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Recessions and Recoveries. Multinational Banks in the Business Cycle
Abstract
How does the expansion of multinational banks influence the business cycle of host countries? We study an economy where multinational banks can transfer liquidity across borders through internal capital markets but are hindered in their allocation of liquidity by limited knowledge of local firms’ assets. We find that, following domestic banking shocks, multinational banks moderate the depth of the contraction but slow down the recovery. A calibration to Polish data suggests that multinational banks reduce the average depth of recessions by about 5% but increase their duration by 10%. The predictions are broadly consistent with evidence from a large panel of countries.
... Intungane (2023) considers international asset investment as the transmission channel of shocks, while this article considers global credit supply in this role. Cao et al. (2021) also look at the impact of macroprudential policies in times of crisis. They demonstrate that multinational banks moderate the depth of the period of contractions but slow down the recovery in case of a banking crisis. ...
... In addition, they show that countercyclical LTV ratios are better economic stabilizers than capital requirements in the country experiencing a crisis. Our study complements Cao et al. (2021) by analyzing the interaction of LTV ratios and capital requirements as macroprudential policies in times of expansion. ...
... HC is Home Country, FC is Foreign Country find that these policies can dampen household consumption. Cao et al. (2021) find that compared to capital requirements, LTV ratios are more helpful in stabilizing an economy affected by a financial crisis. ...
This paper examines the ability of macroprudential policies to dampen the pro-cyclicality of credit market cycles and to enhance the macroeconomic stability in countries open to cross-border banking activities. For the analysis, we develop a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with collateral constrained investors and global banks. The existence of cross-border lending activities is the source of the transmission of shocks across countries. The macroprudential policies analyzed are loan-to-value ratios and capital requirements, also known as the capital adequacy ratio, which are formulated as Taylor-type rules. Our results show that the effectiveness of capital requirement financial regulations is undermined if borrowers can increase credit from foreign banks originating from a country with more relaxed financial restrictions. When cross-border lending is permitted, national financial regulators can improve the financial stability of credit growth and management of credit by complementing the capital adequacy ratios with loan-to-value ratios.
... Since then, Cardenas et al. [19], Mian [20] and Clarke et al. [21] have used empirical results to show that transnational banks are more inclined to lend to large enterprises with more information. Cao et al. [22] absorbed the two characteristics of transnational banks from previous studies into the DSGE model and analyzed the impact of transnational banks on the economic cycle of the host country. ...
... Entrepreneurs can mortgage some assets to SOBs to obtain loans X l t or mortgage another part to foreign banks at the same time to obtain loans X l g . According to the micro-basis of Cao et al. [22], there is information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries; thus, there are heterogeneous mortgage technologies among different banks. Due to localization and other factors, to a certain extent, SOBs can better overcome the distortion caused by information asymmetry than foreign banks, and with the expansion of mortgage assets, their information advantages are more obvious. ...
... The value of 0.292 for foreign countries means that the loan amount of local banks in foreign countries is approximately three times that of international banks, and for domestic countries, the value is 0.15. With reference to Cao et al. [22], we set r ¼ 0:969; 1 ¼ 4:85e À 04 to make the interest margin between the loan interest rate and deposit interest rate 30 basis points annually in the steady state. Table 1 shows the calibration and assignment of the relevant parameters. ...
The degree to which the banking sector opens up will immediately impact the structure of the national financial system, which will then directly influence the transmission mechanism and effect of monetary policy because it is the fundamental link in the financial system. This study describes the DSGE model of two nations with heterogeneous banks in light of the disparities in global capital flows and loan restrictions between Chinese and foreign banks. DSGE stands for Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium. The results show that (1) foreign banks can lessen the net worth shocks of local banks when they are subject to negative shocks to their net worth by injecting international capital flows. (2) The buffer mechanism of foreign banks will obstruct the transmission of monetary policy and partially offset its policy effects. (3) The buffer mechanism of foreign banks has a more pronounced interference effect on monetary policy when facing negative shocks to their net worth. The management of foreign banks is increasingly loosening as China’s financial opening up quickens. The findings of this paper have policy implications for how to seize the dividends brought by financial openness and control the interference with monetary policy beyond the advantages of foreign banks in stabilizing economic fluctuations.
The Great Financial Crisis and the COVID‐19 pandemic have raised concerns about business cycles. In this paper, we examine the dynamics of past business cycles in CAEMC economies to infer the shapes of recessions and subsequent recoveries. We use annual GDP data covering the period 1960–2020 and non‐parametric approach. The main results are fourfold. First, recessions are, on average, long with a positive duration dependence relationship and the strength of recoveries is independent of the duration and the depth of the associated recessions. Second, recessions and recoveries are not all alike, meaning that history cannot be used as a guide for forecasting issue. Third, nearly 45% of the recessions and subsequent recoveries are V‐shaped, and the L, U and W patterns appear when governments are heavily indebted. Fourth, a regional cycle sometimes emerges. The results suggest a strengthening of the capacities of CAEMC states and a resilient supply chain management.
This paper investigates whether foreign banks help mitigate the effects of domestic liquidity shocks by exploiting a policy-induced shock to the U.S. wholesale market for liquidity and matched bank-syndicated loan data. We find that, following the 2011 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) regulatory change to the cost of wholesale liquidity, foreign banks, which faced a relatively positive liquidity shock, accumulated more reserves by engaging in liquidity hoarding, but did not expand their lending. These responses are more pronounced for foreign banks affiliated with complex global bank holding companies and whose parent banking systems experienced distress at the moment of the shock. (JEL G21, G28, E44)
Received August 18, 2020; editorial decision September 1, 2021 by Andrew Ellul. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
There is increasing interest in loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-service-to-income (DTI) limits as many countries face a new round of rising house prices. Yet, very little is known on how these regulatory instruments work in practice. This paper contributes to fill this gap by looking closely at their use and effectiveness in six economies—Brazil, Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Malaysia, Poland, and Romania. Insights include: rapid growth in high-LTV loans with long maturities or in the number of borrowers with multiple mortgages can be signs of build up in systemic risk; monitoring nonperforming loans by loan characteristics can help in calibrating changes in the LTV and DTI limits; as leakages are almost inevitable, countries strive to address them at an early stage; and, in most cases, LTVs and DTIs were effective in reducing loan-growth and improving debt-servicing performances of borrowers, but not always in curbing house price growth.
Over the past two decades, foreign banks have become much more important in domestic financial intermediation, heightening the need to understand their behavior. We introduce a new, comprehensive database, made publicly available, on bank ownership (including the home country of foreign banks) for 5,324 banks in 137 countries over the period 1995–2009. We document large increases in foreign bank presence in many countries, but with substantial heterogeneity in terms of host and banks’ home countries, bilateral investment patterns, and bank characteristics. In terms of impact, we document that the relation between private credit and foreign bank presence importantly depends on host country and banks’ characteristics. Specifically, foreign banks only seem to have a negative impact on credit in low‐income countries, in countries where they have a limited market share, where enforcing contracts is costly and where credit information is limited available, and when they come from distant home countries. This shows that accounting for heterogeneity, including bilateral ownership, is crucial to better understand the implications of foreign bank ownership.
We examine the evolution of real per capita GDP around 100 systemic banking crises. Part of the costs of these crises owes to the protracted nature of recovery. On average, it takes about eight years to reach the pre-crisis level of income; the median is about 6 ½ years. Five to six years after the onset of crisis, only Germany and the US (out of 12 systemic cases) have reached their 2007-2008 peak in real income. Forty five percent of the episodes recorded double dips. Post-war business cycles are not the relevant comparator for the recent crises in advanced economies.
Using a novel dataset that allows us to trace the primary bank relationships of a sample of mostly unlisted firms in Eastern Europe, we explore to what extent foreign banks can improve the allocation of credit. Our results suggest that the limits of financial integration are less tight than what previous literature based on a static picture of bank loan portfolios suggested. Foreign banks appear to allocate credit more efficiently than domestic banks do. Most importantly, using a propensity score methodology, we show that only in countries where foreign bank presence is limited, firms that (directly) borrow from a foreign bank obtain more financial loans than comparable firms and thus invest more and have higher increases in profitability. In other words, firms seem to benefit from foreign bank presence only if they maintain a direct relationship. In countries where foreign bank presence is large, on the contrary, firms appear to have the same access to financial loans and ability to invest whether they borrow from a foreign bank or not. Thus it appears that foreign banks presence affects domestic banks lending policies and improves access to credit for all firms.
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of financial cycles using a large database covering 21 advanced countries over the period 1960:1-2007:4. Specifically, we analyze cycles in credit, house prices, and equity prices. We report three main results. First, financial cycles tend to be long and severe, especially those in housing and equity markets. Second, they are highly synchronized within countries, particularly credit and house price cycles. The extent of synchronization of financial cycles across countries is high as well, mainly for credit and equity cycles, and has been increasing over time. Third financial cycles accentuate each other and become magnified, especially during coincident downturns in credit and housing markets. Moreover, globally synchronized downturns tend to be associated with more prolonged and costly episodes, especially for credit and equity cycles. We discuss how these findings can guide future research on various aspects of financial market developments.
How does the management and resolution of the current crisis compare with the response of the Nordic countries in the early 1990s, widely regarded as exemplary? We argue that, while intervention has been prompter, the measures taken so far remain less comprehensive and in-depth. In particular, the cleansing of balance sheets has proceeded more slowly, and less attention has been paid to reducing excess capacity and avoiding competitive distortions. In general, policymakers have given higher priority to sustaining aggregate demand in the short term than to encouraging adjustment in the financial sector and containing moral hazard. We argue that three factors largely explain this outcome: the more international nature of the crisis; the complexity of the instruments involved; and, hardly appreciated so far, the effect of accounting practices on the dynamics of the events, reflecting in particular the prominent role of fair value accounting (and mark to market losses) in relation to amortised cost accounting for loan books. There is a risk that the policies followed so far may delay the establishment of the basis for a sustainably profitable and less risk-prone financial sector.
Using panel data for a large set of high-income, emerging market, developing, and transition countries, we find robust evidence that the large output loss from financial crises and some types of political crises is highly persistent. The results on financial crises are also highly robust to the assumption on exogeneity. Moreover, we find strong evidence of growth over optimism before financial crises. We also find a distinction between the output impact of civil wars versus other crises, in that there is a partial output rebound for civil wars but no significant rebound for financial crises or the other political crises. (JEL D72, D74, E32, E44, O17, O47)
This paper studies the international propagation of sovereign debt default. We posit a two-country economy where capital constrained banks grant loans to firms and invest in bonds issued by the domestic and the foreign government. The model economy is calibrated to data from Europe, with the two countries representing the Periphery (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the Core, respectively. Large contractionary shocks in the Periphery trigger sovereign default. We find sizable spillover effects of default from Periphery to the Core through a drop in the volume of credit extended by the banking sector.
This paper examines the aftermath of postwar financial crises in advanced countries. We construct a new semiannual series on financial distress in 24 OECD countries for the period 1967-2012. The series is based on assessments of the health of countries' financial systems from a consistent, real-time narrative source, and classifies financial distress on a relatively fine scale. We find that the average decline in output following a financial crisis is statistically significant and persistent, but only moderate in size. More important, we find that the average decline is sensitive to the specification and sample, and that the aftermath of crises is highly variable across major episodes. A simple forecasting exercise suggests that one important driver of the variation is the severity and persistence of financial distress itself. At the same time, we find little evidence of nonlinearities in the relationship between financial distress and the aftermaths of crises.
This paper develops a model of banking across borders where banks differ in their efficiencies that can replicate key patterns in the data. More efficient banks are more likely to have assets, liabilities and affiliates abroad and have larger foreign operations. Banks are more likely to be active in countries that have less efficient domestic banks, are bigger and more open to foreign entry. In the model, banking sector integration leads to bank exit and entry and convergence in the return on loans and funding costs across countries. Bank heterogeneity matters for the associated welfare gains. Results suggest that differences in bank efficiencies across countries drive banking across borders, that fixed costs are crucial for foreign bank operations and that globalization makes larger banks even larger.
We describe the theory and practice of real GDP comparisons across countries and over time. Version 8 of the Penn World Table expands on previous versions in three respects. First, in addition to comparisons of living standards using components of real GDP on the expenditure side, we provide a measure of productive capacity, called real GDP on the output side. Second, growth rates are benchmarked to multiple years of cross-country price data so they are less sensitive to new benchmark data. Third, data on capital stocks and productivity are (re) introduced. Applications including the Balassa-Samuelson effect and development accounting are discussed.
This paper analyzes how international …nancial integration a¤ects the transmission of monetary policy. I extend a standard New Keynesian open economy model to a richer structure in …nancial markets, allowing for international trading in multiple assets and subject to …nancial intermediation costs. I analyze two di¤erent forms of …nancial in-tegration, namely an increase in the level of gross foreign asset holdings and a decrease in the costs of international asset trading. The calibrated simulations show that none of the analyzed forms of …nancial integration undermine monetary policy e¤ectiveness. Under realistic parameterizations, monetary policy is more, rather than less, e¤ective as the positive impact of strengthened exchange rate and wealth channels more than o¤set the negative impact of weakened interest rate channels of monetary policy transmission. I also analyze the interaction of …nancial integration with trade integration, varying both the importance of trade linkages and the degree of exchange rate pass-through. I …nd that the positive e¤ects of …nancial integration are ampli…ed by trade integration. Overall, monetary policy is most e¤ective in parameterizations with the highest degree of both …nancial and real integration.
We use data on the 48 largest multinational banking groups to compare the lending of their 199 foreign subsidiaries during the Great Recession with lending by a benchmark of 202 domestic banks. Contrary to earlier and more contained crises, parent banks were not a significant source of strength to their subsidiaries during 2008–09. When controlling for other
bank characteristics,multinational bank subsidiaries had to slowdown credit growth almost three times as fast as domestic banks. This was in particular the case for subsidiaries of banking groups that relied more on wholesale funding.
Financial integration in the markets for banks' assets and liabilities makes balance sheet constraints highly correlated across countries, resulting in a high degree of financial and macroeconomic interdependence. Likewise, under financial integration unconventional policies aimed at stabilizing domestic financial and credit conditions could entail large international spillovers. Therefore, stabilization by one country will also benefit other countries, reducing incentives to implement credit policies in a classic free-riding problem, especially when these policies entail domestic costs. We show that this outcome can emerge in an open economy model featuring financial intermediaries that face endogenously determined balance sheet constraints.
A macroeconomic model with financial intermediation is developed in which the intermediaries (banks) can issue outside equity as well as short term debt. This makes bank risk exposure an endogenous choice. The goal is to have a model that can not only capture a crisis when banks are highly vulnerable to risk, but can also account for why banks adopt such a risky balance sheet in the first place. We use the model to assess quantitatively how perceptions of fundamental risk and of government credit policy in a crisis affect the vulnerability of the financial system ex ante. We also study the effects of macro-prudential policies designed to offset the incentives for risk-taking.
We study the effect of financial integration (through banks) on the transmission of international business cycles. In a sample of 20 developed countries between 1978 and 2009 we find that, in periods without financial crises, increases in bilateral banking linkages are associated with more divergent output cycles.This relation is significantly weaker during financial turmoil periods, suggesting that financial crises induce co-movement among more financially integrated countries. We also show that countries with stronger, direct and indirect, financial ties to the U.S. experienced more synchronized cycles with the U.S. during the recent 2007-2009 crisis. We then interpret these findings using a simple general equilibrium model of international business cycles with banks and shocks to banking activity. The model suggests that the relation between integration and synchronization depends on the type of shocks hitting the world economy, and that shocks to global banks played an important role in triggering and spreading the 2007-2009 crisis.
This paper develops an asymptotic theory for test statistics in linear panel models that are robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and/or spatial correlation. Two classes of standard errors are analyzed. Both are based on nonparametric heteroskedasticity autocorrelation (HAC) covariance matrix estimators. The first class is based on averages of HAC estimators across individuals in the cross-section, i.e. “averages of HACs”. This class includes the well known cluster standard errors analyzed by Arellano (1987) as a special case. The second class is based on the HAC of cross-section averages and was proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998). The ”HAC of averages” standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and spatial correlation but weak dependence in the time dimension is required. The “averages of HACs” standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation including the nonstationary case but they are not valid in the presence of spatial correlation. The main contribution of the paper is to develop a fixed-b asymptotic theory for statistics based on both classes of standard errors in models with individual and possibly time fixed-effects dummy variables. The asymptotics is carried out for large time sample sizes for both fixed and large cross-section sample sizes. Extensive simulations show that the fixed-b approximation is usually much better than the traditional normal or chi-square approximation especially for the Driscoll–Kraay standard errors. The use of fixed-b critical values will lead to more reliable inference in practice especially for tests of joint hypotheses.
In this paper we study the intra-group transactions between the parent bank and its foreign subsidiaries in European Union countries during the crisis. We use hand-collected data from annual statements on related party transaction and find that they may create a serious problem for the stability of the foreign banks’ subsidiaries. Moreover, as some of those subsidiary banks were large by assets in some of the member states the related party transactions with the parent bank created a serious threat to host countries financial system stability. We attribute this transaction to weak governance in foreign subsidiaries. We suggest improvements in governance as well greater disclosure of related party transactions in bank holding companies in Europe.
We study how foreign bank penetration affects financial sector development in poor countries. A theoretical model shows that when domestic banks are better than foreign banks at monitoring soft information customers, foreign bank entry may hurt these customers and worsen welfare. The model also predicts that credit to the private sector should be lower in countries with more foreign bank penetration, and that foreign banks should have a less risky loan portfolio. In the empirical section, we test these predictions for a sample of lower income countries and find support for the theoretical model.
We develop a quantitative monetary DSGE model with financial intermediaries that face endogenously determined balance sheet constraints. We then use the model to evaluate the effects of the central bank using unconventional monetary policy to combat a simulated financial crisis. We interpret unconventional monetary policy as expanding central bank credit intermediation to offset a disruption of private financial intermediation. Within our framework the central bank is less efficient than private intermediaries at making loans but it has the advantage of being able to elastically obtain funds by issuing riskless government debt. Unlike private intermediaries, it is not balance sheet constrained. During a crisis, the balance sheet constraints on private intermediaries tighten, raising the net benefits from central bank intermediation. These benefits may be substantial even if the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate is not binding. In the event this constraint is binding, though, these net benefits may be significantly enhanced.
The relatively infrequent nature of major credit distress events makes an historical approach particularly useful. Using a combination of historical narrative and econometric techniques, we identify major periods of credit distress from 1875 to 2007, examine the extent to which credit distress arises as part of the transmission of monetary policy, and document the subsequent effect on output. Using turning points defined by the Harding–Pagan algorithm, we identify and compare the timing, duration, amplitude and co-movement of cycles in money, credit and output. Regressions show that financial distress events exacerbate business cycle downturns both in the 19th and 20th centuries and that a confluence of such events makes recessions even worse.
We use new panel data on the intra-group ownership structure and the balance sheets of 45 of the largest multinational bank holdings to analyze what determines the credit growth of their subsidiaries. We find evidence for the existence of internal capital markets through which multinational banks manage the credit growth of their subsidiaries. Multinational bank subsidiaries with financially strong parent banks are able to expand their lending faster. As a result of parental support, foreign bank subsidiaries also do not need to rein in their credit supply during a financial crisis, while domestic banks need to do so.
We examine the international transmission of business cycles in a two-country model where credit contracts are imperfectly enforceable. In our economy, foreign lenders differ from domestic lenders in their ability to recover value from borrowers’ assets and, therefore, to protect themselves against contractual non-enforceability. The relative importance of domestic and foreign credit frictions changes over the cycle. This induces entrepreneurs to adjust their debt exposure and allocation of collateral between domestic and foreign lenders in response to exogenous productivity shocks. We show that such a model can explain the comovement of output across countries.
The authors construct a model of a dynamic economy in which lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their debts unless the debts are secured. In such an economy, durable assets play a dual role: not only are they factors of production but they also serve as collateral for loans. The dynamic interaction between credit limits and asset prices turns out to be a powerful transmission mechanism by which the effects of shocks persist, amplify, and spill over to other sectors. The authors show that small, temporary shocks to technology or income distribution can generate large, persistent fluctuations in output and asset prices. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.
Banks offering credit to borrowers are faced with uncertainty about their creditworthiness. If banks obtain information about borrowers after lending to them, they are able to reject riskier borrowers when refinancing. Potential entrant banks will face an adverse-selection problem stemming from their inability to distinguish new borrowers from old borrowers who have been rejected by their previous bank. We analyze the effects of asymmetric information on the market structure of the banking industry. We characterize the equilibrium under Bertrand competition with two banks, and show than an equilibrium where a third bank enters does not exist (blockaded entry).
Legal and institutional differences shape the ownership and terms of bank loans across the world. We show that under strong creditor protection, loans have more concentrated ownership, longer maturities, and lower interest rates. Moreover, the impact of creditor rights on loans depends on borrower characteristics such as the size and tangibility of assets. Foreign banks appear especially sensitive to the legal and institutional environment, with their ownership declining relative to domestic banks as creditor protection falls. Our multidimensional empirical model paints a more complete picture of how financial contracts respond to the legal and institutional environment than existing studies. Copyright 2007 by The American Finance Association.
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