STATE CAPTURE: FROM THEORY TO PILOTING A MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGY

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to present a method to measure and quantitatively assess the prevalence of state capture. This phenomenon refers to the emergence of private interests which, in the course of modernization and growth tend to become dominant (in a sector, in the economy or globally). The assessment of this phenomenon is controversial and depends on the dominant perceptions of norm and deviation from the norm embedded in laws and regulations. In the context of the European civilizational model, and the Webe- rian state ideal, the norm postulates that all interests and actors should be regarded equal and no specific privileges should exist. The paper is based on the idea that the functional nature of the capture process (the acquisition of privileged status) can be achieved not only by influencing the adoption of regulations and rules but also through other mecha- nisms. At a general level, state capture could be described as virtual privatization of the state functions which ensures a systemic privilege for captors. Depending on who the captors are (business, government officials, parties, politicians, etc.) capture could in- clude combinations of multiple base mechanisms. The concrete state capture assessment methodology used focuses exclusively on business capture and includes three groups indicators of state capture: business capture pressure assessment, institutional enablers, environmental enablers. This theoretical structure has been tested using factor analysis. Pilot test data from five countries have been merged to produce 1605 different institu- tional assessments. The factor analysis generally confirms the initial theoretical assump- tions about the structure of indicators necessary to assess state capture vulnerabilities.

Full text

STATE CAPTURE: FROM THEORY TO PILOTING A
MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGY
Alexander Stoyanov
Alexander Gerganov1
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to present a method to measure and quantitatively
assess the prevalence of state capture. Such a task would be straightforward, given
that there is a denition of state capture that could be broken down into components
and subcomponents. Each of the elements would be measured independently
and respectively the aggregation of subcomponents would render a quantitative
measure of state capture. Dening state capture in the above described way is still
work in progress; it would start with dening state capture and aim to describe
its mechanisms, forms, outcomes, and effects. The current work is an attempt to
address many of these aspects of state capture by developing a denition and a
model of state capture that would make its empirical assessment possible.
State capture refers to the emergence of private interests which, in the course of
modernization and growth tend to become dominant (in a sector, in the economy
or globally) [1]. This domination is either 1) unaddressed by governments as a
treat to competition or 2) is government assisted [2] deliberate acquisition of
privileged status or monopoly position.
The assessment of this phenomenon is controversial and depends on the
dominant perceptions of norm and deviation from the norm embedded in laws and
regulations. In the context of the European civilizational model and the Weberian
state ideal, the norm suggests that all interests and actors should be regarded equal
and no specic privileges should exist. All actors should have equal possibilities
to pursue their interest and should be equal before the law. However, privileges
and unequal treatment exist for different reasons social, political, related to the
national interest, ideological, religious, etc. (Teachout, 2018) The combination
between the equality principle and the existence/creation of privileges is the main
challenge in the analysis of state capture.
1 Alexander Stoyanov, PhD, Assoc. Prof., Department of Economic Sociology, UNWE,
email: stoyanov.alex@unwe.bg
Alexander Gerganov, PhD, Assist. Prof., Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge
at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, email: alexander.gerganov@csd.bg

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Assumptions
The analysis of state capture in this paper is based on several theoretical
assumptions. First, corruption is interpreted with its most common denition as
abuse of power for private gain (Tanzi, 1998). This denition includes two main
elements (abuse and gain) which can be used to construct a dual typology of the
forms of empirical manifestation of corrupt behaviour (Figure 1)[3]. Numerous
combinations between the abuse and gain aspects are theoretically possible and
most of them have been empirically observed. The more advanced societies, legal
and monetary systems become, the subtler and more complex forms of observed
corrupt behaviour become and the less possible it is to exclusively associate
corruption with bribery and graft.
Fig. 1. Forms and elements of corruption
Second, the wide variety of corruption forms has led to conceptualizing it
as an "umbrella concept" encompassing a multitude of phenomena (Varraich,
2014). Each form of corruption has its own specic features, but the common
denominator is that all forms represent specic forms of abuse of power for
private gain.
Third, based on the adopted classication scheme, state capture could be
labelled as a specic and extreme form of corruption (Brooks et al., 2013). In
terms of abuse of power, state capture could be classied into the category of
"societal" forms of corruption, as it affects/targets societal level governance
functions by modifying governance rules in order to facilitate private interest

State Capture: From Theory to Piloting a Measurement Methodology 21
domination over the public interest. It is labelled as extreme as it is a powerful
legally based (impersonal) privatization of governance functions.
Fourth, both corruption in general and state capture in particular present
different forms of abuse of power, they are exercise-of-power dependent and
are conditioned by the structure of public power in society. Structures of power
that are not subject to public control are essentially excluded from the analysis.
In such social systems the highest level of power is personalized, the respective
ruler/leader "owns" society, is the embodiment of the state, denes the rules,
and decides on cases of abuse of power. The mechanisms of this privatization
are largely dependent on the existing rules and regulations which in their turn
comprise the principles of good governance. The different set-ups of public
authority can be located along the continuum "totalitarian regimes – Weberian
type democratic societies". One of the extreme scenarios (totalitarian regimes)
is a highly hierarchical system of power that is largely self-elected and self-
appointed. These types of political regimes do not signicantly depend on the
public for their own appointment in public positions and have overtaken the
right to interpret and represent the interests of the public and the state interest.
When public authority is "privatized" its interests "merge" with the interests of
society and determine the rules for use and abuse of public power. The higher
levels of public authority can in this context never abuse their power because they
dene how power should be used. Cases of power abuse could only occur at the
lower levels of government (the ofcials of the public administrative system, the
bureaucracy). Under this scenario dening and identifying corruption and state
capture is not based on "impersonal rules" (laws) but is rather derived based on
the political will of the highest level of government.
Fig. 2. State capture and political system type (path dependence)

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The alternative public power structure would be the ideal model referred to as
the Weberian state. In the context of this model, public authority is shaped by the
public (political) choice. Government appointments are result of free elections,
and the exercise of public authority is based on impersonal rules (laws). The
latter set the criteria for the proper functioning of governments and the principles
of good governance. A fundamental principle of the Weberian-type state is the
uniform application of rules to all citizens. There are no privileged citizens
and interests. Such a system of public authority implies the principle that laws
themselves should ensure equal treatment of citizens and interests and apply
equally to all citizens and interests.
In the context of the Weberian state, the privatization of law making and
law enforcement violate the principle of equality. Most corrupt practices (at all
levels) are in fact the sale of a privileged treatment that no citizen or private
interest is legally entitled to. The result of this type of privatization is that it
leads to the creation of legislation biased towards certain groups of citizens or
interests, violates the principle of equality and creates privileges. There are,
however, complications to the implementation of this principle which often make
interpretations of equality problematic:
First, a democratic government is elected in order to implement certain
policies. This includes adoption of laws and rules that set priorities and privileges
for some interests or citizens at the expense of others. However, through elections
(political choice) such privileges are accepted by the public as legitimate. For
example, support for motherhood creates privileges for mothers and children at
the expense of other groups (access to public resources). The creation of a strong
army redirects resources from some sectors and creates privileges for the military
and military-industrial complex. Such and other cases of privileges are generally
supported by the public and not interpreted as illegitimate actions.
Second, depending on situational factors, the need to dene privileges and
preferences may change over time. For example, the 2008 nancial crisis has
forced many governments to intervene and "save" parts of the banking and other
sectors under the threat of a general crisis and economic collapse. Situational
factors can often be used as an argument to legitimize the creation of privileges
and consequently to create rules that benet specic groups or interests (Carpenter,
Moss, 2014).
Third, as most rules and laws are justied based on public needs, the problem
often is whether these needs are "real" and or "articial" (deliberately produced
and used as justication). Moreover, in most modern societies, conducting
information campaigns in favour of a particular interest or cause is considered a
legitimate activity. Eventually, such activities produce new rules, rearrange the
public priorities and respectively lead to the creation or revocation of privileges.

State Capture: From Theory to Piloting a Measurement Methodology 23
Fourth, the legal regulation of lobbying varies substantially across countries.
In many countries lobbying is not regulated at all and therefore most lobbying
is illegitimate or illegal. In the quoted study by the World Bank (Hellman and
Kaufmann, 2001), the paid for involvement of businesses (illegitimately) in the
legislative process is the main proxy to the state capture processes. In the period
of the survey (end of 1990s), the interests of the emerging private sector in post-
communist countries were both important and unknown. Due to the novelty and
absence of regulation, especially at the early stages of transformation, it was
difcult to clearly distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate consultations
of legislators with representatives of the private sector. It is also difcult to
determine whether the laws adopted in the period of transition create privileges
to protect emerging national private capital or they create prerequisites for
cartels, monopolistic structures and restrict competition. It should be noted that
the involvement of businesses in the design of rules is often motivated by rent
seeking behaviour on behalf of ofcials and is not a symptom of paid access to
"rule making".
Fifth, the primary aspect of most of the denitions of state capture (see below)
is the exclusive focus on the rule making process (laws, norms, etc.) as the central
element of the state capture process [4]1. State capture should not be related (as is
often the case) with the concept of political corruption (e.g. corruption involving
higher level government ofcials). In most cases, political corruption is a classic
case of abuse of power, rather than an attempt to redesign the legal framework in
order to violate the principles of administrative neutrality and equality of interests.
Denitions of state capture
The specic focus of state capture as a type of abuse of public power is on the
shaping of rules [5] that regulate society in general or the economy in particular.
Two aspects of this phenomenon are relevant in this respect: the process, the
abuse of public power in the process of shaping the rules, i.e. the undue inuence
of the rule-making process, or, the result (the content of rules), i.e. adoption of
rules that violate the public interest and/or are biased in some specic way.
The most often cited state capture denition (Hellman and Kaufmann, 2001)
is based on an empirical study by the World Bank in the countries of Eastern
Europe (BEPS), and its main nding is that a substantial amount of companies
(in post-communist transition countries) admit to have illegitimately contributed
funds to members of the legislature in order to inuence the design of laws and
1 The focus of rules displays the interest of captors to achieve systemic or long-term results
and not to "limit" the capture to a one-time corruption transaction. For more on systemic
corruption see (Rothstein, 2018)

24 Alexander Stoyanov, Alexander Gerganov
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rules regulating different economic sectors. Both the number and the effect of
this activity proves signicant: companies taking part in the capture process are
on average more successful than non-participating market competitors, i.e. state
capture is a violation of the rules of public authority (abuse of power) in the
process of drafting of the rules/legislation leading to comparative advantages for
captors. In terms of identication and measurement the above approach assesses
the prevalence of state capture through the instances of "paid participation" in
the drafting of rules. The focus is on the state capture process and therefore "paid
participation" becomes the proxy for capture.
The creation of special privileges in the economy through legislation has been
discussed earlier, e.g. by Stigler (Stigler, 1971) who identies two interests which
coordinate the formation of special privileges in the economy. First, the interest of
businesses to control the market environment in order to discourage undesirable
competition, which is labelled as "demand" for regulations. Secondly, the interest
of the public authorities, or the "supply" of regulations, which are based on two
fundamental motives. On the one hand, there is the need for the legislator to
account for various interests; this would eventually bring political benets as
well as possibilities to deliver on promises to voters. On the other hand, there is
the individual greed and desire to benet by providing services to specic people,
groups or interests.
To date, denitions and contents of state capture as a phenomenon has been
described in several similar and/or overlapping ways:
Type of abuse of power/
interaction Denition/interpretation
Government-private sector
Design of rules/laws
"… shaping the formation of the basic rules of the game
(i.e. laws rules, decrees and regulations) through illicit
and non-transparent private payments to public ofcials."
(Hellman and Kaufmann, 2001)
Government-political
parties-private sector
Design of rules/laws, legal
environment, policies and
the economy
"... companies, institutions or powerful individuals use
corruption such as the buying of laws, amendments,
decrees or sentences, as well as illegal contributions to
political parties and candidates, to inuence and shape a
country’s policy, legal environment and economy to their
own interests." (Martini, 2014)

State Capture: From Theory to Piloting a Measurement Methodology 25
Government-private sector
Design of rules/laws and
other government sources.
Capture of one state by
another state
"State capture then, is seen as a form of grand corruption,
which involves the actions of individuals, groups or
rms, both in the public and private sectors, that are able
to inuence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees
and other government sources to their own advantage,
as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provisions of
private benets to public ofcials.
… We suggest that while this description is sufcient
for explaining post-communist transitional economies, it
is insufcient in identifying and examining the complex
interplay of state capture in democratic western states, and
the capture of another state by a western state." (Brooks
et al., 2013)
Government-private sector
(corporate state capture) and
parties-government (party
state capture)
Design of laws/rules
Parties politicize the state to
achieve political monopoly
"… The argument advanced here is that the region is
peculiarly vulnerable to two modes of state capture:
party state capture and corporate state capture. In the
former, parties re-politicize the state in pursuit of political
monopoly. In the latter, public power is exercised primarily
for private gain, and private interests pay to subvert the
legitimate channels of political inuence (Hellman et al.,
2000, pp. 2–3). While it is plausible that both modes could
operate together, the evidence suggests two surprisingly
clear clusters of central European states around a dominant
mode, with some relatively non-corrupted systems facing
vivid attempts to re-monopolize the values and allegiance
of the state (for example, Hungary, Poland) and the
more corrupted systems showing a clear and consistent
prioritization of the extraction of nancial value (for
example, in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria). (Innes, 2014)
Network of companies and
ofcial colluding at the
expense of the public good
… "a distinct network structure in which corrupt actors
cluster around parts of the state allowing them to act
collectively in pursuance of their private goals to the
detriment of the public good." (Fazekas and Toth, 2014)
Existing denitions are relatively simple, but not particularly effective, if state
capture is to be identied and measured. Its main elements are the captor (the
actor who makes an illegitimate payment in exchange for representation of his
interests in the regulations), public ofcials (most often these are representatives
of the executive and/or legislative authorities who develop and adopt the
respective biased regulations), privileges/benets (the privileges and benets for
the captor from the implemented regulation) and disadvantages (the forms of
losses for every other social actors appearing as a result of the implementation of
a biased regulation). The application of the described denitions leads to several
more signicant conclusions on the nature of the phenomenon of state capture:

26 Alexander Stoyanov, Alexander Gerganov
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• The ultimate effect of a state capture (conceptualised as an illegitimate
inuence on the adoption of regulations and laws) is the existence of laws
and regulations that violate two basic principles: the neutral attitude of the
administration towards individuals, groups and interests in society when
implementing public authority, and that of equality of individuals and
interests in society (absence of privileges). Violation of these rules creates
differential privileges that favour individuals and interests through the laws
at the expense of others.
• The principles of neutrality and equity are under constant threat from the
governing politicians, as they are by denition chosen to protect certain
interests and priorities. Their election pledges include changing priorities
and favouring particular interests. In this sense, violation of the principles
of equality and neutrality goes through the lter of legitimacy – some vio-
lations are publicly supported (elections) and others are not. That is why
the creation of biased regulations can be both legitimate and illegitimate.
• The legitimacy of protection through regulations of an interest or a group
is changing over time. Lobbying and advocacy contribute to changes and it
is often difcult to assess whether certain regulations reect legitimate or
illegitimate inuences.
• The focus on the capture process (illicit payments to ofcials) is in most
cases perceived as the main indicator for the existence of capture. The lack
of empirical evidence makes the identication of cases of capture difcult
and contradictory.
Extended denition of state capture
Successful identication of state capture can lead to disclosing both problematic
sectors and actors who have illegitimate relative advantages and privileges, as
well as regulations that generate such advantages and privileges. Respectively,
if political will exists, the problem could be analyzed and resolved. There are
several dimensions along which the existing denition of state capture could be
operationalized:
Type and number of actors involved. Existing descriptions of the
phenomenon show that state capture cannot in principle be a mass phenomenon.
This concerns the number of captors and, respectively, the privileges they hold.
The essence of privileges is that they favour the interests of few at the expense
of the interests of the rest of society. It is not possible for privileges to be a mass
phenomenon, as this contradicts the idea of privilege. Captors can be analysed
based on their activity or the characteristics of the sector in which they operate. In
this respect a major capture target is the business sector. A captor in the business

State Capture: From Theory to Piloting a Measurement Methodology 27
sector is an actor who can has comparative advantages in the sectors in which he
operates in two main ways:
- Protection from competition and the possibility of achieving a dominant
market position through regulatory preferences. This also includes a possible
legally-based possibility of cartels and other similar agreements that lead to
market dominance and comparative advantages.
- Ensuring privileged access to public resources (public procurement,
concessions, structural funds, land for construction, land and forests, etc.) through
rules that reduce competition and provide privileged access.
Administrative environment. Many elements of the process of state capture are
more or less illegitimate and/or inadmissible. In an environment characterized by the
rule of law, a low level of administrative corruption and media freedom, achieving
state capture would be very difcult or impossible. In the model of state capture
developed in the present analysis, these elements are referred to as environmental
enablers, as they are factors conducive to the process of capture (Figure 2).
Reverse capturе. Together with the traditional understanding of the state’s
capture by non-state actors, Yakovlev notes that, for example, a reverse process can
be observed in Russia (Yakovlev, 2006). The consolidation of bureaucracy (after
the initial period of transformation) raises interests among the public authorities to
use their power to control or capture the business sector: groups of public ofcials
use their powers to acquire business assets. In fact, this is a modied "reverse" form
of early post-communist administration’s involvement in the privatization of state
assets. It should be noted that the situation in Russia described by Yakovlev exposes
the possibility for public sector employees to play an active role: a number of authors
(Нончев, 2017) note the possibility of informal groups of employees in different
public organizations merging into a network that provides "multidimensional"
corrupt services to private individuals, thereby playing the role of mediator in the
capture processes (Jancsics and Jávor, 2012).
Virtual privatization of public organizations. Another specic case observed
is when the high levels of administrative corruption in a public organization actually
leads to the corrupt privatization of this public organization by its employees. In
this situation, public sector employees sell their services to the public, while the
employees deviating from corrupt relations are eliminated, and the organization
itself starts formulating its objectives on the basis of the interests of its employees
rather than on the basis of the public interest. In some post-communist countries,
an example of such a public organization is the trafc police. The inability to deal
with the capture of the organization by its employees has led to radical reforms.
For example, such a decision was made by the government in Georgia which
closed down parts of its police force and recruited new staff.
Institutional enablers. The functional characteristics listed above operate
as institutional enablers or disablers/inhibitors of corruption transactions. In this

28 Alexander Stoyanov, Alexander Gerganov
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respect the unfavourable status of environmental and institutional enablers is
a factor enabling the operation of state capture mechanisms. The experience in
transition societies shows that the privileged status of the captors can be achieved
not only by inuencing the regulations but also by inuencing the implementation
of the regulations. Using environmental and institutional enablers, some captors
have been able to build mechanisms which practically make them exempt from
public scrutiny. Such mechanisms include a web of connections to the executive
and the judiciary which are able to block most attempts for public control and rule
of law interventions. The term most often used for this type of captors is oligarchs.
Their specic modes of operation have been described in numerous analyses which
detail the modes of connection of businesses to public power (Magyar, 2016).
The above considerations show that the functional nature of the capture process
– the acquisition of privileged status in a given public sector – can be achieved
not only by impacting the adopted regulations and rules but also through other
mechanisms. Therefore, at a general level, state capture could be described as
virtual long-term privatization of the state functions which ensures a systemic
privilege for captors. Depending on who the captors are (business, government
ofcials, parties, politicians, etc.) capture could include combinations of
multiple base mechanisms: particularistic modication of the legal environment,
particularistic law enforcement and implementation of regulations/rules,
particularistic access to public resources, asymmetric control over media and the
functioning of the nancial sector, particularistic political control over domestic
and foreign policy, development plans and others.
Fig. 3. Elements of the state capture model

State Capture: From Theory to Piloting a Measurement Methodology 29
State capture dimensions and strategies
The dimensions of state capture can be dened on the basis of the specics
of actors playing the role of captors. In principle, this role can be played by
many actors, but the most of the analysed cases of state capture narrow this
circle to businesses, institutional actors, politicians and representatives of the
criminal world [6]1. The forms of state capture are respectively business capture,
institutional capture, political capture and black-market capture:
Business
capture
The active side (captors) are business entities which use different forms
of corruption to inuence legislation affecting the business sector and
other social areas and the implementation of legislation and rules in order
to acquire a privileged status.
Institutional
capture
The active side are state institutions and/or political networks/parties.
Typically captured are business structures which ensure kickbacks after
being provided with contract assignments (procurement or other) by
institutional actors. The incentive for captors is the appropriation of
corruption rents. The incentive for the captured business structures is part
of the corruption rent and their eventual privileged position in a given
market.
Political
capture
The active sides are groups of politicians who establish close
relationships to ensure party donations from sources of funds (mainly
business entities) in exchange for future access to public funds and
law making. Political capture would show symptoms very similar
to clientelism and party favouritism and could be measured through
traditional methods, for example based on analyses of the parties
nancing, etc. The three main subcomponents of political capture are
clientelism, procurement capture and media capture.
Black
economy
capture
The active side are typically organized crime groups who capture state
institutions (typically the judiciary, but also the executive) in order to
secure systematic violations of the law and regulations for conducting
black sector activities (on a large scale) and launder the prots.
In general, four types of state capture strategies seem most common:
clientelism, predation, fusion and exploitation (Grzymala-Busse, 2008). They
differ in the mechanisms used for obtaining control over the state. They are
also heavily inuenced by the initial conditions, as exemplied in the case of
SEE countries. In Bulgaria and Romania, which belonged to the former Soviet
bloc, state capture has been characterised by the transformation of political into
economic power through the process of privatisation, and the use of the state
resources through public procurement and concessions to strengthen monopoly
positions. In the countries of the Western Balkans, this process has been heavily
1 This refers to one of the most often discussed forms of capture and not to all possible forms
of state capture. The latter are, of course, numerous.

30 Alexander Stoyanov, Alexander Gerganov
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inuenced by ethnic divisions and the newly emerging nation states. Political
leaders riding on guaranteed ethnic support and on their role in the process of
re-starting nation building have leveraged their support to monopolise (state)
economic resources.
The nal result of the capture is the achievement of a privileged status that
allows the captor to extract benets, which he/she is not legally entitled to and
that are usually at the expense of others and/or society as a whole. The problem
of the empirical identication and assessment of the processes of state capture
are mainly hampered by the fact that the processes that produce it are secretive,
concealed and most often untraceable. Therefore, the empirical assessment can
be based mainly on the results of state capture, combined with the status of the
environmental and institutional enablers. The existence of processes of state
capture in this sense is occurring when there are essential signs of its results
(privileged actors in a given sector). In this sense, the empirical assessment of
capture can help the outline of the areas in which capture processes are in place.
It should be noted that the specic identication of the captors in a sector
cannot be achieved through research methods but would rather be the result
of investigations carried out by competent control authorities. Naturally, at the
beginning of any such investigation is the issue (discussed above) of whether
the privileged status of certain actors is legitimate or "natural" or is the result of
corrupt activities.
Empirical identication and assessment of business capture
Based on the major features of the state capture process, the main empirical
business capture model used in this analysis includes three basic components:
Institutional enablers. They characterise the institutional environment in
which the business operates, in terms of its capacity to provide neutrality of the
administration and equality among the participants in the economy. The impact
of these factors concerns all participants in the specic sector of the economy
and in that sense the values of particular indicators are set to be measured on a
sectoral level. This also translates to the fact that the empirical assessments refer
to the public authorities that are related to the particular sector (it has to be kept
in mind that some public authorities affect all sectors, such as the tax and customs
authorities).
The enablers of state capture refer to institutions and processes that produce
an environment which is favourable to state capture processes. These elements of
the environment cannot be directly linked to state capture as a whole or to specic
state capture forms but enhance or reinforce most state capture mechanisms.
Unfavourable values/status of these processes make the organizations vulnerable
to different corruption inuences and create favourable conditions for the

State Capture: From Theory to Piloting a Measurement Methodology 31
realization of state capture mechanisms. In this respect the expectation with
regard to the empirical ndings is that high business capture pressure would be
correlated to unfavourable institutional environment characteristics.
Direct capture enabling statuses/situations in the organizations explored
include:
• Effectiveness of anticorruption policies in the organizations;
• Integrity of the organizations;
• Impartiality in the decision-making process (to specic interest and/or
cases) in the organization;
• Existence (or lack of) bias towards private interests.
Environment enablers refer to the status of various processes in society
that favor or inhibit corruption transactions. These are vital aspects of societal
functioning that could enhance or inhibit state capture mechanisms and include:
- Level of media freedom or media independence;
- Overall level of administrative corruption in the country;
- Level of corruption in the judiciary and law enforcement in general.
The effect of environment enablers is similar to the effect of institutional
enablers: unfavourable statuses enhance state capture processes. The essential
difference however is, that the main components of environment enablers operate
and can only be assessed empirically at the national level.
Business capture. This is one of the most common forms of state capture
(Dassah, 2018). Moreover, the potential for its identication and empirical
assessment is comparatively greater than in other elds due to objective
information on the various economic sectors.
The natural outcome of business state capture is market concentration which
can be measured directly with the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (Miller,
1982) or other established instruments for market concentration measurement.
Estimates should be made at the sectoral level with different economic sectors
having different weight when determining the risk of business capture. There are
some caveats to such an approach. Firstly, it could be argued that some companies/
corporations have established their monopoly legitimately – through innovative
and superior product/service/business model. To account for such a possibility,
anti-monopoly laws or policies in the diagnosed state should be assessed/
monitored for their effectiveness. A combination of high market concentration
in key economic sectors (energy, construction, transport, agriculture, etc.) and
ineffective anti-monopoly laws/policies/bodies would be a very strong indicator
of the presence of business capture. Secondly, market concentration analyses
could be sometimes misled by having a set of companies which appear to be
independent, but are connected and operating as an entity for the purposes of the
captor, hidden behind them (Wallis, 2004). The presence of such structures is by

32 Alexander Stoyanov, Alexander Gerganov
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itself a very strong predictor of business capture and could be discovered with the
appropriate network analyses.
Regarding business capture, privileged actors (captors) usually obtain (though
corruption) undue multiple advantages with respect to society and the market,
and manage to extract rents because their captor status enables them to:
– Acquire monopoly status in a given sector;
– Effectively counter attempts to limit their market power;
– Have privileged access to public resources and effectively block attempts
to be deprived of this privilege;
– To ensure legal advantages by modication of rules and legislation;
– To control media and inuence public opinion;
– Block investigations or court proceeding against their actions or business.
Two regional case studies in the Middle East and in Central and Eastern
Europe exemplify the vulnerability of countries in transition to state capture
pressures. Although most of the countries in the two regions have made some
progress in adopting formal democratic and market economy institutions, these
are still seen as functioning in a particularistic manner (beneting some at the
expense of all), rather than following universalistic principles of public goods
provision (Stoyanov et al., 2014). The accumulation of social injustices has made
people resort to vertical accountability measures in the form of street protests,
as mechanisms for horizontal accountability between institutions have failed to
provide good governance (Diamond, 2019).
The assessment model
The empirically based diagnostics of state capture would help measure and assess
at least the following aspects of this phenomenon:
– Existence of capture and its relative impact in a given sector (what part of
the sector is captured based on turnover in the sector)
– Identication of public sector units that have been captured and to what
extent
– Estimated loss or damage for the economy and the society from the
observed level of state capture.
The direct measurement of the prevalence of state capture is, however,
difcult or rather close to impossible due to the hidden character of capture
relations. It could hardly be expected for captors or the captured to report or
share information on any aspect of the capture process. Therefore, it seems quite
obvious that the identication and measurement of the state capture process
using research methods is rather impossible. To achieve such an objective,
investigative techniques should be employed (Školkay, 2018). This would
mean access to condential, hidden or secret information, specic investigative

State Capture: From Theory to Piloting a Measurement Methodology 33
resources and methodologies, etc. Regarding the potential of empirically based
research diagnostics of state capture, its heuristic value is mainly in identifying
the probable spheres or sectors where state capture processes are likely to evolve
or are already in operation. Respectively which elements of these processes are
manifested with greater intensity and which sectors appear most vulnerable to
state capture.
Vulnerability assessments do not show which sectors/spheres have been
captured and how these sectors have been captured, but rather which the high
vulnerability sectors are. Therefore, state capture research instruments are
primarily vulnerability identication and diagnostics tools which show where
attention should be directed. All subsequent analytic and investigative work fully
depends on existing institutional and political capacity and will.
The concrete state capture assessment methodology used focuses exclusively
on business capture and is based on a model which is slightly simpler than the base
model, elaborated above. The simpler model features three level one indicators
of state capture: institutional enablers, environmental enablers, business capture
elements. The interpretation of the model is straightforward: state capture
processes likely exist if the values of the indicators for each level one concept
are high and/or unfavourable. Indicators (and respectively the processes they
measure) tend to reinforce each other. Dynamically, unfavourable statuses in one
dimension (level one concept) would be expected to have a negative impact on
values in the other dimensions.
Institutional enablers. This group of indicators characterize the institutional
environment in which businesses in a specic sector operate with respect to the
ability of the environment to ensure the neutrality of the administration and equal
opportunities for each economic actor. These factors affect all actors in a sector
and therefore their values should be measured at the sector level. This would
mean that assessments refer to public organizations which have an operational
mandate to regulate businesses in a specic sector. Some organizations, however,
regulate all sectors and businesses (e.g. tax administration, customs, etc.)
The enablers of state capture pertain to institutions and processes that produce
an environment which is favourable to state capture processes. These elements of
the environment cannot be directly linked to state capture as a whole or to specic
state capture forms but enhance or reinforce most state capture mechanisms.
Unfavourable values/status of these processes make the organizations vulnerable
to different corruption inuences and create favourable conditions for the
realization of state capture mechanisms. In this respect the expectation for the
empirical ndings is that high business capture pressure would be correlated to
unfavourable institutional environment characteristics. Direct capture enabling
statuses/situations in organizations explored include:
– Effectiveness of anticorruption policies in the organizations;

34 Alexander Stoyanov, Alexander Gerganov
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– Integrity of the organizations;
– Impartiality in the decision-making process (to specic interest and/or
cases) in the organization;
– Existence (or lack) of bias towards private interests.
Environment enablers refer to the status of various processes in society that
favour or inhibit corruption transactions or mechanisms and include:
- Level of media freedom or media independence;
- Overall level of administrative corruption in the country;
- Level of corruption in the judiciary and law enforcement in general.
The effect of environment enablers is similar to the effect of institutional
enablers: unfavourable statuses enhance state capture processes. The main
difference, however, is that the main components of environment enablers operate
and can only be assessed empirically at the national level.
Business capture. Business capture elements have been constructed to
reect those elements of the business sector environment which would have
unfavourable statuses if capture processes exist or are evolving. Existence or
absence of these elements would prove existence or absence of state capture
processes. The business capture dimension is dened by a classical state capture
scenario: the captors are business entities which use different forms of corruption
in order to:
– inuence law makers to adopt favourable legislation which enhances its
market position (biased legislation);
– prevent the relevant government agencies from interfering in cases of
established market concentration of different forms;
– achieve long-term dominant position on the procurement market in its
sector not through innovation and competition but through wholesale
corruption deals (usually high-level corruption);
– accumulate illegitimate government assistance through concentration of
direct subsidies or other forms of direct government assistance.
Business captors could use some or all the mechanisms listed above to achieve
and retain dominant position in key economic sectors. Successful business capture
eventually leads to high market concentration and/or privileged local players. The
latter are as a rule not established internationally or innovative and/or efcient
companies, i.e. their dominant position has not been achieved through normal
market mechanisms. Antitrust laws and state regulations are supposed to prevent
monopolization and promote competition; however, these laws and regulations
are typically ctitious or ineffective in a business capture environment or even
can be used as tools to facilitate the goals of captors.
The business capture dimension is measured as a combination of high
monopolization pressure and ineffective antimonopoly laws. Monopolization
pressure is used as the primary indicator. However, under some scenarios it could

State Capture: From Theory to Piloting a Measurement Methodology 35
be argued that high market concentration is a result of market success. Therefore
the effectiveness of antimonopoly laws should also be evaluated. A scenario with
high monopolization pressure and ineffective antimonopoly laws would strongly
suggest business capture.
Effectiveness of the anti-monopoly laws should yield practical results. State
capture sometimes can exist within a perfect legal framework which could be even
used by captors to their business advantage. Therefore, the instrument measuring
this component should differentiate between implementability, implementation
(formal and real) and effectiveness of a policy/law and should be able to estimate
all of these adequately.
The assessment diagnostic instrument
The main instrument used for the state capture assessment diagnostics is a survey
of experts and government ofcials implemented in the ve pilot countries. At least
20 public ofcials and 20 experts are required to participate for a country estimate.
Unlike typical instruments relying on experts’ assessments, the instrument uses a
large pool of both external experts and acting public ofcials who can participate
in the assessment process with only one restriction – they have to be familiar with
some of the regulatory and control bodies in the country. Different views and
opinions are represented through the large sample and the high-pressure areas
are those where the different expert opinions converge. Discrepancies between
public ofcials and external experts contribute to yet another level of analysis.
The diagnostic instrument is developed specically for assessment of some of the
less visible dimensions and enablers of state capture and consists of two groups
of questions/ indicators:
The rst group of indicators focuses on public organizations regulating and/
or controlling the market. These organizations are assessed in terms of integrity,
impartiality, tendency to serve the public or on the contrary – demonstrating
private interest bias, and the effectiveness of their anti-corruption policies.
The second group of indicators focusses on the assessment of economic sectors.
Initially a very thorough list of NACE rev.2 economic sectors is provided to the
experts who select those of the sectors for which they have reasons to suspect
the existence of a monopoly/ oligopoly / cartel in the sector. The list covers
more than 40 of the sectors with the highest turnover in the country or sectors
which have been proved to be high risk in many countries (like gambling and
waste treatment for example). If a sector is assessed as monopolized, additional
questions regarding the potential risks in this sector are asked. Finally, experts
assess the quality of rules and regulations in each of the sectors in the context of
their anti-monopoly effectiveness.

36 Alexander Stoyanov, Alexander Gerganov
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The information about the environmental enablers indicators is collected from
external sources which measure the respective indicators (media freedom and
rule of law indexes).
Judiciary corruption assessment is based on several key indicators from the
Rule of Law index, presented in the table below. The Judiciary corruption score
is computed as the average of the ve components. Media corruption is assessed
as the average of two media freedom indexes (World Press Freedom Index by
Reporters without Borders [7] and Freedom of the Press Index by Freedom House
[8]) and two key components of the Media Pluralism Monitor by CMPF [9].
Overall the instrument includes three levels of operationalization of indicators
(Table 1) and combines data obtained from the assessment instrument as well as
data from external sources.
Table 1. Measured concepts, indicators and sources
of information of MACPI State Capture
Level one
concept Business capture Level three indicators [10]
Level two
indicators
Assessed monopolization
pressure (national level)
Assessed level of monopolization of
sectors at the country level
Sector turnover in national economy (%
of operating turnover in sector)
Sector level assessments
of monopolization
(for sectors with high
levels of assessed
monopolization)
A specic company or a small number of
companies win too many public tenders
Laws provide illegitimate competitive
advantage
Selective application of control and/or
sanctions
Concentration of public funds in the
sector (euro funds, direct subsidies, etc.)
Ineffectiveness of
antimonopoly laws
Laws regulating the sector help/
hinder/not related to the formation of
monopolistic, oligopolistic or cartel
structures
Level one
concept Institutional enablers Level three indicators
Level two
indicators Lack of Integrity Activities are not transparent
Not accountable for its actions

State Capture: From Theory to Piloting a Measurement Methodology 37
No checks and balances
Lack of Impartiality Often serves private interests
Would never sanction certain people/
rms
Its rules of operation are violated often
Private Interest Bias
Ineffectiveness of anti-
corruption policies Estimated External Corruption Pressure
Estimated Pressure from Above
Estimated Involvement in Corruption
Level one
concept Environmental enablers Level three indicators
Level two
indicators Media corruption
World Press Freedom Index
Freedom of the Press
Media Pluralism Monitor: Market
Plurality
Media Pluralism Monitor: Political
Independence
Administrative
corruption
CMS survey of CSD and Eurobarometer
data
Judiciary corruption
Rule of Law indicator: 7.3. No corruption
Rule of Law indicator: 7.4. No improper
government inuence
Rule of Law indicator: 2.2. No corruption
in the judiciary
Rule of Law indicator: 8.5. No corruption
Rule of Law indicator: 8.6. No improper
gov. inuence
As noted, an important element of the assessment is the evaluation of public
organizations (institutions) which regulate a certain sector or are relevant to this
sector. These evaluations are matched with the sectors evaluated at the stage of
data processing in order to assess vulnerabilities that apply to a specic sector.
Implementing this principle for different countries, however, has been troublesome
as national regulations differ and are implemented by different "sets" of public
organizations. The approach adopted to address this specic problem has been to
structure public organizations by function and match assessments by function.
This ensures proper comparability of data across countries.

38 Alexander Stoyanov, Alexander Gerganov
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Pilot test results and their empirical validation
The values of all indicators are presented in a scale of 0 to 100, where the
most favourable value is 0 and the most unfavourable – 100. All primary (level
three) indicators are percentages and the combined level-two indicators (e.g.
Table 2 below) are a simple average of the percentages of their corresponding
sub indicators. All data from external sources were normalized to match the
0-100 range with once again the most favourable value being 0 and the most
unfavourable – 100.
The concept of business capture is measured through a combined indicator
called business state capture pressure, while the different groups of enablers
(institutional and environmental) are combined into an aggregate indicator called
"state capture enablers". These two main outputs of the state capture measurement
methodology provide a rough overall estimate of the situation in each country.
As becomes evident in Table 2, the lowest summary assessment of state capture
enablers is that of the Czech Republic (27), followed by Spain (28) and Italy (30).
The difference between these three countries with respect to enablers of state
capture is very small and the conclusion that they have a similar state capture
vulnerability level is relatively straightforward. Business state capture pressure
for these three countries is also relatively similar with again Czech Republic
presenting the lowest score (12) followed by Spain (15), and Italy (17).
The second group of countries in the pilot study is that of Romania and Bulgaria
which have overall state capture enabling scores of respectively 38 and 41. This
shows that the two countries have a similar capture vulnerability which is larger
than in the rst group of countries. The business state capture pressure overall
indicator also puts Bulgaria at the top with 26, followed by Romania with 21.
While the overall scores for the enablers and business capture rank the
countries very consistently, there are some important differences in the level-two
indicators. For example, Spain’s score is much lower than all other countries when
it comes to administrative corruption (despite being assessed worse than Czech
Republic in all summary indicators). These differences complement the overall
country scores with more precise estimates of where potential vulnerabilities
might occur. This can guide more detailed micro-analyses as well as adequate
policy responses addressing concrete vulnerabilities in the particular country.

State Capture: From Theory to Piloting a Measurement Methodology 39
Table 2. Summary results for State capture vulnerability and State capture pressure
Indicator Bulgaria Italy Czech
Republic Romania Spain
Business State Capture
Pressure (average) 26 17 12 21 15
Assessed monopolization
pressure 27 13 722 13
Ineffectiveness of
antimonopoly laws 25 23 20 21 19
State capture enablers
(average) 41 30 27 38 28
Institutional enablers
(average) 42 35 31 43 33
Lack of Integrity 44 38 44 38 54
Lack of Impartiality 39 40 30 44 32
Private Interest Bias 27 10 12 33 9
Ineffectiveness of Anti-
corruption Policies 57 53 36 56 38
Environmental enablers
(average) 41 24 24 33 23
Media corruption 51 37 39 48 36
Administrative corruption 16 10 13 18 2
Judiciary corruption 55 24 19 33 29
The institutional enabling measurement was tested through factor analysis to
see if empirical data supports the theoretical model and if the different primary
(level-three) components are internally consistent in forming the level-two
indicators as predicted in the model. The four second level institutional enabling
indicators (Lack of Integrity, Lack of Impartiality, Private Interest Bias, and
Ineffectiveness of Anti-corruption Policies) were included in a factor analysis
using the combined data from all ve countries where the instrument was piloted.
From a theoretical perspective, Lack of Integrity, Lack of Impartiality and
Ineffectiveness of Anti-Corruption Policies are based on three level three
indicators each (see Table 1). As explained in detail in the previous sections, each
of the three indicators reect different potential vulnerabilities or governmental
gaps which could enable one or more state capture aspects. Private Interest Bias
is a separate "stand-alone" indicator which describes state-capture-like actions
from public authorities which are symptomatic for the presence of actual state
capture (institutional or business).

40 Alexander Stoyanov, Alexander Gerganov
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This theoretical structure was tested empirically in the following factor
analysis. Data from the pilot testing of the instrument in ve countries were
merged in a single le with experts’ answers for different institutions treated
as separate data points [11]. This led to 1605 different institutional assessments
from all ve countries.
Factor analysis was performed on the 10 level three indicators using SPSS
software. Principle axis factoring was used as the extraction method. Fixed
number of factors (four) was used as an extraction criterion and Varimax rotation
was performed. The rotated solution is presented below.
Table 3. Factor analysis of 10 primary institutional enabling indicators
Rotated Factor Matrix Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Often serves private interests .744 .317
Its rules of operation are violated often .743
Would never sanction certain people/
rms .406
Estimated Involvement in Corruption .550 .419
Estimated Pressure from Above .369 .667
Estimated External Corruption Pressure .665
Activities are not transparent .396 .360 .307
Not accountable for its actions .575
No checks and balances .484
Private interest bias .452
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser
Normalization.
The expected factor structure is marked with grey in the corresponding cells.
For the purposes of the current empirical validation, factor loadings above 0.7
are considered to be good, loadings between 0.55 and 0.7 are considered fair and
between 0.3 and 0.55 are treated as low. Coefcients below 0.3 are not shown or
considered for interpretation.
The factor analysis shows that empirical results deviate slightly from the
theoretical assumptions. The strongest rst factor can be matched to "Lack of
Impartiality" and it indeed consists of "Often serves private interests" and "Its
rules of operation are violated often" ("good" loadings above 0.7). "Would never
sanction certain people/rms" is not well correlated with this factor, but since

State Capture: From Theory to Piloting a Measurement Methodology 41
its highest coefcient with Factor 2 is also low (0.41), the theoretically derived
structure of the Lack of Impartiality indicator could be preserved.
The second factor is formed by "Estimated Pressure from Above" and
"Estimated External Corruption Pressure" with fair factor loadings (0.67 for
both) and therefore matches the theoretically formulated "Ineffectiveness of Anti-
Corruption Policies". "Estimated Involvement in Corruption" has low correlation
with both this factor and "Lack of Impartiality". While its loading with Lack of
Impartiality is slightly larger (0.55), it should remain in "Ineffectiveness of Anti-
Corruption Policies" (loading 0.42) based on the theoretical arguments and better
overall clarity of the indicators structure.
The third factor consists of "Not accountable for its actions" (loading 0.58
which is considered "fair") and "No checks and balances" (0.48 – low correlation).
This factor while not very well-formed still matches the "Lack of Integrity" level
two indicator. "Activities are not transparent" has low correlation with factors
one to three, so for clarity and theoretical purposes it can remain as part of factor
3: "Lack of Integrity".
Finally, "Private interest bias" has low correlation only with Lack of
Impartiality which is somewhat logical given that it also addresses problems
with the Impartiality of the organization. Private interest bias however is directly
derived from the question: "Q57C In your opinion, how effective is the control
and punitive activity of the following organizations?" with one of the answers
treated as 1 and all other answers as 0. The answer which denes "Private interest
bias" is "The control and the imposition of sanctions are done selectively, and the
choice of whom to control / sanction follows private interests" – actions which
are strongly associated with state-capture-like behaviour.
Another empirical test was performed to check for possible bias in the answers
of public ofcials. It was assumed based on results from previous studies showing
"institutional bias" of employees’ answers (e.g. (Stoyanov et al., 2015) that
external experts will be more critical in their assessments than public ofcials.
This hypothesis was supported strongly by the pilot results – the percentage of
experts from the two group who gave a state-capture contributing assessment for
each of the primary (level-three) indicators is presented below.
Table 4. Differences in the assessments by public ofcials and external experts.
Public
ofcials
External
experts Difference
Estimated external corruption pressure 56% 69% 12%*
Estimated pressure from above 47% 65% 18%*
Estimated involvement in corruption 23% 43% 20%*
Often serves private interests 21% 40% 19%*

42 Alexander Stoyanov, Alexander Gerganov
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Would never sanction certain people/rms 51% 75% 24%*
Its rules of operation are violated often 19% 30% 10%*
Activities are not transparent 41% 62% 22%*
Not accountable for its actions 28% 41% 13%*
No checks and balances 36% 43% 7%*
Private interest bias 12% 25% 13%*
* all differences between the two groups are statistically signicant at p < 0.05
While systematic bias like the one above is usually considered a methodological
issue, here it was expected and left intentionally as a separate level of analysis –
the larger the differences between the assessments of experts and public ofcials,
the larger the gap or vulnerability in a particular country, indicator or assessed
organization. Larger assessment gaps between internal and external experts
demonstrate clearly that real problems are rather concealed than admitted and
addressed properly which is the worst possible scenario with respect to state
capture.
Conclusion
The overall conclusions based on the empirical testing of the proposed state
capture assessment methodology show that the model is theoretically consistent
and can be used to further explore the state capture phenomenon. Another pilot test
nding is that state capture processes, especially the business capture segment,
should be explored at the sectoral level where more concrete hypotheses could
be tested and supplemented with the qualitative data (anecdotal evidence). What
has been difcult to evaluate directly are the "normal" and "deviant" threshold
values levels of indicators. This is mainly due to the lack of extensive use of
the methodology and respectively larger scale comparisons within national
economies and between the economies of different countries.
In terms of practical applications, what follows directly from the state capture
assessment measurements is the need to follow up the analysis of sectors with
legal analysis, and, eventually direct investigations. However, as argued in the
paper, such executive and legislative follow ups are heavily dependent on the
existing political will and national priorities.

State Capture: From Theory to Piloting a Measurement Methodology 43
Notes
[1] Two papers are especially important when attempting to describe the phenomena
which delineate scope and characteristics of state capture – the publications of
G. Stigler (Stigler, 1971) on the one hand, and Hellman, Kaufmann and Jones
(Hellman and Kaufmann, 2001), on the other.
[2] Most often through intense lobbying, adoption of legislation granting specic
privileges, declaring emergencies that need to be addressed by specic actors,
legislation to protect the national capital and businesses, etc.
[3] For other types of decomposition of the elements of corruption see also:
(Vargas-Hernández, 2009) (Vargas-Hernández, J., 2009. The Multiple Faces of
Corruption: Typology, Forms and Levels).
[4] The focus of rules displays the interest of captors to achieve systemic or long-
term results and not to "limit" the capture to a one-time corruption transaction.
For more on systemic corruption see (Rothstein, 2018).
[5] The term "rules" is used throughout the paper to denote to law, decrees,
executive orders, etc., i.e. all formal/legal documents produced by the executive,
the legislative and the judiciary to regulate activities and behavior in all sectors
of society.
[6] This refers to one of the most often discussed forms of capture and not to all
possible forms of state capture. The latter are, of course, numerous.
[7] https://rsf.org/en/ranking
[8] https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/romania
[9] http://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2016-results/
[10] Indicators and questions are formulated negatively in order to make
interpretation of values easier – the higher the value, the more unfavorable the
status of the respective capture aspect is.
[11] If an expert assesses more than one public organization, each assessed
organization is added as a separate row in the data le.
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46 Alexander Stoyanov, Alexander Gerganov
Годишник на УНСС, ИК – УНСС, София
STATE CAPTURE: FROM THEORY TO PILOTING A
MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGY
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to present a method to measure and quantitatively assess the
prevalence of state capture. This phenomenon refers to the emergence of private interests
which, in the course of modernization and growth tend to become dominant (in a sector,
in the economy or globally). The assessment of this phenomenon is controversial and
depends on the dominant perceptions of norm and deviation from the norm embedded in
laws and regulations. In the context of the European civilizational model, and the Webe-
rian state ideal, the norm postulates that all interests and actors should be regarded equal
and no specic privileges should exist. The paper is based on the idea that the functional
nature of the capture process (the acquisition of privileged status) can be achieved not
only by inuencing the adoption of regulations and rules but also through other mecha-
nisms. At a general level, state capture could be described as virtual privatization of the
state functions which ensures a systemic privilege for captors. Depending on who the
captors are (business, government ofcials, parties, politicians, etc.) capture could in-
clude combinations of multiple base mechanisms. The concrete state capture assessment
methodology used focuses exclusively on business capture and includes three groups
indicators of state capture: business capture pressure assessment, institutional enablers,
environmental enablers. This theoretical structure has been tested using factor analysis.
Pilot test data from ve countries have been merged to produce 1605 different institu-
tional assessments. The factor analysis generally conrms the initial theoretical assump-
tions about the structure of indicators necessary to assess state capture vulnerabilities.
Key words: Corruption, Corruption denitions, State capture, Forms of corruption,
Abuse of Power, Collective actor
JEL: A14, A13, H11, K42