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The most effective element in conceptualization is social interaction, not source or modality: A new model of the conceptual development in children
Abstract
Are children's conceptualizations based on perceptual similarities or their learnings from others? The model proposed in this article, Setting up the Cage of Meaning (SCM), mainly defines conceptualization as the ability to organize mental representations through a series of top-down processes in social interaction. It also claims that conceptualization, in this way, reshapes our perceptual experiences. To test this model, a new block classification task was developed, which can be used with a tablet computer or wooden blocks. The experiments consisted of two sessions. In the first session, the impacts of a social interaction process provided by the SCM were examined; in the other session, it was examined whether these effects were transferred to a similar task a few days later. Results of the experiments showed that conceptualization performances of three-, five- and seven-year-olds increased when they were supported by a human over wooden blocks. The conceptualization performances of the three- and five-year-olds supported by an artificial intelligence tool over the tablet computer version also increased. These performances were successfully transferred to two opposite modalities in the second session. In all experiments, supported young children's conceptualization performances rose to the level of children two years older.
... Bu konudaki en etkili araç, hatta Vygotsky'e göre "araçların aracı," dildir. Dil aracılığıyla çocuk, bireysel algılarının ötesindeki kültürel bilgilere ulaşabilme kabiliyeti kazanır (Yıldız, 2020 ...
Önceki bölümde gelişimsel psikolojinin tarihini, temel kavramlarını, ilkelerini ve araştırma tekniklerini öğrendiniz. Şimdiki bölümde ise gelişimsel olguların köklerine inip onları birbirleriyle ilişkilendirerek bütünleştireceğiz. Gelişimsel olguları anlamak için gerekli olan temel biyoloji, psikoloji ve antropoloji kavramlarını tarihsel bir akış içinde hatırlayacağız. Ardından gelişimin kaynaklarını tartışan iki ana paradigmayı tanıyacağız.
This study provided a content analysis of studies aiming to disclose how artificial intelligence (AI) has been applied to the education sector and explore the potential research trends and challenges of AI in education. A total of 100 papers including 63 empirical papers (74 studies) and 37 analytic papers were selected from the education and educational research category of Social Sciences Citation Index database from 2010 to 2020. The content analysis showed that the research questions could be classified into development layer (classification, matching, recommendation, and deep learning), application layer (feedback, reasoning, and adaptive learning), and integration layer (affection computing, role-playing, immersive learning, and gamification). Moreover, four research trends, including Internet of Things, swarm intelligence, deep learning, and neuroscience, as well as an assessment of AI in education, were suggested for further investigation. However, we also proposed the challenges in education may be caused by AI with regard to inappropriate use of AI techniques, changing roles of teachers and students, as well as social and ethical issues. The results provide insights into an overview of the AI used for education domain, which helps to strengthen the theoretical foundation of AI in education and provides a promising channel for educators and AI engineers to carry out further collaborative research.
Homo sapiens is not just a tool-using species, they also can invent and develop tools. This is the feature that distinguishes humans from other species. It is necessary to get rid of the perceptual dominance of the present state of the material to invent and develop a tool. It is based on a mental process: designing. So how was that possible? In this article, I propose an evolutionary hypothesis in response to this question: the referential triangle. Accordingly, the relationship that people establish with things is mentally indirect, but the relationship they establish with each other is mentally direct. The hypothesis claims that the mental solutions of people have naturally established with each other are also used to invent and develop tools. The latest and most interesting product of this mechanism is artificial intelligence. Because artificial intelligence also acts as an inorganic system. What distinguishes it from other machines in this context is its social behavior. Artificial intelligence can generate social signals. So can artificial intelligence be both a tool and a partner at the same time in the referential triangle established with the tools by the human? In other words, can children, for instance, socially interact with artificial intelligence, just as they do naturally with people around? The article draws attention to that this problem should be included in the cultural psychological research agenda.
The present study investigates brain-to-brain coupling, defined as inter-subject correlations in the hemodynamic response, during natural verbal communication. We used functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to record brain activity of 3 speakers telling stories and 15 listeners comprehending audio recordings of these stories. Listeners’ brain activity was significantly correlated with speakers’ with a delay. This between-brain correlation disappeared when verbal communication failed. We further compared the fNIRS and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) recordings of listeners comprehending the same story and found a significant relationship between the fNIRS oxygenated-hemoglobin concentration changes and the fMRI BOLD in brain areas associated with speech comprehension. This correlation between fNIRS and fMRI was only present when data from the same story were compared between the two modalities and vanished when data from different stories were compared; this cross-modality consistency further highlights the reliability of the spatiotemporal brain activation pattern as a measure of story comprehension. Our findings suggest that fNIRS can be used for investigating brain-to-brain coupling during verbal communication in natural settings.
Transfer from symbolic media to the real world can be difficult for young children. A sample of 73 toddlers aged 17 to 23 months were read either an electronic book displayed on a touchscreen device or a traditional print book in which a novel object was paired with a novel label. Toddlers in both conditions learned the label within the context of the book. However, only those who read the traditional format book generalized and transferred the label to other contexts. An older group of 28 toddlers aged 24 to 30 months did generalize and transfer from the electronic book. Across ages, those children who primarily used screens to watch prerecorded video at home transferred less from the electronic book than those with more diverse home media experiences.
Interactional quality has been shown to enhance learning during book reading and play, but has not been examined during touch screen use. Learning to apply knowledge from a touch screen is complex for infants because it involves transfer of learning between a two-dimensional (2D) screen and three-dimensional (3D) object in the physical world. This study uses a touch screen procedure to examine interactional quality measured via maternal structuring, diversity of maternal language, and dyadic emotional responsiveness and infant outcomes during a transfer of learning task. Fifty 15-month-old infants and their mothers participated in this semi-naturalistic teaching task. Mothers were given a 3D object, and a static image of the object presented on a touch screen. Mothers had 5 min to teach their infant that a button on the real toy works in the same way as a virtual button on the touch screen (or vice versa). Overall, 64% of infants learned how to make the button work, transferring learning from the touch screen to the 3D object or vice versa. Infants were just as successful in the 3D to 2D transfer direction as they were in the 2D to 3D transfer direction. A cluster analysis based on emotional responsiveness, the proportion of diverse maternal verbal input, and amount of maternal structuring resulted in two levels of interactional quality: high quality and moderate quality. A logistic regression revealed the level of interactional quality predicted infant transfer. Infants were 19 times more likely to succeed and transfer learning between the touch screen and real object if they were in a high interactional quality dyad, even after controlling for infant activity levels. The present findings suggest that interactional quality between mother and infant plays an important role in making touch screens effective teaching tools for infants’ learning.
The mechanisms underlying the discovery of abstract rules like those found in natural language may be evolutionarily tuned to speech, according to previous research. When infants hear speech sounds, they can learn rules that govern their combination, but when they hear non-speech sounds such as sine-wave tones, they fail to do so. Here we show that infants’ rule learning is not tied to speech per se, but is instead enhanced more broadly by communicative signals. In two experiments, infants succeeded in learning and generalizing rules from tones that were introduced as if they could be used to communicate. In two control experiments, infants failed to learn the very same rules when familiarized to tones outside of a communicative exchange. These results reveal that infants’ attention to social agents and communication catalyzes a fundamental achievement of human learning.
Children are in the midst of a vast, unplanned experiment, surrounded by digital technologies that were not available but 5 years ago. At the apex of this boom is the introduction of applications ("apps") for tablets and smartphones. However, there is simply not the time, money, or resources available to evaluate each app as it enters the market. Thus, "educational" apps-the number of which, as of January 2015, stood at 80,000 in Apple's App Store (Apple, 2015)-are largely unregulated and untested. This article offers a way to define the potential educational impact of current and future apps. We build upon decades of work on the Science of Learning, which has examined how children learn best. From this work, we abstract a set of principles for two ultimate goals. First, we aim to guide researchers, educators, and designers in evidence-based app development. Second, by creating an evidence-based guide, we hope to set a new standard for evaluating and selecting the most effective existing children's apps. In short, we will show how the design and use of educational apps aligns with known processes of children's learning and development and offer a framework that can be used by parents and designers alike. Apps designed to promote active, engaged, meaningful, and socially interactive learning-four "pillars" of learning-within the context of a supported learning goal are considered educational.
© The Author(s) 2015.
The purpose of the research was to examine the cognitive flexibility of three-year-olds, who usually persevere in the Dimensional Change Card Sort task, when a constant representation was referred in the classic instruction. In accordance with this purpose, the Dimensional Change Pencil Sort task was developed and used in the current study that 13 three-year-olds participated in. Findings seemed to support partially the hypothesis predicted that the kids could achieve the task in terms of rule use and mental representational flexibilities between length and color at the post switch phase in which situation classification dimensions were referred over a real and constant object (pencil) instead of a card. This result drew attention to the conceptual and perceptual mediation roles of language and objects respectively in terms of the cognitive flexibility literature.
The purpose of this review is to present a new perspective on children's development of transfer of learning. The focus is on transfer of the effectiveness of a skill (i.e., improved performance), rather than just the transfer of the skill (e.g., a strategy) itself. Specifically, we examined the role of strategy utilization deficiencies, along with cognitive capacity, in the transfer of a memory strategy and, especially, strategy effectiveness (increased recall). Executive functions, metacognition, and mindset were considered as mechanisms that can both facilitate and hinder transfer of strategy effectiveness. Implications for theorizing about both transfer and utilization deficiencies were discussed.
In this article we argue that the problem of the relationships between concepts and perception in cognitive science is blurred by the fact that the very notion of concept is rather confused. Since it is not always clear exactly what concepts are, it is not easy to say, for example, whether and in what measure concept possession involves entertaining and manipulating perceptual representations, whether concepts are entirely different from perceptual representations, and so on. As a paradigmatic example of this state of affairs, we will start by taking into consideration the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content. The analysis of such a distinction will lead us to the conclusion that concept is a heterogeneous notion. Then we shall take into account the so called dual process theories of mind; this approach also points to concepts being a heterogeneous phenomenon: different aspects of the conceptual competence are likely to be ascribed to different types of systems. We conclude that without a clear specification of what concepts are, the problem of the relationships between concepts and perception is somewhat ill-posed.
Young children frequently do not transfer information from video to real-world situations. We provided perceptual and conceptual supports to help children transfer a new word from video to physical objects and photos. An on-screen actress labeled one of two novel objects; then 24-month-olds were asked to identify the ‘modi.’ Children failed to demonstrate word learning after holding the objects while viewing (comparison condition). In a two-step transfer condition, children correctly identified the modi on a test video image but did not identify the real matching object. However, when parents pointed out that the real objects were “the same” as those on screen (scaffold condition), children demonstrated reliable transfer of the word from video to reality. This study shows that parents’ active co-viewing of videos supports transfer and suggests that toddlers’ frequent failure to learn from video stems at least partially from their lack of understanding of the relevance of video to real life.
The human mind is extraordinary in its ability not merely to respond to events as they unfold but also to adapt its own operation in pursuit of its agenda. This 'cognitive control' can be achieved through simple interactions among sensorimotor processes, and through interactions in which one sensorimotor process represents a property of another in an implicit, unconscious way. So why does the human mind also represent properties of cognitive processes in an explicit way, enabling us to think and say 'I'm sure' or 'I'm doubtful'? We suggest that 'system 2 metacognition' is for supra-personal cognitive control. It allows metacognitive information to be broadcast, and thereby to coordinate the sensorimotor systems of two or more agents involved in a shared task.
Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.
© The Author(s) 2013.
In a study with 79 3-year-olds, we confirm earlier findings that separating the sorting dimensions improve children's performance on the Dimensional Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task. We also demonstrate that the central reason for this facilitation is that the two sorting dimensions are not integral features of a single object. Spatial separation of the sorting dimensions has no additional significant influence. This finding highlights the important role of objects with respect to children's attentional flexibility. Implications for current theories on the DCCS task and for the development of perspective taking and cognitive flexibility are discussed.
Abstract In Experiment 1, 24-month-old toddlers were taught a new word (“whisk”) through the labeling of a picture of a whisk. After repeated pairings of the word and picture, participants were shown,the picture and a real whisk and asked to indicate the whisk. They took the word to refer to the real object rather than to the picture. Experiment 2 established that children are not biased to select any novel real object in the test trial. Rather, the results from Experiment 1 reflected the child’s interpretation of the word as referring to the pictured kind. A third study confirmed that a novelty preference within a perceptually specified category could not account for the results of Experiment 1. A final study (Experiment 4) examined whether 18-month old infants also understand pictures and words as symbols, and results were comparable to Experiments 1 and 2. Taken together, these results confirm that the mapping between words and objects for 18 and 24-month-olds is a referential relation, as opposed to an associative one. Furthermore, these results show that children as young as 18-months begin to understand the symbolic nature of pictures. Pictures and Words ,3 Do Both Pictures and Words Function as Symbols for 18 and 24-Month-Old Children?
Cognition materializes in an interpersonal space. The emergence of complex behaviors requires the coordination of actions among individuals according to a shared set of rules. Despite the central role of other individuals in shaping one's mind, most cognitive studies focus on processes that occur within a single individual. We call for a shift from a single-brain to a multi-brain frame of reference. We argue that in many cases the neural processes in one brain are coupled to the neural processes in another brain via the transmission of a signal through the environment. Brain-to-brain coupling constrains and shapes the actions of each individual in a social network, leading to complex joint behaviors that could not have emerged in isolation.
Much of children's knowledge is derived not from their direct experiences with the environment but rather from the input of others. However, until recently, the focus in studies of concept development was primarily on children's knowledge, with relatively little attention paid to the nature of the input. The past 10 years have seen an important shift in focus. This article reviews this approach, by examining the nature of the input and the nature of the learner, to shed light on early conceptual learning. These findings argue against the simple notion that conceptual development is either supplied by the environment or innately specified, and instead demonstrate how the two work together. The implications for how children reconcile competing belief systems are also discussed.
Marie Evans Schmidt and Elizabeth Vandewater review research on links between various types of electronic media and the cognitive skills of school-aged children and adolescents. One central finding of studies to date, they say, is that the content delivered by electronic media is far more influential than the media themselves. Most studies, they point out, find a small negative link between the total hours a child spends viewing TV and that child's academic achievement. But when researchers take into account characteristics of the child, such as IQ or socioeconomic status, this link typically disappears. Content appears to be crucial. Viewing educational TV is linked positively with academic achievement; viewing entertainment TV is linked negatively with achievement. When it comes to particular cognitive skills, say the authors, researchers have found that electronic media, particularly video games, can enhance visual spatial skills, such as visual tracking, mental rotation, and target localization. Gaming may also improve problem-solving skills. Researchers have yet to understand fully the issue of transfer of learning from electronic media. Studies suggest that, under some circumstances, young people are able to transfer what they learn from electronic media to other applications, but analysts are uncertain how such transfer occurs. In response to growing public concern about possible links between electronic media use and attention problems in children and adolescents, say the authors, researchers have found evidence for small positive links between heavy electronic media use and mild attention problems among young people but have found only inconsistent evidence so far for a link between attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and media use. The authors point out that although video games, interactive websites, and multimedia software programs appear to offer a variety of possible benefits for learning, there is as yet little empirical evidence to suggest that such media are more effective than other forms of instruction.
Verbal communication is a joint activity; however, speech production and comprehension have primarily been analyzed as independent processes within the boundaries of individual brains. Here, we applied fMRI to record brain activity from both speakers and listeners during natural verbal communication. We used the speaker's spatiotemporal brain activity to model listeners' brain activity and found that the speaker's activity is spatially and temporally coupled with the listener's activity. This coupling vanishes when participants fail to communicate. Moreover, though on average the listener's brain activity mirrors the speaker's activity with a delay, we also find areas that exhibit predictive anticipatory responses. We connected the extent of neural coupling to a quantitative measure of story comprehension and find that the greater the anticipatory speaker-listener coupling, the greater the understanding. We argue that the observed alignment of production- and comprehension-based processes serves as a mechanism by which brains convey information.
Whether verbal labels help infants visually process and categorize objects is a contentious issue. Using electroencephalography, we investigated whether possessing familiar or novel labels for objects directly enhances 1-year-old children's neural processes underlying the perception of those objects. We found enhanced gamma-band (20-60 Hz) oscillatory activity over the visual cortex in response to seeing objects with labels familiar to the infant (Experiment 1) and those with novel labels just taught to the infant (Experiment 2). No such effect was observed for objects that infants were familiar with but had no label for. These results demonstrate that learning verbal labels modulates how the visual system processes the images of the associated objects and suggest a possible top-down influence of semantic knowledge on object perception.
We propose that human communication is specifically adapted to allow the transmission of generic knowledge between individuals. Such a communication system, which we call 'natural pedagogy', enables fast and efficient social learning of cognitively opaque cultural knowledge that would be hard to acquire relying on purely observational learning mechanisms alone. We argue that human infants are prepared to be at the receptive side of natural pedagogy (i) by being sensitive to ostensive signals that indicate that they are being addressed by communication, (ii) by developing referential expectations in ostensive contexts and (iii) by being biased to interpret ostensive-referential communication as conveying information that is kind-relevant and generalizable.
Goren, Sarty, and Wu (1975) claimed that newborn infants will follow a slowly moving schematic face stimulus with their head and eyes further than they will follow scrambled faces or blank stimuli. Despite the far-reaching theoretical importance of this finding, it has remained controversial and been largely ignored. In Experiment 1 we replicate the basic findings of the study. In Experiment 2 we attempt a second replication in a different maternity hospital, and extend the original findings with evidence suggesting that both the particular configuration of features, and some aspects of the features themselves, are important for preferential tracking in the first hour of life. In Experiment 3 we use a different technique to trace the preferential tracking of faces over the first five months of life. The preferential tracking of faces declines during the second month. The possible causes and consequences of this observation are discussed.
Previous research reveals that novel words highlight object categories for preschoolers and infants as young as 12 months. Three experiments extend these findings to 9-month-olds. Infants were familiarized to slides of animals (e.g., rabbits). Infants in the Word condition heard infant-directed word phrases ("a rabbit") and infants in the Tone condition heard tones. During familiarization, infants' visual fixation was enhanced on trials with sounds (either words or tones), relative to silent trials. On test trials, a new exemplar from the familiar category (e.g., rabbit) was paired with a novel animal (e.g., pig). Infants in the Word condition showed greater attention to novelty than those in the Tone condition. A third group of infants who heard content-filtered words responded similarly to infants in the Word condition. Implications of the facilitative effects of words and content-filtered words on object categorization are discussed within a framework describing infants' emerging appreciation of language over the first year of life.
Young children can use cues that an adult is pedagogically providing information for their benefit to evaluate its importance and generalizability. But to use pedagogical actions to guide learning, children must learn to navigate ongoing pedagogical interactions, identifying which specific actions within an overarching context are in fact meant as pedagogical. In two experiments (N = 120) we illustrate that 3-year-old struggle with this ability, failing to distinguish pedagogical from merely intentional actions unless the endpoints of a pedagogical interaction were clearly demarked. These results shed light on the development of this powerful learning mechanism for facilitating inductive inference.
Young children can in principle make generic inferences (e.g., “doffels are magnetic”) on the basis of their own individual experience. Recent evidence, however, shows that by 4 years of age children make strong generic inferences on the basis of a single pedagogical demonstration with an individual (e.g., an adult demonstrates for the child that a single “doffel” is magnetic). In the current experiments, we extended this to look at younger children, investigating how the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon are integrated with other aspects of inductive inference during early development. We found that both 2- and 3-year-olds used pedagogical cues to guide such generic inferences, but only so long as the “doffel” was linguistically labeled. In a follow-up study, 3-year-olds, but not 2-year-olds, continued to make this generic inference even if the word “doffel” was uttered incidentally and non-referentially in a context preceding the pedagogical demonstration, thereby simply marking the opportunity to learn about a culturally important category. By 3 years of age, then, young children show a remarkable ability to flexibly combine different sources of culturally relevant information (e.g., linguistic labeling, pedagogy) to make the kinds of generic inferences so central in human cultural learning.
Because young children are devoting increasing time to playing on handheld touchscreen devices, understanding children's ability to learn from this activity is important. Through two experiments we examined the ability of 4- to 6-year-old children to learn how to solve a problem (Tower of Hanoi) on a touchscreen device and subsequently apply this learning in their interactions with physical objects. The results were that participants demonstrated significant improvement at solving the task irrespective of the modality (touchscreen vs. physical version) with which they practiced. Moreover, children's learning on the touchscreen smoothly transferred to a subsequent attempt on the physical version. We conclude that, at least with respect to certain activities, children are quite capable of transferring learning from touchscreen devices. This result highlights the limitations of generalizing across screen-based activities (e.g., "screen time") in discussing the effects of media on young children's development.
This book updates the Dual Coding Theory of mind (DCT), a theory of modern human cognition consisting of separate but interconnected nonverbal and verbal systems. Allan Paivio, a leading scholar in cognitive psychology, presents this masterwork as new findings in psychological research on memory, thought, language, and other core areas have flourished, as have pioneering developments in the cognitive neurosciences. Mind and Its Evolution provides a thorough exploration into how these adaptive nonverbal and verbal systems might have evolved, as well as a careful comparison of DCT with contrasting "single-code" cognitive theories.
When children acquire language, they often learn words in the absence of direct instruction (e.g. 'This is a ball!') or even social cues to reference (e.g. eye gaze, pointing). However, there are few accounts of how children do this, especially in cases where the referent of a new word is ambiguous. Across two experiments, we test whether preschoolers (2- to 4-year-olds; n = 239) can learn new words by inferring the referent of a new word from the surrounding linguistic discourse. Across two experiments, we show that children as young as 2 can learn a new word from the linguistic discourse in which it appears. This suggests that children use the linguistic discourse in which a word appears to learn new words.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Much of learning and reasoning occurs in pedagogical situations-situations in which a person who knows a concept chooses examples for the purpose of helping a learner acquire the concept. We introduce a model of teaching and learning in pedagogical settings that predicts which examples teachers should choose and what learners should infer given a teacher's examples. We present three experiments testing the model predictions for rule-based, prototype, and causally structured concepts. The model shows good quantitative and qualitative fits to the data across all three experiments, predicting novel qualitative phenomena in each case. We conclude by discussing implications for understanding concept learning and implications for theoretical claims about the role of pedagogy in human learning.
Language learning takes place in the context of social interactions, yet the mechanisms that render social interactions useful for learning language remain unclear. This study focuses on whether social contingency might support word learning. Toddlers aged 24-30 months (N = 36) were exposed to novel verbs in one of three conditions: live interaction training, socially contingent video training over video chat, and noncontingent video training (yoked video). Results suggest that children only learned novel verbs in socially contingent interactions (live interactions and video chat). This study highlights the importance of social contingency in interactions for language learning and informs the literature on learning through screen media as the first study to examine word learning through video chat technology.
How do infants acquire their first words? Word reference, or how words map onto objects and events, lies at the core of this question. The emergentist coalition model (ECM) represents a new wave of hybrid developmental theories suggesting that the process of vocabulary development changes from one based in perceptual salience and association to one embedded in social understanding. Beginning at 10 months, babies learn words associatively, ignoring the speaker's social cues and using perceptual salience to guide them. By 12 months, babies attend to social cues, but fail to recruit them for word learning. By 18 and 24 months, babies recruit speakers' social cues to learn the names of particular objects speakers label, regardless of those objects' perceptual attraction. Controversies about how to account for the changing character of word acquisition, along with the roots of children's increasing reliance on speakers' social intent, are discussed.
This monograph reports a study of differential responses determined by social factors when the individuals face the same stimulus situation. Individuals of different cultures may react in widely different ways to the same stimulus situation; these differences are due to differences of subjective norms or frames of reference. In the range experiments the subjects estimated the extent of movement. When the objective scale was missing, the individual built up his own reference point or norm. When these individuals are later put in a group situation their points of reference converge toward a common norm. Stereotypes, fads, traditions, fashions, customs, and attitudes are psychologically cases of establishment of socially determined norms and values serving as frames of reference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Children are judicious social learners. They may be particularly sensitive to communicative actions done pedagogically for their benefit, as such actions may mark important, generalizable information. Three experiments (N = 224) found striking differences in preschoolers' inductive generalization and exploration of a novel functional property, depending on whether identical evidence for the property was produced accidentally, intentionally, or pedagogically and communicatively. Results also revealed that although 4-year-olds reserved strong generalizations for a property that is pedagogically demonstrated, 3-year-olds made such inferences when it was produced either intentionally or pedagogically. These findings suggest that by age 4 children assess whether evidence is produced for their benefit in gauging generalizability, giving them a powerful tool for acquiring important kind-relevant, generic knowledge.
The hypothesis is tested that during the preschool period a particular form of reasoning is applied to theory of mind and a set of problems that do not require the understanding of mental states. Three experiments each provided a different piece of support for this hypothesis. Experiment 1 found similar age-related changes between three standard theory-of-mind tasks (false belief, appearance-reality and representational change) and two specially designed nonmental state tasks (rule-based card sorting and physical causality). Experiment 2 demonstrated that 3-year-olds' poor performance on card sorting occurred across different pairs of dimensions (color-size, shape-number, size-number, color-shape) just as it does across different pairs of perspectives in the theory-of-mind tasks (self-other, looks like-is, before-after), and that sorting performance was related to theory of mind with age partialled. Experiment 3 showed that theory of mind was related to a specific complexity of sorting—sorting by one of two dimensions and not sorting by one dimension or two dimensions simultaneously. The results indicate that advances in theory of mind, card sorting, and causality between 3 and 5 years of age depend on being able to switch judgments across conditions and that reasoning by embedded rules could account for these changes.
Two studies compared children's attention to sample composition - whether a sample provides a diverse representation of a category of interest - during teacher-led and learner-driven learning contexts. In Study 1 (n = 48), 5-year-olds attended to sample composition to make inferences about biological properties only when samples were presented by a knowledgeable teacher. In contrast, adults attended to sample composition in both teacher-led and learner-driven contexts. In Study 2 (n = 51), 6-year-olds chose to create diverse samples to teach information about biological kinds to another child, but not to discover new information for themselves, whereas adults chose to create diverse samples for both teaching and information discovery. Results suggest that how children approach the interpretation and selection of evidence varies depending on whether learning occurs in a pedagogical or a non-pedagogical context.
According to conventional wisdom, multisensory development is a progressive process that results in the growth and proliferation of perceptual skills. We review new findings indicating that a regressive process - perceptual narrowing - also contributes in critical ways to perceptual development. These new data reveal that young infants are able to integrate non-native faces and vocalizations, that this broad multisensory perceptual tuning is present at birth, and that this tuning narrows by the end of the first year of life, leaving infants with the ability to integrate only socio-ecologically-relevant multisensory signals. This narrowing process forces us to reconsider the traditional progressive theories of multisensory development and opens up several new evolutionary questions as well.
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of classic tensions concerning the fundamental nature of human knowledge and the processes underlying its acquisition. This tension, especially evident in research on the acquisition of words and concepts, arises when researchers pit one type of content against another (perceptual versus conceptual) and one type of process against another (associative versus theory-based). But these dichotomies are false; they rest upon insufficient consideration of the structure and diversity of the words and concepts that we naturally acquire. As infants and young children establish categories and acquire words to describe them, they take advantage of both perceptual and conceptual information, and relate this to both the (rudimentary) theories they hold and the statistics that they witness.
Forty newborn infants, median age 9 minutes, turned their eyes and heads to follow a series of moving stimuli. Responsiveness was significantly greater to a proper face pattern than to either of two scrambled versions of the same stimulus or to a blank.
The demonstration of such consistent response differences suggests that visual discriminations are being made at this early age. These results imply that organized visual perception ion is an unlearned capacity of the human organism. The preference for the proper face stimulus by infants who had not seen a real face prior to testing suggests that an unlearned or "evolved" responsiveness to faces may be present in human neonates.
Infants' ability to form new object categories based on either visual or naming information alone was evaluated at two different ages (16 and 20 months) using an object manipulation task. Estimates of productive vocabulary size were also collected. Infants at both ages showed evidence of using visual information to categorize the objects, while only the older ones used naming information. Moreover, there was a correlation between vocabulary size and name-based categorization among the 20-month-olds. The present results establish that infants as young as 20 months can use the non-obvious cue of naming to categorize objects. The possibility of a link between this ability and lexical development is discussed.