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352 Cary Campbell, Alin Olteanu, Kalevi Kull
Sign Systems Studies 47(3/4), 2019, 352–381
https://doi.org/10.12697/SSS.2019.47.3-4.01
Learning and knowing as semiosis:
Extending the conceptual apparatus
of semiotics
Cary Campbell1, Alin Olteanu2, Kalevi Kull3
Abstract. If all knowing comes from semiosis, more concepts should be added
to the semiotic toolbox. However, semiotic concepts must be defined via other
semiotic concepts. We observe an opportunity to advance the state-of-the-art in
semiotics by defining concepts of cognitive processes and phenomena via semiotic
terms. In particular, we focus on concepts of relevance for theory of knowledge,
such as learning, knowing, affordance, scaffolding, resources, competence, me-
mory, and a few others. For these, we provide preliminary definitions from a
semiotic perspective, which also explicates their interrelatedness. Redefining these
terms this way helps to avoid both physicalism and psychologism, showcasing the
epistemological dimensions of environmental situatedness through the semiotic
understanding of organisms’ fittedness with their environments. Following our
review and presentation of each concept, we briefly discuss the significance of our
embedded redefinitions in contributing to a semiotic theory of knowing that has
relevance to both the humanities and the life sciences, while not forgetting their
relevance to education and psychology, but also social semiotic and multimodality
studies.
Keywords: affordance; competence; scaffolding; semiotic learning; semiotic resource;
theory of knowledge; memory; umwelt
Cary Campbell, Alin Olteanu, Kalevi Kull
The theoretical strength and useful applicability of semiotics is largely dependent
on the adequacy and richness of its conceptual apparatus. The greater part of the
semiotic toolbox comes from a few classic authors, with considerable enrichment
and diversification occurring between the 1960s and 1980s. The decades after that
1 Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada; e-mail: cary_campbell@
sfu.ca.
2 Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu, Jakobi St. 2, Tartu 51005, Estonia; Kaunas
University of Technology, Kaunas, Lithuania; e-mail: alin.olteanu@ut.ee.
3 Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu, Jakobi St. 2, Tartu 51005, Estonia; e-mail:
kalevi.kull@ut.ee.
Learning and knowing as semiosis: Extending the conceptual apparatus of semiotics 353
have not added many new concepts. Mostly, this recent period is characterized
by its focus on discussions about the areas of applicability of existing concepts
and about the relationships (complementarity, or incompatibility, or fittedness,
or synthesis, etc.) between the conceptual systems of different semiotic schools.
Some conceptual (and terminological) changes are seemingly irreversible: for
instance, the earlier opposition between signs and symbols in some approaches
has led to the acceptance of symbols as subtypes of signs; after the initial opposi-
tion between Saussurean and Peircean semiotics, attempts have been made to
accommodate both, making a natural space for Saussurean semiotics in a wider
theory, at the same time avoiding the pansemiotic approach (e.g. Stables 2012;
Favareau, Kull 2015); interpretation and meaning-making are understood as
universal features of semiosis; semiosis is identified as taking place in a wide range
of living systems. The latter aspect has opened the area for the development of
biosemiotics (together with the important border area of cognitive semiotics),
which became in this way a field of discussions on general semiotics.
Our thesis is that semiosis as the fundamental process of meaning-making
implies, as its central aspects, learning, memory, and knowing; and that semiosic
activity assumes and is framed by resources, competence, affordances, and
scaffolding. All these listed concepts describe components or aspects of semiosis;
therefore, they can be incorporated within contemporary semiotics. For this,
however, these concepts should be understood through intra-semiotic lenses.
We understand a concept to belong to the semiotic toolbox (i.e., to be a semiotic
concept) if it is defined via other concepts of semiotics. Thus, our task is to
redefine these mentioned concepts accordingly, within a semiotic framework.
The authors of this article met for some seminars in Tartu in the spring of
2019, and divided the work in the following way: Cary Campbell led the study on
affordances and scaffolding, Alin Olteanu on resources and competence, Kalevi
Kull added the introduction, and we together connected it into a study on the
semiotics of learning and knowing.
1. Learning, knowing, and other aspects of cognition–
extending the list of basic semiotic concepts
While, according to an old formula, life and cognition are coextensive (e.g.,
Heschl 1990), it is also rather natural to accept that cognition and semiosis are
coextensive.4 Therefore, it is necessary to explicate the relationships of all the
4 See also Zlatev 2003.
354 Cary Campbell, Alin Olteanu, Kalevi Kull
above-mentioned cognitive concepts to the concept of semiosis. Semio tic defini-
tions for the concepts of cognitive processes are necessary for a comprehen sive
general semiotic theory. The recent attention that semiotic research is paying to
aspects of cognition (Eco 1999; Zlatev, Sonesson, Konderak 2016; Konderak 2018;
Mittelberg 2019; Brandt 2020) demonstrates this need.5
To establish the whole network of cognitive semiotic concepts is beyond our
current task. Our aim here is (1) to argue for the importance of importing a
row of concepts into the basic semiotic theory, and (2) to sketch some of these
relationships.
A look into semiotic dictionaries clearly suggests the necessity of such an
integrating effort. As shown in Table 1, the terms describing learning and cogni-
tion are mostly absent in the classic semiotic terminology.
Thus, in this paper, we sketch the relations between some elements of the
general semiotic account of learning. Within our model, these elements include
the embedded and interrelated concepts of resource, competence, affordance, and
scaffolding. We explore these notions as connected to the seemingly more primary
biosemiotic concepts of umwelt and learning.
We consider that the future development of semiotic theory will rely on these
terms– often plagued with hidden homunculi and psychologism– redefined
in general semiotic terms; i.e. without reducing them to mentalistic schemas or
production rules, but rather, as sign-relations, descriptions of the ways in which
organisms live, interact and co-evolve with their environment.
Each of these concepts (take, as a clear example, ‘learning’) is used in in con-
sistent variations through different discourses. Therefore, as part of our metho-
dology, we will present each concept individually, carefully tracing (a) the term’s
common meaning and introduction; (b) its historical development and use in
different disciplines, including semiotics; and (c) redefinition of the term within a
general semiotic theory of knowledge. Following our presentation of each concept,
we briefly discuss the significance of our embedded redefinitions, in contributing
to a semiotic theory of knowing that has relevance to both the humanities and the
life sciences, while not forgetting their relevance to education and psychology, but
also social semiotic and multimodality studies.
5 e biosemiotic glossary project has partly a similar aim, to enrich the conceptual system
of general semiotics (see Favareau, Gare 2017; Rodrí guez Higuera, Kull 2017; Tønnessen 2015;
Tønnessen, Magnus, Brentari 2015). Also, see the volume Concepts for Semiotics (Rodríguez
Higuera, Bennett 2016).
Learning and knowing as semiosis: Extending the conceptual apparatus of semiotics 355
Table 1. Inclusion of some cognitive semiotic terms in some dictionaries of semiotics (– no
such entry; + corresponding entry exists).
Dictionary
Entries
Colapietro
1993
Bouissac 1998 Martin,
Ringham
2006
Sebeok,
Danesi 2010
Cobley
2010
a ordance – + – – –
competence + – + competence/
performance
+
tting – – – – –
knowing – knowledge
representation;
cultural knowledge
knowing-
how-to-do
––
learning – – – – –
memory – – – – –
modelling – – – modeling
system
+
representation + – – – –
resources – – – – –
sca olding – – – – –
umwelt + + – /under
Uexküll
+
2. Semiotic learning, memory
Learning is a significant concept within a range of disciplines; not only those
concerned with organic forms of learning (psychology, educational studies,
anthropology, biology) but also technology-related fields (such as the study of
artificial intelligence, and computer sciences) through the related notions of
machine and computational learning.
A starting-point definition states that learning is the acquiring or modification
of sign relations, which is manifest in a change of behaviour (see Stables 2005,
2006).
Recently, the concept of semiotic learning has become a significant cornerstone
in biosemiotic, but also educational semiotic research. In these discourses,
learning is linked with the growth of significance within a species-specific pheno-
menal world, or umwelt. Andrew Stables laid out the foundation for a semiotic
educational philosophy and theory starting from the observation that “if all living
is semiotic engagement, then learning is semiotic engagement” (Stables 2006:
375). This broad– and hermeneutically permissive– concept of learning has
356 Cary Campbell, Alin Olteanu, Kalevi Kull
stimulated much semiotic inquiry on education recently (see Stables et al. 2018;
Olteanu, Stables 2018; Campbell 2017; Olteanu, Campbell 2018).
Paul Bouissac, speaking about semiotics as the science of memory, has ob-
served: “Considering that semiotics takes as its main object of inquiry systems
of signs that are learned (languages, cultural codes, social discourse, etc.), it is
surprising that so few semioticians so far have shown a marked interest in
the science of memory” (Bouissac 2007: 76, emphasis added). Accordingly,
together with the concept of learning, the concept of memory should also have
a fundamentally semiotic definition. For instance: memory is the semiotic
scaffolding established by learning. From this understanding, as we observe,
“memory is not limited to the body of an organism. Traces in the surrounding,
constructed niche, can be a part of memory” (Kull 2018: 458).
3. Knowing, knowledge
This overlap between the semiotic theory of education and the semiotic theory of
biology reveals one of the most interesting features of semiotics in general: its implied
theory of knowledge. Signs, as basic semiotic units, are not units of measurement,
but rather refer to meaningful relationships that sustain, enable and constrain the
organism’s interactions– thus, they are ultimately qualitative and subject to dynamic
change and growth. Notably, semiotic relations refer to an important type of “second
order causality”, that causes changes in the causal action itself, through altering the
ways in which organisms re-channel energy (see Pearson 2018: 399–400; Campbell
2018: Section 5). Following trends in ecosemiotics and biosemiotics, it is possible
to consider that semiotics itself is increasingly becoming a theory of knowledge,
as it describes the diversity of models and modelling phenomena across different
organisms’ umwelten, and thus the “forms of knowledge” (Sebeok, Danesi 2000)
expressed by life’s diverse interactions. The interactions of living systems create new
forms (scaffoldings and resources) for meaning-making. These basic biological
forms (scaffolding structures) appear to be signs (or sign-vehicles) that organisms
endow with meaning through coming to know them in their own species-specific
ways. In this way, “biology accounts for a spectrum of meanings that a form affords
within the horizon of an organism’s competences for meaning-making” (Olteanu,
Stables 2018: 411, emphasis added).
Defining semiotics as a theory of knowledge, of course, has a longer tradition.
Tzvetan Todorov stated: “We are treating semiotics as a discourse whose objective
is knowledge (rather than poetic beauty or pure speculation), and whose subject
matter is the whole variety of sign phenomena (not only for example words)”
Learning and knowing as semiosis: Extending the conceptual apparatus of semiotics 357
(Todorov 1978: 1, emphasis added). This same idea is also referred to by Walker
Percy (1957, “Semiotic and theory of knowledge”), Sandra Moriarty (2002: 25,
“Peircean semiotics is a theory of knowing”), etc.
A principal and common feature of semiotic theories consists in their con-
ceptua lization of knowledge as interpretative. Both Charles Peirce’s semiotics and the
(post)structuralist tradition, inspired mostly by Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiology,
claim that knowing supposes interpreting. Semiotic theories, many of which can be
conflicting in several regards, imply a hermeneutic epistemology (cf. Hoffmeyer 2018;
Feil, Olteanu 2018). Also, meaning is to a large extent functional, as the pragmatic
maxim states: meaning is in reference to some purpose, no matter how changing
and dynamic such purposes may appear to be (CP 5.3 [1902]). In what regards
behaviour, this semiotic view is complementary to, but also more encompassing
than, that of cognitive dissonance theory in psychology (Festinger 1957).
We argue that a general semiotic theory of knowing can bridge logic and
psychology while avoiding the pitfalls of subduing one to the other (e.g., Stjernfelt
2014). Cognition does not fit the narrow principles of formal, propositional logic;
nor is logic necessarily psychological. Rather, a biosemiotic perspective asserts
that phenomena like cognition, perception, and even consciousness, assume some
primary semiosic operations that sustain these higher-level pro cesses. Semiosis is
a universal of cognition, expressed in the actions of any meaning-seeking system.
The category of meaning, as foundational to semiotics, offers a perspective from
which to understand learning outside of psychologic reductions, which mostly
conceive of learning as the expression of achieved mental states or behavioural
outcomes, ultimately occurring within the brain of the subject. From a semiotic
account, meaning implies a relationship; this includes a mediating element that
emerges through the pairedness of an organism’s inside and outside (see Nöth
1998: 339). Thus, a semiotic theory of learning must ulti mately be ecologically
construed (Olteanu, Stables 2018; Campbell 2018, 2019), emphasizing the
active abilities of organisms to reshape their environments through using and
discovering sign-relations.
From a semiotic point of view, knowledge can be defined as everything
meaning ful. However, together with Jesper Hoffmeyer we add that “knowledge
is not something we have but something created [evoked] in the very moment of
use” (Hoffmeyer 2018: 1). Truthfulness is not a necessary condition for knowledge.
According to a semiotic model, meaning assumes mediatedness. Consequently,
what may seem as direct knowledge (e.g. in the sense of Ingold 2019), in a closer
analysis is revealed to include mediation. Mediatedness is a characteristic feature
that distinguishes knowing from processes that do not include knowing (as
occurring among non-living entities).
358 Cary Campbell, Alin Olteanu, Kalevi Kull
4. Semiotic resources
From a semiotic perspective, resources and competences are complementary and
inseparable concepts. A semiotic resource is something that can be used to represent;
that can be engaged with semiotically and, as such, leads to the genera tion (or
discovery) of (more) meaning. The concept of resources has roots in the Greimasian
tradition of semiotics and is associated with the related notion of performances (cf.
Pikkarainen 2018: 443) as the enacting of new active behaviour. The concept has
mostly been investigated in social semiotics, in relation to the concept of modality
that is used in communication and education (Kress, Leeuwen 2001; Kress 2003,
2010), and its applicability should be rather universal (Fei 2004). Semiotic resources,
Kress considered, depend upon “the context of the choice of modes made” (Kress
2003: 8) within a new performance. The basic concept of semiotic resource supposes
choice. Kress explained that because conveying something implies a representation
of what is conveyed, the choices made in designing the representation are inherent
in what is conveyed. The same holds true for learning: the way in which the learner
perceives what is apprehended, its modalities of expression, is an inherent part of
the apprehension. Knowledge, this is to say, is a matter of design. The idea behind
Kress’ construal of resource as a matter of modal choices is also expressed, in a
biosemiotic concern, in Hoffmeyer’s explanation that information is meaningful
only by its framing in a medial context (Hoffmeyer 2018: 5).
The social semiotic approach, however, tends to ignore the role of the body in
knowledge and communication. Semiotic resources are here deemed as anything
“available in a culture” (Kress, Leeuwen 2001: 4) that can be used for meaning-
making. We extrapolate and expand this notion of semiotic resource to encompass
not only resources for meaning-making within a culture, but available in the en-
vironment, in general. The need for an embodied account of meaning is evident not
only in a biosemiotic concern. For instance, Elleström (2018: 270–271; 2019: 10)
argues that mediality, as the intermediate stage of communication, is not evoked
only by culture or technology but, to begin with, by an organism’s body. Besides the
need for an embodied perspective on meaning (and knowledge), this also avoids
the cultural atomism and exaggerated relativism implied, on some accounts, in
social semiotics (e.g., Kress 2010: 19) by anchoring learning in specific linguistic
and cultural modes (see Cobley 2016; Olteanu 2019). As we explain in more
detail below, this comprehensive notion of semiotic resource connects with that of
affordance, as coined by Gibson (e.g., 1979). The relation, mostly morphological,
between body and landscape affords certain resources. Thus, semiotic resources are
not merely anything present in the environment, but anything that an organism’s
sense perceptive and motoric capabilities evoke as available.
Learning and knowing as semiosis: Extending the conceptual apparatus of semiotics 359
Semiotic resources are subjective, depending on (1) what the organism, given
its embodied morphology and its relation to the environment, can use and (2)
what the organism chooses to use. For instance, a tree can be used for nesting by a
bird and as source of food for a monkey. However, the monkey could additionally
come to choose to use the tree as shelter. A human might choose, also, to use the
same tree as fuel. All these uses are based on (almost) the same “hard” physical
matter, but they rely on different resources, conceived semiotically.
5. Semiotic competences
According to Stjernfelt (2006), the (post)structuralist tradition of semiotics
tends to regard the body as yet another cultural concept, represented in cultural-
dependent modalities, being conceived “as subjected to the free arbitrariness
of semiotic systems– and no special attention would be paid to the body as a
crucial prerequisite of semiotic articulation” (Stjernfelt 2006: 14). This mentalistic
view dissociates what evokes learning from what limits it, as “no extrastructural
constraints are supposed to determine the spectrum of possibilities of body
representation” (Stjernfelt 2006: 14). In view of the various pathways that
contribute to biosemiotic theory, such as Jakob von Uexküll’s (1982[1940])
theoretical biology, cognitive semantics (Lakoff, Johnson 1999; Fauconnier, Turner
2002), Merleau-Ponty’s (1995) phenomenology of the body, and complexity theory
(Kauffman 2000), Stjernfelt sets the direction for developing a body concept that
“makes evident the basic semiotic competences of an organism, i.e., a body concept
which entails semiotics” (Stjernfelt 2006: 14, emphasis added).
With this claim, Stjernfelt also places the notion of semiotic competence in
the new light of embodiment theory. In contradiction to the dualist view of the
body as the external shell of an intelligent mind, where the latter is responsible for
knowledge, the body itself is conceived as epistemological. Thus, the body is not
defined as a brute physical form, constituted merely by joint limbs and component
parts, but in relation to the competences for meaning making that this biological
form entails.
From this perspective, we define semiotic competence as the capability of an
organism, dependent on its embodied morphology, to discover meaning resources
in a given environment and to recombine them in new, pragmatically functional
models. As such, semiotic competences are employed to scaffold knowledge, which
is to say, to develop models of (aspects of) their environment, which result in a
capacity to navigate in the environment. A scaffolding is similar to what it aims
to grasp, being deemed a model, because, following this metaphor for learning,
360 Cary Campbell, Alin Olteanu, Kalevi Kull
it moulds onto it.
6
The erection of new scaffoldings, thus, leads to environmental
changes that evoke new semiotic resources. In the scaffolding process, not only
organisms change – their environments change, too. Thus, as new semiotic
resources become available and are used, organisms and environments co-develop.
This notion of semiotic competence critically differs from the traditional
conception as merely a more encompassing version of the concept of literary
competence (see Culler 1980: 109–110), stemming from Chomskyan linguistics
and, further down the line, from Saussure’s semiology. Rooted in linguistics, these
accounts of competence are precisely the target of Stjernfelt’s (2006) criticism, as they
imply a view of the body as entirely subjected to cultural and linguistic arbitrariness
and, thus, not responsible for knowledge (see also Olteanu, Stables 2018: 425).7
6. Affordances: an evolving concept
6.1. Gibson’s conception
The American psychologist James Gibson coined the concept of ‘affordances’
through his project of developing an “ecological approach” to the study of visual
perception. Gibson marked this a theory of direct perception, in distinction to
theories that assert that perception is mediated (i.e., through mental represen-
tations, models, cognitive schemas, etc.).8
6 See René om’s and omas A. Sebeok’s view of competence, as discussed in the context
of iconic learning and educational semiotics, in Campbell (2019: 300–304).
7 A related notion of competences (also linguistically derived and expressed) has signi cantly
entered curriculum discourse and policy in the last two decades (see, for example, Ruitenberg
2019). In these discourses, competences basically refer to pre-determined benchmarks for
educational success that learners and teachers are expected to “perform” (see Stables 2019:
27–30, for this “problem of performativity” in education). As Biesta and Priestley observed
in their classic article “Capacities and the curriculum”: “what is signi cant here is that [...] the
student shi s from being the subject in education– that is the one who is supposed to study,
learn, master, acquire, evaluate, judge, etcetera– to become the outcome of education” (Biesta,
Priestley 2013: 36). It is hypothesized that an embodied and ecological, meaning-based notion
of competences (as presented in this study) may open new avenues for philosophically re ning
“competency-talk” in educational research and curriculum design.
8 Chemero (2006: 59–60, emphasis added) describes the three main tenets of Gibsonian
direct perception cogently: “First, perception is direct, which is to say that it does not involve
computation or mental representations. at is, Gibson thought that perception was not a
matter of internally adding information to sensations. Second, perception is primarily
for the guidance of action, and not for action-neutral information gathering. We perceive
the environment in order to do things. e third tenet follows from the rst two. Because
perception does not involve mental addition of information to stimuli, yet is able to guide
Learning and knowing as semiosis: Extending the conceptual apparatus of semiotics 361
Over the course of his career, Gibson increasingly found classic empirical
psychology generally inadequate for understanding the complexities of percep-
tion, as it did not account for an actor’s actual engagement and immersion in their
environment: “[...] orthodox psychology asserts that we perceive [...] objects insofar
as we discriminate their properties or qualities” (Gibson 1979: 134). Instead, he
proposed “that what we perceive when we look at objects are their affordances, not
their qualities” (Gibson 1979: 134, emphasis added). Thus, he introduced the novel
term “affordance” that implies an ecological dimension for learning:
The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides
or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in the dictionary,
but the noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that
refers to both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does.
It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment. (Gibson 1979:
127, emphasis in original)
This concept was in many ways Gibson’s last main contribution to the theory
of visual psychology that he had been developing since the publication of his
first book The Perception of the Visual World (1950) and culminating in the
posthumous, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (1979), where the
notion of ‘affordances’ is presented and developed. Gibson believed that visual
psychology could no longer proceed from the dualistic basis of a “depersonalilzed”
operational environment, conceptualized as distinct from the organism’s cognized
environment (see D’Aquili et al. 1979 for the distinction). Although it is possible to
model aspects of the environment through a physicalist lens, Gibson stressed that
“this is not to say that it [an organism] perceives the world of physics and behaves
in the space and time of physics” (Gibson 1979: 8). On account of this non-dualist
and phenomenal approach we consider that Gibson’s affordance theory can be
insightfully coopted in the scope of (bio)semiotics.
When considering how the environment affords possibilities for action and
response, the organism’s embodied, species-specific phenomenal world (umwelt)
is of central importance.9 Gibson stressed that the organism must always be
considered in terms of its embeddedness within an eco-system; as even its sense
organs and perceptual systems evolved in intimate connection to a local and
behavior adaptively, all the information necessary for guiding adaptive behavior must be
available in the environment to be perceived.” See also Michaels, Carello (1981: 2) and Fodor,
Pylyshyn (1981) for more on the importance of this distinction for psychology.
9 “[ e physical properties that constitute a ordances] have unity relative to the posture
and behaviour of the animal being considered. So, an a ordance cannot be measured as we
measure in physics” (Gibson 1979: 127–128).
362 Cary Campbell, Alin Olteanu, Kalevi Kull
dynamic environment (cf. Gibson 1966). In a semiotic manner, the organism’s
embeddedness within an ecosystem can be regarded as long processes of
scaffolding, which, in most cases, started long before the organism’s individual
birth and is continued by the individual organism’s environmental modelling, in
ways critical for its own existence. This idea of embeddedness led Gibson to an
important reimagining of the concept ‘niche’ as “a set of affordances” (Gibson
1979: 128).10
6.2. Limits of Gibson’s concept
As the above passages indicate, central to Gibson’s conception is that affordances
are not solely in the environment or the organism, but rather, cut across the
subjective-objective barrier. Nevertheless, it is precisely this complementarity that
has given rise to ambiguity in Gibson’s own use of the term and has resulted in the
concept being frequently critiqued and reformulated (cf. Shotter 1983; Stoffregen
2000; Scaratino 2003; Costall 2012; Dotov et al. 2012; Barsingerhorn et al. 2012:
55). For exampl e, Gibson often seemed to suggest that affordances are fully on
the side of the environment, and thus more (ontologically) “real” than purely
meaning-based (semiotic) relations.11
By not focusing on the ontological status of affordances, and dealing mainly with
the perception of ambient light, Gibson could sidestep the complicated problems
around how an actor’s experience (personal and cultural) impacts upon the
perception of affordances. Gibson stated this explicitly: “The central question for the
theory of affordances is not whether they exist and are real but whether information
is available in ambient light for perceiving them” (Gibson 1979: 140). The result: the
awkward line that Gibson is forced to walk because of this evasion, is empirically
vague and philosophically muddled. We aim to invest the concepts of ‘niche’ and
‘affordance’ as inspired from Gibson, in sharper focus by nesting them in a semiotic
framework, where body and environment are revealed as co-developing.
10 “A species of animal is said to utilize or occupy a certain niche in the environment. is
is not quite the same as the habitat of the species; a niche refers more to how an animal lives
than to where it lives. I suggest that a niche is a set of a ordances [...]. e natural environment
o ers many ways of life, and di erent animals have di erent ways of life. e niche implies a
kind of animal, and the animal implies a kind of niche. Note the complementarity of the two”
(Gibson 1979: 128). Cf. the concept of semiotic niche in Ho meyer (2008: Ch. 6).
11 “An important fact about the a ordances of the environment is that they are in a sense
objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which are o en supposed to be
subjective, phenomenal and mental. But, actually, an a ordance is neither an objective property
nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like. An a ordance cuts across the dichotomy of
subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy” (Gibson 1979: 129).
Learning and knowing as semiosis: Extending the conceptual apparatus of semiotics 363
6.3. Connections to umwelt
As evidenced by the widespread use of the term in many disciplines, the power
in Gibson’s concept resides precisely in its broad generality, not its narrow
applicability within visual psychology.12 As testament to this, many scholars
have suggested that more heuristic value can be returned to Gibson’s concept by
embedding it within Jakob von Uexkü ll’s theory of umwelt.13
Tim Ingold (2009; also 2000) in particular has closely compared the relation-
ships between the two concepts. Despite Gibson having set out to develop an
eco logical conception that always maintains complete complementarity of
observer and environment,14 he eventually contradicted himself by ultimately
placing affordances firmly on the side of the environment, even making in-
compatible statements like “the environment does not depend on the organism
for its existence” (Gibson 1979: 8, 129). Ingold (2009: 144) concludes by affirming
how the philosophical conviction behind statements such as these are ultimately
incompatible with the active functional meaning-seeking system referred to
through Jakob von Uexkü ll’s umwelt concept:
For whereas Gibsonian affordances are supposed to exist as the inherent potentials
of environmental objects, regardless of whether they are attended to or put to use
by any organism, von Uexküll maintained that what he called the ‘quality’ (Ton)
of a thing, by virtue of which it has significance for a particular creature, is not
intrinsic to the thing itself but is acquired by virtue of its having been drawn into
that creature’s activity (Uexkü ll 1982: 27–29). (Ingold 2011: 79)
Ingold goes on to draw upon classic examples from umwelt theory, which are also
interrelated with our re-definition of semiotic scaffolding in this article: a stone
in a river can function as a habitat for a crab, a hard surface for breaking shells for
gulls, and a stepping-stone for a bridge for a human:
In Gibson’s terms [...] [these] are all properties of the stone that are available to be
taken up. For von Uexküll, by contrast, they are qualities that are bestowed upon
12 As Dotov et al. (2012) point out, a notable in uence of Gibson’s concept came directly and
indirectly from the American pragmatist tradition, which Gibson was a part of through his
adviser Edwin Holt who himself was a student of William James. For more about the in uence
of pragmatist philosophy on ecological psychology in general, see He 2001.
13 See for example: Cunningham 1988, 1998; Ingold 2009; Dotov et al. 2012. Uexkü ll even had
his own notion of a ordances within his approach to ethology, in his concept of ‘functional
tone’ (funktionale Tönung).
14 e “subjective world” (Gibson 1979: 129) perspective that Gibson recognizes as being
present in the work of certain biologists, without speci cally mentioning or citing Uexkü ll.
364 Cary Campbell, Alin Olteanu, Kalevi Kull
the stone by the need of the creature in question and in the very act of attending
to it [...]. Thus, far from fitting into a given corner of the world (a niche), it is the
animal that fits the world to itself by ascribing functional qualities to the things it
encounters [affordances] and thereby integrating them into a coherent system of
its own. (Ingold 2009: 144–145)
Ingold concludes that the concept of affordances is enriched when embedded
within this corollary concept of umwelt, in place of more static designations such
as environment and niche; helping to maintain the holism that Gibson sought but
was ultimately unable to fully articulate.
When in recent work Ingold preferred the concept of affordances to the
concept of umwelt, he used an argument that affordances (as different from
umwelt) provide unmediated direct knowledge (Ingold 2019). This is obviously
due to a narrower concept of mediation used by Ingold; according to biosemiotic
accounts, any perception includes mediation.15
Donald Cunningham (1988; 1998) has proposed the affordances–umwelt
coupling for educational psychology and developing semiotic theories of learning.
Despite occasional forays into the term’s applicability within semiotic studies (cf.
Windsor 2004), ‘affordances’ has been relatively underexplored in general semiotic
discourse16– at least compared to the extensive use of the term within social
semiotic and other applied forms of semiotics.
As noted by Niveleau (2006), affordance stems from the concept and philo-
sophy of gestalt and forgetting this connection has impoverished the concept of
affordance.
6.4. In technology, social semiotics, music
As alluded to, the concept of ‘affordances’ has been widely adopted within
technology studies and design-oriented fields (e.g. Faraj, Azad 2012; Majchrzak
et al. 2013; Treem, Leonardi 2013). It is important to note that in large part the
concept entered these discourses through Donald A. Norman’s repurposing of the
term in his design classic The Psychology of Everyday Things (1988). In contrast
to Gibson’s earlier formulation that stressed non-dualistic complementarity of
subject-object relations, Norman’s notion is entirely (and deliberately) dependent
15 Even signal transduction requires mediation (Bruni 2008). For instance, the mediating
element is described by Barbieri as code-maker.
16 Winfried Nöth (2010) has compiled a valuable and thorough literature review of educational
semiotics, or edusemiotics as it is sometimes referred to. Gibson’s concept of a ordances and
its use in semiotic discourses is brie y discussed in a section on ecological semiotics, a eld
Nöth himself has been an important pioneer of.
Learning and knowing as semiosis: Extending the conceptual apparatus of semiotics 365
upon the competence and capability of the actor.17 Unlike much subsequent research
in technology and even multimodality studies, Norman fully acknowledges this
distinction between his concept of affordance and that of Gibson’s.18
As McGrenere and Ho note, the main difference between the two conceptions
is that for Gibson, affordances are “action possibilities in the environment in
relation to the action capabilities of an actor” and for Norman, they are “perceived
properties that may not actually exist” (McGrenere, Ho 2000: 181). As for Gibson,
for Norman, too, the ontological status is ultimately irrelevant, but now the notion
has been inverted, in part. Notably, it is the interpretation and linage of the term
within design that seems to have informed Kress and the New London Group’s
concept of ‘modal affordance’ as “what it is possible to express and represent easily
(within a given cultural mode)” (Jewitt 2008: 247).19
Interestingly, the concept has also significantly entered music-related discipli-
nes (music cognition and perception studies, music education studies), from other
related educational discourses (e.g. López Cano 2006; Menin, Schiavio 2012).
Some recent music-related research that has significantly developed the concept
of affordances has turned to biosemiotic theory and explanations. This includes a
neo-Peircean ‘biosemiotic’ reading of how music emerged in the human species,
from evolutionary musicologist Gary Tomlinson (2015; cf. Schyff, Schiavio 2017),
and a biosemiotic account of musical perception and cognition that places both
umwelt and affordances in a central role, in the work of Reybrouck (2012, 2015).
17 “[...] the term a ordance refers to the perceived and actual properties of the thing, primarily
those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly be used. [...]
A ordances provide strong clues to the operations of things. Plates are for pushing. Knobs
are for turning. Slots are for inserting things into. Balls are for throwing or bouncing. When
a ordances are taken advantage of, the user knows what to do just by looking: no picture, label,
or instruction needed” (Norman 1988: 9).
18 As an important footnote puts it: “ e notion of a ordance and the insights it provides
originated with J. J. Gibson, a psychologist interested in how people see the world. I believe that
a ordances result from the mental interpretation of things, based on our past knowledge and
experience applied to our perception of the things about us. My view is somewhat in con ict
with the views of many Gibsonian psychologists, but this internal debate within modern
psychology is of little relevance here” (Norman 1988: 219).
19 e term had made its way into educational discourse long before Kress and his colleagues
took it up (largely in the elds of educational psychology, science and engineering education,
music education). Two points should be noted: rst, that usage of the term in educational
discourses picked up as the 1990s progressed, although it had been used as early as 1984, and
second, the majority of the articles explore the concept from within a “designs for learning”
perspective.
366 Cary Campbell, Alin Olteanu, Kalevi Kull
6.5. Extending affordances into general semiotics
The issue of how far we may comfortably extend this notion of affordances into
the cultural and social realms is of central importance for our re-definition within
a general (bio)semiotic framework. This issue has been the subject of vociferous
and frequent debate in the Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, particularly
through the 1980s and 1990s. Ginsburg (1990) offers an extensive review of this
scholarly conversation, and emphasizes that the diversity of often contradictory
views on affordances is in large part the result of Gibson’s own “conceptual
temerity” around how to best deal with cultural or social perception. This was
no doubt due to Gibson’s own convictions that direct perception, unmediated by
language, or any sort of representational content is the “simplest and best kind
of knowing” (Gibson 1979: 263). As Noble (1981, 1991) and Heft (1989, 1990,
2001) do well to note, ultimately this conviction results in Gibson having: (1)
conceptualized affordances as almost solely environmental properties, and (2)
undermined the role played by the organism’s (potential) actions in detecting and
perceiving affordances (in brief, the organism’s freedom).
This debate directs us to take a semiotic view on affordances, in which, as
Sanders (1997: 108, emphasis added) states, “affordances are opportunities for action
in the environment of an organism, the opportunities in question include everything
the organism can do, and the environment includes the entire realm of potential
activity for that organism [...]”. Luke Windsor, a musicologist, extended this debate
into general semiotics by emphasizing that when considering affordances, no
distinction between direct and indirect perception is required: “the perception of a
semiotic affordance is just as direct as the perception of an affordance of any event
or object, given that one accepts that cultural aspects of the environment provide
us with affordances at all” (Windsor 2004: 189). He explains how Peirce’s triadic
sign model allows for the conceptualization of affordance as a changing mediation,
between (a) stimulus information, (b) unfolding events in the environment, and (c)
action-possibilities for the actor. Windsor (2004: 193) explains that “the organism
and environment are brought into a meaningful relationship by perceiving and
acting upon affordances. However, affordances are a description of the relationship
between organism and environment, not the means by which organism and
environment become coupled.” This suggests that affordances are potential (as yet,
unactualized) action-possibilities; and thus, ultimately sign-relations, whose meaning
emerges in reference to an evolving function (a means)20 and in use (CP 5.569).
20 “ e action of the organism “interprets” this causal relationship to create the possibility
of meaning through a “third”. Stimulus information, events and actions are the necessary
components for describing a ordances, and no pair of these terms provides a su cient
explanation of perception” (Windsor 2004: 194).
Learning and knowing as semiosis: Extending the conceptual apparatus of semiotics 367
6.6. Redefinition
As for our redefinition within a general semiotic theory of knowing, we place
affordances in close connection to the semiotic construal of learning: we propose
defining affordances as potential semiotic resources that an organism enacts
(detects, reads, uses, engages) to channel learning-as-choice in its environment.
Like Gibson (1966: 285), Windsor emphasized that “learning is vital to the
perception of affordances” (Windsor 2004: 189). We follow Windsor, but also
further highlight that the organism’s ability to make use of these resources in
meaningful ways is dependent upon its species-specific embodied competences.
Further, to account fully for the implications of this definition, we emphasize
that in invoking and enacting these affordances, organisms make use of and enact
scaffolding structures and processes. These scaffolding processes direct and focus
decision-making, expressed through learning.
7. Scaffolding
7.1. Scaffolding in educational studies
The concept of scaffolding stems from the socio-constructivism of Lev Vygotsky–
who introduced the idea but did not himself use the term (see Vygotsky 1986
[1934]).
21
The concept was first significantly developed by Jerome Bruner and his
colleagues in Wood, Bruner, Ross 1976 to help explain how adults interact with
children in joint problem-solving activities. Put very generally, scaffolding is used
as a conceptual metaphor in the learning sciences– explaining a developmental
and pedagogical process or strategy by which temporary support (in a broad
sense) is given to learners to aid them through tasks and activities they might not
otherwise be able to complete or undergo independently (Pol, Volman, Beishuizen
2010: 271–272). Cazden (1979) early on connected the concept with Vygotsky’s
zone of proximal development (ZPD). The ZPD refers to a liminal developmental
space; between what a learner can do on her own and what she cannot yet do.
As described by Vygotsky: “[…] the distance between the actual developmental
level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential
development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or
in collaboration with more capable peers” (Vygotsky 1978: 86; see also Olteanu,
Campbell 2018: 253–254).
21 Although, Vygotsky and Luria (1930: 202) occasionally used the sca olding metaphor (see
Veer, Valsiner 1991: 226). For the early history of the sca olding metaphor see Shvarts, Bakker
(2019).
368 Cary Campbell, Alin Olteanu, Kalevi Kull
Pol, Volman and Beishuizen (2010) explain in their review of “Scaffolding in
teacher-student interaction”, that despite the term being well used in the learning
sciences, there remains no common consensus on its definition. Many authors
have argued that “the concept of scaffolding has been applied too broadly in
educational and psychological research” (Pol, Volman and Beishuizen 2010: 272)
to the extent that it “has become unclear in its significance” (Pea 2004: 423).22
7.2. Interdisciplinary scope and use in biosemiotics
The term ‘scaffolding’ has recently received significant transdisciplinary attention.
23
Notably, the concept has been developed and used within biosemiotic research
within the last 15 or so years: see, in particular, Hoffmeyer 2007, 2014a, 2014b,
2015, Kull 2012, 2014, 2015, and Fernández 2015a, 2015b.
In these studies, it seems to be precisely the term’s broad generality that is
valued; providing explanatory power in understanding biological and semiotic
evolution non-deterministically. Semiotic scaffolding is closely linked with a
concept of learning, describing how organisms continually seek and extract
meanings through their interactions within their umwelt.
The term has become a central theme within Jesper Hoffmeyer’s post 2005-work
(noted in Kull 2015: 224). The following description from Hoffmeyer highlights
the broad scope of the concept for biosemiotics, and its connections to semiotic
conceptions of embodiment: “The network of semiotic interactions by which
individual cells, organisms, populations, or ecological units are controlling their
activities can thus be seen as scaffolding devices assuring that an organism’s activities
become tuned to that organism’s needs” (Hoffmeyer 2007: 154). From Hoffmeyer’s
research on scaffolding two main points become clear: “(1) scaffolding in its exact
sense is always a semiotic scaffolding, and (2) semiotic scaffolding is at work in all
levels of semiosis, from the origin of life forward” (Kull 2015: 224).
22 At its most general, sca olding seems to be used as a metaphor for any kind of instructional
support (Puntambekar, Hübscher 2005) and many authors have critiqued its utility: see Butler
1998; Donahue, Lopez-Reyna 1998; Scruggs, Mastropieri 1998, and the discussion in Pol,
Volman, Beishuizen 2010: 274–276. For defenses of the sca olding metaphor, see the work of
Stone (1993, 1998a, 1998b).
23 Within the philosophy of science, to describe the growth and construction of scienti c
theories and knowledge and the process of cultural evolution (Wimsatt, Griesemer 2007;
Wimsatt 2014); a notion of language as sca olding within embodied cognition discourses
(Clark 2008). e term has also received focus from recent research in theoretical biology
(see Caporael, Griesemer, Wimsatt 2014). See also the connection to models as sca olds of
understanding in Shank et al. 2014.
Learning and knowing as semiosis: Extending the conceptual apparatus of semiotics 369
7.3. Scaffolding defined through learning
What makes scaffolding properly semiotic must have to do, ultimately, with the
kind of learning evoked.24 As explained by Kull (2015; 2018)– but also Campbell
(2017, 2018) – semiotic learning is different from computational learning,
for “semiotic learning requires a choice between options” (Kull 2015: 225). It
requires decision-making and “decision making is not computing, it is choice”
(Kull 2015: 226). Choice, as meant here, is phenomenological: decisions are
situated, taken by organisms in timespace. Problems that require solving are not
laboratory simulations or the playing-out of algorithms. They are real events, with
existential consequences for sentient beings, unfolding in organisms’ umwelten.
Semiotic learning through choice requires two elements: (1) a situation of logical
incompatibility, in which a problem-situation emerges for the organism, and
(2) a phenomenal present (or species-specific nowness), “a subjective duration
felt as one moment so that the options or choices, which computationally taken
are always sequential, are seen simultaneously” (Pikkarainen 2018: 444). This
choice may prove in the future to be adaptive, in the sense that it may come to
make the organism’s needs more aligned with its actions in the environment.
Through such processes the organism sets new scaffoldings (semiotic, but with
“real” environmental effects) to channel knowing in the environment. These
scaffolding structures would not be there if the “correct” decision was taken to
begin with (simply encoded in the environment, or in the organism’s brain and
body structure, as exemplified in our above discussion on affordances). This
highlights the importance of the learning process itself, suggesting that in life,
there are no shortcuts to knowledge– knowledge and knowing are something that
must grow with and within the organism. While there are no shortcuts, in a sense,
neither are there detours: continuous learning-through-time unavoidably evokes
learning, which is how we interpret Peirce’s daring statement that, while denying
the old empiricist tabula rasa doctrine, “experience is our only teacher” (CP 5.50).
Understanding learning and living as co-extensive with meaning-making means
that knowledge, and the study of it, takes on an existential dimension. To live is to
learn (or know) about the world through the scaffoldings of previous experiences and
previous generations (at biological, cultural and personal levels). Such scaffolding
is enacted according to an organism’s species-specific competences and to how these
function adaptively within a historically dynamic environment.
24 Kull (2014: 118) observes how di erent mechanisms of learning result in the formation
of di erent types of sign relations: “(a) relation of recognition– iconic signs; (b) relation of
association– indexical signs; (c) relation of imitation– emonic signs; (d) relation of convention–
symbolic signs”.
370 Cary Campbell, Alin Olteanu, Kalevi Kull
To recap: through evolving modes of semiotic engagement (Stables 2006),
particular challenges (or problem-situations) arise for an organism; and through
these, also new opportunities and affordances. Some of these problems/opportu-
nities are reoccurring and thus generalizable; others are more indeterminate and
novel. These problems require responses, and through a process of learning-over-
time organisms create and enact varying types of “scaffolding” to channel learning
adaptively: “Due to scaffolding, the choice becomes directed” (Kull 2015: 226).
Learning requires both some degree of incompatibility (code plurality), as well
as constraints and direction (that is, scaffolding). As noted by Kull (2015: 227):
“Semiotic scaffolding provides direction, while code plurality provides incompa-
tibility for choice. The reason why scaffolding provides direction is because it is built
of links that are earlier products of choice, of the decisions made”. This is to say that
for ‘learning’ to be learning at all, it cannot be singular and occasional. Learning
requires memory (Kull 2018: 458; Campbell 2019: 301–304), a trace, so that a related
problem can be solved in a less unpredictable way in the future:
[...] what we call scaffolding is the means that supports decision making and
learning. It is that which, in the situation of indeterminacy, provides certain
preferences in making decisions. Also, under scaffolding we mean the kind of
structures that carry traces of some earlier like, that has been built by life, by
semiosis. (Kull 2015: 229, emphasis added).25
This allows for the explanation that “what appears as adaptation, has gone through
this kind of stage of problem-solving” (Kull 2015: 225), and thus scaffolding refers
to an important but, arguably, neglected aspect of the evolutionary process.26
25 is points to a di erence with educational studies. Unlike its characterization, for
example, in Pol, Volman, Beishuizen 2010: 277, who insist that sca olding is a combination
of certain sca olding means with certain sca olding intentions, in biosemiotics, by focusing
on the “means” of sca olding, we can better understand the structural aspects of this general
process, while recognizing that, in a certain sense, the intentional aspects of sca olding at the
biological level are provided by the teleological aspects of the life process itself.
26 Fernández (2015a: 91–92, emphasis added) says, that biosemiotics itself is an attempt
“to organize and reconceptualize our knowledge of living systems, their functions, origins
and evolution, in terms of the crucial role played by semiotic causation and semiotic
sca olding in practically every aspect of their internal dynamics (i.e., energy and nutrients
acquisition, metabolism, reproduction, etc.) as well as in their complex energetic and
semiotic interchanges with their surroundings”.
Learning and knowing as semiosis: Extending the conceptual apparatus of semiotics 371
7.4. Redefinition and integration with other general semiotic concepts
The notion of semiotic competence that we present in this article is also closely
related and, more precisely, explicative to our definition of scaffolding. Semiotic
competence (see above) here consists in the organism’s ability to activate semiotic
resources in the form of affordances (see Kull 2018: 459; Olteanu, Stables 2018:
423, 429). This ultimately manifests itself as an anticipatory response; by which a
relationship to a ‘possible future state’ reconfigures the organism’s current state of
being (Campbell 2017; 2018; Nadin 2017; Hoffmeyer 2007: 149). This anticipatory
competence is always “based on the constraints established or modified in learning”
(Kull 2018: 45). Thus, affordances as potential resources are themselves “a result of
earlier traces and choices that reappear during the recognition event” (Kull 2018:
45). Through a recursive process of discovering sign relations in the environment
and gradually canalizing these action-habits into scaffolding, organisms achieve new
semiotic competences or, more directly, they learn: “[Scaffolding] is the frame for the
formation of future habits” (Kull 2015: 232).
As emphasized in both educational and semiotic studies (see Wood, Bruner,
Ross 1976: 98; Bernstein 1967; Kull 2014: 116), scaffolding imposes and enacts
constraints that– like the recursive process of semiosis itself– simultaneously
narrow interpretative possibilities while revealing new ones (in the form of
affordances). Hoffmeyer (2015: 251–252), explained that through such lens we
can think of cultural institutions as scaffolding structures, that channel learning
in a particular way: “Each new jump to higher level semiotic scaffolding systems
tends to homogenize cultural performances at the lower level while opening up
new agendas of expressivity at the higher level”.27
These tendencies are prevalent in what is commonly called learning, which can
be said to proceed through a process of (1) singularization, closing and narrowing
meaning-possibilities, and (2) diversification, which introduces new distinctions
and thus new codes and code incompatibility (Kull 2014: 117).
When scaffolding is able to channel effectively learning in an umwelt, new
habits and also new codes arise. At this stage, it is important to distinguish
between the concepts of scaffolding and code. What distinguishes codes from
scaffolding, is their functionality; code refers to a binary sign-relation, defined
through correspondence, “whereas scaffolding always has a supporting task or
function” (Kull 2015: 230). We can clarify each in relation to the another: “[...]
27 We see these principles at work in how representational systems (notation, languages) both
close and open communicative possibilities. See, for example, the analysis of the e ects that
musical notation and symbolic cognition have on music perception and learning in Reybrouck
2015.
372 Cary Campbell, Alin Olteanu, Kalevi Kull
semiosis is a learning process that produces scaffolding that forms habits that results
in codes” (Kull 2014: 116, emphasis added). The process of habituation refers
primarily to transformations at the agent level– and this is perhaps how we may
distinguish habit from scaffolding, which refers more specifically to a continuing
process that necessarily involves at least several agents and a supporting (i.e.
collaborative and in a sense pedagogical) function.
As regards scaffolding, Hoffmeyer (2010: 196) postulated that “one of the
few general trends that can be ascribed to organic evolution is the tendency
towards the production of species exhibiting more and more semiotic competence
or freedom in the sense of locally meaningful interpretants”. Such an increase in
semiotic freedom can be described as the growth in the logical richness of decision-
making.
Semiotic freedom refers here to the complexity of choice an organism has for
channeling learning in a way that sustains meaningful relationships within its
umwelt (see also Stjernfelt 2006: 23). This is not necessarily or simply an increase
in choice, but rather growth of meaning. As Peirce posited, “And what is growth?
Not mere increase!” (CP 1.174).28
Of course, the diversity of semiotic resources at an organism’s disposal is
related to the faculty of re-cognition, and thus the competency in interpreting a
depth of meaning, so that the same form or event
29
can be variously interpreted–
for example, one may identify the same sign as quality (icon), as referent (index),
as convention (symbol). However, such variability is not necessarily by default
evolutionary advantageous for organisms with very different bodily structures
(such as plant and fungi life). Divergent umwelten require divergent solutions; to
learn is to find solutions that work locally and immediately.
Conclusion
A semiotic account on learning (and its various descriptive elements and concepts:
competence, resource, affordance, scaffolding) shows the need for a broader eco-
logical perspective, where the eco-system itself is recognized as central to how
the organism forms meaning within its umwelt. As Nöth shows, the biosemiotic
28 For more details see Ho meyer 2015: 251. Campbell (2018: 563) explains this notion of
semiotic freedom through reference to the etymological origins of the English word learning
in ‘leornian’, which has base roots in ‘to follow or nd the track’, saying: “A growth in semiotic
freedom is inevitably expressed in the capacity of an organism to model its environment in its
own species-speci c manner; to learn (to “ nd the track”) within its umwelt”.
29 See Stjernfelt’s (2006: 23–24, 33–34) concept of ‘neutral object’.
Learning and knowing as semiosis: Extending the conceptual apparatus of semiotics 373
notion of umwelt implies that organisms model their environments by an un inter -
rupted, subjective hermeneutic circle (Nöth 1998: 339). We identify this herme-
neutic circle with the interpretive framework, understood as evolving, which
according to Stables both enables and constrains knowledge. More pre cisely, the
hermeneutic circle enables knowledge by restricting it, by framing it within what
Peirce, inspired by Augustus de Morgan (1840), termed the “universe of discourse”
(CP 2.517). This is what is ultimately described through semiotic scaffolding:
“[…] organisms would hardly be able to make reasonable decisions without their
bodies together with their ecosystems embedding earlier experience helping
them to direct their future choices” (Kull 2015: 232). Scaffolding is thus central in
contributing to an account of development and learning that puts these qualitative
features (such as support, environment-organism interaction, and collaborative
learning) into focus: a reminder that learning is enacted from within the unfurling
event of semiosis (Campbell 2018).
Like the concept of affordances, scaffolding also refers to a mediation. It is in
this sense, that we can say that “semiotic scaffolding is what makes history matter
to an organism (or a cultural system)” (Hoffmeyer 2015: 154). This basic emphasis
on complementarity is highly compatible with Peirce’s conviction that signs play a
central role in what is now called cognition, to the extent that “externalized signs are
not mere supportive devices, instead, they undertake tasks which simply could not
be performed by the brain (or body) alone” (Peirce as paraphrased in Hoffmeyer
2015: 252; cf. CP 7.364). This synthetizes this article’s proposal for a general semiotic
account of knowing, that redefines psychological and cognitive conceptions without
reducing them to mentalistic or computational explanations.30
Defining learning as the growth or modification of sign relations eschews
reductively cognitivist or computational accounts.
For a semiotic theory of knowing, what is important is what things mean for
the organism. Because this meaning grows over time, it must be accounted for
through criteria of semiotic fitting (Kull 2020). Every choice is an opening and
a closure, and to know is to occupy a place within a vast network of semiotic
entanglements within an environment and ecosystem. This emphasises both the
ecological and phenomenological dimensions of a semiotic theory of knowledge:
“Knowledge acquisition is based on new relations being established by the
learning system itself” (Kull 2015: 232).
30 Olteanu and Stables (2018: 421) explain: “[...] from its beginning, biosemiotics was de ned
by Sebeok [e.g. 1991, 2001] [...] as a modelling theory and, while useful for cognitive theories as
well, it does not impose any particular assumption about cognition. us, from this perspective,
a theory of learning does not necessarily imply a discussion on cognition. An educational
theory and system can conceive learning in terms of signi cation only”.
374 Cary Campbell, Alin Olteanu, Kalevi Kull
In brief, our argument is that the semiotic toolbox can be greatly expanded
by linking concepts that describe cognitive processes to the concept of semiosis
via their updated definitions, because cognitive processes are naturally semiosic.
Semiosis as the basic meaning-making process grounds learning and knowing.
Extending the list of semiotic concepts is part of a larger programme in the
development of semiotic theory.31
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31 Acknowledgements. Alin Olteanu receives research funding from the Estonian Research
Council (grant MOBJD346). Cary Campbell travelled to Estonia to conduct research at the
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Обучение и знание как семиозис: расширение концептуального
аппарата семиотики
Если все знания рождаются в процессе семиозиса, то в семиотический инструментарий
следует добавить дополнительные понятия. Вместе с тем, семиотические понятия
должны быть определены через другие семиотические понятия. Мы рассматриваем
возможность определения понятий когнитивных процессов и явлений с помощью
семиотических терминов. В частности, мы концентрируемся на понятиях, имеющих
отношение к теории познания, таких как обучение, знание, доступность (affordance),
подпорка (scaffolding), ресурсы, компетенция, память и некоторые другие. Даем их
предварительные определения с семиотической точки зрения, что позволяет также
показать их взаимо связанность. Переосмысление этих терминов помогает избежать
как физикализма, так и психологизма, демонстрируя эпистемологические характе-
ристики взаимоотношения организмов и среды через семиотическое понимание
при способленности. Также мы вкратце обсудим значение наших введенных заново
определений в качестве вклада в семиотическую теорию познания, которая имеет
отношение как к гуманитарным наукам, так и к наукам о жизни, не забывая при этом об
их значимости для образования и психологии, а также для социальных семиотических
исследований и исследований в области мультимодальности.
Õppimine ja teadmine kui semioos: semiootika mõistestiku laiendamine
Kui kogu teadmine pärineb semioosist, siis tuleb semiootika seniste vahendite hulka lisada roh-
kem mõisteid. Semiootika mõisteteks on need, mis on defineeritud teiste semiootika mõistete
kaudu. Näe me võimalust laiendada semiootika mõistestikku sel teel, et defineerida tajuprotsessi
mõisted ja nähtused semiootiliste mõistete kaudu. Võtame selleks käsile teadmis teooriaga seo-
tud mõisted nagu õppimine, teadmine, võimaldus (affordance), toestus (scaffolding), vahendid,
pädevus, mälu ja mõned teised. Esitame nende mõistete definitsioonide esialgsed semiootika-
kaudsed sõnastused, sellega ühtaegu neid ka omavahel seostades. Nende mõistete niisugune
ümberdefineerimine aitab vältida nii füsikalismi kui psühhologismi, tuues esile organismide
keskkonnasuhete epistemoloogilise tahu semiootilise sobitumise tähenduses. Arutledes iga
mõiste ümberdefineerimise juures nende osa üle semiootilises teadmisteoorias (millel on roll
nii humanitaarteaduste kui eluteaduste jaoks), toome esile ka rakendatavuse haridus teaduses
ja psühholoogias, samuti sotsiosemiootikas ja multimodaalsuse uuringutes.