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1
Arctic Shipping and Polar Seaways
Julie Babin, Frédéric Lasserre, and Pauline Pic
Laval University, Quebec, Canada
1Introduction
Climate change in the Arctic triggered a series of dis-
courses about the opening up of a previously unreachable
region. e long-fantasized northern routes would be on
the verge of becoming actual seaways as a consequence of
the melting of sea ice. In reality, navigation remains dif-
ficult in the Arctic, transits are still very limited, as sea
ice is still a major constraint. e passages have always
intrigued though, provoking fascination as early as when
the Vikings reached the western coast of Greenland, to
the vivid reaction to the Russians planting a flag on the
North Pole in 2007. With climate change, the Arctic is
being scrutinized more than ever; hence, the numerous
discourses about navigation in particular. In this article,
we analyze the development of both the Northwest Pas-
sage (NWP) and the Northern Sea Route (NSR). We then
investigate the recent trends in Arctic shipping in order
to put those discourses into perspective and portray the
current tendency.
2 The Soviet State and the
Development of the Northern Sea Route
e Northern Route, Sevmorput in Russian, was par-
tially explored and used in its western part as early as
the eighth century by Irish monks, the Vikings in the
tenth century, and also Basque whalers in the fourteenth
century [1]. e search for a route from Europe to
Asia began in the sixteenth century by British, Dutch,
Danish merchants, and later, Peter the Great envoys [2].
Explored in phases during the nineteenth century, the
Northeast Passage was first traversed in two seasons
in 1878 and 1879, from Tromsø to the Bering Strait by
Swedish explorer Nordenskjöld, and the first voyage
between Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok in a single season
was carried out in the summer of 1932 [1].
e Russian government regained interest in the
Northern Route at the end of the nineteenth century,
particularly for its strategic importance during the
1904–1905 Russian–Japanese war [2]. In February 1932,
the Soviet Union established the Chief Administration
of the NSR, called Glavsevmorput, to conduct and man-
age the NSR in accordance with the Soviet National
Interest and the Arctic Institute [1, 3]. Its mission was to
design, set up, and manage a regular navigation system
in the Russian Arctic. e NSR is the section of the
Northeast Passage comprised between the Kara Gate
and the Bering Strait, and administered by the Northern
Sea Route Administration (NSRA). is specification
is important inasmuch as it accounts for the fact that,
for instance, ships sailing from Murmansk to Asia are
considered as transiting ships by the NSRA, whereas,
when compared to the Northwest Passage, they are per-
forming a destinational voyage, as they departed from a
RussianArcticport(seeFigure1).
e route was opened every summer from 1935 and
was navigable all year round in its western part since
1978 [4]. e Soviet project was exclusively intended
for the development of the Siberian North by the
Soviet merchant fleet: until 1966, no transit dimension
between Europe and Asia was considered, nor was the
opening of a service to non-Soviet shipping compa-
nies in the Arctic [5]. ree priority objectives were
assigned to the Sevmorput administration: scientific
research, aids to navigation, and the constitution of
an Arctic fleet. Funded by the State until 1987, this
administration trained qualified staff able to work in
high latitudes: sailors, aviators, meteorologists, dockers,
etc. [4, 6]. Commissioned in 1959, the Lenin was the first
nuclear-powered icebreaker and could reach isolated
regions without fuel capacity limitations [3]. Only the
USSR and then Russia deployed a fleet of nuclear ice-
breakers, and the maintenance of the NSR presently still
rests on these powerful vessels. e Glavsevmorput also
Encyclopedia of Water: Science, Technology and Society, edited by Patricia A. Maurice.
Copyright © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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2Atmosphere and Precipitation, Ice and Glaciers, Oceans and Coasts, Water–Soil
Northwest Passage
Canada
Churchill
(port closed 2016)
Milne Inlet
Anadyr
Magadan
Pevek
Tiksi
Dudinka
Sabetta
Yamal Peninsula
Arkhangelsk
Murmansk
Hammerfest
Norilsk
Mary River
Raglan
Voisey’s Bay
Bering Strait
Arctic
Ocean
Kara
Strait
Pacic
Ocean
Atlantic
Ocean
Mys Shmidta
Provideniya
Port
Baselines claimed by :
ALASKA
(United States)
GREENLAND
(Denmark)
SVALBARD
(Norway)
RUSSIA
CHINA
JAPAN
ICELAND
NORWAY
CANADA
Mine
Russia
Northeast Passage
Arctic Bridge (now suspended)
Transarctic (hypothetical)
L
e
n
a
K
o
l
y
m
a
I
e
n
i
s
s
e
i
500 km
Production : Departement of Geographiy, Université Laval, 2018
Mackenzie
Figure 1 Arctic Shipping routes.
opened several ports along the NSR including Dikson,
Tiksi, Mys Shmidta, and Provideniya [3, 6]. From the
first five-year plans (1928–1932), the development along
theNSRwasintegratedintotheArcticregionsdevel-
opment programs: the development of shipping along
the NSR, meant as a tool to tap into Siberian resources,
is largely the result of the centrally planned soviet eco-
nomic system. Moscow promoted the construction of
railways, Siberian ports, and the articulation of sea traffic
along the Siberian coast with river transportation for
the development of the hinterland, along the Ob, Ienis-
sei, Lena, and Kolyma rivers. Resource development,
construction, and operation of the ports also initially
depended on the Gulag administration and the pioneer-
ing fronts developed largely through the contribution
of prison labor. Vorkuta (coal mining), Norilsk (a major
nickel-mining center), Pevek, and Magadan initially
developedasgulagcampsorhubs,setuptoexploit
natural resources.
On the military perspective, the Sevmorput was used
during World War II to transfer military and supplying
ships from the Far East bases to Murmansk to support
convoy escorts on the North Atlantic and as an alternate
supplyroutefromAmericanWestCoastportstoRussia’s
northern ports through the Bering Strait [1, 3, 4, 7].
After World War II ended, the Soviet grew increasingly
appreciative of the value of the NSR for defense strategy
reasons [1]. During the Cold War, multiple radar surveil-
lance stations, missile and naval launch bases, military
aerodromes, and border guard camps were established
along the NSR. Several experimental centers for under-
ground nuclear tests took place: 130 tests between 1955
and 1990, especially in Novaya Zemlya.
e Arctic Soviet economic development policy was
largely based on the centrally planned economic policy
and the government’s will to maximize the development
of Soviet resources, for political reasons: the USSR
should not depend on foreign supply of raw materials
[5]. Traffic gradually increased as ports were set up and
Arctic mines, as in Norilsk, were opened, and peaked
in 1987 at 6.6 million tons (Mt) [4, 8]. e goods sent
to Arctic ports were composed of energy products (oil
products and coal), construction materials, construction
and industrial equipment, foodstuff, transportation, and
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Arctic Shipping and Polar Seaways 3
Tab le 1 Evolution of Northern Sea Route transits, 1991–1997.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Numberofvessels 15 12227 83 2
Tonnage (1000 tons) 210 186 226 10 120 38 30
Source: CHNL Information Office (2013). NSR Transits Before 2011, www.arctis-search.com/NSR%2bTransits%2bbefore%2b2011 (accessed 24
January 2018).
consumer goods for the local population. On return
journeys, the ships transported raw materials [4].
2.1 NSR Decline with the Fall of the USSR
e Sevmorput exploitation remained profitable until
1991, when traffic had, however, fallen to 4Mt. e
economic decline and the suspension of public subsidies
that followed the collapse of the USSR led to a decline
in traffic that reached a post-Soviet low in 1998 with
1.45 Mt [4]. e Arctic regions were struck by profound
economic and demographic recession. With the collapse
of the USSR, the jurisdiction over the NSR passed to
the Russian Federation. Financial and economic dis-
ruption forced an administrative reset: the Ministry of
the Merchant and the Ministry of River Transport were
reorganized as departments under the new Ministry of
Transport, which resulted in budget cuts [3, 6]. Also,
due to the dismantlement of the USSR, Russia’s port
capacity was reduced by 53%, as 11 of 18 ports were
closed, and the national commercial fleet was severely
compressed [3]. Many land equipment was no longer
maintained. e end of the USSR was accompanied by
a demilitarization of the Arctic. On the Kola Peninsula,
the military-industrial complex collapsed, military ship-
yards went down, and a large number of soldiers left the
region. e city of Murmansk, which partly benefited
from its development of the military sector, lost 100 000
inhabitants between 1991 and 1999, down from 450 000
to 345 000.
Before its collapse in 1991, the USSR had tried to
foster international interest for Arctic shipping. In 1987,
according to the policy of openness, the president of
the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev suggested that the NSR
should open for commercial foreign vessels. e official
opening took place on 1 July 1991 [9–11]. However,
largely due to complex formalities, up until 2009, Soviet
(later Russian) ships carried out most transit voyages
along the NSR.1is renewed interest in the NSR led to
the establishment of international research assessments,
such as the “International Northern Sea Route Program”
(INSROP), an initiative of Russian, Norwegian, and
Japanese organizations [1, 3]. Despite the conclusion
of the research underlining the difficult commercial
conditions for shipping at the time, it was a pioneering
comprehensive study focused on the navigation and
commercialization of the NSR. More than 160 reports
were produced in this context between 1993 and 1999
and cover both the prospects for the economic and social
development of the Arctic regions and the environment,
ecosystems, meteorology, navigation, ports, and the
merchant marine [4].
However, the economic crisis that hit Russia after the
collapse of the USSR led to a dramatic decline in traffic
along the NSR, especially transit traffic (Table 1).
2.2 Renewal of Russian Interest in the NSR
Following a decade of economic decline and demography
in the Russian Arctic, the Russian government decided
in 2000 to establish the NSRA [6]. is centralized public
service manages the icebreaker service, the organization
of the prevention and control of accidental spills of gas
and oil, and the operation and maintenance of naviga-
tional aid systems in the NSR. is service also monitors
hydrographic conditions, including port and port basin
access, as well as the use of nuclear energy in maritime
transport, ship support (rescue operations), the dispatch,
and the positioning of the icebreakers fleet. e Adminis-
tration sets the fees for navigation and icebreaker escort.
ese are reviewed annually and determined based on
the nature of the goods transported and deadweight
of the ship [4]. e renewal of the fleet is also a part
of the Maritime Doctrine adopted by President Putin in
2001 [7]. Besides its military and scientific aspects, the
maritime doctrine emphasizes the need for Russia to
possess a merchant marine and efficient maritime trans-
portation sector, with the construction of ice-classed
tankers and strong but costly icebreakers. Russia is the
only country exploiting nuclear icebreakers, under the
administration of Rosatomflot. e conventional ice-
breaker fleet is also aging, and plans for renewal of the
fleet have been discussed for many years in much the
same way as for the nuclear icebreakers. In 2018, Russia
exploited 4 nuclear (plus 3 under construction) and 35
diesel-electric icebreakers (plus 4 under construction).
In 2007, a titanium Russian flag was planted at the North
Pole, which led to widespread concern [12]. Other than
its military and scientific aspects, the maritime doctrine
emphasizes the need for Russia to possess a merchant
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4Atmosphere and Precipitation, Ice and Glaciers, Oceans and Coasts, Water–Soil
marine and efficient maritime transport. While in the
1990s the administration of the NSR was mainly based
on shipowners and the regions, more and more private
actors are emerging, particularly in the mining and oil
& gas sectors, such as Norilsk Nickel, Gazprom, Lukoil,
and Rosneft. [4]. is translates into the development of
dedicated fleets and infrastructure by these actors, like
the Sabetta port opened in 2017 in the Yamal Peninsula.
e modernization of the fleet also corresponds to the
Northern Regions Development policy, designed to
foster the resource-based economic development of the
area that the cash-starved federal government aims to
promote. e federal state thus regained a centralized
control over the Route. e extraction sites are for the
most part almost inaccessible by land, and the new
projects for the Arctic highlight the need to improve
maritime transport. e Sevmorput indeed gives access
to many solid mineral deposits: apatite (90% of Russian
reserves) in the Kola and Taymyr Peninsulas, nickel (85%)
and copper (60%) in Norilsk and the Kola Peninsula, wol-
fram (50%) in the north of Yakutia and Chukotka, as well
as gold and silver deposits. Community servicing also
remains an important service.
In September 2017, the Russian Ministry of Economic
Development introduced the 2025 Arctic Development
Agenda [7, 13]. is strategy envisions a new impetus for
the development of the Russian Arctic region, including
the creation of a new deep-water port at Arkhangelsk; the
expansion of port facilities on the Yamal peninsula; and
the modernization of the ports of Tiksi, Pevek, and
Anadyr in the easternmost part of the Arctic. e 2017
law also reserves coal, oil, and gas cargoes from Russian
waters along the NSR for the Russian-flagged fleet, in
effect setting up a protectionist ban on foreign ships for
this market [7].
3 The Slow Development of Shipping
in the Canadian Arctic
Before the twentieth century, the Canadian Arctic and
the Northwest Passage remained largely unexplored
territory. e first complete passage was the result of
a three-year expedition led by the Norwegian explorer
Roald Amundsen in 1903–1906. Explorations started
quite earlier, however, as the Vikings reached Greenland
and the western coast of Canada before 1000 CE. Beyond
a fascination that still persists today among Westerners,
the region remains hostile for navigation: the ice and
its unpredictability continues to be a major hindrance,
and no climatic models foretell an ice-free winter in the
region in the foreseeable future.
e European fascination for the Northwest Passage
is watermarked by the many expeditions launched there
by the end of the Renaissance. e turning point was
the 1575–1577 expedition led by Martin Frobischer,
which reached Baffin Island and started the modern era
of Arctic shipping [14], with the quest for the fabled
Northwest Passage to circumvent North America on
the way to Asia. ose voyages were dangerous, often
resulting in many fatalities, and the famous ill-fated
Franklin expedition highlights the hazardous nature of
such quests. e exploration departed Britain in 1845
under the command of Captain John Franklin and got
icebound approaching King William Island. All of the 129
crew members perished in that voyage, and the two ships
were only located in 2014 and 2016, triggering much
media attention [15]. Some expeditions were successful
though: Kaynes, Hayes, and Hall are, for instance, the
first ones to go through the channel between Greenland
and Ellesmere Island [16], and in 1831, James Clark Ross
became the first recorded man to reach the magnetic
North Pole [17]. In 1906, Roald Amundsen and his crew
successfully transited the Northwest Passage, while in
1909, Robert Peary claimed he reached the geographic
North Pole.
Beyond those adventurous quests for the North
Pole and the Northwest Passage, another important
development occurred regarding Artic navigation: the
expansion of commercial shipping in the region. e fur
trade, along with whaling activities, and the development
oftheHudsonBayCompanyweresignificantinArctic
shipping up until the beginning of World War I [14].
By mid-nineteenth century, shore stations started to
develop along the coast beginning in Eastern Arctic,
allowing the development of a lucrative business based
on whaling [18]. e fur exploitation was, however, the
most important activity, and the Hudson Bay Com-
pany had an almost monopoly over the trade from its
establishment [19]. As of the 1920s, cargo shipping
was present in the Canadian Arctic, albeit with limited
numbers, for community supply, the development of
natural resources projects, and for grain export after the
construction of the port of Churchill in Hudson’s Bay in
1931. is shows again that Arctic shipping rested for a
good measure on the State initiative with the construc-
tion of the port of Churchill, but to a much more modest
extent than in the USSR at the same time. Because in the
Canadian Arctic the government was much less involved
than in the Soviet Arctic, the region has for long (and still
does) witnessed much smaller levels of shipping activity.
It is important to underline that the fascination for
the Arctic and the transit route across the Northwest
Passage was shared by few people. e Great North was
largely ignored by the general population and politics:
when the United States bought Alaska to Russia in 1867,
it was done in general indifference [20], and many expe-
ditions were actually sent reluctantly by governments to
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Arctic Shipping and Polar Seaways 5
serve sovereignty purposes: only minimal activity was
deployed because the region remained a hostile one with
relatively limited economic potential [14].
3.1 Canada Uneasy About a Strong American
Military Presence
By the time World War I sparked, navigation in the
Northwest Passage was still very limited. Whaling and
the fur trade declined; commercial shipping to resup-
ply northern communities remained, yet only during
summer time with short navigable seasons. During the
two conflicts, the North American Arctic was clearly a
peripheral zone, but it gained in significance during the
Cold War. With the forward development strategy of the
Marine forces of the United States, aiming at protecting
the North Atlantic, the Arctic became a major strategic
region in the USA/USSR opposition [21]. e Cold War
was significant regarding the North American Arctic
because it witnessed a strong, yet uneasy cooperation
between the USA and Canada in the region. In 1954,
the two countries signed an agreement planning defense
infrastructure on the territory with two radar lines to
protect the region against a soviet attack. It was the first
time that the United States actually recognized Canadian
sovereignty on the Far North islands [22, 23]. Navigation
was then largely military. is cooperation raised many
questions about navigation in Arctic waters and their
status, a debate that still persists today as Canada felt the
American military presence in the Arctic would threaten
its nascent claim to the Arctic waters.
3.2 Commercial Navigation in the North American
Arctic: Also Fueled by Natural Resources
Government and military navigation in the Arctic
remained fairly stable throughout the twentieth century.
e evolution of commercial navigation proved less
stable on the other hand. It is only in 1974 that the
Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services was instated:
from this moment forward, annual data is available
regarding navigation in the Arctic. It shows that even
with climate change and the slow opening up of the
passage, navigation remains quite limited. Figures show
a stable traffic level between 1980 (112 voyages) and
2003 (131 voyages), with a low of 89 in 1987 [16].
Natural resources exploitation did generate some traf-
fic, with oil on Cameron Island (1985–1997) and the
zinc–lead–silver mine at Nanisivik (1976–2002). Both
these ventures closed down when natural resources
collapsed at the end of the twentieth century.
From 2004, the increase in traffic is steadier, but
in spite of a media discourse announcing the open-
ing up of a polar seaway catalyzed by climate change,
navigation remains actually limited, with very few com-
panies operating in the region [24] (see the following
discussion).
Service to the Nordic communities and export of
natural undermentioned resources are the main growth
engines for navigation in the North American Arc-
tic, just like with the Russian/Soviet Arctic. Several
factors contributed to the slow development of commer-
cial shipping, beginning with the potential for natural
resources. e melting of sea ice has indeed opened
up the possibility of easier natural resources extraction.
Exploitation remains very costly though, because of
remoteness, lack of infrastructure, and a climate that
remains harsh, in spite of climate change [25]: sea ice
extent remains very variable and unpredictable from
year to year. In the mid-1950s, exploration programs
such as Operation Franklin, Eureka, or Admiralty were
undertaken to assess the geological indicators for min-
erals, oil, and gas resources [14], and the first actual
well drilled in the Arctic was Dome Winter Harbor on
Melville Island, in 1961–1962. e high potential for
oil in Alaska was discovered only a little while later
in 1968, but the economic rationale for the pipeline
was much stronger than for Arctic shipping, and thus
Alaskan oil is shipped overland to ice-free anchorage.
If the economic potential is definitely present, however,
technical difficulties remain and even if exploration and
exploitation activities are still going on, many significant
projects were discarded due to the lack of infrastructure
and the difficulties associated with Arctic exploration
and navigation. Oil and gas are the most mentioned
resourceswhenitcomestotheArctic,butthereisalso
a significant potential for mining activities. Natural
resources extraction is presently likely to remain the
growth engine for navigation in the region as there are
no competing modes of transportation [24].
4 Sovereignty Issues: The Status
of Strait Waters
In 1969 and 1970, the oil tanker Manhattan transited
the Northwest Passage, escorted by American and Cana-
dian icebreakers, sparking an important public debate
about Canadian actual sovereignty in the Arctic as the
tanker had not consulted with Canada before entering
into the passage [26]. e 1954 agreement between the
two countries foresaw that US ships had to wait for
a formal authorization to enter those waters, but the
United States claimed that those authorizations were
only required regarding military ships dealing with
the defense infrastructures related to the agreement
[16]. e official discourse in Ottawa was that Arctic
waters in the Northwest Passage were Canadian inner
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6Atmosphere and Precipitation, Ice and Glaciers, Oceans and Coasts, Water–Soil
seas, but before the Manhattan crossed it, this position
never had to be publicly put forward [27]. e Canadian
response was the Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act
of 1970, essential preamble of the article 234 of the UN
convention of the Law of the Sea [28]. It had become
clear that Arctic waters and the potential for navigation
were going to be a key issue for Canada and the United
States regarding their Arctic Strategy. In 1988, the Arctic
cooperation agreement signed between Canada and the
United States about American icebreakers navigating in
the passage stated that all movements in waters claimed
by Canada would be undertaken with Canadian consent:
the United States would give notice but not have to ask
for permission, and Canada would be considered to have
consented. e agreement also stated clearly that this
cooperation did not affect the official position of either
state regarding the legal status of the passage [16].
For Canada as for Russia, sovereignty over the North-
west Passage and the Northeast Passage rests on the
status of internal waters. Under the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), internal
waters constitute a maritime area in which the coastal
state has full sovereignty, including the right to suspend
foreign navigation. Canada and Russia estimate that
their title over their respective straights comes from
a historic title. In 1986, Canada clarified this claim by
enacting the baselines that enclose the Arctic Islands and
delimit the inland waters below. e then Soviet Union
had adopted a very similar position in 1984 with regard
to the Northeast Passage, a route that runs along the
Siberian coast and takes several straits between it and
the offshore archipelagos.
Canada and Russia formally declared that it is not their
intention to prohibit international navigation in their
claimed internal waters; rather, they reserve the right
to regulate navigation to protect the Arctic environ-
ment – the effects of an oil spill on the Arctic ecosystem
wouldbedevastating–evenifthatreasonisalsoan
instrument of political assertion. is position was reaf-
firmed by Canada in 2010, with the promulgation of the
mandatory ship reporting to the Northern Canada Vessel
Traffic Services Zone (NORDREG) control system. In
Russia, navigation by foreign vessels is actively promoted
for commercial reasons. Ships must also obtain clearance
from the NSRA before entering its waters and must pay a
navigation fee for the services provided, whereas Canada
up to now (2018) does not levy any fee – but offers far
less services. e European Union and the United States,
on the other hand, believe that the Arctic passages are
international straits according to UNCLOS, and that as
such all ships in transit can navigate freely without any
regulatory constraint (article 38).
In fact, the dispute with the European Union and the
United States seems essentially to be the conclusion of a
disagreement, no party seeking to make it a major politi-
cal battleground. A US State Department document even
acknowledges that US commercial vessels are subject to
Canadian regulations: for Washington, it is primarily the
freedom of transit for military vessels that is at stake, and
the fear of the previous one [29].
It is mostly Canada that worries – or pretends to
worry, for domestic politics purposes? – about a possible
stronger protest against its claim, while Washington is
content to reiterate its position following each Canadian
government declaration. e United States and the
European Union will not recognize the Canadian nor the
Russian claim, but will not challenge it either, especially
the European States. It is because of its desire to defend a
sovereignty claim opposed by the United States and the
European Union that Canada displays a determination
that contrasts with a lack of civilian and military means
in the region.
5 Recent Shipping Activity in the Arctic:
Transit Remains Elusive
A total of 11 066 ships were detected in the Arctic (north
of the Arctic Circle) in 2014, the majority being supply,
research, and survey vessels, and then fishing vessels
(1960), cargo ships (1892), tanker (524), and passenger
(308) vessels. Most of these ships were concentrated in
the Arctic reaches of the North Atlantic, especially in
the North and Barents Seas. With such a large geograph-
ical definition, Arctic shipping represented 9.3% of the
world’s shipping traffic in movements [30].
Fishing vessels represent the most numerous single
category. ey are concentrated, however, in the Barents
Sea, in the waters off Iceland, off southern Greenland,
and in the Bering Sea: there is no commercial fishery
in the Central Arctic Ocean, and a 16-year ban that has
been agreed upon in December 2017 will prevent the
development of such fisheries despite the melting of sea
ice [31].
Arctic shipping is thus not new. However, after the
aftermaths of climate change were beginning to become
apparent for the media with sea ice melting, debate
about its scope and possible development took the front
of the scene. Indeed, paralleling the movement of the
retreat of sea ice, it rapidly took off in several regions
where it previously was constrained by ice. For instance,
in Greenland, cruise tourism expanded fast since 1994,
especially since 2003 with the number of port calls going
from 164 in 2003 to 375 in 2008 [32]. e Norwegian port
of Hammerfest is witnessing a significant traffic fueled
by the gas exploitation in the Barents Sea. e number
of voyages in the Canadian archipelago, all types of ships
together, went from 121 in 2005 to 416 in 2017 [33].
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Arctic Shipping and Polar Seaways 7
However, directly linking the expansion of traffic to
the reduction of sea ice would be an oversimplification.
Pizzolato et al. [34] underlined the fact, in their statistical
analysis of shipping traffic in the Canadian archipelago,
that macroeconomic and business factors, rather than
sea ice conditions, may be driving the observed increases
in shipping traffic in the Canadian Arctic, with the melt-
ing of sea ice acting as an enabler rather than a driver.
Contrasting images can be drawn from the observation
of traffic along the two major sea lanes of the Arctic.
5.1 The Northwest Passage
As for transit traffic along the Northwest Passage, it
remains very modest and mainly fueled by tourism and
pleasure crafts (see Table 2). As for destinational traffic,
i.e. ships going to the Canadian Arctic to either load,
unload, or perform an economic activity there, it is
apparent that this segment is experimenting a significant
growth, fueled by fishing but also commercial cargo
traffic: this market is driven by the servicing of local
communities, natural resources exploitation, and the
Arctic Bridge traffic up until 2016, the year the port of
Churchill was closed down by its owner, OmniTRAX
(Table 3).
e figures underline several facts:
•Traffic is indeed increasing in the Canadian Arctic,
with 416 voyages to the Arctic region in 2017, com-
pared to 121 voyages in 2005: over that period, it was
multiplied by 3, 4.
•Commercial cargo ships represented 188 voyages
(45.2%) of these voyages in 2017, against 121 (53.7%)
in 2005. e expansion of their traffic does not appear
very affected by the closing down of the port of
Churchill and the end of the Arctic Bridge.
•Even though the general trend may be toward the
expansion of traffic, some submarkets may stagnate
or contract. For instance, the Arctic bridge never
really took off as traffic declined after 2010 without
OmniTRAX being able to develop alternate markets.
e 2012 closure of the Canadian Wheat Board was
not good for the economic fortunes of Churchill or
the Hudson Bay Railroad since it provided the vast
majority of the port’s traffic through grain exports.
Traffic thus went from 650 000 tons of grain in 2010 to
190 000 in 2015 and then zero in 2016 when the port
was shut down. Shipping companies Desgagnés and
Royal Arctic Lines had tried to develop a regular ser-
vice between Churchill and Nuuk, but the profitability
never materialized as the project coincided with the
economic downturn of 2008 [35].
•Fishing vessel experimented a fast expansion, from 20
voyages in 2005 (16.5%) to 138 (33.2%) in 2017.
•Pleasure crafts and adventurers also increased their
presence in Canadian Arctic waters, from 10 ships
(8.3%) in 2005 to 32 (7.8%) in 2017.
•ese figures attest to a growing destinational traffic.
Transits remain scarce: they peaked at 31 in 2012.
•Pleasure crafts or adventurers conduct most of these
transits. In 2012, they were responsible for 23 (74.2%)
Tab le 2 Number of voyages in the Canadian Arctic.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Ships in the Canadian Arctic (no. of voyages) 121 135 181 209 185 257 317 314 349 301 315 347 416
of which:
Fishing vessels (number of voyages) 20 26 39 52 44 78 136 114 137 119 129 131 138
Cargo ships or barges (number of voyages) 65 67 101 105 100 124 126 124 127 108 120 147 188
of which:
General cargo 16 17 28 30 23 34 38 32 35 32 34 36 50
Tanker 17 16 24 29 23 28 30 31 28 25 27 23 24
Bulk 21 17 27 25 27 27 23 26 27 33 36 53 72
Tugs and Barges 11 17 22 21 27 35 33 35 36 18 23 35 42
Pleasure crafts and adventurers 10 6 9 7 13 13 15 27 32 30 23 22 32
Cruise/passengervessels 12151720111811101711182019
Government vessels (Navy, Coast Guard) 9 9 9 10 10 13 20 16 17 23 16 20 22
Icebreakers 222
Research vessels 6 12 9 12 7 11 11 23 20 10 9 6 13
Others 114
Source: N, figures compiled by author from data compiled by Nordreg Iqaluit.
Traffic north of 60∘N.
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8Atmosphere and Precipitation, Ice and Glaciers, Oceans and Coasts, Water–Soil
Tab le 3 Transits of the Northwest Passage.
Year Canadian government
ships
General
cargo
Tankers Bulk
carriers
Passenger Tugs Pleasure crafts
and adventurers
Research
vessels
Foreign
government
Others Total
2017 2 1 1 0 3 0 21 1 0 2 32
2016 3 1 0 0 3 0 15 0 0 1 23
2015 4 0 0 0 2 0 19 0 0 2 27
2014 4 0 0 1 2 0 10 0 0 0 17
2013 2 0 0 1 4 0 13 2 0 0 22
2012 2 0 1 0 2 2 23 1 0 0 31
2011 4 0 1 0 1 0 15 0 0 0 21
2010 4 0 0 0 3 2 11 0 0 0 20
2009 3 0 0 0 2 2 10 0 0 0 17
2008 3 0 0 0 1 0 7 1 0 1 13
2007 3 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 9
2006 4 0 0 0 2 2 3 0 0 2 13
2005 4 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 2 11
2004 3 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 6
2003 3 0 0 0 2 6 2 0 1 0 14
2002 4 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 12
2001 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 6
2000 1 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 6
Source: N Iqaluit.
e Canada Shipping Act, 2001, defines a pleasure craft as a “vessel that is used for pleasure and does not carry passengers”. Ministry of Justice.
Canada Shipping Act, 2001. (S.c. 2001, c.26). http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-10.15/. Adventurers are pleasure crafts not reportingto
N.
of the transits; 13 (59%) in 2013; 10 (58.8%) in 2014; 19
(70.4%) in 2015; 15 (65.2%) in 2016; and 21 (65.6%) in
2017.
•Canadian government ships come second in terms of
transit traffic with between 1 and 4 ships per year, and
then passenger vessels, between 1 and 4 transits per
year too.
•Commercial cargo vessels, including general cargo,
bulk, and tankers, account for a very small share of
transit traffic: for most of the period, their traffic is
nil; then one ship between 2011 and 2016, but none in
2015, and then two vessels in 2017. e media placed
much emphasis in 2013 on the bulk carrier Nordic
Orion transiting the NWP between Vancouver and
Finland, but subsequent years proved the route to
remain poorly attractive for commercial cargo transit
shipping [36].
It thus appears that if Canadian Arctic waters are
definitely busier, this increasing traffic is largely fueled
by ships that go to the Arctic to perform their eco-
nomic objective (destinational traffic), whereas transit
traffic remains tiny. Moreover, most of this transit
traffic is fueled by pleasure boats. e commercial
cargo component for now remains very limited, despite
significant improvement in naval architecture that make
ice-class ships more affordable, although still more
expensive than ordinary vessels. Destinational traf-
fic is experiencing a real, if not steady, growth. is
traffic is fueled by the expansion of traffic from the
exploitation of natural resources and by the servicing
of local communities. Bulk traffic thus benefited from
the exploitation of Arctic or subarctic mines such as
Voisey’s Bay (Labrador), Raglan (Quebec), and Mary
River (Baffin Island, Nunavut); this traffic largely made
up for the drying up of traffic to and from Churchill after
its closing down in 2016. For instance, Baffinland Iron
Mines shipped 4.1 Mt of ore from its mine in Mary River
through its port of Milne Inlet in 2017. e company,
Baffinland Iron Mines, eventually intends to reach the
volume of 12 Mt annually. e first shipment took place
in 2015 [37], and traffic that year reached 920 000 tons.
As for community servicing, cargo companies such as
Desgagnés, Nunavut Sealink and Supply Inc (NSSI), and
Nunavut Eastern Arctic Shipping Inc (NEAS) could take
advantage of the receding ice to tap into a real demand
for cheaper consumer goods. e shipping season now
extends over five months instead of 4; NEAS could set
up 16 voyages instead of 12 in 2017 [37].
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Arctic Shipping and Polar Seaways 9
5.2 The Northern Sea Route
Itisintheframeofclimatechangenarratives,theatten-
tion paid by a few shipping companies, and the Russian
desire to promote traffic through reformed administra-
tive frameworks and tariffs [38, 39] that traffic picked up
after 2009 (see Table 4).
Figures show that transit traffic began picking up in
2010 to expand rapidly to 71 in 2013, only to drop sharply
afterward to 18 in 2015 and 19 in 2016. is decline,
and later stagnation at low levels, in transit traffic along
the NSR, is clearly out of step with the media forecasts
announcing the advent of heavy traffic along Arctic
routes. It is due to several factors [40, 41]:
e decline in oil and fuel prices makes the search
forpossiblereductionsintransitcostslessattractivefor
shipping companies.
•e decline in commodity prices makes Arctic
resources less attractive, both for exploitation and
for initial investment for transport with specialized
vessels.
•e continuing decline in both bulk and container
freight rates, which discourages shipping companies
facing overcapacity from investing in new icebound
vessels.
•e reorientation of certain export routes for raw
materials, including natural gas with the opening of
the Russian terminal at Ust-Luga on the Baltic Sea,
carrying volumes previously shipped via Vitino in the
White Sea [42].
•e priority deployment of Russian icebreakers to
infrastructure projects, notably the Sabetta port
linked to the gas project on the Yamal Peninsula: the
lower availability of buildings has dissuaded some
carriers from hiring their vessels for lack of guarantee
escort.
•A tariff schedule for the services of the NSR, some-
times considered opaque by the maritime carriers.
Here again, it appears economic factors, some of them
having nothing to do with the Arctic like world commod-
ity prices or freight rates, have much more impact of the
development of Arctic shipping than the mere melting
of sea ice that continued unabated during the period of
transit decline.
As for Canada, a detailed review of transit traffic
compared to destinational traffic underlines that the
two categories of activity are not evolving on par. e
NSR appears attractive given the high number of appli-
cations for transit (see Table 5), with figures oscillating
between 661 and 730. It seems either the NSR Admin-
istration is less demanding or that shipping companies
have adapted to regulations, as the number of refusals
dropped from 83 in 2013 to 2 in 2017. Interestingly, most
applications were made for Russian-flagged vessels, as
Tab le 4 Number of official transits, Northern Sea Route, 2010–2017.
Ship type 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Icebreaker 232212
Governmentship 101131
Cruiseorpassengership 1101311
Tug,supplyvessel 11 4451144
Commercialship 1 2 5 6 313864241511
Researchship 220200
Total official transit 2 3 5 13 41 46 71 31 18 19 27
Source: CHNL Information Office, Transit Statistics, www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_transits, and NSR transits before 2011, www.arctis-search.com/
NSR+Transits+before+2011&structure=Arctic+Sea+Routes (accessed 26 January 2018).
Tentative figure for 2017.
Tab le 5 Number of transit permit application for navigation in the NSR, 2013–2017.
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Permit applications 718 661 730 721 664
Refusals 83 30 15 3 2
Permit application, foreign-flagged vessels 141 124 130 142 108
Source: Northern Sea Route Administration, List of Applications, www.nsra.ru/en/rassmotrenie_zayavleniy/perechen_zayavlenii.html (accessed
22 January 2018).
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10 Atmosphere and Precipitation, Ice and Glaciers, Oceans and Coasts, Water–Soil
Tab le 6 Traffic along the NSR, total and transit, in metric tons, 2010–2017.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
NSR, transit tonnage (metric tons) 111 000 820 789 1 261 545 1 176 454 274 103 39 586 214 513 194 364
NSR, total tonnage (metric tons) 2 085 000 3 225 000 3 750 000 3 914 000 3 982 000 5 432 000 6 060 000 9 737 000
Source: CHNL Information Office, Transit Statistics, www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_transits (accessed 26 January 2018); Staalesen [44].
the number of applications for foreign-flagged vessels
range between 142 and 108. e trend toward an even
greater dominance of Russian shipping companies is
likely to be fostered following the Russian Parliament
(Duma) recent decision to ban foreign-flagged vessels
from the transportation of oil, gas, and coal along the
NSR, except if operations are already under way [43], a
move reportedly designed to boost Russia’s shipbuilding
industry so as to tap into an expanding market, but that
couldrepresentariskybet.
Tonnage traffic figures confirm that destinational ship-
ping is developing fast, while transit stagnates at low lev-
els. Transit tonnage peaked at 1176 Mt in 2013, and then
collapsed in 2014 to 274 103 tons and 39 586 tons in 2015,
only to recover to 194 364 tons in 2017 (Table 6).
However, total tonnage in the NSR increased from
2.09 Mt in 2010 to 6.06 Mt in 2016 and then 9.74 Mt in
2017 according to the Russian Federal Agency for Mar-
itime and River Transport, the biggest annual volume
ever thus surpassing the previous record of 6.6 Mt set
in 1987. In particular, traffic seems to have exploded in
2017. Figures from the Association of Russian Sea Ports
show that the Russian Arctic seaports in 2017 handled
a total of 74.2 Mt, an increase of 49.1% compared with
2016. e growth is rooted in a significant hike in Rus-
sian Arctic shipments [45]. According to data from the
Seaport Association, Murmansk accounted for almost
two-thirds of all the total port turnover. e harbor
masters in the Arctic city last year saw a total of 51.7 Mt
of goods being shipped through the port, an increase
of 54.5% over 2016. e growth comes as several major
Arctic industrial projects related to the exploitation of
natural resources are in the making. Among them are
the Yamal LNG and the projected Arctic LNG 2, both of
them with major effects on regional shipping. Also, oil
shipments from new projects such as the Novy Port, as
well as the terminal at Varandey, are leading to higher
volumes.
e Varandey terminal in 2017 handled 8.2 Mt of oil,
an increase of 3.4% year-on-year. Of the volumes handled
in Murmansk, as much as 29 Mt were oil products, while
the volumes of minerals and ores traditionally handled
by the port remain stable. Forecasts expect volumes to
continue to grow over the next years, possibly to more
than 70 Mt after 2020. Sabetta, the new port on the Yamal
Peninsula, recorded a huge growth in 2017. According to
the Federal Agency for Maritime and River Transport, as
much as 7.99 Mt of goods were handled at Sabetta, up
from 2.85 Mt in 2016 [45].
6 Conclusion
us, in Canada as well as in Russian Siberia, it is largely
destinational traffic that dominates a very real expansion
of Arctic shipping: ships come to the Arctic to perform
an economic activity, rather than just transiting. Along
the NSR, the number of transits and trade volume both
increased from 2011 to 2013 and declined in 2014 and
2015, slightly recovering in 2017, indicating an unstable
and vulnerable shipping environment up to now [46]. e
NSR seems to be more appealing to liquid, bulk, and gen-
eral cargo transportation, while container shipping com-
panies have not carried out any voyage – this may change
as Maersk announced it would carry out an experimen-
tal trip.2Currently, most activities are still domestic and
destinational in nature. is expansion of destinational
traffic is partly sustained by the expansion of community
resupply in Canada, but in both countries, all the more so
in Russia, it is the construction of infrastructure and the
development of natural resources exploitation that fuel
the present strong growth.
Similarly, traffic is dominated in Siberia by Russian
shipping companies, and by Canadian companies in the
Canadian Arctic, for natural resources transportation as
well as for the community resupply market. Canadian
shipping companies in particular have adapted to the
poor infrastructure of the Canadian Arctic villages and
to the numerous barriers of entry to this niche market
[47]. If natural resources exploitation picks up in Canada,
it could prove more attractive for foreign corporations.
isisinlinewiththepastRussiandeclarationstothe
effect they did not expect transit traffic along the NSR to
develop to large volumes [48], and with the past analyses
of shipping companies’ strategies. ese showed that
cost per transit may prove to be lower, depending on
the origin/destination couple, but that this factor is
not paramount in the decision to develop shipping in
the Arctic: this business decision rather rests on the
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Arctic Shipping and Polar Seaways 11
perceived strategic opportunity perceived by shipping
companies.
e melting of sea ice may act as an enabler, but it is
not in itself sufficient to trigger the development of mas-
sive traffic along Arctic seaways, nor of single-voyage
cost-effectiveness: it does not drive the expansion of
Arctic shipping since its evolution is contrasted between
regions and between market segments, except for a few
market niches like community resupply in Canada where
demand is consequent. Shipping companies display
a very limited interest for transit traffic but are more
interested for the natural resources market. ey stress
that entering the Arctic market is a strategic diversifica-
tion move that implies much broader considerations. It
continues to be seen as a risky choice, both operationally
and commercially, and implies business strategy choices,
which involve the global picture of the positioning of the
company in its regional or global market.
Endnotes
1In 1997, the Finnish tanker Uikku traveled the
commercial route from northern Murmansk to Pevek
before exiting through the Bering Strait. It took up fuel
and made the journey in the opposite direction to
Murmansk. e Russian authorities state that a Latvian
tanker also made a full transit in 1997.
2Maersk announced it considers conducting test trips for
transits along the NSR with a 3000 TEU container
carrier in September 2018. “NSRA met with the
representatives of Maersk company”, NSR
Administration, November 9, 2017, www.nsra.ru/en/
glavnaya/novosti/n14.html (accessed 11 January 2018).
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“keywords/abstract
Dear Author,
Keywords and abstracts will normally not be included in the print version of your chapter but only in the online
version (if not decided differently by PPL Design).
ank you!”
Abstract
Climate change in the Arctic triggered a series of discourses about the opening up of a previously unreachable region.
Navigation remains, however, difficult in the Arctic, transits are still very limited, as sea ice is still a major constraint.
How did the development policies of both the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route unfold? What are the
recent trends in Arctic shipping?
Keywords
Arctic; shipping; Northern Sea Route; Northwest Passage; sea ice
