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Romanowska, M & Dobroczyński, B. (2020) Unconscious processes in Aaron Beck’s cognitive
theory: Reconstruction and discussion. Theory & Psychology, 30(2), 223-242.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354320901796
Unconscious processes in Aaron Beck’s cognitive theory:
Reconstruction and discussion
Monika Romanowska
University of Gdansk,
pebe.monikaromanowska@gmail.com
Bartłomiej Dobroczyński
Jagiellonian University
Abstract: The concept of the unconscious has always evoked controversy. While some
psychologists treated it as a relic of metaphysics or a manifestation of psychoanalytic mysticism,
others saw it as an important explanatory construct. At the heart of this conflict, there is the
theory proposed by Aaron Beck, the originator of cognitive therapy. According to the founding
myth, he rejected the concept of dynamic unconscious to develop an evidence-based approach.
The aim of the article is to reconstruct and analyze Beck’s understanding of the unconscious
based on his published works and archival materials and to identify the values that guided his
theoretical choices. We argue that Beck’s conceptualization of the unconscious ignores
contradictory conscious and unconscious representations and attitudes and offers no systematic
model of basic needs and the conflicts between them. We conclude that this stems from Beck’s
attachment to the phenomenological understanding of the psyche, emphasis on humanism in the
therapeutic relationship, fear of cognitive theory losing its distinctness, and caution in
formulating theories.
Keywords: Beck, unconscious, cognitive psychotherapy, history of
psychotherapy, psychoanalysis
Introduction
The concept of the unconscious has a long history in psychology. It refers “to the idea that
mental states—cognitions, emotions, and motives—can influence ongoing experience, thought,
and action outside of phenomenal awareness and voluntary control” (Kihlstrom, 2001, p. 222).
Although the unconscious is popularly associated mainly with the name of Freud and with the
psychodynamic approach, it is very well known that its numerous conceptualizations existed as
early as the 18th and 19th centuries—not only earlier than the psychoanalytic ones but also
totally different from it (Brinkmann, 1943, Ellenberger, 1970; Miller, 1942; Prince, 1910; Whyte,
1978). At that time, representatives of various disciplines of knowledge contributed to the
development of the idea of the unconscious; they included magnetizers, philosophers, physicians
and physiologists, and, above all, early psychologists and psychopathologists, such as Johann F.
Herbart, Hermann von Helmholtz, Gustav T. Fechner, Pierre Janet, Theodore Flournoy, Samuel
Butler, or Ewald Hering—to name just a few (cf. Chertok, 1978; Ellenberger, 1970; Margetts,
1953; Whyte, 1978). They understood implicit mental processes in many different ways, often
difficult to conceptualize unambiguously. As a result, researchers trying to systematize the
existing perspectives on the unconscious reached different conclusions. For instance, Donald
Brinkmann (1943) distinguished four types of the unconscious: the physiological unconscious
(Descartes), the perceptual unconscious (Leibniz), the apperceptual unconscious (Kant), and the
vital unconscious (Schelling, Carus). Henri F. Ellenberger (1970) distinguished five types: the
metaphysical unconscious, the biological unconscious, the deep psychological unconscious, the
more accessible psychological unconscious, and the dynamic “repressed” unconscious.
Sonu Shamdasani (2010, p. 294) calls the concept of the unconscious “one of the most
powerful artefacts of modern psychology,” and Alasdair McIntyre (2004, p. 43), in his classic
study, explains its immense popularity by the fact that
this essentially simple notion seems able to relate a far wider range of disparate human
phenomena and to subsume the wildly abnormal and the tediously normal activities of human
beings under the same headings far more easily than any other explanatory concept advanced so
far.
Indeed, treated as a hypothetical construct, this concept offers enormous possibilities, enabling
the multifaceted explanation of individuals’ behavior as well as the prediction of future behaviors
and the generation of creative hypotheses useful in further therapeutic and research work
(Greenwood, 1999; Bucci, 2000). At the same time, it carries numerous risks: scientific risks—
because as a hypothetical construct it has “surplus meaning,” and for this reason its strictly
established operative definition does not exist (Greenwood, 1999); moral risks—only the
psychotherapist can properly interpret the patient’s behaviors, and thus there appears a power
relationship. It is no wonder that the majority of mainstream academics remained skeptical about
it, as Weinberger wrote in his article about James, citing Klein (1977): “From its inception,
scientific psychology opposed the idea of unconscious processes” (Weinberger, 2000, p. 444).
Since the 1980s, however, we have witnessed a clear comeback of the idea of the
unconscious to psychology (Bowers & Meichenbaum, 1984; Erdelyi, 1985; Hassin, Uleman, &
Bargh, 2005; Uleman & Bargh, 1989; Underwood, 1996; Wilson, 2004). Although advocates of
the cognitive orientation either dissociate themselves from the Freudian understanding of the
unconscious (e.g., Kihlstrom, Barnhardt, & Tataryn, 1992; Loftus & Klinger, 1992) or regard it
as insufficient and requiring significant extension (e.g., Wilson, 2004), attempts are still made to
reconcile the dynamic and cognitive approaches to implicit mental processes (Bucci, 1997, 2000;
Epstein, 1994; Horowitz, 1999, 2014). Despite this, it seems other ways of understanding the
unconscious are still possible, including the nonmental, “behavioral” understanding of the
unconscious proposed, for example, by Skinner (1974)
1
, or the phenomenological perspective
(Boss, 1979; Rogers, 1951). It is, then, still possible to speak about the unconscious in a variety
of languages and legitimately believe, for instance, that the dynamic unconscious, based on
complex motivational constructs, is something different than the cognitive unconscious, not
based on motivations and simpler, which in turn differs from the “nonmaterial” behavioral
unconscious or from the phenomenological unconscious potentially accessible to introspection.
In the broad context of diverse psychological perspectives on the unconscious, a theory
that seems to be particularly interesting is the one proposed by Aaron T. Beck, the originator of
cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT). After graduating from the Philadelphia Psychoanalytic
1
“It is often said, particularly by psychoanalysts, that behaviorism cannot deal with the unconscious. The
fact is that, to begin with, it deals with nothing else. The controlling relations between behavior and genetic and
environmental variables are all unconscious so long as they are not observed, and it was Freud who emphasized
that they need not be observed (that is, conscious) to be effective” (Skinner, 1974, p. 169).
Institute in 1956, this psychiatrist affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania began to
gradually drift away from psychoanalysis in order to finally publish his 1963 Thinking and
Depression—which can be regarded as a cognitive therapy manifesto (Rosner, 2012, 2014,
2018). Currently, according to the meta-analysis performed by Knapp et al. (2015), CBT is
probably the most popular therapeutic approach in the world, and its popularity keeps increasing
each year. According to the “founding myth” of CBT, Beck designed a therapy based entirely on
empirical evidence, rejecting the concept of the dynamic unconscious as unscientific (Rosner,
2018). Rosner’s historical works prove, however, that long after the publication of Thinking and
Depression Beck still thought in terms of psychoanalytic concepts and that he grappled with the
theoretical problems initiated by Freud for many years. Thus, Rosner offers a new and less
obvious narrative on the birth of cognitive therapy. The most important theoretical conclusion
emerging from it is that the concept of dynamic unconscious can still be an attractive and fertile
construct, though at the same time a highly risky one.
The aim of the present article is, therefore, to provide an outline reconstruction of the
perspective on unconscious processes offered in Beck’s theory, which will make it possible to
identify the insufficiently refined fragments in his reasoning. We decided to formulate a number
of questions. What language does Beck use to speak about unconscious processes and how does
he support his position? Is he closer to the phenomenological, psychoanalytic, cognitive, or
behavioral perspective? What aspects of the unconscious are included in his conceptualization of
this notion and what aspects are not? What solution does Beck choose with regard to the benefits
and risks involved in using the construct of the unconscious?
We availed ourselves for the analysis not only of Beck’s published works but also of
archival documents from Beck’s Archives in Philadelphia: his notes, letters, as well as drafts of
books and papers (Beck, A. T., personal collection). The conclusions we present have a
preliminary and sketchy character, and their main aim is to identify the general tendencies in
Beck’s thinking about the unconscious. It is not our ambition to provide a detailed historical
study of any particular period in Beck’s writing; this would require using a much more elaborate
set of analytic methods.
In our article, we will try to demonstrate that Beck's way of speaking about unconscious
processes is eclectic and that it draws on all four perspectives: phenomenological,
psychoanalytical, cognitive, and behavioral. At the same time, we put forward the thesis that
Beck’s conceptualization of the unconscious has two important weaknesses: (a) it fails to take
into account contradictory representations or attitudes at the conscious and unconscious levels
and (b) does not offer a systematic model of basic needs and their dynamics. We suggest that
disregard for these two aspects of unconscious processes can be explained by several factors,
such as attachment to the phenomenological understanding of the psyche, emphasis on humanism
in the therapeutic relationship, and the risk of cognitive therapy losing its distinct status. What
must have also played an important role was Beck’s characteristic caution in formulating
theories.
In the first part of the article we will discuss Beck’s links with the phenomenological
perspective in psychology as well as the role of preconscious contents in his theory and practice.
In the second part, we will discuss Beck’s attitude towards psychoanalysis. Next, we will
reconstruct the birth of the concept of the unconscious based on data derived from cognitive
psychology. In the final part, we will sketch the missing elements in Beck’s conceptualization,
associated with contradiction and conflict. In Conclusion, we will explain the presumable reasons
for Beck’s theoretical decisions.
1. Beck and Phenomenology
Beck acknowledges that the theoretical foundations of his therapy come from three
sources: (a) the phenomenological approach to psychology, (b) psychoanalysis, particularly
Freud’s structural theory and ego psychology, and (c) the achievements of cognitive psychology
(Beck, A. T., personal collection, draft Psychoanalysis, ca. 1983–1984). Additionally, because
since the 1970s cognitive and behavioral therapies have been gradually getting closer to each
other and integrating, we can speak of the fourth source of influence.
The source that Beck names as the first one behind his theory is the phenomenological
approach to psychology. What is interesting, rather than the classic phenomenological
philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, or Maurice Merleau-Ponty, he names
figures associated with broadly conceived psychoanalysis, such as Alfred Adler, Franz
Alexander, Karen Horney, or Harry Stack Sullivan (Beck, A. T., personal collection, draft
Psychoanalysis, ca. 1983–1984).
What Beck has in common with phenomenology is the focus on direct experience data
and the exploration of the patient’s world of meanings: “Even when meanings are elusive,
however, careful introspection and reporting of internal experiences help to expand a person's
awareness to encompass a continuous flow of images and thoughts” (Beck, 1976, p. 50).
Beck often stresses that the therapist must remain as close as possible to direct experience
data, without engaging in far-reaching interpretations in order not to distort these data. This is
usually understood as a sign of Beck’s attachment to the experimental and scientific way of
reasoning, but this feature of his theory can also be regarded as a sign of an attachment to the
tradition of phenomenological thinking, in which the trust in source data, including direct
contents of consciousness, has always been present and recommended.
The attachment to the consciousness runs through Beck’s works from the earliest to the
most recent. In 1968, Beck wrote to Jack Ewalt: “I would like to emphasize, however, that the
only real data is what the patient says and what she does. Everything else is a matter of inference
or speculation” (Beck, A. T., personal collection, A. T. Beck to J. R. Ewalt, January 31, 1968)
In 1976, he firmly asserted:
Reified abstractions such as id, ego, and superego are dispensed with. The complex
psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious, a postulated mental organization that is not only
remote from conscious experience but consists of ideas and wishes antagonistic to conscious
cognition, is drastically modified: Cognitive therapy treats awareness as a continuum rather than
as a dichotomy separating conscious from unconscious experience. . . . it is concerned with
conscious rather than hidden symbolic meanings. (Beck, 1976, p. 318)
In his only book devoted to strictly metatheoretical and theoretical issues, The Integrative Power
of Cognitive Therapy, published in 1997 with Brad Alford, Beck stresses the important role of
intentionality and subjective experience, marginalized in experimental cognitive psychology:
“Thus, cognitive content specificity . . . cannot be reduced to any aspect or fact that can be
meaningfully compared to a digital computer” (Alford & Beck, 1997, p. 35).
The attribution of such a great role to conscious experiences and meanings indicates that
Beck actually excludes the existence not only of unconscious emotions (Beck, A. T., personal
collection, A. T. Beck to S. Epstein, October 27, 1994), but also of unconscious wishes (as
distinguished from behavioral inclinations) and unconscious conflicts (Beck, A. T., personal
collection, draft Emotions and Cognitions, 1981, draft Psychoanalysis, ca. 1983–1984). This
means that a cognitive therapist is forced (or, perhaps, is given a wonderful opportunity) to
explore only conscious and preconscious emotions, wishes, and conflicts. Rumor has it that one
of Beck’s favorite catchphrases was: “Conscious is far more than meets the eye” (personal
communication, Cory Newman, November 4, 2018). This illustrates how Beck understood the
hidden wealth of consciousness, which, as it were, does not reveal important elements of the
individual’s inner life right away. Focusing exclusively on the conscious domain of experience
seems to be an attractive alternative to psychoanalysis, which, according to Eugen Fink—a
phenomenologist and Husserl’s collaborator—is based on the erroneous assumption that the
consciousness has already been thoroughly explained. We cannot study the unconscious if we do
not understand consciousness well (Fink, 1970). Also one of the greatest critics of
psychoanalysis, philosopher Adolf Grünbaum (1984), emphasizes the role of conscious conflicts
and wishes; when these are revealed, an explanation based on unconscious repression is no longer
needed.
Thus, the first possible conceptualization of the unconscious in Beck’s cognitive theory
and therapy has a phenomenological character: the unconscious is that which is conscious to a
smaller degree: “Although the patient may not be immediately aware of the content of his
maladaptive attitudes and patterns, this concept is not “unconscious” in the psychoanalytic sense
and is accessible to the patient's introspection” (Beck, 1970/1993, p. 346).
This means that consciousness has a gradable structure from the most distinct conscious
data to those that are unnoticed, less clear, but accessible through introspection with some effort
and with the therapist guidance (the therapist’s role being to “expand a person’s awareness”;
Beck, 1976, p. 50). It seems this is an understanding that draws on the German concept of
mitbewusst, and its meaning is to some extent conveyed by the term “co-conscious”. In an
unpublished note, Consciousness (Beck, A. T., personal collection, August 4, 1992), Beck
distinguished as many as three levels of consciousness (apart from the unconscious level): (1)
Conscious Automatic Unintended—obsessive automatic thoughts; (2) Conscious Controlled
Unintended—automatic reality testing; and (3) Conscious Controlled Intended—intentional
reality testing. In 1997, he referred to these levels as: (a) preconscious, (b) conscious, and (c)
metacognitive (Alford & Beck, 1997). On this basis, we can conclude that Beck certainly did not
commit a sin of omission with regard to consciousness, since the study and conceptualization of
consciousness seem to be a priority in his theory. Unconscious processes are an integral part of
this conception, and we can infer that what Beck has in mind when Beck writes: “Thus, it is
correct to say that cognitive therapy aims to make conscious certain processes that are initially
unconscious” (Alford & Beck, 1997, p. 125) is precisely the preconscious processes that become
conscious.
Despite the attractiveness of this way of describing internal experiences, it is legitimate to
fear that focusing exclusively on the individual’s conscious experience will not explain many
irrational human behaviors. As noted by Drew Westen (1992), data obtained in patients’ self-
reports concerning anything potentially linked with their self-representation may be highly
unreliable. Therefore, Westen concludes, theories ignoring ambivalence, conflict, and the
existence of contradictory conscious and unconscious representations may have insufficient
explanatory power. If we make the assumption present in Beck’s theory, postulating the
continuity of conscious and preconscious beliefs, we will lose grasp of the main function of the
concept of the unconscious. It consists in the fact that unconscious contents or processes, as
contrary to the individual’s conscious knowledge, provide a completely new perspective
explaining behavior. At the same time, the concept of unconscious structures or processes
understood in this way gives direction to therapeutic work, because it enables formulating
hypotheses.
2. Beck and Psychoanalysis
Psychoanalysis, by which he understands, above all Freudian theory and ego psychology,
is the second source of inspiration behind Beck’s theory named by him (Beck, A. T., personal
collection, draft Psychoanalysis, ca. 1983–1984). As common features of psychoanalysis and
cognitive therapy, he mentions the fact that they are both based on insight and their striving for a
reorganization of personality structure (Beck, 1976; Beck, A. T., personal collection, draft
Psychoanalysis, ca. 1983–1984). According to the author of Thinking and Depression, both
theories are built on the analysis of intrapsychic phenomena (which Beck refers to in his note
Psychoanalysis as “centralism,” while behaviorists would probably call it “mentalism”): “I stuck
with the analytic approach in the sense that I try to deal with intrapsychic phenomena, perhaps a
bit more than some of the other investigators” (Beck, 1970, p. 65).
According to both theories the investigated intrapsychic phenomena are organized into
certain structures, and the aim of therapy is to change these structures. These structures are
accessible thanks to the study of meaning—unconscious in psychoanalysis and conscious in
cognitive therapy. Both in psychoanalysis and in cognitive theory, intrapsychic phenomena have
a certain hierarchy—there are more primitive, lower level structures (the primary process; Beck,
1970/1993) and more mature, higher level structures (the secondary process). The common
features of Beck’s theory and Freudian psychoanalysis, therefore, are mentalism (concentration
on psychological structures) and striving towards obtaining a domination of a secondary process
over the primary process. Independently of whether we consider the primary process as conscious
or unconscious, the distinction into these two levels present in Beck, derives from
psychoanalytical theories and the domination of ego over the primary process is a constant of
both therapies. Philip Cushman (1995) calls it „self-domination” ideology.
Many more similarities can be observed, however, between Beck’s theory and the ego
psychology (Rapaport, Gill, 1967). Between 1950-52, Beck worked as a psychiatrist in a team led
by David Rapaport, that resulted in a strong influence of this psychoanalyst on the future creator
of the cognitive therapy (Rosner, 2014). Beck took over from Rapaport a focus on the
regulatory/controlling function of the ego, the conscious activity of the subject and support in
therapy of adaptive skills and cognitive processes. Rapaport saw psychoanalysis as a science that,
unlike behaviorism, focuses not only on the third-person perspective, but also on the first-person
perspective (Rapaport, 1947/1966). These ideas inspired to a large extent young Beck, albeit he
later rejected the motivational model of the psyche that Rapaport, as a faithful follower of Freud,
upheld.
Is it possible to find common features of Beck’s cognitive perspective of the unconscious
and the psychoanalytic perspective? Rosner suggests and extensively documents that the
psychoanalytic way of thinking was still present in Aaron Beck in the 1960s and 1970s (Rosner,
2012, 2014, 2018). The author proves that the unipolar cognitive schema theory (e.g., “I am a
failure”) emerged out of bipolar motivational structures (depressive needs and wishes on one pole
and manic needs on the other). These structures gradually changed from motivational to purely
cognitive, and then from bipolar to unipolar. However, as Rosner herself notes, the Beckian
dynamics of schemas that she described had a conscious and cognitive character. So, we could
say that there is a common feature in the derivative, historical sense, but there is rather a
significant difference on the theoretical level.
The next common feature of Beck’s theory and psychoanalysis discerned by Rosner
(2012) is the role of ego—or, as Beck calls it, rational thinking. As in psychoanalysis, the
rational instance in cognitive theory is supposed to resist and neutralize irrational, primitive
products of lower level thinking (i.e., of the primary process). Still, as we have pointed out
before, Beck seems to understand the primary process as preconscious data, accessible through
introspection, rather than as what is in psychoanalysis: the “proper” unconscious i.e. utterly
inaccessible through introspection. The conflict between mature and primitive thinking is
therefore a more conscious conflict—or, more accurately: a conflict potentially accessible to
consciousness. The unconscious in the Freudian sense is a sphere essentially inaccessible for the
individual, one about which it is only possible to advance hypotheses and whose functioning can,
in a way, be reconstructed in the process of therapy. The unconscious (or, more accurately, the
preconscious) in the Beckian sense is accessible through introspection, and its contents are
consistent with conscious experience data. Beck himself states:
Cognitive therapy was in part derived from and in part a reaction against classical
psychoanalysis. . . . The emphasis on meanings, the role of symbols, and the generalization of
reaction patterns across diverse situations were all derivative. However, the meanings were found
to be available through introspection, and not to require the penetration or circumvention of a wall
of repression in order to be elucidated. Other notions that were rejected included the
predominantly motivational model, the idea of unconscious taboo drives defended against by
mechanisms of defense, and the central importance attached to the psychosexual stages of
development (Alford & Beck, 1997, p. 109)
What all this means is that, despite the presence of a certain kind of conflict and
dynamics, we are still not dealing with the unconscious in the psychoanalytic sense of the word.
The Beckian concept of unconscious processes is closer to the phenomenological understanding,
despite the general metatheoretical features shared by psychoanalysis and cognitive therapy.
3. Beck and the Cognitive Unconscious
The third source of Aaron Beck’s inspiration are the achievements and results of cognitive
psychology. First mentions of the primary process or schemas inaccessible to the individual’s
conscious experience appear as early as 1964, in Thinking and Depression. Beck, however, does
not specify the exact characteristics of the concept of schema, derived from Piaget’s theory. He
states: “Since the schemas are not directly observable but are inferred from the obtained data,
they may be regarded as ‘hypothetical constructs’” (Beck 1964, p. 563), and in his 1967 book he
asserts:
The theory I will present in this section deals with entities (hypothetical constructs) not
experienced by the patient as such, but whose existence is postulated to account for the
regularities and predictabilities in his behavior. These hypothetical constructs include cognitive
structures and energy. (Beck, 1967/1973, p. 281).
Naturally, this presentation of the concept of schema goes against the previously cited
numerous assertions suggesting the introspective accessibility of all meanings in the patient’s
consciousness. It remains unknown if early Beck understands the unobservability of schemas as
temporary (preconscious schemas) or otherwise. It is unknown, too, if different schemas may
exist in parallel to one another, such as belief in impotence and belief in omnipotence, presented
in Beck’s unpublished drawings (Rosner, 2012). The early concept of schema thus remains
weakly conceptualized. This may stem from Beck’s great caution in formulating hypotheses.
Developing an empirically unsupported theory of schema dynamics may have been risky for a
scholar who wanted to win over the community of behaviorists (Rosner, 2012; Rosner, 2014).
The inexactness in Beck's early conceptualization of the schema may also be due to the
conflicting influences to which Beck might have been subjected in the 1960s. On the one hand,
the concept of a schemas derives from the work of Piaget, who inspired both Rapaport and Beck.
The scheme in the approach of Piaget and Rapaport (Piaget, 1973, Rapaport, Gill, 1967) is a
cognitive structure that can reorganize itself to achieve greater adaptability. Both Piaget and
Rapaport assumed, however, that the scheme is a structure, of which activity we are aware, albeit
not of the structure in itself. In addition, they both suggested that reorganization occurs as a
means of resolving a conflict. We do not know whether Beck adopted such an understanding of
the cognitive construct as the psychodynamically-oriented Piaget and Rapaport, or an
understanding basically excluding psychological unconsciousness, as in Tolman, Meehl or Krech
(Krech, 1950, MacCorquodale, Meehl, 1948). The latter cognitive behaviorists assumed that
hypothetical constructs must refer to the neurophysiological sphere, and not to the unspecified
unconscious "psychological field".
In Beck’s earliest publications there are also references to the primary process (Beck,
1964, 1993). As Beck himself acknowledges, this concept was taken from Freudian theory. The
primary process is a set of primitive, immature, inflexible, and irrational cognitive structures that
can be tested and modified by the secondary process—rational thinking (Beck, 1970/1993). In the
1960s and 1970s the characteristics of the primary process and its relation to unconscious
information processing mechanisms were not explored in detail. Starting from the 1980, with the
gradual development of cognitive studies on automatic processes, we can observe a rapid
increase in Beck’s theoretical reflection on the primary process in his unpublished drafts and
notes. All these perspectives on the primary process bear the hallmarks of distinction between
automatic and controlled processes, introduced by Posner and Snyder (1975) and by Shiffrin and
Schneider (1977; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), as well as of Langer’s (1989) reflectivity theory.
In an unpublished draft dated August 13, 1980, titled Primary Process (Beck, A T.,
personal collection), Beck names the following features of the primary process: automatic
character, dichotomous and global nature of concepts, categorization of stimuli as “good” or
“bad”, homogeneousness, stereotypicality, reductionism, and nondiversity of stimuli in terms of
importance. This shows that Beck perceived the primary process, above all, as rigid, slowly
adapting to new stimuli, and rather unsophisticated. Shiffrin and Schneider’s (1977) theory of
automatic and controlled processes also stresses the effortless nature of automatic processes, but
at the cost of their complexity. Ellen Langer (1989) places emphasis on the fact that unreflective
processes, as more repetitive and stereotypical, are susceptible to cognitive distortions.
In his sketches titled Fallacies About Mind and Matter (Beck, A. T., personal collection,
August 26, 1982), Cognitive Set (Beck, A. T., personal collection, June 13, 1983) and
Hypothesis—Levels of Protective Reactions (Beck, A. T., personal collection, September 12,
1983), Beck continues to experiment with the conceptualization of the primary process, clearly
using a computer metaphor (he uses terms such as “the apparatus,” “receptor,” “integrator,”
“effector,” “input,” “output,” and “super ordinate program”). Perhaps at that time he was trying
to expand his cognitive theory to include a description of the unconscious stages of information
processing and followed the model of theories in the field of cognitive experimental psychology.
For the next several years, however, Beck was still not ready to publish his findings, as attested
by his letter to Safran dated April 24, 1985, in which he stated:
I have been thinking in much the same vein as you for quite a long time, but for the most part had
not worked out my ideas sufficiently to go public with them (that accounts for the many “silent”
areas such as unconscious processing) (Beck, A. T., personal collection, April 24, 1985).
In letters to Paul Gilbert (Beck A. T., personal collection, A. T. Beck to P. Gilbert, August
23, 1985, March 27, 1986) we can also see a great deal of caution in Beck’s way of thi nking and
formulating theories: “Dixon’s work on preconscious processing is certainly relevant, although I
am never sure what generalizability of this subliminal exposures are to actual in vivo
functioning” (Beck, A. T., personal collection, August 23, 1985). In another letter, dated March
27, 1986, Beck advises Gilbert against calling automatic processes “unconscious,” encouraging
him instead to refer to controlled processes as “more conscious” or simply to use the terms
“reflexive thinking” and “reflective thinking.”
What can be regarded as the first published tentative conceptualization of the primary
process is the subsection titled “The Nature of Cognitive Processing” in Anxiety Disorders and
Phobias (1985) written with Emery and Greenberg
2
. What is interesting, Beck does not justify his
interest in unconscious processes with findings concerning automatic and controlled processes in
this publication; he justifies it by referring to studies on unconscious perception (Dixon, 1981)
and to John Bowlby’s (1981) assumptions. In this work, Beck once again rejects the Freudian
concept of unconscious motivation, using terms such as “primal response” and “behavioral
mobilization” instead. Thus, although Beck acknowledges the adaptiveness of unconscious
information processing (due to the limited capacity of conscious processing), he strongly rejects
more abstract or complex forms of this processing, such as unconscious motivations or
unconscious emotions. In Anxiety Disorders Beck remarks that motivation can only be conscious.
2
The mature Beck's conceptualization of unconscious processes may, however, be heavily influenced by
his co-authors: Brad Alford, David Clark, Arthur Freeman, Gary Emery and Ruth Greenberg. They were all
behavioral-cognitive therapists without psychoanalytical education. Therefore, books and articles published by
Beck and colleagues in the eighties and nineties may be more distant from the psychoanalytic way of thinking than
previous works.
Reactions such as avoidance, escape, attack, or reaction freezing are behaviors, not conscious
motivations. According to Beck, what happens at the unconscious level can therefore be more
accurately referred to as “inclination” or “mobilization.”
The slow and careful process of Beck building his conception of unconscious processes
culminated in the exchange of views with Seymour Epstein, the author of a cognitive-experiential
theory of the self, whose works Beck frequently cites in his subsequent publications. In a letter
dated October 27, 1994, he writes: “I certainly appreciate your comments and am delighted over
the convergent evolution of our ideas . . . I am particularly impressed by how our observations
and our putting them together in a coherent fashion are so similar” (Beck, A. T., personal
collection, October 27, 1994). In this letter and in the next one, dated November 8, 1994, Beck
notes that, like Epstein, he sees the primary process basically as adaptive from the evolutionary
point of view and not always irrational. It may be “irrational” only from the point of view of the
individual’s conscious goals.
Readiness to go public with his conception of the primary process emerged in Beck over
the next three years. In 1996 he published a theoretical chapter, “Beyond Belief: A Theory of
Modes, Personality and Psychopathology”; 1997 saw the publication of the book titled The
Integrative Power of Cognitive Therapy (Alford & Beck, 1997) and a paper co-authored with
David Clark, containing probably the most exhaustive presentation of the cognitive
understanding of unconscious processes: “An Information Processing Model of Anxiety:
Automatic and Strategic Processes” (Beck & Clark, 1997). In the last of these publications, Beck
and Clark distinguished three stages of information processing: Stage 1—“initial registration”;
Stage 2—“immediate preparation”; and Stage 3—“secondary elaboration”; the first two of these
seem to be of significance to our discussion. The only stage that can be regarded as fully
unconscious and entirely inaccessible to introspection is Stage 1, engaging what is referred to as
the “orienting mode.” According to Beck and Clark, processing in this stage is simple and leads,
at most, to defining the significance of a stimulus to the individual: positive, negative, or neutral.
What may also occur in Stage 1 is checking if threatening environmental stimuli fit the familiar
“orienting schema” that requires a particular response (Beck, 1996). If one was to repeat the
question asked by Elisabeth F. Loftus and Mark R. Klinger (1992) about whether unconscious
processing in Stage 1 is smart or dumb, the answer would probably be the latter. Even though, as
Beck argues, “The present model asserts that much data is processed implicitly (out of
awareness)” (Beck, 1996, p. 8), this large proportion of processing seems to be neither
particularly complex nor intelligent. The conceptualization of these processes is not particularly
extensive, either.
Stage 2 in the theory proposed by Beck and Clark is an indirect, partly automatic and
partly controlled level of cognitive processing. It has certain features of automatic processes, such
as: quickness, unintentionality, inflexibility, and dependence on environmental stimuli. At the
same time, it also has features of controlled processes: it includes the semantic analysis of stimuli
and engages a considerable part of attentional resources. Stage 2 processes may either be
conscious—in the form of automatic thoughts—or take place outside the individual’s
consciousness. Beck and Clark do not explain whether the unconscious processes are, with some
effort, accessible to introspection or not. There is no mention, either, of whether or not
unconscious meanings and beliefs can be contradictory and lead to conflict. What is also unclear
is the status of Stage 2 unconscious motivations—the expression used in the 1996 publication is
“motivational schema” (Beck, 1996, p. 6), but Beck notes that it is not synonymous with
“conscious intention.” The motivational schema in Stage 2 refers to automatic motivation, an
impulse to act or stopping this impulse. This can be a motivation to escape, to freeze reaction, to
fight, or to satisfy hunger or sexual needs. What is particularly important is that the authors do
not address the issue of whether if may happen that these motivational schemas are contradictory
to one another.
A historical look at the development of Aaron Beck’s theory reveals that, over the years,
he tried to get closer to the empirical findings of cognitive psychology, making use mainly of
Shiffrin and Schneider’s (1977) distinction between automatic and controlled processes. It seems
that this choice of cognitive conception of the unconscious is both a strength and a weakness of
Beck’s theory. On the one hand, the analysis of archival documents shows that Beck is what can
be called a middle-way mind. Just like in his work with patients he discouraged the error of
thinking in black-and-white terms and suggested avoiding extremes, in his own theory building
he chose to acknowledge neither the dominant role of unconscious processing nor the opposite:
the exclusive determination of behavior by conscious cognitive processes
3
. This probably
inspired the hypothesis about the continuum of automatic and controlled processes. Despite the
fact that, as he claims himself, studies on unconscious processes are currently more compliant
with the standards of objective science than consciousness studies (Alford & Beck, 1997), Beck
does not abandon attributing a considerable role in his theory and therapeutic practice to
consciousness. His common-sense and moderate approach would not allow a reductionism
eliminating the significance of conscious processes. This is a strong point of his theory, because
after the era of psychoanalysis conscious contents or conscious conflicts are indeed
underestimated, and consciousness itself is inadequately explored and explained (LoDico, 2018).
3
We wish to thank Prof. Cory Newman from the Center for Cognitive Therapy for his valuable comments
on Aaron Beck’s style of thinking and personality.
On the other hand, restricting theory to the automatic and controlled processes perspective
leads to ignoring the phenomena analyzed by other paradigms of unconsciousness research.
Logan (1988) points out that the division into automatic and controlled activities is not a clear-cut
one. It is possible to move from controlled activities to automatic ones through a process of
automatization, or conversely, with some effort it is possible to become aware of the successive
phases of automatic activity and even change it. Automatic processes inaccessible to
introspection are therefore not sufficiently distinguished from those that we can consciously
register and control. The border between them is blurred, and the automatisms include both
perceptual priming and doing up one’s tie. This differs slightly, for instance, from the explicit and
implicit memory research paradigm (Graf & Schacter, 1985), where we are dealing with the
functional dissociation and stochastic independence of the two types of memory. Just like in the
automatic and controlled processes paradigm, in Beck’s theory the contradictions between
behaviors resulting from unconscious processes and that which the individual consciously reports
are not highlighted in any way. Beck does not mention any kind of dissociation between
processes accessible and inaccessible to introspection. This leaves a certain class of patients’
behaviors inadequately explained.
4. Cognitive Theory and the Issue of Contradiction and Conflict
The possibility that the behaviors of certain classes of patients are inadequately explained
by Beck’s cognitive perspective on unconscious processes can be demonstrated with the use of
two simple examples. The first one concerns the narcissistic patient. Beck, Freeman, and Davis
(2004) write that in narcissistic patients the underlying beliefs of inferiority and unimportance are
easily activated and immediately trigger compensatory strategies of magnifying one’s value. At
the same time, the authors note that these underlying beliefs are activated only in specific
circumstances and that during therapeutic sessions the narcissistic patient is usually unwilling to
analyze his or her sense of inferiority. It is legitimate at this point to ask what happens to this
feeling over therapy duration (possibly lasting even several months) in which the patient does not
consciously experience a sense of inferiority and does not report it to the therapist. If the
cognitive therapist follows only the phenomenological path of discovering successive meanings,
thoughts, and beliefs, is there anything that guides this discovery (i.e., working hypotheses)? If
we consistently adhere to the hypothesis on the conscious–unconscious continuum and rely
exclusively on meanings accessible to introspection, in the first phase of therapy in the case of a
narcissistic patient with weak insight, we are unlikely to go beyond the contents reported by the
patient. We are dealing with a situation in which the contents of the conscious self-concept and
the contents of unconscious beliefs are contradictory to each other. Cognitive theory does not
need to use the theoretical apparatus of psychoanalysis to explain this contradiction, but it seems
that it should devote more attention to this issue.
The other example concerns a patient suffering from obsessive–compulsive disorder
(OCD) and showing obsessive thoughts of aggression against his wife.
4
If this kind of patient
came to see a cognitive-behavioral therapist, his core beliefs would certainly be investigated,
such as: “I am responsible for harm done to others” or “I am immoral, sinful, and evil.” The
patient would also learn to accept his obsessive thoughts and to cope with anxiety. According to
Salkovskis’s (1985) cognitive model based on Beck’s theory, the main problem in OCD is
subjectively perceived excessive responsibility. If, however, the patient reported to a
psychodynamic therapist, the therapist would probably ask him if he felt anger or resentment
towards his wife, hypothesizing an unconscious affect or frustrated needs. If the hypothesis on
4
We are grateful to Prof. Cory Newman for inspiration in creating this example.
the patient’s resentment towards his wife turned out to be true, the cognitive therapist would
probably also reach the relevant automatic and conscious thoughts by using the method of
gradual discovery, but this could take much more time and would be treated as a problem distinct
from OCD symptoms. The cognitive therapist, together with the patient, would probably discover
also beliefs such as: “I should never be angry with anyone because I might lose their acceptance”
or “I should be a loving husband.” He or she would not, however, be able to explain how these
beliefs relate to the occurrence of obsessive thoughts, since the effect of avoiding the experience
of anger on OCD symptoms is not included in the cognitive model of the disorder. In this case we
are also dealing with contradictory experiences at the conscious and unconscious levels.
Westen (1992) observes that cognitive psychologists take on unnecessary work when they
choose laborious cognitive explanations where a motivational model would be more effective and
helpful in formulating hypotheses. The model of automatic processes presented by Beck seems to
be insufficient, because it does not take into account the possibility of contradictory
representations at different levels and the role of conflict between various needs. Below, we
present several directions that could be followed in this kind of expanded conceptualization of
automatic processes in cognitive theory.
The first area in which contradictions between conscious and implicit processes are
investigated is research in social psychology devoted to “dual attitudes” and “implicit attitudes”
(Devine, 1989, Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio, 1990; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Hu, Gawronski, &
Balas, 2017; Nosek & Banaji, 2002; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). According to
Greenwald and Banaji (1995), the construct of “implicit attitude” becomes more valuable when
contradictions occur between the results of direct and indirect measurement of attitudes. This
means that indirect measures may point to a different attitude towards the object than direct
measures. Wilson et al. (2000) define an “implicit attitude” as one whose source people are not
aware of, one that is activated automatically and causes uncontrolled, automatic reactions. This
kind of attitude may but does not have to be accessible to introspection, and keeping it outside
consciousness may but does not have to be motivated. What is more important, according to
Wilson et al. (2000) the “explicit attitude” acquired by the individual does not simply replace the
“implicit attitude”: the two may function simultaneously in the cognitive system. Conscious and
unconscious attitudes towards the same object can therefore be contradictory. In his more recent
works (Alford & Beck, 1997; Beck, 1996, Beck & Haigh, 2014; Beck & Clark, 1997), Beck cites
mainly Shiffrin and Schneider’s (1977) theory of automatic and controlled processes, Kihlstrom’s
(1987, 1990) review studies, and Epstein’s (1994) article. Although studies on implicit attitudes
have developed since the late 1980s, their findings and conclusions did not essentially influence
Beck’s conceptualization of unconscious processes, and it seems they could have enriched it
considerably.
The other area that seems to be a path for the conceptualization of unconscious processes
which Beck chose not to follow is the language of behaviorism. Skinner (1974) offers an
attractive behavioral explanation of the repression mechanism, which makes it possible to
understand why (a) certain experiences or thoughts (understood as behaviors here) are neither
accessible to the individual’s self-observation nor verbalized, and (b) what the conflict between
the tendency to emit certain behaviors and punishment avoidance consists in. According to his
definition, “repression” comes down, simply, to a behavior that was punished in the past (e.g.,
expressing certain needs, thinking in a particular way) becoming aversive, which results in the
individual’s avoidance of emitting this behavior. Additionally, “seeing” this behavior—that is,
the person’s self-awareness of it—also becomes aversive. The individual therefore avoids
“seeing” aversive thoughts, emotions, and needs as well. It seems that, if the theory underlying
cognitive-behavioral therapy does not use the techniques of cognitive and social psychology to
explain the existence of contradictory representations, then perhaps this economical behavioral
conceptualization could play such a role. It is therefore true that cognitive theory includes the
unconscious level of functioning, but this level seems to be inadequately conceptualized as
regards the dissociation between conscious and avoided thoughts.
The third area, present especially in Beck’s unpublished drafts but not covered in a
systematic way, is the issue of basic needs. If we hypothesize the existence of contradictory
attitudes (to use the language of social psychology) or avoided thoughts (to use the language of
behaviorism), it becomes necessary to explain why certain attitudes exist only in implicit ways
and why certain thoughts are avoided. Only the theory of basic needs and the conflict between
them can offer such an explanation.
Germs of this conceptualization can be seen, for example, in the unpublished draft titled
Primary Process (Beck A. T., personal collection, August 13, 1980), in which Beck states that
unconscious processing is focused on two issues: membership in a group and self-esteem. The
basic needs in this case would therefore be the need for bonds and the need to maintain high self-
esteem. This is compatible with Becks conception of two types of personality: autonomous and
sociotropic (Clark & Beck, 1991). In another draft, Anxiety and Inhibition (Beck A. T., personal
collection, October 1, 1980), Beck describes the basic human affiliative motivation, determined
by evolution, comprising—firstly— rejection anxiety, the need for bond with and obedience to
parents, and secondly, the need to be “aggressive, pushy, talkative.” When behaviors stemming
from the latter need are punished or are not rewarded, the natural need for self-expression is
disturbed and a social phobia may develop. Although in the above unpublished note Beck does
not refer to this mechanism as conflict, it is undoubtedly legitimate here to speak of a conflict of
needs regulated by behavioral laws. In an unpublished table dated 1982, “Themes of Depression
and Anxiety” (Beck, A. T., personal collection, April 15, 1982), Beck distinguishes many types
of goals related to psychopathology: acceptance, respect, position in a group, intimacy, support,
independence, and efficacy. Unfortunately, what is missing is the explanation of what happens
when the realization of different goals at the same time is impossible. In a draft titled Cognitive
Set (Beck, A. T., personal collection, June 13, 1983), Beck describes cognitive programs (similar
to the subsequent concept of “mode”), such as hostility or threat orientation which are
evolutionarily adaptive but may stand in conflict with goals such as harmonious interpersonal
relations. Finally, during a symposium with Steve Hollon in 1993, Beck asserted:
Much of our behavior is really preprogrammed, going back to our ethological ancestors, and has
great survival benefit. We are programmed toward bonding, survival, autonomy, independence,
and group affiliation. . . . I think, in general, human beings are predisposed to problems when their
particular environmental niche is not the same niche in which their adaptive programs were
formed. (Beck & Hollon, 1993, pp. 87–88)
This means that, as in the previous example, evolutionarily determined needs and their
realization may be contradictory to the current needs in the patient’s current life. Had Beck
elaborated his theory of basic needs, it would have undoubtedly had a biological and evolutionary
character. Beck assumes, however, that a conflict occurs between biological needs and conscious
goals. It seems, though, that it would be simpler to assume that all needs and goals are
evolutionarily determined, but they are not always pursued in a harmonious way. In Beck’s
writings there is no conceptualization of the dynamics of needs, and no there are guidelines there
for therapists on how to identify the frustrated needs or avoided behaviors that the patient has no
introspective access to.
To sum up, we believe that although Beck’s theory undoubtedly includes a
conceptualization of unconscious processes, both those that, with some effort, it is possible to
discern through introspection and those that are “no more conscious than the functioning of the
internal organs” (Beck, 1991, p. 373), this conceptualization does not offer an explanation of the
existence of contradictory representations at the conscious and unconscious levels or of the
mechanisms responsible for this. Beck seems to ignore this issue, using neither cognitive nor
behavioral explanation.
Conclusion
In this article we have reconstructed the conceptualization of unconscious processes in
Aaron Beck’s cognitive theory. We argue that the Beckian understanding of the unconscious to a
great extent results from his phenomenological approach to psychology—from attributing the
primary role to conscious meanings and from the therapist working towards broadening the
patient’s field of consciousness rather than towards advancing hypotheses. The Beckian
unconscious is therefore rather like the preconscious. In Beck’s writings we can also see strong
but selective influences of cognitive psychology: a view of unconscious processes as automatic
and adaptive. At the same time, there are no conclusions there from research on implicit attitudes
contrary to the individual’s conscious beliefs. What is also lacking is a systematic proposal of a
theory of basic needs and the regulation of conflicts between them.
The philosophical foundations of Beck’s cognitive theory would undoubtedly make the
conceptualization these issues possible. As pointed out by Bucci (2000), LoDico (2018), and
Greenwood (1999), cognitive theories as well as psychoanalytic ones are based on examination
from a third-person perspective and on the use of mentalistic constructs explaining individuals’
behavior, which are at the same time hypothetical constructs. The existence of complex
motivational mechanisms or implicit representations that are not simple extensions of conscious
beliefs can therefore be explained within the framework of this kind of metatheoretical
methodology. This is evidenced by the existing attempts to combine dynamic theories with
cognitive psychology. Wilma Bucci’s (1997) multiple code theory introduces the concept of
dissociated emotion schemas, which result from avoiding painful internal experiences. Mardi
Horowitz (1999, 2014) uses the term “inhibited self-schemas,” which is similar in meaning, and
develops excellent methods of identifying implicit attitudes on the basis of patients’ behavior.
Epstein (1994) offers the most complete conceptualization of the theory of four basic needs and
the outcomes of their conflictual, disharmonious satisfaction.
What may be the reasons for Beck to ignore such important issues? The first reason may
be the fact that Beck’s theory developed in the clinical context, in work with patients and,
consequently, that it tries to avoid excessively abstract constructs that could be perceived as
imposed on the patient, inconsistent with his or her experience, and disturbing the partnership.
Like phenomenological therapists, what Becks regards as the principal value seems to be
humanism and the reduction of the power relationship in psychotherapy. Therefore, the exclusion
of the “dynamic” unconscious protects against its moral dangers and at the same time opens up
opportunities to explore the equally fascinating world of consciousness.
The second possible reason may be Beck’s caution in advancing new theoretical
proposals unless there is a large accumulated body of empirical data to support them. While the
existence of the cognitive, adaptive unconscious is well documented, research on implicit
attitudes appeared later and may not have been sufficiently convincing to the author of The
Integrative Power of Cognitive Therapy.
The third possible reason for Beck’s theoretical decisions is the risk of cognitive therapy
losing its distinct status as a result of acknowledging the conflict of needs. Clark (1995) writes:
“standard CT cannot accommodate the more radical versions of these criticisms that advocate . . .
abstract motivational conceptualizations of the unconscious” (p. 166). The motivational
understanding of the unconscious as a distinct factor playing a primary role would go against the
fundamental assumptions of cognitive therapy.
Monika Romanowska - Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Gdansk.
Interested in the history of psychotherapy and particularly the idea of unconscious in
psychotherapy. Certified CBT psychotherapist, working clinically in public health service
and her private practice.
Bartłomiej Dobroczyński - Faculty of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University,
Cracow, Poland. Associate professor at the Institute of Psychology. His academic
interests include origins, history and the significance of the idea of the unconscious within
the psychological thought, the history of Polish psychological thought and
psychoanalysis, the new spirituality and art. His recent publications include “Generations
of "wasted chances": Władysław Heinrich and psychology in Poland” (with A. Gruszka, in
History of Psychology) and History of Polish psychological thought. New edition (in
Polish, with T. Rzepa).
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