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Religious mobilization, ethnic conflict and the problem of trust: social cohesion in democratizing Myanmar
... Since 1948, both elected and military governments had attempted to build a nation around ethnicity, the Bamar language and religion. The result has been calls for independence and revolts against the central government by many minoritized non-Bamar/non-Buddhist groups and efforts to create a shared sense of a united Myanmar identify have failed so far (Bünte, 2020;Steinberg, 2021). For example, when the Asian Barometer Survey (Fourth Wave) asked Myanmar's citizens to prioritize their self-identity, and to select either their religion, ethnic group or the nation of Myanmar, only 32% selected Myanmar in 2015, but 53% opted for their religion and another 15% for ethnicity. ...
Dieses Kapitel analysiert das politische System des malaiisch-islamischen Sultanats Brunei Darussalam. Zunächst wird die historische Entwicklung von der Kolonialzeit bis zur Unabhängigkeit des Kleinstaates im Jahre 1984 dargestellt und die Struktur des bruneiischen Rentenstaats ausgeleuchtet, dessen Wohlstand hauptsächlich auf dem Export von Erdöl und Erdgas basiert. Anschließend werden das Verfassungs-, Regierungs- und Rechtssystem der dynastisch-autoritären Monarchie analysiert. Es folgt die Darstellung des Aufbaus der staatlichen Verwaltung, der Gründe für das Fehlen eines bedeutsamen Systems der politischen Parteien, der zivil-militärischen Beziehungen und des Sicherheitssektors, sowie der politischen Kultur und Zivilgesellschaft Bruneis. Wie die Analyse der politischen Institutionen und Strategien der autokratischen Herrschaftssicherung zeigt, basiert die Stabilität des autoritären Regimes auf der Kombination „weicher“ Repression, der politischen Tauschlogik des Rentenstaats, sowie der Legitimation der autokratischen Monarchie im Rahmen des Konzepts der „Melayu Islam Beraja“. Wahlen, Parteien und Parlamente, denen die aktuelle Autokratien-Forschung große Bedeutung beimisst, spielen in der monokratisch organisierten, absoluten Monarchie eine geringe Rolle.
... All in all, 10 months after the coup, neither the military nor the opposition is showing 26 an inclination towards dialogue as a way out of the crisis. Since coalition building in Myanmar's society is extremely difficult due to the lack of trust between the various parties (Bünte 2020), it will be a Herculean task to build up institutions that are supported by both military and civilian actors. Although the coup has united oppositional forces for the time being, an agreement on the rules of the political game that is supported by all ethnic groups is currently out of reach. ...
This chapter discusses the institutional foundations of democratic erosion and breakdown in Myanmar. The military coup of February 2021 ended a decade of power-sharing between the military and the National League for Democracy (NLD). This chapter argues that Myanmar´s special form of hybrid presidentialism, which was created by the 2008 constitution, conditioned the transition to civilian rule but also provided the basis for later military dissatisfaction, ultimately leading to a military coup. Since the constitution was never carried by an overarching elite compromise and key actors could not agree on the rules of the political game, power-sharing between the military and the civilian arms of the government became increasingly precarious after 2015. Perilous not in the Linzean sense of an increasing polarization between executive and legislature, and not as increased conflict between political parties, but as growing antagonism between the civilian and military arms of the government. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD increasingly used informal mechanisms to govern, which not only eroded the constitutional framework imposed by the 2008 constitution, but also led to growing dissatisfaction on the part of the military.
... Since 1948, both elected and military governments had attempted to build a nation around ethnicity, the Bamar language and religion. The result has been calls for independence and revolts against the central government by many minoritized non-Bamar/non-Buddhist groups and efforts to create a shared sense of a united Myanmar identify have failed so far (Bünte, 2020;Steinberg, 2021). For example, when the Asian Barometer Survey (Fourth Wave) asked Myanmar's citizens to prioritize their self-identity, and to select either their religion, ethnic group or the nation of Myanmar, only 32% selected Myanmar in 2015, but 53% opted for their religion and another 15% for ethnicity. ...
This chapter provides a systematic overview of the political actors, institutions, and dynamics of Singapore’s political system and summarizes its history and recent developments. The political system of Singapore appears to contradict conventional wisdom in political science. Despite a very high level of social and economic modernization, a small group of administrative and political elites governs the city-state autocratically. Despite its authoritarian regime type, it scores well on established measures for the rule of law, bureaucratic quality, and public goods provision. While PAP has been in power since 1959, the party as organization is almost invisible in daily life. Despite the very substantial and interventionist role of the state in economic development, Singapore ranks among the freest market economies worldwide. The city is an international media hub and home to one of the most connected digital infrastructures and digital societies, yet its media is unfree. Finally, the state tightly administrates and regulates political and social activities, and the government in Singapore, as all authoritarian governments do, relies on repression to guarantee regime survival, its use is highly selective and of low intensity, stressing self-regulation with the mere threat of coercion. Even though genuine opposition parties regularly achieve between 20 and 40% of the total vote, they are barely represented in parliament.
... Since 1948, both elected and military governments had attempted to build a nation around ethnicity, the Bamar language and religion. The result has been calls for independence and revolts against the central government by many minoritized non-Bamar/non-Buddhist groups and efforts to create a shared sense of a united Myanmar identify have failed so far (Bünte, 2020;Steinberg, 2021). For example, when the Asian Barometer Survey (Fourth Wave) asked Myanmar's citizens to prioritize their self-identity, and to select either their religion, ethnic group or the nation of Myanmar, only 32% selected Myanmar in 2015, but 53% opted for their religion and another 15% for ethnicity. ...
This chapter provides a systematic overview of the political actors, institutions, and dynamics of the Philippine political system and summarizes its history and recent developments. Despite the 30 years of democratic politics following the People’s Power Revolution in 1986, the political system of the Philippines remains a highly defective democracy. There are regular and strongly contested elections, and parties are free to organize and campaign for votes. There is a vibrant civil society, a pluralist media, and decentralization reforms that have brought the government closer to the people. However, human rights violations are widespread and have further increased in recent years. Nevertheless, the relevant political elites and social actors seem to accept the democratic institutions as the only game in town. Even the military, despite not being completely under civilian control, seems to have made its peace with democracy. Yet two caveats are in order: First, major political players, including President Duterte (2016–2022), have an electoralist rather than liberal understanding of what constitutes democracy. Secondly, elite support for democracy appears to be rooted, at least to some extent, in the fact that the post-Marcos democratic order has been essential for the preservation of elite control over the political process and its outcomes. This is manifested in the lack of political support for constitutional reforms, which would eliminate the presidential term limit or introduce a shift from presidentialism to a parliamentary system of government. Nonetheless, divisive politics, ongoing insurgencies, and the rise of an autocratic strongman such as Duterte reflect the fragility and weakness of Philippine democracy in successfully tackling problems relating to social, economic, and political inequality, both between social classes and between ethnic groups. In fact, vast segments of the population remain barred from equal access to economic opportunities and life chances in general.
... Since 1948, both elected and military governments had attempted to build a nation around ethnicity, the Bamar language and religion. The result has been calls for independence and revolts against the central government by many minoritized non-Bamar/non-Buddhist groups and efforts to create a shared sense of a united Myanmar identify have failed so far (Bünte, 2020;Steinberg, 2021). For example, when the Asian Barometer Survey (Fourth Wave) asked Myanmar's citizens to prioritize their self-identity, and to select either their religion, ethnic group or the nation of Myanmar, only 32% selected Myanmar in 2015, but 53% opted for their religion and another 15% for ethnicity. ...
Vietnam is a communist one-party regime in transition. With the implementation of doi moi, the Communist Party of Vietnam replaced a centrally planned economy with a “socialist-oriented market economy”. The transition from a fully planned economy to a mixed economy generated dynamic economic growth and socioeconomic modernization that puts the communist party in a potentially vulnerable position. The party has reacted resolutely against any demands for political liberalization or a more open political process. Overall, it appears that the communist rulers have successfully adapted the pillars of regime stability to changing international and domestic contexts. The strategy of economic transformation and institutional innovation has enabled the CPV to keep its regime coalition together and to reconcile increasingly diverse sectoral and regional interests. Today, the CPV is no longer a revolutionary party striving for a utopian socialist ideal, but a bureaucratic party seeking to preserve the political status quo. Three decades of reform have generated conflict between the government and society in general, within the party, and within different social groups in various forms, indicated by a steadily growing number of protests since the late 1990s. But even with these challenges, communist party rule in Vietnam appears resilient and adaptive. This chapter provides a systematic overview of the political actors, institutions, and dynamics of Vietnam’s political system and summarizes its history and recent developments.
... Since 1948, both elected and military governments had attempted to build a nation around ethnicity, the Bamar language and religion. The result has been calls for independence and revolts against the central government by many minoritized non-Bamar/non-Buddhist groups and efforts to create a shared sense of a united Myanmar identify have failed so far (Bünte, 2020;Steinberg, 2021). For example, when the Asian Barometer Survey (Fourth Wave) asked Myanmar's citizens to prioritize their self-identity, and to select either their religion, ethnic group or the nation of Myanmar, only 32% selected Myanmar in 2015, but 53% opted for their religion and another 15% for ethnicity. ...
This final chapter discusses trends in democratization and autocratization in Southeast Asia in the late 20th and early 21st century, the structural vulnerabilities of democracy as well causes of autocratization as well as features of autocratic consolidation in the region. While there were several democratic transitions in the region between 1986 (Philippines) and 2002 (Timor-Leste), none of them resulted in institutionally coherent, liberal democracies. All Southeast Asian democracies remain “defective” and are subject to legitimacy crises, deficiencies in the rule of law, or problems with their sociopolitical structures of representation and integration. Autocrats in the region remain in power if they manage to grant their “winning coalition” and members of the moderate opposition access to private goods but maintain their ability to counter opponents or dissidents by coercive force. Especially the well-institutionalized regime parties in Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam have maintained social stability by balancing elite interests. Successful management of interethnic conflict in Singapore and Malaysia or winning independence in Vietnam, Laos, or Myanmar provide an important additional source of regime legitimacy. In view of the inherent weaknesses of democracy and the resilience of autocracy, it would be naïve to expect too much progress in democratization and democratic governance in this part of the world in the near future. On the contrary, it is likely that democracy in Southeast Asia will be even more on the defensive in the coming years than it has been in the past decade.
Im Zentrum des Beitrags von Jörn Dosch steht die Frage nach den Religion-Staat-Beziehungen bzw. den vielfältigen Wechselwirkungen von religiösen und säkularen Elementen in den Polities Asiens. Aus Perspektive der deutschen Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften werden zunächst zentrale Forschungslinien und Kernargumente herausgearbeitet, um anschließend die Rolle von Konfuzianismus, Buddhismus und Islam für die politischen Ordnungen bzw. das Staats- und Regierungshandeln ausgewählter Länder nachvollziehen zu können.
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