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Chapter Eight. The French Developmental State as Myth and Moral Ambition
... Developmental state theorists have written extensively on this collective solidarity, calling it a 'developmental mindset' or 'developmental determination', which if absent makes citizens unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices for national growth (Thurbon, 2016;Woo-Cumings, 2019). Consequently, many post-war Western governments, such as France, cannot be classified as a developmental state even though industrial policy was heavily used, because they lacked a 'solidaristic vision' around a common mission (see Loriaux, 1999). Whatever the precise terminologies, East Asian development is clearly an instance of missiondirected governance because the entire public consciousnessand not just disparate actors in governmentwas cohesively directed towards a common mission. ...
Recently, scholars have advanced an ideal of the entrepreneurial state in which industrial policy is pursued in a mission-directed manner. Crucially, this perspective does not merely call for the heavier use of industrial policy, but envisions the state as a central focal point, mobilising society around the pursuit of a common mission. Using the historical example of East Asia's developmental state, which closely resembles its contemporary variant, I demonstrate that mission-directionality – should it be consistently applied – tends towards the pursuit of a singular overarching mission, and could require the use of authoritarian and disciplinary mechanisms to sustain mission focus in an environment of uncertainty. In turn, this potential risk arises because mission-directionality seeks to transcend the otherwise directionless nature of market-based and democratic decision-making through the use of bureaucratic discretion, to align the behaviour of social actors in a cohesive and directional manner.
... Tied to the use of new materials and possibilities, in modernist vein, France built a very large amount of highrise housing, much of it in enormous complexes called grandes ensembles (Dufaux and Fourcaut 2004). Here the state and 'championed' big businesses worked together to reconstruct French political economy (Loriaux 1999). It was commonplace for such firms to reserve numerous apartments in the French HLMs (habitations à loyer modéré or low-income housing) for their employees. ...
Response to need, or providing for the requirements of social reproduction, form two apparent causes of public housing action. In both cases, the state intervenes in response to market failure. While these may be underlying truths, it is equally valid and important to look at the ideological context which motivates and powers the process; a context which is bound to reflect in the impact of the housing once constructed. This paper points to several different 20th century contexts for large-scale housing projects in Europe and in Africa. Turning to South Africa, the paper looks at the changing ideological context of public housing and the impact of societal goals going far beyond the provision of worker accommodation and also raises more questions than just the familiar racial separation issues. The paper seeks to integrate findings from different periods and locational spaces, making use of research over many decades.
... Employing a range of rhetorical, discursive, and ideological tools, developmental state policies are presented as "necessary for one to live a good life". This is precisely the "solidaristic vision" and "moral ambition" said to be central to developmental states (Loriaux 1999). Consequently, the pro-business policies of the developmental state are not only actively pursued but are also strongly legitimised in the cultural realm. ...
Developmental state scholars argue that through “embedded autonomy”, state activism can steer society towards positive outcomes without capture by private interests. This paper questions this claim through a case study of such activism in Singapore. It argues that not only may rent-seeking have been encouraged by Singapore’s use of industrial policy but that such a policy goes hand in hand with attempts by state actors to create an economic culture that legitimises such behaviour. The wider implication drawn is that mission-oriented state activism may require extensive cultural engineering to foster consensus over the relevant “missions”, but this level of social penetration also increases the risk of private interests capturing the state in less visible ways.
... The reason is found in the nature of developmental states, which rely on performance legitimacy and use their state capacity to forge a national consensus over growth (Chu, 2016;Haggard, 2018). The citizenry as a whole must buy into the national mission of growth and make the necessary sacrifices asked for by the state-called a "solidaristic vision" (Loriaux, 2019) or a "developmental mindset" (Thurbon, 2016). ...
Why have Singapore’s unique developmental state arrangements persisted in a region which has experienced democratic change? This paper argues that this is due to the PAP state’s successful legitimation of its unique brand of meritocracy, one which has both competitive and interventionist elements. During the colonial era, a culture of economic meritocracy evolved in a bottom-up process through social and commercial interactions between the British class and Chinese community. This was then transmuted by the PAP’s top-down imposition of the institutions and discourses of political meritocracy. This cultural hybrid allows the state to sustain its hegemony in the face of progressive social change. Accordingly, our emphasis on the wider institutional environment within which merit is conceived helps to better illuminate Singapore’s challenges of encouraging organic innovation, alleviating social stratification, and opening up its political arena. This paper suggests that the problems in these areas stem not from meritocracy per se, but from the PAP’s “monocentric meritocracy” where merit is narrowly defined and singularly imposed in the post-colonial era.
... Doing this necessitates the elaboration and specification of "East Asian" concepts as they apply to public policy studies more broadly. We know that the developmental state model has been applied by Michael Loriaux (1999) to the French dirigiste approach. This exercise could be extended to other countries, as suggested by Ornston and Vail (2016), who underlined how the focus on the developmental state remained exclusive to the literature on developing countries but could be also fruitfully applied to advanced industrial societies. ...
East Asian policy transfer and diffusion is conceived as following a “flying geese” model but transformations in the region challenged this hierarchical leader‐follower relationship between countries. Based on the articles in this Special Issue, this article seeks to nuance the flying geese dynamics of policy transfer. New types of transfer agents afford a different view of agency in policy transfer. Modes of governance and administrative traditions increasingly shape transfer dynamics and its tempo. Historical relations between countries increasingly affect the perception of legitimacy and appropriateness of policies to be borrowed. Most cases point to the transfer of specialized and successful models or recipes within national and subnational entities. There is a notable variety of temporalities in transfer, often intermediated by experimentation and an active but often limited “search” for solutions. We conclude by presenting an agenda for future research about policy transfer and diffusion beyond the flying geese model in East Asia.
... Данное сочетание было выражено в форме устойчивой комплементарности интересов представителей государства и частного сектора, в первую очередь -крупного бизнеса, нацеленных на реализацию стратегий догоняющего развития. В этих странах особую роль сыграл бюрократический аппарат, использовавший политическую волю и административные компетенции в интересах всего общества, а не узких групп специальных интересов (Loriaux, 1999). По замечанию Ф. Фукуямы, «бюрократический аппарат такого сорта, что возник в Японии, Корее и Тайване, не появляется из рук технократов, его корни питают многовековые традиции бюрократии мандаринов (китайских чиновников), специфические для каждой из упомянутых стран; другими словами, веберианское государство имеет исторический прецедент в азиатских обществах и поэтому гораздо менее восприимчиво к укреплению неопатримониализма или государственного протекционизма» (Фукуяма, 2006: 59-60). ...
The presented article was carried out within the framework of scientific project dedicated to Russia's participation in the export and import of institutions. The solid question arose that the conditions and specificity of Russia's place in these processes are related to its position in the global world economy. These problems are considered within the framework of competing concepts of catch-up and forward-looking development in the economic literature. Comparative characteristics of methodological foundations, provisions and normative recommendations of these concepts are highlighted in the article. The analysis shows that there is no ground to justify the absolutization of their differences. Representatives of competing approaches came to the conclusion that it was necessary to search for the optimal configuration of imported and genuine institutions at the level of specific problems of development of countries that were largely on the periphery of the modern global economy. This configuration provides productive orientation of economic actors and creation of favorable conditions for the development of Schumpeterian type innovations. The solution of these tasks is linked with the formation and activities of developmental state. The functions of such a state are fundamentally different from compensating market failures that is characteristic of developed market economy. Such a state acts as a subject that forms the basic institutions of the economic system. Fundamental importance is its ability to ensure the combination of selective imports of institutions with the modification of genuine institutions that have historical and cultural specificity. Characteristics of the reasons and conditions for the successful solution of these tasks by countries such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, are highlighted in the article. The success stories are compared to the experience of partial failure of developmental state in Brazil. The fulfilled study is of interest not only for positive analysis, but also for the elaboration of normative recommendations for the formation of optimal configuration of imported and genuine institutions in contemporary Russia.
... 2. EPRDF's political discourse of "developmentalism" is rooted in the theory of the developmental state. The developmental state, according to Loriaux (1999), is "an embodiment of a normative or moral ambition to use the interventionist power of the state to guide investment in a way that promotes a certain solidaristic vision of national economy" (p. 24). ...
For nearly three decades, Ethiopia's current ruling party, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), has maintained its power through a highly centralized, vanguard party system. Recently, the Ethiopian government has extensively used the provisions of the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (EATP) to prosecute several Ethiopian citizens and organizations that are critical of the ruling party. By framing the adoption and execution of the EATP as an outcome of EPRDF's long-term hegemonic project coalesced in neopatrimonialism, this paper demonstrates how the Ethiopian State has created a rational-legal bureaucracy that exploits terrorism narratives to stifle critical speech on digital as well as traditional media. The result is the making of an online public that is unsure of what could be considered as a "terrorist" message as opposed to "normal" speech, who, in an attempt to not take the risk altogether, may avoid participating in political discourse. While the disbandment of the neopatrimonial order is key in dislodging Ethiopia's legislative bottlenecks to civic liberties, a more urgent task calls for a move toward participatory, inclusive, and equitable Internet policy framework.
... With the rejection of the reform propositions, the only way of financing the development became clear: the development plans would be financed by the IOs credits and remittances. That is, technocrats would never perform strict fiscal financial and monetary policies like their French or Japanese counterparts did (Johnson, 1982;Loriaux, 1999). In this sense, the achievement of the ISI would have been dependent mainly on foreign resources. ...
... been largely narrowed. The developmental state should be seen as a 'moral ambition' according to Loriaux (1999), while Fine (2013) noted that the concept was retrospective, not predictive, and was a model to aspire to, not to create forecasts. 15 Haggard (2013) argued that the most enduring contribution of the developmental state paradigm was its observation that the character and capacity of the state can become a driver of growth. ...
... Par ailleurs, la maîtrise de l'inflation et la consolidation progressive des finances publiques permettent au pays de bénéficier d'une balance des paiements courants excédentaire au milieu des années 2000 (Chauffour, 2018). Ces marges de manoeuvre nouvelles favorisent l'émergence d'une « vision du monde » développementaliste parmi les élites nationales, dans laquelle la transformation techno-industrielle et la compétitivité sont érigées en objectif national de premier rang et suscitent une adhésion très générale à l'activisme stratégique de l'État (Loriaux, 1999). Nous ne suggérons pas, ici, que l'État marocain correspondrait de près à l'idéal-type de l'État développeur 12 . ...
Cet article interroge la capacité des associations marocaines d’irrigants (AUEA) à renforcer la position sociale et politique locale de leurs dirigeants. Il se demande, en particulier, dans quelle mesure le leadership associatif confère aux dirigeants une légitimité procédurale particulière (throughput), fondée sur leur élection et sur leur capacité à représenter un collectif; en même temps qu’une légitimité par les résultats (outputs) liée à leur gestion efficace d’un service collectif très valorisé. Pour l’évaluer, nous étudions le processus d’aménagement, toujours en cours, d’un périmètre irrigué de taille réduire (300 hectares) situé dans l’arrière-pays de Casablanca. Le projet semble en effet propice à cette double légitimation : d’une part, l’association d’irrigants est l’une des rares de la région, ce qui pourrait offrir à ses dirigeants une légitimité procédurale distinctive; d’autre part, leur légitimité par les résultats pourrait être soutenue par le caractère innovant du projet, l’eau d’irrigation provenant d’une station de traitement des eaux usées urbaines. Malgré ces conditions favorables, nous montrons que les dirigeants associatifs ont plutôt vu jusqu’à présent leur légitimité fragilisée, tant du fait de la forte hétérogénéité du collectif à représenter que des multiples délais entourant la fourniture du service. Au-delà de facteurs circonstanciels, nous pointons une cause structurelle à ces difficultés : la désarticulation entre un processus ancien de décharge participative, qui se poursuit, et la réaffirmation actuelle d’un État développeur qui centralise les décisions et concentre les ressources.
... 74 Loriaux similarly noted the breakdown of the École nationale d'administration-derived moral orientation behind French indicative planning as private sector pathologies over pay, pointless expansion by firms, and real conflicts over market share infected ex-bureaucrats parachuted into the private sector. 75 Successful firms began hiring bureaucrats to influence the bureaucracy, reversing the flow of influence that amakudari and pantouflage generated. ...
How and why did comparative political economy (CPE) lose sight of the sources of growing macroeconomic and political instability, a problem that encompassed a growing financial bubble and then a crash in the housing market, a period of sluggish growth that plausibly constitutes secular stagnation, and a crisis of political legitimacy manifesting itself in the rise of antisystem “populist” parties? A gradual shift in CPE’s research agenda from macroeconomic to microeconomic concerns, and from demand-side to supply-side explanations, diminished its ability to analyze adequately the central economic and political problems of the past twenty years. This article traces CPE’s evolution through successive “supermodels” that constituted its core research foci. To understand the current crisis, CPE needs to revisit and update its original roots in Keynes, macroeconomics, and the demand side. This shift is already happening at the margins, as CPE scholars struggle to understand the current crisis.
... Observers of some advanced economies have concurred with this emphasis on the ideational foundation. Writing on France, Loriaux (1999) contends that, even though the bureaucratic structure of the French state and the ways it mobilized bank credits to shape economic decisions were remarkably similar to the cases of Japan and South Korea, the French state was not "developmental." Not only had the country developed before such strategic intervention was undertaken, the country lacked the "solidaristic vision" and the "moral ambition" that were central to a developmental state. ...
The rapid economic transformations of Japan and, later, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and other second-tier East Asian newly industrializing countries have since the 1970s daunted observers around the world. The “developmental state” is one of the most influential ideas that have been put forth to make sense of the drama. Johnson (1982, 1995), in presenting a pioneering study of Japan, identified the developmental state as one that gives priority to economic growth, productivity, and technological competitiveness. It is led by a small, elite bureaucracy recruited from the best managerial talents, which provides leadership through the formulation of industrial policies. Furthermore, a pilot agency within the bureaucracy exists to coordinate the policy formulation and implementation. Such industrial policies do not displace the market, but gear to market rationality in the long term. Finally, it is facilitated by a political system that gives sufficient room for the bureaucracy to take initiatives (see Öniş 1991).
... The budget increases that had provided the bureaucracy with political power were stopped and a policy of balanced 8 Amakudari also motivates talented university graduates to become bureaucrats, despite a relatively low salary and long working hours (Muramatsu 1994:61-65). In France, there exists a similar, or even more extensive practice, called pantouflage (Loriaux 1999). 9 Complex historical factors resulted in a particular type of corporatism in Japan. ...
... Nevertheless, the voluntarism around the French state persists. Thus, Loriaux (1999) argues that the authority and legitimacy of France's developmental state remains: 'the power to identify problems and provide these problems with solutions is ineluctably informed by our mythological constructions of the world and by the moral ambitions that nest within those constructions' (p. 274). ...
This paper considers French economic performance in comparative perspective since the 1990s in the light of the national capitalisms literature. It up-dates earlier decomposition analysis of employment and consumption trends to determine any possible trends towards demarketisation and/or decommodification as part of an analysis of changing role of the state. It discusses trends in French global integration in general and particularly changes in the financial system to provide the basis for assessing the future for French state policy activism. Finally it argues that the complex links between profitability, investment and employment merit further exploration in the French case.
... It turns out then that the U.S. state was more developmental in its practice than the European states, which were often more explicitly developmental in their ideology (Loriaux, 1999). In the United States, the state, particularly through the military, mobilized society to participate in the market, while in Europe, the state incorporated society into itself on a greater scale through the institution of the "national champion." ...
This article examines the conditions under which firms in different economies were able to emerge as significant actors in
the global computer industry during different time periods. To achieve this, the article divides into three periods the history
of the industry in terms of the three major policy regimes that have supported the dominant firms and regions. It argues that
these policy regimes can be thought of as state developmentalisms that take significantly different forms across the history
of the industry. U.S. firms’ dominance over their European counterparts in the 1950s and 1960s was underpinned by a system
of “military developmentalism” where military agencies funded research, provided a market and developed infrastructure, but
also demanded high quality products. The “Asian Tigers”—Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea—in the 1970s and 1980s
were able to eclipse their Latin American and Indian rivals due in large part to the significant advantages offered by a highly
effective system of “bureaucratic developmentalism,” where bureaucratic elites in key state agencies and leading business
groups negotiated supports for export performance. The 1990s saw the emergence of a system of “network developmentalism” where
countries such as Ireland and Israel were able to emerge as new nodes in the computer industry by careful economic and political
negotiation of relations to the United States, reestablished at the center of the industry, and by more decentralized forms
of provision of state support for high-tech development. Finally, the conditions under which new regimes can emerge are a
consequence of the unanticipated global consequences of previous regimes. While state developmentalisms have been shaped by
existing global regimes, they have promoted further and different rounds of industry globalization.
... Many American experts acknowledged the fact that structural differences between industrial and developing countries required different types of policies (Krampf 2009a). Countries, both developing and developed, employed policies that deviated from the Anglo-American free-market convention (Johnson 1982;Loriaux 1999; for cases of developing countries see Woo-Cumings 1999;Haggard and Lee 1993;Sikkink 1991). Therefore, the fact that pro-market ideas and prescriptions dominated economic discourse in Israel during the late 1950s cannot be explained solely as part of an international trend. ...
Argument
Following World War II, as macroeconomics and econometrics became a necessary tool for policy-making, economists worldwide rose in influence. Those economists in peripheral and new countries were especially important as they could wield the instruments essential in forming states. Israel was no exception. In Israel this process was associated with the establishment of the economics department at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the Falk Project, led by Don Patinkin and the community of economists that he nurtured. This article poses three questions regarding Patinkin's influence and his role in the process of state formation. First, how did he affect economic policy discourse in Israel; second, what role did Patinkin and his students play in the process of state formation; and finally, what was the effect of Patinkin and his students on Israeli government policies? I argue that Patinkin had a specific and irreducible influence on the localization of pro-market ideas and policies in Israel, and that he and his students contributed to the consolidation of the state autonomy and capacity. Furthermore, I argue that they contributed to a more strict implementation of the recession policy in the mid-1960s.
... This argument has later been confirmed by a large literature on the 12 Evans (1995). 13 Because of its conception of the missions of the state, France has been analysed as a particular form of developmental state; see Loriaux (1999). 14 Brautigam (1995). ...
Asian developmental states do not rely on high levels of taxation. Their key features are the capacity to commit and intervene credibly in the form of policies directed towards growth rather than taxation. These features are often lacking in sub-Saharan Africa where the problem is compounded by three main constraints that prevent taxation from financing African states in a developmental way: their dependence on commodities, the effects of trade liberalisation, and the impact of aid, which provides incentives that may undermine the tax structures and key institutions of recipient countries. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has the potential to transform Pakistan’s economy through economic cooperation, large-scale infrastructure projects and other forms of investment. Many observers fear, however, that the CPEC will become the “New East India Company,” effectively turning Pakistan into a Chinese client state. Through extensive interviews with key stakeholders in Pakistan as well as documentary research, we weigh the arguments on both sides of this debate. While the CPEC has the potential to become what many fashionably term a “game changer” for Pakistan, economic and social problems will likely prevent the country from fully realizing the CPEC’s transformative potential. On the other hand, the CPEC seems likely to expand the China–Pakistan relationship beyond its historical military and security emphasis to bring substantial social and economic benefits to Pakistan, while the complexity of the Pakistan case makes comprehensive “colonization” unlikely.
This Element qualifies the common understanding of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as mere instruments of the state and instead conceive of them as economic actors in their own right. Specifically, SOE top management teams have leeway to diverge from goals that the state they are owned by pursues. Through 'institutional work' they can even actively shape the institutional framework in which they are embedded. However, the extent of SOE top management teams' leeway for agency is determined by macro- (country), meso- (State–SOE governance system), and industry-level factors. These factors, in turn, vary from country to country and over time. In other words, SOE agency is 'embedded agency.' Combining institutional work and historical institutionalism analytic lenses, this Element presents a multilevel model to understand embedded agency of top management teams of SOEs in contemporary capitalism. The model adds an important element to our understanding of the 'new state capitalism.'
Observers in academia and media alike have observed a return of ‘French ideas’ in the European Union (EU), equated with the legacy of dirigisme. However, there has been relatively little interest in why economic voluntarism remained so resilient in French government discourse. After all, the country has been a central actor in the making of embedded neoliberalism in Europe and implemented market reforms no less profound than in other member states. French material interests only provide a partial explanation for this discursive resilience. This paper builds on discursive institutionalism to explain how dirigiste communicative discourse and neoliberal coordinative discourse interact and jointly shape the French government’s input into EU politics. Using secondary literature and original empirical material based on the uses of the ‘European sovereignty’ concept between 1995 and 2017, I show that Heroic Industrial Policy Discourse is used to justify the extension of (EU-driven) market logics into all spheres of public action in France on the grounds that this will, at an indeterminate future, lead to the implementation of dirigisme on a grander scale.
The discovery of oil in Chad in the 1960s and its subsequent exploitation triggered the idea by international institutions that oil extraction would lead to sustainable development. Furthermore, Chad in tackling the resource curse would use rents to solve social, economic and security challenges on its territory. I argue that the state is the main actor in the resource curse, and its power derives rents from natural resources extraction. The curse emerges under local or international institutional pressures even if political outcomes are contextual and based on local norms. Drawing on theories of rentier state and developmental state, this paper seeks to critically explore local and international pressures that pull the state towards rentier behaviors resulting in poor local development outcomes.
The role of the state is highly contested in the study of the political economy of development. After World War II (WWII), development theory envisioned an activist role for the state, whether in terms of injecting capital investment into the economy, pursuing import substitution industrialisation, or facilitating the economy’s move towards “higher stages of growth”. Key to such approaches is the belief that central planning was desirable or even necessary to realise economic growth. This did not necessarily imply full-scale central planning as in the Soviet Union, but a variety of developmental planning approaches persisted until the 1980s (Perkins et al., 2012, pp. 130–137).
This chapter presents an analysis of Singapore as an emblematic case of the modern-day meritocracy, positing that its meritocracy has evolved, over time, a “parentocracy” that extends and consolidates the lead of wealthy children over their less privileged counterparts. The chapter begins by underscoring the value of meritocracy as a system that is able to facilitate social mobility, spot talent, and usher economic growth. However, attention is also drawn to its downside, which includes a society-wide fixation on measurable indicators such as academic grades, the ossification of class boundaries that makes it hard to identify disadvantaged talents, and ultimately the loss of social cohesion wrought by a class-divided society. The chapter discusses policy interventions that the government has implemented and highlights some paradoxes that these policy levers bring to bear. The chapter argues that meritocracy remains a work-in-progress and that Singapore’s continued flourishing requires that policymakers and other stakeholders imagine meritocracy afresh, keep alive its original intent of opening pathways for all, but also ensure that the system evolves to characterize success more broadly, lift the disadvantaged in society, and disrupt social closures associated with class, race, and gender.
Cette thèse cherche à évaluer la politique de développement mise en œuvre par les autorités mongoles entre 1990 et 2016. Elle s’articule autour de la question de recherche suivante : Entre « malédiction des ressources », sinophobie et dépendance, comment la Mongolie démocratique et libérale fait-elle face au défi du développement économique pour préserver son indépendance et sa souveraineté et éviter d'être « transformée en une simple annexe de matières premières » pour la Chine ? À travers ce prisme, cette thèse ambitionne de rendre compte du processus de transition suivi par la Mongolie après 1990. L’objectif est de proposer une description du nouveau système politico-économique qui a vu le jour, donc des spécificités de son capitalisme. Outre cette contribution aux études mongoles, cette thèse entend également permettre de mieux comprendre les défis auxquels sont confrontés les États riches en matières premières dans leur processus de développement. Enfin, elle entend contribuer à expliquer les mécanismes qui ont conduit à la divergence observée dans les processus de transitions politique et économique des pays postsocialistes.
The economics of the authoritarian regime of Francisco Franco in Spain are often narrowed to a bespoke form of fascism. This paper suggests that this regime’s rather inchoate economic regimes were in fact a series of experiments that blended varieties of statism and liberalism. Thus, a form of import-substitution industrialization colored by Italian fascist features (1939-1959) lasted fifteen years longer in Spain than in the country of importation. In contrast, a local version of French developmentalism (1964-1975) was largely in sync with what was being tried in France at the time. However, this French developmentalist template imbued with fiscal Keynesianism was layered with liberal economic projects, particularly in the monetary policy arena. But while fascist import substitution (the so called “autarky”) collapsed mostly due to its internal problems, Spain’s translation of French developmentalism was associated with economic growth and was only extensively damaged by the crisis of the global capitalist core ushered by the 1973 oil shock. Critically, while in the symbolic terrain of Spanish politics the liberal economic projects that accompanied the local translation of French developmentalism were always associated with reformist and even “dissident” elite circles, the stigma of developmentalism’ association with the core elites of authoritarianism removed developmentalism as a source of alternatives to the liberal economic reforms ushered by Spain’s transition to liberal democracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
The scholarship on the developmental state has been influential in some scholarly arenas, and virtually ignored in others such as human geography. Recognizing this conceptual lacuna, the purpose of this paper is to review the developmental state theory and its use in diverse fields, examine arenas of human geographic research where the application of the theory has been successful and propose arenas where the theory can prove to be beneficial. To that end, the paper first, discusses the theoretical concepts, analytical tools, theoretical relevance and limitations of developmental state theory. Since, a major focus of state scholars has been to examine various dimensions of state-industry relationships, the paper additionally, explains the state’s role in determining industrial location patterns and in framing industrial policies in the present period of neoliberalism. Next, it encapsulates the arenas in which the developmental state approach has proved to be useful. This includes studies that have analyzed the state’s role in fostering economic development, promoting welfare, shaping transnational agreements, creating private sector partnerships and in providing environmental protection. The paper then analyzes ways in which insights from the theory have informed human geographic scholarship and explains how the scope of both developmental state and human geography can be broadened by examining the state’s relation with other sectors that have been undertheorized including the agricultural sector. Finally, the paper explains how the theory can be productive in two branches of human geography including economic and labor geography.
South Africa’s national constitution makes a case for democratic and developmental local governance. Combined with the constitution, key local government laws, policies and strategies provide the governance framework to deliver democratic and developmental local governance.
The governing African National Congress has attempted to fashion a democratic developmental state at the national level. At the local governance level, ANC-led governments have attempted to create democratic developmental cities.
This article will look at the progress made at establishing democratic and developmental local government in South Africa, specifically the attempts to create democratic developmental cities. It will do so by looking at specifically at local governance at the metropolitan cities. It measures success against progress made as outlined in the national constitution and key local governance laws, policies and strategies.
It looks at strategic challenges and provides some recommendations for consideration to deepen democratic and developmental local governance in South Africa.
After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, the Japanese government tried to democratize energy policy-making by introducing public participation. Over the course of its implementation, however, public participation came to be subordinated to expert committees as the primary mechanism of policy rationalization. The expert committees not only neutralized the results of public participation but also discounted the necessity of public participation itself. This trajectory of public participation, from its historic introduction to eventual collapse, can be fully explained only in reference to complex interactions between the macroinstitutions and microsituations of Japanese policy-making at the time of the nuclear disaster: the macroinstitutional reassembling of the developmental state to reallocate more power from the bureaucracy to the cabinet office and the civil society vis-à-vis the microsituational, shifting power dynamics involving political parties, citizens and NGOs, businesses and labor unions, and other relevant actors. This case study thus helps advance the growing science and technology studies research on how the macro and microparameters of policy-making, ranging from the durable institutions of nation-states to situationally specific political struggles, combine to shape the designs, implementations, and policy influences of public participation at particular places and times as well as in particular policy domains.
Indonesia insists to defend its regulation on trade of horticulture, animals, and animal products after its loss on New Zaeland’s indictment in Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of World Trade Organization (WTO). Indonesia appealed the DSB decision, despite previous findings in DSB panel which reports that Indonesia’s regulations contains trade restriction and various trade barriers. This paper analyzes the reason why Indonesia appealed the DSB Panel decision, despite the fact that Indonesia violates WTO principles which lead to free trade barriers. This paper uses law perspective to find out whether Indonesia really violates the law or not. Besides, this paper also uses developmental state theory to analyze the case. The theory takes root in the merchantilism which emphasizes on export, domestic production, and national welfare. Developmental state’s position lies between liberalization and centered-plan policy which means that the country that applying this policy joins the globalization and plays its role in international order to reach national welfare.Keywords: developmental state, trade dispute settlement, trade restriction
This chapter gives a clear outlook to the case of the developmental state in China in conjunction with industrial policies. The chapter specifically compares China with the previous developmental states in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Possible cases that evoke the Chinese case or stand as a conceptual approach to the developmental state model are also examined. A brief historical background of Chinese economic development is also provided to see the major events and policy changes. The communist inheritance of Deng Xiaoping and the transformation are defined through remarkable events. This historical outline is linked to a political economy interpretation to explain the institutions, dynamics, and policies that constitute the Chinese developmental state. A comparative analysis elaborates the Chinese developmental state vis-à-vis the previous East Asian experiences. The main question is whether the developmental state is still alive or dead. Since the development process of China is still ongoing, recent events are also of interest to provide an insight to the current stage of development. We also elaborate on the recent green industrial policies in China as a case in point.
To what extent can the theory of the developmental state (DS) illuminate China’s development? This paper argues that the Chinese state reflects the standard accounts of the DS, but the conventional wisdom of the DS alone cannot capture comprehensively the features of Chinese development. In all aspects of standard accounts of the DS, China’s development embodies new characteristics. It is the Chinese DS with these new characteristics that has brought about China’s economic success. Consequently, the Chinese DS broadens the traditional concept of the DS and explores a new way for the development of some countries with similar social and economic backgrounds, particularly the economies in post-socialist transformation.
Abstract
This Policy Brief argues that, for South Africa
and many developing countries, the alternatives
to pursuing a democratic developmental state
are ultimately worse. It focuses on the central
question: how can a developmental state be
created in the specific political, social and
economic environment of a South Africa that
also strives to deepen its democracy? The Policy
Brief first examines the obstacles to a democratic
developmental state and then outlines the steps
South Africa needs to take to deliver a genuine
democratic developmental state.
Triggered by neoliberal market reforms in the United Kingdom and the United States in the 1980s, regulatory reforms, such as privatization of public ownership and market liberalization, rapidly and extensively spread to many regions. This was believed to be the solution to state failure in a market economy. Acknowledging the diminishing role of the state in managing and controlling a market economy, scholars have questioned the transformation of state authority in the globalized and liberalized telecom market. The impact of structural and institutional changes on regulatory reform has been widely discussed in the literature.
How have the developmentally oriented states of East Asia coped with the unprecedented levels of structural power that global companies now possess? This chapter argues that under conditions of intensifying knowledge-based competition, states with strategic industry objectives seek new ways of managing collaborative ties between public and private actors. The argument is developed by examining the development of the Korean telecommunications sector from the 1980s to the 2000s. The Korean state's relationship with the conglomerates or chaebol has increasingly been based on an equal partnership in which the chaebol themselves are expected to bear greater responsibility for promoting national techno-industrial competitiveness. These expectations have been translated into two main ways: (1) collaborating in state-sponsored efforts to promote the international standardization of Korean-developed technologies, and (2) providing initial markets for the innovations created by fledgling high-tech start-ups who provide crucial sources of innovation in the pursuit of the Korean state's emphasis on transitioning towards innovation-led development. This edition first published 2013
This article situates the Marikana massacre, in which 34 mine workers were gunned down by police in South Africa, in the context of what the South African state has become, and questions the characterisation of the post-Apartheid state as a "developmental state". This contribution first highlights what is at stake when the post-Apartheid state is portrayed as a "developmental state" and how this misrecognition of the state is ideologically constituted. Second, it argues for an approach to understanding the post-Apartheid state by locating it within the context of the rise of transnational neoliberalism and the process of indigenising neoliberalism on the African continent. Third, it examines the actual economic practices of the state that constitute it as an Afro-neoliberal state. Such economic practices are historicised to show the convergence between the post-Apartheid state and the ideal type neoliberal state coming to the fore in the context of global neoliberal restructuring and crisis management. The article concludes by recognising that South Africa's deep globalisation and globalised state affirm a form of state practice beyond utilising market mechanisms that includes perpetrating violence to secure its existence. Marikana makes this point.
O texto analisa o conceito de Estado Desenvolvimentista e sua utilidade para pensar comparativamente os casos de Brasil e Argentina. O método da pesquisa é comparativo e o material utilizado é a extensa bibliografia sobre o conceito e sobre os dois países, além de algumas fontes empíricas, notadamente entrevistas com decisores da área econômica. A pesquisa indica até o presente momento a importância das elites políticas e burocráticas para explicar as diferenças de desempenho no processo de industrialização de Brasil e Argentina. O desenho comparativo da pesquisa, amparada num conceito que, ele próprio, nasceu de pesquisas comparativas, contribui para melhor delimitar as causas não econômicas do desenvolvimento.
This paper utilises ideas of correspondence as a way of thinking about intersections between school and work in Singapore’s developmental state. Whereas the principle of correspondence predicts segregated patterns of association between school and work, this paper shows how a developmentalist form of political economy gives rise to crosscutting, rather than segregated patterns of school-to-work correspondences among the elite. Although the correspondence principle treats education and economy as major elements, it fails to consider what is arguably a far more revolutionary force - namely the state, which ultimately frames and mediates the pathways elite students take from school to work.
This study addresses the transformation of the South Korean developmental state since the early 1990s in relation to globalization and neoliberal restructuring. First, several key analytical-concepts are discussed for the study. Next, we examine two recent civil-ian-governments' major policies that have accelerated the transformation. Then, we spell out the changes of three major institutional actors in the developmental-state framework, i.e., the state, banks, and chaebols, which have resulted from the aforemen-tioned conditions and policies. In conclusion, we argue that an alternative path should be followed instead of the current path of neoliberal transformation in South Korea to achieve a form of substantively-democratic development.
This paper examines the significance of personal contacts in job searches, in the context of Singapore's meritocratic system. I show that in certain sectors, such as the state bureaucracy, social networking brings no distinct advantages as appointments are made exclusively on the basis of the academic credentials of the candidates. Thus, personal contacts are not always useful, especially in labour markets that rely heavily on the signalling role of academic credentials to match persons to jobs and allocate rewards. In contrast, personal contacts are more useful among less qualified job searchers in the private sector.
Various developments in the post–WWII global economy have led many scholars of international relations to contend that borders are eroding. My argument takes issue with this, suggesting that borders are not becoming increasingly meaningless; instead, some states are working to endow them with meaning in innovative ways. Specifically, I examine the trade disputes over culture industries during recent GATT and NAFTA talks to demonstrate that some states are shifting their attention from territorial borders to conceptual or invisible borders. Many governments support the removal of borders that serve as barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital, information, and, in some cases, people. Nevertheless, these same governments resist the increasing permeability of borders that provide the boundaries of political community.
The concept of the developmental state links economic, political and institutional structures and explains the remarkable performances of the North-East Asian countries. The ingredients of developmental states are often presented in the literature as determining factors in the prospects of catching-up of developing countries and as a paradigm of escaping underdevelopment. The economic stagnation of Sub-Saharan Africa is interpreted as a consequence of common characteristics and the constraints of its states, in terms of history, economy, political economy (e.g. predatory states), and global integration. The paper analyses the different dimensions of the developmental states and shows their systematic contrast with significant features of Sub-Saharan African countries: colonial economic history, international integration, determinants of growth, states' redistributive constraints and institutional capacity. Some features are shared by developmental and African states: limited redistributive capacities, external dependence, overlapping of private and public interests, rents. However, specific modes of interaction between domestic politics, institutions, and economics as well as public intervention in the economy (capacity to implement policies) have enabled certain Asian states to engage in developmental trajectories. After two decades of economic crisis and ineffectiveness of the reforms recommended by international financial institutions, most Sub-Saharan African countries are confronted with the reconstruction of the state and, on occasion, with its very construction.
Dissertação (Mestrado)--University of Sheffield.
The paper is a study about the process of import substitution industrialisation in Brazil (1930-1980). Given the central role played by the state, the concepts of state capacity and developmental state are employed to understand why the process was not able to produce more consistent results. The paper shows how the state increased its involvement in the economy after 1930, improving its capacity to promote economic development. It also emphasises the obstacles that constrained the action of the state and impeded that its intervention produced a more balanced and self-sustained process of development. In this sense, the paper is also a study about the difficulties to replicate the positive results obtained by the developmental states in Japan and Korea. The paper concentrates special attention in the period 1974-1978, in which the military government implemented an ambitious program of industrial restructuring.
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