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Dis/ordering politics: urban riots and the socio-political configuration of contemporary Niger
Abstract
This article focuses on ‘generic moments of becoming’, historical sedimentation and patterns of recurrent protests to explain the structural drivers that sparked the dramatic increase in urban protests and riots in Niger between 2013 and 2018. It identifies several factors in the country's socio-political configuration as particularly important for understanding the protests: new media and politics by proxy, political machines, the social and political embeddedness of civil society, ethnicity and regional political strongholds, the legacy of Françafrique , religious reform movements, and male youth violence. In examining these drivers, the article aims to provide an informative overview of contemporary politics and society in Niger and to counter culturalist, ahistoric and Eurocentric notions of ‘African disorder’.
... However, these two epistemological perspectives are not necessarily incompatible. I think it is indeed possible to grasp the narrative character of the field and to use the extended case method in order to illustrate a historically sedimented and fragmented order in the first place (Schritt, 2019d). In a second step, understanding the situation as inherently 'global', we are then able to both locate forces of globalization (like neoliberalism or racism) in particular locales, and avoid having to accept or imagine the world hegemony of these forces by looking at their frictions in the sense of Tsing (2000). ...
In this article, I discuss the methodological framework of the extended case method in light of both the findings of my case study and contemporary social theory. Taking the inauguration event of the first oil refinery in Niger in 2011 as a starting point from which to analyse the country’s socio-political order, I then extend the situation into time, space and theory to account for oil-induced transformations. To do so, I make use of Burawoy’s four moments of the extended case method but critique and consequently reformulate each moment in order to push them through theories of practice, process, globality and serendipity.
The opening of the first oil refinery in Niger at the end of November 2011 spurred protests and violent clashes between youths and police. These protests turned into urban riots in the days following. In this extended case study, I analyse the processual, performative and affective dimensions of the protests and discuss urban protest and contentious politics in Niger against the backdrop of political machines, a hybrid civil society, the dynamics of intersectionality, and the role of ordering technologies. I argue that influential theories of social movements tend to overlook the heterogeneity, contingency and relational processuality of protest movements, and that taken together, these elements are rather best understood using the holistic notion of ‘contentious assemblages’.
This is a briefing to inform USAID Niger 5 year governance programme.
The article focuses on spatializing struggles in relation to Niger's new oil infrastructure and shows how it turned public and political. Two different but interconnected perspectives are employed: first, a historical perspective illuminates how economic theories of growth, visions of industrialization, desires for energy autonomy, political projects for constitutional change and infrastructural developments in neighbouring countries were, from the very beginning, entangled in Niger's oil assemblage. These entanglements made the petro-infrastructure political even before it had materialized. Second, by focusing ethnographically on the spatial dispersion of the petro-infrastructure over different administrative regions in Niger, the article examines territorializing processes in which temporally and spatially separated histories of marginalization were stitched together to reconfigure collective identities. These dynamics go beyond existing explanations of resource curse theories, showing how oil acts as a catalyst that accelerates pre-existing dynamics, slowly transforming the socio-political configuration in which it operates in the process.
50 free eprints: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/PvaJxtZVXDGNNPm8WUTD/full
Bokanmeldelser 76 sjoner hadde blitt gjort til del av tekstmaterialet og tatt ansvar for. Kanskje står bildene ukommentert og ikke-situert nettopp for å fremme undringen hos leseren. Men gitt det tverrfaglige utgangspunktet hadde dialogen med kunsten kommet tydeligere frem om det kuratorielle virket hadde vaert klarere artikulert. Gro Ween Førsteamanuensis i sosialantropologi, Etnografisk avdeling, Kulturhistorisk museum, Universitetet i Oslo g.b.ween@khm.uio.no. Hva er en hendelse? Hvordan kan vi naerme oss kritiske hendelser analytisk som ge-nerative øyeblikk da nye virkeligheter er i emning? Dette er tilbakevendende spørsmål i antropologi, og med Bruce Kapferers og Lotte Meinerts redigerte samling får de ny og forfriskende aktualitet. Boka består av et grundig innledningskapittel forfattet av Bruce Kapferer selv, etterfulgt av ni for-holdsvis korte etnografiske case-studier som hver tar for seg en spesifikk hendelse som de utforsker ved hjelp av et beslektet analytisk repertoar. Bidragsyterne er ho-vedsakelig yngre danske antropologer, og samlingen illustrerer aktuelle tema i dansk antropologi. Det er Manchester-skolen med Max Gluckman i spissen som danner bakteppe for denne boka, og Kapferer gir en solid innføring. Poenget var som kjent å dreie opp-merksomheten fra vedvarende strukturer til kritiske eller konfliktfylte hendelser der noe står på spill. Det er nettopp i slike øyeblikk at vi kan avdekke motsetningsfylte krefter i sosialt liv, og gjennom analyse av disse kan vi gripe kimen til endring. Man-chesterskolens tilnaerming står i kontrast til en mer fortolkende orientering som se-nere har preget faget: I stedet for å analysere en hendelse som en illustrasjon av ved-varende kulturelle mønstre (jfr «thick description»), rommer hendelsen i seg selv det dynamiske samspillet som er nødvendig for analysen, og dette blir fokuset for analy-sen. Et kjent eksempel på denne tilnaermingen er Gluckmans berømte studie av møtet mellom britisk kolonimakt og Zulu-ledere ved åpningen av en bro i det som den gang het «Zululand» (Gluckman 1958). Manchesterskolen anbefalte tidlig en dreining fra det vi i dag ofte kaller et fokus på representasjon til et fokus på performativitet, og fra «being» til «becoming». Etter-som hendelser var mer enn illustrerende eksempler, men utgjorde selve kjernen i de-res analyse, ble det svaert viktig å vaere etnografisk presis. Gluckman understreket be-tydningen av en nitid nedtegning av alt som fant sted, og var opptatt av å få med de mange ulike perspektivene og praksisene som inngår i hendelsen, noe vi kan kjenne igjen i nyere studier av teknologi og vitenskap (STS), og i praktisk ontologi (se for ek-NAT-2016-1.book
In Niger, there is an increasing rejection of politik (a term with highly pejorative connotations): that is, party politics and the politics of democracy, characterized by personal rivalries and power struggles between clans and factions. But there is a direct link (albeit not a causal one) between the social perceptions of intra-familial rivalries and the social perceptions of political rivalries. The archetypical relationship among the baab-izey (children of one father but different mothers) is characterized by competition and jealousy. This is a product of the latent rivalry that pits co-wives against each other. Polygamy is clearly at odds with a number of received ideas and clichés about ‘the African family’ as primarily a locus of support and solidarity. Such formal social norms may reign in public situations, but in private de facto practical norms give rise to subtle discriminations and the omnipresence of more or less hidden conflicts within the family. The same is true for the political microcosm of Niger. While the public norm of the concern for the public good is supposed to regulate political behaviours, rivalry and jealousy are structural components of the political world. The baab-izey pattern is frequently used in reference to politicians. Political conflicts are above all personal/factional conflicts in which friends and supporters are implicated, and are rivalries of proximity. In the familial space as in the political space, ‘magico-religious entrepreneurs’ (i.e. experts in the occult) are merely an ‘accelerator’ of these conflicts: they reinforce suspicions about the familial or political entourage, which, in turn, intensify rivalries.
The rentier state and resource curse concepts understand oil and uranium as fixed resources generating economic rents. In doing so, these theories largely ignore the social, economic, political and technological arrangements essential for a material substance like oil or uranium to become a resource. By comparing the diachronic and synchronic entanglements of the different socio-technical arrangements of oil and uranium in Niger, the assumption of the resource curse and rentier state theories, that resource revenues foster authoritarian tendencies, is revisited. Exploring the concept of resource assemblages, this article analyzes how political configurations are related to the process of resource exploitation. This perspective reveals that a new resource-political configuration in Niger has emerged since the beginning of oil production. Whereas Niger’s uranium-political configuration has long been characterized by a neocolonial discursive formation, the emerging petro-political configuration has produced a new resource nationalism in public opinion and governance which is transforming politics in Niger.
In many Muslim countries in West Africa and beyond, “protests against Charlie Hebdo” occurred when citizens went out on the streets following Friday prayers on 16 January 2015. However, only in Niger did these protests turn extremely violent. This report analyses the social, political and religious workings behind the protests in Niger. In doing so, it shows that the so-called “protests against Charlie Hebdo” are only superficially linked to the Muhammad cartoons by the French satirical magazine. Similarly violent protests have occurred in Niger – often in the town of Zinder – for quite different reasons and on different occasions in recent years. The report therefore argues against simplistic notions of religious fundamentalism and shows that the protests can be explained more appropriately in terms of politics and socio-economic exclusion.
ABSTRACT To fight boredom, un(der)employed young men in Niger have joined fadas (youth clubs) where they listen to music, play card games and strike up new friendships – or nurture old ones. Membership in these organizations cuts across social divides, educational backgrounds and religious affiliations, affirming the spirit of egalitarianism and comradeship that drives these largely urban projects. At the fada, conversation routinely takes place around the making and sharing of tea, a ritual idle young men have come to value greatly as they struggle to fill their days with purpose and direction. Whereas elders largely condemn fadas as futile, self-indulgent, and occasionally criminal endeavours, samari (young men) defend their pastimes, claiming that they engage in meaningful activities. In this essay I explore the temporalities of teatime at the fada. Rather than focus on what is lost under conditions of crisis and privation, I consider instead what is produced, and in particular how value, exchange, and affect emerge in the context of daily routines at the fada. In the absence of other temporal markers punctuating daily life, the practice of preparing and consuming tea becomes a key happening, enabling samari to carve out meaningful temporalities and reconfigure their relation to the future.
Though African party systems are said to be ethnic, there is little evidence for this claim. The few empirical studies rarely rely on individual data and are biased in favour of Anglophone Africa. This paper looks at four Francophone countries, drawing on representative survey polls. Results reveal that ethnicity matters, but that its impact is generally rather weak and differs with regard to party systems and individual parties. ‘Ethnic parties’ in the strict sense are virtually absent. In particular, the voters’ location seems more important than ethnic affiliation. Other determinants such as regional ties, elite strategies, cross-cutting cleavages, and rational preferences deserve more attention in the future study of voting behaviour in Africa.
Bargaining for Women’s Rights: Activism in an Aspiring Muslim Democracy asks why a Muslim-majority democracy, the Republic of Niger, adopted some gender equality reforms and rejected others. It argues that Niger’s seemingly inconsistent policies on gender equality can be explained by the mobilization of women and conservative and the political context. Governments are more likely to adopt gender equality reforms when women mobilize for them. Women’s activists are not the only ones who care about the regulation of gender relations. Conservative activists may mobilize as well. In democratic contexts where public opinion polling is limited, women’s and conservative activists must use other tactics to convince government officials that their demands represent the will of the electorate. The activists who succeed use locally salient symbols and public rituals to draw the line between policies that are thinkable and unthinkable. Thus, Islam does not have a uniformly negative effect on women’s rights policy adoption, contrary to the conventional wisdom. Further, government concerns about international funding and reputation, even for countries as poor as Niger, are mediated by the demands and power of domestic groups.
Based on twelve case studies (Senegal, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zanzibar and the Comoros), this books provides the first comprehensive analysis of Muslim movements of reform in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. It looks at patterns and peculiarities of different traditions of Islamic reform, considering both Sufi- and Salafi-oriented movements of reform in their respective historical and regional contexts. It stresses the importance of the local context to explain the different trajectories of development. The books studies the social, religious, and political impact of these reform movements in both historical and contemporary times and asks why some movements of reform have become successful as popular mass movements, gaining influence among African middle class groups, while others failed to attract substantial audiences. It considers jihad-minded movements in contemporary Mali, northern Nigeria and Somalia and looks at modes of transnational entanglement of movements of reform. Equally, the book discusses the biographies of major reformist scholars and addresses the importance of generational dynamics in the development of movements of reform. Against the background of a general inquiry into what constitutes “reform”, the text responds to the question of what “reform” actually means for Muslims in contemporary Africa.
Abstract
Die erweiterte Fallmethode, die von der Manchester Schule in der Ethnologie bereits in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren entwickelt wurde, um gesellschaftliche Konflikte anhand von (Groß-) Ereignissen exemplarisch zu untersuchen, findet in der Protestforschung bislang kaum explizite Anwendung. Der vorliegende Artikel veranschaulicht am Beispiel von Protesten um die Eröffnung der ersten Erdölraffinerie in Niger 2011 methodisches Vorgehen, theoretische Prämissen und Stärken der erweiterten Fallmethode. Der Artikel verfolgt dabei auch das Ziel, die Methodologie der erweiterten Fallmethode im Lichte gegenwärtiger Sozialtheorie neu zu formulieren.
Abstract
The extended case method, developed by the Manchester School of Anthropology in the 1950s and 60s to analyze social and political conflicts on the basis of (major) events, has hitherto received little attention in the context of protest research. Using the example of the protests surrounding the opening of the first oil refinery in Niger in 2011, this article illustrates the methodology, theoretical premises, and strengths of the extended case method. The article thereby also aims at reformulating the methodology of the extended case method in the light of contemporary social theory.
Most young Africans are living in “waithood,” a period of suspension between childhood and adulthood. Failed neo-liberal economic policies, bad governance and political instability have caused stable jobs to disappear—without jobs that pay living wages, these young people cannot support families, thus becoming fully participating members of society. As this limbo becomes pervasive and prolonged, waithood in Africa becomes seemingly permanent, gradually replacing conventional adulthood. And with the deepening of the world economic crisis, youth in Europe, North America and other parts of the world face the same crisis of joblessness and restricted futures.
In The Time of Youth , Alcinda Honwana examines the lives of young people in Africa, drawing on in-depth interviews in four countries: Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia. While the case studies are local to Africa, the book argues that the ”waithood generation” is global, and possesses a tremendous transformative potential, as young people believe the struggle to overcome their predicament requires radical social and political change. From riots and protests in the streets of Maputo, Dakar, Madrid, London, New York and Santiago, to revolutions that overthrow dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the ”waithood generation” is taking upon itself to redress the wrongs of contemporary society and remake the world.
Assumptions about the political economy of African states predominantly centre on a dominant elite’s ability to stabilize power. A key assertion is that elites maintain clientelistic networks of rents and redistribution and in turn extend their control over their respective territories by instrumentalizing disorder. We challenge the assumption that disorder plays such a functional role. Largely drawing on data and fieldwork from the Central African Republic, we demonstrate the profoundly unproductive consequences of disorder that tend to be overlooked through current approaches to the political economy of African countries. We investigate how disorder impacts three dimensions of effective politics of domination: a set of elite groups that structure power in society, a political economy that redistributes its benefits through formal and informal networks, and the existence of functional centre–periphery ties across a territory. The article shows with regard to the Central African Republic that disorder has produced a small political elite that is largely unable to stabilize its power basis. We argue that certain African states are subject to forms of disorder that political elites cannot turn into an advantage.
The study of political influence in the West has for the most part focused on the process by which interest groups affect the content of legislation; hence, the input process has occupied the center of attention.
Students of politics in the new states of Africa and Asia who have adopted this perspective, however, have been struck by the relative weakness both of interest structures to organize demands and of institutionalized channels through which such demands, once organized, might be communicated to decisionmakers. The open clash of organized interests is often conspicuously absent during the formulation of legislation in these nations. To conclude from this, however, that the public has little or no effect on the eventual “output” of government would be completely unwarranted. Between the passage of legislation and its actual implementation lies an entirely different political arena that, in spite of its informality and particularism, has a great effect on the execution of policy.
Much of the expression of political interests in the new states has been disregarded because Western scholars, accustomed to their own politics, have been looking in the wrong place. A large portion of individual demands, and even group demands, in developing nations reach the political system, not before laws are passed, but rather at the enforcement stage.
This article examines the relationship of ideological and material factors in the rise of wife seclusion in two rural towns south of Maradi, Niger. Much of the literature on wife seclusion in Hausaland associates wife seclusion with urban or wealthier households, but it is also practiced in rural households of varying economic status and with differing labor needs. Data examining economic and religious changes as well as the perspectives of residents in two rural towns show that seclusion can be a strategy for achieving prosperity for some and a marker of class or religious status by others.
Operation Somme : The French Connection and Seyni Kountché’s Coup d’État in Niger, April 1974
This article revisits the question of French involvement in African regime change by analysing an example from the past : the putsch by Seyni Kountché in Niger (1974), which led to the fall of President Diori. The French were accused of involvement because Diori had disagreements with them. The article discusses this with the help of archival material so far never consulted : the papers of Jacques Foccart. It shows that the French were not only not involved in the putsch but also taken by surprise by Kountché’s action. Moreover, in the wake of the coup they took measures for an airborne operation to save Diori, code-named “Plan Somme”. This was called off because of the fait accompli in Niamey and the interregnum in Paris after Pompidou’s death. The analysis is set against the background of changing Franco-Nigérien ties, Nigériens’ reactions to regime change and the wider vicissitudes surrounding France’s Africa policy.
Conspiracy theories, while not unique to the Middle East, are a salient feature of the political discourses of the region. Strongly reflecting and impacting on state-society relations and indigenous impressions of the world beyond the region, they affect how political behaviour within and among the states of the region is situated, structured, and controlled. Discounting the common pathological explanation for conspiracism, the author argues that a complex mix of political factors account for most conspiracy theories in the contemporary Arab world. The author argues that the region's modern history, genuine conspiracies, the complex and oftentimes strained relationship between state and society, the role of the state and the mass media as conspiracy theorists, and the impacts of new technologies have all helped to develop and sustain conspiracist narratives. Drawing on a range of examples and cases, including the impacts of globalization, economic reform, weak state legitimacy, the war in Iraq, the Arab-Israeli issue, the rise of political Islamism, and internet and satellite television, the book illuminates the complex sources of conspiracy theories. Providing a comprehensive overview of this controversial topic, this book will appeal not only to students and scholars interested in Middle East studies, political science, globalization and conspiracy theories, but to anyone seeking an understanding of the region's complex economic, social, and cultural dynamics.
In contrast to similar organizations in its neighbouring countries, Niger's domestic Salafi associations have remained peaceful
and apolitical. Drawing on historical institutionalist scholarship and on recent conceptualizations of the state as a religious
actor, this article examines how the Nigerien state has tried to regulate religious practices since Seyni Kountché's military
coup in 1974. It argues that the institutional regulation of religious practices is one important variable that accounts for
Niger's deviant trajectory. During Niger's autocratic period (1974–91), the government established the Association islamique du Niger (AIN) as the sole legal authority regulating access to Niger's Friday prayer mosques. Committed to peaceful and apolitical
interpretations of the Koran, the AIN confined access to Niger's religious sphere to local clerics and Sufi brotherhoods.
After the breakdown of autocratic rule in 1991, the AIN served as a religious advisory body. Salafi associations could assemble
freely but had to abide by certain criteria. Confronted with the prospect of Islamic violence in 2000, the Nigerien state
intervened in Niger's religious sphere in several ways. Among other initiatives, the government began to resurrect a more
rigorous system of religious supervision in order to monitor religious practices on an ongoing basis.
This article investigates whether political or economic grievances were the main driver of the mass demonstrations in Niger in 2009-10, which occurred at a time of famine and the President's attempt to defy the constitution and seek a third term in office. Using original survey data from a quasi-random sample of Niamey residents, the article shows that low prospects of upward mobility are associated with a higher likelihood of protest participation, whereas opposition to the President's anti-constitutional politics is not. Membership in civic organizations is also associated with higher protest participation, but not because these groups are effective at framing the issues: what matters is the capacity of organizations to mobilize individuals. This suggests that civil society may have a galvanizing effect on citizens, even if efforts to win hearts and minds fail. The article concludes that the uprisings were driven mainly by economic grievances, thus contradicting international perceptions of the protests as a public outcry for democracy and casting doubt on the motivations behind supposedly pro-democracy movements, especially in contexts where autocracy and poverty coincide. © The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved.
This essay identifies patterns in the organisation and character of social movements in Africa, drawing upon examples from sub-Saharan Africa and finding connections with the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings. It pays attention to historicising social movements, global linkages and the problem of sustaining change. Rather than defining social movements in an a priori manner, or generalising from definitions derived from the western societies, it explores their concrete meanings in Africa. Thus it aims to avoid both the ‘false negative’ of overlooking genuine African social movements and the ‘false positive’ of labelling movements in a misleading manner. It identifies constraints upon collective action in Africa, exploring the political dynamics which undermine the formation of durable and organised movements and limit their capacity to represent popular concerns.
The abduction of two Frenchmen in January 2011 in Niamey's supposedly most secure neighbourhood has led many to question the functioning of the city's security apparatus. This paper analyses Niamey's security landscape, initially from an historical and then from a spatial perspective. It argues that for a comprehensive analysis of security, we must first decentre our perspective on security construction, and thus take informal non-organised modes of policing just as seriously as policing by state and vigilante organisations; and second, take into account the inseparability of sociality and security, a fragile balance of trust and acceptable risk. In conclusion I argue that this focus may be one way of comprehending the kidnapping: how was it possible and what were its implications for Niamey's security landscape?
The article provides a critical discussion of the literature on ‘patrimonialism’ and ‘neopatrimonialism’ in Development Studies in general and African Studies in particular. Based on Max Weber's concept of patrimonialism and legal-rational bureaucracy the authors present their own definition of ‘neopatrimonialism’. Three key conceptual questions are addressed. These are related to the operationalisation of the concept in empirical research: (1) how can neopatrimonialism be delimited vis-à-vis the concepts ‘clientelism’ and ‘patronage’?; (2) how can neopatrimonialism be ‘measured’?; and (3) how does neopatrimonialism relate to classical typologies of political regimes?
The development of a public sphere forms a central ingredient in the consolidation of a new political culture following a transition to democracy. The Habermasian idea of the public sphere has been challenged for not taking into account the role of ‘part’ and ‘counter public spheres’, particularly with reference to ‘developing’ societies. ‘Actually existing’ public spheres must therefore be conceptualised within the framework of a broader category of ‘public space’. A national public sphere in South Africa is held back by inequalities of wealth and power. A minority public of privileged consumers has access to a structure of print and electronic media, while the majority population relies on different systems of networking that make up counter publics. After 1994, the public sphere has been influenced by a dominant‐party system, accompanied by a division into formal and informal politics, with formal politics assuming a ritualistic function and ‘Realpolitik’ being played out within the non‐public structures of the dominant party. Meanwhile, critical public debate has had to find its course through varieties of informal politics. The article examines how moral debates around HIV/AIDS and crime in KwaZulu‐Natal have constituted an alternative arena for debate, and how cultural and religious discourses have been the channels of a local public sphere. The article discusses to what extent debates have constituted a local democratic ‘deliberative public sphere’, and looks at the ways in which the local state in the form of the eThekwini Municipality has interacted with local publics since 1994.
As far as corruption in Africa is both conspicuous and generalised,
it has
to be studied from the viewpoint of the participants. This article starts
with
six general theses on corruption in Africa, which place it within a broader
‘corruption complex’, and emphasise its routine nature, the
stigmatisation
of corruption despite the absence of effective sanctions, its apparent
irreversibility,
the absence of correlation with regime types and its legitimacy to
its perpetrators. Corruption is then shown to be socially embedded in ‘logics’
of negotiation, gift-giving, solidarity, predatory authority and redistributive
accumulation. Any anti-corruption policy must face up to these realities.
This article deals with the 1958 referendum that the French held in Niger to gain approval for the Fifth Republic and reorganization of their empire. It reassesses the French record in Niger, where more people voted ‘No’ – in favour of immediate independence – than in other territories, except Guinea. It does this on the basis of research on the history of the Sawaba movement, which led Niger's autonomous government until the plebisicite. It shows that the French forcibly intervened in the referendum to realize a ‘Yes’ vote and preserve Niger for their sphere of influence after independence in 1960. In detailing the violence and manipulation of the referendum and its aftermath, the article criticizes a revisionist viewpoint which disputed the significance of French intervention. The analysis draws on research on the Sawaba movement, benefiting from insights of social history into the grassroots forces in the nationalist movements of the 1950s. It discusses the historiography of Niger's referendum in relation to new archival sources and memoirs, drawing parallels with other territories, notably Guinea. It concludes that France's interventions in 1958 are crucial for understanding the long-term consequences of the transformations of the independence era.
The recent war in Sierra Leone and Liberia is connected in both the scholarly literature and the popular imaginary to the global economy via the diamond trade. Yet there is another way to think the connection between war and work. In this article, I ask what it would mean to think of the violence young men in the region's militia movements performed as a mode of post-Fordism. This stands in sharp contrast to recent writing on conflict in Africa, writing that focuses on how violence is a process of identity formation. By contrast, I suggest that “identity” was not a problematic category for fighters in this war. Their own identities could be comfortably contradictory, and the identities of their enemies were a minor issue at best. What mattered was the work of violence, work that increasingly took on the character of emergent modes of what has been called “just-in-time” production.
This article presents ACLED, an Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset. ACLED codes the actions of rebels, governments, and militias within unstable states, specifying the exact location and date of battle events, transfers of military control, headquarter establishment, civilian violence, and rioting. In the current version, the dataset covers 50 unstable countries from 1997 through 2010. ACLED's disaggregation of civil war and transnational violent events allow for research on local level factors and the dynamics of civil and communal conflict. Findings from subnational conflict research challenges conclusions from larger national-level studies. In a brief descriptive analysis, the authors find that, on average, conflict covers 15% of a state's territory, but almost half of a state can be directly affected by internal wars.
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