The federation regained control of the state police and criminal investigation.
Shared competences became practically controlled by the federation.
22
2. From Revolution to Dissolution
With the 1989 revolution, the confederal constitutional solution of 1968 suddenly came to life.
Without the balancing and centralizing function of the Communist Party it served as a catalyst
of disintegration. The revolutionary movement party, the Civic Forum, was unable to serve as
a democratic alternative to the integrative role of the Communist Party. The reasons are rooted
17
Preamble to the Federation Act. Emphasis added. Cf. also Art. 1(2) of the Act.
18
Art. 7-9 of the Federation Act.
19
Art. 7 of the Federation Act.
20
Article 8 of the Constitutional Act No. 143/1968 Coll.
21
Constitutional Act No. 125/1970 Coll.; Act No. 126/1970 Coll.; Act No. 128/1970 Coll. See Ján Grónský,
Komentované dokumenty k ústavním dějinám Československa (Karolinum 2005) 169.
22
Federal committees were replaced by federal ministries. Act No. 126/1970 Coll.

6
in the evolution of the dissent dating back to the same period that gave the shape to the
confederative constitutional arrangement. Neither the organisers of the Two Thousand Words
Manifesto,
23
nor the drafters of the Charter 77
24
in the wake of the Prague Spring sought any
kind of strategic incorporation of Slovak opponents of the Communist regime. These initiatives
run in parallel to the Dubček-led intra-Communist reform movement that originated from
Slovakia. Václav Havel emerged as the leader of the anti-regime movement that built on the
success of the two manifestos and became the major platform for regime opponents. However,
the movement’s origins in Prague’s intellectual and cultural scene made it predominantly
Czech. The evolution of Slovak dissent took a very different trajectory. Religious (read:
Catholic) events became an opportunity to express by simple participation an opposition to the
regime and form personal ties between dissenters and establish their connection to the public.
The Charter 77 never became a mass movement of the kind of Lech Wałęsa’s Solidarity in
Poland, which grew from Gdańsk shipyards and appealed primarily to workers. Its roots in a
small intellectual elite made it difficult to mobilize masses. Only with the escalation of the
conflict between the Communist regimes and the reform movements in Poland and Hungary,
mass anti-regime demonstrations took place in Prague. The reorganization of the Chartists into
a revolutionary movement party, that negotiated the transition of power with the Communists
in November 1989, was a last-minute improvisation. The missing structural links between the
Czech and the Slovak dissents led, in the absence of a Czechoslovak revolutionary movement
party, to the emergence of a sister movement in Slovakia – Public Against Violence. The two
revolutionary parties together won an absolute majority in both chambers of the federal
parliament in the first democratic elections held in June 1990 and formed a coalition
government.
25
The Chartists built their anti-regime strategy on holding the Communists accountable to their
window-dressing constitution and international human rights agreements. As legality became
their weapon, they could not but insist on adherence to the existing constitutional procedures
23
Ludvík Vaculík, Dva tisíce slov (Two Thousand Words), 1968. The Manifesto, initiated by group of renowned
scientists at the Czech Academy of Science, among others by Otto Wichterle, an inventor of contact lenses, was
published the day after the censorship was lifted during the Prague Spring and signed by more than 100 000
citizens. English tr. in Jaromír Navrátil, The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader
(Central European University Press 1998) 177.
24
The Charter 77 Manifesto attempted to hold accountable the Communist regime to its human rights obligations
arising from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. It originated from a group of Prague intellectuals – mostly philosophers,
writers and journalists. An English translation <http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/archive/files/declaration-of-charter-
77_4346bae392.pdf. > accessed 13 August 2019.
25
Together with the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement, which was a platform of Slovak dissent that
associated more closely with Catholicism.

7
once they raised to power, foregoing the advantage of independent legitimacy created by the
revolutionary new beginning. The flawed 1968 constitutional arrangement with the right of
national veto on constitutional laws in the Federal Assembly,
26
made their legalistic exercise
intractable. The revolutionaries made a fateful decision to schedule the next election for 1992
in order to conclude the extraordinary period.
Once the constitutional talks begun in the earnest, the Slovak starting position was conceptually
reinforced by the existing confederative constitutional arrangement. The Slovak Prime Minister
Mečiar insisted on the sovereignty of the republics, which would delegate some of their powers
to the federation. For the Czech negotiators, such an approach would invariably weaken the
federal government to the point that it would not be able to carry out the transition to market
economy that required structural changes in almost every aspect of society’s life. Based on the
concept of the primacy of the republics, the Slovak negotiators proposed devolution of many
shared competences that were crucial for ensuing competition for foreign investments, such as
transport, telecommunications, power plants and grids and foreign trade. The election of Václav
Klaus to the chair of the Civic Forum in October 1990 shifted the Czech revolutionary
movement party to the neoliberal right. The neoliberals, both in Czech and Slovak parts of the
state, had a very different view on the transition of the state than the Chartists. They focused on
rapid liberalization of all sectors of economy and privatization of state ownership accompanied
with tight monetary policy. Such a ‘shock therapy’ would have immediate negative effect on
employment, production, housing and energy prices, and overall purchasing power of the
population. The advantages of quick transition to market economy outweighed, in Klaus’s view,
its short-term social impact.
Interim constitutional amendments (the Competence Bills)
27
gave the federation powers over
economic strategy, defence, foreign policy, banking and federal taxes. The republics would
own the assets originating from their territory (except national resources), local taxation power
and be permitted to conclude international treaties with the consent of the federal government.
Mečiar was not impressed with such overt re-centralization. The Czech neoliberals went on the
offensive and portraited Mečiar as the devious secessionist. President Havel, who acted as a
26
As a result of the tricameral constitutional decision-making, a mere one-tenth of the total number of deputies
could block a constitutional law. Any structural solution thus required a significant bi-national consensus. See
Václav Žák, ‘The Velvet Divorce - Institutional Foundations’ in Jiří Musil (ed), The End of Czechoslovakia
(Central European University Press 1995).
27
Constitutional Laws No. 295/1990 Coll., 296/1990 Coll. (so-called Minor Competence Act) and 556/1990 Coll.
(so-called Major Competence Act). See Jan Rychlík, Rozpad Československa: česko-slovenské vztahy 1989-1992
(AEP 2002) 162 ff.

8
moderator between the two groups, unwisely added to the controversy by warning the Federal
Assembly that if the Competence Bills failed, the Slovak parliament might declare supremacy
of its laws over federal laws. The Federal Assembly obliged, but the Czech attitudes pushed the
Slovak Prime Minister into an ever more nationalistic position.
As an agreement on a structural solution became increasingly elusive, the Federal Assembly
resorted to a piecemeal strategy focusing on constitutionalizing less controversial parts of the
revolutionary program – the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and direct
applicability and superior position in the constitutional order of human rights treaties.
28
The
Preamble to the Charter nonetheless confirmed “the right of the Czech and Slovak nations to
self-determination.” The talks lingered on the conceptual issue of whether sovereignty
emanated from the republics or the federation. As Eric Stein observed, to the surprised of the
group of international advisors for drafting the new constitution, the original draft of the Civic
Forum as well as the subsequent drafts
29
included the right to secession.
30
President Havel urged
the Federal Assembly to adopt a constitutional law that would make it possible to call a
referendum on any proposal for secession. It was adopted in July 1991.
31
In the case of two-
member federation, a secession meant the end of the federal state with immediate consequences
in international law, which is an aspect scholars of secession have not yet sufficiently
addressed.
32
The stalemate over a new constitution signified more profound divisions over the course of
economic transition and sped up the disintegration of the revolutionary movement parties. The
Civic Forum broke up into Klaus’s neoliberals and Dienstbier’s liberal centre-left, close to
Havel, and two platforms formed within the Public Against Violence – a centre-left Mečiar’s
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia with indeterminate federal-confederal views and pro-
federal neoliberals. The Federal Assembly could not agree even on the question to be put to the
citizens in a referendum if other options failed. In the last stand, Havel appealed directly to the
people and called for a gridlock-resolving reform that would simplify the process of amending
the constitution (consent of the republics’ parliaments would suffice) and give him the power
to call a referendum, if unopposed by the Federal Assembly. The up-and-coming Klaus and
28
Constitutional Law No. 23/1991 Coll.
29
Civic Forum, First Proposal for a Constitution, Sec. 5(2) (Feb. 1, 1990); First Federal Draft (1990), Art. 3(3);
Second Federal Draft (Aug. 1991), Art. 3(4); Slovak Republic working draft, Ch. 5, Art. 2(2) (1990).
30
Eric Stein, Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup (University of
Michigan Press 1997) 42 ff..
31
Constitutional Law No. 327/1991 Coll., on Referendum.
32
Similar point is made by Eric Stein. Stein (n 30) 44.

9
Mečiar denounced Havel’s proposals, while the Slovak Christian Democrats, who hold the
constitutional veto power in the Federal Assembly, insisted on founding the ‘federation’ on a
treaty between the republics, which was unacceptable to the Czecho-Slovak neoliberal coalition
that took over both national revolutionary movement parties after ousting Mečiar.
33
As the
Federal Assembly could not reach consensus on Havel’s proposals or the treaty, the political
scene turned its attention to the upcoming election.
All political parties but the Slovak National Party pleaded for the preservation of the common
state ahead of the 1992 elections. Within weeks after the election, the leaders of the victorious
parties in each of the republics, Klaus and Mečiar, nonetheless concurred on dissolving the
federation. It is likely that both prime ministers wanted to preserve the common state. However,
their visions diverged so much that a common solution became increasingly unlikely. How was
such a rapid and consensual demise of Czechoslovakia possible? The answer is complex and
we have tried to capture this complexity on the previous pages – accumulated historical
mistakes and grievances, an unfortunate constitutional status quo inherited from 1968, separate
development of the Czech and Slovak dissent and the consequential lack of a bi-national party
system, and the inability to reach any kind of consensus between 1990 and 1992. However, the
most immediate impulse, that cut through the entire history of Czecho-Slovak relations, was
the economy.
For neoliberal Klaus, an uncompromising and swift transition to market economy and the full
elimination of state economic control would bring political freedom in all aspects of society.
However, his democratic mandate for such a radical transformation was dubious. The 1989
revolution was fought by social liberals, not hawkish monetarists, and in the 1992 election
Klaus’s new party – the Civic Democratic Party – won with a mere 23 per cent of the votes.
Nevertheless, by early 1991 Klaus and his team were in full control of the formulation and
implementation of federal economic reforms.
34
The one-sided industrialization of Slovakia during the Communist regime made it more
vulnerable than the Czech lands to the demise of the planned economy within the Soviet
controlled Comecon and the exposure to global markets. In 1991, the rapid economic decline
of Slovakia became apparent. This development made Mečiar abandon his original free-market
position in favour of gradual reforms, state interventionism and strong social policy. With the
33
The Slovak neoliberals drove Mečiar into opposition, from where he was free to take more confrontational
positions ahead of 1992 election.
34
Klaus was appointed the Federal Minister of Finance in December 1989 and took over the Civic Forum in
October 1990.

10
end of preferential treatment (both from the federation and the Comecon), he hoped to secure
Western foreign investments and gain new markets independently of the federation. This
required a competence for Slovakia to negotiate treaties. In order to shield Slovakia against
internal shocks of the strict federal monetary policy, Slovak negotiators pushed for establishing
central banks at the level of republics or a national veto within the federal central bank. To be
sure, Mečiar’s motivations to preserve the common state were entirely self-serving. The anti-
Prague rhetoric was the cornerstone of Mečiar’s electoral success and he needed the federal
funds for the economic transformation.
35
At the same time, he imagined a virtually independent
Slovakia, giving him full powers in the republic and broad powers in the foreign (trade) policy.
Western Europe and its institutions, such as the OECD, inadvertently helped to widen the
Czecho-Slovak rift by applauding and legitimizing Klaus’s uncompromising reforms.
36
Once
Klaus emerged victorious from the 1992 election, he called bluntly for re-centralization of the
common state to effectuate his economic reforms. Mečiar, back in the office of Slovak Prime
Minister after winning the election in the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia (two seats short of
absolute majority), was cornered – as any confederative arrangement was now unacceptable to
the Czech government and a centralized, if nominally federal, state was unacceptable to the
Slovak government, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia became a superior alternative for both
sides.
37
The relative strength of their new parties in each of the republics promised Klaus and
Mečiar the realization of their program and political dominance for the foreseeable future.
As we have seen, the Klaus-Mečiar bargain was authorized by neither the 1989 revolution nor
the 1992 elections. They did not participate in the dissent and joined the revolutionary
movement parties only when the struggle with the Communists was over. After the 1992
election, they have neither absolute majority in the federal parliament together nor absolute
majority in each of the national parliaments separately. Neither of them campaigned for
dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The 1992 election turned the dissidents’ principled adherence
to existing constitutional forms, which made their job so difficult in the previous two years,
upside down. This development was so pronounced that Zdeněk Jičínský, a constitutional
scholar and a federal deputy, complained that “instead of a valid constitution we have had a
35
Stein (n 30) 222.
36
OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 1991 (1991) 16 ff..
37
Valerie Bunce, Robert H. Bates and Peter Lange, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of
Socialism and the State (Cambridge University Press 1999) 97.

11
constitution with single article – that everything important is decided by Václav Klaus and
Vladimír Mečiar.”
38
In July, the Mečiar-controlled Slovak parliament issued, in the form of a resolution, a
Declaration of Independence. Three days later, President Havel resigned his post in protest of
the Czech and Slovak prime ministers’ deliberate circumvention of federal institutions. The
Slovaks mounted the pressure on the Czech side and the Federal Assembly by adopting their
own constitution in September. Although the Federal Constitution authorized in its Article 142
the republics to adopt their own constitutions, the new Slovak Constitution was construed as a
constitution of an independent state. Its Article 156 postponed the effectiveness of a number of
provisions that contradicted the Federal Constitutions, however, a number of other provisions
of a sovereign state became effective immediately. For instance, the constitution created a
central bank, customs territory and granted the President the power to negotiate international
agreements in any area.
39
In the words of Pavol Höllander, a Slovak scholar who later became
the Vice-President of the Czech Constitutional Court, “[b]y adopting the constitution, and
therefore also Article 152i, according to which all constitutional laws, statutory laws and other
legal regulations that contradict the constitution are invalidated, the Slovak National Council
assumes without any doubt full state authority in Slovakia into its own hands.”
40
The Slovaks
were, however, eager to avoid their acts being branded as a unilateral secession
41
and the Slovak
institutions restrained from applying the new constitution contrary to the federal one. On the
political level, they continue to press for a consensual constitutional solution to the dissolution
of the federation and its authorization by the Federal Assembly.
The blocking minority in the Federal Assembly as well as Havel insisted on calling a
referendum on dissolution. In an opinion poll conducted one month after the 1992 election, 86
per cent of the respondents were in favour of a referendum.
42
In none of the polls the people in
38
Report of the 5th joint session of the Federal Assembly, 4th Part, VII election term, at 777.
39
The election of the Slovak President were one of the provisions whose effectiveness was postponed for after the
dissolution.
40
Pavol Höllander, ‘The New Slovak Constitution: A Critique’ 1 East European Constitutional Review 16 [1992]
16.
41
Stein (n 30) 259.
42
Signálně správy Inštitútu pre výskúm verejnej mienky z aprila, júla a septembra 1992 (Signal Reports of the
Public Opinion Polling Institute of April, July and September 1992) quoted in Zora Bútorová, ‘A Deliberate "Yes"
to the Dissolution of the ČSFR?: The Image of the Parties and the Split of Czecho-Slovakia in the Eyes of the
Slovak Population’ [Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic] 1 Czech
Sociological Review [1993] 58, 69.

12
either of the republics favoured a dissolution.
43
The most significant polls conducted shortly
after the dissolution in Slovakia showed that less than half of Slovaks would have voted for an
independent Slovakia.
44
The results of a referendum were, however, unpredictable, especially
if held separately in each of the republics. What the polls indicated more clearly was the
frustration of society with the inability of their political leaders to find a solution and the impact
of Mečiar’s propaganda on Slovak society resulting in the distrust of federal institutions in
favour of the Slovak ones.
45
In any case, for the pivotal forces, the referendum was not an option. Klaus did not believe that
a result in favour of the common state could alter the stalemate, while Mečiar was concerned
that a result in favour of dissolution would mean a Slovak secession with all the consequences
regarding international succession. Whatever the outcome of the referendum, the distribution
of bargaining power would inevitably change and neither Klaus nor Mečiar was willing to have
his hand forced by the people. The referendum was dropped and the Federal Assembly was
presented with the Klaus-Mečiar proposal for a constitutional law that simply declared that the
federation was to end by December 31, 1992. Both republics were declared the successors of
the common state and authorized, even before the end date, to enact appropriate legislation and
negotiate treaties with each other and with third states with effect upon the dissolution.
46
Given
the right of veto, the outcome was unpredictable. Eventually, the Federal Assembly passed the
constitutional law on the dissolution (the Dissolution Act) in November 1992.
47
III.
Second Disintegration of Czechoslovakia: International Law Dimension
1. Secession or Dismembratio?
Czechoslovakia, as a subject of international law ceased to exist at midnight of 31 December
1992 and the two new independent states, the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic emerged as
new subjects of international law on 1 January 1993. On the road to the end date, the republics
43
Rüdiger Kipke, ‘Nejnovější politický vývoj v Československu v zrcadle veřejného mínění’ in Rüdiger Kipke
and Karel Vodička (eds), Rozloučení s Československem: příčiny a důsledky česko-slovenského rozchodu (Český
spisovatel 1993) 51.
44
Martin Bútora and Zora Bútorová, ‘Neznesiteľná ľahkost´ rozchodu’ in Rüdiger Kipke and Karel Vodička (eds),
Rozloučení s Československem: příčiny a důsledky česko-slovenského rozchodu (Český spisovatel 1993) 134
At the same time, the majority of Slovaks were in favour of international personality of Slovakia. Vladimír Krivý,
Aktuálne problémy Slovenska, máj 1992: správa zo sociologického výskumu (FOCUS 1992) 4.
45
Karel Vodička, ‘Příčiny rozdělení Československa : analýza po 10 letech’10 Politologický časopis [2003] 55.
46
Stein (n 30) 260 ff..
47
Constitutional Act no. 542/1992 Coll., on Dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

13
employed the new treaty-making power given to them by the constitutional law on dissolution
and concluded treaties between themselves.
48
From this reason Šturma claims that from an
international law perspective, Czechoslovakia transformed from federation of internal type to
international kind,
49
because both component parts of the federation already enjoyed partial
international subjectivity.
There is no standard view on how to categorize the demise of Czechoslovakia from an
international law point of view. As we could see, the political elites in both republics invested
considerable efforts in preventing an outcome that could be understood as secession on either
part of the federation. Some authors nevertheless consider the dissolution of Czechoslovakia as
an example of successful secession.
50
Both republics proclaimed their new constitutions before
the dissolution of federation.
51
While the Czechs proceeded only after the authorization by the
Federal Assembly, the Slovak parliament adopted, in July 1992 and thus before any such
authorization, a Declaration of the Slovak National Council on Sovereignty of the Slovak
Republic, which stated that “the thousand years’ struggle of Slovak nation for independence
has been fulfilled”
52
. The declaration recalled the right of self-determination of the Slovak
nation and concluded by stating that “[b]y this declaration, the Slovak National Council
declares sovereignty of the Slovak Republic as a basis for a sovereign state of the Slovak
nation.”
53
In September the Slovak parliament proclaimed the Constitution of the Slovak
Republic, intensifying the efforts for independence.
54
Its text was drafted as a constitution of a
sovereign independent state and some of its provisions were manifestly inconsistent with the
federal constitution, ignoring to a great extent that the federation still existed.
55
48
Pavel Bureš, ‘Barevná paleta mezinárodních smluv o rozdělení ČSFR’ in Pavel Bureš, Martin Faix and Ondřej
Svaček (eds), Mezinárodněprávní aspekty vzniku a zániku státu: 20 výročí vzniku samostatné České republiky a
Slovenské republiky (Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci, Právnická fakulta 2013) 252.
49
Pavel Šturma and Čestmír Čepelka, Mezinárodní právo veřejné (C.H. Beck 2018) 57-58. According to this
doctrine a “federation of internal” kind refers to such federations which reserve the treaty making capacity only
for the central federation and from international law perspective these federations do not differ from unitary states.
In contrast a “federation of international types” shares the treaty making capacity and corresponding responsibility
with its own constitutive parts.
50
Miljenko Antić, ‘Procedure for Secession’ XLIV Politička misao [2007] 145; Holly A. Osterland, ‘National
Self-Determination and Secession: The Slovak Model’ 25 Case W Res J Int'l L [1993] 655.
51
The Czech Republic adopted its constitution on 16 December 1992.
52
Declaration of the Slovak National Council on Sovereignty of the Slovak Republic, available (in Slovak
language) at the webpage of the Slovak National Council <https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Static/sk-
SK/NRSR/Doc/v_deklaracia-o-zvrchovanosti.htm> accessed 13 August 2019.
53
Declaration of the Slovak National Council on Sovereignty of the Slovak Republic, Ibid.
54
The Constitutional Act No. 460/1992 Coll., The Constitution of the Republic of Slovakia.
55
Věra Jirásková, ‘Ústavní aspekty zániku ČSFR’ in Pavel Bureš, Martin Faix and Ondřej Svaček (eds),
Mezinárodněprávní aspekty vzniku a zániku státu: 20 výročí vzniku samostatné České republiky a Slovenské
republiky (Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci, Právnická fakulta 2013) 270.

14
Given the timeline, arguments for categorizing the dissolution of Czechoslovakia as a
dismembratio
56
instead of a secession seem more persuasive. Our analysis of constitutional
politics shows that the end of the federation was a result of trilateral political agreement between
the federation and both republics, not a (mostly) unilateral action.
57
The dissolution of the
federation was in the end mainly organised by the two following constitutional acts approved
by the Federal Council in late November of 1992. According to the Dissolution Act, the
federation ceased to exist by 31 December 1992 and both, the Czech Republic and Slovak
Republic were designated as its successor states (Article 1). It also declared that the
competences of the federation passed to the republics on 1 January 1993 and that the federal
institutions ceased to exist at the moment when the federation ceased to exist as well (Article 2
and 3). As already mentioned, the Dissolution Act also bestowed upon the two succeeding states
both, (i) a capacity to conclude reciprocal treaties on matters which up to that date had belonged
to the federation’s authority, and (ii) a capacity to conclude international treaties with third
states which were to enter into force after extinction of the federation (Article 8).
The second crucial act in this context was the constitutional law on division of property
58
laying
down general principles on separation of the federal property (Division of Property Act, see
more below in Part II.8). In addition, despite the fact that the aforementioned Constitution of
the Slovak Republic was adopted during the existence of the federation, those provisions the
effectivity of which was not postponed until the dissolution were in fact not applied until 1
January 1993.
59
The extinction of Czechoslovakia thus occurred as a result of a plan which had
been prepared by political representations of both component republics of the federation.
Czechoslovakia was succeeded by two new sovereign states, which were not identical with the
federation. In this context, the view that the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was a dismembratio
rather than unilateral secession seems to be more appropriate.
3. General Issues of Succession
Czechoslovakia signed the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties
(VCSST) in 1979, however the VCSST entered into force no sooner than three years after the
56
Ingo von Münch and Günter Hoog, ‘Zánik československého státu z mezinárodněprávního hlediska’ in Karel
Vodička (ed), Dělení Československa: Deset let poté (Volvox Globator 2003) 135
57
For a detailed analysis of the political dynamics see Stein (n. 30).
58
Act no. 541/1992 Coll., on division of property of the Czechoslovak federation between the Czech Republic and
Slovak Republic.
59
Jirásková (n 55).

15
dissolution. In addition, Czechoslovakia did not sign the second treaty, the Vienna Convention
on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts from 1983. There is
no consensus in the international community whether these treaties codified international
customary law. Accordingly, international law at the time of dissolution and emergence of the
new republics was not of comprehensive character.
60
Nevertheless, the overview below shows
that the rules contained by the VCSST were followed by both new states, though with some
divergences.
In the context of international treaties both, the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic declared
their intention to succeed to multilateral and bilateral international treaties to which
Czechoslovakia was a party at the time of its dissolution.
61
In 2 December 1992, the Slovak
parliament adopted a Proclamation to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World, where it
declared that “in accordance with existing international norms and to the extent they so provide,
the Slovak Republic, as one of two successor States of Czechoslovakia, shall consider itself,
effective as of January 1, 1993, bound by multilateral and bilateral treaties and instruments to
which the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was a party on that date”
62
Correspondingly, on
17 December 1992 the Czech parliament adopted a similar Proclamation to the Parliaments and
Peoples of the World,
63
declaring its identical intention to be bound by multilateral and bilateral
international treaties to which Czechoslovakia was a party.
In addition, the Slovak Constitution of July 1992 stated in Article 153 that “[t]he Slovak
Republic will be a successor state to all rights and duties ensuing from international treaties and
agreements binding on the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to the extent defined by a
Constitutional Act of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic or by an agreement between the
Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic.” The Czech Republic did not address this matter in
its constitution, but on 15 December 1992 the Czech parliament adopted Constitutional Act No.
4/1993 Coll., on Measures Connected with the Dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic which was to enter into force on 31 December 1992. The key provision in this context
was its Article 5 which read: “The Czech Republic takes over rights and obligations not listed
60
Mahulena Hofmann, ‘Dissolution of Czechoslovakia’’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia
of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2009) 8.
61
Duncan B. Hollis, The Oxford Guide to Treaties (OUP Oxford 2012) 418.
62
Proclamation of the National Council of the Slovak Republic to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World, 2
December 1992, UN: Letter Dated 31 December 1992 from the Permanent Representatives of Czechoslovakia to
the United Nations, UN doc. A/47/848, Annex II.
63
Proclamation of the National Council of the Czech Republic to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World, 17
December 1992, UN: Letter Dated 31 December 1992 from the Permanent Representatives of Czechoslovakia to
the United Nations, UN doc. A/47/848, Annex I.

16
in Article 4
64
deriving for Czechoslovakia from international law on the date of its extinction,
except those related to the territory which was under sovereignty of the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic, but it is not under the sovereignty of the Czech Republic.”
Thus, both successor states to a great extent followed rules determined in Article 34 of VCSST.
Although, the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic did not separate from Czechoslovakia, both
states could have based their action on the phrasing of the first paragraph “whether or not the
predecessor State continues to exist.”
65
From the phrasing of the aforementioned Proclamation
to the Parliaments and Peoples published by both states in December 1992 (“in accordance with
existing international norms…”), it could be also derived that both republics considered the rule
of automatic succession to international treaties embodied in Article 34 of VCSST as a part of
customary law.
66
There was an exception to the general rule. The so called territorial or localized treaties were
exempted from the regime of automatic succession. These treaties include those international
agreements which are related only to a certain part of the predecessor state’s territory, which
does not constitute a part of the successor state’s territory. This approach was also inspired by
Article 34 of VCSST which states that automatic succession is applicable for treaties “…in
respect of the entire territory” or treaties “in respect only of that part of the territory of the
predecessor State which has become a successor State.” This exemption was reflected by
Article 5 of the Czech Constitutional Act No. 4/1993 Coll., which stated that “[t]he Czech
Republic takes over rights and obligations… except those related to the territory which was
under sovereignty of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, but it is not under the sovereignty
of Czech Republic.”
This special regime for the territorial or localized treaties came to attention of the International
Court of Justice in the case of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project involving a dispute between
Hungary and Slovakia.
67
It concerned the implementation and termination of the Budapest
Treaty of 16 September 1977 on the Construction and Operation of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
Barrage System. The treaty had been concluded between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the
International Court of Justice had to address the possibility of Slovak active legitimacy in the
64
Article 4 of Act No. 4/1993 Coll. concerned succession of proprietary rights and obligations addressed by the
Constitutional Act No. 541/1992 Coll., on division of property of the Czechoslovak federation between the Czech
Republic and Slovak Republic.
65
Emphasis added.
66
Hofmann (n 60) 8.
67
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, (Hungary v Slovakia) (Merits) [1997] ICJ Rep 7.

17
dispute based on the treaty from 1977. After analysing the object of the treaty, the International
Court of Justice concluded that “it must be regarded as establishing a territorial regime within
the meaning of Article 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention [which] created rights and
obligations” attaching to the parts of the Danube to which it relates; thus the Treaty itself cannot
be affected by a succession of states. The Court therefore concludes that the 1977 Treaty
became binding upon Slovakia on 1 January 1993.
68
The International Court of Justice hereby
took the same approach as the Czech Constitutional Act no. 4/1993 Coll., and considered
Slovakia to be the only successor to the international treaty from 1977 because of the localized
or territorial character of the treaty.
4. Succession to multilateral treaties
In relation to multilateral treaties, the two new states considered themselves bound by all such
treaties (with exception of the treaties of constitutive character), including the reservations, to
which Czechoslovakia was a party at the time of dissolution.
69
With this intention both republics
notified the respective international organizations, such as the United Nations, International
Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,,
International Labour organization, etc., which served as depositors of the multilateral treaties.
For example, in one of its letters to the Secretary General of the United Nations the Czech
Republic notified as follows: “In Conformity with the valid principles of international law and
to the extent defined by it, the Czech Republic, as a successor State to the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic, considers itself bound, as of 1 January 1993, i.e. the date of the dissolution
of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, by multilateral international treaties to which the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was a party on that day including reservations and
declaration to their provisions made earlier by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.”
70
The
phrasing of the notification (“with the valid principles of international law… considers itself
bound”) indicates that the Czech Republic saw this automatic succession to multilateral treaties
as obligatory without a possibility to opt out of some of these treaties.
In addition to the multilateral treaties which Czechoslovakia ratified, both successor states also
declared their intention to remain signatory states to such multilateral treaties to which
68
Ibid, para 123.
69
Hofmann (n 60) 8.
70
Letter from Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the Secretary General of the United Nations from
10 December 1992 reprinted in United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General:
Status as at 31 December 2002 (United Nations Publications 2002).

18
Czechoslovakia was a signatory (but did not conclude their ratification). While the Czech
Republic again used language indicating that it considered this as an automatic result deriving
from customary international law, Slovakia chose a different phrasing and declared its wishes
to keep the status of signatory states.
71
There were no objections from the Secretary General of
the United Nations or signatory states in relation to these notifications and their content.
72
5. Membership in International Organisations
A different procedure was followed in relation to membership in international organizations.
Still in 1992, the Czech and Slovak republics (as component parts of the federation) concluded
an agreement allocating their membership in international organizations,
73
and declared
individually their intention of being members in approximately fifty international
organizations.
74
For example, in its Proclamation to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World
the Czech Republic stated that “the Czech Republic will endeavour to deepen its integration
into the world economy and to steadily succeed into the membership in the International
Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development”
75
The language of the declaration and reference to succession suggests that the Czech Republic
considered to automatically succeed to the membership of Czechoslovakia. However, both new
states had to undertake a procedure of admission in almost every case.
76
The admission
procedures and length of related negotiations with international organizations differed, and
exceptions when the new states were deemed as succeeding to the membership instead of
acceding also occurred. Thus, for example Czechoslovakia was one of the founding members
of the United Nations in 1945, yet the Czech and Slovak Republics had to apply to the
organization and became new (not continuing) members of the United Nations on 19 January
71
Mikulka Václav, ‘The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia and Succession in respect of Treaties’ in Mrak M (ed),
Succession of States (Springer Netherlands 1999) 112.
72
Ibid.
73
Agreement on Membership in International Governmental Organizations, signed in Prague on December 12,
1992 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics, the Minister of Foreign Relations
the Czech Republic, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs the Slovak Republic.
74
Proclamation of the National Council of the Slovak Republic to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World, 15
December 1992 and Proclamation of the National Council of the Czech Republic to the Parliaments and Peoples
of the World, 17 December 1992.
75
Proclamation of the National Council of the Czech Republic to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World, 17
December 1992.
76
Konrad G. Bühler, State Succession and Membership in International Organizations: Legal Theories Versus
Political Pragmatism (Springer Netherlands 2001) Ch IV.

19
1993.
77
They also did not succeed to the Association Agreement with the European
Communities which was agreed by Czechoslovakia and the European Communities in 1991.
New associations agreements with both new states were negotiated in June 1993.
78
As already mentioned, neither of the new states had any difficulties to succeed into multilateral
treaties administrated by international organizations. However when it came to constituent
treaties of international organizations accession of the new states was required.
79
The Czech
and Slovak Republics were, for instance, not allowed to automatically succeed to the European
Convention on Human Rights, because the participation in this multilateral treaty would
presuppose their membership in the Council of Europe. Slovakia faced difficulties because of
Hungary’s concerns over the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia’s territory. Both republics
were primarily required to accede to the Statute of the Council of Europe. After this accession,
both states were regarded as participating in the European Convention on Human Rights
retroactively from 1 January 1993.
80
There were few exceptions to this general approach. In case of the International Monetary Fund,
World Bank and World Intellectual Property Organization, the new republics succeeded to the
Czechoslovak membership. The succession was, however, not automatic, and they were
required to notify the organizations of their intent to succeed or continue as members.
81
6. Succession to Bilateral Treaties
In relation to bilateral treaties, both countries were engaged in bilateral consultations with the
respective counterpart in order to decide which treaties should remain in force and which
should be terminated. The bilateral negotiations with states did not follow a uniform pattern.
But it seems that a common result of such consultations was the continued application of the
treaties. This approach is well illustrated by the official communications between the Czech
Republic and Germany, France, Sweden, Portugal, Finland, etc.
82
Some of the states did not
77
Ibid.
78
The EU Press Release Database <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-95-100_en.htm.> accessed 20
June 2019.
79
Bühler (n 78) 278.
80
Hofmann (n 60) 14.
81
Bühler (n 78) 283.
82
Mikulka (n 73) 120.

20
even consider the bilateral negotiations necessary and expected automatic continued validity
and application of the treaties.
83
Occasionally, the negotiations between the new republics and the other parties to the bilateral
treaties amounted to termination of the treaties. For example, the Czech Republic and Hungary
concluded a protocol by which they agreed on termination of sixteen treaties, mostly for being
obsolete.
84
A different, but closely related issue, was a succession to responsibility for wrongful acts
attributable to the Czechoslovakia. It was particularly relevant where the wrongful act would
materialize in form of violation of an international treaty into which one of the republics
succeeded post facto. This issue could arise for example in case of bilateral investment
protection treaties into which the new republics succeeded.
85
While it is clear that the succession
to a treaty brings with it an obligation of the new states to act in conformity with such treaty, it
is less clear whether it also amounts to a succession to responsibility for a violation of that
treaty. As we already mentioned, the Czech Republic succeeded to majority of multilateral
treaties and to many bilateral treaties, and from its Proclamation to the Parliaments and Peoples
it could be derived that it considered the automatic succession to treaties as a requirement of
customary international law. Although some scholars support the view that general rules on
succession includes succession into responsibility for wrongdoing,
86
the prevailing view is that
there is no such automatic succession under customary international law.
87
7. Division of Property and Debts
The division of property and debts was a matter of some tension during the dissolution
negotiations between the two parts of the federation.
88
It was eventually settled, as mentioned
above, by the Division of Property Act in November 1992.
The division of immovable property followed the territorial principle (i.e. such property
belonged to the state in the territory of which it was located), which was consistent with Article
83
The diplomatic note of Germany to the Czech Republic of 9 April 1993, No. VN-NR. 180/93.
84
Protocol concluded between the Czech Republic and Hungary on 21 September 1995 in Mikulka (n 73) 122.
85
For example, the Czech Republic succeeded to the bilateral treaties on investment protection with Korea (from
1992), Belgium and Luxemburg (from 1989), Germany (from 1990), Norway (from 1991), Austria (from 1990),
Greece (from 1991), etc. Full list available at<https://www.mfcr.cz/cs/legislativa/dohody-o-podpore-a-ochrane-
investic/prehled-platnych-dohod-o-podpore-a-ochra.> accessed 20 June 2019.
86
First Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Pavel Šturma (69th session of the ILC (2017).
87
James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge University Press 2013) ch 13.
88
Vladimír Balaš, ‘Některé mezinárodněprávní aspekty dělení státu’ 131 Právník [1992] 996.

21
18(1)(a)-(b) Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives
and Debts.
89
The property where the principle could not be applied was divided proportionally
to the size of the population. The movable property, financial rights and obligations included,
was also divided according to the size of population, that is by the ration of two to one.
International institutions respected this agreement between the republics, and the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank divided the actives and passives in the described proportion
(two thirds for the Czech Republic and one third for the Slovak Republic).
90
Conclusion
The dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1939 and 1992 was in neither case driven by a separatist
movement motivated by nationalist ambitions.
91
In both cases, the Slovaks expected an equal
participation in the common decision-making. The Czech laisse-faire capitalism in the interwar
period as well as the neoliberal reforms in the wake of the 1989 revolution did not account for
structural socio-economic differences between the two parts of the state. As a consequence,
these reforms were disproportionally detrimental to Slovakia. These policies drove the
electorate from sensible Slovak politicians to up-and-coming political realists and radicals who
were willing to ‘save’ Slovakia at any cost. To avoid the fate of Bohemia and Moravia, Tiso
proclaimed an independent Slovak state in 1939 and adopted a fascist organization of state
power and Nazi racial policies. Mečiar, faced with a prospect of Czechoslovak recentralization
employed nationalistic rhetoric to legitimize the creation of independent Slovakia. Stuck with
a rather radical electorate and unable to swiftly deliver socio-economic improvements, his rule
turned increasingly autocratic, leading to isolation from the West.
The international rules on secession were virtually non-existent in 1939 and the process of
Czechoslovak dissolution was dictated by Nazi Germany, which nominally legalized the new
status quo by bilateral treaties establishing in fact two different types of protectorates for
Czechia and Slovakia. The evolution of international rules makes the 1992 dissolution for
Czechoslovakia more analytically valuable. A threat of being charged with secession made both
sides of the conflict work hard to arrive at consensual dissolution nominally authorized by the
federation.
89
Art. 3 of the Constitutional Act No. 541/1992 Coll.
90
Hoffman (n 60) 6.
91
Innes (n 9) 60.

22
The dissolution marked the end of the revolution. Both republics formally constitutionalized
the revolutionary program upon their independence.
92
However, as new elites, not rooted in
dissent, took over the transformation of state and society, their constitutional practice run often
contrary to the original understanding of the constitution, weakening the revolution’s
achievements. In Slovakia, this divergence took an early height during Mečiar’s rule; in the
Czech Republic, the dismantling of the revolutionary legacy has been mitigated by Havel’s
charismatic Presidency and remaining dissent elite spread among all mainstream parties. After
Havel’s death, the non-dissent elite fortified their victory in the succession struggle in a series
of presidential elections and mounted their attacks on the revolutionary legacy, stearing the
country onto the collision course with the values of European integration. At the same time,
Slovakia, having survived Mečiar’s autocratic regime, now perceives itself as the ‘island of
liberty’ in the region.
92
Both constitutions are based on the same values and principles, similar structure and inter-institutional checks
and balances. Their bills of rights copy the 1991 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.