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Psychology in Russia: State of the Art
Volume 13, Issue 1, 2020
ISSN 2074-6857 (Print) / ISSN 2307-2202 (Online)
© Lomonosov Moscow State University, 2020
© Russian Psychological Society, 2020
http://psychologyinrussia.com
Decision Making and Ethical Reasoning in Psychology
Miguel Ricou, Sílvia Marina*
Faculty of Medicine of the University of Porto and CINTESIS – Center for Health Technology
and Services Research, Porto, Portugal
*Corresponding author. E-mail: silviamarina@outlook.com
Background. Rationality, emotions, and intuition all seem to underlie the deci-
sion-making process. In a profession such as psychology, it is crucial to improve
the rational dimension of decision making. Ethical reasoning can be compared to
moral decision-making, but it is also linked to professional judgment. In psychol-
ogy and other professions, ethical reasoning seems to be the basis for the develop-
ment of professional skills.
Objective. Present and discuss the role that rationality, emotions, and intui-
tion can play in people’s decision making, especially in the eld of psychological
intervention.
Design. A theoretical perspective is presented which takes into account the rel-
evant literature in the eld.
Results. We support the idea of ve fundamental preconditions for ethical rea-
soning: self-knowledge, excellent training, experience or supervision, humility,
and intervision. We recommend that psychologists meet these conditions in their
professional decision making in order to promote the best quality of professional
practice.
Conclusion. We can say that ethical reasoning is a professional moral decision.
As professionals, we are primarily intuitive in our decision making, which is why
we make decisions almost automatically; but our decisions are based on our pro-
fessional experience. Psychologists should reect on and understand the processes
involved in decision making in order to avoid conclusions based on their personal
experiences.
Keywords:
Reason;
emotions;
intuitions;
decision
making;
ethical
reasoning;
psychology.
4 M. Ricou, S. Marina
Introduction
roughout life, people are called upon to make decisions. Some are simple and
occur intuitively, while others are more complex and require a more signicant ef-
fort of reection. In this regard, two processes are responsible for decision making
(Frith & Singer, 2008): one is controlled by intuition, and the other requires rational
justication (Moll, Zahn, Oliveira, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005). e meaning of the
situation and the context in which the person is called upon to decide, can be cru-
cial to the decision-making process. us, the role of emotions, or the emotional
signicance associated with the decision to be made, is essential.
For a long time, emotions were seen as playing a secondary role in decision
making, as well as an obstacle to people’s rational functioning (Mayer, DiPaolo, &
Salovey, 1990). e role of emotions gained acceptance from work in the neurosci-
ences, especially that by Antonio Damásio (1994/2001, 2010), on the importance
of emotions in decision making (Ceitil, 2006). According to Damásio (2010), emo-
tions allow human beings to have a sense of their will and to satisfy their needs.
Reason, in turn, allows the adaptation of these aspirations to social reality, combin-
ing the interests of the individual with those of their peers (Damásio, 2010; Kahne-
man, 2015; aler & Sunstein, 2008).
In professional decision making, it is only through reason that it becomes pos-
sible to help others make the choices that are in their best interests. In the eld of
psychological intervention, decision making plays a central role, since it aims to
provide the person with maximum knowledge about him- or herself, thus allowing
for conscious and responsible choices (Ricou, 2017). Psychologists must be able to
identify and understand their own emotions, in order to be able to recognize omit
their intuitions. e psychologist’s emotional balance can be considered a funda-
mental precondition for his or her practice; otherwise, the professional would risk
being too focused on his or her own emotional problems, which would make it
dicult to understand the client. Understanding the other implies understanding
one’s own emotions, and can be achieved only through a well-established relation-
ship of trust and by dierent technical assumptions (Ricou, 2014). e develop-
ment of this capability is based on the exercise of ethical reasoning as explored
in the present study, and should promote personal understanding and increased
self-knowledge.
It is essential to reect on and understand the processes involved in the devel-
opment of ethical reasoning. us, we intend to explore the role of reason, emo-
tions, and intuition in decision making. To this end, throughout this text we pres-
ent the role that each of these dimensions can play in people’s decision-making
processes. In addition, we advocate the application of this model to professional
decision making in the eld of psychology.
Rationality
A rational decision is a decision based on a hypothetical-deductive model aer all
the necessary information has been obtained. Although this denition is clear, it
is dicult for the individual to have full control over the process. e importance
of rationality in decision making has been advocated and strengthened over time
Decision Making and Ethical Reasoning in Psychology 5
(Filliozat, 1997/2001). In ancient Greece, only rationality and logic were considered
(Lehrer, 2009). e idea of a dichotomy between reason and emotion, in which the
former controlled the latter, was accepted.
e theory of limited rationality (Simon, 1977, 1987) contradicts the idea of a
perfect and comprehensive rationality. In Simon’s (1977, 1987) view, human rea-
soning is subject to environmental, cognitive, and psychological limitations which
inuence the decision-making process. Rationality in the decision-making process
is oen approached in an instrumental manner for a specic purpose. According
to Over (2004), our mental processes are rational when we aim to achieve our own
goals and integrate them with the needs of other people. e distinction between
reason and emotions has been overcome, and the integration of all dimensions has
been achieved. Damásio (1994/2001), for example, argues that emotions are part
of the process of rational choice; without them it would be dicult for a person to
make any decision at all.
According to Goleman (1997/1995), the appropriate combination of reason
and emotion allows for the strengthening of intellectual capacity. In this regard,
Coricelli, Dolan, and Sirigu (2007) state that human decisions cannot be explained
through rationality alone. e authors highlight the fact that certain types of aec-
tive states can induce specic mechanisms of cognitive control over the processes
of choice, such as the reinforcement or avoidance of experienced behaviors.
In professional practice the exercise of rationality should be to understand
emotions, learn how to deal with them, and interpret the information they provide,
i.e., promote the identication and knowledge of feelings (Ricou, 2014).
Emotions
Decisions made strictly from a rational standpoint would result in such complex
hypotheses that they would render useless the reasoning and eort exerted to make
the decision (Damásio, 1994/2001); thus it is accepted that other dimensions are
involved in the decision-making process.
Oatley and Jenkins (1998/2002) consider emotions to be at the center of human
mental life since they connect people with events and are central to the decision-
making process. By reecting on their emotions, people can use them as intelligent
cognitive phenomena and promote behaviors adapted to their goals.
According to Lehrer (2009), both rational and emotional dimensions are in-
volved in decision making. To make a decision based on a deductive logical per-
spective would be a lengthy process. erefore, Damásio (1994/2001) proposes the
somatic marker hypothesis. According to his theory, the somatic markers involve
the use of feelings created through learning from secondary emotions, which serve
as an alarm or incentive for the choice of a particular option. From this perspec-
tive, it is important to note that Damásio identies both primary and secondary
emotions. e secondary ones correspond to the notion of somatic alterations
juxtaposed to mental images, while the primary ones refer to a set of innate emo-
tional responses, commanded mainly by the amygdala. Primary emotions can pro-
mote predispositions that can, however, be adjusted in an adaptive way. e rapid
and explosive manifestations of these emotions can limit the exercise of human
rationality.
6 M. Ricou, S. Marina
Primary emotions are considered innate and similar for all persons, while sec-
ondary emotions are dened as self-conscious. Secondary emotions are acquired
throughout an individual’s personal history and evoked through self-reection
and self-evaluation (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). If we considered only the
primary emotions, it would be essential to learn to control them in order to pro-
mote more adaptive responses and select emotionally competent stimuli (Damásio,
2010). e recognition of secondary emotions, inuenced by the characteristics
of each human being, is in line with the idea that the person is much more than
his or her rationality. erefore, to achieve the best possible results from individ-
ual choices, it is not sucient to simply understand the logical and factual side of
events, exercising what Damásio (2010) calls the “autobiographical self.” It is also
necessary to look in-depth at the motivations, phenomenology, and complexity of
people’s emotions, in order to increase one’s real knowledge about them and pro-
mote an understanding of their feelings (Ricou, 2014). In addition, the evaluation
of the role of intuition in the decision-making process is crucial (Kahneman, 2015;
aler & Sunstein, 2008).
Intuition
To dene intuition and arrive at a consensus regarding its role in the decision-
making process has been a challenge. McBain (2005) refers to intuition as a tem-
porary mental state that allows one to quickly make decisions; he denes it as a
“propositional attitude” that we can express through beliefs, desires, hopes, and
fears. Damásio (1994/2001) refers to intuition as a hidden mechanism, outside con-
sciousness, through which we can solve problems without reasoning. Reber and
Reber (2001) consider intuition a response to unperceivable signs which are cap-
tured unconsciously. In other words, the authors point to the possibility of making
decisions in an almost involuntary way. According to Johnson-Laird (2006), when
there is very limited information, intuition enables one to make the best decisions;
in these situations, he believes that the use of conscious reasoning makes it dicult
to nd answers.
Haidt (2001), in his model of social intuition, highlights the dierence between
intuition and rationality. He argues that intuition is automatic and unconscious
in relation to its processing; it is faster and requires less eort than the reasoning
process. On the other hand, reason justies intuitive answers, either when we try to
make others agree with us, or in cases where our own personal intuitions are dis-
sonant (Moll et al., 2005). McBain (2005) argues that it is intuition that the person
primarily values when he or she has to make a decision. In a situation that requires
a quick answer, it is dicult to imagine that a cognitive process of anticipatory
assessment of the benets and the harms of a given situation would be used to de-
termine the path to follow. is process would certainly take a very long time and
make it dicult to reach a conclusion. Besides, human beings do not deal well with
uncertainty; they need answers that give them condence in their integrity (Ricou,
2014). erefore, in all situations, we seek quick answers, at least initially.
Even in situations that can be considered predominantly cognitive, such as try-
ing to solve an enigma, the brain does not stop until it nds a solution, even if the
conclusion is that there is no answer. If the brain does not nd a satisfactory answer,
Decision Making and Ethical Reasoning in Psychology 7
we can say that the person is in crisis (Ricou, 2014). is crisis may induce suer-
ing, which can be felt in the form of emotional activation, and may be perceived as
distress if the person does not nd an adequate solution (Ricou, 2014).
Reason does not seem to be sucient for obtaining a quick and adequate an-
swer. Intuition is apparently linked to emotions but also to learning, values, and
the social context (Moll et al. 2005). It seems to be at the center of the decision-
making process. We can say that intuition corresponds to the secondary emotions
proposed by Damásio (1994/2001) or to the complex emotions of Johnson-Laird
(2006). erefore, it represents the result of the relationship between the core and
autobiographical consciousness of Damásio (2010), i.e., between emotions and ra-
tionality.
According to several authors (e.g., Ariely, 2009; Damásio, 1994/2001; Filliozat,
1997/2001; aler & Sunstein, 2008), the role of intuition or secondary emotions
is to provide fusion with reason in order to enhance the ability to make the best
choices, at least in situations where serious consequences are at stake.
Professional decision making: Ethical reasoning
In a profession like psychology, the goal is not to have psychologists give their per-
sonal opinions about a given situation. Instead, we need answers based on a profes-
sional perspective and the best interests of the clients (Ricou, 2014). erefore, the
decision-making process used in personal dilemmas may not be sucient to solve
the ethical dilemmas in the psychology profession. Professionals have to move away
from their personal frames of reference to achieve a better empathic understand-
ing of their clients (Rogers, 1942/1974). To do this, professionals should be able to
critically question their own intuition in order to intervene as little as possible with
their personal judgment, and also to analyze their feelings.
Moral or ethical judgments cannot be based solely on intuition. ese judg-
ments include concepts about groups, interpersonal relationships, and social per-
spectives, and notions about when certain rights should be applied, and when they
should be denied (Turiel, 2006). According to Frith and Singer (2008), there are
two processes that are responsible for decision making in the face of moral di-
lemmas. e rst is guided by intuition, which is oen unconscious and quick,
and evokes in the individual a feeling of congruence in relation to the answer. e
second is a conscious and rational process that is inuenced by education, culture,
and context (Moll et al. 2005) and provides legitimacy for the decision. ese as-
sumptions can correspond to secondary emotions and autobiographical memory,
respectively (Damásio, 1994/2001). According to Ricou (2014), it seems clear that
the mechanisms that underlie the analysis of an ethical dilemma are the same as
those used in moral judgment. However, he states that caution should be exercised,
because psychologists must make decisions, not for themselves, but in the client’s
best interest.
We presented the role of emotions in decision-making processes since they are
the result of complex procedures that involve all the dimensions of human func-
tioning. Emotions seem to be the basis for important decision-making processes,
providing guidance about what can be best for the individual. In other words,
emotions help the person understand what is best for them, both individually and
8 M. Ricou, S. Marina
in a social context. However, to assess what can be better for others, only reason
allows the necessary discernment. So it can be argued that the basis for ethical
reasoning in the resolution of any dilemma is reason (Ricou, 2014). It is no coinci-
dence that personal diculties evoke more signicant emotional processing than
impersonal problems (Myyry & Helkama, 2007). us, reason can increase the
distinction between what is best for oneself, and what is best for another person.
Furthermore, reason seems to allow psychologists not to confuse their personal
interest with the interest of others. In addition, an emotional assessment can lead
to a reading based on what “I” think would be the best if “I” were in the other’s
shoes. is scenario is not acceptable in the psychological intervention setting.
Respecting the dignity of the human person is more than respecting dierences;
it is helping the person to express him or herself, while promoting the person’s
autonomy (Ricou, 2014).
Emotions support empathy and allow the establishment of a relationship of
trust that makes it easier to know the other person. However, we emphasize that
this recognition of the other person should be done on a rational basis. erefore,
a sentimental assessment of reality, i.e., a reection on the intuitive response to the
other, may not be sucient.
Psychologists should remove themselves from the situation and focus on their
clients. In other words, they should detach their judgment from themselves, to be-
come solely psychologists, guided by the ethical principles that guide their profes-
sion and the associated models and techniques. us, the psychologist becomes a
professional guided by the autobiographical (Damásio, 2010) self, and the intuitive
or nuclear self disappears. Of course it is not possible to fully achieve this goal. In
the setting of psychological intervention, professionals cannot remove themselves
totally from their emotions and evaluate situations according to reason alone. It
seems appropriate to point out that psychologists are not perfect, and that error is
an intrinsic part of professional practice. It is important that each psychologist be
aware of this fact and question his or her performance, in order to decrease the risk
of making decisions that harm the client.
Bricklin (2001) dened some points that a psychologist should take into ac-
count for an adequate exercise of his or her profession. ese ideas were adopted
and adapted by Ricou (2014) (see Table 1).
Table 1. Preconditions for ethical reasoning
1. Self-Knowledge
2. Excellent Training
3. Experience or Supervision
4. Humility
5. Intervision
e rst precondition concerns the psychologists knowing their own beliefs
about right and wrong, not allowing these views to inuence their professional
behavior, and avoiding an attitude of judgment toward the client. It is important to
Decision Making and Ethical Reasoning in Psychology 9
recognize that understanding one’s intuitions is central to avoiding making moral
judgments. Psychologists cannot mistake the client’s best interest with what he or
she would do in a similar situation. e psychologist should guide the client on the
basis of psychological science, not his or her own life history.
e second precondition involves ensuring an excellent level of training for
psychologists. Poor training can lead to personal intuitive decisions. Training
should include a strong grounding in the principles and norms that guide and gov-
ern the exercise of the profession, and in the psychological science and techniques
associated with its practice. e psychologist needs excellent training to be able to
apply psychological theory and restrain the inuence of his or her personal experi-
ence, i.e., intuitions. e psychologist has the responsibility for achieving this high
level of training.
e third precondition for ethical reasoning relates to experience. It is crucial
to be aware that intuitive answers can arise in situations in professional practice. It
is experience that makes it possible to have a clear awareness of how we can solve
problems, and acquire intuitions appropriate to psychological practice. It would
be dicult for an inexperienced professional to achieve competence immediately,
because there are too many variables for the psychologist to be aware of when
dealing with clients. Hence, supervision in the training of psychologists is very
important.
Associated with the previous preconditions is the need for the psychologist to
be humble. Humility is central to ensuring a responsible attitude in reaching con-
clusions. All psychologists have personal limitations in their work related to the
decision-making process. Even when a psychologist has good self-knowledge, ex-
cellent training, and a good deal of experience, he or she should take into account
the fact that all hypotheses made about the client’s situation are fallible. is is not
only because the science is indeterminate, but also because it is impossible for a
person to disconnect totally from personal experience. e psychologist must rec-
ognize this fallibility and not present absolute scenarios, but rather leave space for
the possibility of other options.
Finally, the last point regarding ethical reasoning is intervision. Asking for
help from other professionals ensures dierent perspectives. We are prone to using
mechanisms to simplify information in order to be able to streamline the process
of nding solutions and making decisions. e more experience a psychologist has,
the greater the probability he or she will simplify information. is could lead to
the psychologist putting the client into the framework of a comprehensive model
that could reduce the understanding of the person’s uniqueness. is explains why
psychologists should seek intervision. ey should discuss their interpretations
and proposals for intervention with colleagues, listen to alternatives, and increase
their awareness of other perspectives.
e central precondition for good psychological practice seems to be psycholo-
gists engaging in deep reection about their own desires and intuition.
Conclusion
Decision making seems to stem from the combination of an individual’s core con-
sciousness with an autobiographical consciousness (Damásio, 2010). Only reason
10 M. Ricou, S. Marina
can increase the probability of helping someone from a psychological perspective.
Emotions will reect personal desires.
Bearing in mind that intuition is the basis for decision making, it is essential for
psychologists to be aware of the high probability of having an intuitive response in
each situation. Psychologists must be able to increase their ability to discern when
they are relying on their intuition. As previously argued, it is not possible to stop
core consciousness and make decisions only from an autobiographical conscious-
ness (Damásio, 1994/2001). From this perspective, we think it is essential to value
the role of reason. e exercise of ethical reasoning seems to be the central precon-
dition for achieving solutions that are in the client’s best interest.
ese preconditions for the exercise of ethical reasoning identied by Ricou
(2014), which we support, come from careful reection on the principles that guide
professional psychological practice. e objective is to increase the psychologist’s
perspectives about the dilemma replace with he or she faces. e psychologist
needs a clear awareness of the variables involved in his or her judgment, and should
then try to discern the best choice for the client. is includes admitting that it is
possible to fail. It means humbly recognizing the need to improve one’s knowledge
about others and the world. It is a highly cognitive reection. e rst step for psy-
chologists should be to understand their own reasoning and try to avoid the per-
sonal intuitions and feelings that tell them what the best choice is. is is dicult,
but a decision made on this basis is what’s suitable for the client.
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Original manuscript received October 24, 2019
Revised manuscript accepted December 24, 2019
First published online February 02, 2020
To cite this article: Ricou, M., Marina, S. (2020). Decision Making and Ethical Reasoning in Psycho-
logy. Psychology in Russia: State of the Art, 13(1), 3–11. DOI: 10.11621/pir.2020.0101
