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Introduction
As the formative successor of the Soviet Union, Russia has
re-engaged in the Russo-centric paradigm of constructing a
peripheral zone to insulate its developing hegemonic order
with significant attention directed upon the former Soviet
peripheral regions in Central Asia, comprising several sub-
ordinates, in other words, a Russia-plus zone or Kremlin-
centric hegemony (Trenin, 2001, p. 110). Faced with the
task of achieving great power status as the precondition for
orchestrating the Kremlin-centric political and economic
order, Russia perceives the need to renegotiate its bargains
with the Central Asian republics (Gvosdev, 2004; Lake,
1997). Simultaneously, China’s relative increase of military
and economic capabilities has been portending a geopoliti-
cal shift to the potential detriment of the Kremlin. This
raises the question whether and, if so, to what extent China
is able to challenge Russia by offering more tangible net
benefits for the former Soviet republics in the security and
economic domains (Blank, 2010). Despite its ambitious
quest for great power status and contemporary resurgence,
the Kremlin is still struggling to offset its deficient power
capabilities (Trenin, 2012, 2013). Therefore, China has
emerged as Russia’s prime geopolitical competitor in
Central Asia, considering its increasing engagement with
the Central Asian republics, which have been striving to
overcome the politically volatile instabilities after the post-
Soviet smuta (time of troubles), while incurring the out-
comes of regional power hedging between Moscow and
Beijing (Korolev, 2016).
Considering this constellation, China and Russia, recog-
nized as the leading or dominant states, are facing the pre-
dicament as to whether primacy over the other is more
appropriate than parity in the shaping of their geopolitical
China’s engagement with
Kazakhstan and Russia’s Zugzwang:
Why is Nur-Sultan incurring
regional power hedging?
Maximilian Ohle1, Richard J. Cook2 and Zhaoying Han2
Abstract
Grappling with the contemporary topos of a Sino-Russian Entente, Kazakhstan is caught between a delicate long-term peer-
competition and potentially a structural rivalry involving the two Eurasian Leviathans, China and Russia. Acknowledging
this perspective, Nur-Sultan is inducing hedging dynamics, fishing for a better range of net benefits, while playing a
significant fulcrum role central to the regional geopolitical and geo-economic matrix. Although Russia is retaining the
prevailing role in the security domain, China is catching up with Russia in various economic indices, notably generated by
the Belt and Road Initiative. Utilizing the conceptualization of hierarchy in international relations adapted from the work
of David A. Lake, this paper outlines how Nur-Sultan’s interests and preferences are acknowledged by the respective
dominants, as a basis for social contracting processes to generate a dual hierarchical order in Central Asia.
Keywords
China, hedging, hierarchy, Kazakhstan, Russia
1
Department of Political Science, Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen,
Tübingen, Germany
2
Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University, Tianjin, People’s
Republic of China
Corresponding author:
Zhaoying Han, Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University,
Tianjin 300350, People’s Republic of China.
Email: zhaoyinghan@nankai.edu.cn
900996ENS Journal of Eurasian StudiesOhle et al.
Article
2 Journal of Eurasian Studies 00(0)
periphery in Central Asia. In particular, they have been
engaged in establishing a dual hierarchical order checked
and balanced by the subordinates in various institutional
projects. In the international arena, however, a Sino-
Russian entente, as the result of the expansion of Western
influence, is conceived as a geopolitical counterweight,
providing alternative political and economic order(s) since
the United States gained the unipolar moment (Larson &
Shevchenko, 2010).
Kazakhstan as a case study offers a sufficient scope of
applicability surrounding these geopolitical dynamics.
Due to its position in the heart of Eurasia, it is able to link
countries by functioning as a transit actor for future eco-
nomic and security prospects. In addition, since
Nazarbayev’s resignation in March 2019, Kazakhstan has
had to redefine its role in the regional dimension, facing
the conundrum as to whether the balancing act between
Moscow and Beijing is still the prime foreign policy nar-
rative in the near future. In recognition of these patterns,
the following questions will be addressed: how do both
dominants engage with Kazakhstan, specifically in terms
of the potential economic and security benefits? Why and
to what extent is Kazakhstan incurring regional hedging,
considering the background of China’s potential “intru-
sion” into Russia’s conventional sphere of influence?
And, finally, to what extent do the regional dominants’
interests and preferences overlap within the dual hierar-
chical order, specifically regarding the specific hierarchi-
cal designs?
In the forthcoming analysis, the understanding of hier-
archy elaborated by David A. Lake is applied to illustrate
these dynamics in such relational authority frameworks as
the basis for the dual hierarchical order conception.
Thereafter, Kazakhstan’s bargaining position is outlined
by taking into consideration the incentives that various
institutional frameworks generate, as well as conver-
gences of interests and preferences between Nur-Sultan
and the two dominants. In particular, the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (security domain) as
well as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), more specifically the land-
based Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) (economic
domain), function as examples to illustrate how the two
dominants are orchestrating their respective political
order. This provides the empirical scope of application to
validate the conception of the dual hierarchical order in
Central Asia. Such regional power contestations reveal a
distinct hedging pattern, which the Central Asian states
intend to incur to obtain the best set of net benefits. By
demonstrating the dual hierarchical order hypothesis, this
paper seeks to fill a gap in existing discourses, which is
occurring as the geopolitical tectonic plates are beginning
to shift decisively.
Kazakhstan and the Sino-Russian
Entente: redefining the bargaining
position
Since it gained independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has
maintained a balancing position between two regional pow-
ers, thus having adopted a multi-vectoral political agenda
as an engagement stratagem. However, the multi-vector
foreign policy is largely dependent on how Russia, China
and also the United States design their respective relation-
ships—a constellation referred to as the “Second Great
Game” (Krapohl & Vasileva-Dienes, 2019). Therefore, a
constant recalibration of the Kazakh government to the
fluctuant changes is required to maintain the balance amid
the geopolitical competition, to control the pivot area of
power projection in the Eurasian rim-lands (Harper, 2017;
Sullivan, 2019, p. 36). As such, Kazakhstan has to respond
to the different structures of the respective international
order that each dominant power has been seeking to
materialize.
Stemming from the adherence to derzhavnost, the “natu-
ral right to claim great power status,” Russia has been tra-
ditionally seeking to legitimize its power projection by
providing sufficient military deployability to protect the
periphery of the imperial structures in the Eurasian rim-
lands (Zabortseva, 2016, p. 106). This Kremlin-centric
political order is, according to the revisionist perspective,
“doomed to be an empire,” which has reinforced the claims
to great power status after the collapse of the Soviet Union
(Trenin, 2001, p. 313, 2009). However, this constitutional
moment has contributed to a redefinition of the previously
subordinated properties with varying degrees of approval to
Moscow’s historical and political role (Trenin, 2012). Also,
the Kremlin’s claims to derzhavnost have been challenged
by numerous other subordinates, inter alia by Uzbekistan
having opted to finally suspend its CSTO membership in
2012 (Romashov, 2016, pp. 170–171). This points to
Moscow’s inability to maintain its influence over centrifu-
gal subordinates—a constellation which is exacerbated by
political instabilities and fears of regime change, as in the
cases of Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004, 2014)
(Berryman, 2015; Trenin, 2009). Kazakhstan, by contrast,
has maintained close relations with Russia, which dominate
the official diplomatic rhetoric of both countries concern-
ing both the economic and security domain (McDermott,
2012; Zabortseva, 2014). According to most scholarly lit-
erature, Nur-Sultan’s multi-vector foreign policy, neverthe-
less, insinuates a more nuanced approach to the regional
environment beyond the traditional bond with Moscow.
While proposing Eurasian integration in 1994 and, thus,
signaling a re-bargaining interaction with the Kremlin, it
has also sought to enhance engagement with the West and
China to preserve its newly gained national sovereignty
(Alexandrov, 1999; Cooley, 2012; Satpayev, 2015).
Ohle et al. 3
China was historically more focused on organizing hier-
archical tributary systems (chaogong tixi) to generate a
political order by establishing a ring of allied states that pro-
tected the inner core of the empire and central decision-
making, conforming to tianxia (all under heaven) (Womack,
2012; Zhang & Buzan, 2012, p. 24). Specifically, under the
Ming and Qing dynasties, the integral aspect of the Eurasian
rim-lands became a prime foreign policy imperative to
secure the trade routes westwards—a narrative which has
been revitalized since President Xi Jinping announced the
BRI in Kazakhstan in 2013 (Harper, 2017, p. 16). Following
its formidable rise China has been seeking to invigorate its
construction of an economically based hierarchical architec-
ture in Central Asia, signaling its commitment to economic
development as a vital incentive for potential subordinates
in its periphery (Lake, 2017). This is reinforced by the per-
ception of encirclement along the southern and western
frontier, where most actors have expanded bilateral security
commitments with the United States, compelling China to
seek engagement with states to its west in Central Asia to
construct an international order and, thus, providing incen-
tives to induce alignment (Cooley, 2012). Kazakhstan has
been recognized as one of the key components in China’s
vision due to, as various literature suggests, a convergence
of interests in both the security and the economic domain.
This pertains to cross-border cooperation to combat the spill
overs of the separatist movements (specifically in Xinjiang);
the deepening of economic interdependence based on the
exchange of natural resources from Kazakhstan for con-
sumer goods from China, culminating in the former’s com-
mitment to the SREB; and the preservation of regime
legitimacy in Central Asia (Blank, 2011; Burkharov &
Chen, 2016; Kembayev, 2018; Rousseau, 2013).
To personify the new power dynamics of China’s rise
and ambitions, Yan Xuetong contextualizes China’s posture
as a wangdao (humane authority), which “represents the
view that China can and wishes to be an enlightened,
benevolent hegemon whose power and legitimacy derive
from its ability to fulfill other countries’ security and eco-
nomic needs—in exchange for their acquiescence to
Chinese leadership” (Yan, 2019, p. 44). This is also rein-
forced by Beijing’s attempted charm offensive to illustrate
China’s role as a responsible great power—although ideal-
istic in tone—with proclamations, such as renlei mingyun
gongtongti (community with a shared future for mankind)
and hezuo gongying (win-win cooperation), to dissuade
actors that are skeptical of Beijing’s intent (Schmidt &
Hellmann, 2011, pp. 20–21).
As for Sino-Russian relations, a substantial power shift is
visible, as Russia’s relative capabilities (both militarily and
economically) have been decreasing as compared to China,
which may shape the cornerstone for its own potential hegem-
ony.1 This provides the basis for the hedging dynamics of
most Central Asian republics in the Eurasian rim-lands
engaged in geopolitical and geo-economic projects. Given
these conditions, the geopolitical competition may generate
certain frictions between Moscow and Beijing, leading either
to conflictual or peaceful change in the respective bids for
hegemony (Lo, 2008; Sutter, 2018). As implied above, in spite
of being labeled as geopolitical contenders in the regional
dimension, China and Russia do have a convergence of inter-
ests framed by a Sino-Russian entente, which is based upon a
shared rivalry with the United States. To challenge Western
interventionism, Beijing and Moscow have made significant
contributions to regime legitimacy in Central Asia (Trenin,
2015). The CSTO and the SCO are, thus, to be seen as an
establishment of hierarchical security relationships under
Russian and Sino-Russian leadership respectively (Allison,
2018). In addition, two development projects are discernible in
the economic domain: (1) the EAEU, which notably contrib-
utes to the economic consolidation of Russia and (2) the
launch of the BRI as a Chinese attempt to enhance the eco-
nomic development in Central Asia. Kazakhstan is, thereby, of
specific geo-strategic importance due to its location in the
Eurasian heartland and being the geographically largest and
most economically developed of the Central Asian republics.
Seeking to become a land-linking actor, Kazakhstan has
expanded its bilateral relations with China and Russia, result-
ing in its commitment to the BRI, while simultaneously main-
taining its alignment with Russia in both military (CSTO) and
economic institutional projects (EAEU). Nur-Sultan is,
thereby, manifesting its balancing act between the two
Eurasian powers (Morozov, 2015). This instance is yet another
case amid the developing “dual-order thesis” in IR ontology
and discourse—a pattern in Sino-Russian relations, which has
not yet been sufficiently covered in academic literature
(Ikenberry, 2016; Liu & Liu, 2019; Q. Zhao, 2014).
“Anarchy” and “hierarchy”
as sui generis hegemonic order
categories
The “anarchy-hierarchy” dichotomy as a concept has long
existed under the rubric of international relations, yet it
has recently gained prominence as a significant alterna-
tive to the dominance of formal legal sovereignty
approaches centering on a “culture of anarchy” (Kang,
2004; Lake, 2009; Mearsheimer, 2001; Morgenthau,
1948; Waltz, 1979). Alternatively, through the lens of var-
ious hierarchical literature, anarchy and hierarchy operate
as opposite poles, with varying gradients of authority:
anarchy <–> loose hierarchy <–> tight hierarchy (Parent
& Erikson, 2009, pp. 136–137). Hierarchical relations are
synthesized to generate a political order by having con-
ferred authority upon the dominant state, which is recog-
nized by the approving subordinate(s) and enshrined in a
social contract (Lake, 2009).
As seen in Figure 1 which delineates a form of rational
bargaining interactions, a subordinate views hierarchical
conditions with a dominant as a valuable alternative to the
4 Journal of Eurasian Studies 00(0)
conditions of self-help or anarchical relations, as it has
identified potential for aligned interests. These hierarchical
(H) bargains are conducted as dominant (D) to subordinate(s)
(S1/Sn), that is, H1 = D1(S1 + Sn) (Cook et al., 2019, p. 6).
Under these conditions, actors per se are not ordered as
equal entities, but via an asymmetric lens, as actors’ relative
properties are unequal (Renshon, 2017, p. 1; Womack,
2016). The dominant, as a major power seeking to synthe-
size hierarchical relations to construct or expand a political
order, then offers incentives via either an attractive output
of net benefits for the subordinate or by means of persua-
sion (Womack, 2016, pp. 136–139). A dominant may also
specialize in providing a range of incentives, befitting the
characteristics of its order, based upon the arsenal of its
capabilities and its interests, that is, security, economic,
diplomatic among more or all factors. If there is more than
one available dominant in a geopolitical theater, subordi-
nates may be afforded the ability to engage in order shop-
ping, that is, seeking the best range of net benefits from the
political orders provided without offsetting them entirely,
while the dominant will attempt to use their carrots and
sticks to push and pull subordinates in the direction they
wish (Ikenberry, 2016).
Based upon converging interests, the incentives signaled
by the dominant offer additional policy preferences pertain-
ing to closer alignment (Frieden, 1999; Lake, 2017, pp.
370–371). The dominant and subordinate align by crossing
a point of equilibrium and then synthesize a political order
based upon a social contract, conforming to the subordi-
nate, conferring a gradient of authority to the dominant.
Following Dahl’s definition of power as “the ability of A
[the dominant] to get B [the subordinate] to do something
he would otherwise not do,” the subordinate subjects itself
to the rules set out by the dominant, thereby legitimizing
the political order (Dahl, 1957, p. 202; Lake, 2007, p. 50).
Recognizing the authority conferment upon the dominant
as the manifestation of the inequality among states in the
international system, subordinates thus display bandwag-
oning patterns by signaling their commitment as a bargain
to obtain the most optimal set of net benefits (Fearon, 1997;
Jervis, 2002; Kang, 2004; Lake, 2009, pp. 8–16; Weeks,
2008). Doing so, subordinates will consistently seek to
obtain the best sets of net benefits, while not offsetting the
political order provided that the order conforms to interests,
incentives and preferences (Clapton, 2009; Kang, 2003;
Lake, 2009, p. 26). Strong alignment of interests and pref-
erences produces a strong social contract with tighter align-
ment, whereas lesser alignment of interests and preferences
produce a weaker social contract with a looser order (Parent
& Erikson, 2009, pp. 136–137).
The net benefits generated by the political order further
provide attraction and legitimize the dominant’s relational
authority, mutually reinforcing the legitimacy outputs, con-
forming to the principles of the political order and its perfor-
mance. According to Lake, “principles of legitimation are
typically embodied in ideologies or precepts that are ‘moral’
or ‘normative’ precisely because they are understood and
accepted by all (or nearly all) members of society” (Lake,
2017, p. 379). Referring to the performance aspects, the
reinforcement of the dominant’s legitimacy of the political
Figure 1. Dynamics of relational authority bargaining.
Source. Cook etal. (2019).
Ohle et al. 5
order necessitates that certain constraints are acknowledged,
as the dominant and the subordinate maintain a mediation
medium between them (Nexon & Wright, 2007, p. 264).
This entails that the dominant must not overstep its authority
and engage in abusive behavior as this would evaporate
principle and performance factors eroding legitimacy and
reducing, or even removing the benefits of the subordinate
to remain in the political order. If such an occurrence were
to take place, the effects would not be restricted, but would
trigger an audience cost with other subordinates throughout
the dominants hierarchical network filtering down to other
nodes of the political order, disrupting its image as a rational
and attractive provider of net benefits (Cooley & Spruyt,
2009, p. 44; Lake, 2009, p. 14).
As interests, preferences and incentives are subjected to
the flux of political change in the international arena, the
social contract must be continuously re-negotiated, to
maintain a condition of hierarchy, and as such the political
order (Lake, 2009, p. 44). If interests diverge and social
contract value and activity decreases, net benefits as the
output of the political order begin to shrink, effecting the
performance, principle and, as such, the legitimacy of the
political order. Two outcomes of hierarchical failure can be
identified here: the first would be the subordinate moving
back to anarchical relations seeking self-help and/or even
defection to another political order. This, however, opens
the door for the dominant to potentially signal its ability to
punish the subordinate and coercively persuade it via a dis-
ciplinary measure. The second views the dominant ejecting
the subordinate from the political order via contractual sev-
erance, as the subordinate has become detrimental to its
foreign policy plans.
As such, utilizing a hierarchical lens provides sufficient
applicability to the dynamics in Sino-Russian, Sino-Kazakh,
and Russian-Kazakh relations, as it offers an alternative way
of how a subordinate (Kazakhstan) maintains its relations
with more than one dominant. This conceptualization insin-
uates a dual hierarchical order with overlapping branches of
engagement, which requires an issue-specific analysis to
investigate the respective bargaining stratagems built upon
converging interests, incentives, and preferences.
How does Russia engage with
Kazakhstan geopolitically and
geo-economically?
Already by December 1991, Russia had set the cornerstones
for a post-Soviet hierarchy by establishing the CIS to create
multiple interdependent channels of military and economic
power projection (Loftus & Kanet, 2015, p. 25). Pertaining
to the military and security domain, the Collective Security
Treaty was signed in 1992 as a basis for the establishment of
a military alliance in 2002, the CSTO, which currently con-
sists of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan (CSTO, 1992, 2002). Since the inception of
the CSTO, Russia has been seeking to canalize its power
projection into the near abroad, specifically the aforesaid
countries, by offering sufficient security incentives and,
despite initial setbacks, posing itself as a security guarantor.
The latter is ensured by Russia’s prevailing military capa-
bilities and deployability rates, manifesting its authority
over the members of the CSTO. These aspects conform to
the contemporary components of a Russian or Kremlin-
centric hierarchical architecture in the security domain
(Klevakina, 2013; Zakharov, 2012).
On a bilateral basis, Moscow and Nur-Sultan have further
deepened their security commitments enshrined in the
“Treaty on Military Cooperation between the Russian
Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan,” which was
signed in 1994 (Administration of the President of the
Russian Federation, 1995). Thus, the Kremlin has main-
tained its military and security leverage over Kazakhstan,
having deployed military personnel at the Baikonur space
launch center, the Sary-Shagan anti-missile testing range as
well as the space-surveillance radars at Balkhash according
to specific bilateral agreements (Berryman, 2007, p. 155).2
This arrangement has enabled the Kremlin to supply suffi-
cient security provision along the “southern strategic fron-
tier” against spill overs deriving from subversive forces in
Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan—factors that have
raised concerns about increasing instabilities in a highly vol-
atile and politically charged environment, which may entail,
if not properly contained, regime change (Gorecki, 2014, p.
66; Trenin, 2012, p. 180). The “Color Revolutions” have fur-
ther reinforced these fears, as their implications—particu-
larly the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan (2005) due to its
immediate proximity—would have threatened the self-pro-
claimed legitimacy of the regime in Nur-Sultan, thus reveal-
ing a sufficient congruence of interests and preferences with
Russia (Gorecki, 2014, p. 86; Trenin, 2012, p. 177).
As such, Russia’s bilateral hierarchical orchestration in
the security domain is based upon shared interests and pref-
erences, stemming from a similar threat perception, mili-
tary heritage, geographic proximity and administrative
structure of the military forces (Weitz, 2012). Supplementary
to this security commitment is the complementarity to the
CSTO, as the interoperability is amplified through the regu-
lar conduction of military exercises and the CSTO defense
mechanisms, inter alia the Collective Rapid Reaction
Force, to counter military aggressions, terrorism and trans-
national drug trafficking (McDermott, 2012, pp. 49–50).
Since the CSTO functions as a prime foreign policy tool to
maintain a post-Soviet political order, it has generated suf-
ficient incentives to attract subordinates to acknowledge
Russia’s post-Soviet security order (Lukin, 2014, p. 91).
Russia is also committed to designing the post-Soviet eco-
nomic order following the inception of the CIS and various
economic appendages. Recognizing Russia’s comprehensive
capabilities, Nursultan Nazarbayev, former President of
Kazakhstan, proposed in 1994 to promote the multilateral
6 Journal of Eurasian Studies 00(0)
cooperation based on a robust institutional structure and regu-
latory powers in the principal branches of the economy
(Alexandrov, 1999, p. 229). Such a posture was interpreted as
a subordinate bargaining for better net benefits and requesting
dominant-subordinate interaction. As Russia supported this
vision, it signed bilateral agreements on the customs union
with both Belarus and Kazakhstan in 1995, marking the com-
mencement of post-Soviet Eurasian economic integration
through means of multilateral institutionalization and region-
alism within the framework of the CIS. Russian ambitions
have gradually become more tangible, considering the estab-
lishment of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC)
and the subsequent finalization of the Customs Union between
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in January 2010. Underlining
the necessity to further expand the multilateral cooperation,
the presidents of these states signed the Declaration on
Eurasian Economic Integration to initiate the Common
Economic Space (CES) as the next step for the necessary
diversification of trade and the transition from a resource-
based economy to an economy built on innovations (January
2012). This expressis verbis involves unified legislation, free
movement of goods, services, capital and labor, subsidies for
industry and agriculture, transport, power engineering, tariffs
of the natural monopolies as well as several privileges for
entrepreneurs (such as free access to the common market, free
and independent choice of registration within the CES and the
sale of their products in any CES member state). To regulate
the economic relations within the CES, the Eurasian
Economic Commission (EEC) has been set up as a suprana-
tional organ. It further emphasizes the inclusive character,
revealed when the accessions of Armenia in 2014 and
Kyrgyzstan in 2015 were acknowledged to expand the
Eurasian integration projects, which culminated in the trans-
formation of the hitherto existing EurAsEC into the EAEU in
January 2015 (Sargsyan, 2016; Yarashevich, 2014).
While drafting the EAEU Treaty, Kazakhstan accentu-
ated the principle of non-interference into matters of politi-
cal sovereignty as an essential precondition for economic
cooperation. According to Nazarbayev, the EAEU should
be based upon economic pragmatism and voluntary inte-
gration without changing the political system, thus insinu-
ating a multi-vectoral approach between the regional
powers. As such, the Kazakh leadership has been seeking to
strengthen its bargaining position and the potential benefits
that the EAEU, as a geo-economic project, may generate—
in particular: (1) the market access to EAEU member states
and government contracts for Kazakh corporations, which
increases cross-border trade activities; (2) the transforma-
tion of Kazakhstan into an international transport and logis-
tics hub that attracts further investments, even beyond the
EAEU framework; and (3) the access to energy infrastruc-
ture (Satpayev, 2015).
Notwithstanding these significant incentives, Russia
maintains its prevailing position since the inception of the
EAEU. Despite the formal equality among the member
states, the bilateral trade figures indicate such a disparity, as
all branches considered are dominated by Russia (Targsyan,
2016, p. 14). By providing more financial contributions,
Moscow is able to insinuate itself into the decision-making
process. It is amplified by the fact that the EEC, the key
institution of the EAEU, is located in Moscow, so that in
case of negotiations with the member states or even with
other international actors and third countries, Russia princi-
pally determines the political settings of the contractual
arrangements (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2017, pp. 13–17).
The Kremlin’s proposal to link the EAEU with China’s
SREB in spring 2015 without having sought coordination
with the other EAEU member states can serve as an exam-
ple in this context (Sangar, 2017).
As Moscow is seeking to shape its subordinates’ inter-
ests, it has established various institutions and appendages
as a contemporary architecture of its political order based on
a “loyalty for stability” exchange system. It is maintained by
a broad range of sanction mechanisms and coercive diplo-
macy as deterrent measures, to demonstrate Russia’s
“enforcement of integration,” which prevents subordinates
from defection. The Kremlin has been so far unable to rea-
dapt the strategies to constitute a social contract with rela-
tional authority properties. Should the interests and
preferences diverge on a remarkable scale, the hierarchical
framework of the Kremlin—as in the cases of Ukraine and
Georgia—might collapse, as in this sense defection would
be considered the only option available to obtain a better set
of net benefits beyond the “loyalty for stability” pattern
(Makarkin & Oppenheimer, 2011; Sergunin, 2016).
Does the alignment with China
generate better net benefits for
Kazakhstan?
While maintaining alignment with the Kremlin, Kazakhstan
has reiterated its signals to recognize China as a valuable
option to obtain additional net benefits. As Nur-Sultan seeks
to diversify its developmental strategies and various forms of
bilateral and multilateral cooperation, Beijing has enhanced
its incentives within the framework of the BRI. Furthermore,
under the security umbrella of the SCO, the commitments
have been intensified in the domain of security collaboration.
Regarding the latter, as Russia has been a long-standing
member since the inception, an institutional hedging dynamic
based upon a checks-and-balances pattern has commenced,
amplified by subordinates signaling to seek the most optimal
benefits in a political order provided by both dominants.
SCO: regional power hedging—common
security interests and preferences
Founded in 2001, the SCO—currently consisting of Russia,
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Ohle et al. 7
India and Pakistan—has emerged as an institutional frame-
work to resolve regional security issues, which have been
threatening the regional stability and the regimes of Central
Asia in particular since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The commitment encompasses the combat against seces-
sionism, terrorism and extremism (the so-called “three
evils”) as well as divisive clan politics, border disputes and
transnational organized crime. The SCO, thereby, functions
as an institutional instrument to coordinate the means of
conflict resolution, recognizing the national interests of the
other member states. Since the Regional Anti-Terrorist
Structure (RATS) was adopted in 2002, the member states
have also been considering military measures, if applicable,
to stabilize the politically charged and highly vulnerable
environment—namely: the encouragement of information
sharing; provisions of advice and proposals on combatting
terrorist forces; training of personnel; and the maintenance
of contacts with other international organizations related to
containing terrorism (Lanteigne, 2006; H. Zhao, 2013, p.
440). Since the SCO is specifically designed to take on
internal security challenges, it is functioning as an institu-
tion of regional cooperation with a permanent negotiation
mechanism. Its decision-making essentially involves the
regime legitimacy and geopolitical sustainability of strong
and centralized regimes, the dominant political form of
government in Central and East Asia. Thus, the SCO pro-
vides sufficient incentives for the subordinates to contrib-
ute to this political order generated under the informal
Sino-Russian leadership (Aris, 2009).
With the increasing role of China in the security sphere,
questions are beginning to arise as to China’s ability to
develop security leverage over Nur-Sultan. This is tied to
Beijing’s developing arms industries and superior military
spending in comparison to Moscow. However, Russia
maintains significant leverage over the arms export indus-
try to Kazakhstan.
As indicated in Table 1 and Graphs 1 and 2, China has
constantly increased its military expenditure, which signals
the capability to supply sufficient security provision, whereas
Russia has to afford proportionately more to maintain its
military might. Despite this, Kazakhstan significantly relies
upon Russian arms sales, as displayed in Table 1, suggesting
that Russia, despite China’s developing interests in entering
the international arms trades, still maintains sufficient secu-
rity linkages. China’s commitments are, nevertheless, inter-
preted as a supplementary means of security provision,
stemming from the correlation of security interests and pref-
erences between Beijing and Nur-Sultan. In particular, China
is concerned about domestic tensions and separatist threats in
Tibet and Xinjiang. Regarding the latter, since the political
instabilities have been threatening its gateway to Central
Asia, China has been compelled to increase its engagement
with neighboring states, to offset its demarcation vulnerabili-
ties (Abilov, 2012; Zheng, 2014). These fears are reinforced
by a potential American patronage over the Uighurs, echoing
Washington’s assistance of the Taliban to restrain the Soviet
Union (Christoffersen, 2006, p. 44). As a significant number
of Uighur insurgents currently reside in Kazakhstan to shirk
Chinese law enforcement, such a constellation necessitates
comprehensive cross-border security cooperation to combat
secessionism more effectively (H. Zhao, 2013, p. 437).
In parallel, Kazakhstan is well aware of the threats posed
by ethnic and religious separatism having emerged from
the war in Afghanistan, the instabilities in Tajikistan and
the aftermath of the Color Revolutions. Considering the
potential spillover effects deriving from the aforemen-
tioned, the SCO declarations since 2005 have reiterated the
joint commitment of all member states to countering such
developments, seeking to ease concerns about regime
change. This forms the basis for Kazakhstan’s harmoniza-
tion of interests and preferences with both Russia and
China, thus revealing a convergence between the subordi-
nate and the two dominants and sufficient potential for
alignment (Lanteigne, 2006, pp. 616–618; Sullivan, 2019,
pp. 35–36). Recognizing Nur-Sultan’s proposal to launch
the Code of Conduct in International Anti-Terrorist
Operations in the UN format, Kazakhstan’s commitment
was widely praised in the SCO, as it was reiterated in the
Qingdao Declaration of the SCO (2018). The Code of
Conduct presents a more nuanced implementation approach
of previous international security commitments, seeking to
establish a global coalition against international terrorism
in accordance with the principles of the UN. Kazakhstan’s
vision of the Code of Conduct also reflects its own political
agenda in the SCO, reaffirming its commitment to ensuring
regional stability in Central Asia under the RATS of the
SCO. In particular, it has approved the increasing regional
cooperation, inter alia involving the following: (1) the
more effective implementation of joint measures against
the threats posed by the three evils; (2) a more harmonious
legislation directive among the member states, while
upholding the non-interference principle, such as the refusal
to grant asylum or the immediate extradition if requested
by another SCO member states; (3) training of relevant spe-
cialists; and (4) the securitization of trade routes as an
essential means to promote economic growth, and the pro-
vision of infrastructure for temporary deployment of mili-
tary troops if requested (SCO, 2005, 2018).
Considering these implications, Nur-Sultan has enhanced
its security commitments not only with Russia, but also with
China that may function as a reassurance to Kazakhstan that
certain security challenges stemming from the volatile and
politically charged environment of Central Asia do not spill
over. Such signals do not necessarily indicate an authority
transfer, but do legitimize China’s role as a consolidator of the
political order within the SCO and the bilateral engagement
between Nur-Sultan and Beijing (Jia, 2007; Syroyezhkin,
2010). Hence, China is able to challenge the Russian leverage
over the Central Asian republics. Although Russia can coun-
ter-balance by promoting Eurasian integration in other
8 Journal of Eurasian Studies 00(0)
Table 1. Transfers of Major Weapons: Chinese and Russian Deals with Deliveries or Orders made for 2000 to 2018.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2019)
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Information Generated: 28 August 2019
Supplier/
recipient R
Ordered No. designation Weapon description Year(s) weapon
of order
Year
delivery
of
delivered
Comments
China
R: Kazakhstan (3) Wing-Loong-1 UAV/UCAV (2015) 2016 3
4 Y-8 Transport aircraft 2018 2018 (1) Y-8 F-200WA version; for Naitonal Guard
Russia
R: Kazakhstan 3 Project-22,180 Patrol Craft 2009 2010–2014 (3) Kazakh designation Sardar
(13) L-39 C Albatros Trainer aircraft (1995) 1996–2000 (13) Secondhand; payment for Russian debt to
Kazakhstan
(14) Su-27 S/Flanker-B FGA aircraft (1995) 1999–2001 14 Secondhand; payment for debt
(40) 5V55U/SA-10 SAM 1998 2000 (40) Secondhand
1 I1-76M Trainer aircraft 1998 2000 1 Secondhand
1 S-300 P/SA-10A SAM system 1998 2000 1 Secondhand
(3) Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter (2002) 2002 (3) Mi-17 V-5 version
(14) Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter (2002) 2004–2007 (14) $63 m deal; Mi-17 version; for anti-terrorist
and anti-narcotics operations
(14) BTR-80A IFV (2003) 2004–2005 14
18 BPM-97 APC 2006 2008 18 Probably for border guards
(1) BTR-80 APC 2006 2008 1
(3) ANSAT Light helicopter 2007 2008–2009 (3)
(79) BTR-80A IFV 2007 2007–2010 (79) Possibly $40 m deal
(12) Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter 2007 2009–2012 (12) Mi-17 V-5 version
(2) N-001 Myech Combat ac radar 2007 2010 (2) N-001 V version: for Su-27UB combat aircraft
modernized to Su-27UBM2 in Belarus
(120) 9M120 Ataka/AT-9 Anti-tank missile (2010) 2011–2013 (120) For BMPT AFSV
(10) BMPT Terminator Tank/AFSV (2010) 2011–2013 (10)
(44) BTR-82A IFV (2010) 2011–2012 (44)
(Continued)
Ohle et al. 9
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2019)
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Information Generated: 28 August 2019
Supplier/
recipient R
Ordered No. designation Weapon description Year(s) weapon
of order
Year
delivery
of
delivered
Comments
(20) Igla1/SA-16 Portable SAM (2010) 2013–2014 (20) For project-22,180 patrol craft
(21) Tigr APV (2010) 2011–2012 (21)
(3) TOS-1 Sel-propelled MRL (2010) 2011 (3)
(17) BTR-80 APC (2011) 2012 17
90 BTR-82A IFV (2012) 2015–2017 (90)
(10) Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter (2012) 2013–2015 10 Mi171Sh armed version; for border guards
(200) 5V55U/SA-10 SAM (2013) 2015 (200) Probably secondhand; aid
1 Project-10,750/Lida MCM ship 2013 2017 1 Kazakh designation Alatau
(5) S-300PS/SA-10B SAM system (2013) 2015 (5) Secondhand (but possibly modernized before
delivery); aid as part of unified Russia-Belarus-
Kazakhstan air defense network
4 Mi-35M Combat helicopter 2015 2016 (4)
6 Su-30MK FGA aircraft 2015 2015–2016 6 Su-30SM version
(3) Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter 2016 2016–2017
(100) 9M317/SA-17 Grizzly SAM (2017)
1 Buk-M2/SA-17 SAM system (2017)
4 Mi-35M Combat helicopter 2017 2018 (4)
12 Su-30MK FGA aircraft 2017 2017–2018 6 Su-30SM version
Mi-8MT/Mi-17 Transport helicopter (2018) Mi-8AMT (Mi-171) version; assembled in
Kazakhstan
8 Su-30MK FGA aircraft 2018 Su-30SM version; delivery planned by 2020
Note. The “No. delivered” and the “Year(s) of deliveries” columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. The “Comments” column includes publicly reported information on the value
of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL: http://www.sipri.org/contents/
armstrad/sources-and-methods.
Table 1. (Continued)
10 Journal of Eurasian Studies 00(0)
institutional frameworks, it has forfeited its domination in the
SCO (Facon, 2013). This reveals regional power hedging pat-
terns within the SCO checked and balanced by the subordi-
nates as well as Sino-Russian convergence of security
interests and preferences in the international dimension
(Harper, 2017; Korolev, 2016).
SREB—economic strategies for central Asia
to overcome developmental shortcomings
In addition to its security commitment with Kazakhstan,
China has underlined its ambitions to promote economic
development as a vital incentive to legitimize its hierarchi-
cal orchestration. Considering China’s increasing demands
for energy resources to facilitate further economic growth,
President Xi Jinping has put forth a comprehensive strat-
egy to (1) strive toward energy self-sufficiency by devel-
oping clean coal technologies, reducing coal consumption,
and increasing oil, natural gas, shale gas and alternative
energy sources; (2) reduce energy consumption by
promoting energy efficiency; (3) increase international
cooperation, energy technology, focus on “going out,”
especially for Russia and Central Asia, Middle East,
Africa, the Americas, and Asian Pacific and develop land
and sea transport; and (4) promote energy research and
development (Cole, 2016, p. 123; Petersen & Barysch,
2011, p. 11). As approximately 80% of China’s oil imports
are transferred via the Strait of Malacca, a vulnerable geo-
political chokepoint in southeast Asia (i.e., the so-called
Malacca Dilemma), Beijing is de facto compelled to diver-
sify its trade routes to ensure a long-term and alternative
energy supply (Andrews-Speed & Dannreuther, 2011;
Chen, 2011; Cole, 2016, pp. 135–137).
Designed to discover new trade routes west- and south-
wards through bi- and multilateral trade expansions, the
BRI is, thus, not only a vital incentive for the Central Asian
republics to promote economic development, but also
China’s principal political instrument to seek long-term
leverage over the periphery of its sphere of influence (Pirro,
2015; Witte, 2013). In that light, the generation of net
Graph 1. Military expenditure—China, Russia and Kazakhstan (Current USD $).a
aCurrent USD $ as of August 2019.
Source: Adapted from World Bank Group (2019a).
Ohle et al. 11
benefits is substantially based on the extraction of natural
resources in exchange for investments in the oil and gas
sector and infrastructural projects (Cooley, 2012, p. 9;
Qoraboyev & Moldashev, 2018, p. 123).
Due to its location in the heartland of Eurasia, Kazakhstan
has played a crucial role in China’s geopolitical visions.
Already in 1997, Beijing and Nur-Sultan agreed on the con-
struction of an oil pipeline across Kazakhstan (from Atyrau at
the Caspian Sea to Alashankou in Xinjiang at the Chinese-
Kazakh border), which had been completed in 2005 and
already exceeded the annual amount of 14 million tons of crude
oil by the end of 2014 (Fedorenko, 2013, p. 13; Pepe, 2016, p.
424). Since then, the pipeline has been jointly operated by
KazMunayGaz and the Chinese National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC). In addition, China has already acquired a
share of the oilfield in the Caspian Sea, worth USD 30 billion,
and purchased Petro Kazakh for USD 4.2 billion to expand the
energy relations in the oil sector. Acknowledging such a tre-
mendous commitment, Kazakhstan exports 4.3% of its annual
trade volume in the oil sector to China (Hu et al., 2017, p. 423;
Ipek, 2007, p. 1190; Pirro, 2015, p. 123). The Chinese-Kazakh
economic cooperation is similarly discernible in the transport
of gas resources from Turkmenistan via the Central Asia-China
pipeline to Khorgos (Xinjiang) at the Chinese-Kazakh border,
emphasizing Kazakhstan’s role as a transit actor. Since 2014,
three (out of four) sections of this pipeline have been in full
operation to transfer a total amount of 85 billion cubic meters
per annum of natural gas resources extracted in Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan. The fourth section is estimated to be com-
pleted by 2020, enabling China to import an additional amount
of 30 billion cubic meters per annum. Regarding Nur-Sultan’s
membership in the EAEU, the Chinese-Kazakh energy com-
mitment is principally negotiated within the framework of the
regulations set by the EEC, prompting Russia to provide the
settings under which such cooperative frameworks are culti-
vated (Hu et al., 2017, pp. 422–423; Roberts, 2016, p. 8).
Identifying Kazakhstan’s position as a transit and resource-
exporting actor, President Xi Jinping has signaled this value,
Graph 2. Military Expenditure—China, Russia and Kazakhstan 2000–2018 (% of GDP).
Source: Adapted from World Bank Group (2019b).
12 Journal of Eurasian Studies 00(0)
as he announced the BRI during his state visit at the Nazarbayev
University in Nur-Sultan 2013. By providing comprehensive
economic development, China seeks to legitimize the con-
struction of its political order, recognizing that these republics
do not have other substantial alternatives, except for Russia.
Beijing considers Central Asia as compatible with the BRI
because its components are solely based on economic aspects,
neglecting political criteria (Mardell, 2018).
This bilateral engagement has been enhanced since the
SREB was synergized with Nurly Zhol (bright path), an
economic initiative launched by the previous Nazarbayev
administration, to receive a more considerable amount of
Chinese investments (Silin et al., 2018, p. 307). The pro-
cess of linking, or otherwise translatable as “pairing”
(sopryazhenie in Russian or duijie in Chinese), was
enshrined in a joint declaration signed by President Xi and
former President Nazarbayev in 2015 (Chubarov, 2018).
Nurly Zhol is an economic stimulus plan to develop the
national infrastructure after the global financial crisis of
2008/2009 and the following depreciation of the Tenge, the
national currency of Kazakhstan (Lukin & Yakunin, 2018,
p. 104). In particular, it has supplemented numerous
national strategies, inter alia the initiative “The 100
Concrete Steps Set Out by President Nursultan Nazarbayev
to Implement the Five Institutional Reforms,” “The
Strategy for Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan
until the Year 2030” and the “Strategy ‘Kazakhstan-2,050’,”
aiming to provide sufficient means for modernization and
incentives for foreign investors (Ministry of Justice of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, 2016; President of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, 2014). Via the aforementioned synergies,
Kazakhstan has been aiding China’s construction of eco-
nomic corridors in Central Asia, thus contributing to an
increase of Beijing’s economic power projection and a
canalization of Chinese investments into Kazakhstan to
achieve modernization (Fallon, 2015).
Although both President Xi and former President
Nazarbayev have officially claimed the aspects of “mutual
benefits,” it has to be emphasized that such a geopolitical
symbiosis is not necessarily constituted. As the trade figures
in Graphs 3 and 4 indicate, although Kazakhstan has gradu-
ally increased its exports rates to China, which have
Graph 3. Kazakhstan’s Exports to China and Russia 2000–2017.
Source: Adapted from The Observatory of Economic Complexity (2017a).
Ohle et al. 13
proportionately exceeded the volume to Russia, the import
rates specify contrasting dynamics with a higher volume
from the latter as compared to the former. Although
Kazakhstan’s overall trade with Russia has been declining
relatively since the 1990s, while China has caught up sig-
nificantly, Nur-Sultan is still dependent on how the Kremlin
implements its economic policies, as most of the natural
resources are exported to the European Union, thus utilizing
Russian pipelines as a transporting means (nearly 85%).
Considering Beijing’s increasing demand for oil and gas to
satiate the domestic market, the China–Kazakhstan pipeline
currently accounts for approximately 15% of the entire vol-
ume of oil exports, which is likely to grow in the future and,
thus, indicates increasing Chinese leverage. Therefore, Nur-
Sultan maintains its multi-vector foreign policy, which
involves a hedging position between China, Russia and—to
a lesser extent—the West (Kembayev, 2018; Krapohl &
Vasileva-Dienes, 2019; Orazgaliyev, 2017).
Moscow and Beijing are aware of the value that
Kazakhstan’s geostrategic position provides, so that any sharp
shift vis-à-vis one side may disturb Nur-Sultan’s relations
with the other, although it does recognize the benefits gener-
ated by the BRI, potentially exceeding those that it would
receive from the EAEU. Acknowledging that it is compelled
to engage in regional power cooperation with China, Russia
declared its commitment in March 2015 to a link-up between
the EAEU and the BRI, despite concerns about potential col-
lisions with its own economic institutionalization process
(Pieper, 2019). While officially endorsing Beijing’s economic
projects encompassing the BRI, the Kremlin has been, none-
theless, attempting at the same time to prevent Beijing from
constructing a hegemonic order in Central Asia (Lukin, 2003,
2018). In that light, the Kremlin seeks to accommodate a ris-
ing China, responding to the latter’s position as one of
Kazakhstan’s biggest trading partners (Harper, 2017, p. 5).
Conclusion: pursuing the benefits from
China in the “Russian World”?
The empirical domain has illustrated Kazakhstan’s care-
fully calibrated hedging position amid the two regional
Graph 4. Kazakhstan Imports from China and Russia 2000–2017.
Source: Adapted from The Observatory of Economic Complexity (2017b).
14 Journal of Eurasian Studies 00(0)
Leviathans engaged in leverage seeking. The current para-
digm insinuates that to respond to China’s rise, Russia is
compelled to increase its engagement with Kazakhstan by
maintaining its hierarchical grip over Nur-Sultan, while
offering sufficient security provision (CSTO and, partly,
SCO) and means for economic development (EAEU) to
ensure that it remains in the Kremlin-centric political order.
Nevertheless, Russia has not yet entirely released itself
from the zugzwang situation, as it has to further resort to
reactionary acts to restrain a rising China, despite the fact
that any move possible would further constrain Russia geo-
politically stemming from Beijing’s increasing power pro-
jection, chiefly in the economic domain (SREB).
While Kazakhstan can opt to seek additional benefits
from outside the region, namely the West, it is still geo-
politically inclined to carefully assess policy options to
avoid friction with Beijing and Moscow, which could
undermine its stability through the presidential transition
period. Particularly the United States, retaining interest
following Kazakhstan’s assistance during the War in
Afghanistan and combating Islamic extremism as well as
significant US private sector interest on the energy front,
is keen to deepen its involvement to bolster competition,
essentially aiding investment opportunities as US trade
activity totaled more than USD 2.2b in 2018, while
investments exceeded USD 5b (Coffey, 2019). A prime
motive for the United States is to “seek Central Asian
states resilient to domination by rival powers” which
could presuppose Russia and China (President of the
United States of America, 2017, p. 50). This constella-
tion is likely to be continued even after Nazarbayev’s
resignation, announced on 19 March 2019. As Kassym-
Jomart Tokaev, Nazarbayev’s successor, has acquired
sufficient expertise on China-related issues in the 1980s
while serving at the embassy of the Soviet Union in
Beijing, he is also recognized to conform Nur-Sultan’s
role to the regional environment in Central Asia. As the
head of the Security Council, Nazarbayev himself will
nevertheless continue to determine Kazakhstan’s foreign
policies, to supervise the bargaining interactions vis-à-
vis Russia and China as to whether Nur-Sultan’s prefer-
ential outcomes can be achieved within a hierarchical
framework (Putz, 2019).
Considering the balancing act between the two
Leviathans, Nur-Sultan’s multi-vector foreign policy builds
upon the maintenance of the dual architecture or “co-ruling
dynamic” embedded in a dominant-dominant engagement.
Often referred to as the third type of “great power relation-
ship,” as opposed to hegemonic war or cold war, “the ‘co-
ruling dynamic’ whereby two major powers jointly lead all
or most of the small and medium-size states in the system,
rather than demarcate their ‘spheres of influence’ geo-
graphically,” reinforces a dual hierarchical hypothesis
(Yang, 2018, p. 195). This presents the conception of a hier-
archical overlap, as previously proposed, a phenomenon in
the epistemology of international relations and worthy of
further investigation and medium-term observation as the
possible outcomes remain hard to predict in terms of their
pace and inter-state dynamics. In other words, “China
would be the bank, and Russia would be the big gun,” as
Beijing is recognized as an economic leader, whereas
Moscow remains the diplomatic and military broker, at
least for now (Lukin, 2018; Standish, 2015).
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Zhaoying Han https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4832-6897
Notes
1. On the symposium of power transition, see Gilpin (1981),
Organski (1964), and Taliaferro et al. (2018)).
2. The agreements referred to are the Treaty on the Lease of the
Baykonur Complex between the Government of the Republic
of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Russian Federation
(1994) and the subsequent Memorandum in 2004; the Treaty
between the Government of the Russian Federation and the
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Order of
Maintenance and the Use of the Balkhash Early Warning
Radar Node System Located in the Republic of Kazakhstan
and subsequent agreements; and the Treaty between the
Government of the Russian Federation and the Government
of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Leasing of the Testing
Site Sary-Shagan (1996) (Administration of the President of
the Russian Federation, 2015; Government of the Republic
of Kazakhstan, 1994; Ria Novosti, 2004, 2015).
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Author biographies
Maximilian Ohle is a PhD student of International Relations at the
Department of Political Science, Eberhard Karls University of
Tübingen (Tübingen, Federal Republic of Germany). His research
interests include China-Russia Relations, Hierarchy in
International Relations and International Security in East Asia.
Richard J. Cook is a PhD candidate of International Relations at
the Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University
(Tianjin, People’s Republic of China). His research interests
include China-U.S. Relations, Hierarchy in International Relations
and International Security.
Zhaoying Han is a professor of International Relations at the
Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University (Tianjin,
People’s Republic of China). His research interests include
China-U.S. Relations, Chinese Foreign Policy and International
Relations Theory.
