From Fascism to Populism in History
... More broadly, populist governments are often at odds with any notion of a balance of powers, insisting that these restrict their capacity to represent the people properly. 3 Given this, some commentators have argued that populism is a distortion of democracy analogous to fascism and National Socialism in the 1930s and 1940s (Finchelstein, 2017). Indeed, it is suggested that in some respects it is a throwback to premodern absolutism: that, despite populist leaders' use of the rhetoric of democracy, populism leads to dictatorship and to reliance upon political theatre rather than the exercise of sovereignty by citizens. ...
... Populists often appeal to the Gemeinschaft ideal in challenging existing democratic institutions, though what is involved is not usually the project of restoring the ancien régime but rather of instigating a new type of political system that draws on conservative ideals while at the same time reshaping them, along with the means by which they are to be realised. In this respect, there is a direct parallel with fascism (Finchelstein, 2017) and other forms of 'reactionary modernism' (Herf, 1984). ...
... For him, fascism is one form of utopianism, offering a vision of a new society that cannot be realised, so that what results is a new and dictatorial political elite which subsequently represses even the spontaneous forces that had brought it to power (Loader and Kettler, 2002). He labels this as a process of 're-primitivization' (Mannheim, [1930] 2001: Lecture 5). 9 Here we can perhaps see a direct parallel with the character of some current populist governments (Finchelstein, 2017). ...
The parallels and differences between current forms of populism and early 20th-century fascism have been the focus for much discussion. This article examines the relevance today of Karl Mannheim’s analysis of fascism and of its relationship to democracy in the 1930s. He argued that the threat of fascism arose from the very nature of liberal democratic society, rather than being a product of external forces. He claimed that liberal democracy is transitional, rather than stable in character, and that the new emerging form of governance that was required to replace it shared a key component with fascism: a high level of social and economic planning. At the same time, he insisted that, as a pathological development, fascism served to illustrate the disastrous consequences that a failure to engage realistically with the process of societal development can have for upholding Western civilisational ideals. This article explores Mannheim’s arguments against the background of current thinking about populism and ‘post-democracy’.
... Sakurai 2018b: 145). This shows precisely that fascism first thrived in the context of Italian politics (Bach 2006;Finchelstein 2017;Griffin 2012;Passmore 2014Passmore [2002; Whittam 1995). In the sense that it emerged in 1919 (Finchelstein 2017;Griffin 2012;Passmore 2014Passmore [2002; Whittam 1995), it differs from political phenomena that have long existed, such as traditional autocracy, despotism, dictatorship and tyranny, each conceptual implication of which overlaps with that of fascism. ...
... This shows precisely that fascism first thrived in the context of Italian politics (Bach 2006;Finchelstein 2017;Griffin 2012;Passmore 2014Passmore [2002; Whittam 1995). In the sense that it emerged in 1919 (Finchelstein 2017;Griffin 2012;Passmore 2014Passmore [2002; Whittam 1995), it differs from political phenomena that have long existed, such as traditional autocracy, despotism, dictatorship and tyranny, each conceptual implication of which overlaps with that of fascism. Briefly speaking, the term 'fascism' refers to a 'generalized historical type of authoritarian political regime' (Bach 2006: 192). ...
... 28 In the current political landscape, Fromm's theory of narcissism has the potential to cast light on chauvinist political movements enmeshed in populist phenomena such as the National Rally and AfD (Alternative für Deutschland). To be sure, it is conceded that the concept of populism, an 'authoritarian form of democracy' that emerges as a 'counteroffensive reaction of populations who are virtually unrepresented', theoretically best functions in present social contexts in relation to those political movements (Finchelstein 2017;Müller 2016). 29 This is because it captures the essence of the current political climate of which anti-pluralist, political ingredients have burst out, especially in advanced countries. ...
This article methodologically explores Erich Fromm’s theory of narcissism in socio-theoretical terms while referring to his theory of alienation. It thereby portrays the foundations of an analytical method of far-right politics in the context of capitalism and demonstrates that malignant narcissism touches off fascism without regard to authoritarianism. Essentially, the Freudian psychoanalytic concept of narcissism lies in Fromm’s social theory. However, it is possible to discern the theoretical essence of his social theory characteristically in his conception of alienation. By focusing on this theoretical concern, I argue that in Fromm’s social theory the concept of narcissism works on a socio-pathological level, particularly in the way in which it synchronises with alienation, a social phenomenon that fulfils its important functions in conjunction with the marketing orientation under the conditions of a market society, and therefore that the concept plays an overriding role in his theory of alienation. I conclude that the relevance of a Frommian critical social theory of narcissism for our society is best showcased by the concept of postfascism.
... The common traits that united the experiences of Perón, Cárdenas and Vargas-and therefore the element that legitimized their classification in a unitary category-were a series of economic measures that were favorable to the urban popular classes, the opposition with foreign economic groups, the presence of charismatic leaders and the attempt to overcome the mediations of traditional organizations. Despite their heterogeneity, it has become commonplace to describe all these regimes as "populist" (Finchelstein 2017;Zanatta 2013). However, in the economic history of the concept, there is an extremely important aspect that absolutely cannot be forgotten. ...
... In this way, the concept lost the denigrating connotation that had marked its re-elaboration, but it also lost a clear anchor regarding the distinction between right and left (Dussel 1977(Dussel , 2007. Therefore, in the following years, the notion could lend itself both to demanding attempts at theoretical rehabilitation, such as that made by Ernesto Laclau (2005), and to an inflated use that was suitable for identifying the government of Popular Unity led by the Salvador Allende in Chile with both the political style and neoliberal economic program of Carlos Menem (Finchelstein 2017). At the same time, following identification with Latin American government experiences, another meaning of the term could also be consolidated which, exclusively in the context of economic studies, came to identify populism with policies that were focused on deficit spending programs, as opposed to policies to reduce public budgets and that were connected instead to very strong inflationary pressures (Dornbush and Edwards 1992). ...
This article proposes a “genealogical” rereading of the concept of “populism”. Following the idea of “genealogical” analysis that was suggested by Michel Foucault, the aim is to show the “political” logic of the reinvention of the concept of “populism”, which was carried out between the 1950s and 1960s by the social sciences in the United States. First, this contribution reconstructs the history of the concept, identifying five different phases: (1) Russian populism of the late nineteenth century; (2) the Popular Party in the United States; (3) the Perón and Vargas regimes in Argentina and Brazil, respectively; (4) the reformulation carried out by the social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s; and (5) the subsequent extension of the concept to Western Europe. It is argued that the decisive turning point took place in the 1950s when the social sciences “grouped” the traits of heterogeneous movements into a single theoretical category.
... To this end, legitimacy is defined herein as a structural, relational property that arises from intersubjective beliefs about the external acceptance of an actor and their actions. Legitimation, the other side of this agentstructure coin, is understood as the agency-oriented process of justification that aims to shape and boost such perceptions within a specific context and audience (Tallberg and 2 That said, it can be argued that there is also a long internationalist tradition among radical right-wing movements, primary within various fascist governments in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s (see Finchelstein 2019;Steffek 2015). These expectations regarding populist tendencies towards transnationalism may also be influenced by the analytical distinction between 'inclusionary' and 'exclusionary' populism, which mainly refers to domestic political practices (see Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser 2012;Filc 2015;Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). ...
This paper aims to contribute to the growing academic debate on the transnational drivers and patterns of contemporary populism. As populist leaderships expand both politically and geographically, the very nature of the populist phenomenon is changing, as it is increasingly being projected on the international stage. Contemporary populist leaders show a growing willingness to transfer the discursive construction of a struggle between 'the people' and 'the elites' to the regional and global levels as a way of obtaining internal and external legitimation. In so doing, they exploit the symbiotic two-level game that links national and international (de-)legitimation dynamics, seeking to gain 'abroad' the kind of legitimacy that they cannot obtain 'at home'. This paper suggests three mechanisms that explain the populist 'way out' from various legitimation traps based on the traditional distinctions between input, throughput, and output legitimacy. The paper's argument is illustrated with reference to prototypical cases of populism in Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The incorporation of the literature on international legitimacy enhances our understanding of the strategic activation of populist attitudes through the transnational articulation of empty signifiers, the global diffusion of this phenomenon, and the possibilities for its contestation and mitigation.
... To this end, legitimacy is defined herein as a structural, relational property that arises from intersubjective beliefs about the external acceptance of an actor and their actions. Legitimation, the other side of this agentstructure coin, is understood as the agency-oriented process of justification that aims to shape and boost such perceptions within a specific context and audience (Tallberg and 2 That said, it can be argued that there is also a long internationalist tradition among radical right-wing movements, primary within various fascist governments in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s (see Finchelstein 2019;Steffek 2015). These expectations regarding populist tendencies towards transnationalism may also be influenced by the analytical distinction between 'inclusionary' and 'exclusionary' populism, which mainly refers to domestic political practices (see Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser 2012;Filc 2015;Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). ...
This article aims to contribute to the growing academic debate on the transnational drivers and patterns of contemporary populism. As populist leaderships expand both politically and geographically, the very nature of the populist phenomenon is changing, as it is increasingly being projected on the international stage. Contemporary populist leaders show a growing willingness to transfer the discursive construction of a struggle between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’ to the regional and global levels as a way of obtaining internal and external legitimation. In so doing, they exploit the symbiotic two-level game that links national and international (de-)legitimation dynamics, seeking to gain ‘abroad’ the kind of legitimacy that they cannot obtain ‘at home’. This article suggests three mechanisms that explain the populist ‘way out’ from various legitimation traps based on the traditional distinctions between input, throughput, and output legitimacy. The article’s argument is illustrated with reference to prototypical cases of populism in Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The incorporation of the literature on international legitimacy enhances our understanding of the strategic activation of populist attitudes through the transnational articulation of empty signifiers, the global diffusion of this phenomenon, and the possibilities for its contestation and mitigation.
... According to Finchelstein (2017), post-Second World War populism started with the recognition that fascism was part of the past. In a new age of affluent democracy and liberalism, it replaced fascism as the most significant challenge to liberal democracy and as a post-fascist response to the left. ...
Considered by many scholars to be principally a catch-all or a useless concept, populism has rarely gone hand-in-hand with historical reflection. Building upon ‘the need to return populism to history’, this article offers an overview of the reasons why populism as a concept and as a potential sequence of historical events seems to fit well in post-Second World War Italy, and aims to suggest areas for further research. At the intersection between conceptual history, democratic theory and discourse-historical analysis, the article explores the continuities and discontinuities of Italian populisms, focusing on the resemioticisation of the concept of civil society and its legacy within historical Italian Fascism, especially during the transition to the so-called Second Republic.
... While some of these positions were shared by other candidates, he was perhaps the most outspoken and persistent radical right candidate in the race, and those attitudes were found to be predictive of support for him before the elections (Rennó, 2020). His discourse is a typical example of the contemporary fourth wave of the far right (Mudde, 2019), and bridges the gap between populism and fascism (Finchelstein, 2019). This profile meant that Bolsonaro had plenty of radical right and anti-liberal policy positions which, given the primacy of ''thick'' over ''thin-centered'' ideology in explaining vote choice, we expect to be the main drivers of support for him in 2018. ...
Contemporary research classifies populism as a thin-centered ideology, which can be attached to different “host” ideologies. Populist attitudes have been found to predict electoral support for populist candidates in Europe and the Americas, albeit still subsidiary to “thick” ideological issue positions. With the concomitant rise of the radical right, the lingering question is how much do populist attitudes actually matter for voting. We test the effects of populist attitudes and ideology on vote choice in a likely case scenario, the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, using data from the Brazilian Election Study. Support for the far right populist candidate, Jair Bolsonaro, is explained by right-wing ideology and illiberal attitudes, with populist attitudes playing a very small role, if any. These results reinforce the idea that populist attitudes may be no more than a flamboyant but ultimately irrelevant packaging to explain the global rise of the far right.
... "The Perón Movement", its patriarch declared, must initially be united under the leadership of one man, although this individual will "afterwards be replaced by organization" (Perón [1948(Perón [ ] 1973. While Perón's writings are oft quoted by his acolytes, Peronism's detractors view them as expressing Peronism's latent authoritarian conceptions of political power (Finchelstein 2010(Finchelstein , 2014(Finchelstein , 2017Germani 1978). 8 This personalist conception of political representation resonates with Claude Lefort's description of totalitarianism as "power concentrated within the limits of the ruling apparatus and, ultimately, in an individual who embodies the unity and will of the people" (Lefort 1986, p. 287). ...
Since 1945, Argentine politics has been largely defined by Peronism, a populist movement established by General Juan Perón. While the ideology of Peronism has shifted and swerved over its seven-decade history, its central emphasis on loyalty has remained constant. This paper examines the notion of “organicity” (organicidad), a Peronist conception of obedience, to elucidate how populist movements valorize discipline and loyalty in order to unify their ranks around sentiment and ritual in the absence of more stable programmatic positions. The original sense of “organicity”, as Perón developed it in his early writings, equated to strict military notions of discipline, obedience, and insubordination. In other words, Perón understood loyalty as an organic conception of discipline that consisted of both unyielding deference for the leader and unwavering commitment to the Peronist Movement. Yet, at particular moments in Argentine political history, Peronist militants either find organicity and loyalty to be intrinsically incompatible, or vocalize definitions of organicity that seem to question the top-down structure of the movement celebrated in Perón’s writings. As a result, among Peronists there is disagreement over what it means to behave organically and loyally. This article draws on extensive ethnographic fieldwork among Peronist militants to argue that populism’s authoritarian preoccupation with fealty attempts to obscure the internal contradictions that result from its lack of clear ideological commitments. However, an emphasis on loyalty cannot produce eternally harmonious uniformity. As Peronists come to view those holding alternate interpretations of their doctrine as heretical and traitorous, their accusations against their comrades reveal the intrinsic fragility of populist unity.
... lichen klimapolitisch orientierten Linkspopulismus sucht. Während Linkspopulismus historisch im Kontext lateinamerikanischer Autokratien politische Prägekraft entfalten konnte (Finchelstein 2017;Prutsch 2019) und in jüngerer Zeit mit Evo Morales (Präsident Boliviens, 2006 eine linkspopulistische Regierung mit einer sozial-ökologischen Programmatik zumindest Mobilisierungserfolge erzielen konnte (Andreucci 2018), haben einige Wahlerfolge linkspopulistischer Parteien und Politiker in liberalen Demokratien das Thema auch hierzulande auf die Forschungsagenda gesetzt. Unser Beitrag schließt an die damit eröffnete Diskussion linkspopulistischer Politikansätze an. ...
The continuing boom in the study of populism raises questions about new approaches to the topic. In research practice, a form of conceptual schematism has taken root that is not always adequately reflected in its rigour, analytical viability and normative orientation. This volume responds to this by examining, further developing and making key concepts accessible for current research topics. The book’s contents include basic questions, concepts and (self-)critiques of populism research: sociology of knowledge, ideology, moralism and normativity; new phenomena and problems: populism and gender, populism and climate politics as well as anti-populism. This is the first volume in the DVPW Populism Group book series. With contributions by Brigitte Bargetz, Tobias Boos, Andreas Eder-Ramsauer, Nina Elena Eggers, Olaf Jann, Jörg Kemmerzell, Victor Kempf, Seongcheol Kim, Heike Mauer, Julian F. Müller, Benjamin Opratko, Veith Selk, Astrid Séville, Jared Sonnicksen, Vincent Streichhahn, Alexander Struwe und Stefan Vennmann.
... Fascism is a relatively new political phenomenon that thrived in the first half of the twentieth century. 1 The political issues characterising the wartime political scene do indeed summarise the times of the twentieth century, rather than a certain historical period in the twentieth century. The concept of fascism has thus far been theorised by many thinkers, including Karl Polanyi, Wilhelm Reich, Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, Theodor Adorno, Michel Foucault and Umberto Eco. ...
This paper seeks an integral part of the two concepts of the political theorist William E. Connolly’s ‘aspirational fascism’ and the intellectual historian Enzo Traverso’s ‘postfascism’, thereby revealing the conceptual relevance of each concept. Its primary purpose is to give details of why movements as depicted by these concepts should be categorised as postfascism, rather than as aspirational fascism, and thereby to unravel these movements that have prospered in advanced countries under liberal democracy. Since fascism emerged in the first half of the twentieth century, many prominent scholars, including the two aforementioned theorists, have been engaged in its discourse. In the light of a comparative analysis, I argue that although Connolly’s aspirational fascism works by deciphering certain far-right movements, it has severe conceptual difficulties. Finally, I conclude that theorists should prefer to use Traverso’s postfascism in that it captures the essence of broader far-right and authoritarian political movements in the West and is more convincing due to its accurate understanding of the key elements of those movements in liberal democracies in terms of involuntary and unconscious practice, rather than in strategical terms.
... Los riesgos tienen hoy su raíz en la amenaza interna de las democracias, en la paradoja de su debilidad, por la cual se puede acceder al poder por medios democráticos y desde él mismo minar sus mecanismos y espacios (Popper, 1995). En estas democracias, se instauran nuevas formas de representación directa líder-pueblo, no mediadas por instancias tradicionales de la democracia, como son las que caracterizan a los populismos (Finchelstein, 2019;Urbinati, 2019). Esta complejidad la destacan Avaro y Sánchez y Sánchez, así como Valdés Ugalde y de la Peña en sus respectivas contribuciones. ...
p>¿Cómo abordar intelectualmente la inmensidad de aristas y transformaciones de lo social que la pandemia del coronavirus ha traído consigo? Mientras asistimos a la violenta aceleración de procesos des estructurantes del orden y a nuevos ordenamientos sociopolíticos, encontramos un reto real en el sólo ejercicio de comprender las dimensiones que la coyuntura trastoca. De fondo, observamos fuerzas contradictorias que mutuamente se cierran el paso: al tiempo que la ciencia se despliega en su carrera contra la enfermedad (con la esperanza de ofrecer certidumbres ante los desafíos emanados) vemos que la pandemia de la Covid-19 significa un evento que, por más que pudo ser prevenido, no encontró posibilidades de ser cabalmente combatido una vez desencadenado. No porque no existiera la técnica para hacerlo, sino por las formas fragmentarias de gestión y convivencia dentro de la estructura del sistema en el que vivimos, aun en su interconexión global.</p
... Although relying on the same temporal narrative form, the difference between the use of victimhood by Trump and Erdoğan is in the degree to which those named as the victimisers, traitors, faithless and enemies are named, punished and persecuted. Finchelstein (2017) argues that one of the main elements that turns populism into neofascism is the move from 'a more or less generic rhetoric of an unidentified enemy (the elites, traitors, outsiders, etc)' (p. 28) to the articulation of an identifiable foe who is met with political violence. ...
This article explores historical victimhood as a feature of contemporary populist discourse. It is about how populist leaders invoke meta-history to make self-victimising claims as a means for consolidating power. I argue that historical victimhood propagates a forked historical consciousness – a view of history as a series of junctures where good fought evil – that enables the projection of alleged victimhood into the past and the future, while the present is portrayed as a regenerating fateful choice between humiliation and a promised golden age. I focus on the cases of the United States and Turkey and examine two key speeches delivered by presidents Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2017. My case-study approach aims to show how the same narrative form of historical victimhood, with its temporal logic and imaginary, latches on widely different contexts and political cultures with the effect of conflating the leader with the people, solidifying divisions in society, and threatening opponents.
... One of the starting factual assumptions of contemporary liberal democratic thought is that individuals have different interests, worldviews, doctrines, and values. Yet populist leaders, as most analytic descriptions of populist parties and movements highlight (Finchelstein, 2017;Moffitt, 2016;Mudde, 2007;Taggart, 2000;Urbinati, 1998;Wolkenstein, 2018), try to replace the pluralist picture with a portrait of a unitary and homogenous body of citizens. In so doing, they address all addressees collectively as 'the people.' ...
This article sheds light upon the role of the audience in the construction and amendment of populist representative claims that in themselves strengthen representative-represented relationships and simultaneously strengthen ties between the represented who belong to different constituencies. I argue that changes in populist representative claims can be explained by studying the discursive relationship between a populist representative and the audience as a conversation in which both poles give and receive something. From this perspective, populist representative claims, I also argue, can be understood as acts of bonding with the intended effect of constituting ‘the people,’ and inputs from the audience can be seen as conversational exercitives. Populist appeals therefore may change when the audience enacts new permissibility facts and signals to populist representatives that there is another way to strengthen relationships between several individuals belonging to otherwise-different constituencies.
... The Plague as metaphor for fascism and the excesses of state authoritarianism is more relevant than ever in a time of the worldwide coronavirus pandemic. There are striking parallels with the rise to power of right-wing populist 'strongmen' around the globe and the way in which populist Indeed, the latest iteration of right-wing populism can be viewed as a reformulation of classic fascism, 'or one might argue a heir to fascism, a post-fascism for democratic times' (Finchelstein, 2017). Based on this reading what follows is a brief overview of right-wing populist responses to the pandemic which is loosely structured around fascistic themes developed by Camus in The Plague. ...
Purpose
This paper aims to explore right wing populist government responses to the coronavirus pandemic.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper is a narrative overview of right-wing populist policies and strategies, which is loosely structured around fascistic themes set out in Albert Camus’ allegorical novel, The Plague .
Findings
Although individual responses to the coronavirus pandemic among right-wing populists differ, they appear to coalesce around four central themes: initial denial and then mismanagement of the pandemic; the disease being framed as primarily an economic rather than a public health crisis; a contempt for scientific and professional expertise; and the “othering” of marginal groups for political ends. Populist responses to the pandemic have given rise to increased levels of xenophobia, the violation of human rights and the denigration of scientific expertise.
Research limitations/implications
This is a narrative overview from a personal viewpoint.
Originality/value
Drawing on themes in Camus' novel The Plague , this is a personal perspective on right wing populist government responses to the coronavirus pandemic. Populist responses to the pandemic have given rise to increased levels of intolerance and xenophobia and the violation of human rights and civil liberties.
... To make the connection more evident, the poster included the logo of 'Frente para la Victoria' (Front for Victory), Kirchner's party at the time. The posters' symbolism fits with Kirchner's life-long affiliation to Argentina's strong Peronist Party, historically known for its authoritarian, demagogical discourse (e.g., Craig, 1976;Finchelstein, 2014Finchelstein, , 2017, conflagrated especially around supposedly helping those in need and fighting for the "victory" of the masses. At that time, Kirchner's supporters commented online, which was quickly picked up by the press (Perfil, 2015), comparing Daenerys' battle for fairness and justice −albeit later derailed and deranged− through helping others and saving slaves to Kirchner's personalistic political style and alleged Left-wing ideals of fighting for and protecting those in need (Houle and Kenny, 2018). ...
Parting from the awareness that not all consumers of U.S. media are located within the geographical and linguistic context of the United States, this paper contributes to media sociology with an approximation to the fandom of transnationally popular texts (Chin and Morimoto, 2013). Empirical findings presented here draw from a broader qualitative study on the reception of the series Game of Thrones (GoT) by 21 viewers from Argentina, Spain, and Germany (García-Rapp, 2021). Here I build on participants’ responses to both the original novels by George R.R. Martin and the series adaptation by HBO as distinctive media texts to explore notions of authorship, adaptation, and cultural legitimacy. Given the polysemic, intertextual quality of contemporary’s memetic culture, I also discuss a case of digital re-appropriation of GoT’s characters within socio-political discourses in Argentina.
... While some of these positions were shared by other candidates, he was perhaps the most outspoken and persistent radical right candidate in the race, and those attitudes were found to be predictive of support for him before the elections (Rennó, 2020). His discourse is a typical example of the contemporary fourth wave of the far right (Mudde, 2019), and bridges the gap between populism and fascism (Finchelstein, 2019). This profile meant that Bolsonaro had plenty of radical right and anti-liberal policy positions which, given the primacy of "thick" over "thin" ideology in explaining vote choice, we expect to be the main drivers of support for him in 2018. ...
Contemporary electoral behavior research classifies populism as a thin-centered ideology, which can be attached to any kind of "thick" or "host" ideology. Studies in Europe and the Americas have found that thin-populist attitudes are predictive of electoral support for populist parties and candidates. This research shows that, while perhaps important, populism is still secondary to "thick" ideological issue positions in determining vote choice. How much does populism actually matter, therefore, is still subject of debate. We test the effects of thin populist attitudes on populist vote choice in a most likely case scenario, the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, using data from the Brazilian Election Study. Our findings suggest that support for the allegedly populist candidate, Jair Bolsonaro, is explained by ideological position and anti-minority attitudes, with populist attitudes playing a very small role, if any. These results reinforce the idea that populist attitudes might be less relevant than often assumed to explain the global rise of populism.
i>This article examines the growing prevalence of populism in global political communication, with a focus on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It analyzes the interplay between Erdoğan's populist discourse and hate speech, with the aim of highlighting the central role that hate speech against political opposition plays in his rhetoric. The article argues that Erdoğan’s polarizing populist rhetoric functions as a euphemism for hate speech and seeks to trace its development in his political speeches. Additionally, the research identifies the specific expressions of hate speech employed by Erdoğan, evaluates their intensity, and explores how his discourse constructs and perpetuates a political 'other.'</i
I periferien af demokratiets ånd eksisterer den stærke leder, der ønsker at blive be-tragtet som legitim varetager af folkesuverænitetens vilje, der ligger til grund fordemokratiet. Inspireret af Max Webers teori om karismatisk lederskab, undersø-ger denne artikel, hvordan den stærke leder kan betragtes som demokratisk legi-tim, såfremt folket overbevises af lederens karisma. Artiklen analyserer, hvordankarismatiske ledere stjæler det politiske rampelys ved at engagere dem selv, deresprivatliv og deres personlighed i deres politiske virke, og dermed politiserer detmenneskelige. Artiklen fokuserer på de italienske politikere, Silvio Berlusconi ogMatteo Salvini og betragter dem som arketyper. Berlusconi er karismatisk, idet haner ekstraordinær og etablerer en vertikal magtstruktur mellem sig selv og sine væl-gere, mens Salvinis relation til vælgerne er horisontal, da han på karismatisk visudstiller sig selv om bemærkelsesværdig almindelig. Endelig argumenterer artiklenfor, at karismatisk lederskab er et nyttigt begreb til at belyse, hvordan underhold-ning og personliggørelse indvirker på moderne politik.
While populism has recently garnered much scholarly attention and media scrutiny, we know little about what citizens think of this phenomenon. We conducted surveys in Canada, the United States, France, and Italy to probe how citizens perceive populism and whether they self-identify as populists or anti-populists. Surprisingly, many respondents do not comprehend the term, equating populism with "being pop-ular" or the "population." Only a small proportion put forth definitions of populism advanced by academics and associate the term with people-centrism or anti-elitism. The ideational approach and populism's "thin-centered" nature is lost on the average citizen. Both supporters and critics of populism frequently link it to charismatic leaders, suggesting that defining populism with a focus on leadership resonates more with the public's perception. Those that self-identify as populists typically equate it with community, democracy, equality, hope, leadership, and giving a voice to the people. However, anti-populists are more critical, likening populism to demagogu-ery and extremism, and describing populist supporters in derisive terms.
We have to live with strongman politics for some time to come. With no obvious political solutions in sight, then, we have to ask fundamental questions about who we are and how we shall live. In the West, moreover, the mainstream church has become increasingly marginalized. So, there are also important questions about the political and social relevance of the church. Nevertheless, I am specifically interested in the identity and practice of theologians in the face of strongman politics. As such, theologians hold a privileged position in the academy, as well as the church. In colloquial terms, we have a platform. So, then, we are more or less public intellectuals. Subsequently, we have an ecclesial and social responsibility to resist strongman politics. Moreover, with the COVID pandemic, the climate crisis, and strongman politics, which are all related, this calls into question our identity and practice as theologians, as well as our ethical commitments, our collaborative spirit, our use of time, and our choice of projects. Nevertheless, the task of resisting strongman politics is complex. It is exacerbated by the pervasive nature of violence. What’s more, resistance itself can escalate violence. In response, I am employing concepts from Michel Foucault in order to reinterpret the theologian’s vocation. In Foucauldian terms, vocation is an expression of subject formation. In the face of strongman politics, the theologian is called to resist strongman politics, where defiance is expressed in terms of counter-conduct and critique. In that sense, Howard Caygill’s concept of resistant subjectivity encapsulates the theologian’s vocation. All this works at two levels. At the personal (or micro) level, this entails the transformation of the theologian. This is the undoing and re-formation of the subject (i.e., de-subjectivation). At the political (or macro) level, and as a result of self-transformation, the theologian engages in the work of resistance in the political space. In this chapter, the focus is primarily on the personal level, which also has wider political implications. In the end, this is more than an exercise in political theology. In the present global crisis, resistance is in fact incumbent on all theologians.
Populism, as a political concept, has garnered substantial attention emerging as a subject of growing global concern. This bibliometric research seeks to investigate the prominence and trends of populism, with a specific emphasis in academic publications in Turkey indexed in Dergipark. The keyword "populism" emerged as the most effective, leading to the exclusion of other keywords from the analysis. The primary objective of this study is to observe the evolving role in academic publications. This analysis does not seek to comprehend the underlying drivers and consequences of populism on democratic values and institutions. Instead, it aims to contribute to the expanding body of knowledge about populism by providing a comprehensive bibliometric analysis of scholarly works. Drawing upon data retrieved from Dergipark, a prominent repository of academic publications, this study will discern publications on populism and its related subtopics, aiming to identify patterns and shifts over time. As a result, this bibliometric analysis will not only underscore the significance of the concept of populism but also lay a foundation for further in-depth research on the topic. By concentrating on Turkey and utilizing data from Dergipark, this study endeavours to enrich the academic understanding of the rise of populism.
In this article, we shall explore how digital populists in Italy and the United States approach the ‘regulation’ of online disinformation in order to understand their approach to constitutions. The field of the measures adopted to combat disinformation seems to us an excellent case study to verify the populists’ constitutional approach. In this article, we will focus on the manipulative and instrumental approach that Italian and US digital populists employ with regard to constitutional texts by looking at the relationship between the instrumental use of freedom of expression clauses by digital populists and the attempts to fight online disinformation by private and public actors.
Commentators often interpret the resentment of supporters of populism as blindly emotional and unconnected to facts and principles. Democratic Respect argues instead that we should approach the populist politics of resentment as a struggle for recognition based on moral experiences that are intimately connected to people's factual and moral beliefs. By associating populist resentment with alleged violations of democratic principles, we can discuss what citizens and governments owe one another in terms of recognition and respect. Populism advances a unique interpretation of democracy and recognition, which Rostbøll confronts with the notion of democratic respect. How democracy should recognize the people is shown to be connected to debates over the meaning and value of democratic procedures, rights, majority rule, compromise, and public deliberation. The book builds a bridge between empirical research and philosophical analysis, while providing insights relevant to a public grappling with the challenges many democracies face today.
Neste ensaio analisamos como o movimento populista encarnado por Bolsonaro se engaja com a história de uma forma que ativa sua base política heterogênea. Esses engajamentos parecem ser diferentes de alguns aspectos das cronossofias modernas, como o abandono da sincronização e a apresentação coerente de uma história nacional. Em vez disso, a nova historicidade populista da extrema direita brasileira se baseia mais no apego afetivo, uma performance histórica pragmática e altamente fragmentada que, como defendemos, mais se assemelha a uma historicidade que chamamos de “atualismo”. Para demonstrar a afinidade que vemos entre essa historicidade chamada de atualismo e a versão específica bolsonarista do chamado neopopulismo, este artigo está dividido em três partes. Primeiro, apresentamos o conceito e a teoria do atualismo. Em seguida, caracterizamos as dimensões neopopulistas do bolsonarismo, ou seja, o movimento cultural e político representado por Jair Bolsonaro. Por fim, analisamos o novo populismo brasileiro em seus engajamentos com a história, especialmente as atuações da história pelos três secretários de cultura do governo Bolsonaro e como a desfactualização da realidade ganha força, criando as condições de possibilidade de o passado ser como um grande guarda-roupa cheio de imagens e modelos de prêt-à-porter.
Jan-Werner Müller’s analysis of ‘authoritarian populism’ represents a highly limited approach to the issue that is typical of many mainstream approaches within populism studies and liberal-democratic constitutional theory. Through a critique of Müller, the article develops an account of the historical emergence of authoritarian populism as a ‘long counter-revolution of the radical right’ against the values and institutions of the social-democratic welfare state. Focussing on the USA and UK, the article shows how, rather than being a novel phenomenon emerging from the fringes in the 1980s and 1990s, authoritarian populism emerges from the middle of the twentieth century as a highly successful form of hegemonic struggle over the Republican and Conservative parties and over American and British societies. The political success of a highly contradictory ideological framework of the radical right has helped to largely normalise a language, rhetoric and imaginary of authoritarian populism and place it at the centre of contemporary politics and culture. By largely ignoring such a development, and the highly contingent nature of North Atlantic ‘democracy’, theorists and commentators like Müller fail to grasp the depth of the current authoritarian populist threat and offer only liberal-democratic mythology in response to the ranting and chanting of ‘fake news’.
O artigo debate as disputas classificatórias contemporâneas em torno de figuras como Trump, Bolsonaro, Le Pen e afins. Sem pretender esgotar essa discussão demasiado ampla, faz-se aqui um balanço bibliográfico possível, apresentando e interrelacionando algumas interpretações. Começa introduzindo, de forma muito sintética e a partir do “Dicionário de conceitos políticos”, parte da bibliografia que define fascismo e populismo e pensa suas relações. Garantido esse entendimento básico, periodiza-se brevemente a extrema-direita no pós-guerra, apresentando suas tipologias e a atualidade do conceito de fascismo.Então, são apresentadas algumas interpretações que mobilizam um ou outro desses conceitos para definir lideranças e partidos contemporâneos como (neo)fascistas, pós-fascistas ou (neo)populistas. Constata-se que, não há consenso quanto ao uso dos conceitos nem para os casos clássicos nem para os atuais.
In discussing conceptions and definitions of fascism, this text offers a new and broader perspective on the phenomenon by introducing the concept of fascization as an analytical tool. Given the fact that the conditions that fascism produced have not been destroyed, its elements have not been delegitimized and that the fascist imagination still exists in European and non-European societies, the author argues that we need a new category connecting the past and present without historicizing fascism. The author identifies practices and forms of fascization in evidence such as the EU anti-migrant and anti-refugee policy as well as racist violence in Germany after reunification. The author critically examines various definitions of fascism and analyses its key characteristics including the fascist community from a psychoanalytical perspective. The author also looks at the historiographical debate concerning the question of whether or not fascism could be considered revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. Making a clear-cut distinction between fascism and National Socialism, the author re-visits the case of Ernst Nolte whose interpretation of the origins of National Socialism resurrected the Nazi Weltanschauung by normalizing and justifying the Nazi campaign against the European Jews.
This article discusses how scholars have analyzed left populist governments in Latin America that include the previously excluded on the condition of their loyalty to the leader. It shows how different normative understandings of democracy have allowed the classification of populism as democratizing, a risk to democracy that could lead to competitive authoritarianism, or a sui generis combination of inclusion and authoritarianism. The paper distinguishes inclusion from democratization, and populists seeking power, from populists in governments, and populist regimes. It argues that the notion of polarized populist democracies captures better their autocratic and inclusionary practices. Populists maintain a commitment to elections hence selectively preserving rights to pluralism, free expression, and association. At the same time, they are authoritarian because populist leaders assume that they embody the people and consider that a section of the population represents the people as a whole, and that their mission is to redeem the people.
Abstract: This article outlines a critical systems theory approach to the study of populism by arguing that populism is an avenue of contestation which assumes a distinct role and function in the existing constitution of the political system. Most notably, it is characterised by the re-entry of a popular sovereignty dimension within regular political procedures. By taking up a critical systems theory perspective, it becomes possible to more precisely distinguish populism from other forms of politics, such as oppositional politics, social movement politics, or procedural constitutional politics. Further, populism’s oscillation between democratic and authoritarian dynamics can be elucidated as an inversion which operates from within its political form. Finally, it is argued that the critical systems theory approach provides a more nuanced understanding of populism’s inherent problems and, consequently, moves beyond a blunt defence or rejection of populism as such.
The paper is an attempt to examine how Carl Schmitt's constitutional theory can be useful to analyse the Constitution of the State of Israel designed in the late 1940s – the impact of which Jacob Taubes once certified. The author analyses three projects created then by Leo Kohn through the prism of Schmitt's concept of Verfassung and Verfassungsgesetz. He also reads in the context of Schmitt's philosophy (from Constitutional Theory and The Nomos of the Earth) the constitutional situation of Israel as a country where, first, the Constitution has not been passed and the basic matter of its legal system is regulated by the Basic Laws; second, citizens of Arab origin are excluded from the national community; and third, the borders of the state remain fluid and change due to the constant partition of the land.
This article examines fellowship and accusations of betrayal among members of a populist movement in contemporary Argentina. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted among self‐described “militants” of the Kirchnerist movement, a contemporary iteration of Peronism, this work makes a uniquely anthropological intervention into existing literature on populist politics, which tends to focus on populism’s demonization of the enemy of “the people.” In contrast, this article argues that a focus on the demonization of an external enemy misses essential dimensions of the social world of Peronist politics, which is primarily characterized by loving bonds of fellowship between Peronist militants. I show how, in moments of uncertainty, this emphasis on fellowship morphs into a preoccupation with treachery, such that concern with the potential insubordination of one’s fellow Peronists eclipses animus towards external enemies. This article argues for greater attention to the lived experiences of adherents to populist movements to encourage a more holistic and nuanced understanding of the social world of populist politics.
This article offers a brief critical summary of our Populism(s) project to date, and introduces Thesis Eleven readers to the articles edited in this Special Issue. We comment on significant recent developments on populism scholarship, and reflect about the most recent developments currently taking place and their (potential) impact on current populism research.
Fascism, Populism and Common Sense in Spain: La Gaceta Literaria, La Conquista del Estado, F.E. y Vértice (1927-1939) focuses on the emergence of Spanish fascism in a crucial period of Spain's history: the end of the monarchy, the proclamation of the Second Republic, the outbreak of the Civil War, and the establishment of Franco’s dictatorship. Drawing on theories about populism and common sense, this work demonstrates the changing and contingent fascist propagandas of the magazines cited in the title in order to appeal to the popular discourses shared by a variety of non- fascist ideologies and organizations. This dissertation poses questions that resonate in today’s controversial situation with the ascendance of extremist populisms and the never- ending presence of the word "fascism" as a rhetorical tool against the opponent in the political debate.
Deploying a transnational approach, the article follows the explanatory framework of diffusion theories in aiming to provide a new perspective on the rise of national-populist actors across different sociopolitical and national-historical settings, in the context of ever-increasing interdependence and transfers of ideas. Thus, it focuses on reconceiving national-populist units not as evolving detached from one another, but rather influencing and providing discursive frames for each other, even in the context of non-institutionalized, indirect connections. For demonstrating the theoretical claims about diffusing ideas and transnational modes of borrowing in the European context, the article discusses the evolution of national-populist discourses in post-communist Georgia through an example of the emergence and exclusionary agenda of a social movement, “Georgian March.” Locating the case within diffusion models, the analysis scrutinizes discursive strategies and incorporation of “the West” in the movement’s discourse over the process of its collective identity construction. Thus, the article focuses on mediated experiences as providing models for certain behaviors; new roles and uses of social media as direct political platforms and channels for diffusions and borrowings; the factor of mutual references as tools for self-legitimization and mutual identification; and the relevance of borrowings and emulation among national-populist actors.
The coronavirus pandemic has suddenly and fast emerged, bringing new challenges on a global scale. Brazil and the United States have been for months the two countries with most cases and deaths by Covid-19 in the world, until India surpassed Brazil, and only on the number of cases. Therefore, there are similarities in the way their presidents have been dealing with the crisis. Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro have been in standout on international media by their poor leadership in face of the crises created by the pandemic. Both presidents have politicized the crisis, standing against scientific evidence and world recommendations. Contrary to social isolation, they have antagonized governors and mayors, intensifying conflicts despite the lost lives, disqualifying the media as fake news. Given that, this paper aims to analyse how the populist leaders, in Brazil and in the United States, have responded to the coronavirus crisis in terms of actions and discourses. For this purpose, we analyse tweets from both their official Twitter accounts, on the period from the first official recorded case until the milestone of 100 thousand deaths in each country.
This paper argues theoretically and illustrates empirically that the border and populism are mutually constitutive concepts. Borders are basic elements in the process of decontestation of "the people" and the construction of exclusion and inclusion narratives, which are at the centre of any successful populist strategy. Meanwhile different dimensions of populism, such as antagonism, morality, idealisation of society, popular sovereignty and personalistic leadership, can be found in the articulation and reproduction of bordering claims and practices. To show the interplay between populism and borders, the electoral manifestos of four radical right populist parties-Vox, Rassemblement National, UKIP and Brexit Party-are quantitatively and qualitatively analysed and compared. The interactions between borders and populism exposed in this paper illustrate that they can be considered not only as objects of analysis, but also as epistemic frameworks to understand each other. Further cross-fertilisation between these interdisciplinary areas of studies is desirable.
Günümüzde faşizmin gölgesi, başta Avrupa olmak üzere farklı bölgelerde hızla yayılmakta olan popülist hareketler aracılığıyla gittikçe belirginleşmektedir. Bu makale, birleştirilmiş karşılaştırma ile desteklenen bağlamsal siyasi analiz yöntemiyle günümüz popülizmi ile faşist ataları arasındaki ortaklıkları ortaya koyarak, insanlığın karşı karşıya olduğu tehlikeyi vurgulamayı amaçlamaktadır. Ekonomik sorunlar, toplumsal memnuniyetsizlik ve umutsuzluk gibi çevresel koşullar faşist ve popülist rejimlerin farklı zamanlarda içerisine doğdukları çevrelerdeki benzerliklere işaret ederken, elitizm karşıtlığı, çoğunlukçuluk, revizyonizm ve demokrasi karşıtlığı gibi eğilimler, bu yönetimlerin genel uygulama ve yöntemlerindeki ortaklıkları vurgular, bu hareketler arasındaki doğrudan bağı tarihsel bir düzleme yerleştirir. Popülist yönetimlerin güçlenerek çoğalmasıyla yaklaşan iki boyutlu tehlikeyi analiz edebilmek de ancak geçmişteki faşist öncüllerinin ulusal ve uluslararası ölçekte yarattığı derin etkileri incelemekle mümkündür. Karşılaştırmalı bir perspektiften gerçekleştirilen bu çalışma, bugün liberal demokrasinin ve liberal uluslararası sistemin yüz yüze geldiği tehdidi, geçmişte karşılaşılan olay ve olgular üzerinden incelemektedir. Yirmi birinci yüzyılda faşizm, aşırı sağ eğilimlerden beslenen popülizm kılığında tekrar dünyaya gelmiştir ve yüz yıl önceki hedeflerine aynı kararlılıkla saldırmaya devam etmektedir. Bu gerçeğin gözden kaçması, aynı hataların tekrarlanması anlamına gelecek ve benzer sonuçların doğmasına yol açacaktır.
Used and abused by journalists and politicians, the concept of populism has always struggled to command respect in the scientific arena. The difficulties of defining its essence and circumscribing its range of applications have determined a contradictory destiny among political scientists, sociologists, philosophers and historians with sudden bursts of popularity and long periods of abandonment, interspersed with critical reinterpretations leaning towards scepticism. The electoral successes of populist parties and leaders in many countries since the late 1990s has revived the academic debate and fuelled a large amount of studies and research. This focus aims to detect and discuss some interesting contributions to the understanding of the features and causes of this phenomenon, that arise from the recent literature on the topic.
An enduring theme in US politics is tension between people on the right who favor limited government that serves individual and elite interests and people on the left who prefer active government with emphasis on a broader public interest. Recently, though, the political landscape has shifted toward a far-right authoritarian populism with parallels to mid-twentieth century fascism. This shift represents a splitting, or polarization, in American politics, revealing characteristics of the nation that were thought to have largely disappeared in an increasingly progressive twenty-first century. The essay examines this new reality and explores potential future effects on US society.
Key Terms: Authoritarian populism, cultural context, fascism, post-truth, white nationalism.
What is the relationship between right-wing populism and contemporary fascism? How has fascism changed since the 1920s? And how do the answers to these questions concern a global shift that can be called the Great Unsettling—including a postmodern fracturing of prior modern ‘certainties’ about the nature of subjectivity, political practice and meaning, deconstructing the consequences of ‘truth’? This essay seeks to respond to these questions by first going back to foundational issues of defnition and elaborating the meaning of populism and fascism in relation to their structural ‘moving parts’. Using this alternative scaffolding, the essay argues that right-wing populism and an orientation to postmodern fascism represented by Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro have converged. The context of this convergence is a globalizing shift that now challenges democratic politics.
Longe de voltar a discutir as grandes teorias do populismo, debate resgatado recentemente por excelentes trabalhos (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Finchelstein, 2017; Mény, 2019; Urbinati, 2019), o objetivo do livro Populismo: teorias e casos é apresentar um diálogo interdisciplinar entre cientistas políticos, economistas e historiadores internacionalmente reconhecidos como especialistas no tema em questão.
As contribuições apresentam teorias originais e inovadoras, frutos de longas reflexões e de rigorosos trabalhos de campo sobre casos específicos, divididas em duas partes. Na primeira parte, o leitor encontra estudos de cunho teórico político, enquanto a segunda parte se dedica à análise de casos nacionais, representando o crescimento do populismo ao redor do mundo com foco privilegiado no Brasil, no Portugal e na Itália – considerados laboratórios contemporâneos das principais tendências populistas em países latino-americanos e europeus, respetivamente.
This article analyses the effect of the anti-Enlightenment tradition on the functioning of the European Union. This tradition covers a lack of belief in liberal values, human rights, egalitarianism, the rule of law, individualism, tolerance, and the respectful cooperation among people. Its ideological background is not new: its existence is also the reason why scholars started to talk about post-fascism in the twenty-first century. In a number of European Union member states, where autocratic tendencies have recently been witnessed (like in Hungary or Poland), it started to dominate decision-making, while its presence is also visible elsewhere, like in the UK, Germany, and Italy. This article selects four prime examples (the rule of law backlash, refugee law, Brexit, and changes to the single market) to show how arguments containing elements of the anti-Enlightenment tradition are used in a cynical way to support partisan and oppressive politics while maintaining a seemingly inclusive façade of democratic decision-making. In the European Union, this can result in dubious, un-explained measures and great policy changes both at EU and member state level.
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