Content uploaded by Zlatko Vujovic
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Zlatko Vujovic on Jan 31, 2020
Content may be subject to copyright.
COMPARATIVE
BALKAN
politics
Volume 1, Issue 1, ________ 2015 ISSN:_____-______
CENTAR ZA MONITORING I ISTRAŽIVANJE
Vol. 2, No. 1, 2016
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
Volume 2, Issue 1
International Advisory Board
Michael Marsh (Trinity College Dublin, Ireland), Georg Lutz (University of Lausanne, Switzerland), Asa von
Schoultz (Åbo Akademi University, Finland), Ioannis Andreadis (Aristotle University, Greece), Vladimir Goati
(Trasparency International - Serbia, Serbia), Suad Arnautović (University of Sarajevo, Bosna and Herzegovina)
Editorial Board
Zoran Stojiljković (University of Belgrade, Serbia)
Srđan Darmanović (University of Montenegro, Montenegro)
Nermina Mujagić (University of Sarajevo, Bosna and Herzegovina)
Dušan Spasojević (University of Belgrade, Serbia)
Editor-in-Chief
Milan Jovanović (University of Belgrade, Serbia)
Deputy Editor-in-Chief
Damir Kapidžić (University of Sarajevo, Bosna and Herzegovina)
Zlatko Vujović (University of Montenegro, Montenegro)
Editorial Secretary
Nikoleta Tomović (University of Donja Gorica, Montenegro)
Publisher:
Centar za monitoring i istraživanje CeMI
(Center for Monitoring and Research CeMI)
Bul. Josipa Broza 23a
81000 Podgorica, Montenegro
e-mail: cemi@t-com.me
www.cemi.org.me
www.balkanelectoralstudies.org
DISCLAIMER:
This issue is supported by the Regional Research Promotion Programme – Western Balkans (RRPP).
The RRPP promotes social science research in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia). Social science research aids in the understanding of the specic reform
needs of countries in the region and in identifying the long-term implications of policy choices. Researchers
receive support through research grants, methodological and thematic trainings as well as opportunities
for regional and international networking and mentoring. The RRPP is coordinated and operated by the
Interfaculty Institute for Central and Eastern Europe (IICEE) at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). The
programme is fully funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Federal Depart-
ment of Foreign Aairs.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent opinions
of the SDC and the University of Fribourg.
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
Vol. 2, No. 1
February 2016
Table of Contents
Editor’s Note ..............................................................................................................................3
1. Petar Marković
The Achilles Heel of Democracies in Southeast Europe: Responsiveness
Trapped Between Clientelism and the EU ............................................................5
2. Nermina Mujagić, Sarina Bakić
Political Parties as Generators of Social and Ethnic Conicts in Bosnia
and Herzegovina ............................................................................................................31
3. Zlatko Vujović, Nikoleta Tomović
Perspectives for Development of Intra-Party Democracy
in Montenegro ............................................................................................................... 41
4. Jelena Đurišić
Criminal Law Protection of Electoral Rights in Criminal legislation
of Montenegro .............................................................................................................. 65
3
EDITOR’S NOTE
Politics in the Balkans has been researched with increasing
interest over the past few decades. The Balkans’ tumul-
tuous past, marked by conict, transition and democracy
consolidation issues, ethnic, religious and language diver-
sity, geostrategic position, globalisation and European
integration processes clashing with national identities and
political culture, to a large extent determine the behaviour
of political participants and the political events not only in
this part of Europe, but also globally. This is why the whole
world has taken an interest in the political processes of
the Balkans. A lack of comprehensive academic studies
and systematic research into the political processes has,
along with existing prejudices, often given international
audiences incomplete, interest-stigmatised and biased
ideas about the Balkans. All this makes the Balkans of additional interest for research,
which has, however, mainly restricted itself to the national scope. Comparative anal-
yses, more thorough studies of politics in a number of this region’s countries and
eorts to describe the political processes, participants and institutions in a more
comprehensive and scientic manner are rare, if not completely lacking. Broader
insight into the events, key political inclinations and perspectives in the Balkans is
further hindered by a lack of communication between researchers and the small
number of journals and comparative projects dealing with longitudinal research
into politics in this part of Southeast Europe. These are the main reasons which
prompted us to set up a journal which would analyse the political phenomena in
the Balkan states from a comparative perspective.
This journal, the rst issue of which we are presenting to the academic community and
general public, is one of the results of the Comparative Electoral Study: The Impact
of Personal Vote on Internal Party Democracy research project, implemented within
the “Regional Research Promotion Programme” (RRPP), with the nancial support
of the Swiss Agency for Development and Coordination (SDC), and administered
by the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. The content of this rst issue has been
inspired by the experiences gained from carrying out this project. Elections are the
most crucial political process in all societies and the greatest mass form of political
participation. Even after almost three decades of re-democratisation, elections are
still a point of division and conict in the Balkan states. The debate on electoral
institutions as a means of strengthening democratisation continues with varied
intensity throughout the Balkan states. Election results shape national policies and
determine relations within the entire region. It is for these reasons that we have
devoted the rst issue to electoral campaigns.
Milan Jovanovic,
Editor-in-Chief and
Professor at the
University of Belgrade
Before the readers is the second issue of the scientic
journal “COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS” that discusses
phenomena of democracy, parliamentarism, elections,
electoral systems and political parties, respectively and
political institutions in political systems of young democ-
racies in the region of the Balkans, generally. We conrm
our intention to convert this project into a platform for ex-
changing researchers’ views on problems which the states
and societies in the Balkans in the process of democracy
consolidation are facing, along with all the problems that
the beginning of a scientic publication entails.
The above mentioned themes are precisely the contents
of this issue. The rst article analyzes the democracy
consolidation process in three Balkan states – candidates for EU membership– in
the context of internal and external factors. It shows how the anchoring of democ-
racy in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro hovers between clientelism and the EU
incentive, indicating some possible directions for reducing weaknesses that slow
down the process of consolidating democratic institutions. The second article is
dedicated to the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina as causes and prisoners of
ethnic divisions. Fighting for the votes, the parties are positioning themselves as
protectors of ethnic interests, which the authors consider as an obstacle to mod-
ernization and building of democratic institutions. The third article is dedicated to
the neglected area of internal party democracy in the case of the Montenegrin party
system. Results of the research show that parties in Montenegro do not have any
built in mechanisms of internal party democracy, which reduces their capacities to
build democracy in a political system - and the Montenegrin society specically. The
respect of the electoral rule is often put in doubt. In young democracies it is one of
the basic divisions. The forth article that shows protection of the electoral rule in
the electoral system of Montenegro is precisely dedicated to that. The subject of
analysis of this article is the fragmentation of legal norms, focusing on important
moments of processes in candidacy, voting, determining results, funding electoral
campaigns and the role of media in elections in the electoral law of Montenegro.
The presented papers reect the editors’ intentions in shaping this journal – chal-
lenges and dilemmas of democracy in the Balkan states in a comparative dimension.
We believe that studies that were published in this issue will nd their readers not
only in the academic society and the interested community, but will also encourage
researchers to present their works to the public through “COMPARATIVE BALKAN
POLITICS”.
Comparative Balkan Politics is devised as an expert scientic panel discussing all
the relevant aspects of the organisation and functioning of the authorities, the (re)
design of political institutions, the political institutions themselves, political parties,
the non-government sector, public politics, geostrategic movements, international
relations, security structure and European integration processes, focusing on the
Balkan region. We are open to all researchers from universities, institutes and other
institutions in the eld of scientic research of the various aspects of political science,
law, sociology and related disciplines.
Every beginning is a challenging one, and there is no guarantee of success. We
will attempt to avoid the fate of so many journals that faded out after the initial
enthusiasm. To achieve this, we will need the support and involvement of all those
who see this project’s signicance for the academic community and general public
in the Balkans. The more substantial the support is, the greater the odds are of
Comparative Balkan Politics establishing itself as a relevant media publication. We
are convinced that it will prove itself worthy of such support, and we invite all inter-
ested individuals and institutions to cooperate with us and oer their suggestions,
remarks and contributions.
The Achilles Heel of
Democracies in Southeast
Europe: Responsiveness
Trapped Between
Clientelism and the EU
Author: PETAR MARKOVIĆ
PhD fellow, GEM PhD School, Erasmus Mundus
Joint Doctorate
Université libre de Bruxelles & Libera Universita
degli Studi Sociali LUISS
Teaching Assistant, Humanistic Studies,
University of Donja Gorica
E-mail: petar.markovic@erasmusmundus-gem.eu
Address: Via Luca Marenzio 8/32, 00199 Rome, Italy
Tel: +32497334648(BE)
+39 392 006 0265 (IT)
+38267691636(MNE)
7
The Achilles Heel of Democracies in
Southeast Europe: Responsiveness
Trapped Between Clientelism and the EU
Summary
The process of democratic consolidation in the Western Balkans is a thorny subject both
in practice and in academia. An apparent stalemate and the constrained development of
democracies in the former Yugoslav countries in particular seem to stem from a particular
conjunction of internal factors that pertain to the relationship between citizens and the gov-
erning political parties and external factors pertaining to the relationship between the EU as
the key promoter of democracy in the region and the domestic elites. This article attempts
to examine the state of democracy in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia as the only EU
candidate countries in the former Yugoslavia. Particular attention is paid to the specicities
of domestic and external ‘democratic anchoring’ in these countries as well as the democratic
quality of responsiveness. Following the elaboration of the research puzzle in the introduc-
tion, Section II of the article briey presents the framework of democratic consolidation and
outlines how it might be used to analyse the selected cases. The analysis of the domestic
demаocratic anchoring focuses on a particular anchor the political elites in the region use
to create intermediary structures that bond the voters to the political system – clientelism.
External democratic anchoring revolves around the promotion of democracy by the EU as
an external anchor of these three democracies. In Section III, the two anchoring mechanisms
are assessed in the light of the data pertaining to responsiveness and the most recent EC
Country Reports. The conclusion section summarises the ndings of the article, indicating
the lessons learned, as well as the constraints on and opportunities available to Western
Balkan democracies in the future.
Keywords: democratic consolidation, democratic anchoring, clientelism, European Union,
responsiveness, accountability
8
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
Introduction
There is no doubt that in the literature, as well as among practitioners, the path
towards democratisation in the Western Balkans has been a thorny one.1 The prog-
ress of the countries in this region from the breakdown of communist regimes to
the elusive moving target of a fully-edged liberal democracy has been beset with
setbacks, gridlocks and ups and downs, such as civil wars, territorial disputes and
authoritarian resurgences. Hence the question of the success of eorts towards
democratisation, and the lack thereof, is a pertinent one – not least because com-
parative data shows that there are no guarantees of a ‘happy ending’. It is now
clear that the majority of ‘third-wave’ countries have not become well-functioning
democracies.2 A quarter of a century after the process was unleashed by political
liberalisation and the introduction of a multiparty system, it is still not clear how
much further these countries have to go. One missing link in the literature which
additionally impedes our ability to make credible suppositions about the distance
to the point of arrival of democratisation is an acute lack of consensus in academia
about the point along the journey that these countries are now at.
While some authors champion an optimistic estimate that in “all the Western
Balkan countries democratic consolidation has been achieved” albeit with “clear
dierences in the quality of democracy” (Sakellariou & Sotiropoulos, 2014: 12), or
have attempted to demonstrate through process-tracing how some of these coun-
tries have “democratised [their] hybrid regimes” (Vukovic, 2011; Levitsky & Way,
2010),3 others tend to portray a more nuanced picture. As an example of this more
sensitive register, some SEE countries are regarded as democracies (e.g. Slovenia,
Croatia, Romania and Serbia), while others are labelled as hybrid regimes (e.g.
Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) (Berglund et
al., 2013). If Dahl’s procedural conception of democracy as poliarchy is taken as a
1 In this article, the two overlapping denominators for the region – the Western Balkans and Southeast
Europe – will be used interchangeably. ‘Western Balkans’ is is a neologism coined by the European
Union to politically demarcate the countries of the former Yugoslavia (minus Slovenia) and Albania,
which have a clear perspective for EU membership, at least since the EU–Western Balkans Summit
in Thessaloniki in 2003. See: Declaration, EU–Western Balkans Summit, Available at: http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm [Accessed on: 18 January 2016]. The other genus
proximum, South-East Europe (SEE), is a term with a much longer pedigree dating back to the 19th
century (Hösch et al., 2004). I shall explain why it is important to keep SEE as a regional denominator
in relation to democratisation later on in the article.
2 According to McFaul, the transition to democracy in post-communist Europe was successful in only
eight out of 28 cases (2002: 212). The author refers to post-communist democratisation as belonging
to the fourth wave, so as to dierentiate it from the earlier processes in Southern Europe and Latin
America, but that is not relevant here.
3 In this article as well as in his later doctoral thesis (2014), Vukovic examines the diverging party
outcomes of the incumbents in power after the regime change, and attempts to explain why Serbia
and Croatia underwent a turnover of power while Montenegro did not. In their formidable study of
competitive authoritarianisms, Levitsky and Way (2010) analyse the trajectories of regimes that began
the transition from authoritarian rule but fell short of establishing democracy, only to subsequently
succeed after a prolonged lingering of hybrid regimes. Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania are
to be found within the scope of the examined cases.
9
benchmark for a minimally functioning democracy,4 and a hybrid regime is dened
as a stable conguration that is neither authoritarian nor democratic in the above
procedural sense because it lacks at least one of the minimal conditions,5 labelling
may prove to be very dicult in cases where compliance with those conditions is
murky and uctuating.
Among these countries, our interest here lies particularly with Macedonia, Monte-
negro and Serbia. These three former Yugoslav countries all experienced political
liberalisation and the beginning of transition in the early nineties; all three have gone
through a period of national and state uncertainty and had to simultaneously push
for democratisation and the restabilisation of state borders and national identities;
all three embarked on a upward trajectory of democratisation after transitioning
from the hybrid regimes of the 1990s; and nally, all three are under a high degree
of political conditionality from the European Union since, unlike other former Yu-
goslav countries, these have the status of candidates for EU membership6, which
arguably dramatically increases the eectiveness of EU democratic conditionality
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). Nevertheless, they are still considered to be
fragile democracies with a variety of domestic issues and external factors hamper-
ing democratisation (Bieber & Ristic, 2012). Moreover, the latest empirical evidence
suggests that instead of moving forward, they are stagnating or even backsliding.
According to Freedom House’s ‘Freedom in the World’ index for 2016, all three
countries experienced a downward trend, or at least stagnation. It was particularly
steep for Montenegro, which went from being considered ‘free’ to ‘partly free’ for
the rst time since it recovered from this status in 2010, and Macedonia, which has
never managed to pass the threshold of a ‘free’ country.
The puzzling democratic stagnation of the SEE region can best be illustrated when
juxtaposed with the similar process that another group of post-communist countries
with similar constitutional set-ups and prerequisites for the development of vibrant
multiparty systems and under the inuence of EU conditionality and democracy
promotion – Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In her analysis of the ‘democratic
4 Dahl’s classic denition of democracy is a common point of departure for most later conceptualisations
of democracy. For example, recalling Dahl (1971), Morlino provides the following minimal empirical
requirements of a democratic regime: (a) universal surage, for both males and females; (b) free,
competitive, recurrent, and fair elections; (c) more than one party; and (d) dierent and alternative
media sources (2011: 32).
5 Morlino (2011: 56–57) denes a hybrid regime as a set of institutions that have been persistent, be they
stable or unstable, for at least a decade, that have been preceded by authoritarianism, a traditional
regime (possibly with colonial characteristics), or even a minimal democracy, and that are characterised
by the break-up of limited pluralism and forms of independent, autonomous participation, but the
absence of at least one of the four aspects of a minimal democracy.
6 Macedonia was granted the status of candidate for membership as early as 2005, but accession
negotiations with it have still not commenced. Montenegro became a candidate for membership in
2010 and began negotiations in 2012. Serbia became a candidate in 2012 and began negotiations in
2014. In addition, Macedonia would have received an invitation to join NATO as soon as 2008, had
it not been for Greece’s veto on the move, because of the notorious naming dispute between the
two countries. Montenegro received its invitation to join the alliance at the end of 2015. While Serbia
persists on its course of military neutrality, it remains committed to NATO’s Partnership for Peace
framework of cooperation.
10
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
advances in post-communist regions for period 1991–2012’, Dolenec (2013: 10) has
shown that despite some similarities, the two regions exhibit important dierences
in their democratisation trajectories. Disregarding for a moment the dierent in-
terceptors, i.e. starting points of democratisation, her analysis, based on Freedom
House (FH) data, shows that the CEE countries went through two critical junctures
or windows of accelerated democratisations (1992–1995 and 2003–2005) whereas
the SEE countries have gone through just one (1998–2002).
If we assume, as I think is correct, that the rst brief period of accelerated advance-
ment is the period of a largely successful transition in the cases of both regions,7
although protracted in the case of several SEE countries due to conicts and hybrid
regimes, and the second period marks the denite consolidation of democracy,
which coincides with the nal stage of EU accession, beginning with the granting
of candidate status to the applicant country, the puzzle this paper aims to solve is:
why then is the second jump upwards not happening in the case of SEE?
Supercial and purely outcome-based explanations of democratic consolidation
cannot explain this conundrum. One such way of looking at consolidation is an in-
ternal outcome-based glance at consolidation. For example, Macedonia and Serbia
passed the ‘double-turnover test’ that was suggested as an indicator of democratic
consolidation (Huntington, 1991) in 2002 and 2008 respectively. Additionally, the
fragile democratic institutions have survived major crises: the breakdown of public
order after the assassination of Zoran Djindjic in Serbia and the Albanian uprising
in Macedonia. In contrast, Montenegro is the only European democracy (excluding
Belarus) that has not experienced a democratic change of government. Another
option, however, is to look at external outcome-based indicators of democratic
consolidation. Here, the picture is reversed, as Montenegro is currently the regional
champion on the path to EU accession. How then can their democratic stagnation
be explained?
The following lines oer an analysis of the state of democracy in these EU candidate
countries in the Western Balkans. It stems from the context that we must focus on
processes and not outcomes, and that both national and international factors are
important. Particular attention will be paid to the specicities of both domestic
and external ‘democratic anchoring’ in SEE as well as the democratic quality of
responsiveness. Leonardo Morlino stated that responsiveness is the ‘Achilles heel’ of
democracies at the beginning of the 21st century (Morlino, 2011). Such an empirically
based nding is a lighter articulation of the pessimistic theoretical assessments of
contemporary democracies as being ‘hollowed out’ from the inside (Mair, 2013)
or even the notion that, in the light of the widening gap between citizens and
governments and the convergence of the latter with private economic interests,
we are standing at the brink of ‘post-democracy’ (Crouch, 2004). Section II briey
7 This window of opportunity in SEE was characterised by the rst democratic changes of government
in Romania, Bulgaria and Macedonia 1996–1998, as well as the ‘democratic turn’ elections in Serbia and
Croatia in 2000 (Schimmelfennig: 2005; Dolenec: 2013). Note that Montenegro is the only country
that has not, to this date, had a turnover in power since the collapse of the communist regime.
11
introduces the theoretical framework of democratic consolidation and outlines how
the two aspects of ‘anchoring’ may be used in the analysis of the selected cases.
Section III provides evidence for the dynamics of domestic and external anchoring
in the three countries. Due to space limitations, the analysis of domestic anchoring
immediately homes in on the particular mode that the political elites in the region
use to create intermediary structures that would bond voters to the political system.
Then the focus shifts to the analysis of the eects of the promotion of democracy
by the EU as an external anchor of the WB democracies, and its success is assessed
in the light of the most recent EC Country Reports and the mediatorial role that the
EU has assumed in the region. The concluding section summarises the ndings of
the article, indicating the lessons learned as well as the constraints on and opportu-
nities available to the constrained democracies of the Western Balkans in the future.
Theoretical Framework: Integrating Domestic
and External Anchoring
Given the dubious status of democratic consolidation in Macedonia, Montenegro
and Serbia, the state of democracy in these countries can be explained by looking
into both factors that have hindered the process of consolidation of democracy
therein and by identifying the decient aspects of democratic qualities that char-
acterise these countries. Not unlike Bieber (2012), I nd that theoretical approaches
need to be adjusted to the context of the area under scrutiny and not vice versa.
This is also a lesson from the history of theories of democratisation – each newly
explored region has given rise to new research concerns specic for it.8 Therefore,
my straightforward claim is that democratisation in South-East Europe is a result
of a particular combination of the political and economic legacies characteristic of
Southern Europe and the salience of international democracy promotion that has
characterised Eastern Europe.9 Moreover, for reasons that will become clear in the
exposition of my arguments, I abandon here the practice accepted in the literature
of looking at the consolidation and qualities of democracy separately. This choice
is also motivated by a worrying lack of relevant, up-to-date empirical data about
these countries. Cross-fertilisation of these often separated elds of study can
yield more interesting conclusions for complicated cases. In short, I shall argue that
(a) the stalemate in democratisation in Southeast Europe stems from the chronic
absence of responsiveness among the local political elites to their citizens; and (b)
8 The rst generation of democratisation researchers that focused on Latin America mostly ignored
economic factors (cf. Morlino, 2011 for this conclusion); on the other hand, researchers focusing on
Southern Europe studied the political and economic systems of these countries together (cf. So-
tiropoulos, 2006 for this conclusion); the importance of external factors came into the equation with
the unlocking of democratisation processes in the CEE region.
9 Successful examples of such an integrated approach to the study of democratisation in the region
still assign much less weight and attention to external factors and focus on historical legacies (e.g.
Bieber & Ristic, 2012; Dolenec, 2013 and 2016).
12
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
such a conguration is the result of particular internal and external factors, such as
authoritarian legacies and the impact of the EU.
According to the current state of the art of at least a part of the literature on de-
mocratisation, democratic change (as well as the processes opposed to it) occurs
on a continuum where several phases are discernible: transition to democracy (and
democratic installation), followed by democratic consolidation (and crisis), after
which it makes sense to deal with the deepening (or worsening) of the qualities of
democracy (Morlino, 2011: 11). Once a democratic regime is consolidated, even weakly,
according to Morlino, the main internal processes of regime continuity and change
can only be crisis and reconsolidation – “there is no longer space for breakdown
and authoritarian installation” (1998: 2). As consoling as this may be, the type of
regime that comes out of the process of consolidation may vary vastly. In order to
adequately grasp the achieved state, we need to understand the specicities with
regards to the local sub-processes that comprise consolidation.
Democratic consolidation is comprised of two parallel processes. The rst is the
bottom-up process of legitimation, whereby democracy and its institutions acquire
diuse support among the population. The second is the top-down process of
democratic anchoring, whereby the governing institutions and elites solidify their
bonds with citizens. Since democracy is the only game in town as far as the diuse
support from citizens is concerned, we need to focus on the second process.10 The
most notable democratic anchors are political parties, but they can also be certain
governmental or other institutions such as unions, or even social movements and
signicant media. In short, they are new rules and ‘intermediary institutions’ able to
provide alternative choices and, on some occasions, solutions to the actual problems
people have. These institutions ‘anchor’ democracy because they politically bind
citizens and associations in a stable relationship (2011: 113). In short, depending on
what kind of anchors prevail and what kind of electoral and/or functional circuit
they establish, a particular form of democracy will take shape as a result. Dem-
ocratic anchoring is a process- and actor-oriented approach. Depending on the
position of at least one of the driving actors of democratic consolidation, it can be
domestic or external. Here, a particular kind of domestic anchor pertinent to the
examined countries will be introduced rst, after which the theoretical focus will
move to preparing the ground for the analysis of EU-mediated external anchoring.
Firstly, if one domestic anchor had to be singled out as a dierentia specifica of
Southern Europe, it would be the gatekeeping and patronage role of the political
parties in power and the converse clientelistic relations they forge with large sec-
tions of the citizenry (cf. Garziano, 1978; Ferrera, 1996; Morlino, 1998). Clientelism
10 The analytical need to focus on the patterns of linkages which regimes establish to the body of citizens
in order to consolidate their rule rather than to focus on the societal basis of democratic politics is one
reason why some perhaps more conventional tools, such as Rokkanian ‘cleavages’ were not chosen
for the analysis. Another is that such tools were originally designed for the study of established, old
Western democracies and would therefore have to ‘conceptually travel’ (Sartori) much more in order
to be useful for the analysis of our cases than the categories employed for SE and CEE.
13
is one of the historical forms of interest representation. It is “a practical (although
in many ways undesirable) solution to the problem of democratic representation”
(Roniger, 2004: 360). “Clientelism”, writes Roniger, “involves asymmetrical, but
mutually benecial relationships of power and exchange, a non-universalistic quid
pro quo between individuals or groups of unequal standing. It implies mediated
and selective access to resources and markets which others are normally excluded.
This access is conditioned on subordination, compliance or dependence on the
goodwill of others.” (2004: 353–354). Clientelism works both ways – it “privatises
politics”, giving segments of the society uneven access to political authority and
it “colonises society”, establishing party control over previously autonomous parts
of civil society (Graziano, 1978: 297). As such, clientelism was a way of procuring a
functional circuit of representation for the people in the former Yugoslav republics
at the time when the old party structures had crumbled with the fall of the com-
munist ancien régime. At the same time, although half a century of socialism had
brought the country unprecedented modernisation and urbanisation, it had not
managed to eradicate the customary informal bonds that have characterised Balkan
societies for centuries. These, by denition, pre-political horizontal relations are a
fertile ground for the ourishing of patronage. Moreover, the communist rule had
implanted in the institutional system of these states a sort of “legal nihilism” (Goati,
2008), a purposeful, instead of legally based, decision-making,11 by virtue of which
the subsequent hybrid regimes, existing in a state of gravely diminished legal and
social certainty, encapsulated the observation that “parliaments that do not decide
on anything, elections are reduced to mere voting and multiparty systems, in which
all the decisions are made by a single party” (Ibid., own translation). Thus both the
cultural and institutional conditions favour clientilistic practices in the region. But
if common sense dictates that such a practice is better purged than cherished for
democracy, can it be functional?
In his study about domestic anchoring in Southern Europe, Morlino (1998) provided
an overview of the literature on and the mechanisms and eects of such anchoring
practices mostly in Italy and Greece. Interestingly, his rather counterintuitive but
important nding is that even such a malignant and endemic political phenomenon
can be benecial for democratic consolidation because it establishes a particularistic,
if not universal, and a personalistic, if not public, responsibility and accountability
among the bearers of political representation to their citizens.12 As the example of
Democrazia Christiana, in the south of Italy during the 1980s and before the political
crisis that dismantled this system in the wake of the ensuing decade, shows, when
a politically under-dierentiated, patriarchal and rural society meets a catch-all
party, clientelistic bonds appear. They are intermediated by “middle-level elites as
‘brokers’ of local and individual interests, being able to transfer central resources to
the periphery in dierent ways, but always through state agencies or bureaucracy
(Morlino, 1998: 220–221).
11 A proverbial saying, credited to Josip Broz Tito, states that “one should not hold on to the law like a
drunken man holds on to a fence”.
12 These terms are used only in a relative sense. Associating accountability with clientelistic transactions
is an overstretched and misleading use of the term.
14
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
The literature on the role of clientelism in the Balkans is plentiful (e.g. Kitschelt,
2001; Cvejic, 2016). Yet, to my knowledge, no one has explicitly formulated this
kind of hypothesis for the WB region. While I am certain that it had a role to play in
stabilising the societies in the acute absence of more organised, better channels of
inuence, my main concern here is to explore how this functional bond has aected
the electoral circuit of representation and, particularly, electoral accountability and
the overall responsiveness of those governing towards the governed. Claus Oe
famously wrote that citizens are structurally related to state authority in three ways
– as citizens, subjects and clients (1996: 147). What happens, then, in states that
are not fully consolidated democracies, welfare or otherwise, when a clientelistic
mentality takes precedence or when it proves to be the most cost-eective way to
secure one’s needs? As the case of Italy before the 1992 crisis shows, such situations
are not politically sustainable, but a very long time can pass before a punctured
equilibrium appears and democracy reconsolidates at a higher level of equilibrium.
The analysis of this aspect in the next section should also oer an account of the
chances of democratisation in an unchanged domestic anchoring situation.
Secondly, this article joins the literature on CEE and SEE that pays due attention
not only to the domestic conditions, but also to the inuence of the international
milieu and the role of the European Union especially. The impact of the Union in
post-communist democratisation has been operationalised: (a) within a ratio-
nal-choice cost/benet approach in terms of political conditionality (Vachudova,
2005; Schimmelfennig, 2005; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Schimmelfennig
& Scholtz, 2008) or ‘Western’ leverage (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Vachudova, 2005), and
(b) a more constructivist approach of democratic socialisation (Checkel, 2005).13
The theoretical expectation from the literature on conditionality is that the impact
of the EU on candidates for membership should be stronger than its impact on
non-candidate states: “[o]nly the highest international rewards – those associated
with EU membership – can be expected to balance substantial domestic power
costs” (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008: 191). It is true that, notwithstanding the
dilemmas of national elites, EU political conditionality has exerted a signicant
inuence on democratisation (Ibid.) in the Western Balkans. Why, then, do we de-
tect stagnation in or a deterioration of these democracies in some instances and
sectors – sometimes even while they are making progress towards EU accession?
The approach chosen to help answer this puzzle here is the similar but wider no-
tion of external anchoring of democracy (Morlino, 2011).14 It implies “a process of
inducting individuals and states into the democratic norms and rules” of a wider
community (2011: 146). Firstly, it is complementary to the domestic anchoring ex-
13 This incomplete classication is merely illustrative, since it does not encompass all the theoretical
conceptualisations of international inuence and since the approaches are not as neatly divided as
it would seem to suggest.
14 External anchoring is a generic term that encompasses at least four dierent mechanisms of the
inuence of external democracy promoters on a target country – imposition; example; conditionali-
ty; and socialisation – each involving dierent modes of interaction with local systems and drawing
on dierent theoretical traditions. The latter two are, however, unanimously accepted as the most
inuential.
15
plored at the beginning of this section. Neither the picture from just the national
arena nor that from the international arena suces for a comprehensive account
of democratic consolidation in the former Yugoslav countries. Secondly, external
anchoring is a tool for “conceptualising the interaction between external inuence
and the domestic change processes” (Ibid.: 144) which includes both the logic of
consequences, wherein local actors and veto players calculate if compliance with
the international actor’s inuence is benecial in terms of expected outcomes, and
the logic of appropriateness, wherein the actors’ preferences are not xed but can
change as a result of their incremental socialisation into the normative community
of the promoter of democracy (cf. March and Olsen, 1998).
What are the key phases of and mechanisms that allow the process of external
anchoring to take place? Morlino and Magen (2008) and Morlino (2011) see the
process of external democratic anchoring as being revealed through three phases
of decision-making which they consider to be layers of anchoring – rule adoption,
rule implementation and rule internalisation. It is quite useful, practical and com-
monsense to think of external inuence in terms of these phases as the EU Country
Reports 15 also use the distinction between adoption as a purely legislative act and
implementation as an indication of genuine compliance.
Now that the two distinctive aspects of anchoring have been introduced, the
following section will scrutinise the evidence of democratic stagnation in Serbia,
Montenegro and Macedonia in the light of them.
Evidence and Discussion
The most recent evaluations of the democratic record of our cases from 2016 are
discouraging. In Montenegro, the government is under increasing pressure from
the opposition, civil society and the EU to transparently reform the electoral system
and dismantle the mechanisms of corruption and clientelism that are suspected of
leading to election fraud in several previous cycles. Its FH ratings have thus fallen
because of the “abuse of state funds for political party purposes” (EU Country
Report, 2015: 15) and primarily because of the belief that the head of government
“sanctioned harassment of independent media” (FH Overview Essay, 2016: 8) and
15 The 2015 EC Reports reect the Commission’s new methodology that ought to provide a better and
more objective operational framework by assessing the current state of play in all sectors, identi-
fying shortcomings and oering a clear set of recommendations. Two innovations with respect to
the previous reports are crucial: rstly, the change of the name from ‘Progress’ to ‘Country’ Report
implies that the EC realises that its annual reporting has a signicant and often undeserved domestic
legitimising function for the regions’ governments, which tend to interpret them publicly as an external
approval of progress made. From now on, the reports will be issued without any unintended distortion
of reality and no progress will be a priori implied. Secondly and more importantly, newly introduced
harmonised assessment scales are likely to increase comparability between countries or between
dierent screening periods of a single country and improve the transparency of the accession process
generally.
16
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
restricted the right to peaceful assembly “including clashes between police and
opposition demonstrators and the repeated postponement of an LGBT pride pa-
rade” (Ibid.: 19). The resulting tarnished image of the incumbents as purveyors of
good governance and democratic norms resulted in the beginning of parliamentary
dialogue between the heads of political parties with the mediating presence of the
head of the local EU delegation, aimed at restoring trust in the electoral process and
discussing a transitory government that would ensure that the next elections would
be free and fair. Macedonia’s ruling party since 2006, the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE,
was exposed and implicated in scandals of electoral fraud and the extensive wire-
tapping (FH Overview Essay, 2016: 18–19) of an unthinkable number of up to 20,000
people, exacerbating the culmination of a political crisis that ultimately required
the EU to get involved as a mediator between the government and the opposition
that had boycotted the Parliament, and to arrange a transition period leading up
to snap elections scheduled for 2016 (Balkan Insight, 2015). Even though Serbia is
the only EU candidate country in the region that has been considered ‘free’ without
interruption since 2006, a slight fall in the ratings is largely due to diminishing media
independence and professionalism due to economic duress, increased dominance of
the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), increased self-censorship and political
pressures (cf. FH Nations in Transit Report for Serbia, 2015: 579).16
Our expectation is that the language of anchoring can prove to be very useful in
resolving the perplexing paradox of democratic stagnation amidst the candidate
countries with the strong presence of inuence from the EU. In this register, a
democratic regime is dened by the predominant anchors used as intermediary
structures to bind the governing structures and citizens together. We shall exam-
ine them in light of domestic anchoring (clientilism and patronage) and external
anchoring (the EU) before we combine these two perspectives in the conclusion.
Domestic Anchoring in SEE: Hooking onto Clients?
There are no cross-country regional surveys or other research on clientilistic practices,17
but this is widely acknowledged as an endemically widespread phenomenon in the
region. The lack of such evidence forces us to make inferences from other data. One
logical way to test the risk of an overwhelming clientele on democracy in the Balkans
is to consider the numbers of employees in the public sector. It is well known that
in the former Yugoslavia, the state is the biggest employer. It is too often the case
that no complete data on the number of people working in the public sector can be
found. Still, indicative numbers suggest that the percentage of the employees who
16 Similar to Freedom in the World, Nations in Transit in 2015 classies Serbia and Montenegro as
semi-consolidated democracies and Macedonia as a hybrid regime.
17 A notable exception is the Media Clientelism Index (MCI). Launched in 2015 in Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Montenegro, FYR Macedonia and Serbia, it measures the risks of clientelistic practices
and the existence of such practices, as well as the potential of the society to deal with issues of media
clientelism. The results show that among our three countries, Serbia fares the best and Macedonia
the worst (See also Cvejic, 2016 for Serbia and Kosovo).
17
work in the public sector in the total number of registered employees is 35.2 % in
Montenegro (Monitor, 2015), increasing to as much as 50% in Serbia (Danas, 2014)
and is above 20% in Macedonia (OECD, 2013: 4). If the incumbent political elites
in the region use the logic employed by one MP in Montenegro’s Parliament, who
was secretly recorded saying at the ruling party’s meeting about the strategy for
the 2012 elections that “one job [equals] four votes”, hinting at the grateful family
members of the employed, the harmful link between politically-driven employment
and a distortion of electoral accountability is evident. Electoral preferences should
not be a manifestation of private interests or non-anonymous favouritism, but of
Rawlsian public reason that impartially looks after the public good.
With this in mind, the available empirical data can be read in a new light. Respon-
siveness has been empirically operationalised as an index comprised of at least two
variables – satisfaction with democracy (SWD), as a proxy for perceived legitimacy,
and the level of public debt, as a proxy for objective constraints to responsiveness
(Morlino, 2011: 258–260, Table in the Appendix). As for the SWD, Eurobarometer
data shows that, currently, half of Europeans are dissatised with the way in which
democracy works in their country, while 48% are satised and 2% expressed no
opinion (2013: 99). Our three countries appear to be on a par with the EU, with
dissatisfaction being slightly higher (Figure 1), even though all the facts stated at
the beginning of this section point to the crisis of democracy being much deeper in
these countries than in the EU. A possible explanation already hinted at above is that
patronage, in the form of resource and favour redistribution, really has legitimised
the incumbents and that the surveyed citizen–clients, without much experience in
how a functioning democracy ought to function, falsely connect their satisfaction
with democracy when in fact they are satised with the private privileges the in-
cumbents provide or are grateful that they have not been denied them.
Figure 1. Satisfaction with democracy in Serbia and Montenegro.18
Secondly, the available data on the public debt expressed as a percentage of GDP
shows a steady rise in all three cases (Figure 2). While this would indicate a rela-
tive decline in the objective ability to cater for citizens needs in Morlino’s account
(2011: Chapters VII and VIII), it is possible to imagine a dierent and paradoxical
situation not yet considered in this framework – that the SWD will continue to rise
18 The most recent available results for Macedonia are older. According to EVS, in 2008 42% were very
satised or fairly satised with the way democracy works in their country.
18
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
together with public debt.19 This could imply that governments have an incentive
to uncritically spend, so long as they secure public support from their clienteles.
Staying in power can lead to irresponsible and unaccountable public spending with
a supposedly democratic regime that maintains its net responsiveness.
Figure 2. Public debt in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia.
Source: World bank, data for observed years. EU 28 data from Eurostat.
Overall, the evidence points to the conclusion that in our three cases, the governments
are legitimised by their ability to provide clientelistic services to the citizens. That
would partly explain the absence of turnovers despite the deteriorating democratic
performance of the incumbents. Finally, by mirroring the Italian example in the
previous section, it explains a part of our puzzle: when client–patron relations are
deeply rooted as anchors of the regime, to such an extent that they undermine the
other anchors, the process of democratic consolidation slows down, while the core
of the regime remains remarkably resilient to the democratic advances otherwise
made. In such a context, the otherwise unreliable indicator of satisfaction with de-
mocracy acquires a very particular and telling meaning: the gure, in fact, reects
the people who are satised with the regime as clients rather than the people that
are satised with democracy as citizens.20
19 If we look at the pertinent case of Italy during the First Republic, we can see the existence of the
same trend. Public debt exploded from around 60% of GDP in the late 1970s to around 120% in the
early 1990s when the political crisis led to a system characterised by excessive growth of the public
sector, party patronage and clientelism as fundamental resources of democratic anchoring. At the
same time, the number of citizens not at all satised with democracy kept steadily falling from around
40% at the beginning of the 1980s to 25% at the end of the decade (Martini & Quaranta, 2013: Figure
1).
20 The fact that the satisfaction of the respondents does not really reect a positive orientation among
competent citizens toward the regime, but is more likely the attitude of contented clients is armed
by the fact that citizens in Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia are much more afraid to openly express
their political views than their counterparts in Croatia, Albania and Kosovo (Gallup Balkan Monitor,
2010: 28).
19
External anchoring: What kind of lesson learning?
Which part of the ‘soil’ of the local political system does an external anchor need to
take hold of in order to help consolidate democracy? The broadest answer when it
comes to EU membership is undoubtedly the fullling of the political criteria laid
down by the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993.21 The reality of the
past few years that has unfolded since the quoted literature was published clearly
conrms the assumption that “anchoring involving external actors’ eorts to pro-
mote democratic change mainly implies the promotion of a democratic rule of law”
(Morlino, 2011: 151). Though this focus on the rule of law stemming from in-depth
qualitative analysis of the interaction of the selected countries with international
actors, it is now an undisputable fact. Namely, since the launch of accession nego-
tiations with Montenegro on 29 June 2012, the EU has adopted a new approach
to negotiations which resulted from the lessons learned during the accession of
Bulgaria and Romania prior to 2007 and of Croatia prior to 2013. Namely, while all
other chapters of the Acquis will continue to be provisionally closed following the
candidate country’s successful alignment with EU legislation (and its full implemen-
tation), Chapter 23 dealing with the Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Chapter
24 dealing with Justice, Freedom & Security, are the rst ones to be opened and the
last ones to be closed. This new approach was rearmed and strengthened in the
2015 Enlargement Strategy which embraced this “fundamentals rst” approach and
identied the following core issues: the rule of law, fundamental rights, strength-
ening of institutions, public administration reform, economic criteria and regional
cooperation (cf. EC Enlargement Strategy, 2015). Furthermore, the EC has reminded
the Montenegrin government of the existence of an ‘overall balance’ clause in the
negotiating frameworks (EC Progress Report, 2014), which implies the possibility
of stopping negotiations on other chapters if progress on issues to do with the rule
of law lags behind (EC Enlargement Strategy, 2014: 19). Thus the EU sees the rule
of law as the rock upon which a functioning democratic political system is to be
built, especially in this region.
Lastly, a methodological clarication: the requirement of brevity in the analysis
necessitates the use of conceptual shortcuts to dene and explain key phenomena
of interest. Such will be the case with the relationship between the rule of law and
corruption. Here, we are interested in corruption as a relational notion, a longstand-
ing obstacle to establishing the rule of law. That corruption can serve as a litmus
test for deciencies in the rule of law is not just an intuitively sound idea, but has
already been successfully implemented in relation to WB countries. According to
Dolenec, “the problems of corruption and state capture may be understood as the
the inverse measurement of the extent to which democratic polities have succeeded
in establishing functioning rule of law systems to protect their citizens’ civil liberties”
(2013: 17, 45).22 Now that the focus of the analysis is established, we can simply
21 The political criteria imply that the candidate country has achieved stability of the institutions guar-
anteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.
22 The evidence on the anti-corruption track record as a proxy for the domestic dedication to the rule
of law will be derived from the EC Progress Reports. The ndings, however, correspond to the most
20
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
compare the state in this area at the beginning of the candidacy with its state now
and assess the progress made.
The situation with Macedonia is unique with respect to the analytical framework. In
2015, the European Commission recommended for the seventh consecutive year that
membership negotiations with Macedonia be launched, yet the situation has continued
to linger because of the still-pending notorious name dispute with Greece. In this
case, the strongest veto player that is paralysing not just one sector but the whole
process is not a domestic stakeholder, but an EU member state. Thus the credibility
of conditionality equates to zero and the domestic stakeholders are provided with
a protracted excuse not to eectively adopt, implement and internalise rules that
would democratise the country. The massive setbacks in democracy unveiled over
the course of 2014 and 2015 did not prevent the EC from extending an invitation to
start negotiations. One may hypothesise that this ‘lifeline’ thrown to Macedonia is
motivated by the realist logic of the EC in that a positive assessment is needed in
order to exert the necessary leverage required to keep things on track with the Przino
political deal23 (Ker-Lindsay, 2015). Finally, the stagnating situation in the region is
certainly direst in Macedonia, where the EC nds that corruption, interference with
judicial independence, media freedom and elections, as well as the politicisation
of the administration, having already been signalled in previous Progress Reports,
are persisting and deepening (EC Country Report, 2015: 4). Moreover, the report
nds that those issues, together with “the breakdown of political dialogue and the
diculties in arriving at a consensus on issues have highlighted once again the
divisive political culture in the country” (Ibid.). Thus, Macedonia presents itself as
a somewhat outlying case, since the conditionality is becoming more determinate
but is deemed not credible due to an external veto player from within its own ranks.
On the other hand, the same deteriorating dynamic exists in the other two cas-
es. Montenegro’s accession negotiations with the EU, which began in 2010, were
conditioned on the fullment of the seven key priorities laid down in the European
Commission’s Opinion on Montenegro’s EU membership application, in which the
Commission recommended to the member states the granting of candidate status
to Montenegro. This milestone moment was the most optimal time for eective con-
ditionality from the EU. Indeed, conditionality at this point was strong both in terms
of determinacy, because the steps to be taken were spelled out clearly, and in terms
of credibility, since the reward for compliance was the beginning of negotiations.
The Opinion demanded: improvement of the legislative framework for elections,
recent rankings of our three cases in the TI Corruption Perception Index – both in terms of the results
(40–44/100 points) and decline with respect to the previous years. While progress reports present a
valuable and rich source of relevant data, the author is not unaware of the potential double standards
that the EU might have towards dierent states due to its own internal political interests – implying
here, rst and foremost, the disparity in the Union’s reaction to the authoritarian tendencies and
accusations of election fraud present in all three cases – and potentially of conicting goals of de-
mocratisation and stability in the region. These concerns, falling outside the scope of the data source’s
considerations, will be revisited in the discussion and conclusion.
23 The deal refers to the settlement brokered with the mediation of the EU between Nikola Gruevski and
the opposition regarding a transitional government that would bring about free and fair election.
21
public administration reform, strengthening of the rule of law, of the ght against
corruption and of the ght against organised crime, enhancing media freedoms
and implementation of anti-discrimination policy (EC, 2010: 10–12). The escalation
of the ongoing political crisis, though, demonstrates that the initial successes in
democracy promotion have not been continued consistently.
The unique characteristic in the case of Serbia is the existence of Chapter 35 in
the negotiations, titled “Other issues”, which is nonexistent in the other cases, yet
a conditio sine qua non for Serbia: relations with Kosovo. The Brussels Agreement,
concluded by the governments of Serbia and Kosovo on the normalisation of their
relations, was negotiated and concluded (although not signed by either party)
in Brussels under the auspices of the European Union’s High Representative for
Foreign Aairs & Security Policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton. The Agreement was
an explicit condition for the beginning of the negotiations. Wrapped in Chapter 35,
the normalisation of relations with Kosovo was opened rst along with the chapter
covering the rule of law and will remain key as the negotiations progress.24
The EU and each member state that had since ratied candidate status took this
initial zeal as a sign of domestic political will to fully tackle them. Yet the track record
up until now proves Morlino’s conclusion that “the relation among rule adoption,
implementation, and internalisation is a weak one” (2011: 173). Fast-forward to 2016
and most of these areas are still very much issues of political contention and do-
mestic and EU concern. For example, while in Montenegro tangible steps have been
made in the area of the ght against corruption and organised crime (although still
without nal convictions for high-level corruption, EC Country Report, 2015: 14), the
institutional capacities for its prevention and even the legislative framework remain
relatively poor, particularly with respect to nancial investigations and prevention
of corruption respectively (Ibid.). As for Serbia, in the statement quoted above,
Commissioner Hahn added that the progress of Serbia would depend on the
“continuation of reforms, especially in the area of justice, rule of law, ght against
corruption, freedom of expression” (B92, 2015). The EC Progress/Country reports
from 2013, 2014 and 2015 register some, but insucient, results in the area of judicial
reform. After recovering from the previous reform eorts that had gone wrong, the
Serbian judiciary in 2014 was found susceptible to political pressures, particularly
when taking on high-prole cases of corruption.25 The incumbent government
headed by Aleksandar Vučić from the Progressive Party won the elections, in part,
on the promise of resolving the “24 controversial privatisations” that the EU had
supposedly demanded be satisfactorily concluded in court proceedings as part of
Serbia’s path towards EU integration (Euroactive, 2012). Yet the latest EU Country
Report identies some, but not sucient, progress in this area:
24 Hahn: “Progress in the normalization of relations with Kosovo is crucial for the further progress of
Serbia in the European integration process.” Available at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.
php?yyyy=2015&mm=12&dd=10&nav_id=96328
25 It is stated that: “Final convictions remained rare and high-prole cases remained at risk of political
interference” (p.43).
22
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
Serbia has some level of preparation in preventing and ghting corruption, which
remains widespread. The anti-corruption eort has yet to yield signicant results.
The institutional setup is not yet functioning as a credible deterrent. A track record
of eective investigations, prosecutions and convictions in corruption cases is re-
quired, including at high levels (Serbia Country Report, 2015: 4).
To a careful follower observer of politics in the WB region (e.g. Kmezic, 2015), the
deterioration of the freedom of the media in Serbia seems to be the most worrying.
Media censorship in Serbia “is no longer news”.26
Altogether, with respect to the rule of law in its broader sense, the three countries
face common challenges and exhibit similar patterns of coping with the promotion
and conditionality of EU norms. Judicial systems are still not suciently independent,
ecient or accountable. Serious eorts are still needed to tackle organised crime
and corruption, in particular to establish track records of investigations, prosecutions
and nal convictions. While fundamental rights are often largely enshrined in law,
there are persistent shortcomings in practice. Ensuring freedom of expression is a
particular challenge, with negative developments in all three cases. Public admin-
istration reform needs to be pursued with vigour, to ensure the necessary admin-
istrative capacity, as well as to tackle high politicisation and a lack of transparency.
The functioning of democratic institutions also requires attention. There is a need
to work even more closely with local civil society actors in order to anchor reforms
across society (cf. EC Press Release, 2015). At this stage, compliance is to a degree
assured with rule adoption, but rule implementation (including institutional capac-
ities) is uneven, while rule internalisation remains little more than wishful thinking
for any measure that seems to touch on politically sensitive matters of power, the
reform of which would involve signicant political costs to the incumbents. While
the limited space does not allow for a more detailed analysis than the one already
provided here, the overview of the state of play in the area of the rule of law in all
three post-communist countries would seem to conrm Morlino’s nding that the
political elites, formal institutions and socio-economic networks, coupled with the
political culture constructed under the previous non-democratic regimes, have turned
into the most stubborn, reform-recalcitrant veto players (2011: 163, cf. Dolenec, 2013
for the same nding). At the same time, the progress made over the last few years,
mainly in legislation, but less so in implementation, points to the conclusion that the
26 Serbia is ranked 74th on Freedom House’s annual index on Freedom of the Press in the latest 2015
report, with the Serbian media considered only ‘partly free’. It is interesting to observe that Serbian
media freedom has, according to Freedom House, been declining for six years in a row, with setbacks
registered in the legal, political and economic environment. In its previous Progress Reports, the
European Commission had been restating that threats or violence against journalists or the more
covert avenues of political inuence on the media continue to be a signicant factor aecting the
existence of self-censorship, which must be addressed during Serbia’s accession talks (cf. Freedom
of the Press, 2015). In the most recent report, however, the Commission concluded that, overall, “no
progress” has been made in the last year (EC Country Report, 2015: 17). The FH Freedom of the
Press report nds that Montenegro is also rmly entrenched in the ‘partly free’ status, while the most
alarming trend exists in Macedonia which has deteriorated from ‘partly free’ to ‘not free’ mainly due
to massive “illegal government wiretapping of journalists, corrupt ties between ocials and media
owners, and an increase in threats and attacks on media workers” (Freedom of the Press, 2016).
23
local elites have perfected the craft of partial or even fake compliance. On the one
hand, the incumbents demonstrate the ability to be responsive to the EU demands to
a degree necessary for keeping the process of integration going and the possibility
of reaping the benets from it in terms of domestic and international support. On
the other hand, this ‘institutional hypocrisy’ (Iankova & Katzenstein, 2003) means
that no reform steps that would severely hamper the grip that the local elites have
on political power will be genuinely taken. This remains the case even when the
political alternatives to the EU have disappeared domestically.
This section cannot be concluded without two points of caution: rstly, the success of
external democratic anchoring cannot be comprehensively assessed without insight
into the crucial aspect of the three countries’ declining democratic standing – which
is the most singularly important requirement of a minimalist denition of democracy
– free and fair elections. This is the point where external and domestic anchoring
overlap, and it is important to look deeper into this issue before we examine and
compare the two types of anchoring in the conclusion. Yes, the EU has duly noted
the opposition and civil societies’ complaints about the continuous irregularities of
elections in the region, but has nevertheless sided with the results of international
monitoring missions which have routinely concluded that the elections meet dem-
ocratic standards in spite of ‘minor’ irregularities. Yet, it is precisely the elections in
Montenegro in 2012, before which the Organisation for Security and Cooperation
in Europe’s (OSCE) election monitoring mission decided that it no longer needed
to observe the regularity of elections, in which the alleged institutionalised “abuse
of state funds for political party purposes” took place. The aair was discovered in
2013 and has since plagued the political scene as the main cause of the widespread
distrust in electoral democracy. Similarly, the Macedonian opposition has been loud
and clear about state capture by the dominant party in that country and allegations
of electoral fraud. The dierence between them politically is that, in Macedonia the
political opposition is less fragmented and has presented a united front against the
incumbents in boycotting the Parliament, protesting and, most recently, in negoti-
ations about a transitional government. In Montenegro, the process is slower, more
contested and with a narrower consensus, even though the dominant party there,
headed by the prime minister, Milo Djukanovic, has been in power for 25 years,
whereas the dominant party in Macedonia with prime minister, Nikola Gruevski,
has held oce since 2006. Dierences aside, the metastasising issue of election
regularity in both countries has retroactively raised questions over the level of
democratic consolidation that the international political and academic community
believed they had reached. It also cast doubt on the accuracy of the assessments
by international election watchdogs and the eectiveness of such mechanisms of
democratic socialisation. Now the EU seems politically constrained to present a
balanced case to the opposing parties and not to put any of them in the position
of suering too great a cost, if its explicitly asked-for mediating role is to bear fruit.
However, in a situation where the dominant party with its authoritarian legacies as
a veto player faces systemically weakened change-agents in the opposition, I argue
24
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
that the last few years testify to the fact that “protracted action by an external actor,
such as the EU” (Morlino 2011:173) is not enough. This situation in Montenegro and
Macedonia has potentially transformative features of a ‘constitutional moment’
(Ackerman). Indeed, it corresponds to the denition of ‘domestic uidity’ (Morli-
no & Magen, 2008; Morlino, 2011) wherein external anchoring is likely to be more
ecient. It may prove to be a critical juncture at which the process of democratic
consolidation can be unlocked and set at a higher level of equilibrium. That is why
the external anchor needs to be substantially more eective – both determinate and
credible. Unless the EU takes a more active and clear role in the domestic processes
which have opened the door to its inuence, it may lose the chance to rectify the
mistakes it made in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania. Finally, although Serbia
is stable and more democratically advanced than the other two, the institutional
features and failures in compliance alert us to the possibility that the new dominant
party in that country may lead to the same situation. Beyond just the institutions
that the incumbents occupy, the societal indicators in Serbia now resemble those
of the other two before the current crises, since a dwindling zeal for activism and
participation in political activities is being detected and the majority of citizens are
expecting change to come from the outside (Matic, 2012). The defective system for
ensuring the rule of law lacks checks and balances, while the prominent role of the
executive branch threatens to undermine the entire democratic system. In the long
term, this deciency may even discredit attempts to hold fair elections as part of a
meaningful democratic process (cf. Kmezic, 2015).
Secondly, the EU has not been engaged only in the business of democratic anchor-
ing in the region. Its mission has had, and still has, signicant stability-anchoring
features. I believe that it is important to stress that the two sometimes can be at
odds with each other. In Montenegro, the EU has never had a chance to see how
the opposition would behave in power, while it is familiar with the modus operandi
of the incumbents who maintain a discourse that a turnover would bring about
political instability. In Macedonia’s case, the security interest of the EU has mainly
consisted of avoiding conict between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians.
For many years the priority of implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement
has somewhat marginalised the Union’s interest in securing a functioning democ-
racy. This ‘democratic security dilemma’ will be most obvious in the case of Serbia,
where it is possible that if the incumbents there continue to deliver on Chapter 35,
some transgressions in the sphere of the rule of law and democracy may not look
so gloomy from the perspective of the Union.
Conclusion
In this article, I have attempted to succinctly single out the specicities of the pro-
cess of consolidation and qualities of democracy in South-East Europe. Using the
theoretical toolkit of domestic democratic anchoring in Section III.1. and external
25
democratic anchoring in Section III.2., I have tried to locate the real addressees of
local elites’ responsiveness in the ostensibly democratic countries of Macedonia,
Montenegro and Serbia.
With regards to domestic anchoring, the key conclusion to be drawn from the discus-
sion is that in societies where the patron–client relationship is the strongest anchor
of the political system for the citizens, responsiveness and electoral accountability
are misplaced. The democratic regime is not predominantly responsive nor is it
accountable to the voters as citizens, but to the voters as clients. Such a misplace-
ment can have grave consequences for the procedural qualities and democracy in
terms of results.
‘Particracy’ – a notion ubiquitously lamented in the civil societies of the deteriorating
democracies in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia – is in fact no more than the
monopolisation of the gatekeeping of resources by the governing parties. Gate-
keeping has allowed them to stay in power by securing political obedience during
elections. Following a fullled promised favour or targeted allocation of resources, it
also provided legitimation by means of patronage. Yet the fate of the First Republic
in Italy warns us that anchoring democracy via clientelism leads to a political crisis,
because segments of the citizenry are excluded from the client–patron bond and
catering for the needs of clients, with the simultaneous macro-economic deterio-
ration, is economically unsustainable in the long term.
Finally, when present to such an extent, clientelism also undermines the rule of law
as the principle of the supremacy and universality of law, and the guarantee of a
functioning democracy. Therefore, in summary, the anchoring mechanism employed
predominantly in the region is, in fact, anti-political, since it negates the cardinal
dynamic relationship between the citizens and government. If citizens are in retreat
because of the tide of clients, then responsiveness, dened as the capacity of the
government to satisfy the governed by executing its policies in a way that corre-
sponds to their demands (Morlino, 2011:208), is wrongly positioned. Responsiveness
is found within a feudal relationship and not in relation to politically mature and
responsible citizens. Thus, when not counterbalanced suciently by other anchors,
patronage “hollows” democracy out (Mair, 2013) from the inside. Nonetheless, being
unsustainable, it is bound to eventually lead to a political crisis. Whether the crisis
will result in a reconsolidation of democracy at a higher level of equilibrium does
not, however, depend solely on domestic factors.
With regards to external anchoring, the key nding is that the governments in the
three countries are partially compliant to the conditionality to the EU, whilst at the
same time the governments represent an obstacle to the full implementation and
internalisation of the democratic norms promoted by the EU, since they stand to
lose a lot should the diusion of norms be complete. On the other side of the issue
of conditionality, the EU has been gradually recalibrating its approach to enlarge-
ment for these countries and has recently succeeded in gathering leverage for more
eective conditionality. Notwithstanding all this, there are two important caveats:
26
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
(a) the EU needs to be more determinate in its requests and has to empower the
actors of change; and (b) the political strategies aimed at restoring and maintaining
stability are not necessarily compatible with democracy promotion. But what are
the unintended consequences of only partially successful external anchoring? The
governments are more accountable and responsive externally to their EU counter-
parts than to their own citizens. The policy cycles seem to be more attuned to the
issuing of EU’s annual reports than the elections.
The explanatory factors sketched here do not function independently of each other.
Indeed, domestic and external anchoring have fed into each other and have unin-
tentionally created frozen and irresponsible democracies wherein the clienteles at
home and the EU abroad have replaced the citizens in their function of keeping the
government responsible. Finally, the rm grip of clientilistic domestic anchoring seems
to be exactly the core which the local elites are least willing to sacrice in the process
of EU accession, as their power depends on it. Therefore, democratic stagnation is
the dual eect of the demise of the role of citizens in relation to responsiveness and
the mutually neutralising eects of domestic and external anchors.
Bibliography:
B92 (2015). Hahn: “Progress in the normalisation of relations with Kosovo is crucial
for the further progress of Serbia in the European integration process.”
Available at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2015&m-
m=12&dd=10&nav_id=96328.
Balkan Insight (2015). Hahn: Snap Polls Agreed in Macedonia in April, http://www.
balkaninsight.com/en/article/hahn-snap-polls-agreed-in-macedonia-in-april.
Berglund, S. (Ed.). (2013).The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe.
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Bieber, F., & Ristić, I. (2012). Constrained Democracy: The Consolidation of Democracy
in the Yugoslav Successor States.Southeastern Europe,36(3), 373–397.
Checkel J., (2001), “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change”,
International Organization, 55/3.
Crouch, C. (2004).Post-democracy, Cambridge: Polity.
Cvejić, S. (2016). Informal Power Networks, Political Patronage and Clientelism in
Serbia and Kosovo*, SeConS.
Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition.New Haven.
Della Porta, D. & Vannucci, A. (1999). “Corrupt Exchanges: Actors’ Resources and
27
Mechanisms of Political Corruption”, Aldine de Gruyter, New York.
Dolenec, D. (2013).Democratic Institutions and Authoritarian Rule in Southeast
Europe. ECPR Press.
EurActive (2012). Serbia Targets Corruption as Part of EU Integration Drive. Available
at: http://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/opinion/serbia-
targets-corruption-as-part-of-eu-integration-drive/.
Freedom House (2015).Freedom of the Press 2015: Harsh Laws and Violence Drive
Global Decline Rowman & Littleeld, Available at: https://freedomhouse.
org/sites/default/les/FreedomofthePress_2015_FINAL.pdf.
Freedom House (2016).Freedom in the World 2016: The Annual Survey of Politi-
cal Rights and Civil Liberties. Rowman & Littleeld, Available at: https://
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016; Overview
Essay: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/overview-es-
say-anxious-dictators-wavering-democracies.
Freedom House (2016).Macedonia Country report, Freedom of the Press 2016, Avail-
able at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/macedonia.
Freedom House (2016). Nations in Transit 2016 – Serbia Country Report. Available
at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2015/serbia.
Gallup Balkan Monitor (2010). Insights and Perceptions: Voices from the Balkans,
European Fund for the Balkans, Belgrade.
Goati, V. (2008). Političke partije i partijski sistemi, Univerzitet Crne Gore, Fakultet
političkih nauka, Podgorica.
Graziano, L. (1978). Centre–periphery Relations and the Italian Crisis: The Problem
of Clientelism.Territorial Politics in Industrial Nations, 290–326.
Hösch, E., Nehring, K., Sundhaussen, H., & Clewing, K. (2004). Lexikon zur Geschichte
Südosteuropas. Utb.
Huntington, S. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century,
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Iankova, E. A., & Katzenstein, P. J. (2003). European Enlargement and Institutional
Hypocrisy.The State of the European Union,6, 269–290.
Ker-Lindsay, J. (2015). The Commission Appears to Have Thrown Macedonia a Lifeline.
European Western Balkans, Available at: http://europeanwesternbalkans.
com/2015/11/18/experts-react-eu-progress-reports-2015/.
Kitschelt, H. (2001). Divergent Paths of Post-Communist Democracies.Political
Parties and Democracy, 299–323.
Kmezic, M. (2015). Serbia’s EU Progress Report: No Progress for Press Freedom.
EUROPP/LSE, Available at: http://bit.ly/1PBi1im
28
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010).Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after
the Cold War. Cambridge University Press.
Linz, J. & A. Stepan. (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.
Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press).
Mair, P. (2013).Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy. Verso Books.
March, J.G., & Olsen, J.P. (1998). The Institutional Dynamics of International Political
Orders.International organization,52(4), 943–969.
Marčeta, I. (2008) Building Democracy with External Help: Macedonia and Serbia,
Bologna University, unpublished doctoral thesis.
Martini, S., & Quaranta, M. (2013). An Unresponsive Democracy? Explaining the Dy-
namics of Italian Political Discontent: 1973–2012, conference paper, XXVII
Conference of the Società Italiana di Scienza Politica.
McFaul, M. (2002). The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Non-Cooperative
Transitions in the Post-Communist World.World Politics,54(02), 212–244.
Morlino, L. and Magen, A. (2008). “Democratisation, the Rule of Law and International
Actors. An Introduction”, in Morlino, L. and Magen, A. (eds), “Transitions From Hybrid
Regimes: External Inuence and Domestic Constraints in Wider Europe”,
Centre on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli
Institute for International Studies, Stanford.
Morlino L. (1998). “Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis. Parties, Groups
and Citizens in Southern Europe”, Oxford University Press.
Morlino, L. (2011). Changes to Democracy, Oxford University Press
Oe, C. (1996).Modernity and the State: East, West. MIT Press.
Roniger, L. (2004). Political Clientelism, Democracy and the Market Economy. Com-
parative Politics, 353–375.
Sakellariou, A. & Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2014). Democracy in the Western Balkans: An
Overview, ELIAMEP Working Paper No 51, August 2014, Available at: http://
www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/51_2014_-WORKING-PA-
PER-_Sotiropoulos-_Sakellarioudoc.pdf.
Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2005).The Europeanisation of Central and
Eastern Europe. Cornell University Press.
Schimmelfennig, F. (2005). ‘Strategic Calculation and International Socialisation:
Membership
Incentives, Party Constellations and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern
Europe, International Organization, 59(4): 827–860.
Schimmelfennig, F., & Scholtz, H. (2008). EU Democracy Promotion in the Europe-
29
an Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and
Transnational Exchange.European Union Politics,9(2), 187–215.
Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2006). Patronage in South European Bureaucracies in the
1980s and the 1990s: The Politicisation of Central Public Administrations
in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. InNicosia: ECPR Workshops, Available
at: https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/d4cddfc9-3ec5-41e3-8d64-
edc2d4df46.pdf.
Standard Eurobarometer 80 Autumn 2013, Public Opinion in The European Union.
De Sousa, L. (2008).Clientelism and the Quality(ies) of Democracy. Public and Policy
Aspects. DIS Working Paper 2008/2, Centre for the Study of Imperfections
in Democracy, Central European University, Budapest.
Vachudova, M.A. (2005).Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration
after Communism. OUP Oxford.
Vucetic, S. (2004). “From Southern to Southeastern Europe: Any Lessons for De-
mocratisation Theory?” Southeast European Politics 5(2–3): 115–141.
Vukovic, I. (2011), Diverging Party Outcomes in Hybrid Regimes: The Cases of Cro-
atia, Serbia, and Montenegro, Romanian Journal of Political Science, Vol.
11, No. 2, Winter 2011.
Vukovic, I. (2014).Party Outcomes in Hybrid Regimes in the Western Balkans and
Beyond(Doctoral dissertation, Central European University).
World DataBank, Available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx.
Documents:
Declaration, EU–Western Balkans Summit, (2003), Available at: http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm.
European Commission Opinion on Montenegro’s application for membership of the
European Union, COM(2010) 670, (2010), Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlarge-
ment/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/mn_opinion_2010_en.pdf.
EC Press Release 2015, Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
5976_en.htm.
EU Enlargement Strategy 2014, Available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-strategy-pa-
per_en.pdf.
EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, Available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/
key_documents/2015/20151110_strategy_paper_en.pdf.
Macedonia 2015 Report, European Commission, Available at http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_the_former_yugoslav_re-
public_of_macedonia.pdf.
Montenegro 2014 Report, European Commission, Available at http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-montenegro-progress-report_en.pdf.
Montenegro 2015 Report, European Commission, Available at http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_montenegro.pdf.
Serbia 2013 Report, European Commission, Available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlarge-
ment/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/sr_rapport_2013.pdf.
Serbia 2014 Report, European Commission, Available at http://ec.europa.eu/en-
largement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20140108-serbia-progress-report_en.pdf.
Serbia 2015 Report, European Commission, Available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlarge-
ment/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_serbia.pdf.
POLITICAL PARTIES AS
GENERATORS OF SOCIAL
AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS
IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
NERMINA MUJAGIĆ
Associate professor at the University of Sarajevo,
Faculty of Political Science
E-mail: mujagic.nermina@fpn.unsa.ba.
SARINA BAKIĆ
PhD candidate at the University of Sarajevo,
Faculty of Political Science
E-mail: sarinabakic@hotmail.com
Bosnia and Herzegovina
33
POLITICAL PARTIES AS GENERATORS
OF SOCIAL AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Summary
Political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina are parties that generally fail to meet the criteria of
political parties in modern political theory. We usually expect them to take social responsibility.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the dominant ethnic political parties do not have the democratic
capacity to strengthen the political democratic institutions and processes that are vital for
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s economic, political and cultural development and, thereby, its path
towards European integration.
In this text our aim is to explore why political parties produce social and ethnic conict, col-
lective fear, mass mobilisation, hysteria, hatred and civic apathy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In their roles as protectors of the “national or ethnic good”, the dominant political parties in
Bosnia and Herzegovina appear as “the weakest party of the political practice scope.”
Therefore, it seems important to open up a debate on issues such as the limits of tolerance
towards the enemies of democracy. If parties show that their actions are against democracy,
they use the democratic framework of the system, which is bonded with their own demagogy.
Bit it is clear that they do not contribute to the general democratisation of the society. They
are an obstacle to the progress and modernisation of the society. In the democratic transition
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were a lot of previously recognised powers of party groups.
The citizens were left without adequate institutional protection from the promotion of violence,
which came from party organisations. Consequently, it seems important to raise the issue of
“civilising political parties” and to dene the limits of tolerance towards the other position,
politically speaking. Although the answer to this question is dicult, and it is one for more
mature and more stable democracies than the Bosnian one, the rise of right-wing political
parties in developed European countries indicates the signicance of this issue.
Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, political parties, democratisation, tolerance, ethnic conicts
There are two reasons why research into political parties is very provocative: their
history is predominantly associated with crises, and their content with conicts.
French political theorist Daniel-Louis Seiler illustrated ‘the discontent’ with political
parties by a prominent statement, in which political parties are likened to “the unloved
children of democracy”. Maybe it is due to the fact that the term ‘party’ “consists
of something politically unnatural – party is a synonym for division”, and wisdom
has taught us since Plato that “there is nothing worse for the state than that which
divides” (Pierre Avril, in Seiler, 1999: 23). As soon as a party is established, Pierre
34
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
Avril says “it is an opponent”. In French, partir means – to part, to divide, to separate.
At one time, political parties were synonyms for something rebellious, but today,
according to Robert Michels, they are increasingly “combat organisations” (Michels,
1990: 31). Michels’ assertion can assist us in the description and explanation of the
phenomenon of the upswing of the large nationalist parties in Bosnia and Herze-
govina which won the rst multiparty elections.
According to Michels, political parties are organisations that obey tactical rules,
which have an apparatus, a centralised one, which implies a hierarchical structure.
“The martial character of the party and its hierarchical arrangement with centralistic
methods and the types of the decision-making process within very narrow circles
in the party, bring the principles of organisation and democracy into contradiction
(Milardović, 2006: 19). The organisation is like an oligarchy because the party’s au-
thority is mostly oligarchical, and the party ends up under the rule of a democratic
or anti-democratic leader. If we remind ourselves about the leaders of national and
ethnic reestablishments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their extreme inuence on
the masses (in the frame ethnically predisposition), it is noticeable that that took
place at the very time that people in Bosnia and Herzegovina needed someone
to “take them” through the so-called democratisation process. The newly formed
political parties were actually military factions.
Nevertheless, the compulsion to transfer part of our own responsibility onto the
leaders was actually disastrous for the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The masses
began to worship those leaders, and unfortunately, that kind of worship formed
even their everyday life.
As much as nationalist parties were unattractive due to their connection with the
painful and bloody experiences of multiparty democracy, they were ‘capable’, as Weber
would say, of imposing themselves as corporations which ensured their leaders the
power to achieve particular and general interests, with ethnic/national interests as
the main and general ones during the tripartite system in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Yet, it seemed that those three corporations could only be temporary ones because
they arose out of circumstances – hence the break up of one ideological system,
which occurred in many socialist and communist societies, especially after the fall
of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Time showed and still shows that the parties in Bosnia
and Herzegovina are more than temporary. In addition to this theoretical reection,
we are able to notice that these political parties were for a long time a synonym for
the “new democracy” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of the fact that their
largest expansion was related to the deaths and killings of the ethnic groups that
they represent. Their aim was not only to create a new form of political rule, but
to reshape the existing self-management socialist governance into a pro-capitalist
system of ethnic self-governance that implied the redistribution of territories and
resources on a virtually ethnic basis.
The political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not the political subjects usually
35
recognised in modern political theory. Hence, a political party, which in its programme
and actions is directed towards the development of democratic institutions, pro-
cedures and values, should constantly provide rm contributions towards these
particular goals.
Due to the fact that that political democracy is a product of interactions between
parties as organisations, we could state that political parties directly and indirectly
participate in the manufacturing of social conicts, mass mobilisation and civic ap-
athy in our country. Sometimes it is obvious that political realities, political parties
in post-socialist and post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina are “the weakest fragment
of political practice”, which reminds us of Lefor’s thought that “power in democracy
is not in the people’s hands – it is an empty space” and demagoguism and lies very
easily ll that empty space (according to F. Cunningham, 2003). This is the reason
why political parties, particularly nationalist ones, present themselves as “state cre-
ators”, as parties with the support of all the national corpuses and electoral bodies
and as the only protectors of “all national benets and interests”.
According to Blondel and Cotta, at the root of every political party there is the
“presence of deep social conict” (Blondel & Cotta, 2000: 17), they are the “ex-
pression of certain social conict”, but at the same time, they can be instruments
of integration within the same society. The failure of the political parties in Bosnia
and Herzegovina to be an integrating factor reveals one important fact about the
political parties’ democracy and their relationship towards conicts and issues of
conict in general, in agreement with Milardovic’s statement that “conicts (neg-
ative energy) and all the polarities within the structure of a particular society are
the energy source that is used by all political parties” (Milardović, 2006: 23). That is
why these political parties are not capable of updating themselves, changing into
parties of a dierent democracy.
Lipset and Rokkan wrote that political parties form along lines of conict (Lipset &
Rokkan, 1967). Territorial and cultural reshaping is conditioned by the creation of a
nation, and in the context of functionality, it is a “consolidation of national territo-
ries”. The creation of nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina unfortunately resulted in a
bloody war and our ethnic parties still have disputes and conicts over the territorial
arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Taking into account that the political and social structure of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina’s society is not liberal – it limits individual rights, human freedoms, justice and
equality; the state constitution/structure is actually a basic link between parties, but
also between political researchers and analysts. Political opinions and views on the
Dayton Peace Agreement and the state structure are quite diametrically opposed,
therefore the Constitutional Law – Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement – is
the most used political narrative within discussions of various issues. Other rele-
vant political topics, which would prole political parties as right, left or centre, are
excluded from the public sphere, because the “vital national interest” is, according
to them, the only interest for the country. The term “vital national interest” is used
36
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
in rhetoric more or less equally by the SDA and HDZ BiH, SDS, Party for BiH, SNSD
and even the SDP – because the rules and regulations of the state’s electoral system
also place ‘left-wing political parties’ within the ethno-national political framework.
This ethno-national design very often works as an ‘invisible force’ which gathers
together citizens. This kind of design leaves no space for political freedoms, because
all freedoms and rights are connected exclusively to ethnic, private, and familial
interests, political parties’s links, bonds and mutual interests.
Political parties with a mostly Bosniak electorate claim that the Dayton Peace
Agreement is the product of pressure from the international community to force
the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina into ethnic divisions, and therefore that kind
of state structure has no historical or economic justication. The only bases for this
kind of Bosnia and Herzegovina are aggression and genocide.
Political parties with a majority Croatian electorate consider that the Dayton Peace
Agreement opened up the question of the Croatian nation but to Croatia’s disad-
vantage. Accumulated discontent is strengthening requests for a third entity.
Political parties with Serbs as their electorate consider the entity of Republika
Srpska as a territorial and legal continuity existing since 1992 right up until the
present day, which did not come into existence with the Dayton Peace Agreement,
as the Bosniaks and Croats claim, but was merely veried by that agreement, so its
existence cannot be questioned.
In addition to this, ‘vital national interests’ prevented implementation of an important
issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s society, the judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights on the application by Dervo Sejdić and Jakob Finci (representatives
of non-constitutional people in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Roma and Jews), issued
on 22 December 2009. The implementation of the Sejdic–Finci judgment forms
part of the reform packages which would have guaranteed substantive progress
towards Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU membership. None of the political parties in
Bosnia and Herzegovina showed any interest in this case, ignoring completely the
importance of this specic and signicant matter.
Therefore, when researching political parties in various contexts, attention should
be predominantly devoted towards the forms of conict regulations and conict
content. Through this, we are able to gain an accurate answer as to whether these
parties are liberal or totalitarian.
Anđelko Milardović states: “identication with a particular political group, eld of
conict, lines of conicts and distinctions are the source of existence and survival
of political parties” (Milardović, 2006: 16). The kind of topics that are of interest to
political parties (right, left, elite, mass, populist, etc.) and the character of the dis-
cussions related to these conicts are the key factors in their position and survival.
However, although some political theorists have advocated for the end of political
parties, this is a false notion – power is a natural phenomenon. As Weber stated,
37
they are “the children of democracy and of the general right to vote” (Weber, 1999:
159) and consequently it is not possible to deny their existence. But, the manner
in which they function in society – their policy content – should be the focus of
researchers in order to prevent a waning in condence and belief in multiparty and
parliamentarian democracy among political parties.
The political culture and the political and parliamentary life in Bosnia and Herze-
govina are far from developed, according to contemporary political theory. From
their beginning up until the present day there has been no major step forward in
the organisation of political parties. It seems that political pluralism does not ac-
tually exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina because political parties are formed mostly
along ethnic and religious lines (Šačić, 2006). In the ethno-national spectrum of
the political parties, in a country without a tradition of true political pluralism, it is
dicult to talk about any kind of typology – which is not really a good position.
But it is something that we share with the rest of the world. Experience constantly
shows that both right-wing and left-wing political parties can become totalitarian
by virtue of transformations of the parties from within. Consequently, there are
examples where right-wing political parties are often advocating for solidarity and
social equality, which were previously ‘reserved’ only for left-wing political parties.
French theorist Jean Laponce showed in research that this right–left dimension
has its roots purely in cultural heritage. Also, theory shows that political parties are
de-ideologised (Orlović, 2007), so according to their structure and function they
are more like corporations. That is why in the eld of political science in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, most research deals with the subject of party representation in
the media and what parties’ relationships towards the public are like. The power
of “political gladiators” is growing with the increased role of the internet. At the
same time, intellect and capacity are becoming less important, because things
like verbal duels that are intolerant and primitive, and aggression and noise by the
media count for more in the media-dominated world of politics. There is very little
scientic research that deals with the source of the problem.
The experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina shows out that a large number of political
parties are a complete farce. The new democracy of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a
liberal one according to many criteria. According to Šarčević, there is a constitutional
ethnicisation of the society, an internationalisation of the state law, temporality, the
legalisation of war crimes and war aims, ethnic-consensus democracy, ethnic de-
termination of political decisions, assistance from abroad, loss of state sovereignty,
constant violation of human rights and legal contradictions of constitutional solu-
tions” (Šarčevič, 2010. p. 427).
To remind readers about multiparty democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the
1990s: the victorious political parties at the rst multiparty elections – the SDA BiH,
HDZ BiH and SDS BiH – truly appeared as opponents of the Yugoslav regime at that
time, whose paradigm was the Communist Party. Some other parties also appeared
at that elections, but the major victory was attained by three nationalist parties
presented in the public sphere as the representatives of the three main national
38
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
groups living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The SDA represented the Bosniaks, the SDS
represented the Bosnian Serbs and the HDZ represented the Bosnian Croats. In the
second decade of the tripartite system of governance, there was a fragmentation
in our political parties, so the establishment of new parties such as Stranka za BiH,
HDZ 90 and SNSD, which were at one time ‘opposing’ parties too, is noticeable.
Today analysts mostly agree that these new political parties are branches of the
three previously mentioned parties, but still in certain crisis situations, the dominant
ethnic political parties have been more interested in arguing their own personal
pretensions to represent “our people” than in opposing other political parties. In
the third phase there was an inuence from the SDP BiH (superseded by the Union
of Communists of BiH), but political reality has convinced us that even this political
party is not ready to change the procedures and mechanisms of ethno-national
parties that this left-wing party was very much against in the election campaigns.
Furthermore, compromises made with nationalist parties have denitely eroded the
credibility of this left-wing political party in the public sphere. The citizens of Bosnia
and Herzegovina trusted that the SDP BiH would implement vital reforms for the
country, but they lost their moral and ethical compass, performing their activities
mostly in the manner of a corporation: from the aspect of its own interests.
In the area of the ethno-territorial fragmentations of the populus, none of the
parties in the context of the whole electoral body is able to count on a monocracy.
Therefore, the requirement for coalitions exists in order to maintain the regime’s
dominant position. This kind of coalition serves no other purpose than to sustain
and reproduce the ethno-political regime without any arguments being raised. The
dierent identity-based politics of multiethnic and monoethnic political parties
should be an obstacle to the politics of coalitions, but practice constantly shows that
power is stronger and sweeter than all the dierences in their identity proles. This
kind of politics is destined for failure, because it is not able to eectively inuence
the real association in the society and the acceptance of reality in the context of
pro-liberal and social democracy.
John Keane, in his book The Life and Death of Democracy, describes what actu-
ally happened to the political parties in the USA during the period of their revival
and prosperity. According to the main thesis of this author, the ‘system of political
party patronage’ explains why the level of participation by the American public in
the 19th century was very high. “Parties were mainly the major tool for an inuence,
and sometimes they were like a state of prosperity and welfare within the state
itself” (Keane, 2009: 331). An election victory was a synonym for employment, the
awarding of public contracts, the gaining of licences – in one word, it was all about
loyalty, just as it is today in Bosnia and Herzegovina. People become members of
political parties in order to achieve various kinds of personal gain: in order to get a
job, to have a better status with medical services, education, to earn money, to have
an advantage in public tenders, etc. Unfortunately, the best way to attain civic rights
in Bosnia and Herzegovina is within political parties, not through state institutions.
In the context of political science, our political parties are “splintering the state”
without any particular “ideological content” taking over their primary functions.
39
After each election when those parties win comprehensively, we always wonder
what the secret of their success is; particularly of those political parties that are a
direct threat to democracy. Why does contemporary democracy not abrogate those
political parties that are actually a threat to the state and its structures? Germany’s
experience shows that the state has the right to supervise or control radical political
parties or groups, especially if their activities jeopardise the stability of democracy,
or the legal or democratic system. In that case, the Constitutional Court can prohibit
their activities.
Very often, in public debates, especially with topics regarding the social and political
crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, discussion usually ends up going in one of two
directions: eradication of the political parties, or the formation of a completely new
party to change the situation in the country, which is constantly rising according to
numerous indicators. With our political parties, the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina
is in the crisis of “national state development”. By this term we are referring to the
process that started after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 when many communist
countries had to reorganise their own classical models of national state building and
development that dated back to the 19th century. Due to several important historical
moments, such as: the territorial pretensions of Serbia and Croatia towards Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the aggression and war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992–1995,
the stratied ethnic structure, an insuciently developed civil society, the incoher-
ency of the international community, etc., Bosnia and Herzegovina has had and still
has the issue of how to develop a Bosnian identity (Šačić, 2006).
In the context of what has been said, it is important to stress the fact that Bosnia and
Herzegovina, with today’s political parties in power and their huge war trophies and
enormous responsibility, is constantly failing to disentangle itself from the “crisis of
national state development” – in other words national and state integration – which
imply a functional state and civic society with the rule of law and not the law of rule.
It also implies individual rights before collective ones, the creation of satisfactory
and suitable social policies towards equality and justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In conclusion, the political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina still remain chained
to conicts and disagreements. They are ends in themselves. In the case of national
integration, these political parties have to be made functional. That would lead to
their removal due to their massive accountability and responsibility for the general
condition in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s society and the unstable democracy produced
by their leaders as those most responsible.
Naturally, there is no parliamentary democracy in the world without political parties,
so their withdrawal and abandonment is not a serious or common sense approach.
In theory, their existence is unavoidable and inevitable. They are the “conditio sine
qua non of the functioning of a representative system” (Seiler, 1999: 2).
Moreover, according to many political theorists, these political parties are born with
discontinuity through the totalitarianism or dictatorships. But, political parties appear
40
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
when respect towards citizens is absent, so their leaders rush to create imitations of
pluralism. That is the moment when pseudo-modern political parties or movements
appear, which are actually part of the system, and not the carriers of reform ideas.
Bibliography:
Aron, Raymond. (1996). Demokracija i totalitarizam, Zagreb: Politička kultura.
Blondel,Jean and Cotta, Maurizio. (2000). The Nature of Party Government: A
Comparative European Perspective, London. Palgrave Macmillan.
Bobbio, Norberto. (1995). Desnica in Levica: razlogi in promeni političnega razliko-
vanja, Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče.
Cunningham, Frank. (2003), Teorija demokratije, Beograd. Filip Višnjić.
Keane, John. (2009). The Life and Death of Democracy, London, Sydney, New York,
Toronto: Pocket Books.
Lipset, Seymour, Martin, and Rokkan, Stein. (1967). Party systems and voter align-
ments: Cross-national perspectives. Toronto. The Free Press.
McNair, Brian. (2003). Uvod u političku komunikaciju, Zagreb: Politička misao.
Meyer, Thomas. (2003). Mediokracija: medijska kolonizacija politike, Zagreb: Politička
misao.
Michels, Robert. (1990). Sociologija partija u savremenoj demokratiji. Istraživanja
o oligarhijskim tendencijama u životu skupina, Zagreb: Informator/FPZ.
Milardović, Anđelko. (2006). Političke stranke u doba tranzicije i globalizacije, Zagreb,
Centar za politološka istraživanja.
Orlović, Slaviša. (2002). Političke partije i moć, Beograd, Jugoslovensko udruženje
za političke nauke i Čigoja štampa.
Pavlović, Vukašin, ed. 2006. Političke institucije i demokratija. Beograd: Fakultet
političkih nauka.
Radosavljević, Duško. (2001). Elite i transformacija: slučajevi Poljske, Mađarske i
Srbije, Ilida Štampa, Inđija.
Šačić, Nermina. (2006). Izvan politike, Sarajevo, Fakultet političkih nauka.
Šarčević, Edin. (2010). Ustav iz nužde: Konsolidacija javnog prava Bosne i Herce-
govine, Sarajevo: Rabic: ECLD.
Seiler, Daniel-Louis. (1999). Političke stranke, Zagreb/Osjek/Split: Pan liber.
Street, John. (2003). Masovni mediji, politika i demokracija, Zagreb: Politička misao.
Weber, Max. (1999). Vlast i politika (ed. Vjeran Katunarić), Zagreb, Naklada Jesenski
i Turk/HSD.
Weber, Max. (2001). Politika kao poziv, Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk.
Perspectives for
Development of Intra-Party
Democracy in Montenegro
ZLATKO VUJOVIĆ
Faculty of Political Science (Podgorica)
University of Montenegro (UCG)
&
Center for Monitoring and Research CeMI
zlatko@cemi.co.me
NIKOLETA TOMOVIĆ
Faculty of Humanistic Studies (Podgorica)
University of Donja Gorica (UDG)
&
Center for Monitoring and Research CeMI
nikoleta@cemi.co.me
43
Perspectives for Development of
Intra-Party Democracy in Montenegro
Summary
Intra-party democracy represents neglected area of research, especially in countries that
are in process of democratic consolidation or on start of Europeanization process. Parties
represent closed systems which are not allowing those outside to follow and analyses pro-
cess within them. Thanks to the CCS research we can have insight analyzing experience and
attitudes of candidates for MP positions in some countries including as well as Montenegro.
In this article which represents part of wider research are analyzed statues of key political
parties in Montenegro, following methodology used in analyzing same process in Croatia
before. Comparison of key Montenegrin parties is showing that they represent organization
with lack of internal democracy, or following classication they t in low democracy type (3)
and in individual elitist type (3). Neither one of analyzed parties gains score allowing it to be
set in democratic centralism, or full democracy type. Further development of internal – party
democracy is depending from institutional incentives (legal changes) as well as those coming
from international associations to which Montenegrin parties belong.
Introduction
Montenegro represents a very interesting example of a party system, at least in
Europe. This is the only country in Europe ruled in continuity, (since introduction
of multiparty system in 1990), by the same political party – transformed League of
Communists of Montenegro, now under a new name Democratic Party of Socialists
(DPS), with a charismatic leader Milo Djukanovic. Exactly this fact makes the party
system analysis somewhat awed because, at least at the rst glance, it is distinctive
for the lack of the full competitiveness. One party, mostly due to abuse of the state
resources, rules for such a long time. However, it is not the only cause of its success.
DPS successfully “plays” the card of the divergence of the opposition, major part of
which is even today mostly dominated by former supporters of Slobodan Milosevic,
searching for the new patron in current leader of Russia Vladimir Putin. Exactly these
discrepancies, previously independence/union with Serbia (SRJ), or now NATO and
EU vs. close cooperation with Russia, are blocking the change of the government.
Ruling DPS enjoys support of the EU and US, despite numerous corruption aairs,
because it represents the strongest and the most reliable partner in Montenegro,
when it comes to NATO and EU accession. Thus, its domination over opposition is
not surprising, despite numerous harsh critics coming from ocial Brussels and
Washington on the account of the level of achieved freedoms and rule of law in
Montenegro. When it comes to classication, we will use Sartori’s (2002) typology.
44
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
If we apply this typology, Montenegrin party system today can be characterized as
a “predominant-party system” 1 (read more: Vujović 2015: 50).
Theoretical framework
The issue of the intraparty relations and intraparty democracy is still almost unex-
amined, both in old democratic states and in countries of so-called new democracy.
There are very few academic works which dene adequate criteria and standards
for classication of the intra-party relations and for dening the level of the inter-
nal democracy in political parties themselves. Even when it comes to the term of
intraparty democracy itself, there is no unied and universally accepted denition
among authors on what makes the intraparty democracy and what are the standards
which parties should fulll in its internal functioning. In such way, there are dierent
approaches to dening of the term of intraparty democracy. Most certainly, the term
of intra-party democracy should be researched as one of the main elements of demo-
cratic society, i.e. a very important indicator of respect for the democratic procedures
of decision-making in public interest at the national level. When it comes to dening
of the intra-party democracy, Susan Scarrow considers that intraparty democracy
is a “broad term describing a big scope of methods for inclusion of members into
the intraparty process of deliberation and decision-making” (Scarrow 2005: 3). At
the same time Scarrow considers that political parties, characterized by intra-party
democracy, have more possibilities for achievement of better election results.
On the other hand, there are authors advocating for the view that distinct elements
of intra-party democracy imply higher participation of party membership in the
process of decision-making, which inuences to the weakening of the cohesion of
parliamentary parties, loss of power of the party leadership and selection of unreli-
able person to the position of the party leader, which car result in distancing of the
party from its electorate (Vujović, Tomović 2015:155).
When it comes to denition of criteria on basis of which it is possible to classify
intra-party relations, Susan Scarrow denes three dimensions on the basis of which
the political parties can be compared. Those three dimensions are: inclusiveness,
centralization and institutionalization (Scarrow 2005: 6). Inclusiveness implies level
of inclusion of party members into the decision-making processes, centralization is
referring to level of powers distribution among party bodies in the decision-making
processes, while institutionalization implies party autonomy from other stakeholders,
level of internal organizational development, level to which voters are identied
1 „Party system in Montenegro should be considered as a multiparty system with a dominant party, even
though numerous allegations for abuses during electoral process are opening space for introduction
of characteristics of hegemonic party” This is above all characteristic of the system with a hegemonic
party, in which “not only does alternation occur in fact; it cannot occur” (Sartori, 2002: 204)”( Vujović,
2015:50).
45
with the party and level to which electorate perceives the party as the important
social player (Scarrow 2005: 6). Based on these three dimensions Scarrow diers
between parties which have given the power of decision-making to the party leader
and parties characterized by the large number of structures which have the right
to adopt decisions; furthermore, she diers between centralized, decentralized and
stratarchic parties (Vujović, Tomović: 160), and in the end between parties with high
level of institutionalization and parties with low level of institutionalization.
Except of Susan Scarrow, the dimensions and criteria of intra-party democracy
were dened by Goran Cular too. His model is bi-dimensional and implies dierence
between the dimension of autonomy and the dimension of inclusion. The dimension
of inclusion refers to horizontal aspects of the political party, and it indicates number
of members of political party included in the decision-making process and implies
dierence in the scope of powers given to wider party bodies in comparison with
scope of powers enjoyed by inner circle of the party management (Čular, 2004: 35).
Dimension of autonomy refers to vertical distribution of power, i.e. it deals with the
issue of autonomy of parts of the party at dierent levels and, as stated by Čular, in
which way the “party in the eld” can inuence decisions-making processes at the
dierent levels within the party.
For both dimensions, Čular denes series of indicators in the following manner:
DIMENSION OF AUTONOMY: Within the dimension of autonomy we can dier
between three sub-dimensions: the rights and the protection of party members,
autonomy of the local party level and direct inuence of the local bodies to the
decision making process at the national party level.
Indicators for the dimension of autonomy:
a) Members’ rights - indicators: general rights, rights to form factions, protection
of members against disciplinary measures.
b) Autonomy of the local level: autonomy in decision-making (about local structure,
in disciplinary procedures, in selection procedures for local election and about
local coalitions), prerogatives of higher level in local aairs (in the procedure of
disclosure of local organizations, in election and replacing local leadership, in
calling local conventions, in local decision-making, in the coordination of local
activities, party ocials from higher levels, ex ocio members of local bodies).
c) Inuence of the local level on the central party - indicators: through the elec-
tion of representatives for party conventions, through the election of members
of the central political and executive bodies, through the role in the selection
procedure for national elections, through initiatives in calling national conven-
tions and amending the statute.
DIMENSION OF INCLUSION: Within this dimension we can nd three sub-dimensions:
46
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
the direct role of members in the decision-making process, the prerogatives of the
conventions of members or delegates vs. the executive bodies and the concentration
of power in the hands of the party president. If we observe intra-party democra-
cies through the lenses of these sub-dimensions on the one end of the scale there
would be parties with the most decisions passed by the membership assemblies,
the direct elections and the constrained party president, while on the opposite end
there would be parties with power mostly concentrated within the narrow circles
of executives, the indirect system of representation and the president with strong
powers and privileges (Čular, 2004: 36).
Indicators for the dimension of inclusion:
a) Direct participation of members – indicators: in direct decision-making and
elections, in the selection procedures, in initiatives towards the central level.
b) Prerogatives of conventions vs. executive bodies -indicators: at the central
level: in passing statute and political programs, in the election of members of
the central political and executive bodies, in the selection procedures; at the
local level: in the election of members of local executive bodies, in the election
of representatives for conventions at a higher level, in the selection procedures.
c) Power of the President – indicators: in personal matters: the right to propose/
appoint a vice-president, the right to propose/appoint other members of the
central bodies, the right to suspend/replace/exclude a member; in the selection
procedure: at the central level, at the local level; other prerogatives.
In accordance to this three-dimensional structure, on one side are the parties with
members of representative bodies that have powers of decision-making on all key
issues, implementation of direct elections, and president of which has limited powers
and possibilities of the independent actions, while on the other hand there are parties
in which inner management circle, or executive bodies adopt all key decisions, apply
indirect system of representation and president of which has signicant powers and
privileges (Čular, 2004: 36). In accordance with dimensions and indicators Čular
diers between four types of political parties, dependent on the level of intra-party
democracy which characterizes them:
1. “Low democracy” type (low level of autonomy and low level of inclusion);
2. “Democratic centralism” type (low level of autonomy and high level of
inclusion).
3. “Individualist-elitist” type of party (high level of autonomy and low level
of inclusion);
4. “Full democracy” type and (high level of autonomy and high level of in-
clusion).
47
Graph 1: Two dimensions and types of intra-party democracy
“individualist-elitist” type “full democracy” type
“low democracy” type “democratic centralism” type
Dimension of inclusion
Dimension of autonomy
Source: Čular (2004:35)
In order to obtain clearer picture on situation regarding intra-party relations in
Montenegro, and also compare this situation with Croatia, Serbia and other ex-YU
countries, Cular’s model, dimensions and indicators will be used in order to charac-
terize intra-party relations in Montenegro.
Besides the analysis of the party regulation, this essay will also treat the issue of
inuence of the electoral system in Montenegro to position of representatives inside
of the parties, i.e. how stimulating it is for development of intra-party democracy.
In fourth part, we will use ndings of CSS in order to get acquainted with attitudes of
MP candidates (in 2012 elections) in issue of intra-party democracy in their parties.
Impact of party laws on intra-party democracy
This part of essay is dedicated to analysis of party regulations, i.e. statutes. Through
the analysis of statutory competencies of key party bodies of Montenegrin parties,
we will dene the key elements of intra-party relations and rank Montenegrin parties
in relation to the degree of the intra-party democracy which characterizes them.
It is important to point out that Montenegro is not part of the small number of
48
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
countries, which regulate some intra-party relations (e.g. selection of candidates)
by the law (Finland, Norway, Germany or USA). The parties have full autonomy to
regulate processes of selection of candidates, election of the party management or
dening of party politics. Or, vice-versa parties have full freedom to regulate these
processes in inadequate way. Thus, the high importance of the party regulations
for intra-party democracy in Montenegro is not surprising.
The party system enriched with numerous political parties, however it can’t be
labeled as institutionalized2. Exactly for this reason we decided to analyze statutes
of just one part of political parties. In selection we used only two criteria: (1) that
the party has parliamentary status in the last three election cycles (2) that the party
has more than two representatives in national parliament. In such way we selected
six parties for analysis, avoiding parties which use type of reserved seats: DPS, SDP,
NOVA, SNP, PzP i BS. Out of these parties, 3 were part of governing coalition3 (DPS,
SDP i BS), and three are from opposition (NOVA, SNP, PzP). Also, two parties are
representing “pro-Serbian” electorate (NOVA i SNP), and one party represents the
national minority (BS), which didn’t obtain parliamentary status through institute
of the “reserved seat”, but by the fact that its results exceeded legal threshold of
3% applicable to parties which do not represent a national minority.
Using already presented Čular’s model, we have rstly examined the dimension of
autonomy in respect to dened sub-dimensions and set criteria.
Namely, when we speak about sub-dimension of rights of the party members, by
analysis of statutory provisions of Montenegrin parties, it can be noted that all
parties dene similar conditions which regulate both the procedure of enrollment
and rights and duties of party members. Statutes are stipulating that members
have the right to participate in implementation of program and goals of the party,
to participate in creation and implementation of policies, to elect and to be elected
into party bodies and to equally participate in party activities. On the other hand,
2 „ As we can see, for Montenegrin party system we can’t claim that it has been fully institutionalized. On
one hand we have the stable position of the ruling coalition, where DPS rules since introduction of the
multipartism and SDP since its entrance into the coalition in 1998. On the other hand, the opposition
is constantly in the run for electorat format which would provide it the possibility for electoral victory.
Due to continuous failures and political experiments, some of the key oppositional parties have
disappeared from the political scene (LSCG i NS). Thus, we can conclude that political parties have
many priblems in structuring, while voters (especially from pro-Serbian electorate) have the problem
to identify with a concrete party. In such a way it can be explained that SNP in one elections gets 29
seats in the Parliament, 8 on the next ones, 16 at the elections after that and then again nine“ (Vujović,
2015:54).
3 During 2015, Montenegro passed a dicult political crisis, marked wth the lack of public trust into
electoral process, as well as with accussations that elections for the President (2013) were falsied
by the ruling DPS. In order to overcome the crisis, a parliamentary dialogue between the government
and part of the opposition was established. This dialogue resulted in the formation of the Government
of electoral trust which included the ruling party and a number of parties from current opposition
(URA, DEMOS and SDP). The opposition has been given following positions: Deputy Prime Minister,
Minister of Interior, Agriculture, Labor and Social Welfare, but also many positions on the lower level
in the executive or the government at the local level, the key public enterprises and public institutions.
Regular parliamentary elections, implemented by the government of electoral trust will be held on
16/10/2016.
49
statutes are dening duties of party members, and in such manner party members
are obliged to implement programmatic goals of the party, that they will accept
program and statute of the party, that they will advocate and actively implement
party’s policies and all decisions of its bodies, that they will work on the increase
of the membership and achievement of electoral successes, that they will preserve
reputation of the party etc. Even though none of the parties stipulates formation
of fractions with the party, parties are granting full freedom of expression to their
members as well as the possibility of review of the majority’s decisions, or the de-
cisions of the party bodies.4 In case of violation of member duties, dened by the
statutes, parties are foreseeing dierent measures against their members such as
self-initiated withdrawal, exclusion (DPS, Bosniac Party) or erasing from the registry
(SDP, PZP, New Serbian democracy).
In relation to sub-dimension of autonomy of party’s local level, which is being assessed
with respect to autonomy in the decision-making process and scope of powers of
higher levels of party management in decision-making on local issues, we can no-
tice that decision-making power in Montenegrin parties is concentrated within the
central party bodies, which is mostly reected in the process of dissolution of local,
i.e. municipal boards. This is also the case when we look into the inuence of local
party bodies to decision-making processes at the national level, especially when it
comes to the election of the party president. Namely, possibilities of direct election
of the candidate for certain positions are almost inexistent, while the procedure of
candidacy itself is under strict control of central party bodies. In most of the cases
(DPS, SDP, PzP) key role is played by the main boards in determination of the list of
the candidates for the president, as well as in the election of the main party bodies,
determination of criteria and proportions in appointment of members.
Looking into key criteria of the dimension of inclusiveness, and in analysis of the
direct participation of members of the political party in decision-making processes,
we analyzed representative bodies which belong to lower (local) levels of the party,
i.e. their size, delegated powers and privileges, as well as frequency of their sessions,
taking in consideration that all other party bodies are elected by the indirect model
of representation. Representative bodies at the lower level of organization are most
frequently electoral conferences constituted out of the elected representatives of
the local organizations, while criteria, size and manner of election of their members
are determined by the municipal boards.
In DPS and SNP only direct activities of members are election of local i.e. municipal
electoral conferences. In the local structure of the New Serbian Democracy, the
situation is similar. Representatives of the municipal organizations are determined
by the executive board, which indicates inexistence of the direct participation of the
membership. Direct participation of the members of SDP depends on the size of
the local i.e. municipal organizations of the party, because municipal organizations
of SDP counting less than 100 members the Convention of the given municipality is
constituted out of all members of SDP. In bigger municipal organizations, municipal
4 Statutes and founding acts of DPS, SDP, Nove, SNP, PzP, BS were analyzed
50
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
conventions are composed out of delegates determined by the municipal boards.
Similar situation is encountered in Movement for Changes (PzP) where all members
participate in election of the municipal board of smaller municipal organizations. In
bigger municipal organizations, their representative bodies are functioning on the
principle of delegates. Similarly in Bosniak Party, assembly of communal organiza-
tions are all party members in given community, while municipal bodies are formed
on the principle of representatives.
In our analysis of the sub-dimension criteria we have examined scope of power en-
trusted with representative bodies versus executive bodies of Montenegrin parties,
we have looked in the powers of the representative bodies in election of members
of political and executive bodies, possibilities of initiation of the Statute adoption,
political program of the party, as well as powers entrusted to members when it comes
to selection of candidates. In all analyzed Montenegrin parties, (DPS, SDP, SNP, PzP,
Nova, Bosniak Party), national representative body adopts programmatic documents
and statute of the party and then it elects majority of political and executive bodies.
In election of the vice-president congresses DPS, PzP and Nova are electing the
president and vice-presidents, while congresses of SDP, SNP and Bosniak Party are
electing the president of the party, while its vice-president is elected by the Main
Board. However, members of the management bodies of the DPS, SDP, and Bosniak
Party are elected by their main boards, not by their congresses. Only in the case of
PzP, the representative body elects members of the management.
Regarding powers in the process of selection of the candidates for the party
members, adoption of the party lists and verication of candidates for the local i.e.
parliamentary elections, they are more entrusted with the executive party bodies,
and not representative ones. The strong position of executive bodies is feature of
almost all parties. Namely, main boards are calling for the elections for members of
the party, determining criteria and procedures for election of members of the party
bodies, determining party candidate for the president of Montenegro, determining
criteria and method of nomination of the candidates for councilors and representa-
tives, verifying representatives’ and councilors’ list, verifying candidate of the party
for the president and vice-president of the Parliament and party candidates for the
Prime Minister and members of the Government. The same procedure is applied on
the local level regarding councilors’ lists of parties, determined by municipal boards.
When it comes to scope of powers of representative bodies on the local level in
domain of election of members of the local executive bodies, election of members
of the nation representative body of the party, as well as in the process of selection
of candidates, we can conclude that local representative bodies are entrusted with
very limited powers. In most of the cases (DPS, SDP, SNP, BS, Nova), municipal boards
are elected and controlled by the municipal electoral bodies, while remaining pow-
ers of this sub-dimension are kept by executive bodies of the local organizational
party structures.
In the end we analyzed powers of the party presidents, when it comes to nomination
51
of vice-presidents, nomination of members of the central party bodies, possibilities of
exclusion, or suspension of members, inuence to selection procedures on the local
and central level and remaining powers. Presidents of political parties in Montenegro,
have very distinctive concentration of powers. They almost in all cases symbolize
the party, so almost all parties are recognized by their presidents (Vujović, Tomović:
174). They are elected by the highest representative bodies of the party (Congress,
i.e. Assembly). In earlier research, in respect to the scope of statutory jurisdictions of
president we made categorization of Montenegrin parties. In such way we dened
which are the “presidential” parties in Montenegro which grant signicant powers
to their presidents, who upon their appointment by the Congress are electing re-
maining executive bodies of the party, in order to implement the program dened
by the congress (Vujović, Tomović: 175). In such way we concluded that milder ver-
sions of presidentialism are present in DPS, SDP and SNP, where president of SDP
possesses much higher powers, especially in the procedure of election of executive
bodies’ members, but also in the procedures of candidate selection. In relation to the
powers of president to elect members of the executive bodies, the highest powers
are entrusted to presidents of SNP and SDP. These parties are giving signicant
powers to president to convene and preside over other executive bodies at the
national or local level, as well as to appoint members of some executive bodies and
to be members of these bodies ex ocio at the same time. This creates a situation
in which presidents in signicant measure control decision-making processes in all
central party bodies (Vujović, Tomović: 175).
Presidents with fewer powers stipulated by the statutory provisions are presidents
of PzP, Bosniak Party, and New Serbian Democracy. Their presidents can’t control
election of members and constitution of the key bodies of executive bodies, and
their powers in selection of candidates are very limited. Their small statutory pow-
ers are reected in the fact that presidents of these parties even don’t have the
power to initiate disciplinary procedures or suspension of party members (Vujović,
Tomović: 176).
Through analysis of their statutory provisions against dened indicators of intra-par-
ty democracy, Montenegrin parties can be classied as parties with very low level
of intra part-democracy, despite the fact that current practices of Montenegrin
parties are frequently showing a dierent picture (Vujović, Tomović: 176). Namely,
Montenegrin parties are characterized by the low level of inclusiveness (highest
level of inclusion has SDP, while the least level of inclusiveness is noted in PzP) and
high level of centralization (especially in following parties: NOVA, DPS, SDP, PzP,
BS). In relation to the Cular’s categorization of parties to parties of low democracy,
democratic centralism parties, and individualist- elitist parties, Montenegrin parties
can be divided into parties of the low democracy (SDP, SNP, NOVA), i.e. individual-
ist- elitist parties (DPS, BS i PzP).
52
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
Table 1: Dimension of inclusion and dimension of autonomy: Political parties in Montenegro
DPS SDP BS SNP NOVA PzP
Dimension of inclusion
Members’rights
1 1 1 1 0 0
Autonomy of local level
121 1 0 0
Local level inuence on
central party
1 1 1
121
Total
3 4 3 3 2 1
Dimension of autonomy
Direct participation of
members
212 2 0 1
Conventions vs. executives
1 1 1 1 1 2
Power of the president
21212 2
Total
5 3 5 4 3 5
Vujović, Tomović: (2016: 175)
Having in mind very low level of intra-party democracy, it is very important to provide
conditions for higher degree of activism of party members in Montenegro in selection
of candidates, election of the party management and dening of party’s decisions.
However, looking into the history of Montenegrin parliamentarism, and having in
mind obvious independence of parties from donors, even from its electorate, due to
signicant nancing of political parties from budgetary funds, democratization of
political parties will be a very long and complex procedure. Current Law on Political
Parties doesn’t recognize provisions which would make the procedures of intra-party
democracy obligatory for the parties, and political will for such amendments in the
Law is inexistent. Thus both legal obligations for parties’ managements to democ-
ratize internal procedures of functioning and decision-making, as well as political
will to do so, are lacking.
In the graph below, one can see that all political parties are situated within left/
lower half of the space, dominantly in the quadrant reserved for the party with low
intra-party democracy.
53
Graphic 2: Dimension of inclusion and dimension of autonomy:
Political parties in Montenegro
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Autonomy
Inclusion
PzP
Nova
SDP
SNP
DPS
BS
Source: Vujovic, Tomovic (2015: 175)
Impact of electoral system
on internal party process
Montenegro has remained faithful to proportional electoral system, which has been
introduced during renewal of multy-partism in 1990. If we apply IDEA’s typology
(IDEA’s Handbook Of Electoral System Design, 2005 issue), we can say that Monte-
negro t in the category of PR list system. During observed period the same electoral
system was used in Montenegro, although some changes5 have been introduced
through its evolution ((Pavićević, 2005:59).
In order to present in one place key structural changes of electoral system, we will
use the table 1 where main structural elements are presented, organized in accor-
dance with election cycles.
5 Since introduction of multipartism in Montenegro, the lawmaker was loyal to proportional system,
however some legislative changes that were always leaning towards favoring of the governing party,
took place. Thus, V.Pavićević considers that electoral system in Montenegro should be „Identied
as transit from „majorly proportional“ V.Pavićević, through combined methods of proportional and
majoritarian (1992.), and then „clean proportional“ (1992.), towards unique „ mixed system“ (1996.), i.e.
compilation of positive elements of the majoritarian and negative eects of the proportional system
and nally return to the „ full proportionality“ with one-time introduction of the institute of positive
discrimination for one of the minority nations in Montenegro (1996., 1998. i 2002.)”
54
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
Closed and blocked candidates’ lists were exclusively used in Montenegrin electoral
system. However, in one period, the Law allowed to parties to determine repre-
sentatives of the party in the Parliament, after elections and without any consent
from the candidates from the party list – regardless of the position they were in. V
Goati labeled this system as indirect proportional system6 (Goati 2004:252). Even
though this solution was revoked in Montenegro, it clearly reects the intention of
the lawmaker to provide dominant position to the party leadership, i.e. to render
meaningless citizens’ will, due to the fact that order on the list is not obligatory and
change is not based on the preferential votes, but on the subsequently demonstrated
will of the party.
6 »We have classied such system in the indirect proportional systems, basing this mark on one decision
of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany brought in mid XX century. Aforementioned court
gave answer to the question whether proportional electoral system for representative bodies is ac-
tually direct election demanded by the Basic Law (1949), i.e. the Constitution of Germany? The Court
explained that proportional elections are direct, under condition that the “third person” is not involved
between voting of voters and obtaining of seats (Birke, 1961, 19). In case of Serbia and Montenegro, the
“third person” are party leaderships which are electing representatives in the name of voters, which
constitutes rough violation of fundamental democratic principles and values” (Goati, 2007: )
55
Table 2: Overview of main structural elements of electoral system in Montenegro
Elections
Assembly size
Electoral system
Number of
constituencies
Magnitude
Threshold
Type of elec-
toral list
Preferential vote
Electoral formula
1990 125 List PR 20 1 - 29 4%
Closed
blocked No D’Hondt
1992 85 List PR 1 85 4%
Closed
blocked No D’Hondt
1996 71 List PR 14 1 - 17 4%
Modied
closed
blocked list No D’Hondt
1998 73 List PR 1 73 (5) 3%
Modied
closed
blocked list No D’Hondt
2001 77 List PR 1 77 (5) 3%
Modied
closed
blocked list No D’Hondt
2002 75 List PR 1 81 (4) 3%
Modied
closed
blocked list No D’Hondt
2006 81 List PR 1 81 (5) 3%
Modied
closed
blocked list No D’Hondt
2009 81 List PR 1 81 (5) 3%
Modied
closed
blocked list No D’Hondt
2012 81 List PR 1 81
3%
0.7 for minority
list,
i.e. 0.35% for
minor- ity list of
Croatian
minority
Closed
blocked list No D’Hondt
2016 81 List PR 1 81
3%
0.7 for minority
list,
i.e. 0.35% for
minor- ity list of
Croatian
minority
Closed
blocked list No D’Hondt
56
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
Besides this example, it is important to point out that the mandate in the Montene-
grin political system was imperative until 2004 – i.e. that exclusion of an MP from
the party would also mean end of his mandate. In such way the party had directly
the capacity to deprive disobedient MP of his mandate.
From all above listed, it is clear that party management in the rst 14 years if
multi-partism: (1) has controlled process of the candidate selection for MP’s (2) has
determined who will become an MP from the candidate’s list regardless of order on
the list (3) has indirectly deprived MP’s of their seat by their exclusion from the party.
In such way party leadership has controlled completely the process of candidate
selection, but also actions of MP’s including some kind of impeachment, MP had no
political importance in this period. Under such a ”rm hand” only solution for those
disagreeing with party leadership was departure from the party and sometimes
in creation of new parties. However, departure of MP from the party, would signify
end of his mandate.
Comparative candidates study - (CCS)
In the months May - Jun 2015, CeMI conducted survey on the attitudes of candidates
regarding MP’s in the last parliamentary elections in 2012. The study included 136
candidates, representing approximately 16.25% of the total number of candidates
for MP’s in the parliamentary elections held in 2012, with the participation of can-
didates of the parliamentary parties of 25 - 40%. During the testing CeMI used a
questionnaire that is used in the same form in over 40 countries around the world,
and which consists of questions related to the four segments of political engagement
of candidates for MP’s : (1) political views and activities, (2) political campaigns, (3)
problems and policies, and (4) democracy and representation.
In this essay we used ndings of the CCS in order to get acquainted with attitudes of
the MP candidates, towards party relations (selection of the candidate procedures,
election of party leadership, i.e. policy making) and towards the electoral system.
Candidates and Party Laws
Procedure of selection of MP candidates in Montenegro, is exclusively under compe-
tence of the party bodies, i.e. it is governed by the party regulations. Law on Political
Parties, adopted in 2004, is not dealing with the regulation of candidate selection
procedures or with democratic procedures of the party leadership election. Statutes
57
of political parties are often dealing with this issue in a similar or the same way, In
Montenegro there was never registered a case of direct election of party leadership
by registered voters. Also there is no regulation regarding registration of voters.
Table 3: Do you agree that law should regulate …?
Total Last parliamentary elections in
Montenegro, 2012
Governing
coalition Opposition
N136 50 86
Procedures for nomination of the MP
candidates 38.2 28 44
Elections of the governing structure of
the political party 27. 2 20 31
Decision-making procedures in political
parties 27. 2 18 33
Source: Comparative Candidate Study Montenegro (2015), CeMI.
From the table above we can see that a surprisingly high percent of candidates
in elections considers that procedures of the selection of candidates should be
regulated by the law. However, signicantly lower percent considers that the law
should regulate procedures of election of the party management (27.2%), and the
same percent considers that the law should regulate decision-making processes in
parties (27.2%). Answer to the question on the most inuential stakeholders in the
appointment of candidates, was mainly party leadership (central). Incentives for
candidacy mainly run from above (43%) and not from the lower levels.
58
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
Table 4: Who had the strongest inuence on your decision to run for the parliament?
Total Last parliamentary elections in
Montenegro, 2012
Governin coalition Opposition
N136 50 86
Sig 0.91
National party leadership 43.4 44 43
Party members in my constituency/place
where I live 22.1 24 21
Party leadership in my constituency/place
where I live 10.3 14 08
Supporters of my party (primary election) 10.3 10 10
Party delegates in my constituency/place
where I live 05.1 04 06
Open primary election 02.2 02 02
No answer 06.6 02 09
Total 100%
Source: Comparative Candidate Study Montenegro (2015), CeMI.
Candidacy is rarely disputed, and in 88% of cases it has been induced by the party.
From the small number of those who had their candidacy disputed (4%), 80% stated
that their candidacy was disputed by the party leadership, while 20% claimed that
their candidacy was disputed on the local level. Interesting fact is that these two
levels are still at play. It is possible to search the inuence of the local and national
level exactly in this proportion.
Table 5: Who makes the decision on nominations in your party?
Total Last parliamentary elections in
Montenegro, 2012
Governing coalition Opposition
N136 50 86
Sig 0.93
Main board 71.3 72 71
Presidential board 16.9 20 15
President 06.6 02 09
Local board 03.7 04 03
Member/members 00.7 02
No answer 00.7 01
Total 100%
Source: Comparative Candidate Study Montenegro (2015), CeMI.
59
Candidates and Electoral System
However, in the last decade, things are changing, despite the fact that changes are
very slow. In 2004, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the provision
of the law which stipulates that MP loses his mandate with exit of the party7. Also,
so-called closed and modied blocked list has been used at the national elections
in 2009 for the last time and next elections were held with closed and blocked
party lists. The party has no longer right to determine who will become an MP
after elections. Numerous transfers among parties came as the consequence of
institutionalization of the “free mandate”. In one period, during current mandate of
Montenegrin parliament (2012-2016), 15 MP’s changed the colors of the party, i.e. a
bit more than 18.5% out of the total number of MP’s in Montenegrin parliament (81).
It should be pointed out that these transfers took place within boundaries of division
between government and opposition, i.e. deputies which were elected as the part of
opposition transferred to another, also oppositional party, thus they didn’t inuence
to balance of powers between the government and opposition. However, there is
one exception which can be hardly dened. Namely, ruling SDP8 has split, while it
was part of the ruling coalition. Part of the SDP has formed another party of similar
name – Social-Democrats. Shortly after the split SDP left the ruling coalition, but
former members of SDP, and now members of SD, remained in the ruling coalition
supporting the government. In the table below, which represents a part of the
answer of candidates for MP’s during conducted CCS9 survey in Montenegro10, the
conrmation of this thesis can be noticed, because all candidates that have stated
that they were running for elections for another party were from the opposition and
none of them was from the ruling coalition.
7 Anachronous imperative party mandate was in force in Montenegro until 2004, when it was nullied
by the decision of the Constitutional Court, according to which an individual keeps the role of an
MP even after termination of his party membership. In such manner, Montenegro has joined to vast
majority of democratic countries which are enforcing free mandate. (Goati, 2007: )
8 DPS and SDP have ran for elections in 2012 with the common candidate’s list, which had name of the
charismatic leader of DPS in its title „European Montenegro – Milo Đukanović“.
9 More on the project and CCS survey conducted, can be found at: http://balkanelectoralstudies.org/
10 In period May June 2015, CeMI conducted survey on attitudes of candidates for MP’s at the last par-
liamentary elections in 2012. The survey encompassed 136 candidates, which makes around 16,25% of
total number of candidates in elections in 2012, with participation of parliamentary parties’ candidates
of 25 – 40%. During the survey, CeMI used questionnaire which was used in the same form in over 40
countries of the world, and it is constituted out of questions related to four segments of the political
engagement of the candidate for representatives: (1) political attitudes and activities, (2) political
campaign, (3) problems and policies and (4) democracy and representation.
60
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
Table 6: Did you stand for other parties in previous elections?
Total Last parliamentary elections in Montenegro, 2012
Governing coalition Opposition
N136 50 86
Sig 0.18
No answer 00.7 02
Yes 09.6 15
No 89.7 98 85
Total 100%
Source: Comparative Candidate Study Montenegro (2015), CeMI.
Selection of candidates and democratic election of the party leadership remains as
the open issue. Thus, we can state that conditions for activism of MP’s are somewhat
improved, but the problem of the lack of personalization of the electoral system
remains. This system is not established neither through any form of preferential
voting, nor through procedures of the selection of candidates, and there are no
examples of direct elections for the party leadership.
Such electoral system by default discourages the role of an individual, both in the
position of the member and in positions of the MP candidate or MP.
MP candidates themselves are, in large number, considering that voter should be
allowed to vote only for parties, i.e. for closed and blocked party lists, in the condi-
tions of the current proportional electoral system. There is a signicant dierence
between candidates for MP’s from the government and from the opposition. Namely,
oppositional candidates are more inclined towards the strong party position. Still,
the fact that large percent of candidates consider that voter should be allowed to
vote only for candidates (39%) or for candidates and parties 15.4%, is encouraging.
61
Table 7: How much do you agree with following statements?
Total Last parliamentary elections
in Montenegro, 2012
Governing
coalition Opposition
N136 50 86
Voter should be able to vote only for parties 61.8 46 71
Voter should be able to vote only for candidates 39.7 38 41
Electoral system should be consisted of elements
that provide stable majority of party list 22.1 16 26
Voter should be able to vote for both parties and
candidates 15.4 12 17
Electoral system should be able to provide
high level of proportionality between votes and
mandates
02.9 05
Source: Comparative Candidate Study Montenegro (2015), CeMI.
When directly asked whether majoritarian or proportional systems are better for
the development of democracy, surprisingly large percent (54%) of candidates is
supporting combined model of the electoral system (majoritarian-proportional),
with also surprisingly high number of candidates supporting majoritarian and quite
small number of those who chose only proportional system (21%). In these results,
it can be noticed that candidates are preferring electoral systems with some kind
of personalization.
Basically, there are two types of electoral systems, majority and proportional system.
Which system do you nd better for democracy development?
Graph 3: Which system do you nd better for democracy development?
Combination of
proportional
and majority
system
54%
Proportional
electoral
system
21%
Majo rity
electoral
system
11%
Both system
are the same
1%
Dont know
13%
Source: Comparative Candidate Study Montenegro (2015), CeMI.
62
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
Table 8: Which system do you nd better for democracy development?
Total Last parliamentary elections
in Montenegro, 2012
Governing
coalition Opposition
N136 50 86
Sig 0.83
Combination of proportional and majority system 53.7 48 57
Proportional electoral system 21.3 26 19
Majority electoral system 11.0 12 10
Both systems are the same 01.5 02
Don’t know 12.5 14 12
Total 100%
Source: Comparative Candidate Study Montenegro (2015), CeMI.
Clear determination for personalization of the electoral system is visible in the answer
to the question whether possibility of preferential voting should be introduced into
existing system. Up to 79% of respondents opted for introduction of preferential
voting into currently existing proportional system of party lists, while only 7% opted
against introduction of preferential voting.
Graph 4: Do you consider that the current electoral system should keep / be added
preferential voting (so that voter would be able to circle one or more specic candidates
from party list)?
Yes
79%
No
7%
Don’t know
14%
Source: Comparative Candidate Study Montenegro (2015), CeMI.
63
Table 9: Do you consider that the current electoral system should keep / be added
preferential voting (so that voter would be able to circle one or more specic candidates
from party list)?
Total Last parliamentary elections in Montenegro, 2012
Governing coalition Opposition
N136 50 86
Sig 0.07
Yes 79.4 68 86
No 06.6 10 05
Don’t know 14.0 22 09
Total 100%
Source: Comparative Candidate Study Montenegro (2015), CeMI.
Such responses could be interpreted in several ways. This time, we will use two
interpretations:
(1) Self-condence, i.e. belief in own qualities, (2) insecurity with the current po-
sition, i.e. dissatisfaction with the weak position in the party. The insecurity of
MP’s is noticeable, their complete dependence on the party leadership, thus it
is understandable that they are seeking for security i.e. the chance to earn their
seat in the Parliament by themselves. Through last changes in the salaries for
public ocials, MP’s became one of the highest paid state functionaries. Monthly
salary of an MP in Montenegrin Parliament is net worth close to 2000 EUR, or
more than 4 average net salaries at the level of Montenegro, which shows that
the seat in the Parliament brings many privileges and nancial security.
Concluding remarks
On the basis of presented ndings we can conclude following:
1. Existing PR list system with closed blocked lists strengthens the position of the
party leadership because the role of the voter is minimal. Voter can’t vote for
the candidate, not even for an independent candidate, out of the list, because
electoral system foresees only voting for party lists
2. Inexistence of the legal regulations which would set minimal procedures for
selection of the candidates, i.e. election of the party management, has created
the situation in which central party managements are conducting full control
over selection of candidates for the public functions and making uncompetitive
the election of the central party leadership.
64
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
3. Central party managements are completely controlling the process of creation
of party policies.
4. The degree of intra-party democracy is at the very low level, and when we
apply Čular’s model, none of the political parties from those we analyzed, can
be classied as the full democracy type, and we can only divide them into
groups of low democracy parties (SDP, SNP, NOVA), and individualist-elitist
parties (DPS, BS and PzP).
5. In order to provide conditions for development of intra-party democracy in
Montenegro it is necessary to:
a. Regulate following procedures by the Law on Political Parties: (1) selection
of candidates for MP’s (2) adoption of decisions in parties and (3) direct
election of the party leadership
b. Law on Election of Councilors and Representatives should be amended
so as ti introduce preferential voting within existing List PR system, in
accordance with Finnish experience.
6. Adoption of such changes is not realistic in the short period.
a. It can be expected that the accession to the EU after 2020, induces intro-
duction of preferential voting in national elections, similar to Croatia11, but
this process will be conducted with a lot of resilience.
b. When it comes to amendments of the Law on political Parties, i.e. legal
regulation of the process of selection of candidates and election of the
party management, it will be slower even from the changes in the elec-
toral system. Changes will take place only at the level of individual parties,
which will partially change their party regulations, under inuence of their
European counterparts.
Literature
Birke, Wolfgang. (1961). European elections by direct surage . Leyden : Sijtho.
Comparative Candidate Survey. (2015). Parlamentary Elections in Montenegro 2012.
Podgorica: Center for Monitoring and Research.
Čulan, Goran. (2004). Organizational Development of Parties and Internal Party
Democracy in Croatia. Politička misao, XLI (5).
Čular, Goran. (2004). Uloga političkih stranaka u procesu demokratske konsolidacije:
Hrvatska u komparativnoj perspektivi, PhD thesis. Zagreb.
Goati, Vladimir. (2007). Političke partije i partijski sistemi, Podgorica: CeMI.
11 After entrance to the EU, the elections for the EU Parliament will be inevitably prportional with
preferential voting, so Montenegro will have to introduce preferential voting for their representative
in the EU Parliament.
65
Pavićević, Veselin. (2012). Izborni sistemi, Podgorica: Ekonomski fakultet.
Scarrow, Susan. (2000). Parties without members? Party organization in a changing
electoral environment, Dalton, Russel J., Wattenberg, Martin, Parties without
Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford:
Oxford University Press
Scarrow, Susan. (2005). Party Subsidies and the Freezing of Party Competition: Do
Cartel Mechanisms Work?, West European Politics, 29 (4).
Statute of Bosniak Party
Statute of Democratic Party of Socialists
Statute of Movement for Changes
Statute of NOVA
Statute of Social-Democratic Party
Statute of Socialist People’s Party
Vasović, Vučina. (2006). Savremene demokratije. Beograd: Biblioteka Sinteze,
Službeni glasnik.
Vasović, Vučina. (2013). Izabrana djela I-V: Izbori i izborni sistemi u savremenom
svijetu. Podgorica: CID.
Vujović, Zlatko, Tomović Nikoleta. (2015). Unutarpartijska demokratija u Crnoj Gori.
In: Goati Vladimir, Darmanović Srđan. (2015). Izborni i partijski system u
Crnoj Gori – perspektiva razvoja unutarpartijske demokratije. Podgorica:
Centar za monitoring i istraživanja.
Vujović, Zlatko. (2012). Parlamentarian election in Montenegro 2012: Continuation
of dominance of socialists and return of Djukanovic. Political analyses (13).
Used abbreviations:
BS – Bosniak Party
DPS – Democratic Party of Socialists
NOVA – Nova srpska demokratija
PzP – Movement for Changes
SDP – Social-Democratic Party
SNP – Socialist People’s Party
Criminal Law Protection
of Electoral Rights in
Criminal legislation of
Montenegro
JELENA ĐURIŠIĆ
Professor at the Faculty of Law,
University of Donja Gorica
69
Criminal Law Protection of Electoral
Rights in Criminal legislation of
Montenegro
Summary
Criminal oenses against electoral rights are an independent Chapter of criminal oenses in the
Criminal Code of Montenegro. Protective object of this chapter are the electoral rights.Criminal
Law protection of these rights and fragmentary character, which means that the same provides
only major electoral rights of the most serious attack on them. In this sense, Chapter of criminal
oenses against the electoral rights and represented by the solution of the Criminal Code of
Montenegro belong to the following crimes: Infringement of the Right to be Elected (Article
184), Infringement of the Voting Right (Article 185), Infringement of Freedom of Choice in
Voting (Article 186), Abuse of the Right to Vote (Article 187), Composing Inaccurate Voters
Registers (Article 188), Obstructing Elections (Article 189), Preventing of Monitoring of Voting
(Article 190), Infringement of the Secrecy of Voting (Article 191), Falsifying the Results of Voting
(Article 192) and Destroying Documentation of Voting (Article 193 and 193a).
Due to the partially blanket character of the substance of certain criminal oences which
belong to the chapter of the criminal oences against the electoral rights, in determining the
existence of the criminal oences it is necessary to take into consideration the legislations that
treats the issues of the electoral rights, i.e. the area of the electoral legislation like especially:
Law on Election of Councilors and Members of Parliament, Law on Election of the President
of Montenegro, Law on Referendum, Law on Election of Mayors, Law on Electoral Lists, Law
on Political Parties and Law on Financing of Political Parties.
Keywords: Criminal Law protection, criminal oenses against electoral rights
Introduction
Criminal legislation of Montenegro, like many modern democratic societies, recog-
nizes electoral right as an independent group object of protection. Therefore, the
criminal oences against electoral rights within the Criminal Code of Montenegro
represent an independent chapter of criminal oences. Electoral rights certainly
represent especially important citizens’ rights and it can be said for the same that
they have wider signicance for the whole society since the legitimacy of the state
70
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
and society is based on free elections.1 Free elections imply free exercise of the right
to vote and the right to be elected, i.e. the enjoyment of these rights without the use
of compulsion and therefore the voters cannot be exposed to any type of pressure
like forcing them to vote for certain candidate or certain party. Furthermore, no one
has the right to disclose how some person voted.2 In accordance with the stated,
the criminal law protection is oered in terms of both the right to vote and the right
to be elected as well as the regularity of the voting from the abuse of the right to
vote, use of force, threat, fraud, falsifying of the results and the voting process itself.
The criminal law protection of electoral rights as well as the protection of all rights
covered by the criminal law, is of fragmentary character which means that the same
is provided only to important rights from the most dicult cases of their infringe-
ment or, as in criminal law generally, the legal protection is provided only in respect
of the protection of the most important social values and goods from, as a rule, the
most serious forms of their infringement. In the context of the analyzed themes,
i.e. the matter of the legal protection of the electoral rights and its fragmentary
nature, it is important to emphasize that the constitutional norms guarantee, in
accordance with the Article 45, the right to vote and the right to be elected to every
citizen of Montenegro who is 18 years old and has at least two years of residence
in Montenegro. The electoral right is exercised at elections, the same is general and
equal, the elections are free and immediate and the voting is secret3. The Article 3
I of the Protocol guarantees to every person the right to vote and the right to be
elected which is limited to local citizens and even the European Court for Human
Rights recognizes this restriction in the exercise of the right to vote and the right
to be elected which is provided by the national legislation.4 Therefore the Article 3
refers only to positive liabilities of the state to provide the conditions for the free
and secret elections. On the other hand, these provisions leave to the Member
States extremely wide discretionary powers and therefore, unlike other norms of
the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to free elections is covered
with colours of national right and subject to inherent limitations.5
General characteristics of criminal oences
against electoral rights
In terms of the role of the criminal law in the protection of the electoral rights we
have to be aware of its limited possibilities. Thus the most serious violations and
abuses as a rule are not accessible to the criminal law reaction.6 Beside this, certain
1 Stojanović, Z., Krivično pravo, Podgorica 2008, 430.
2 Jakšić, A., Evropska konvencija o ljudskim pravima – komentar, Beograd 2006, 391.
3 Ustav CG, Službeni list CG, br. 1/07
4 Jakšić, A., 390.
5 Herndl, str. 52. i 92; van Dijk/van Hoof, str. 612; Cit. prema: Jakšić, A. (2006), 390.
6 Stojanović, Z., Komentar Krivičnog zakonika, Beograd 2012, 416.
71
political manipulations which violate citizens’ electoral rights are not suitable to be
the subject matter of the regulation of the criminal law norms because it is usually
the case of some rened procedures which give the illusion of legitimacy. In this
sense the criminal law should be expected to suppress the individual incidents and
the individual cases of the violations of the citizens’ electoral rights.7
Other branches of law regulate numerous matters from the area of the electoral
rights whereas the criminal law protection, which in this sense represents the last
instrument at the disposal of the state in terms of the protection of these rights,
oers protection just to the most important rights against, by the rule, the most
serious attacks on them.
The extremely important characteristic of the majority of the criminal oences
against the electoral rights is the partially blanket substance, i.e. blanket disposition
of the criminal oences, which implies that their substance cannot be ascertained
without consulting the relevant legal norms which regulate the area of the electoral
rights.8 Therefore, certain regulations from the area of electoral legislation have to be
considered with the immediate application of the relevant criminal law provisions. In
this sense, due to the partially blanket character of the substance of certain criminal
oences which belong to the chapter of the criminal oences against the electoral
rights, in determining the existence of the criminal oences it is necessary to take
into consideration the legislations that treats the issues of the electoral rights, i.e.
the area of the electoral legislation like especially: Law on Election of Councilors
and Members of Parliament, Law on Election of the President of Montenegro, Law
on Referendum, Law on Election of Mayors, Law on Electoral Lists, Law on Political
Parties and Law on Financing of Political Parties.
In the context of the contemplation of the matter of the criminal law protection of
the electoral rights in Montenegro we will briey bellow state the main characteristics
and features of the criminal oences which constitute the majority of the criminal
oences against the electoral right and to which belong the following in accordance
with the Criminal Code of Montenegro:9 Infringement of Right to be Elected (Article
184), Infringement of Voting Right (Article 185), Infringement of Freedom of Choice in
Voting (Article 186), Abuse of the Right to Vote (Article 187), Composing Inaccurate
Voters Registers (Article 188), Obstructing Elections (Article 189) , Preventing of
Monitoring of Voting (Article 190), Infringement of Secrecy of Voting (Article 191),
Falsifying the Results of Voting (Article 192) Destroying Documentation of Voting
(Article 193) and Serious Oences against Electoral Rights (Article 194).
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 434.
9 Krivični zakonik CG, Službeni list CG, br. 70/03, 13/04, 47/06, 40/08, 25/10, 32/11, 64/11 и 40/13.
72
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
Characteristics of the substance of criminal
oences against electoral rights
Criminal Oence Infringement of Right to Stand as a Candidate (Article 184) – Criminal
law protection in case of this criminal oence is provided to the right to be elected,
i.e. this incrimination regulates the matter of the protection of the constitutional
right to stand as the candidate at the elections.10 In this sense the criminal oence
of the infringement of the right to stand as a candidate is committed by someone
who, either through the violation of the law or in other illegal manner, prevents or
disturbs running for elections. It is important to note that the criminal oence of the
infringement of the right to stand as a candidate implies actions which violate consti-
tutional provisions as well as the provisions from the area of the electoral legislation.
However, this oence shall exist even in case when the action is undertaken in other
illegal forms beside through the violation of concrete legal provisions. This criminal
oence shall not exist in cases when someone is denied the right to be elected since
the conditions for the same have not been met under the law and Constitution.11
On the subjective side, the intent of the oender is essential. The intent of the of-
fender in every concrete case has to include the awareness of the illegality of the act.
In cases where the violation of the right to stand as a candidate occurs in a manner
which includes the elements of some other criminal oence (e.g. compulsion), the
concurrence shall be only imaginary, since, although it is not explicitly stated, this
criminal oence is of subsidiary character. Hence, the criminal oence of the vio-
lation of the right to stand as a candidate exists when by preventing or disturbing
the candidate, the elements of some other more serious criminal oence are not
accomplished.12
For the committed oence the oender is punished by a ne or penalty of impris-
onment to one year.
Criminal Oence of Violation of Right to Vote (Article 185) – The criminal oence
of the violation of the right to vote has two elemental forms. In this sense the rst
elemental form of this act is done by someone who, with the intention to prevent
someone from voting, does not enter him in voters’ register, erases him from that
register or prevents or disturbs him in other illegal manner to vote. The second
elemental form of this criminal oence is done by someone who enters illegally a
third party in the voters’ register, in order to enable him to vote or enables him to
vote in some other illegal manner although he is not entitled to.
10 Čejović, B., Krivično pravo u sudskoj praksi, Posebni deo, Kragujevac 2008, 243.
11 Manojlović – Andrić, K.,“Izborna prava i sloboda izjašnjavanja kao objekt krivičnopravne zaštite i
Evropska konvencija za zaštitu osnovnih prava i sloboda“, u: Evropska konvencija za zaštitu ljudskih
prava i osnovnih sloboda i krivično zakonodavtsvo SCG, Zlatibor 2004, 221.
12 Stojanović, Z., Komentar Krivičnog zakonika, Podgorica 2010, 411.
73
Unlike the previous criminal oence, with this criminal oence the legal protection
is oered to the right to vote.
Whereas the act of the commitment of the rst elemental form of the oence prevents
a party from his right to vote, the act of the commitment of the second elemental
form enables a party to vote even though he is not entitled to. In accordance with
the above stated the act of the commitment of rst elemental form is set up alterna-
tively and is made of the following elements: illegal failure to enter in voters’ register,
illegal removal from the voters’ register or some other form of illegal preventing or
obstructing a party to vote. In this sense, the criminal oence of the violation of
the right to vote due to the absence of the illegality of the oence shall not be in
case when the voting committee would not permit to a party to vote because he
refused the testing with the spray – invisible ink, since this is pursuant to the law.13
The act of the commitment of the second elemental form consists of enabling a party
to vote through illegal registration in the voters’ register or in other illegal manner
enabling a party to vote even though he is not entitled to it.
The consequence of the alternatively set up acts of the commitment of the rst
elemental form consists in the failure to use the right to vote. Whereas this is implied
in the case of the rst and second form of acts, i.e. in cases of failure to register or
the cancellation from the voters’ register, in case of the acts of the third form it is
necessary that the oender committed such act with which he prevented or disturbed
a passive subject in the voting in an illegal manner.14 If with the described act of the
commitment of the third elemental form the party was not prevented or disturbed
in voting, the attempt to commit this criminal oence shall not be punishable. In
the case of the second elemental form of the criminal oence, the act is considered
completed when a party is illegally entered in voters’ register and if it is the case
of enabling a party to vote in other illegal manner then once the party has voted.15
On the subjective side in the case of both elemental forms of act, the intent and
certain intention are necessary which in case of the rst elemental form of the act
comprises intention to prevent a certain party from his right to vote, whereas in the
second elemental form of the act the intention is needed to enable a party to vote
even though he is not entitled to it.
For the committed oence from the paragraph 1 and 2 the oender is punished
with a ne or penalty of imprisonment up to one year.
Criminal Oence of Infringement of Freedom of Choice in Voting (Article 186) – The
act of the commitment of the criminal oence of the infringement of freedom of
choice in voting is set up alternatively and it exists in cases of the compulsion of
others or any other illegal manner of inuencing others to vote or not to vote at
13 Ibid., 412.
14 Stojanović, Z. (2008), 433.
15 Stojanović, Z. (2010), 412.
74
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
elections or at the referendum or to vote for or against certain candidate, electoral
list, i.e. the proposal. The criminal oence is considered completed at the moment
when the passive subject voted or failed to vote due to the accomplishment of some
alternatively set up activities of the commitment act. Beside the elemental form from
the paragraph 1, the second elemental form exists in cases when a party demands
or receives a present or other benets for himself or others to vote or not to vote
or to vote for or against certain party. In this sense the passive electoral bribing has
been incriminated which has certain similarities with the criminal oence of bribery
accepting (Article 423). The purpose of the incrimination reects in the prevention
of the sale of votes at elections and the subjective element or the intention has to
include the awareness why the bribe is accepted, i.e. the bribing has to be directed
even subjectively to the voting.16
The accepted present of other benet shall be taken away. More severe form of this
criminal oence exists in cases if the act from the paragraph 1 and 2 is committed
by a member of the voting committee or other person during his service related
to the voting.
This criminal oence recognizes a separate form which exists in case when someone,
after conducted elections or at the referendum, invites the voter to responsibility in
relation to the voting or demands from him to tell how he voted or why he voted or
he did not vote. Therefore, the condition which is as such even legally established
is that the act of this criminal oence is undertaken once the elections or referen-
dum are held. For the qualication of the act it is necessary to estimate the relation
between the oender and the passive subject as well as the manner in which the
request is addressed, the seriousness and persistence to nd out how he voted and
for whom did he vote or why he did not vote.
For the committed oence from the paragraph 1 and 2 the oender is punished
with a ne or penalty of imprisonment up to three years. For the qualied form of
the act the oender is punished with penalty of imprisonment from three months
to ve years whereas for the oender of separate form of act the imprisonment is
from three months to ve years.
Criminal Oence of Abuse of Right to Vote (Article 187) – The criminal oence of
the abuse of the right to vote is done by anyone at the elections or at referendum
who votes instead of other party under his name or he votes more than once at
the same voting or uses more than one voting paper. The act of the commitment is
set alternatively and it includes voting instead of third party under his name, voting
more times and use of more voting papers during the same voting. More serious
form of this oence is found in cases when the member of the voting committee
enables someone to perform the criminal oence from the paragraph 1. The oender
of the rst elemental form of act can be any person whereas the oender of the
qualied form can be only the member of the voting committee. In this sense, on
subjective side, there has to be the intention of the oender whereas in the case
16 Ibid., 414.
75
of the negligent assisting, in the context of the act from the paragraph 2, there is
no criminal oences.
For the elemental form of act there is ne or penalty of imprisonment up to one year
whereas for the more serious form of act there is ne or penalty of imprisonment
up to two years.
Criminal Oence of Composing Inaccurate Voters’ Registers (Article 188) – The
criminal oence of composing inaccurate voters’ registers is done by someone who
composes inaccurate voters’ registers with the intention to inuence the results of
elections or referendum. The dierence compared to the act of committing a criminal
oence of violation of right to vote from the Article 185 reects in fact that here it is
not only the case that some party or individual is not entered or is erased unlawfully
from the voters’ registers, i.e. it is not the case of partial, individual intervention in
the voters’ registers but of composing of such inaccurate voters’ register which can
objectively inuence the results of elections. The dierence is even more expressed
on subjective plan and it reects in the intention which has to be present in terms of
the inuence at the elections or referendum whereas this intention with the criminal
oence of the violation of the right to vote is directed on that to prevent other party
from his right to vote.17
The oender may be a person in charge for the composing of the voters’ register.
For the committed oence of composing inaccurate voters’ registers the oender
is punished with a ne or penalty of imprisonment up to three years.
Criminal Oence of Obstructing Elections (Article 189) – Criminal oence of obstruct-
ing elections has two elemental forms. First elemental form of the oence exists in
cases of prevention or disturbing of voting on voting places by using force, threat or
in some unlawful manner. The force and threat in the context of this criminal oence
too, should be understood in usual manner as the same is understood in criminal
law. The second elemental form is done by someone who is obstructing the voting
process by causing disorder on a voting place due to which the voting is interrupted.
For the completed criminal oence from the paragraph 1 it is undisputable that
the same exists in cases when the voting was prevented. Certain dilemma arises in
terms of the existence of this criminal oence in case when it is the matter of the
obstruction of voting. In this sense there is an attitude in theory that the obstruction
has to be serious, i.e. in cases when the voting has not been prevented holding of the
same must have been seriously called into question. Unlike the stated, in cases of the
commitment of the oence from the paragraph 2, it is necessary that the disorder
at the voting place interrupts the voting whereas in terms of the qualication of the
criminal oence it is not signicant how long the interruption lasted at the relevant
voting place nor whether the voting was continued or not.
17 Ibid., 415.
76
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
The intention is essential on the subjective side of the oender.
For the committed rst form of the act the oender is punished with the penalty
of imprisonment up to three years whereas in the case of the commitment of the
second form the oender is punished with a ne or the penalty of imprisonment
up to two years.
Criminal Oence of Preventing of Monitoring of Voting (Article 190) – Criminal oence
of preventing of monitoring of voting may be committed only by a member of the
authority for the carrying out of elections who prevents or disturbs the monitoring
during voting or determining voting results of voting to a person who is entitled to
it under the law or on the basis of the decision of the competent state authority,
and these could be the representatives of local or foreign non-governmental or-
ganizations, EU representatives and of other international organizations as well as
the authorized representatives of foreign countries. Republic electoral commission
issues or rejects issuance of approvals for the monitoring of elections.18 The act of
committing this criminal oence is made of preventing, i.e. disturbing of monitoring
during the voting process or the determination of the voting results to the party
who is authorized for that.
The intent makes the subjective element of the substance of the criminal oence.
The oender may be only a party who is a member of the authority for the carrying
out of the elections.
For the committed criminal oence of obstructing the monitoring of voting the
oender is punished with a ne or penalty of imprisonment up to one year.
Criminal Oence of Infringement of Secrecy of Voting (Article 191) – The criminal
oence of the infringement of the secrecy of voting is made by someone who infringes
the secrecy of voting at elections or referendum in the manner he discloses how
someone voted at elections or at referendum.19 The infringement of the secrecy of
voting may be direct or indirect and it may be committed through dierent actions
like entering voting cabin during the voting of third party, taking the voting paper in
order to nd out how someone voted, secret recording of the voting cabins, etc. The
criminal oence is considered completed at the moment when other party found
out for whom the passive subject of oence voted. In case of the undertaken acts
for this purpose and where the second party did not manage to nd out for whom
the voter voted, there is an attempt to commit this oence which is not punishable.
It is important to note that the second party does not have to be the oender since
the oender may make possible to second party to nd out how someone voted.
This criminal oence is not possible in relation to own voting, i.e. this oence cannot
exist in case when the voter would show to present parties the voting paper where
it can be seen how he voted.20
18 Stojanović, Z. (2012), 416.
19 Manojlović – Andrić, K., 221.
20 Stojanović, Z. (2010), 419.
77
This criminal oence has more serious form which exists in case when the act of the
commitment of the oence is done by a member of the voting committee or other
person during his service related to the voting. The oender of the more serious
form of this act can be only certain person, i.e. the member of the voting committee
or other person who is performing certain duty in relation to the voting.21 Having
in mind that the members of the voting committee and other persons related to
the voting are obliged to protect the right to secrecy, their liabilities in this respect
are still greater and the legislator reasonably provides strong punishments in cases
when these parties appear as the oenders of the criminal oence infringement
of the secrecy of voting.
The subjective element of the substance of the criminal oence is made of intent
which is most often direct. However, this oence shall exist even when it was com-
mitted with possible intent.
The ne or penalty of imprisonment up to six months is anticipated for the elemental
form of the act whereas for the more serious form of the act the legislator anticipates
the ne or penalty of imprisonment up to two years.
Criminal Oense of Falsifying Results of Voting (Article 192) – Criminal oence of
the falsifying of the results of voting can be made by a member of the authority for
the carrying out of the elections or referendum or other party who performs duties
related to the voting by adding or deducting the voting papers or votes during
counting or by changing in other manner the number of voting papers or votes or
by publishing the incorrect voting results.
The act of commitment is made of three alternatively set up activities, i.e. adding
or deducting the voting papers or votes during counting, changing the number of
the voting papers or votes in other manner or publishing of incorrect voting results.
Unlike rst and second acts of commitment which actually change the structure
of votes, in case of third form of acts of commitment false results are being pub-
lished which do not correspond to the determined voting results. The third act of
commitment does not actually aect the voting material and documentation but it
publishes the voting results which do not correspond to the actual state of aairs.
The intent of the oender makes the subjective element of the substance of oence.
The punishment for the committed oence is ne or penalty of imprisonment up
to three years.
Criminal Oence of Destroying Documentation on Voting (Article 193) – It is possible
to perform the criminal oence of destroying the documentation on voting through
some of alternative acts of commitments like destroying, damaging, depriving or
21 Perović, Z., „Krivična djela protiv izbornih prava“, u: Ustav Republike Srbije, krivično zakonodavstvo i
organizacija pravosuđa“, Zlatibor 2007, 163.
78
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
hiding voting papers or some other document concerning the voting at the elections
or referendum.
For the existence of this criminal oence it is not important whether the act of
commitment was undertaken in relation to one or more voting papers or other
voting documents at elections or at referendum. Since it is the case of the natural
integrity of the act in case when the act of commitment has been performed in
relation to more voting papers and/or other voting documents, it shall be deemed
as one criminal oence has been performed.
More serious form of this act exists in cases if the act from the paragraph 1 of this
Article is done by a member of the voting committee or other party during his
performance of duties related to the voting.
For the elemental form of this act the legislator anticipates the ne or penalty of
imprisonment up to one year whereas for the more serious form of the act the
penalty of the imprisonment is from three months to three years.
For the main form of the act the legislator anticipates ne or penalty of the impris-
onment up to one year.
Guided by fact that more severe punishment should be in certain cases of the
occurrence of severe consequences instead of resolving such cases through the
concurrence of the criminal oences, the legislator Article 194 anticipates also se-
rious oence against electoral rights. Leaving on the side whether this resolution
is really justied in criminal and political sense, it created certain problems in the
interpretation and application of the provisions of this article of the Criminal Code.22
Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of the Article 194, if due to the acts
from the Articles 185, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192 and 193 of this legal code public dis-
turbance occurred and the endangering of the property the value of which exceeds
the amount of twenty thousand euros or lives of several persons were jeopardized,
the oender shall be punished with penalty of imprisonment from six months to
ve years. If, due to the acts from the Articles 185, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192 and 193
of this legal code a serious bodily injury or property damage occurred which ex-
ceeds the amount of forty thousand euros, the oender shall be punished with the
penalty of the imprisonment from one year to ten years. If, due to the acts from the
Article 185, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192 and 193 of this legal code, death of one party or
of more parties happened, the oender shall be punished with the penalty of the
imprisonment from ve to eighteen years.
22 Stojanović, Z. (2010), 126.
79
Literature
Čejović, Bora. (2008). Krivično pravo u sudskoj praksi, Posebni deo. Kragujevac.
Jakšić, Aleksandar. (2006). Evropska konvencija o ljudskim pravima – komentar.
Beograd, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu.
Jakšić, Aleksandar. (2006). Evropska konvencija o ljudskim pravima – komentar.
Beograd, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu.
Jakšić, Aleksandar. (2006). Evropska konvencija o ljudskim pravima – komentar,
Herndl (52) i (92); van Dijk/van Hoof, (612). Beograd: Pravni fakultet
Univerziteta u Beogradu.
Krivični zakonik CG, Službeni list CG, br. 70/03, 13/04, 47/06, 40/08, 25/10, 32/11,
64/11, 40/13
Manojlović – Andrić, Katarina. (2004). Izborna prava i sloboda izjašnjavanja kao
objektkrivičnopravne zaštite i Evropska konvencija za zaštitu osnovnih
prava i sloboda. In: Evropska konvencija za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih
sloboda i krivično zakonodavstvo SCG. Podgorica.
Perović, Z. (2007). Krivična djela protiv izbornih prava. In: Ustav Republike Srbije,
krivično zakonodavstvo i organizacija pravosuđa. Zlatibor.
Stojanović, Zoran. (2008). Krivično pravo. Podgorica.
Stojanović, Zoran. (2008). Krivično pravo. Podgorica.
Stojanović, Zoran. (2010). Komentar Krivičnog zakonika. Podgorica.
Stojanović, Zoran. (2010). Komentar Krivičnog zakonika. Podgorica.
Stojanović, Zoran. (2010). Komentar Krivičnog zakonika. Podgorica.
Stojanović, Zoran. (2010). Komentar Krivičnog zakonika. Podgorica.
Stojanović, Zoran. (2012). Komentar krivičnog zakonika. Beograd.
Ustav CG, Službeni list CG, br. 1/07
CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији
Национална библиотека Црне Горе, Цетиње
ISSN 2337-0467 = Comparative Balkan Politics
COBISS.CG-ID 31223056
COMPARATIVE
BALKAN
politics
Volume 1, Issue 1, ________ 2015 ISSN:_____-______
CENTAR ZA MONITORING I ISTRAŽIVANJE
Vol. 1, No. 1, 2015
COMPARATIVE BALKAN POLITICS
Vol. 2 No. 1, 2016
Table of Contents
1. Petar Marković
The Achilles Heel of Democracies in Southeast Europe:
Responsiveness Trapped Between Clientelism and the EU
2. Nermina Mujagić, Sarina Bakić
Political Parties as Generators of Social and Ethnic Conicts
in Bosnia and Herzegovina
3. Zlatko Vujović, Nikoleta Tomović
Perspectives for Development of Intra-Party Democracy
in Montenegro
4. Jelena Đurišić
Criminal Law Protection of Electoral Rights in Criminal
legislation of Montenegro
ISSN 2337-0467
