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POLITICKÉ VEDY / POLITICAL SCIENCES
Journal for Political Sciences, Modern History, International Relations, security
studies / Časopis pre politológiu, najnovšie dejiny, medzinárodné vzťahy,
bezpečnostné štúdiá
URL of the journal / URL časopisu: http://www.politickevedy.fpvmv.umb.sk
Author(s) / Autor(i): Artur Boháč
Article / Článok: Middle Eastern Christians in Diaspora and their
Political Activism towards Their Countries of Origin /
Politický aktivizmus blízkovýchodných kresťanov v
diaspóre voči krajinám ich pôvodu
Publisher / Vydavateľ: Faculty of Political Sciences and International
Relations – MBU Banská Bystrica / Fakulta politických
vied a medzinárodných vzťahov – UMB Banská
Bystrica
DOI: http://doi.org/10.24040/politickevedy.2019.22.4.57-80
Recommended form for quotation of the article / Odporúčaná forma citácie
článku:
BOHÁČ, A. 2019. Middle Eastern Christians in Diaspora and their Political Activism
towards Their Countries of Origin. In Politické vedy. [online]. Vol. 22, No. 4, 2019. ISSN
1335 – 2741, pp. 57-80. Available at: http://doi.org/10.24040/politickevedy.2019.22.4.57-80
By submitting their contribution the author(s) agreed with the publication of the
article on the online page of the journal. The publisher was given the author´s /
authors´ permission to publish and distribute the contribution both in printed and
online form. Regarding the interest to publish the article or its part in online or
printed form, please contact the editorial board of the journal:
politicke.vedy@umb.sk.
Poskytnutím svojho príspevku autor(i) súhlasil(i) so zverejnením článku na
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redakčnú radu časopisu: politicke.vedy@umb.sk.
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57
MIDDLE EASTERN CHRISTIANS IN DIASPORA
AND THEIR POLITICAL ACTIVISM TOWARDS
THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN
Artur Boháč*
ABSTRACT
A contemporary globalized world brought intensive research of diasporas and their
connections to their countries of origin to social sciences. These two-way connections are
economic, cultural and political. This text was focused on political activities. Transmigrants
can be politically active or passive towards their homelands. Transmigrants are usually
interested in the events in their homelands where their relatives still live. They benefit from
modern technologies, and several authors speak about digital diasporas. These diasporas
monitor persecution in their homelands. They establish organisations to boost their
fundraising, inform the public and to lobby the governments, primarily in the West, and
supranational institutions. The emergence of Middle Eastern Christian diaspora is
connected with armed conflicts, religious or ethnic discrimination in the Middle East in the
last two centuries. The decline of Christians in the Middle East relates to their massive
emigration to Western countries. This article attempted to gather theoretical information
about diaspora activism, bring some innovative typologies, present the general attitudes of
Middle Eastern Christian transmigrants towards their homelands and show specific
strategies of the Assyrian and Coptic Middle Eastern Christian stateless diasporas. The
emphasis was put on the comparative method. The author identified various tactics and
group opinions among Coptic transmigrants, represented most visibly by laical modernist
and church traditionalists, while the Assyrian transmigrants are politically more coherent in
criticizing governmental structures. However, members of both groups think they do their
best to improve the living conditions of their coreligionists in the turbulent Middle East.
Key words: Middle East, Christianity, diaspora, transnationalism, activism
Introduction
The attention in the text is paid to the Christian communities originally from
the Middle Eastern heartland, from predominantly Muslim and Arab countries,
namely Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. These immigrants especially
* Artur Boháč, Ph.D. is a lecturer at the Department of Geography, Technical University of
Liberec, Komenského 314/2, 460 05 Liberec, Czech Republic, e-mail artur.bohac@tul.cz.
DOI: http://doi.org/10.24040/politickevedy.2019.22.4.57-80
═════════════ Politické vedy / Studies ═════════════
58
inhabit the states of the Euro-Atlantic civilisation where they benefit from liberal
achievements. The number of Christians in observed Muslim countries was
estimated at 11 million before the Arab Spring because of outdated censuses,
censuses not focused on religious affiliation or the fear of Christians to reveal
their faith (Boháč 2010b, p. 22-23). Christians are a minority in terms of
numbers as well as power. Minority mistreatment is a major source of the
conflicts in the region. Most post-Ottoman states did not develop a national
identity encompassing their multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, what led to
intrastate and international conflicts (Chapman, 2012). There are also hidden
conflicts that are not often reflected in the media. Discrimination of Christians or
attacks on them based on religious or ethnic hatred and perpetrated by
governments, organisations or individuals belong to these conflicts. Studied
diasporas attempt to foster awareness of mentioned problems and improve the
status of their coreligionists. They established organisations to inform the
Western public, lobby Western institutions to create pressure on the
governments in their homelands. The Middle East faces the emigration of
Christians. It started in the 19th Century and led to the creation of numerous
diasporas including billionaire Charles Slim Helou, former tennis player Andre
Agassi, musician Mika and political scientist and Donald Trump’s adviser
Walid Phares. Christians were overrepresented among Middle Eastern
immigrants, but since the mid-20th Century, many Muslims leave their
homelands and the ratio is more proportional.
Middle Eastern states, in contrast to Western states, are considered as not-
free (Egypt, Iraq, Syria) or partly free (Jordan, Lebanon) by Freedom House
(2017) and as authoritarian (Egypt, Jordan, Syria) or hybrid regimes (Iraq,
Lebanon) by Economist Intelligence Unit (2017). The impact of Islamic traditions
on a political and social environment is difficult to measure, but Shepard’s
classification
1
is quite reliable (Shepard, 1987). The impact of Islam on the
citizens is traceable through the sociological surveys (Poushter, 2016). Islam
heavily influences the social status of Christian minorities (see next chapter for
details). The theme of Middle Eastern Christians is politically loaded. Middle
1
Shepard’s classification measures the influence of Islam on a political culture based on the
evaluation of complexity and authenticity. Complexity means the scope of implementation of sharia
in politics, personal status of citizens, banking, clothing policy and penology. Authenticity means the
willingness of the government to accept Western ideas and technologies. Authenticity is more
difficult to measure than complexity. The classification was quantified and expanded on the human
rights by Daniel Price (Price, 2002).
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59
Eastern states deny any discrimination or deny the existence of the minorities,
particularly ethnic ones
2
. There are many studies characterizing diasporas in
the general sense (Vertovec, 1999) or describing national diasporas and their
activism, primarily on social media (Bernal, 2006, Naghibi, 2011) and other
tactics (Baser & Swain, 2010, Marzouki, 2016, Yefet, 2016). The goal of the
article to characterize Middle Eastern Christian diasporas, their identities and
relations towards churches and states and to bring innovative typologies of their
activities. Diaspora activities are illustrated by the actions of the Assyrian and
Coptic diaspora, the two most active groups.
1 Middle Eastern Christianity and Historical Roots of Current
Problems
Studied minorities have a distinct religion, concretely Christianity. But some
branches of Middle Eastern Christianity, including Coptic and Assyrian
churches, are coupled with a specific ethnicity, endogamy and are not
missionary oriented. These churches became worldwide religions because of
migration. The vast majority of Middle Eastern Christians is an autochthonous
population. They mostly belong to the Monophysite (the Armenian Apostolic
Church and Coptic Orthodox Church) or Dyophysite (Nestorian – the Assyrian
Church of the East) interpretations separated from the Orthodoxy. There are
also Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant adherents in the region.
Uniates are Christians originally belonging to non-Catholic branches who
recognised the superiority of the Pope (Nisan, 2002). Other Christian
communities arose through migration or conversions among Christian sects.
Conversions of Muslims are almost impossible due to strict Islamic laws. Most
active in converting autochthonous Christians were Roman Catholics,
nowadays most active are Evangelicals. Proselytism is not welcomed by
affected churches which even cooperate with Muslim governments to eliminate
it. Islam based on the Quran, Hadith and Sunna classifies society into two
entities, Muslims and non-Muslims. Christians, Jews and other monotheists
were called Ahl al-Kitab (People of the Book). The People of the Book were
labeled as dhimmi, protected people, who could live and practice their religion
and had autonomy in educational, religious and family affairs. They had to pay
2
Sometimes, the minority name is changed, e.g. the Kurds in Turkey were called Mountain Turks till
the 1990s and the term Arab Christian is misused and related to ethnically non-Arab populations
such as the Assyrians.
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60
special taxes and respect discriminatory rules (Henderson, 2005, p. 156). These
conditions led to a gradual replacement of Christians with Muslims after the
Arab conquest in 7th Century.
The Ottoman Turks established the system of millets, which incorporated the
main denominations of the Empire, Muslim, Jewish, Greek Orthodox and
Armenian. The Ottoman Empire perceived its inhabitants as consisting of
different religions than different ethnicities (Belge & Karakoç, 2013, p. 4).
Representative authorities of the millets were religious leaders. The millet
system brought an identification of the community with the religion. Christian
minorities in the weak Ottoman Empire of the 19th Century enjoyed the
protection of European colonial powers which led to the legal equality conceded
to non-Muslims (Nisan, 2002, p. 145). There occurred revolutionary nationalist
ideas in the 19th Century and Christians who collaborated with the armies of the
Triple Entente urged for the establishment of their states during World War I.
The Armenians cooperated with Russia, the Assyrians with the UK and the
Maronites with France. The Maronites got the state Lebanon, but Assyrian
efforts were not fulfilled. The Copts stayed loyal to the Egyptian anti-British
nationalism. However, mentioned collaborations, together with the old trauma
from the Crusades, led to popular Muslim perceptions of the Christians as a fifth
column of the West. Christians in the mandate states had autonomy in
education, religion and family affairs as in Ottoman times, but Muslim
domination was limited
3
(Muzikář et al., 1989, p. 39). After World War II. all
European mandates ended, and the new superpowers were not interested in
the question of minorities. Then, Middle Eastern Christians were victims of
nationalism, suppressing ethnic and ethnoreligious minorities, socialism,
inhibiting the role of religions, and Islamism, connected with an implementing of
sharia law and suppressing religious minorities. Sharia is one of the pillars of
the judiciary and legislation in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syria. There is still an
autonomy in religion and family affairs (partly in education) for Christians and
the current state is called the neo-millet system. Egyptian and Syrian presidents
must be Muslims due to the constitutions. The Christian presence in the
judiciary, army, administration or politics is disproportionately low in Egypt, Iraq
and Syria. The specific case is Jordan, where Christians are overrepresented
3
Sharia was applied only in family and inheritance affairs of Muslims.
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61
because of the malapportionment and special seats in the parliament
4
. Several
modern branches of Christianity (e.g. Evangelicals, Seventh-day Adventists) not
considered as the religions of the Book are forbidden or very limited in most
Middle Eastern states. Christians face higher rates of terrorist attacks or
communal violence, especially in the states with powerful Islamist groups
(Egypt) or a weak central government (Syria, Iraq).
Minorities are expected to be pro-democratic. The situation is different in the
Middle East with a political role of religion and existing cleavages
5
. Authoritarian
regimes may be more positive for Christians than relatively democratic regimes
which could lead to the deeper implementation of Islam (Belge & Karakoç,
2013, p. 2). Most Christians and their leaders promote autocrats as Abdel
Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, Abdullah II. in Jordan or Bashar Assad in Syria, who
limit the power of pro-Islamist majorities. An ecclesiastic hierarchy has a priority
on the freedom of conscience and the security of believers. The governments
fiscally support a loyal clergy on the one hand and on the other hand clerics
may be tracked by secret services. More liberal attitudes are visible among laity,
especially in the diaspora, oriented towards human and political rights. Diversity
of opinions leads to the quarrels between clergy and laity and people in their
homelands and the diaspora. Most disloyal among observed groups are
connected with a distinct ethnicity and efforts of autonomy, e.g. the Assyrians
(Phares, 2001, p. 64). The Assyrians attempt to establish an autonomous region
in the Nineveh plains
6
in Iraq as a haven not only for the Assyrians but also for
other Christians, the Yezidis and Shabaks. Due to Article 125 of the Iraqi
Constitution, the Assyrians can ask for autonomy and relevant proposals exist.
In north-eastern Syria, the Assyrians cooperate with the Kurds to establish the
autonomous region Rojava (Teule, 2012, p. 190-192). These activities are
suppressed by Middle Eastern governments advocating territorial integrity.
There is also the challenge of contrasting perceptions of human rights in the
Islamic world (The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam from 1990) and
4
Christians (and Muslim countrymen) are preferred to counterbalance the influence of the urban,
Palestinian and pro-Islamist electorate via quota system and the creation of electoral districts with
divergent ratio of voters to representatives (Moaddel, 2012, p. 130).
5
These cleavages express the division of the Middle Eastern societies and they different from the
cleavages in the Western states, because of the importance of ethnic, sectarian identity and
derived loyalties sometimes connected with anti-democratic strategies (Acemoglu & Robinson,
2006 in Belge & Karakoç, 2013, p. 2).
6
The autonomous region should consist of three districts of Nineveh Governorate: Tel Kaif, Al-
Hamdaniya and Al-Shikhan. The region is a part of Arab Iraq with a strong Kurdish presence.
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62
in the UN (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 and The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from 1966). Controversies
are connected with gender, minority affairs, religious and political rights in the
Islamic declaration (Price, 2002, p. 214).
Middle Eastern Christians use emigration to safer and democratic countries,
cooperation with secular governments to restrict Islamists, cooperation with
other oppressed minorities, civil activism with the encouragement of diaspora
and non-governmental organisations and separation from Muslim majority
(ghetto mentality) to improve (or keep) their status.
2 Typical Features of Contemporary Diasporas in
a Globalising World
The concept of diaspora (from Greek word diaspeirein for dispersion) related
to the groups with specific historical circumstances as Greeks, Jews or
Armenians (Baser & Swain, 2010, p. 39, Yefet, 2016, p. 1208). A diaspora is a
group living outside its homeland in many host countries with a continual
presence.
Typical features of diasporas are intensive communication between
members of the diaspora in host countries and in the homeland, collective
consciousness and memory and vision of a return to the homeland.
Martin Sökefeld approached diasporas as transnational imagined
communities (Sökefeld, 2006 in Baser & Swain, 2010, p. 42). Diaspora consists
of people of various generations, classes, education, political ideologies and
attitudes towards religion. It is possible to distinguish three basic types of
diasporas:
- state (national) diaspora more or less supporting current governments
in their country of origin, for example, the Turkish diaspora in Europe;
- state (national) diaspora opposing current governments in their country
of origin, but with strong national identity and pride, e.g. the Cuban
diaspora in the USA;
- stateless diaspora is connected by common ethnicity or religion distinct
from the majority population in the homeland and united around the
idea of secession, autonomy or improvement of living standard of a
community. This type of diaspora is coupled with loyalty to its territory of
origin, but not a country of origin, and belongs to the most dynamic
ones (e.g. the Assyrian diaspora).
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We can also observe that members of diasporas have more linkages with
communities within the homeland because of modern communication means
than with the host country. Long-distance nationalism can be also observed in
terms of preserving the original culture. Then we can observe multiple identities
which may be complementing or contradicting. There is also a hypothesis
claiming that hardships in settling and assimilation of a diaspora in a host land
lead to an increased focus on their erstwhile homeland (Demmers, 2007 in
Baser & Swain, 2010, p. 38).
Voluntary diaspora was created predominantly as a result of economic
migration. Voluntary diaspora does not plan to go back to a country of origin, but
it does not mean inactivity towards a homeland. Voluntary migration is more
usual for a state diaspora backing political regimes in their countries of origin, e.
g. the Turkish diaspora in Europe. Forcible diaspora is a product of
discrimination, life threat or expulsion in the country of origin. Involuntary
migration is more usual for a state diaspora opposing current political regimes in
their homelands or a stateless diaspora. Involuntary diaspora has a plan to
return to its homeland one day, e. g. the Assyrian diaspora in the West.
Steven Vertovec (1999, p. 3) uses the term ethnic diaspora which can be
applied to communities with specific ethnoreligious beliefs. An ethnic diaspora
includes historical and actual conditions, characteristics and experiences of a
group. A typical feature of an ethnic diaspora is triple relation between global
dislocation of diaspora and maintaining of ethnic identity, country of diaspora
current stay and relations connected with the territory of that stay and country of
origin.
Not all Middle Eastern Christian immigrant communities are of ethnic
character, but ethnicity can be replaced by religion and related communal
proximity. Vertovec (1999, p. 3-13) made also a typology outlining the basic
streams of transnational thinking. Social morphology means creating human
communities across borders or regions. This networking has been highlighted
by the expansion of Internet coverage. Digital diasporas have been created by
the Assyrians and Copts, whose fates are discussed on thousands of websites,
blogs and forums (Boháč, 2010a, p. 71). Shared consciousness of
transmigrants is connected with their identification with companies and
locations. They have solidarity with the communities with a similar fate. We can
observe solidarity among Middle Eastern Christians, regardless of a country of
origin or a Christian denomination. This non-sectarian cooperation is a new
phenomenon due to the problematic history of cohabitation between Middle
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64
Eastern churches. Cultural reproduction is certain cultural hybridity which is
evident especially among young transmigrants. Identity is a social construction
and people in a global age have more identities due to the advances in
information and travel. The avenue of capital is connected with financial flows
between the transmigrants and their countries of origin. Transmigrants usually
reside in countries with a higher standard of living than their countries of origin.
Remittances contribute to the development of communities or regions where
people have relatives living abroad. Remittances can exacerbate conflicts in the
country of origin because they increase the economic differences between
people. In the context of the Middle East, where family and community ties are
traditionally strong, this phenomenon occurs. Political engagement of
transmigrants means political activities in their homelands and attempts to
influence politics there. They are involved in the activities of international non-
governmental organisations dealing with human rights, ecclesiastical charities
and exile political movements. There is frequent lobbying of politicians in
receiving states or international organisations by diaspora organisations such as
Coptic ones in the USA (Yefet, 2016, p. 5-11). Reconstruction of a site is a
strategy of transmigrants pursuing the spirit of former home into a new
settlement by shaping of space. An example is a Lebanese town Anjar,
inhabited by Armenians, who fled the genocide in the Ottoman Empire in Musa
Dagh mountain. The city districts were named after original settlements.
Popular in diaspora communication and publishing are social media that
enable people to communicate despite a long distance. Even people in
peripheral regions have an occasional approach to the Internet using
smartphones. In the broader Middle East, there is 142 millions of Internet users
and 76 millions of people with Facebook profiles (Internet World Stats, 2017).
The social media important for activism are Facebook, MySpace, webs such as
Wikipedia, blogs such as Tumbler and microblogs such as Twitter and content
communities such as YouTube or Flickr. There are also plenty of classic
websites connected with diaspora organisations.
Religion is an important element of diaspora identity. Communities of a
universal religion (e.g. Islamic Ummah, global Christendom) can be considered
as transnational communities, religious identity can be more important than
ethnic or national identity. In the case of Middle Eastern Christians, adherents of
universal Churches are usually a part of a national immigrant community or
larger universal Christian group such as Greek Orthodox or Roman Catholics.
These adherents are affiliated to their church and to their states of origin and
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65
are not much politically active in the homeland as well as in host societies. They
do not express specific identity and cooperate with other Christian groups as
well as Muslim and other non-Christian groups originally from their homeland or
region. Communities of a local religion or specific religious branch (e.g. the
Armenian, Maronite, Assyrian diaspora) are different. Religions are perceived in
an ethno-nationalist way and they are an integral part of communal particular
identity. Churches are the main representatives of a community or a nation.
Paternalistic churches influence their adherents regardless of their location.
A separate grouping is symptomatic for these churches and related
communities. Adherents of these groups are politically active in host societies
and in a homeland, if possible. These groups create a distinct identity what may
lead to non-cooperation with other groups originally from their homeland or
region.
These two types of diaspora groups do not have to be in conflict. Middle
Eastern Christians, regardless of a religious branch, cooperate in activities
against terrorism or in support of equality. However, they may have different
opinions on governments in their homelands when stateless diasporas of
specific ethnoreligious branches (e.g. the Assyrians from Syria) are more critical
towards regimes than mostly loyal national diasporas of universal religions (e.g.
Greek Orthodox people from Syria). Churches and church organisations
perceive themselves as part of a state nation and do not create special
identities or claims. They respect the attitudes of their church patriarchs who
usually cooperate with governments in their countries of origins. They are not
too critical towards Muslims and governments, and they attempt to play the role
of a bridge between the world of Islam and the West. Laical organisations put
an accent on a distinct identity in contrast to official national, cultural or regional
identity. American laical organisations of the Copts label themselves as Coptic
organisations, not Egyptian, Middle Eastern or Arab not only because of
ethnoreligious pride but also because of the risk of confusion with Muslims,
Arabs and related prejudices in the host country (Yefet, 2016). These
organisations prepare educational and political actions. They lobby the
government and non-governmental organisations and attempt to prevent
assimilation of their community, but they respect the norms of a host country.
They may be in conflict with churches because they find church attitudes
towards the governments in their countries of origin too cautious.
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3 Middle Eastern Christian Diasporas and Their Activities
Nowadays, Middle Eastern Christian migration is a small part of the
migration flow from the Global South to the Global North. In earlier periods
Christians tended to migrate within Islamic empires. Conservative Christian
European states refused to accept Middle Eastern Christians stigmatised as
heretics. Since the late 19th Century, there appeared signs of protection of
Middle Eastern churches from the Vatican and the Protestant churches. In the
period after World War II., the desire for a convergence of Christian groups grew
stronger and the WCC (World Council of Churches) was founded. Roman
Catholics are not members of the WCC, but they held various conciliatory
meetings with the patriarchs of Oriental Churches. Ecumenical processes
occurred also in the Middle East. The MECC (Middle East Council of Churches)
and the ATIME (Association of Theological Institutes in the Middle East
Association) were founded as the offshoots of the WCC. The MECC is
headquartered in Beirut, and it attempts to build civil society in the region,
prevent the Christian exodus and encourage an interreligious dialogue with
Islam (Bailey & Bailey, 2003, p. 25). Declining numbers of Christians are
symptomatic for the Middle East. The biggest migration waves from the region
were caused by the unpredictable situations as the Simmel massacre of
Assyrians committed by the Iraqi army in 1933, Lebanese civil war, two wars in
the Persian Gulf, short period of the Muslim Brotherhood’s regime in Egypt, civil
war in Syria and the rise of the ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,
Daesh). Some of migrating Christians came back to their homelands after the
end of critical situations
7
, but most of them stayed in exile. The migration of
Christians has increased since the decolonisation of the region. Churches in the
West attempt to help immigrants with practical issues and preservation of their
identity in a new environment. The most popular destination of studied
immigrants is the USA, particularly cities as Chicago and New York. Large
communities of Oriental Christians live also in Canada, Australia, Sweden,
France, Russia and Latin American countries. Popular countries among studied
transmigrants are deductible from the church administration of observed
churches that have administrative units in immigrant countries. Ethnoreligious
churches (e.g. Assyrian Orthodox Church, Coptic Orthodox Church)
occasionally send a clergy from the Middle East to administer churches in
7
Iraqi Christians mostly returned to their homeland from exile in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon after the
Second Gulf War.
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67
diaspora and to maintain a liturgical language. There are also laical
organisations focused on human rights (Chapman, 2012).
Emigration reduces not only the minority's number but also its social, cultural
and political potential in its homeland. The proportion of seniors and women is
increasing as men of working age go abroad. In 1914, Christians represented
24 % of the population of the Ottoman Empire and today they do not represent
more than 10 % in any of the studied countries except Lebanon (Pacini ed.,
1998, p. 22). Most Middle Eastern Christians have relatives living in exile.
Immigrant families help newcomers with accommodation, employment and
other concerns. Many Christian students who have gone abroad for education
did not return back after graduation. In their homelands, they would have trouble
to find adequate employment because of inefficient local economies and their
adherence to Christianity. Middle Eastern Christian diaspora political activities
make Christians disloyal to their homelands in the eyes of the Muslim majority,
despite the efforts of loyal clergy. Unfortunately, some campaigns of the
diaspora are quite aggressive and may damage the credibility of a church in a
country of origin.
A church is considered by the government to be the main actor of
maintaining communal identity responsible for its adherents in the sense of the
neo-millet system (Belge & Karakoç, 2013, p. 4-7). But the influence of a church
in the diaspora with more communal actors is limited. Church in a homeland
sometimes attempts to censor radical opinions of diaspora towards the Middle
Eastern governments. Middle Eastern Christian diaspora activism involves:
- Public protests are the most popular method of social activism.
Diasporas put their causes in an international context which may catch
more attention from the public or the government in a host country and
even indirectly lead to political action (Baser & Swain, 2010, p. 42-48).
- The Internet and alternative media activism are a relatively cheap and
effective method of connecting diaspora communities, host countries or
homelands. Many diasporas have their own satellite televisions, both
religious and laical channels.
- Lobbying of governments, individual representatives of state power and
political organisations, primarily in important countries or political
integrations, is usually not an affair of individuals, but organised
diaspora groups such as ACA (American Coptic Association). Lobbying
may lead to the pressure towards governments in countries of origin,
direct intervention or even military operation (Yefet, 2016, p. 5-6). There
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68
is a cooperation with think-tanks with similar opinions, especially
conservative right ones like Middle East Forum led by US political
commentator Daniel Pipes.
- Pressure through own diaspora politicians elected in host countries or
diaspora political parties established in host countries is typical for the
Western environment with strong diaspora presence. There are
diaspora politicians in the West who are members of established
political parties based on ideology or politicians who are members of
new diaspora political parties with ethnic or religious specifics. Anna
Eshoo is a member of the Democratic Party and the US representative
of the Assyrian and Armenian origin. Middle Eastern Christian diaspora
does not have ethnic or religious political parties active in the host
countries’ politics, but Muslim immigrants do (e.g. Islam Party in
Belgium, Denk in the Netherlands).
- Cooperation with other churches or Christian human rights
organisations, religious (Voice of Martyrs, Open Doors USA) or non-
religious (Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Minority Rights
Group International). We can notice raised awareness about the fate of
mostly non-Catholic Middle Eastern Christians in the Roman Catholic
Church. Visits of the Middle East were made by Popes Benedict XVI.
and Francis. Popes had meetings with politicians and Christian,
Muslim and Jewish clerics and they condemn terrorist and other violent
attacks and guardedly criticized the status of Christians in Middle
Eastern Muslim countries.
- Cooperation with other diasporas is typical for communities with similar
religion or historical experience, for example, the Assyrians and
Armenians who collaborate in the effort of the recognition of the
genocide of their nations in the Ottoman Empire.
- Signing petitions and creating campaigns are popular non-violent
strategies, how to influence people in the host country. The Internet is
full of diaspora petitions. The Assyrians are engaged in organising
petitions related to the planned Assyrian autonomous region in Iraq,
Assyrian genocide Seyfo recognition, etc.
- Memorials and commemorations of historical events make the problem
of a diaspora permanently more visible. Memorials might be a target of
vandalism committed by members of diasporas with opposite interests,
e.g. national diasporas denying the claims of stateless diasporas. The
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memorial in Sydney was vandalized in 2015 and sprayed with
swastikas and slogans against Assyrians and Armenians. These
slogans may lead to a Turkish immigrant community (Aubusson, 2015).
- Extreme activities like hunger strike or self-immolation are not used by
observed groups.
3.1 Assyrian Issues and Activities
The Assyrians are typical stateless diaspora with distinct Neo-Aramean
language and religion. Their original homeland is located in south-eastern
Turkey, north-eastern Syria, northern Iraq and north-western Iran. They
inhabited the same territory as the Kurds, their age-long rivals and their
settlement is relatively compact in this territory. Nowadays, approximately 0,5
million Assyrians live in the Middle East and 3 million in the diaspora (UNPO,
2008). Assyrian emigration outside the Middle East started during the genocide
committed by the Ottomans and continued during the events in Iraq in the
1930s, the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, Turkish-Kurdish conflict
in Turkey in the 1980s and post-1990s wars in Iraq and Syria. The Assyrians are
religiously divided, causing further difficulties. The most active part of the
Assyrian nation are adherents of the Assyrian Church of the East who declare a
kinship with the ancient Assyrians. Several adherents of other Assyrian sects as
the Chaldean Catholic Church, the Syriac Orthodox Church and the Syriac
Catholic Church deny the Assyrian identity. They promote their particular
identities, Chaldean and Aramean, languages (dialects) and Arabic or they
perceive themselves as members of the Christian minority loyal to an existing
state. Adherents of mentioned churches were predominantly urban populations
who had to deal with Muslim rulers frequently whilst adherents of the Assyrian
Church of the East lived in the country (Teule, 2012, p. 180-184). The Assyrian
Church of the East has its patriarchal see in Chicago whereas other sects have
the sees in the Middle East. This also plays a role in identity problems of
Assyrians and differences in their political attitudes. The Assyrian Church of the
East does not only maintain Assyrian religious identity, but also the literacy in
Assyrian. Laic diaspora is also active in creating educational websites and
software to strengthen literacy in Assyrian (McClure, 2001, p. 114). An important
institution for these activities is the AAS (Assyrian Academic Society) in
Chicago. The Assyrian Church of the East is politically active what is uncommon
among Middle Eastern churches. In light of constructivism, it is difficult to find
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70
the truth about the identity of Assyrian subgroups. A nationality became
important in the region in the 19th Century under the influence of European
thought. Several authors use compromise terms Chaldo-Assyrians or Chaldean-
Assyrian Syriacs (Hanish, 2008, p. 42-43). In the article author uses term
Assyrians for a whole group, focuses on the Assyrian nationalism (Assyrianism)
and does not focus on particular identities which could complicate the text.
Assyrians have their flag, national anthem, and their creation are coupled with
diaspora activities.
The Assyrians strive for political emancipation from the Arab, Turkish,
Persian or Kurdish governments. The Assyrians faced genocide in the Ottoman
Empire and Assyrian authors regard the Simmel massacre also as genocide.
The Assyrians were victims of Saddam Hussein’s campaign Al-Anfal (spoils of
war) of de-kurdification of Northern Iraq (Teule, 2012, p. 186). Acts of martyrdom
are important for Assyrian identity. Their genocide in the Ottoman Empire is not
so famous as the Armenian genocide and was recognised by Sweden, Armenia,
Netherlands, Austria, Germany and several federal states of the USA and
Australia. Turkey denies the Assyrian genocide as well as the genocide of
Armenians. Several memorials of the genocide have been built in Western
countries with an Assyrian presence. Most Assyrians have moderate separatist
tendencies and they support Assyrian autonomy because of the religious and
ethnic discrimination in their homelands. They submitted petitions to the League
of Nations requiring their own state because the British promised them
sovereignty in so-called Assyrian Triangle in Mesopotamia. However, after
World War I., the UK had opposite geopolitical interests. The Assyrians were
loyal to the British mandate rule in Iraq, and they formed military forces called
Assyrian Levies (Donabed, 2015, p. 414-415). Levies helped to suppress pro-
Nazi coup in Iraq, but they were disbanded when British troops left Iraqi military
bases in 1955. From the 1950s to 2000s Assyrian autonomy efforts in Iraq were
totally suppressed as well as in Syria, Iran and Turkey.
The fall of Hussein meant a revival of Assyrian emancipation activities in
Iraq, but Assyrian visions of the democratisation of Iraq were not fulfilled. The
Assyrians became a target for Sunni and Shia radicals. Due to the current
political situation, the most probable is partial Assyrian autonomy within Kurdish
Rojava in Syria. The Nineveh plains plan in Iraq, where have majority of
autochthonous Assyrians lived, was delayed by the conquests of the ISIL and
related massive emigration. The Assyrians are almost not present in political
bodies of the Middle Eastern states and if they are, they used minority quota
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71
seats introduced in the last decades. There are five Assyrian MPs in central
Iraqi Parliament and five in the Kurdish Parliament. In Iraqi Kurdistan, there are
also Assyrian ministers. Generally, the Assyrians have the best living conditions
in Kurdistan in terms of the Middle East. They have relative religious, cultural
freedom and their own militias. That is why many Assyrians moved from Arab
Iraq to Kurdistan (Phares, 2001, p. 64). In Turkey, there is one Assyrian MP
elected for secularist and pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party, in Syria no
MP and in Iran, there is one seat reserved for the Assyrian community. Iranian
Assyrian deputy is Yonathan Betkolia, general secretary of the AUA (Assyrian
Universal Alliance). One big exception was Tariq Aziz, Assyrian (Chaldean)
former Iraqi deputy prime minister loyal to Hussein’s Arab nationalism.
The Assyrian diaspora has created many political organisations, their
offshoots and transnational institutions. Some of them are active in the Middle
East. The AUA is Assyrian umbrella organisation and its goal is to spread the
Assyrian name and protect the human rights of the Assyrians in their homeland.
The AUA is the Assyrian representant in the UNPO (Unrepresented Nations and
Peoples Organisation) (UNPO, 2008). The ACE (Assyrian Council of Europe)
lobbies in Brussels. The AANF (Assyrian American National Federation) is a
federation of Assyrian organisations in the USA. It was found in 1933 in the year
of the Simmel massacre. It is focused on Assyrian human rights and culture, it
organizes educational activities, youth camps and workshops. Mentioned
organisations cooperate with Assyrian political parties in the Middle East, e. g.
Iraqi ADM (Assyrian Democratic Movement) or illegal Syrian ADO (Assyrian
Democratic Organisation) (Boháč, 2010, p. 69-70). There are several politicians
of Assyrian origin in the West. US Representative for Democratic Party Anna
Eshoo is a founder of Religious Minorities in the Middle East Caucus (activities
as the Nineveh Plains Resolution or the Genocide Resolution). Unlike most pro-
Middle Eastern Christian Western politicians, Eshoo is a liberal. Ibrahim
Baylan is Swedish minister and Social-Democratic politician supporting the
recognition of the Assyrian genocide. There are also five Assyrian members of
the Swedish Parliament. The Assyrian question is raised not only by politicians
of Assyrian origin. Former Republican US Congressman Henry Hyde
cooperated with the lobbyist organisation AAL (Assyrian American League) and
he had an influence on the recognition of Iraqi ADM (Assyrian Democratic
Movement) as a part of Iraqi anti-Hussein opposition (Michael, 2003).
Also, celebrities of Assyrian origin attempt to improve the status of the
Assyrians in their homeland. US actress and novelist Rosie Malek-Yohan
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72
testified before the US Congress and the House of Commons in the UK in the
case of the Assyrian plight in Iraq. She compared that situation with Seyfo, the
genocide described in her popular novel The Crimson Field. Swedish journalist
and author Nuri Kino is an author of the books about Iraqi Assyrians, and one
of them was dedicated to the Minority Rights Group International. He also
created the film about the Assyriska football team. The team from Swedish city
Södertälje was founded by Assyrian immigrants and still has a significant
number of Assyrian players (Bet-Alkhas, 2006). Assyrian transnational media
are important for maintaining Assyrian identity and literacy. There are Assyrian
satellite televisions as Ashur TV opinion linked to the ADM and located in the
USA. US Assyrian diaspora also publishes many Internet magazines as Zinda
Magazine, Nineveh Online and Assyrian News (McClure, 2001, p. 115).
Assyrians have their agency AINA (Assyrian International News Agency)
providing news on Assyrian-related issues with headquarters in Chicago. AINA
articles are cited by important mass media. Assyrians in the diaspora are
engaged in protesting against actual violent events in their homelands.
Demonstrations with Assyrian flags and various banners are held in Western
cities as New York, Sydney or London, especially after the terrorist attacks
committed on the Assyrians in the Middle East. The Assyrians also struggle for
recognition of their genocide in the Ottoman Empire and they build memorials of
the genocide.
3.2 Coptic Issues and Activities
The Copts do not belong to typical stateless diasporas because they mostly
consider themselves as true Egyptians along with Muslims. The Copts
constitute approximately 10 % of Egypt’s population, and they live in large cities
like Cairo and Alexandria as well as in the country of Upper Egypt or the Sinai
Peninsula. The vast majority of the Copts are adherents of the Coptic Orthodox
Church but there are also Coptic Catholics or Protestants. Nowadays, the Copts
are linguistically fully Arabized, and Arabic is a predominant language in church
rituals
8
. The Coptic language is kept alive by a few enthusiasts. The Copts do
not have autonomist tendencies, although their diaspora is active in the
questions of religious freedom, politics, discriminatory Egyptian laws and had an
impact on strengthening Coptic civil society and promoting Coptic identity in
8
Liturgical languages are usually more resistant to the assimilation than languages of daily
communication in terms of the Middle East.
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73
Egypt (Henderson, 2005). The absence of autonomist tendencies can be
explained by a dispersed settlement of the minority and specific historical
conditions. Copts are systematically underrepresented in the public sector. The
exception was Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former minister of foreign affairs and
general secretary of the UN. The Copts do not attempt to create a special
Coptic political party. Political parties based on religion or ethnicity are banned
in Egypt. Another problem of Copts is prevalent violent attacks on them. The
Egyptian state is sensitive to criticism from abroad related to the Coptic
question, often rejects any discussion and perceives criticism as a foreign
conspiracy against national integrity. Communal violence against Copts in Egypt
is interpreted by the government as terrorist attacks against the whole Egyptian
society regardless of faith. It is obvious that Coptic diaspora activities mostly
contradicts the state policy. Both the Egyptian government and opposition
dominated by Muslims are against any foreign involvement on behalf of Copts
and criticize Coptic particularism because all Egyptians have problems with
poverty, unemployment, etc. (Ibrahim, 2015). Coptic emigration to Western
countries began after Gamal Nasser’s coup d'état in 1952. Nowadays, there
live approximately 600 000 Copts in the West due to the estimations. Hundreds
of local Coptic Orthodox churches are directed by the Patriarchate of the Coptic
Orthodox Church in Alexandria based in Cairo. Diaspora church is focused on
maintaining the religious identity of Copts (also via the Internet), philanthropy
and is far from criticism towards the Egyptian government (Yefet, 2016, p. 1208-
1209).
Various political protests, petitions and lobbying are organised by Coptic laic
organisations. The ACA (American Coptic Association) is the oldest Coptic
diaspora organisation, its foundation is connected with the imprisonment of
Coptic patriarch, Pope Shenouda III., who refused to cooperate with pro-
Islamist Anwar Sadat’s government in Egypt because of its inactivity in the
question of frequent attacks on Copts in the 1970s. Coptic lobbying in the US
Congress led to the pressure on the Egyptian government and the release of
the Pope. It led also to the Freedom from Religious Persecution Act of 1990 and
the activities of the USCIRF (United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom) authorised by the International Religious Freedom Act of
1998. Freedom from Religious Persecution Act of 1990 became an important
part of the US foreign policy that involved sanctions against the states violating
religious freedom. USCIRF is a federal government commission annually
reviewing violations of religious freedom abroad. There are many Coptic
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74
organisations all around the world such as US Copts, Coptic Assembly of
America, ACM (Australian Coptic Movement) and the BCA (British Coptic
Association) with its Internet activities. Coptic diaspora is very active on the
Internet which is an alternative source of information about the Copts because
Egyptian media are not much interested in Coptic topics (Ibrahim, 2015, p.
2591). The Coptic Orthodox Church collaborates with the Egyptian regime,
although young Shenouda III. had not been afraid to criticize the government.
Later he started to cooperate with the government and rejected political
activities of his community and the diaspora in return for guaranteeing relative
security of Egyptian Copts (Henderson, 2005, p. 159-165). His successor
Tawadros II. continues in a similar way.
There are Coptic laic intellectuals as Samir Marqus (Marqus, 2000 in Yefet,
2016, p. 1213) or Hani Labib (Labib, 2000 in Yefet 2016, p. 1213) condemning
diaspora activism as anti-Arab and anti-Islamic agenda exacerbating problems
and supporting neo-colonialism. According to them, the Coptic question can be
solved within the Egyptian framework, concretely through a reformed
conception of Egyptian citizenship. Another Coptic group is liberal idealists who
supported the 2011 revolution against Hosni Mubarak, despite the
recommendations of the Coptic Orthodox Church. The majority of the Copts
feared the rise of Islamists and finally were satisfied when the Egyptian army led
by Sisi overthrew the government of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sisi attempts to
be seen as a protector of Egyptian Christians, he stood for easing the
conditions for church building and renovations, a higher percentage of Coptic
politicians in the parliament (via quota system) and he attends Coptic Orthodox
religious ceremonies. Sisi is the most popular Egyptian president among the
diaspora, so the criticism of the Egyptian government has decreased a little.
Coptic activists from the diaspora have organised many petitions connected
with the Coptic question, one of the actual is connected with the visit of Sisi in
the USA (Makar, 2016).
Well-known pro-Coptic politician of non-Coptic origin is Fred Nile from
Australia. He is a member of New South Wales legislative council for the
Christian Democratic Party, an admirer of Donald Trump and he is famous for
his critical opinions towards homosexuals, liberals and Muslims. He pointed
out discrimination of the Copts in Egypt many times, he collaborates with Coptic
diaspora and he also attempted to put the Muslim Brotherhood on the list of
terrorist organisations (Fred Nile MLC, 2017). There are many Coptic satellite
televisions such as Coptic Sat TV, Logos TV residing in the West. Aghapy TV
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75
and Coptic TV have their headquarters in Cairo and have views particularly in
the USA and Australia. These Egyptian TV stations are allied with the Coptic
Orthodox Church and they have to cope with state censorship (Ibrahim, 2015, p.
2592).
Extreme diaspora activism can be harmful to Egyptian Copts. Zakaria
Boutros is the individual who receives media attention, although he does not
have significant support of the diaspora as well as the Copts in Egypt. Boutros
is a former Coptic priest because the Coptic Orthodox Church cancelled his
priesthood because of his anti-Islamic positions which irritate not only Egyptian
Muslims. Al-Qaeda put a bounty on his head. Boutros is a founder of US Al-
Fady channel and associate of Christian conservative Al-Hayat TV channel
located in Cyprus (Marzouki, 2016, p. 271-272). Both channels are Arabic.
Another controversial person from the diaspora is Nakoula Basseley Nakoula,
US Copt who filmed the Innocence of Muslims and was influenced by Boutros’s
teaching. This anti-Islamic film denouncing prophet Muhammad as a
paedophile caused the rage all around the Muslim world (Los Angeles Times,
2012, Marzouki, 2016, 164). The trailer of the film starts with the scene of
Muslim persecution of Egyptian Copts. Coptic Orthodox Church leaders had to
denounce this movie to prevent Copts to be targeted by angry Muslims.
Conclusion
In many cases, Christians are the only non-Muslim population in the Middle
East which represents a valuable force for the pluralism. Their emigration is a
loss for the region. Let's commemorate the role of Christians in the development
of the Ottoman Empire from Oriental despotism to a relatively modern state with
democratic outcomes in the 19th Century. The future of Christian minorities is
connected not only with the solution of political issues, such as Iraqi and Syrian
questions but with the secularisation and modernisation of Arab societies
towards the American model of the nation. Regimes of relatively secular
autocrats are a short-term solution. Christian strategies for survival oscillate
between loyalty to Muslim governments and self-determination with territorial
claims. Another alternative is emigration. Both studied Assyrian and Coptic
diasporas preserve a distinct identity in host countries, although they are
functioning parts of host societies without social or economic problems and they
partially accepted the identity of host states. They do not have bigger issues
with integration probably due to some cultural proximity, although they belong to
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76
involuntary diasporas with strong connections to a homeland or visions of
return. They are politically active non-state actors, but the level of political
activism or criticism towards homeland governments and the involvement of
their diaspora churches is variable in time and space. The goals of diasporas
are determined by many factors as shown. Relations of diasporas with
coreligionists of the same denomination, other Christians and non-Christian
compatriots are connected with actual diaspora tactics. In contrast to the Copts
and Assyrians with their predominant particularism, diasporas of universal
religions are able to suppress several differences and cooperate within the
wider national and religious communities. These diasporas are prone to the
assimilation in wider immigrant communities or majority society in host
countries.
The Assyrian and Coptic diasporas are vibrant, but they are not
geopolitically important, so they have a problem to attract the attention of the
global players preferring tactful relations with Muslim majorities in the
strategically important Middle East. They raise the question of human rights and
religious freedom via their own associations or in cooperation with various laic
and religious organisations. At times they are quite radical and insensitive in
their criticism, and they cooperate with conservative right parties and in some
cases far-right politicians in the West. Therefore, they may be accused of
Islamophobia.
Activities of studied diasporas are positive for their coreligionists in their
homelands, but there are exceptions unnecessarily irritating local governments
and Muslim citizens. Church leaders in the Middle East then have to publicly
apologize for exaggerated activism of diaspora. The Assyrians have all signs of
a nation and poor relationship with the central Iraqi government which denies all
autonomous or separatist tendencies. They cautiously prefer the cooperation
with the Iraqi Kurdistan in the Middle Eastern region. The Assyrians have better
developed political organisations and parties than the Copts who still mostly rely
on the recommendations of their church. Moreover, geography plays an
important role. The Assyrian Church of the East with the see in Chicago is quite
progressive and encourages political activism and self-determination activities
of the Assyrian people worldwide, whilst the Coptic Orthodox Church with the
see in Cairo is dependent on the Egyptian government and rejects similar
activities of the Copts in Egypt and diaspora. Coptic churches in the diaspora
are subordinated and loyal to the patriarch see in Cairo. Coptic Orthodox
Church oscillates between political passivity and wary support of authoritarian
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77
practices of Egyptian military leaders for decades. Actual support for president
Sisi is more honest than the loyalty to previous Egyptian presidents because he
really improved the political and social status of the Coptic minority. Laic Coptic
organisations are still unsatisfied and demand more changes in Egyptian
society and democratisation of Egyptian politics. They also promote particular
Coptic identity distinct from Egyptian, predominantly Muslim, identity and
demand reformed conception of Egyptian citizenship. Their approach leads to
clashes with the Egyptian government as well as the church. Meanwhile, the
majority of the Copts in Egypt consider themselves as Egyptians, want to live
peacefully with their Muslim neighbours, do not have any separatist tendencies
and have good relations with Sisi.
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