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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Policy design and public support for carbon
tax: Evidence from a 2018 US national online
survey experiment
Nives Dolšak
1
| Christopher Adolph
2
| Aseem Prakash
2
1
School of Marine and Environmental Affairs,
University of Washington, Seattle, USA
2
Department of Political Science, University
of Washington, Seattle, USA
Correspondence
Aseem Prakash, Department of Political
Science, University of Washington, 39 Gowen
Hall, Seattle, WA 98195, USA.
Email: aseem@uw.edu
Abstract
Public support for policy instruments is influenced by
perceptions of how benefits and costs are distributed
across various groups. We examine different carbon tax
designs outlining different ways to distribute tax revenues.
Using a national online sample of 1,606 US respondents, we
examine support for a $20/ton carbon tax that is: (1) revenue
neutral: revenue is returned to citizens via tax cuts; (2) compen-
sation-focused: revenue is directed to helping actors dispro-
portionately hurt by the tax; (3) mitigation-focused: revenue
funds projects reducing carbon emissions; and (4) adaptation-
focused: revenue is directed to enhancing community resil-
ience to extreme weather events. We find devoting revenue to
mitigation raises overall support for carbon tax by 6.3 per cent
versus the control (54.9 per cent) where no information on
spending is provided. Other frames raise support in specific
subgroups only. Revenue neutrality raises support among
lower-income households (+6.6 per cent) and political indepen-
dents (+9.4 per cent), while compensation increases support
among lower-income repondents (+6.1 per cent).
1|INTRODUCTION
Public support is critical for policy success. Public administrators therefore seek public input to design policies that
citizens view as fair and effective (Page and Shapiro 1983; Lodge 1994; Majone 1999; Lodge and Stirton 2001;
Howlett 2009). Designing such policies becomes challenging when policies are perceived as imposing differential
costs and benefits across sectors (Soss and Schram 2007). And if these costs or benefits are perceived as concen-
trated on specific sectors (Lowi 1964; Wilson 1980), interest groups mobilize to support or oppose the policy. The
Received: 23 April 2019 Revised: 25 November 2019 Accepted: 21 January 2020
DOI: 10.1111/padm.12657
Public Admin. 2020;98:905–921. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/padm © 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 905