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https://doi.org/10.1177/2057047319895448
Communication and the Public
2019, Vol. 4(4) 291 –304
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/2057047319895448
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Introduction
Turkey and China are similar in terms of their origin
of birth. Sharing the same steppes along the Silk
Road, both countries experienced constant wars in
ancient times, replaced by two distinct ideological
Representation of the “Belt and
Road Initiative” in Turkish
mainstream newspapers
Gökçe Özsu and Ferruh Mutlu Binark
Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Turkey
Abstract
Turkey and China are the countries that established their relations in the shadow of their ideological affiliation. Turkey
constructed its multi-partied democratic regime as an implementation of Western-based democracy. However, this
has not granted EU full-membership to the country, and Turkey has initiated alternative allies since mid 2000s. This
shift of axis has turned into more enthusiasm after the failed coup d’état of 15 July 2016. The purpose of this study is
to reveal how Turkish mainstream newspapers represent the Chinese alternative globalization project, “The Belt and
Road Initiative” which was introduced in 2013 by General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping. In
order to frame the background information, we will first introduce the aims of the Belt and Road Initiative, and then
summarize Turkey’s relation to China from two aspects: political and economic concerns. Following the overview of
Turko-Sino relationship, we will focus on the Justice and Development Party’s foreign policy to grasp its pragmatic
concern in relation to the Belt and Road Initiative. Based on the contextualization of Turko-Sino relations, we will
conduct thematic content analysis of the news on the Belt and Road Initiative from May to July 2017 in mainstream
Turkish newspapers. Our analysis brings into question how Turkish press relocates the Belt and Road Initiative with
respect to Turkey’s political and economic concerns about China’s alternative globalism, Turkish foreign policy seeking
for new allies as alternatives for the Western counterparts, and thus we will examine President Erdoğan’s influence on
Turkish foreign policy. Based on our findings, we will discuss the reasons for insufficient coverage of the Belt and Road
Initiative in Turkish mainstream newspapers.
Keywords
Alternative globalization, Belt and Road Initiative, content analysis, Justice and Development Party, Turkish foreign
policy, Turkish media
Corresponding author:
Gökçe Özsu, Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Beytepe, Ankara 06800,
Turkey.
Email: gozsu@hacettepe.edu.tr
895448CTP0010.1177/2057047319895448Communication and the PublicÖzsu and Binark
research-article2019
Special Symposium
292 Communication and the Public 4(4)
camps in the 20th century. Currently, while Turkey is
raising its critical voice against the West, especially
US-led global hegemony, China is starting to offer a
self-proposed globalization perspective to the world.
The Belt and Road Initiative (hereafter, BRI) aims at
restoring the historical Silk Road, the ancient trading
roots in Eurasia, and creating a China-led trading
and cultural and political network. However, given
that the project incorporates mutual benefits and pro-
motes the principles of cultural heritage and peace
and development, it cannot be regarded just as a sim-
ple trading and culture cooperation. In fact, it offers
a globalization perspective in the post-global era. To
be more specific, China’s alternative globalization
project consists of ideas, systems, and objects that
comprise a tool kit for sustainable global govern-
ance, especially for developing countries. Opposing
to the Western-oriented global order, Chinese per-
spective has been acclaimed as a non-hegemonic
attempt, unlike the Western order. In parallel with
this development, Turkey’s participation in the
European Union seems to be a remnant and becomes
a nostalgic memory for the Kemalist and secular
population. Accordingly, Turkey needed a new influ-
ential story for the economic growth while evading
fulfilling the basic democratic obligations and liabil-
ities, requested by the European Union. First
Shanghai-5 and then the BRI are argued to be the
best alternatives for Western political orientation
under the rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
and the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) gov-
ernance. Since mid 2000s, Turkey’s search for alter-
native allies has been arguably formulated as a
change of axis within the foreign policy and a prag-
matic multiplication. Therefore, in this article, we
analyze how the Turkish mainstream newspapers
covered the BRI and related discussions during and
after the 1st BRI Forum held in 2017 in Beijing.
Thus, we will attempt to expose how the Turkish
media’s attribution to the BRI is integrated with
Turkey’s foreign policy’s concerns and its pragmatic
approach to China’s alternative globalization pro-
ject. At this point, we will first discuss China’s alter-
native globalization project – the BRI – to
comprehend what it means. Then, we will summa-
rize Turko-Sino relations to grasp Turkish main-
stream news media’s framing of the BRI within the
Turkish foreign policy’s interests by highlighting the
JDP’s governance of the foreign policy.
China’s dream of alternative
globalization
As we often say in China, a single flower does not
make spring, while one hundred flowers in full blossom
bring spring to the garden. All countries are closely
linked and share converging interests. They should
pool and share their strength. (Xi, 2014, p. 363)
In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang both emphasized the need to build
the Belt and Road, which can promote economic pros-
perity of the countries along the Silk Road and
strengthen exchanges among different civilizations.
The action plan of the China-proposed BRI was issued
by the National Development and Reform Commission,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and Ministry of
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
with State Council authorization, on March 28, 2014.1
China opened a special web portal2 introducing BRI,
just as MOFA did. The action plan explains BRI with
respect to the Silk Road and details it’s being a route of
commerce and communication between the East and
the West. It defines the spirit of the Silk Road as “peace
and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual
learning and mutual benefit,” promoting the progress
of human civilization, and contributing to the prosper-
ity and development of the countries along the Silk
Road. According to China, the Silk Road Spirit is both
a historic and cultural heritage. Therefore, BRI is pre-
sented as a joint project that recreates the ancient Silk
Road, connecting Asian, European, and African coun-
tries, and promoting mutually beneficial cooperation
among the participant countries in new forms, based
on a win–win understanding. At the beginning, instead
of BRI, the project was called the Silk Road Economic
Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road
Initiative. Following the Summit in May 2017, the
Project has been renamed as “One Belt and One Road”
(一带一路) (Yīdài yīlù)3 (Miller, 2017).
The initiative, while putting emphasis on the
growth of economic globalization, intercultural
communication, and cultural diversity among the
participant countries, is also aimed at promoting the
Özsu and Binark 293
free flow of trade and integration of markets. It, thus,
strives to encourage the countries along the Belt and
Road to develop economic policy coordination that
benefits all. In fact, China seeks a new model of
international cooperation and global governance,
while highlighting world peace and mutual under-
standing, and thus renames globalization as alterna-
tive globalization. Alternative globalization means
diversified, independent, balanced, and sustainable
development among the participant countries, and it
involves bringing the regions and people together to
live in harmony, which is rooted in the Chinese con-
ceptualization of living in the world, “All Under the
Heaven” (天下).4 China describes her role in alter-
native globalization as one bringing peace and
development to humankind. It is possible to connect
China’s discourse of alternative globalization with
the revitalization of Confucianism and its concept of
harmony, which occurs between individuals, within
families, and between nations and states (Guo, 2004,
pp. 78–79). These discursive practices are articu-
lated and clearly operated by the Chinese govern-
ment to promote the Chinese model of alternative
globalization. According to Jean-Pierre Cabestan
(2010), China has created her image as a “responsi-
ble great power” (p. 2), especially for the developing
countries. In his speech on September 7, 2013,
General Secretary Xi (2014) proclaimed that “China
is committed to peaceful development and an inde-
pendent foreign policy of peace. We respect the
development paths and domestic and foreign poli-
cies pursued independently by the people of every
country” (p. 316). Xi said that BRI is against
US-centered globalization and its structural prob-
lems that have caused inequalities among the coun-
tries and that it aims to bring sustainable development
to the world. The participant countries will have
equal status and share resources fairly. At the open-
ing speech of “The Belt and Road Summit,” deliv-
ered on May 14–15, 2017, Xi underlined that fair,
acceptable, transparent global trade and investment
are the core of BRI. Following the summit, in his
speech at the opening of the 19th Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) General Meeting, Xi, while emphasiz-
ing the success of socialism with Chinese character-
istics and the realization of the Chinese dream5 (Xi,
2017), explained the aim of BRI as follows:
China champions the development of a community
with a shared future for mankind, and has encouraged
the evolution of global governance system. With this
we have seen a further rise in China’s international
influence, ability to inspire, and power to shape; and
China has made great contributions to global peace and
development. (Xi, 2017, pp. 6–7)
Yiwei Wang, criticizing Westrocentrism and
binary opposition as a way of thinking, referred to
China as an ancient civilization meant to end past
hegemonies. To rise as more legitimate than the
United States and Europe, China must set her goal as
neither a superior firepower nor a discourse monop-
olizing power, as already done unreasonably and
often not righteously by both the United States and
Europe, but as a leader toward a better future for
humanity where all civilizations could interact as
peers in a healthier layout of voice and power. To
achieve this goal, China has rearranged her own
Asian heritage (Wang, 2015, p. xvii). Therefore, the
countries especially those that are seeking new allies
against Western hegemony, and the developing
countries such as those in Africa, and South East
Asia considered BRI as China’s alternative globali-
zation project and China’s emphasis of Asian herit-
age as a tool kit for sustainable global governance
and economic growth.
The uniqueness of Chinese governance is derived
from the concept of “permission,” an inheritance
from the Middle Kingdom era (Wang, 2015, p. 138),
which explains how the harmonious world is created
by balancing different interests, powers, and values.
This model, the China model, is a contribution to the
sustainability of humanity (Wang, 2015, p. 155).
While Chinese government is applying the narra-
tives of Middle Kingdom heritage and Confucianist
definition of harmony (Brown, 2010, p. 88; Hess,
2010, pp. 52–54) as her discursive tools to achieve
her dream, these narratives are seen by the neighbor-
ing countries as an alternative approach to globaliza-
tion led by Western countries.
To achieve the Chinese dream briefly explained
above, the Chinese government emphasizes research,
innovation, and development, as well as military
strengthening. We should also mention that apart from
economic influence, the Chinese government has
invested more heavily in cultural politics (Flew, 2016),
294 Communication and the Public 4(4)
following Xi’s address at the 19th General Meeting of
the CCP: “The cultural soft power of China and the
international impact of Chinese culture have been
increased” (Xi, 2017). Furthermore, in the case of
China, we should focus more on the overlap of cultural
nationalism and Party-led state nationalism, although
both have different motivations (Guo, 2004, p. 34),
while considering the influence of BRI at the cultural
diplomacy level. As Zamorano (2016) noted, cultural
diplomacy, which was “initially linked to neocolonial
expansion and to propaganda,” recently became a
main instrument for attaining symbolic power by the
governments (p. 176).
Historical overview of Turkey’s
relations with China
Turkey and China both paid more attention to eco-
nomic scale in establishing relations with each other.
The cultural aspect of their relations has only
recently been put on the two countries’ agenda
despite their mutual heritage known as the Silk Road
dating back to ancient times. In fact, the first bilat-
eral relations were developed between Kemalist
Turkey and Kuomintang China. Turkey’s participa-
tion in the Korean War in 1950 to promote the
Western campaign was a stepping stone that caused
a huge suspension in the relations as both countries
fell into different ideological blocs then. In the
meantime, although Turkey constructed its multi-
party democratic regime as an implementation of
Western-based democracy, this has not granted
Turkey full membership in the European Union, and
thus, one of Turkey’s most fervent intentions ever
turned out to be an embarrassment that rather caused
an identity crisis. As PRC has attended UN Security
Council as a permanent member, Turkey established
diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1971 following
nearly two decades of refusal to recognize. All the
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) mem-
bers did so, likely upon American encouragement, to
form a balance against the USSR. In the Cold War
era, Turkey formulated its foreign policy mostly in
line with its NATO member status. In the 1970s,
when Turkey faced economic and political instabil-
ity, the debates on a closer relationship with China
revolved around the question of “whether the
expected economic benefits would justify taking the
political and ideological risks of recognizing [the]
‘Red China’” (Atlı, 2016, p. 7), following a pattern
of alienation from the West. Nonetheless, Turkey’s
recognition of China is, on one hand, a consequence
of a pragmatic initiative in Turkish foreign policy,
and on the other, a subsequent American encourage-
ment. It could also be stated that it was an outcome
of “relative autonomy” of Turkish foreign policy.
Relatively pluralistic political climate of the 1960s
caused Turkish foreign policy to expand toward the
developing world, mainly China, India, and Pakistan,
along with its Western-ally identity. This move has
been regarded as an “optimal balance” (Gönlübol &
Kürkçüoğlu 1987, p. 539) against Western orienta-
tion, or rather “relative autonomy of Turkish foreign
policy” (Oran, 2001, p. 43), which is an implementa-
tion of Poulantzas’s concept of IR (international
relations) theory. It was originally based on
Althusserian structuralist criticism on the instrumen-
talist phase of state, reduced to the political form of
dominant classes. Poulantzas cast doubt on this
argument by remarking “political structures consist
of the institutionalized power of the state and that
political struggles therefore have the state as their
objective” (quoted from Gulalp, 1987, p. 292).
Beijing’s political reforms and Ankara’s eco-
nomic liberalization in the 1980s caused the two
countries to seek new markets, and as a result, diplo-
matic and commercial traffic between both countries
significantly boosted. The 1980s was a stage for
bilateral subsequent visits that were rendered in both
countries. As a consequence, in the 1980s, the Turko-
Sino relationship grew mainly on economic basis
and enhanced a positive climate leaving the ideo-
logical concerns behind, and the relations remained
superficial until the beginning of the 21st century
(Çolakoğlu, 2012; Zan, 2016).
Although the economic interests underlying the
Turko-Sino relationship gained ground in 1980s, this
gain did not move on to the 1990s as the Eastern bloc
collapsed. This incident led Turkey to consider becom-
ing a regional power and filling the power gap left by
the former USSR. Thus, Turkey started to wield influ-
ence over the countries whose populations were mostly
Turkic Muslim, in the name of disseminating what it
called Turkish model. The slogan of “a whole Turkic
Özsu and Binark 295
world from [the] Adriatic to the Great Wall of China
standing up” aptly summarized Turkey’s vision of
Central Asia, even if not comprising the whole of its
foreign policy. Based on this new foreign policy in
1990s, Turkish Presidents Turgut Özal and then
Süleyman Demirel frequently mentioned the economic
and cultural support given to the Uyghur community
living in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region6
(新疆维吾尔自治区) (Xīnjiāng Wéiwú’ěr Zìzhìqū)
(XUAR) in China. Since then, MOFA and mainstream
media have paid attention to the voices of the Uyghur
opposition leaders. The Turkish media and politicians
from both ruling and opposing parties called this issue
“East Turkestan problem.” Consequently, the Uyghur
community in Xinjiang has become the main political
trouble among Ankara and Beijing governments (Atlı,
2016).
The Uyghur community in Xinjiang is considered
as one of the biggest national security threats for
Chinese government along with other sensitive top-
ics such as Taiwan and Tibet’s status and Hong
Kong. After the 1949 revolution, a significant num-
ber of the Uyghurs migrated from Xinjiang and initi-
ated diaspora activism taking media coverage. The
activities of the Uyghur diaspora have aroused sym-
pathy among the far-right ultranationalists in Turkey
and boosted lobbying against the reconciliation of
Turko-Sino relationship. However, since 2000s
Turkey have developed a new approach for both
Russia and China, emphasizing respect toward both
countries’ territorial integrity. After Beijing’s crack-
down in Xinjiang in 2009,7 Turkish Prime Minister
Erdoğan (now President) called the crackdown as
genocide. Despite that, Turkey has not carried on
with a strong response such as giving note, but
instead declared that Turkey would not interfere with
China’s domestic affairs (Talbot, 2018). After a dec-
ade of Xinjiang oppression, now Ankara is not react-
ing against Beijing’s implementation of mass
detention camps in the region,8 due to the impor-
tance attached to BRI.
Turkish foreign policy under JDP
governance
In the early 2000s following weak and short-lived
coalition governments as well as the economic crisis,
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party, JDP, came into
power in 2002. Since then, JDP has significantly
transformed Turkish foreign policy with long-lasting
results. Having come into power in 2002, PM Erdoğan
and his JDP announced his 2023 political visions to
mark the centennial anniversary of the proclamation
of republic in Turkey. In this respect, Turkey’s foreign
policy was formulated as “pro-active” in pursuing
pro-EU policy and broadening to former Ottoman
regions until the Syrian uprisings. Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu emerged as the leading fig-
ure theorizing on Turkey’s new foreign policy under
JDP governance. His magnum opus, titled Strategic
Depth (originally Stratejik Derinlik) (2001), a policy
doctrine book only available in Turkish, reflected
Davutoğlu’s former academic background as an IR
professor and position in framing present-day Turkish
foreign policy, which suggests incorporation of
Turkey’s historical and cultural elements into foreign
policymaking in the Islamic context. It also refers to
the former Ottoman territories as “land [of] strategic
depth” to be influenced in the neo-realistic sense, also
called neo-Ottomanism, and as an antithesis to the
supposedly ideological Kemalist perspective that
alienated Turkish people from the Empire territories.
In Strategic Depth, Davutoğlu does not make any spe-
cial remark about China but considers Asia as a land
in which significant events were happening, rapidly
changing the world’s political-economic system, and
states that Turkey had not benefited from this strategic
value (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 216). With Davutoğlu,
whose understanding of foreign policy is based on
neo-Ottomanism, Turkey started to increase the num-
ber of foreign missions, conduct a proactive diplo-
macy, and support the activities of Yunus Emre
Institute as tools of soft power.
Under the rule of JDP, Turkey implemented a
global and multifaceted foreign policy in Latin
America, Africa, Middle East, and China (Ekşi &
Erol, 2018, p. 18). According to Keyman (2009),
Turkey had multi-dimensional roles and identity-
based perceptions to implement as key components
of capacity (p. 22). A senior diplomat and recent
Presidential spokesperson Ibrahim Kalın (2011)
wrote as follows: “Turkey’s newly emerging actors
position themselves as active players demanding the
global transformation of centre-periphery relations
296 Communication and the Public 4(4)
to create a more democratic and fair world-system”
(p. 5). Subsequently, Turkish pro-activism has
become a hegemonic attempt along with Erdoğan’s
rhetorical attacks to the basic structures of the inter-
national system, often using this populist phrase:
“The [whole] world is bigger than five [permanent
members of UN Security Council].” Moreover,
Erdoğan has used his postcolonial arguments strate-
gically to engage non-Western regions. As argued by
some experts, “Turkey demonstrates [ . . . ] that
questioning of the colonial past of the international
system and its (post)colonial present could also ena-
ble discourses that reproduce hierarchies and con-
tribute to the continuation of exclusionary practices
in the international system” (Çapan & Zarakol, 2017,
p. 205). Moreover, Erdoğan’s effort to reach out to
non-Western regions has also been argued as change
of axis,9 following long-lasting disappointment of
the EU story, and represents Turkey’s pragmatic
search for alternatives (Gönlübol & Kürkçüoğlu
1987). While Erdoğan focused on the rest of Europe
to seek alternative allies, he also continued to pursue
negotiations with his European counterparts about
one of the most crucial contemporary issues, namely
the refugee crisis. In the meantime, Erdoğan did not
insist on being out of the Western establishment and
maintained Turkey’s memberships in NATO and the
Council of Europe. Although Turkish Republic has
regarded the European Union as the most significant
democratization project since its founding, it has not
fully satisfied the conditions of accession so far. The
country has raised its critical voice, insisting that the
European Union has applied double standards for
more than a decade. In particular Erdoğan’s attacks
incorporating solid rhetoric toward the European
Union have channelized Turkish vision into seeking
alternative allies. This search of identity resulted in
both reluctance and exhaustion regarding the
European Union after “getting tired of waiting at the
door of Europe”; meanwhile, the EU story has turned
to a “Why not EU?” (Yaka, 2016) manner in the
Turkish political elite. Turkey’s full membership
would validate Kemalist modernization project’s
success, but any failure would serve for Islamists
and ultranationalists. As such, “foreign policy
becomes an extension of domestic identity crisis and
carries the signs of power struggle among separate
groups with different identities” (Bozdaglioglu,
2003, p. 90). Thus, Turkey’s new vision of China is
pragmatically positioned in a backup position to be
operated in case the relations with the West falls. As
Turkey moves away from the West, the “Chinese
miracle” is claimed to be one of the favors of
Erdoğan’s governance of both foreign policy and
economics. Erdoğan has practically needed an
achievement story of a growing economy, which
challenges the argument that economic growth is
dependent on human rights or liberal democracy.
Kalın (2011) supported China’s response to Western
criticism that economic growth is not possible with-
out internalizing liberal-democratic values. Turkey
has become a dialog partner of Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, which was arguably “more to do with
Turkish frustration with its Western identity than a
commitment to bandwagon Russian and Chinese
leadership” (Aras, 2017, p. 11). At this point, we
eventually come across the main reason for the prag-
matic interest of JDP government in China and
China’s alternative globalization project, especially
after the failed coup d’état in 15th July 2016.
It is also argued that Turkey’s enthusiasm for the
project has two main economic reasons: more Chinese
direct investments to be expected and Turkey’s con-
solidation itself as a transportation hub (Chaziza, 2016,
p. 277) in the Middle Corridor. According to the
Chinese government, Turkey’s place within BRI is as
the “Middle Corridor,” where the coordination mecha-
nisms in terms of railway transportation and port cus-
toms clearance for the China–Europe corridor are
conducted. Turkish senior economist Fatih Oktay
(2018) recognized the “Middle Corridor” as an oppor-
tunity for Turkey to provide new services and products
to East and South Asian countries amid escalating
trade wars and tightening custom regulations, in spite
of globalization (p. 52).
President Erdoğan ambitiously summarized his
visions in his speech in 2017 at the BRI Summit in
Beijing. The excerpt below shows how he is in
accordance with the Chinese perspective:
Turkey wants to play a pivotal role in the Belt and Road
Initiative as a geographical and cultural bridge linking
East and West, as an indispensable partner of China.
[ . . . ] The New Silk Road initiative [ . . . ] will benefit
Özsu and Binark 297
from bilateral, multilateral and regional cooperation, is
put into practice in an understanding of “win-win.”
This harmonious system in political and economic
areas will herald a new era based on stability and
prosperity. (Erdoğan, 2017)
In summary, Turkey’s current relations with China
have the potential to develop in accordance with
Turkey’s search for alternative ally even though this
search is based on more pragmatic interests. Turkey
will more likely track a fluctuating route in its relations
with the West. This might result in Turkish foreign
policy gaining more relative autonomy.
Framing of BRI in Turkish
Newspapers: a thematic content
analysis
The framing of China-related news stories by
Turkish media is rather problematic, with underrep-
resentation, misrepresentation, or labeling. A few
studies have analyzed Turkish news coverage of
China in terms of either positive or negative framing
(Ergenç, 2015), and news interpretation within social
cognition (Gezgin, 2018). Ergenç’s (2015) study of
news showed that the news coverage mostly tended
to be neutral if Turkey did not have any interest in
China. Gezgin’s (2018) study showed that the news
about China had a very limited number of topics,
such as male–female population imbalance, one
child policy, made-in-China products, Xinjiang case,
and air pollution. Also, the representation of BRI
through media has rarely been researched. In one of
those rare studies, Zhang and Wu (2018) show that
the portrayal of BRI by British mainstream media is
conflicting; China is represented as a significant
player for global economy, along with authoritarian
and geopolitical threat depiction.
We conducted content analysis, described by
Bernard Berelson (1952) as a research technique for
the objective, systematic, and quantitative descrip-
tion of the manifest content of communications.
Through conceptual content analysis, the dominant
concepts, patterns, and repeated themes of news
items are revealed in a descriptive approach (Hsieh
& Shannon, 2005). Content analysis gives research-
ers the opportunity to combine unrelated materials
with a logical link and then information is trans-
formed into analyzable units (Krippendorff, 1980).
Categorizing the main themes of news items reveals
the manifest content of the texts and helps connect
the themes with a macro-level discursive strategy,
such as the dominant policy of the government. Our
main research question is as follows: How have the
Turkish mainstream newspapers represented BRI
and in which context? Therefore, we thematically
analyzed 59 news articles published in the print edi-
tions of national newspapers with a daily circulation
of more than 100,000 copies. As the media coverage
of BRI continued from the beginning of the Forum
to almost the end of July, for the analysis, news items
were selected from May 1 to July 31, 2017. The list
of the newspapers (tabloids were omitted) is shown
in Table 1.
According to MedyaTava (2017), an online net-
work monitoring, the average of all newspapers sold
for the last week of July 2017 was more than 3.2 mil-
lion. Mainstream media in Turkey have always been
vulnerable to government influence and journalistic
autonomy. The Turkish media landscape has under-
gone numerous ownership takeovers that resulted in
press–party parallelism, along with the elimination of
media pluralism (Eldem, 2018). A traditional distinc-
tion of pro-government, anti-government, or main-
stream is not applicable to Turkish media. Thus, we
can only consider newspapers as mainstream based
on circulation; in this study, we used the threshold of
Table 1. Nationally circulated daily newspapers as per
their number of the BRI news coverage.
Newspapers Daily circulation (last week of July 2017)
Hürriyet 315,502
Sabah 302,479
Sözcü 293,003
Haber Türk 204,153
Milliyet 132,994
Türkiye 131,193
Yeni Şafak 110,912
Vatan 103,975
Star 102,799
Total 1,697,010
Source: MedyaTava (2017).
BRI: Belt and Road Initiative.
298 Communication and the Public 4(4)
at least 100,000 copies sold per day. Therefore, the
newspapers provided in the Table 1 do not represent
every aspect of the Turkish political spectrum.
However, we can say that most of the newspapers,
except Hürriyet10 and Sözcü, have pro-government
stance and the ownership of these newspapers fully
belonged to either JDP supporters or Islamic capital
(Sözeri, 2018; Yeşil, 2016).
We claim that Turkish mainstream newspapers
frame BRI within three main themes: mutual benefits,
economic gain, and Silk Road nostalgia (See Table 2).
Therefore, to reveal these themes and dominant fram-
ing, we analyzed the definitions, vocabulary, reference
links, background information, and explanations
regarding geographical and historical locations. The
dominant framing of BRI and China in the news has
been integrated into Turkish foreign policy, especially
President Erdoğan’s self-determined foreign politics.
Mutual benefits
As an alternative globalization project, BRI locates
itself in line with the criticism of the West by empha-
sizing win–win cooperation, mutual prosperity of the
participant countries, and equality. The project also
considers mutual benefits against Western hegemony.
Thus, under this theme, news articles emphasized
peace and development among the participant coun-
tries. Nine news articles (4 from Yeni Şafak, 3 from
Sabah, 1 each from Star and Türkiye) were related to
this theme, only consisting of 15% of the total and
thus accounting for the least number of news. The
news articles also seemed to be clustered at the time
of Erdoğan’s trip to Beijing (all news, except one,
was published between May 3 and 16). The news
article titled “New Global Order to Be Risen in
Beijing” (Yeni Şafak, May 3, 2017) reported on
President Erdoğan’s future trip to Beijing to partici-
pate in the BRI Forum. The article also stated that
globalization would be discussed in the context of
mutual benefits and win–win concept. Another piece
in Yeni Şafak, a full-length article on May 13 titled
“Lifeblood of the 21st Century: One Belt and One
Road Project,” defined the project as “an investment
project located in an unprecedented market that mat-
ters [to] 1 billion people” as a “huge economic front
against the US-led Atlantic system.” Another piece,
titled “Mutual Development to Be Accelerated”
(Sabah, May 14), was mostly about the Chinese
ambassador’s statements. The article announced that
Erdoğan would participate in BRI Forum in Beijing
and the correspondent seemed to have asked this
question by framing the event only by Erdoğan’s offi-
cial trip. However, Ambassador Yu Hongyang’s com-
ments focused on strategic relations between China
and Turkey and the importance of mutual benefit and
development. Another news item in Yeni Şafak (“The
Manifestation of the New Global Order,” May 16)
underlined the gist of the speech of President Xi:
“BRI as an alternative against Western hegemony.”
In Türkiye’s piece titled “China Gains Power Through
Six Regions in the East” on July 11, the report indi-
cated that “BRI [promises] global prosperity [as a]
strategic cooperation project” for Turkey.
Table 2. List of the news based on thematic categorization.
Newspapers Number of news
articles with the theme
of mutual benefits
Number of news
articles with the theme
of economic gain
Number of news
articles with the theme
of Silk Road nostalgia
Total number of
news (May–July
2017)
Hürriyet 0 4 1 5
Sabah 3 4 2 9
Sözcü 0 0 0 0
Haber Türk 0 5 0 5
Milliyet 0 4 2 6
Türkiye 1 4 0 4
Yeni Şafak 4 11 2 17
Vatan 0 5 1 6
Star 1 3 2 6
Özsu and Binark 299
Economic gain
Economic gain mainly focuses on the economic
interests that only benefit Turkey, in a narrowed
scale. Turkey’s specific expectations from BRI such
as the influx of more economic investments and con-
tainment of terrorism are the essence of this theme.
In this respect, Turkish mainstream newspapers
framed BRI from an instrumentalist approach, by
underlining the progress in Turko-Sino relationships,
the struggle against terrorism, Turkey’s significant
location in the Middle Corridor policy, and the
importance of the Chinese investments in Turkey. As
it is clearly seen, Turkey’s approach to BRI was
mostly based on Turkey’s alternative-ally seeking
that would replace downgraded relations with the
West. News related to the economic gain theme
comprised the most frequent type, numbered 40
(68%) in all of the newspapers, except Sözcü.
In Vatan’s piece with the headline “Leap Forward
of the Relations With China” on May 11, the report-
ing was framed with a direct quotation from Erdoğan
during his flight to Beijing: “the BRI Summit could
be a leap forward for the country’s relations with
China”. Sabah’s report on May 15 quoted Erdoğan,
in his response to questions from accredited journal-
ists on his flight back to Turkey: “We are now going
ahead rapidly along the route named the Middle
Corridor of the New Silk Road Initiative. Our invest-
ments for the project will be greater.” Milliyet’s piece
on May 14 covered Erdoğan’s opinion on the forum:
“We will pursue supporting this project by opening a
new economic phase with China,” which formed the
headline; the article provided neither background
information nor political emphasis.
In an article in HaberTürk on May 17, titled
“Being on the Same ‘Road’ With China Changes the
Order,” the report stated that Turkey was seeking
alternative allies in lieu of its dependence on the
European Union for foreign trade. This news item
included a metonymy. In Turkish the expression
“Yol/daş Olmak,” which literally means “being” on
the “same road,” is associated with socialist values
as the word “yoldaş” also means “comrade,” and the
way this expression is used implies that seeking a
new ally will change the “world order,” in other
words, the Western hegemony. Metaphor and meton-
ymy are often used together (Berger, 2005, p. 29).
The previous news also used a metaphor: the word
“order” carries an implication to the power games
among the nation-states. An article in Yeni Şafak
published on May 19, titled “We Are at the Center of
the New Balance. The Countries in Our Region
Cannot Be Away,” is another quotation from Erdoğan
from his statement on BRI. Both the new world
order and the new balance were frequently used to
describe the alternative globalization project from
the viewpoint of Turkish foreign policy.
The struggle against terrorism is another feature
of this theme. Hürriyet’s report on May 15 quoted
Erdoğan’s speech on the Summit, titled “Economic
Road Against Terrorism,” and mainly underlined the
necessity of cooperation against terrorism. For
example, in Haber Türk published on May 14, Xi’s
statement of “We Won’t Support Gülenists Anymore”
was headlined. On the same day, in Milliyet, Xi was
quoted stating, “We Stand With Turkey [against ter-
rorism],” and in Yeni Şafak, “We Won’t Allow
Threats Against Turkey.” On May 15, in Vatan,
“[BRI will] Demolish Terrorism” was provided in
the headline. Terrorism has been one of the topmost
issues for both Turkish and Chinese politics, along
with the Xinjiang case, which is the most sensitive
topic in the relations. “The Initiative that will also
teardown terrorism” was quoted from Erdoğan in the
subheading, without emphasizing the Chinese per-
spective of Uyghurs as a rebellious ethnic group
against China. From Erdoğan’s words, it can be
inferred that BRI would also allegedly bring benefit
to Turkey’s never-ending struggle against Kurdish
separatists or his former domestic ally, the Gülenist
organization. Terrorism has also been a top topic of
the disputes between Turkey and the United States
after the failed coup d’état. According to Erdoğan,
military attitudes toward democratically elected par-
ties also mean an arrogant approach toward the
nation (Oral, 2015, p. 126) and against national will.
Terrorism versus national will formulation has
recently become one of the main dominant discur-
sive strategies of the foreign policy.
Silk Road nostalgia
The Silk Road is widely used as a metaphor referring
to the extent of BRI in both economic and cultural
terms. Having a strong historical background, the
300 Communication and the Public 4(4)
revitalization of traditional routes is highlighted to
create a network among countries located along the
Road. Not only economic pragmatism but also his-
torical and traditional background that dates back to
the ancient times is stressed to legitimize BRI. The
Silk Road metaphor represents the ancient steppes in
which both peoples were trading and engaging in
cultural exchange. This point is noted in the China
Daily Türkiye magazine published in Turkish:
Westerns critical approaches are quite normal, because
they have no idea of the spiritual value of the Silk
Road. However, it is impossible to negatively perceive
a project whose name contains the phrase Silk Road.
This phrase has been the only thing that caused China
to be praised in Turkey in the recent years. (Demir,
2018, p. 25)
Through the Silk Road metaphor, news produced
the feeling of nostalgia as well. The term nostalgia
derives from the Greek word nostos, meaning “to
return home” (Davis, 1979). On the production of
nostalgia, Pickering and Keightley (2006) said that it
“. . . arises only in compensation for a loss of faith in
progress, and for what is socially and culturally
destroyed in the name of progress” (p. 920). Our
study identified 10 pieces of news in which the Silk
Road was used as a nostalgic theme. In the reports in
the Milliyet titled “Caravans to Be Prepared for the
Silk Road” (May 16, 2017) and Vatan titled “Modern
Caravan Project for the Silk Road” (May 16, 2017),
Minister for Transportation, Maritime Affairs and
Communication Ahmet Arslan’s proposal for his
Chinese counterpart was covered. The proposal was
a plan for a test drive of a 10-vehicle convoy to be
undertaken along the full length of the Middle
Corridor. The content of both news was almost the
same. The Minister himself named his proposal as
the “Caravan project” following his opinions on
BRI: “The Modern Silk Road strategy connects
Turkey with China via [the] Caspian Sea and Central
[Asian] states.” The points worth debating in the
context of Western centrism are the definition of the
Silk Road as modern and comparison of the convoy
with caravans. More interestingly, the images that
represent BRI also associate with caravans and the
ancient Silk Road. These images seemed applicable
in terms of producing nostalgia while living in
modernity. As Pickering and Keightley (2006)
underlined, nostalgia does not only provide an onto-
logical security in the past but also enables bearing
the uncertainties of the present times (p. 921). The
emphasis on the Silk Road nostalgia by political
agents thus provides a secure land to handle the cur-
rent political, social, and economic problems of
Turkey. This discursive strategy thus engages the
heroic and unquestionable past with today’s agenda
and offers a very special definitions of situations to
understand the agenda.
Other news from Milliyet reported Minister
Ahmet Arslan’s words on Baku–Tbilisi–Kars rail-
road project, metaphorically called the Iron Silk
Road, which was going to be officially initiated as
Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railroad on September 2017.
Here, the Iron Silk Road also has a nostalgic refer-
ence and produces the feeling of the past. Hürriyet’s
news report on May 20 carried on the same discourse
as the previous news, but referring to the fiber wiring
investment along the Middle Corridor, by citing
Minister Arslan’s speech: “We take [the] fiber corri-
dor that connects the countries [seriously].” What is
meant with the word connectivity here was the inte-
grative manner of providing better relations between
the countries, and it was also engaged with the Silk
Road nostalgia. This time the Silk Road metaphor
was used as a resource for a bright future. Similarly,
Xi emphasized “community of common destiny”
(Miller, 2017, p. 19).
Conclusion
The first point worth remarking is that Turkish main-
stream media are not aware of the political, eco-
nomic, and historical importance of BRI, as it is
explained in the first part of this study. Instead,
Turkish mainstream media frame BRI from the sym-
bolic aspects within the mythic discourse of the Silk
Road. The media have not recognized what China’s
alternative globalization means, and they frame
China’s dream with respect to the pragmatic engage-
ment of Turkish foreign policy. Besides, it is clear
that the news framing of BRI have been fully inte-
grated into President Erdoğan’s hegemonic position
in Turkish politics—the media directly quoted from
President Erdoğan’s views about BRI and developed
Özsu and Binark 301
the news stories regarding Erdoğan’s approach to this
issue. Second, we should mention that the insuffi-
cient number of BRI-related news is worth noting.
The highest inconsistency can be seen in Yeni Şafak
and Sözcü. The former, historically a pro-Islamist
newspaper, produced 17 news articles, whereas the
latter, the only anti-government newspaper with high
circulation, published none. The reason Sözcü pub-
lished no news regarding BRI is the terrorism inves-
tigation that Sözcü itself faced at that time. Third,
another inconsistency can be seen among the themes
in terms of news quantity. Economic gain, the theme
with the highest quantity, was in line with Turkey’s
pragmatic vision of BRI.11 President Erdoğan paid an
official visit to Washington immediately after partici-
pating in the Beijing Summit. Erdoğan may have
been seeking to use BRI as leverage for disputes in
anti-terror policies and extradition of terrorists with
the United States, particularly after the failed coup
d’état. This also shows that the vision of the Turkish
foreign policy for BRI is marked by pragmatism.
This pragmatic turn in the Turko-Sino relationships
is highly visible in the news coverage about the
Chinese alternative globalization project and BRI.
News coverage is subsidiary to develop the legitimi-
zation of searching alternative allies, and functions
as public diplomacy instrument. Despite the human
rights problems in Xinjiang (Miller, 2017, pp. 58–
72), the President Erdoğan and JDP government
ignored the voices of the Uyghur community and
stayed silent on this issue, in contrast to Turkey’s
proactive foreign policy in Syria, Qatar, and
Palestine. Moreover, during his visit to Beijing in
2nd July 2019, President Erdoğan said that Turkey
stays committed to the one-China policy, empha-
sized that residents of various ethnicities living hap-
pily in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region thanks
to China’s prosperity. Furthermore, Erdoğan said
that Turkey will not allow anyone to drive a wedge
in its relations with China.12
At this point, we assume that if Erdoğan had not
officially visited Beijing in 2017, the Turkish press
might not have even considered BRI newsworthy.
Covering BRI through Erdoğan’s trip is highly prob-
lematic, unsatisfactory, and is thus underrepresented.
Ergenç (2015) argued that the main reason for the
inconsistencies in China-related news framing is that
Turkish public space is Western-oriented, which is
the consequence of a Cold War legacy and Turkish
journalists’ lack of knowledge about China and her
politics as well as political economy. Furthermore,
Turkish news media framed BRI directly as tied to
Erdoğan’s political views on China, as it had done
with other topics in Turkish politics.
Chinese soft power instruments in Turkey, such as
Modern İpek Yolu and CRITürk, can offer a new
space for acquiring information from a Chinese per-
spective. Moreover, if Turkey’s desire to welcome
BRI is derived from seeking an alternative ally to bal-
ance superpowers’ influences, as it was implemented
to take relative autonomy in détente, Turkey will be
more inclined to adopt Chinese information sources,
which is Beijing’s propaganda mechanism. Kamil
Erdoğdu, senior editor for CRI Türk, stated in an
interview, “In my opinion the best way to propagate
is showing the truth. If you report the real situation of
a country, you will be doing the best propaganda. If
you exaggerate, it will be backlashed” (Gürsel &
Kumanovalı, 2018). Hence, China’s discursive strat-
egies will likely continue to be worth monitoring to
compare with Turkish governmental discourse.
As a concluding remark, we should say that the
new Presidential regime that came into effect in
2018 might alter Turkey’s foreign policy’s strategies
and techniques. Turkish foreign policy now depends
on President Erdoğan’s personal will and his popu-
list strategies that incorporate anti-Western senti-
ments. Under the new regime, President Erdoğan is
from now on entitled the right to appoint ambassa-
dors with a single decree and shape the entire bureau-
cracy. We need to wait and watch what kind of
discursive strategies are to be applied in Turkish for-
eign policy and media. The search for new allies by
the new Presidential regime will soon orient the
Turkish foreign policy toward alternative globaliza-
tion project, which is directed by China. Turkish
mainstream news media should not shy away from
this change as well, and might be interested in cover-
ing the success stories of the Belt and Road Initiative.
ORCID iDs
Gökçe Özsu https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8732-1397
Ferruh Mutlu Binark https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7458
-5203
302 Communication and the Public 4(4)
Notes
1. It is available on: http://english.gov.cn/archive/publi-
cations/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm.
2. Also available on: https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/index.
htm.
3. In Turkish it is called “Tek Kuşak Tek Yol.”
4. The concept of “tiānxià” indicates a Chinese holis-
tic world view (Qin, 2010, pp. 26–30). It locates the
Middle Kingdom as the center of civilization.
5. The Chinese dream, as a discursive strategy, was
introduced at the 14th National Congress in 1992 by
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and enriched by Xi Jinping.
As to Xi (2014), the “Chinese dream” should be real-
ized with the power of the people and serves the hap-
piness of the people (p. 67). To achieve this dream,
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the
national sovereignty, and the rule of law are the essen-
tials. The discursive strategy of the Chinese dream
encourages Chinese people to work together, create a
strong Chinese nation, and maintain her cultural sov-
ereignty (Keane & Chen, 2017, p. 3).
6. XUAR is home to a number of ethnic groups, includ-
ing Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kyrgyzs, Mongols,
Russians, Huis, and Hans. The region was subjected
to Islamicisation at the hands of Turkic Muslims dur-
ing the ninth century. Since 12th November 1933,
following the declaration of the short-lived self-pro-
claimed “First East Turkestan Republic,” the region
has been called “East Turkestan” in the Western
world, as well as in Turkey (Falkenheim & Hsieh,
2018).
7. The incident is called as “Urumqi 5 July Riots” (乌鲁
木齐7·5骚乱) (Wūlǔmùqí 7·5 Sāoluàn). See: http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8135203.stm.
8. See the following references: Amnesty International
(2018a) and Amnesty International (2018b).
9. For some critics, the change-of-axis formulation is
an exaggeration. Turkey has been undergoing multi-
plication of foreign policy orientations for a number
of reasons, including solid political-economic ones,
as an aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis
(Onis, 2011, p. 48).
10. The largest media group owning Hurriyet and several
mainstream daily newspapers, along with cable and
online networks, has been taken over by Erdoğan-
backed business group in 2018 (Coskun, 2018).
11. The economic concerns related with BRI have been
recently increased in Turkey due to economic cri-
sis. See “Turkey, China Show Desire to Expand
Cooperation Under BRI” (2019).
12. See: Xinhua, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201907/
02/WS5d1b57f6a3105895c2e7b3fa.html (July 2, 2019).
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Author biographies
Gökçe Özsu is PhD student in Communication Sciences at
Hacettepe Üniversitesi. He is working on cultural diplo-
macy, journalism studies and new media studies.
Ferruh Mutlu Binark is Professor at the Department of
Radio-Television and Cinema, and the Chair of Informatics
and Information Technologies at the Faculty of
Communication, Hacettepe University. She is the Chief
Editor of Moment Journal since July 2017. She teaches
media theories, media sociology, media literacy, and new
media culture. She is currently on data ethics, media liter-
acy, creative content industries and cultural policy.
