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Cecelia Varendh-Mansson (Cecilia.Varendh-
Mansson.dphil2016@said.oxford.edu)
University of Oxford
Tyler Wry (twry@wharton.upenn.edu)
University of Pennsylvania
Ariane Szafarz (ariane.szafarz@ulb.ac.be)
Universite Libre de Bruxelles
https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2019.0081
ccc
Beyond Hybridity: Accounting for the
Values Complexity of All Organizations
in the Study of Mission and Mission Drift
Mission drift—the perceived discontinuity be-
tween an organization’s actions and its identity—
continues to garner attention primarily from
234 JanuaryAcademy of Management Review
scholars interested in understanding why “hybrid
organizations”focused on creating social and
environmental value shift away from such
value creation (Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2015;
Wolf & Mair, 2019; Wry & Zhao, 2018). Our recent
study of mission drift (Grimes, Williams, &
Zhao, 2019) broadens this discussion by theoreti-
cally grounding mission drift in long-standing
research on organizational identity and adapta-
tion, unpacking different types of mission drift,
and theorizing about why such drift occurs
and how organizations might respond. In their
respone to our article, Varendh-Mansson, Wry,
and Szafarz’s primary critique suggests that our
theorizing is “built on a shaky foundation”based
on the premise that mission should not be “con-
ceptualized in simplistic terms as an organiza-
tion’s single, orienting purpose”(2020: 230). In
making this argument, the authors reference the
literature on hybrid organizing and the distinction
this literature often draws between organizations
with a single purpose (e.g., economic) and those
with two or more purposes (e.g., economic, social,
environmental). Although our desire is not to re-
peat ourselves, we are grateful for the opportunity
in this dialogue to clarify how our prior article not
only addresses Varendh-Mansson et al.’s primary
critique but also moves beyond the authors’as-
sumptions regarding the multiplex nature of or-
ganizations’missions. After responding to this
definitional issue, we then focus the remainder of
this dialogue on advancing scholarship on mis-
sion drift by drawing on two additional important
questions raised in Varendh-Mansson et al.’s
arguments.
REVISITING OUR CONCEPTUALIZATION
OF MISSION
Given Varendh-Mansson et al.’s stated desire to
better theorize the concept of mission, we were sur-
prised with their lack of reference to and, thus, ap-
parent mischaracterization of our actual definition
of organizational mission. Specifically, we defined
organizational mission by noting that it “serves
as a sociocognitive bridge between [the organi-
zation’s] identity and its actions by specifying
why the organization should exist and how it
should act (i.e., purpose), thereby focusing mem-
bers’attention and intentions in such a way that
actions proceed from identity”(2019: 819). To
be clear, to argue that a mission might seek to
specify an organization’s purpose is not in any
way to argue that such a purpose must be singular
or unidimensional.
Yet to the extent our definition might be inter-
preted equivocally such that Varendh-Mansson
et al. might have inferred our definition of mission
as implying its unidimensionality, we believe the
proceeding arguments in which we consistently
reference the multiplicity of values that guide
every organization should have resolved any
such potential for misinterpretation. For instance,
we state, “As is the case for most if not all orga-
nizations, instead of being guided by a small
number of stable and unambiguous values, or-
ganizations are instead confronted by multiple
coexisting, dynamic, and often times incompati-
ble values,”which we argue operate both inter-
nally and externally to the organization (2019: 825).
Importantly, we believe this emphasis on the
multiplicity of values in and outside of organiza-
tions offers a stronger foundation from which to
theorize about the multiplex nature of organiza-
tional mission—a foundation that is not premised
on what we perceive as a false dichotomy be-
tween singular and multipurposed organizations.
Although we of course welcome improvements
to our stated definition of organizational mis-
sion, Varendh-Mansson et al. do not offer a precise
alternative other than to state that mission is a
“nuanced and variegated construct”(2020: 230)—a
premise we readily agree with and one we be-
lieve is fully commensurate with our existing arti-
cle and definition. Ultimately, we concur with
Varendh-Mansson et al. in their call for research
“upstream”that offers even more clarity about the
nature of organizational mission(s), as well as a
greater understanding of how and under what con-
ditions such missions increase alignment between
organizational actions and organizational identities.
We believe future research focused on “upstream”
topics can build on, extend, and clarify our argu-
ments regarding the importance of values com-
plexity to organizations’identities, actions, and
missions. We now take the opportunity to respond
to two additional and important questions raised
by Varendh-Mansson et al.
WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
STRATEGIC CHANGE AND MISSION DRIFT?
Part of what animates Varendh-Mansson et al.’s
critique is the possibility that our article blurs the
lines between mission drift and strategic change.
Implicit in this argument is an assumption that
2020 235Dialogue
strategic change represents intentional and de-
liberate action on the part of leaders and organi-
zational members, whereas mission drift occurs
only when those individuals stop acting inten-
tionally. However, we believe this assumption is
faulty for three reasons. First, it fails to consider
the potential for unintended outcomes from in-
tentional or deliberate action (Osborn & Jackson,
1988; Perrow, 1984). Specifically, it is clear that
intentional action at one level of an organization
might result in unintentional change or deviance
at another level of that organization (Siggelkow &
Rivkin, 2006). For instance, consider the relation-
ship between strategies and tactics. While tactics
may follow from their respective strategies, most
would acknowledge the agency of individual ac-
tors to intentionally deviate tactically in ways that
do not correspond to a particular strategy. Simi-
larly, because organizational identities exist at a
higher level of abstraction than organizational
strategy, it is possible (and perhaps even proba-
ble) that intentional organizational strategies
will at times deviate from those identities, thereby
unintentionally creating the perceived misalign-
ment between organizational action and identity.
Such perceived misalignment, we argue, is char-
acteristic of mission drift.
Second, the characterization of strategic change
as intentional (in contrast to mission drift) does
not consider how strategic change is often highly
determined. As Mintzberg and Waters noted:
Many planned strategies in fact seem to have this
determined quality to them—pursued by organi-
zations resigned to co-operating with external
forces. One is reminded here of the king in the
Saint-Exupery (1946) story of The Little Prince, who
only gave orders that could be executed. He
claimed, for example, that he could order the sun to
set, but only at a certain time of the day. The point
is that when intentions are sufficiently malleable,
everything can seem deliberate (1985: 268).
Therefore, it could be argued that assumptions
of intentionality in strategic actions are, at a
minimum, overstated and, at worst, grossly ex-
aggerated (Balogun & Johnson, 2005). As such,
there is considerable opportunity to explore
the effects of strategic action that is framed by
the organization and its leaders as intentional
yet appears to be driven by forces that leave
little room for agency or intentionality. For in-
stance, drawing on Mintzberg and Waters (1985),
scholars might ask under what conditions stra-
tegic intentions become “sufficiently malleable”
such that strategic actions are more likely to ca-
ter to exogenous forces rather than uphold the
organization’s identity.
Third, the assumption fails to consider how
audiences may perceive an organization’sac-
tions as lacking intentionality, regardless of
whether those actions were strategic and/or in-
tentional. In other words, mission drift is difficult
to determine objectively and, as such, can be
more usefully represented as a type of audience
judgment of organizations and their actions—
judgments that are the focus of our article
(Grimes et al., 2019). And, thus, as we previously
argued, it is the perception of intentionality that
is likely to shape judgments of mission drift,
rather than the actual intentionality exhibited
by organizations.
This third point, we believe, holds important
implications for future empirical research on the
topic of mission drift. Should scholars wish to
study mission drift, how might they go about
theoretically conceptualizing and empirically
capturing instances of such drift? We suggest two
possibilities, both of which account for the eval-
uatory or reputational nature of the construct.
First, one possibility is to study mission drift as a
socially constructed outcome linked to organiza-
tional legitimacy. In this way, stakeholder judg-
ments of the alignment between an organization’s
actions and its image should be captured. The
degree of consensus and cultural diffusion of such
judgments would then provide scholars with an
opportunity to comment on the reputational or
legitimacy-related liabilities of those judgments.
Second, another possibility is to study mission
drift as a feature of organizational action that can
be captured and studied separately from stake-
holder perceptions and judgments. To do so re-
quires care, since this approach essentially
places scholars in the role of evaluating how and
in what ways the organization’s actions have de-
viated from its identity—a difficult role, given the
typical need for rich, longitudinal data to assess
any identity changes that may or may not have
preceded inconsistent organizational action. Al-
though there are various ways to go about this
process, we would encourage future research to
make use of organizations’publicized mission
statements as a particularly important artifact
by which those organizations seek to clarify the
central and distinctive values they wish to uphold
(Besharov, 2014). And web archives now make it
increasingly easy for scholars to track changes to
236 JanuaryAcademy of Management Review
these statements over time. In concert with such
data collection, scholars might then measure and
model shifts in patterns of organizational actions
over time using in-depth longitudinal and quali-
tative research or drawing on third-party evalu-
ations of those patterns, such as those available
in MSCI’s ESG datasets (https://www.msci.com/
esg-sustainable-impact-metrics).
In sum, we propose that strategic change and
mission drift are fundamentally distinct con-
structs, yet they can have important interdepen-
dencies. As such, strategic change may or may not
result in mission drift, depending on whether the
ensuing actions deviate from the respective or-
ganization’s identity and, perhaps more critically,
the extent to which audiences perceive those
actions as deviating from that identity.
WHAT ARE THE BOUNDARY CONDITIONS OF
OUR THEORY OF MISSION DRIFT?
In general, we would like to join Varendh-Mansson
et al.’s call for future work testing the contextual
applicability of the propositions laid out by our
theory. We would hope, for instance, that such
work would expose important contingencies or
boundary conditions of that theory. As such, with
the desire to advance scholarship in this area,
we take the opportunity to (1) respond directly to
Varendh-Mansson et al.’s proposed boundary
condition and (2) introduce several possible con-
ditions of our own.
Responding to Varendh-Mansson et al.’s
Proposed Boundary Condition
As stated in the beginning of this dialogue,
Varendh-Mansson et al.’s arguments are largely
based on the assumption that our theory and the
relationships we proposed would apply exclu-
sively to the context of organizations with singu-
lar or unidimensional missions. Yet, as we noted
earlier, we believe very few organizations are
likely to operate under such conditions. Indeed, to
suggest that our theory of mission drift is contingent
on whether an organization operates according to
a singular mission or according to multiple mis-
sions would require embracing a seemingly false
dichotomy (Battilana, Besharov, & Mitzinneck,
2017). As such, if we acknowledge that all orga-
nizations’missions are to some extent multidi-
mensional and exposed to values complexity both
inside and outside those organizations (Barney,
2018), we see little reason to bound our theory of
mission drift to “unidimensional”organizations.
However, is it likely that our theory of mission
drift would apply in contexts where there is a high
degree of values complexity, such as social en-
trepreneurship? For the sake of brevity, we will
consider our proposed main effect—that “by ex-
posing misalignment between the organization’s
identity and its audiences, values-based com-
plexity increases an organization’s propensity for
inconsistent organizational action”(2019: 826).
And let us take the microfinance sector as a
seminal example of social entrepreneurship and
of a setting with a high degree of values com-
plexity. As this sector grew across the last several
decades, many commercially oriented investors
became enticed by the opportunities for financial
gains. However, such gains were premised on
minimizing the risks often associated with lend-
ing to the poor and vulnerable. As such, to attract
these commercial investment sources, a number
of microfinance institutions have shifted their
loans away from the most vulnerable customers,
who had previously comprised the core of their
lending portfolio (Armend ´
ariz & Szafarz, 2011;
Wry & Zhao, 2018). In sum, as our proposition
predicts, the values misalignment between capital
providers and lending institutions was accentu-
ated in this setting characterized by high values
complexity, leading to inconsistent action, which
at present many audiences interpret as mission
drift (Beisland, D’Espallier, & Mersland, 2019).
Clearly, as Varendh-Mansson et al. indicate,
there is the capacity for productive tensions
within settings of values-based complexity like
this such that mission drift might be avoided,
and yet Varendh-Mansson et al. appear to incor-
rectly attribute these productive tensions to the
mere presence of values complexity. Smith and
Besharov’s (2019) case study of the social enter-
prise Digital Divide, for instance, does not illus-
trate how the mere presence of groups with
divergent values prevents one set of interests
from dominating over others; on the contrary, the
study illustrates the arduous and ongoing work
that continues to be necessary within this orga-
nization to ensure that one set of interests does not
dominate over others amid such diversity. In sum,
we believe that a closer look at our theorization of
the antecedents of mission drift emphasizes the
relevance of our argumentation to fields such as
social enterprise, which many have labeled as
“hybrid organizations.”
2020 237Dialogue
Our Proposed Boundary Conditions
While we disagree with the boundary condi-
tions suggested by Varendh-Mansson et al., we
continue to recognize opportunities to refine
our theory through empirical testing and/or
further conceptual work. Indeed, the back half
of our proposed model of mission drift and
mission work raises opportunities for further
scholarly advancement by theorizing the rela-
tionship between different types of inconsistent
action and perceived mission drift. Although
we drew on existing research on the requisite
variety of complex systems to support our
premise that core changes in an organization
might be viewed by audiences as responsive,
our study also recognizes the capacity for such
inconsistent action to introduce risks, inas-
much as they lead audiences to question that
organization’s authenticity (Barnett & Carroll,
1995; Hannan & Freeman, 1984). A deeper un-
derstanding of the conditions that encourage
audiences to focus on either an organization’s
authenticity or responsiveness when evaluat-
ing an inconsistent action would clearly help
to push scholarship forward in this area. Our
model also suggested particular types of mission
work that may help organizations overcome
or address perceived mission drift; however,
there may be conditions that importantly mod-
erate the effectiveness of such reactive work.
For instance, as we previously argued, there
may be settings where “audiences perceive in-
consistent action not merely as a violation of
the organization’s image but also as a violation
of some threshold standard of appropriate be-
havior”(2019: 830). It may be, for instance, that in
those settings where mission drift is viewed in
terms of moral or ethical failure (e.g., social en-
trepreneurship), mission work may prove less
effective.
To conclude, we wish to once again express
gratitude to Varendh-Mansson et al. for pushing
this conversation forward. We, too, see much
room for continued debate and refinement re-
garding existing scholarly understanding of
mission and mission drift. We are particularly
hopeful that this debate and refinement will be
inclusive—moving beyond the exclusive pur-
view of research on “hybrid organizations”—
recognizing the challenges (and opportunities)
faced by all organizations in responding to and
navigating values-based complexity.
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Matthew G. Grimes (m.grimes@jbs.cam.ac.uk)
University of Cambridge
Trenton Alma Williams (trenwill@iu.edu)
Eric Yanfei Zhao (ericzhao@indiana.edu)
Indiana University
https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2019.0209
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CEO Retirement: Definition, Discretion,
and Routes
In the “The Final Countdown: Regulatory Focus
and the Phases of CEO Retirement,”Bilgili,
Campbell, O’Leary-Kelly, Ellstrand, and Johnson
(2020) build on upper echelons and regulatory
focus theory (Crowe & Higgins, 1997) to examine
the effect of CEOs’promotion and prevention focus
on the timing, pace, and nature of their retirement.
Adding the concept of liminality, the authors con-
ceptualize top executive retirement as a multi-
phase process. While we welcome their work on
the psychology of departing executives, we aim
to complement Bilgili et al.’s framework to allow
for an even broader theoretical opportunity. In
particular, we offer to expand their model by
relaxing their assumption that CEOs have large
discretion over their retirement and by problem-
atizing their single route of CEO retirement.
Bilgili et al. define the process of CEO re-
tirement but do not define their central construct
of CEO retirement, which has also not yet been
defined in the literature. To strengthen construct
clarity (Suddaby, 2010), we adapt Feldman’s
(1994: 287, 288) understanding of employee
retirement to define CEO retirement as the
termination of a CEO contract or career path
with the consequence of reduced commitment to
chief executive work thereafter. This definition
differs from Feldman (1994) in three main as-
pects, other than including the term chief exec-
utive. First, it does not require the contract or
career path to be of a minimum duration to ac-
count for CEO departures that can occur quickly
(Gibbons & Murphy, 1992: 482). Second, it ex-
cludes an age restriction to account for cases
of relatively young CEOs—such as start-up
founders—who enter CEO retirement early.
Third, it includes the fact that CEO retirement
can be initiated by the CEO or another force
such as the board (Friedman, & Singh, 1989: 723,
730). The above understanding of CEO re-
tirement leads us to reconsider CEOs’control
over their retirement process as well as alter-
native retirement routes.
DO CEOS CONTROL THEIR
RETIREMENT PROCESS?
Bilgili et al. identify CEO past achievements as
a contingency across CEOs’retirement pathways
in Propositions 7a and 7b. While we support their
argument, we additionally stress that CEO past
achievements—among other conditions—greatly
influence CEO discretion over the retirement pro-
cess. Bilgili et al. build their framework of CEO
retirement on the assumption that CEOs “have sub-
stantial discretion over when to step down from
their post”and over “succession-related decisions”
(2020: 64, 59). This underemphasized assumption has
important consequences for the theorization of CEO
retirement, and we propose to question it in two
ways.
First, the assumption of CEO substantial dis-
cretion is often not met in practice. Once a CEO’s
past service to the company disappoints share-
holders and/or other stakeholders, CEO discretion
may vanish (Friedman & Singh, 1989), potentially
triggering CEO departure (see our Figure 1)—as
opposed to private deliberation (Bilgili et al.,
2020: 63, Figure 1). This still holds for “bad firm
performance caused by factors beyond their
control”(Jenter & Kanaan, 2015: 2155). Hence, we
propose that a CEO’s attributed performance
that violates the expectations of others de-
creases CEO discretion during the phases of their
retirement. Importantly, “many CEO firings are
described by companies in neutral, often euphe-
mistic, terms”(Wowak, Hambrick, & Henderson,
Both authors contributed equally to this dialogue. We grate-
fully acknowledge Thomas Roulet, Nadine Kammerlander, and
Sabine Rau for their very helpful comments on earlier versions.
2020 239Dialogue
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