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9 Facing the music
Music subcultures and “morality”
in Malaysia
Azmyl Md Yusof
Introduction
My involvement as a musician in the Malaysian independent music scene began
by chance and rather “late” (I was 20 years old) as I slowly came to realize
my musical works, methods and collaborations were at odds with the general
ideological expectations presented by the mainstream. I found it more pleasurable
and progressive to grow, learn and discover the varied realms that existed in the
underground music subculture. It also helped that my friends with whom I shared a
love of particular strains of music – the lo-fi collegiate rock of the 1990s and noise
rock experimentations – also began networking in underground punk subculture
that to a certain extent we had more in common philosophically speaking.
Growing up in the 1990s, it was common to read in the Malaysian dailies about
the “vicious influence of Western culture” or budaya kuning (yellow culture)
and how certain forms of music such as hip-hop and punk were threatening the
very fabric that held Malaysian society together. Malaysian youths in general, and
Malay youths in particular, were depicted as clueless and out of control, although
my own lived experiences of that era begged to differ and raised an awareness in
me that all is not what it seemed.
In that light, the black metal crackdowns of 2001 and 2005 were media grabbing
and unfortunate incidents. Nevertheless, they make for interesting case studies
on how urban Malay youth subcultures negotiate with the disciplinary power of
morality in the changing Malaysian political landscape. From my perspective as a
musician and a music lover of all genres, some of the accusations hurled at them
were just plain absurd. In general, music “gigs” are organic gatherings of musicians
and fans of a particular genre or subgenre. They are ideal social networking
opportunities for musicians outside of the mainstream cultural industry who share
not only the same musical inclinations but also similar value orientations. The
crackdowns involved a series of raids on independent and privately owned music
performance spaces which led to the arrests of mostly Malay youths who were
subsequently freed without any charges made, save for a few who had broken
council laws regarding permits. The significance of the events can be appreciated
by considering the extensive coverage devoted to them by the local Malay language
180 Azmyl Md Yusof
media which not only reported the events with great enthusiasm but also with little
journalistic regard for accessing credible sources. What clearly emerges from these
episodes of mediated moral panics is a commentary of how modern Malay youth
subjectivities is closely intertwined with popular cultural consumption, and how
ethnic stereotypes are also easily manufactured as a result of these consumptive
choices.
In this chapter, I argue that the construction of Malay cultural identities as
embodied in the body politics of urbanized Malay youths is central in the portrayal
of the phenomena. In bringing to the foreground the disciplining of the “deviancy”
of these groups, what is also implicitly questioned is the efficacy of hegemonic
nation-state ideals and trajectories. In other words, one can read these events as
undermining the importance of addressing “more serious” issues of politics and
culture as imagined by the ruling government.
The black metal crackdowns
On New Year’s Eve, 2005, a police raid was conducted on “Paul’s Place”, a small
music venue for the independent music community along Jalan Kelang Lama (Old
Klang Road) in Kuala Lumpur. Police officers revealed to those present that it was
a raid on the black metal gig. Close to 400 people, mostly men, were rounded up
and detained for a few hours. The detainees consisted of not only those who were
inside “Paul’s Place”, but also members of the public who were outside the venue
and patrons of hawker food stalls within a 100 meter radius of the venue, including
a stall owner and some Singaporean tourists who happened to be passing by the
area at that time.
Ironically, the gig itself was not organized by the black metal fans at all but by
the “hardcore” subculture which is a subgenre of “punk”. Adherents of hardcore
punk subculture emphasize clean and healthy living, and practice what is termed
“straight edge” – no use of drugs or alcohol. The bands performing that night not
only consisted of local hard core bands but also independent bands from various
genres. They included a Singaporean band whose sound can be described as a
cross between pop yeh yeh and rock and a guest Japanese band. A band member
later recounted that the rationale for the raid was that the police had come across
the event’s flyer that appeared to have an image of “the devil” as well as blood
motifs. They concluded that it was a black metal gathering.
All the detainees were subjected to urine tests for drug use. Only seven out
of the 365 detained tested positive. Despite the presence of other ethnic groups,
the Malay media, notably the daily tabloid, Harian Metro, reported the raid in an
ethnically biased manner.
Four individuals were remanded for two days while the rest were released within
a few hours after their detention. The four were released only following a press
conference at “Paul’s Place” organized by the independent music community on
January 2, 2006. By this time, the reasons given by the authorities for the raid had
fluctuated between “black metal” to “unlawful gathering” to “public indecency”
and back to “black metal” again.
Facing the music 181
Quickly following on the heels of the black metal raid, the Malay media reported
of another crackdown on the “Langkawi Fest”. The “Langkawi Fest” was intended
to be a “rave” (a large-scale techno party) happening on New Year’s Eve but was
cancelled at the eleventh hour by the organizers. In the United Kingdom and
elsewhere, “techno” had been closely associated with a particular social setting
along with use of the drug ecstasy, and had generated considerable controversy in
the early to mid-1990s (Shuker 2001: 153). The simplistic link made in the news
reporting between the diverse subcultures of techno and black metal showed a lack
of journalistic professionalism. What seemed to preoccupy both sensationalist
stories was the spectre of drug use without a deeper concern for balanced
reporting.
Indeed, an important precursor to the New Year’s Eve raid was a series of
biased and highly editorialized features on the Malaysian black metal subculture
by Mastika, a popular monthly Malay tabloid magazine, in its October, November
and December issues of 2005. The articles carried, amongst others, accounts
by “reformed” black metal subculture members and carried theatrical images,
including one of a singer in stage make-up with strawberry sauce poured over
his head to resemble blood from black metal events held at “Paul’s Place” taken
earlier in the year. The November issue’s cover headline in Malay read “Kami
sembah syaitan – bakar Al-Quran di Port Dickson” (“We worship the devil –
burning the Al-Quran in Port Dickson”) while the December issue read “Makan
Babi, barulah true black metal!” (“If you eat pork, then you are a true black metal
follower”), followed by a smaller header at the bottom of the page “Anak kita
makin jauh terpesong” (“Our children are further deviating”). The images on the
front page montage that accompany the November headline include an illustration
of a ghoulish creature (presumably the devil) and a photograph from a black metal
live performance. The December issue carried an illustration of a half-woman,
half-skeletal ghost next to a photo of two long-haired youths with face make-up –
similar to that of the American rock band Kiss – one of whom has his tongue
out (their eyes are digitally blurred) and three superimposed images of youths
loitering by sidewalks next to parked cars and a shop lot signage that read, “Pub
dan Disko” (“Pub and Disco”).
On 4 December, 2005, The Star, an English language daily, reported about a raid
at an alleged black metal concert (headlined, “Malaysian Police Bust Black Metal
Concert”) in Seremban town by the police, the day before (on Saturday) in which
105 youths were detained. The issue brought up in the lead was that the organizers
had applied for its permit under the name “Persatuan Cekak Silat” (“Cekak Martial
Arts Club”). However, the District OCPD Assistant Commissioner was quoted as
saying that initial investigations did not indicate activities that broke the law or
went against religion but they were detained for urine tests. According to the
report, “the police had information that the organizers were carrying out activities
that were against Islam and had planned to end their performance with a satanic
worship session and sex”. The report concluded that, “30 youths had tested positive
for drugs and three persons were handed over to the state religious department on
suspicions they had committed acts contrary to Islam”.
182 Azmyl Md Yusof
The raid made the front page of Harian Metro’s December 5 edition and
carried the headline, “Pesta Black Metal – penganjur guna nama persatuan silat
cekak” (“Black Metal Festival – organisers use cekak martial arts club name”),
and continued in the second page with the subheading “Hasrat pijak Al-Quran”
(“Wish to step on the Al-Quran”). Harian Metro’s take on the event was far
more in-depth and recounted an earlier black metal raid in 2001, and the paper’s
extensive coverage of that saga. The story concluded with an un-sourced mention
of followers burning, stepping, and even fornication in front of the Al-Quran.
It also noted the government’s cancellation of a concert by black metal band,
Mayhem, from Norway that was scheduled for 4 February at the Backroom Disco
in Kuala Lumpur.
The following day (6 December, 2005), Harian Metro carried yet another front
page story with the headline, “Amuk Black Metal – 40 kumpulan rancang gegar
Jalan Kelang Lama” (“Black Metal Amok – 40 groups plan to rattle Old Klang
Road”) which continued on inside with a lengthy subheading of an eyewitness
account, “Kata-kata Menakutkan Laman Web Black Metal – Saya lihat banyak
grafik seram selain lambang kumpulan muzik dipenuhi darah, kepala kambing
hitam” (“Scary Sayings on Black Metal Web Page – I saw a lot of scary graphics
other than the band’s insignia full of blood, black goat’s head”).
Four years earlier, in 2001, similar media-grabbing raids were conducted by
the police and religious authorities in the northern Malaysian state of Kedah.
It was believed that a black metal occult movement had thrived among Malay
youths in that state. Youths were randomly subjected to strip searches for black
clothing . Those who wore black T-shirts were apprehended for questioning and
counseling as they were believed to be “black metal followers”. As in the 2005
case, the raids were racialized as they implied the involvement of Malay youths
via suggestive headlines in the 2 January, 2006 edition of Harian Metro such
as “Tin arak bertaburan” (“Alcohol tins found scattered”). In the same edition,
Harian Metro gave a specific count of 380 people consisting of 310 male and
70 female teenagers, while The Star (on 5 January, 2006) merely reported “some
380” people were detained and brought to the Brickfields police station for urine
tests. None were reportedly charged.
Both raids were the latest series of similar actions taken against other music
subcultures like “punk rock”, “hip-hop” and “heavy metal” over the past three
decades. Through their demonization, those in power are fortifying a dominant
ideology which in itself is also deeply entrenched in neo-religious and mythical
rhetoric. Moreover, the “problem” of youths has often been a subject of perennial
concern of the government. As observed by Maila Stivens:
The relative social powerlessness of children and young people leaves them
very vulnerable to authoritative depictions. The small attention paid to youth
in scholarly work on Malaysia is all the more interesting, given the place
occupied by the behaviours and needs of young people in government
polemic and more generally in public discourse since independence in 1957.
The perceived dangers of drugs and, latterly, of the effects of the new
Facing the music 183
affluence, have been prominent planks of government pronouncements and
other national cultural production, featuring regularly in ministerial speeches,
rallies and television propaganda … That young people are now making
themselves heard in a way that worry their elders is clear from recent accounts
of the rapid growth of rock concerts as key events in many young Malaysians’
lives.
(Stivens 2002: 190–1)
Malay media and the Malay consensus
The discursive categories usually used by the Malay media to portray the ethnic
and religious make-up of the “deviants” picked up in the raids are significant.
They are portrayed to be situated within the shifting landscapes of modern urban
Malaysia as well as contrasted against a nostalgic traditional rural Malaysia. This
juxtaposition is central to understanding the cultural politics involved in the raids
because of the social climate of a country undergoing rapid economic development
and the subsequent shifts in cultural identities that are perceived to be set in motion.
The growing importance of a resurgent Islam has also increased the instability
of what constitutes Malaysian modernity. The idea of modernity is located
within a series of tensions surrounding the role of religion in the modern Malay
world and its relationship to tradition, family and critiques of modernization and
Westernization (Stivens 2002: 191). Under these circumstances, the mainstream
media (journalism in this case) and popular culture exist in a state of ongoing
struggle between party politics versus everyday politics, and which often results
in a stalemate.
Hartley explains the linkages between journalism and modernity in the
following terms:
Journalism is the sense-making practice of modernity (the condition) and
popularizer of modernism (the ideology); it is a product and promoter of
modern life, and is unknown in traditional societies … Journalism and
modernity are marked by co-development of capitalization and consumerism,
market expansion … and is caught up in all the institutions, struggles and
practices of modernity; contemporary politics is unthinkable without it, as is
contemporary consumer society, to such an extent that in the end it is difficult
to decide whether journalism is a product of modernity, or modernity is a
product of journalism.
(Hartley 1996: 33–4)
With this in mind, any evaluation of Malaysia’s cultural make-up will usually
lead back to the modern/traditional binary opposition. It is within this relationship
where the ownership of Malaysia’s cultural history is contested as the negotiations
and complexities that arise out of this dynamic drives dominant cultural forms
to add or exclude elements without considering the said dynamism. It is at here
where selected cultural elements are tagged “ideals” and which are then associated
184 Azmyl Md Yusof
with “morality”. The discourse of “Malaysian culture” in local journalism is often
caught within this binary, and is a direct consequence of the state’s ownership
and control of the mass media, whether directly or by proxy ownership. This
phenomena is particularly acute in the Malay media.
Urban Malay youth culture is embedded within wider Malaysian social and
political structures and cultural complexities. The official management of culture
in contemporary Malaysian society is often done with reference to the official
religion of the country, Islam. This necessarily refers to the ethnic Malay majority
as all Malays are constitutionally defined as Muslims. Historically, Islam has
played a significant role in formulating Malay cultural identities for at least
five centuries. The synonymous and naturalized relationship between Malays
and Islam continues to be the platform on which generalized notions of cultural
norms and morality are constructed. Malaysian Islam has also imbibed strains of
“conservatism”, notably from returning Malay students educated in the Middle
East over the years that make up the new Malay middle class. As elsewhere,
since the mid-1970s, global Islamic resurgence has impinged upon the public
sphere of post-colonial, multi-religious and multi-ethnic Malaysia. The project of
a new corporate Islam is oddly reminiscent of the “muscular Christianity” ethos
noted by historians for nineteenth-century Britain, with distinct overtones of the
militarily competent and hyper-masculine Christian gentleman, the heir to the
Protestant Ethic, in the central image of the new order (Stivens 2002: 192). Indeed,
the Malaysian government has more recently leaned towards the conservative
end in matters of religious interpretation and practice in order to avoid a wider
political schism that might weaken Malay political control. Arguably, this shift
has unsettled Malay modernists and partially contributed to the breakup of the old
ruling Malay political party, United Malay Nationalist Organization (UMNO), in
1987 (Provencher 1995: 180).
The Malaysian media is also tightly controlled by the Ministry of Information
through various legislative instruments like The Printing and Presses Act,The
Sedition Act,The Official Secrets Act, and The Internal Security Act. Additionally,
media practitioners are often steered into directions that are dictated by their
proxy owners which are closely linked to political parties of the ruling coalition,
and hence limiting any alternative or dissenting voices from the public (e.g.,
Zaharom Nain and Wang Lay Kim 2004; Mustafa 2003). The Malay media, in
particular, have the largest audience share, and the ideological weight they play
in creating political and moral consensus cannot be underestimated. Indeed, it is
not surprising that most of the contents portrayed in the Malay media tend to be
centered around concerns of “social and moral degradation” among the Malay
populace, particularly among gendered youths.
There is also a high degree of “dumbed-down” and sensationalist contents in
the Malay media offering little intellectual alternatives or reportage of social and
political realities other than trivia and gossip within the entertainment industry.
For instance, the two best-selling Malay medium publications are Harian Metro
and Mastika. The former has a daily circulation of 241,800 according to the Audit
Bureau of Circulation (16 July, 2006). These two publications frequently touch
Facing the music 185
upon topics and sensitivities pertaining to Malay cultural beliefs which hark back
to pre-Islamic times (e.g., animism) and transpose them onto urban settings. These
two publications also make no qualms about being tabloids, and are focused in
selling stories and features which take gossip and word-of-mouth information
as credible sources. For the ruling elite, the challenge is to balance the high
commercial consumption of popular culture as found in media – also frowned
upon by Islamic revivalists – with competing political agendas.
Another angle that these publications usually adopt is that of Malays originally
coming from a predominantly agrarian society still coping with the radical changes
of modernization in a post-colonial urban environment. A residual legacy of the
British “divide and rule” policy, this ideological slant is ironically prominent in
portrayals of urban Malays as the sole “victims” of “wayward” or “Westernized”
lifestyles. In these publications, very few Chinese or Indians, let alone the
numerous ethnic groups in Sabah and Sarawak, are represented. When they appear,
their cultural identities are mired in the colonial stereotypes of the Chinese as
industrious and entrepreneurial traders and the Indians as penniless labourers.
Music subcultures and Malay youth discontent
As I have noted earlier, the key mobilizing metaphor for Malay morality is
Islam. However, politically inspired interpretations of the faith often bear little
resemblances to Islamic teachings as practiced by ordinary adherents. The
appropriation of Islam for the spectre of “moral panics” is central to my argument.
Together with the deployment of the Malay media as a “moral entrepreneur”,
both elements come together to play a powerful policing and rationalizing role
in re-presenting to the general reading public the various punitive police raids
on black metal music events and crackdowns on their fans. However, these
actions must also be seen alongside the context of working-class Malay youths
where music subcultures have long played a central role in the management
of their new urban identities despite being pitted as a force which undermines
traditional Malay cultural values. Both trajectories are symptomatic of Malay
society grappling with its own growing diversity and meeting the demands of
urbanization and industrialization where youth alienation from traditional values
and disgruntlement over job prospects are common since the rapid development
of Malaysia from the 1970s (Lockard 1998: 233).
In comparison, the presence of the Chinese music underground scene, as
opposed to the mainstream Canto-rock, was spearheaded in the late 1990s and
early 2000s by bands such as Chong Yang and Moxuan through the Huang Ho
record label. Currently, the Soundscape record label and more politically aware
bands like Nao and Deng Deng, and more musically inclined bands like Citizens of
Ice Cream are the embodiment of the breadth and variety in the Malaysian music
subcultures that go beyond the discourse of “morality”. These bands tend to sing
in Mandarin and are musically influenced by punk, rock and metal but inhabiting
neither one genre at any specific moment. The local Chinese media are also more
professional and supportive in representing these musical acts, highlighting their
186 Azmyl Md Yusof
music and ideas more rather than focusing on the contextual meanings behind
the subculture itself. The Malaysian experimental music scene is also a result of
the explorations that had its beginnings from the Chinese music underground.
One of its proponents, sound artist Goh Lee Kwang, even had a column in
one of the Chinese dailies before relocating to Europe and touring the region.
The availability of large corporate sponsors such as Tiger Beer (a non-starter
for the Malay subculture) certainly helped with developing their music events
financially. Nevertheless, the market for the Chinese underground is currently
too small to sustain and most bands tend not to stick just within the scene but
also explore outside their comfort zones. I resist using the “subculture” in my
description because the Chinese underground scene is very eclectic and has no
ideological qualms about corporate sponsors as opposed to the more “purist” punk
subcultures.
As with any subcultures, be it musical or otherwise, the driving force of identity
formation lies in the ways which the subordinate group resists the incorporation of
the parent and dominant cultural forms. In the recent past, two music subcultures
in which urban Malay youths have popularly identified with, have been punk and
heavy metal. Lockard notes that by the 1980s:
Some marginalized, aimless, urban young people adopted selective features
of Western popular culture, from punk hairstyles to “heavy metal” music.
Increasing numbers of teenagers and young adults (especially Malays) enjoy
“hanging out”; their elders call it lepak (“loitering”) and view it as idleness.
They lepak at McDonald’s outlets, shopping malls, public squares, or the
beach, in order to relax, listen to music, and relieve tension after work or
school. Authorities worry about drugs, smoking, and vandalism.
(Lockard 1998: 233)
Given the pace of capitalist development in the country, the seeds were sown
early in the media to cultivate a preferred reading for a strong moral policing
force to keep Malaysia productive and untainted by “foreign” values despite the
irony that these cosmopolitian lifestyle choices usually accompany open economic
systems. Intensified advertising campaigns – aimed mostly at younger and female
consumers – to buy products associated with Western popular culture like tobacco,
alcohol and fast food also became an area of some concern (Lent 1995: 7). While
the foregoing might seem unrelated to subcultural activities – which more often
than not reject the consumption of such products – nevertheless it is the imagined
links between these disparate elements that have become a favorite tool for inciting
the need for moral policing and winning moral consensus.
The demonization and scapegoating of rock music and targeting of youth
subcultures (notably punk) is not a new phenomenon elsewhere in the world. In the
1980s, the emergence of the “New Right” in America brought about a complex
network of political, secular and religious organizations exerting considerable
pressure and influence through letter writing and petition campaigns, television
and radio programmes, and the publications of think-tanks. Religion figured
Facing the music 187
prominently as an ideological tool of attack. For instance, Denslow makes
mention of a claim by Pastor Fletcher Brothers, a “rock deprogrammer”, that rock
music is:
the single most powerful tool with which Satan communicates his evil mes-
sage. MURDER MUSIC has led millions of young people into alcoholism,
abortion, crime, drug addiction, incest, prostitution, sadomasochism, satanic
worshipping, sexual promiscuity, suicide and much more. MURDER MUSIC
has to to be STOPPED NOW! The moral fiber of our country and young lives
are at stake!
(cited in Shuker 2001: 224)
In 1985, rock music and free speech was the target of the Parents’ Music
Resource Centre (PMRC), headed by a group of “Washington wives” most
of whom were married to Senators or Congressmen and were “born again”
Christians.
The PMRC dedicated themselves to ‘cleaning up’ rock, which they saw as
potentially harmful to young people, terming it ‘secondary child abuse’. One
of the founding members, Tipper Gore, became involved because she had
bought her 8-year-old daughter a copy of Prince’s album Purple Rain and
found that one of its songs, ‘Darling Nicki’, referred to masturbation (‘I met
her in the hotel lobby, masturbating with a magazine) … The PMRC published
aRock Music Report, condemning what they claimed to be five major themes
in the music: rebellion, substance abuse, sexual promiscuity and perversion,
violence-nihilism, and the occult.
(cited in Shuker 2001: 224–5)
The result of this encouragement of self-censorship was the generic “Parents
Advisory Explicit Lyrics” label that appears on albums evaluated to be culpable.
Various musical subcultural movements that have emerged both in the West
and the East, notably rap and hip-hop, have also been subsequently incorporated
into mainstream music and lost their initial resistant anti-establishment qualities.
Others, such as the hardcore punk scene in America and Japanese skinhead punk,
have maintained and resisted co-optation. The arrival of rap music in Malaysia in
the 1990s was greeted with similar tones of disapproval but remained popular
despite a government ban on broadcasting these performances on radio and
television stations. They were perceived by local critics as “too westernized”
and “un-Islamic” (Lockard 1998: 259). Punk music subculture by comparison
has managed to remain largely outside the radar of the Malay media’s roving
eyes (except for a brief period in the 1990s) and the local music industry’s
incorporation. It resembles more of a counterculture as punk music enthusiasts
usually move on to hold professional jobs but many continue to espouse its guiding
principles of political and humanitarian activism outside of their work sphere.
On the whole, punk subculture (and its various permutations such as hardcore,
188 Azmyl Md Yusof
straight edge, anarcho, skinhead, post-punk, etc.) has the attraction of offering
ready-made solutions to Malaysian society’s ambivalences and a platform for
self-empowerment amongst Malay youths. Pioneering Malaysian punk bands
like Carburettor Dung and The Pilgrims paved the way for not just punk as
a music genre but also ideas and values which are alternatives to dominant
culture. Although the musical aspect is a symbolic vehicle of this, punk itself
is not merely a genre but also a philosophical approach to life and art promoting
empowerment through self-sustenance and socio-cultural and political awareness
through a D.I.Y. (do-it-yourself) ethos. The definition of punk by local punk guru
Joe Kidd of Carburettor Dung can be summarized as follows:
Anybody or any group of people who sincerely push boundaries, create
challenging bodies of work with integrity and thought, is considered to be as
punk, especially when the expression positively reaffirms individual freedom
and allows for the betterment of the world we live in. That’s my conclusion.
That’s punk.
(cited in Muhammad Azwan, undated)
Punk rock and its various subgenres also have their own sets of fashion which
distinguishes one subgenre from another. But its permutations are not always
“antireligious”. In fact, most re-incorporated trends are readily available in youth
fashion stores. Some can be mistaken as black metal to an untrained eye or lazily
appropriated into the ‘black metal’ discourse. As Muhammad Azwan observed:
As punk culture consists of many themes where they are associated with
somehow different type of punk music, they also wear quite different style
of dressings. The anarcho punk wear black cargo pants, t-shirt with slogans
or logos of bands, patches, khaki backpacks, dreadlocks or spiky hair. While
the hardcore kids are spotted with cargo pants, loose denims and t-shirts,
wallet chains and baseball caps among other things. As for the skinheads,
they are synonymous with bald or shaven heads, tight jeans rolled up above
the ankle, suspenders, berets, denims and suede jacket, Fred Perry shirts and
Doc Martens (boots). The skinheads are more fashionable, smart-dressed and
sometimes don’t really show harmful looks.
(Ibid.)
By comparison, the heavy metal genre that emerged did not offer a solution
but more as a form of escapism amongst the urban Malay youths as most of its
membership tend to come from the working class, although not exclusively so.
Heavy metal remains popular amongst all social classes and ages, notably because
of the musical techniques, particular skills at guitar playing, drumming techniques,
vocalizations and so forth that come with performing the genre. Although all
forms of music can be consumed as a form of escapism, certain permutations
and subgenres of punk are often more politicized compared to the other forms
of heavy metal. The spirit of the countercultures and anarcho punks of the late
Facing the music 189
1980s and 1990s can still be found in the anti-globalization protests of the early
twentieth century and are examples of non-musically centered (and sometimes
musically linked) highly politicized groupings that would have once been termed
“subcultures” but are difficult to conceive of as such today (Huq 2006: 21).
Falling under the generic term of “rock”, heavy metal is associated with Malay
youth rebellion. But unlike the punk subculture, their members lack connections to
broader constituencies that might support progressive causes (Lockard 1998: 261).
Heavy metal is also frequently criticized as incorporating the worst excesses of
popular music, notably its perceived narcissism and sexism, and it is also often
musically dismissed (Shuker 2001: 152). The term “rock” in Malaysia often
wrongly refers to heavy metal – a symptom of musical genre ignorance pervades
in the Malaysian cultural landscape – and the continuing popularity of 1980s
heavy metal bands such as Metallica and Iron Maiden, to name a few, with its
supposed “macho” imagery, posturings and music often found in posters, band
photos or album covers are often misread as the “violent” and “aggressive” nature
of the genre. These negative associations are echoed in the local setting where the
Malay media label colloquially heavy metal fans as kutus (hair lice) because of
their trademark long unkempt hair. Margaret Scott (cited in Lockard 1998: 25)
describes its attractive powers in the following terms:
With the strictures of Islamic fundamentalism pressing in on one side and, on
the other side, the drudgery of working or looking for work in a place where
the unemployment rate is more than 35 percent among 15–24 year olds, rock
music offers relief … Dakwahs [missionary Muslims] inhabit the universities
and kutus inhabit the shopping malls. When being young and Malay means
choosing sides between the club of the dakwahs at one extreme and the club of
kutus at the other, popular culture becomes a partisan pastime. Kutu culture,
a provocative, challenging alternative, is a convenient target for what is at
the root a debate over national identity … but why heavy metal? Because it’s
loud and it’s got minor chords and it’s offensive and it’s a badge of distinction
and it’s got clothes to go along with it and it’s only for young Malays and
because dakwahs don’t like it.
Kutus or heavy metal bands and fans consciously adopt a signature fashion
and style to personify their resistance to dominant culture. Although often times
expressing real anger at the system, kutus are less able to play an activist political
role since their music is defined by particular lifestyle concerns rather than
political commitments (Lockard 1998: 261). Heavy metal subculture also has
many subgenres like “black metal”, “death metal”, “speed metal” and so forth.
Their fans often try to outdo one another by self-consciously reveling in their
marginal and outsider status. It is this nebulous aspect of their subculture which
the Malay media usually focuses on when they perform their collective work of
demonization.
While the particular appeal of black heavy metal amongst urban Malay youths
merits further study, it suffices for now to note how this subgenre differentiates
190 Azmyl Md Yusof
itself from other heavy metal subgenres. The most recent of the heavy metal
influenced subgenre to rise into the commercial and capitalist market is “nu
metal”, which incorporates influences from rap and hip-hop via the use of rapping
techniques in singing and the presence of a DJ (disc jockey) who uses sampled
music or sounds within the song structures and performances. Like “grunge”
in the mid-1990s through Seattle-based and Washington-based bands such as
Nirvana, Mudhoney, Soundgarden and Pearl Jam, stylized and marketed rebellion
via fashion and music was the order of the day. This is a key factor in locating the
features of a specific music subculture or subgenre which may or may not appeal
not only to youth culture trends but also the degree of “moral ambiguity” because
of the lack of religious symbolism. More often than not, while heavy metal or
punk influenced subgenres often appear aggressive and loud on the surface, its
lyrical subject matter still draws from traditional modes of popular songs while
varying its signature themes of anomie. As Huq (2006: 147) notes:
… lyrically many of the same emergent themes of grunge have resurfaced
in nu metal, whose proponents include Korn, Offspring, Limp Bizkit and
Slipknot. Papa Roach’s 2002 ‘She Loves Me Not’ for example revolves
around the lyric ‘Life’s not fair’, revisiting the age-old theme in vernacular
popular song of romantic love and articulating the sense of injustice voiced in
numerous examples of punk, grunge and other ‘alternative’ music. There
are also various examples of youth culture shock tactics in nu metal, as
seen in punk posturing and the extreme edges of heavy metal, such as Ozzy
Osbourne’s stage shows.
Indeed, the style and fashion of black metal subculture through its signature use
of insignias, dressing and gestures also play a significant role in fueling negative
media portrayals of them. The fact that adherents of black metal music subculture
seldom localize its symbols and iconography further facilitated the spectre of
negative foreign cultural forms “invading” local “pure” and “untainted” cultures.
What distinguishes black metal subculture from other genres, however, is its often
anti-religious or atheistic motifs expressed both lyrically and symbolically. For
local Malay-Muslims, these themes rub against deeply ingrained religious beliefs
with respect to the seductive powers of the “devil” and the severe penalty of
“disbelief in god”. The specific insignias, dressing, gestures and musicality of
black metal have a culturally specific history and can be traced back to its heavy
metal origins. In the industrialized West, Shuker (2001: 152f) notes that:
Many heavy metal fans are working class, white, young and male, identifying
with the phallic imagery of guitars and the general muscularity and opposi-
tional orientation of the form … The symbols associated with heavy metal,
which include the Nazi insignia and Egyptian and biblical symbols, provide
a signature identification with the genre, being widely adopted by metal’s
youth cult following … The genre has maintained its high market profile into
the 1990s, despite critical derision and a negative public image.
Facing the music 191
The precise reasons for the international popularity of heavy metal among
working class male youths have been a subject of research and debate. Foremost
has been the suggestion that it is essentially a subversive and oppositional cultural
form against the status quo. In the case of Malaysia, rapid urbanization combined
with aspects of religious subordination and the mundane routines of working class
employment for Malay youths are strong plausible factors. This is suggested in
culturally specific local idioms and imageries evident in heavy metal lyrics but
more exaggerated in black metal. For instance, biblical symbols such as the crucifix
often take on more ominous tones which, in its extreme, alludes to fantasy and
paganism but to what extent black metal listeners in general practice them is open
to question, since it is a form of escapism. It would be akin to likening gangta-rap
fans to indulging in guns, murder and crime. The late famed rock critic, Lester
Bangs, who favoured the emergence of heavy metal has this take on the subgenre:
As its detractors have always claimed, heavy metal rock is nothing more than
a bunch of noise; it is not music, it’s distortion – and that is precisely why
its adherents find it appealing. Of all contemporary rock, it is the genre most
closely identified with violence and aggression, rapine and carnage. Heavy
metal orchestrates technological nihilism.
(cited in Shuker 2001: 152)
As in other kinds of music, the heavy metal genre has also been absorbed
into a capitalist mode of consumption. Marketing plays a significant role as the
genre’s performers present an achievable image of flounced hair and torn jeans, a
rock lifestyle whose surface aspects are affordable to its followers. The impact of
Western heavy metal on MTV has been significant and is mirrored in the heavy
music video rotations throughout the 1980s to the 1990s in Malaysian television. In
this context, black metal subculture could be viewed as a knee-jerk reaction to the
commerciality of heavy metal. Its intensified form and reinterpretation of heavy
metal structure and imagery doubles or triples any form of negative public image
and propels it further into underground music and, in the process, engenders less
visibility in the eyes of the dominant culture. This mysterious and cultish nature,
central to its identity, is also detrimental to its listeners who do not partake in its
subculture. Opportunities for scapegoating and demonization can be easily built
around it, as was the case in the Malay media which played up on local beliefs and
cultural anxieties together with its notoriety in the West to mediate a simulated
moral panic.
Simulated moral panics and policing: An analysis of
the 2001 black metal crackdown
As I have discussed earlier, the intended preferred reading of the raids prefixes
the notion of a strong moral policing force to keep Malaysia, and Malay youths in
particular, productive and untainted by “foreign” values and practices. A textual
analysis of media reports reveals some telling insights into how a preferred reading
192 Azmyl Md Yusof
is inferred by the choices of words mediated by an Islamic paradigm to portray the
black metal music genre. The tenuous association made between the black metal
followers and drug use and viewing pornography can basically be seen as an iconic
attempt to scapegoat black metal as fundamentally associated with social ills and
evils like the burning of the Quran, animal sacrifices, blood drinking, and so forth.
Moreover, the commentaries of muftis (a professional jurist who interprets Muslim
law), the Kedah State Executive Committee for Religious Affairs, and the Kedah
Islamic Affairs Council certainly helped to project a grave religious concern. The
frequent mention of “threat to religious beliefs”, “faith”, and “Malay youths”
in the same breath as “evil” practices consisting of “occult worship” and “devil
worship”, and which would lead to the “destruction of Muslims”, if unchecked,
buttressed an Islamic inflection of a moral panic. In the journalistic news reports
on the black metal crackdowns of 2001, a combination of religious commentaries
and strong imageries to characterize black metal rituals and iconography provided
metaphorical weight through language and semantics rather than factual accounts.
To make sense of the episode, I adopt the sequential scheme as famously worked
out by Stanley Cohen to describe the phases of a typical disaster and to explain
the mode of reporting deployed.
Warning: during which arises, mistaken or not, some apprehension based on
conditions out of which danger may arise. The warning must be coded to be
understood and impressive enough to overcome resistance to the belief that
the current tranquility can be upset.
Threat: during which people are exposed to communication from others, or to
signs from the approaching disaster itself indicating specific eminent danger.
Impact: during which the disaster strikes and the immediate unorganized
response to the death, injury or destruction takes place.
Inventory: during which those exposed to the disaster begin to form a
preliminary picture of what has happened and of their own condition.
Rescue: during which the activities are geared to immediate help for survivors.
As well as people in the impact are helping each other, the suprasystem begins
to send aid.
Remedy: during which more deliberate and formal activities are undertaken
towards relieving the affected. The suprasystem takes over the functions the
emergency system cannot perform.
Recovery: during which, for an extended period, the community either
recovers its former equilibrium or achieves a stable adaptation to the changes
which the disaster may have brought about.
(Cohen 2002: 22–3)
The hypothesis that the crackdown is a simulated moral panic can be based
on the third sequence, the impact, in which there had been no actual proof of
Facing the music 193
damage done by the black metal groups other than the damage to Islamic belief
and morals. The initial sequences of warning and threat had not been substantially
supported by an actual impact and the only evidences reported mostly consisted of
black metal paraphernalia and “reformed” ex-black metal members’ confessions.
In fact, there had been many false alarms concerning certain youth gatherings
that turned out actually to be “innocent” gatherings or totally unrelated to black
metal groups. The lack of any coherent voice and opinions from academic or
independent professionals from non-governmental organizations in the reports
also showed considerable bias in the sourcing of information.
The first four initial reports – on July 16, 17, and 21 – by the Malaysian
National News Agency, relied on quotes by authority figures such as the National
Unity and Social Development Minister (describing it as a “street gang”), the
Education Director General (describing it as a “group”), the Deputy Prime Minister
(describing it as a “menace” and “a social problem”), and a Minister in the Prime
Minister’s Department (describing it as a “dangerous virus” and a “cancer …
which will lead to the destruction of Muslims in the country”).
The expressions used in these initial reports at first suggested a warning
that warranted further investigation and the words used to describe black metal
followers (“street gang” and “group”) did not imply grave social concerns as
these descriptions merely imply deviant social groupings and nothing too serious.
However, by quoting an authority figure with the stature of the Deputy Prime
Minister, the spectre of an escalating threat through the words, “menace” and
“social problem”, was raised.This was further supported by a quote in a report four
days later from a Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department who brandished
phrases such as “dangerous virus” and “cancer” as formidable threats to Muslims
in the country. Within the span of five days, the image of these black metal
“members” comprising mostly high school students and youths, had escalated
from mere isolated “deviant” social groups to a huge threat to Muslim society.
It is a common tactic for those in positions of leadership given the responsibility
of managing situations such as moral panics to adopt the public demeanour of calm
father figures managing the irrational outburst of an adolescent. Once the emotion
subsides, it is assumed that the panic will go away (Horsfield 1997: 5). This is
exactly what had happened. A binary opposition was first set up between the
adult paternal figure of the authorities and the adolescent members of the black
metal groups. Later, the binary shifted between the “good”, righteous religious
Muslim leaders (a position also adopted by politicians) and the “evil”, ignorant
youths of the black metal “groups”. If the moral panic was indeed simulation, this
claim is supported by the fact that media reportings eventually disappeared within
a month.
What is evident in the events reported is this apparently clear-cut binary
oppositions – “adult rationalism” versus “adolescent irrationality”, and “good”
versus “evil” – and the rapid succession from initial warning to the remedy
and rescue. The entire fiasco lasted just over a month. Revealingly, the police
were reluctant to intervene. The Inspector General of Police was quoted (on
July 21) as saying that “it is not a national security problem … [but] more social
194 Azmyl Md Yusof
than criminal”. A few days later, on July 24, the North-East District Police Chief
stated that, “it would be futile merely to investigate what could be just another
modern day fashion”. This suggests a strong political basis in pointing fingers
rather too quickly. The rapid progress from a religious concern (July 21) to a
political concern (“aimed at bringing down the government … it was used by the
opposition to show the failure of the government to curb social ills among the
youth” on August 4) also seems rather contrived considering that the remedy and
recovery sequence by the authority offered up a rather quick, clean and simple, and
effective solution – by treating black metal followers with medicine to complement
counseling and motivational programs (August 12), using local music personalities
to combat social ills (August 17), and by the “integrated action” between the
Education Ministry, the police, the Home Ministry, the National Unity and Social
Development Ministry, the National Security Division, and the Malaysian Islamic
Advancement Department (JAKIM).
Another important aspect of black metal subculture is the symbolism and icons
that are, like most subcultures, anti-hegemonic in its representations. Style is a
significant part of subcultures challenging the principle of unity and cohesion,
and which contradicts the myth of consensus (Hebdige 1979: 18). It is these
aspects of subcultures that become easy targets for local media as they transpose
apparent differences to an exaggerated degree. Thus, while punk subculture is
closely associated with profanity and highly stylized fashion of working class
youths, black metal subculture is often aligned with paganism. This aspect of the
black metal subculture makes its useful as a moral target especially in societies
like Malaysia where religion is closely linked with cultural values and public
consensus. In this particular case, there was much political capital to be gained as
most of the alleged members came from religious schools. By brandishing black
metal as a “demonizing” agent, the subculture became an inherently evil entity
which threatens the very social fabric of the Muslim community, especially for
“fragile”, “confused” and “irrational” Muslim Malay youths.
While little had changed in terms of tone and strategies used by both the Malay
media and the authorities in both incidents, the former have become more complicit
in the phenomena. In the 2005 crackdown at Paul’s Place, for instance, according to
eyewitnesses and patrons, members of the Malay press were present. This suggests
that the Malay media are playing an active role as an instigator in pressuring the
authorities into taking action by playing the religious and moral card.
While it is difficult to quantitatively measure whether black metal bands and its
fan base has increased or decreased substantially, black metal events or events with
black metal bands participating still persist and these bands continue to record. The
raid itself was not detrimental to black metal subculture as most black metal bands
and their fans are more inclined to its musicality rather than the ideas associated
with the subculture. As a subculture, most black metal band members, fans and
subculture members often have day jobs and families, and lead ordinary and
possibly equally mundane and routinized lives. The raids constitute more a breach
into an individual’s freedom of choice rather than state ideological repression as
musical tastes do not necessarily dictate an individual’s ideology or worldview.
Facing the music 195
To be sure, low-profile raids are more commonplace, and in comparison to the
media grabbing 2005 New Year’s Eve raid, there were less publicized raids in
places like Seremban town earlier where no formal charges were made. The
episodic nature of these raids thus implies a certain felt need by enforcement
and religious authorities to exert their powers at a marginalized group in order
to give some semblance of corrective “action” in the face of perceived social ills
while bringing about little real change at the same time.
The community most affected by these raids have been the local independent
musicians. Consisting primarily of working to middle class Malaysians with
jobs and families, these musicians find pleasure in performing, recording and
organizing small-scale and self-funded events. They conform to legal requirements
regarding the application for permits from local councils and authorities to
organize such events and put to question the kinds of moral issues sensationalized
by the Malay media.
Conclusion
In the 1990s, similar kinds of mediated moral panics were evident in the
Malay media. They included the naturalized association of “lepak” (“loafing”) at
shopping centres by Malay teens with moral degradation, and the “bohsia/bohjan”
(“biker boys” and “biker girls”) with drugs and free sex (Stivens 2002), The
raids discussed in this chapter also have resonances with more recent crackdowns
on up-market places like the Zouk nightclub in central Kuala Lumpur, and on
“Mat Rempits” – Malay males who perform daring motorcycle races on the
numerous highways that ring cities like Kuala Lumpur. Once again, Malay youths
were specifically targeted for corrective action. In the infamous Zouk raid, for
instance, Malay patrons were separated from non-Malays and humiliated before
they were brought to the police station for questioning and detention. Mat Rempits
comprise largely working class Malays and have also been subject to periodic
police retributions. However, these actions have been supplemented by calls from
within UMNO to “recruit” Mat Rempits into the party for a greater cause and to
re-label these new party members as “Mat Cemerlang” (“achievers”).
Notwithstanding their intended outcomes, what these punitive raids and
assimilative actions succeed in making are moral statements about the plight of
urban Malay-Muslims and the putative loss of cultural and religious values that
come with modernization and urbanization. At the core of these events are issues
of the dueling features of a growing religious conservatism that are at odds with the
demands and democratizing choices brought about by modernity. In this scheme
of things, how musicians and fans of the independent music scene are positioned
in the changing moral landscapes of Malaysia, particularly in sub-genres like
black metal, presents new areas for academic inquiry. A further mapping of
the cultural consumption of urban Malay youths, including the new Malay
middle class – children of parents who have benefited from the New Economic
Policy – may help provide indications to the extent these mediated punitive
actions have affected them and whether the concerns and grievances discussed
196 Azmyl Md Yusof
in this chapter are more universally shared. The availability of alternatives to the
mainstream media through the appropriation of the Internet (for blogging and
social networking) has created a virtual cultural space to navigate, communicate
and present their contestations. At the very least, this promises a healthy
questioning of the truth claims and relevance of the mainstream mass media in
contemporary Malaysian society and the hegemonic values that their owners seek
to transmit.
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