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Free Trade Agreements
in the World Trade
System: Substance and
Semantics
Prema-chandra Athukorala1
Abstract
Over the past three decades, free trade agreements (FTAs) have become an
integral and enduring part of the global trading system. The number of FTAs
notified to the World Trade Organization increased from 19 in 1990 to 292 by
January 2019.1 However, debate on the economic case for following the FTA
path as an alternative to multilateral and unilateral trade liberalisation is far from
settled. The purpose of this note is to assess key themes of this policy debate.
The focus is solely on the economic rationale of FTAs, even though political
considerations play a key role in the proliferation of FTAs.
JEL Codes: F13, F15, F55
Keywords
Free trade agreement, rules of origin, foreign trade, World Trade Organization
FTAs and Trade Opening
By definition, a free trade agreement (FTA) is a treaty between two or more coun-
tries under which all tariffs are eliminated on goods produced in member coun-
tries while tariffs on trade with non-member countries are maintained. However,
in practice, tariff concessions are given on a selective basis depending on lobby
group pressure in the process of FTA negotiation and perhaps genuine concerns
about industrial adjustment problems associated with trade opening. The cover-
age of the eligibility list varies significantly among FTAs. Even for the products
Article
1 Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
Corresponding author:
Prema-chandra Athukorala, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University,
Canberra ACT 2600, Australia.
E-mail: prema-chandra.athukorala@anu.edu.au
Foreign Trade Review
1–8
© 2019 Indian Institute of
Foreign Trade
Reprints and permissions:
in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india
DOI: 10.1177/0015732519886771
journals.sagepub.com/home/ftr
2 Foreign Trade Review
included on the eligibility list, tariff preferences are not automatic but subject to
meeting the rules of origins (RoOs), which are an integral part of any FTA. For
these reasons, the term ‘free trade agreement’ is, in fact, a misnomer; the more
meaningful term preferred by prominent trade economists is ‘preferential trade
agreement’. However, in this article, we stick to the popular term FTA.
In an FTA, unlike in a customs union (CU),2 the participant countries maintain
their own external tariffs, which usually differ between member countries, while
offering concessional tariffs to the member countries. Thus, it is necessary to
combine tariff concessions with RoOs to prevent ‘trade deflection’, that is, tran-
shipment of goods from non-member countries through the member country with
the lowest external tariffs to other FTA members. If eligibility criteria imposed for
the identification of the true originating of products are stringent and the related
administrative mechanism is cumbersome or corrupt, then RoOs can diminish, or
even render worthless, the preference margin offered to traders (K. Krishna,
2006). There is always a possibility to tweak RoOs or delay the approval process
in response to lobby group pressure to undermine the expected trade opening
under an FTA (Falvey & Reed, 2002). Because of these reasons, how the RoOs
are designed and implemented matter a lot for understanding how much market
access an FTA really confers.
The RoOs are set based on two criteria: regional value content (RVC) and
change of tariff classification (CTC). The RVC criterion requires that the cost of
material and processing cost within the FTA member countries represent a set
minimum proportion of the value of the final product. The CTC criterion requires
that the ‘non-originating material’ (i.e., intermediate inputs imported from non-
member countries) used in production belongs to a different commodity code
(category) of the Harmonised System (HS). Until recently, the RVC criterion was
by far the dominant norm used in setting RoOs. Designing and application of
RoOs have become increasingly complicated in recent years because of the rapid
growth of international fragmentation of production: the geographical separation
of activities involved in producing a good (or service) across two or more coun-
tries within vertically integrated production systems. It is difficult to apply the
standard value-added criteria in a context where trade in parts and components
and final assembly occur in different countries, because assembly in a given loca-
tion within a production networks has a very thin value-added content. For this
reason, most FTAs now use a mixture of the two criteria.
Within the limits set by the actual products coverage and RoOs, the actual trade
outcome of an FTA depends on two key factors: ‘supply response’ and ‘trade
compatibility’. The term ‘supply response’ here refers to the capacity of an econ-
omy to increase supply of exports as well as to achieve productivity gains by fac-
ing import competition under an FTA. It depends on a wide range of factors, many
of which fall outside the ambit of an FTA. These factors include not only the trade
and industry policy but also the country’s trade-related institutional infrastructure;
human resource development and all the other elements determining the flexibil-
ity of the economy responding to emerging opportunities in the global economy.
In the negotiation and implementation process of an FTA, the attention of poli-
cymakers is often distracted from these vital supply-side issues. This is because
Athukorala 3
FTA negotiation has its own attractions to the political leadership and the high-
level technocrats compared to domestic reforms. FTAs help attract media atten-
tion (‘photo opportunities’) when foreign dignitaries visit (or request) countries to
sign agreements. Negotiating FTAs is also relatively less cumbersome compared
to handling messy domestic supply-side issues. Whatever the drivers may be, the
policy bias in favour of FTAs has significant (but hidden) cost to the economy: in
a country with limited technocratic and institutional capabilities. There is always
the possibility of a costly trade-off between signing FTAs and undertaking much
needed supply-side reforms (Cattaneo, 2009).
There are possible untoward institutional implications of the newfound
enthusiasm for signing FTAs. With the proliferation of FTAs, tariff structure of
a country will become highly differentiated, giving rise to inefficiencies in
resource allocation. Overlapping of the standard most favoured nation (MFN)
tariff rates, FTA tariff concessions, and multiple ‘rules of origin’ attached to the
FTA tariff concessions complicate customs of administration, weaken efficiency
improvements in the custom system and open up opportunities for corruption
(Bhagwati, 2008; Krishna, 2014).
Trade compatibility is the extent to which the trade patterns of a given country
match with that of its partner country: whether products exported by a given partner
country are the ones mostly imported by the other partner country and vice versa
(Michaely, 1999). The degree of trade compatibility depends on a country’s com-
parative advantage in international production, which in turn depends on the nature
of resource endowment and the stage of economic development. The economic size
of the country also matters, because larger countries generally tend to have a more
diversified product mix. Most of the FTAs listed in the policy debate as ‘success’
cases (such as the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], Vietnam–US
FTAs and FTAs of Australia and New Zealand with China) are between countries
with strong trade compatibility on both import and export sides.
The proponents of FTAs often mention that the increased emphasis on signing
FTAs reflects deep frustration resulted from the failure to make substantial pro-
gress with the Doha Round of Multilateral trade negotiation initiated in 2001.
However, an inspection of the annual data on the reporting of FTAs to the WTO
clearly shows that proliferation of FTAs started around the time of successful
completion of Uruguay Round negotiation that significantly brought down trade
barriers worldwide under the newly restabled WTO. Over 60 of the existing FTAs
came into effect between 1994 and the year of launching of the Doha Round
(2001), when there were high hopes of further reforms under the WTO. It seems
that the launching of the NAFTA in January 1994 is a landmark in the history of
regional trading arrangements, and positive prognoses made by some prominent
economists of NAFTA’s trade effects (e.g., Krugman, 1991; Summers, 1991,)
seem to have had a significant demonstration effect on the proliferation of FTAs
in the ensuing years.
In recent years, FTAs have evolved and gone beyond eliminating restrictions
on trade at the border into provisions for institutional harmonisation between the
member countries relating to intellectual property, health and safety issues, labour
standards, labour migration, investment proportion and protection, banking and
4 Foreign Trade Review
finance, investor–state dispute settlement and others. These FTAs with multiple
provisions are now popularly known as ‘modern FTAs’. The stated rationale for
broadening the coverage of reforms is to achieve deep economic integration
among the member countries going beyond what can be achieved through the
shallow cross-border integration through trade reforms. There is, however,
scepticism on how much deep FTAs can go beyond the possibilities offered by
the WTO process or unilateral reforms. This issue has been widely debated
relating to FTA provisions on cross-border investment and cross-border labour
migration (Krishna, 2014; Rodrik, 2018b).
Trade Effects of FTAs
The share of world trade accounted for by member countries of FTAs increased
from 28 per cent in 1990 to over 55 per cent by the end of the first decade of the
2000s (WTO, 2011). These figures, often misleadingly quoted by the proponents
of FTAs to support the view that countries are going to be marginalised in world
trade unless they get into the FTA game.
However, the recorded total trade of FTA partner countries is not the same as
trade occurring under trade preferences offered by FTAs. According to calculations
by the WTO, only 30 per cent of the world trade takes place on a preferential
basis, but this figure drops to 16 per cent when trade within the European Union
(which is a CU) is excluded (WTO, 2011). The available evidence on the operation
of FTAs in Asian countries also suggests that the utilisation of tariff concessions
offered under FTAs are rather low, ranging from 5 per cent to 20 per cent across
different product categories (Cheong & Choc, 2009; Jongwanich & Kohpaiboon,
2017; Menon, 2014). There is also evidence that the utilisation rates are often firm
or industry specific. Normally, utilisation rates are high for large firms and firms
with close trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) ties or those located in
specific industries where complying with RoO requirements are simple and
straightforward. The upshot is that not only the FTAs have a low actual trade
effect but they also are unlikely to have the potential to promote trade in a neutral
and broad-based fashion.
Why the actual trade effect of FTAs is much lower than what the FTA enthusiast
claimed? First, much of the trade between FTA members is with goods on which
MFN tariff rates are zero or rather small in the first place. Most countries also
provide duty-free accession to imported inputs used in export production through
free trade zone schemes and duty drawback schemes. Second, goods that are sub-
ject to high tariffs are often excluded from the list of products earmarked for duty
concessions in most FTAs. Third, world electronics trade is virtually free of duty,
thanks to WTO’s Information Technology Agreement (ITA) which came into
effect in 2006. Fourth, and perhaps more importantly, traders in many countries
simply ignore FTA tariff concessions because of the administrative cost and other
administrative complications.
The ITA, concluded at the WTO’s Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996,
is a pluralistic agreement that requires participant countries to eliminate tariffs
Athukorala 5
on a specific list of information technology products (computers, semiconduc-
tors, semiconductor manufacturing and testing equipment, telecommunication
equipment, computer software and scientific instruments). So far, 75 countries
have signed the ITA. These countries account for about 97 per cent of the world
trade in IT products. The IT products covered by the agreement amount to about
34 per cent of the total world manufacturing trade. A country that become a
signatory to a pluralistic agreement opens its market to both member- and non-
member countries.
A point often made by proponents of FTAs in South Asian countries is that
exports from these countries are not growing fast because these countries have
been lagging behind the fast-growing countries in Asia in signing FTAs
(Ratnayake, 2017). This observation is simply a misinterpretation of ‘coexistence’
as ‘causality’. The East Asian countries (and, in fact, all high performing countries
in East Asia) had become dynamic exporting nations well before the new pen-
chant for signing FTAs (Perkin, 2013). In fact, South Korea and Taiwan achieved
super-fast export growth in the 1980s in a hostile international environment with
high tariffs and quantitative restriction in most destination countries. Broad uni-
lateral reforms with an emphasis on export orientation were the key to their export
success (Rodrik, 2018a). In any case, as noted above, the available evidence sug-
gests that only a small share of Asian countries’ trade occurs under the existing
FTAs: FTAs are mostly ‘window dressing’. It is also important to note that most
of these countries are signatories to the ITA, and hence FTAs are virtually irrele-
vant for the electronics industry which covers on average over a half of each of
these countries’ exports.
The proponents of FTAs may ask why countries are so enthusiastic in signing
FTAs if the actual trade flow effect is very low. This issue has been well addressed
in the recent literature on FTAs (Cattaneo, 2009; Irwin, 2008; Krishna, 2014;
Rodrik, 2018a). First, countries sign FTAs as much for foreign policy and security
reasons as for economic reasons. Second, there is the so-called bandwagon effect,
the tendency to follow others without considering implication on the actual econ-
omy. Third, as already noted, there is a tendency on the part of the politician and
technocrats to place a great emphasis on the FTA path to trade opening for various
non-economic reasons. In sum, an FTA is rarely, if ever, based on a single motive:
the contracting parties to an FTA often have different and sometimes even con-
flicting objectives.
FTAs and FDI
Do FTAs play a vital role in attracting FDI? The available empirical evidence on
this issue is mixed, at best. Moreover, the available ‘positive’ evidence relates
predominantly to FTAs involving developed and developing countries (Stevens,
Muhammad, Isabella, & Jane, 2015). The best inference possible from the avail-
able evidence is that FTAs can play a role at the margin if and only if other
preconditions required for making the country an attractive place for FDI are met.
It is also important to note that signing bilateral investment protection treaties
6 Foreign Trade Review
(BIPTs) is an alternative to FTAs for facilitating FDIs. However, regardless of
whether a country signs an FTA or a BIPT, the outcome depends on complemen-
tary supply-side reforms (Dollar, Mary, & Mengistae, 2005; Hallward-Driemeier,
2003; Stevens et al., 2015).
Some authors argue that FTAs would help linking the manufacturing sector
of a country to global production networks (global manufacturing value chain)
by attracting multinational enterprises (MNEs) to set up plants to undertake
specific tasks/processes (Baldwin, 2014). The rationale behind this argument is
that these ‘slicing of value chain’ activities are more sensitive to tariff changes, as
the per unit profit margins are much smaller compared to that of conventional
manufacturing. However, whether the FTA would be an effective vehicle for
facilitating the process is highly debatable for two reasons. First, the very
essence of global production sharing within global production networks is
locating different segments of the production process globally, rather than
regionally or bilaterally. The relative cost advantage of producing/assembling a
given part or components in the supply chain need not necessarily lie in a coun-
try within the jurisdictional boundaries of a specific FTA.
Second, there are formidable complications relating to the application of RoOs
for trade within global production networks. Most of the task/segments produced/
assembled within production networks have very thin value-added margins in each
location. In addition, most of the imports and exports of parts and components trade
with production fall under the same HS 4-digit classifications. Therefore, the iden-
tification of the origin of trade within production network for granting tariff prefer-
ences becomes a major challenge (Athukorala & Kohpaiboon, 2011).
Put simply, the rise of global production sharing strengthens the case for mul-
tilateral (WTO-based) or unilateral, rather than regional (FTA), approach to trade
liberalisation. To quote Victor Fung, the Honorary Chairman of Li & Fung, the
world’s largest supply-chain intermediary based in Hong Kong:
Bilateralism distorts ows of goods…. In structuring the supply chain, every country
of origin rule and every bilateral deal has to be tackled on as additional considerations,
thus constraining companies in optimising production globally. (Victor Fung, Financial
Times, November 3, 2005)
These considerations suggest that more appropriate policy options for facilitating
a country’s engagement in global production network is unilateral liberalisation or
becoming a signatory to the ITA. Both policy options assure unconditional duty-
free access to the required inputs. The case for such broader liberalisation, rather
than following the FTA route, lies in that global production sharing is a global
phenomenon, rather than a regional or bilateral phenomenon.
Concluding Remarks
The role of FTAs in trade performance is vastly exaggerated in the trade policy
debate.
Athukorala 7
Most politicians, and much of the media, often do not seem to understand the
distinction between ‘free trade’ and ‘trade under FTAs’. In reality, FTAs are essen-
tially preferential trade deals and actual trade effect is conditioned by the choice of
commodity coverage, which is basically determined by political considerations and
lobby group pressure, and RoOs. The actual coverage of FTAs in the world trade is
much lower than that portrayed in the Sri Lankan debate. Over 80 per cent of world
trade is taking place under the standard MFN tariff system.
The failure to make progress with the process of multilateral liberation under the
WTO does not make a valid case for giving priority to FTAs. The proliferation of
FTAs over the past three decades has been driven largely by several non-economic
factors, including the bandwagon effects. If the road to multilateral approach to
trade reforms is closed, then the better and time-honoured alternative is unilateral
liberalisation combined with appropriate supply-side reforms.
The proliferation of FTAs has the adverse side effect of complicating the
tariff structure, giving rise to inefficiencies in resource allocation. Overlapping
of the standard MFN tariffs with FTA tariff concessions and multiple RoOs
attached to the FTAs weaken efficiency improvements in the custom system and
open opportunities for corruption.
The available evidence on the role of FTAs in attracting FDI is mixed, at best.
The only policy inference one can make from this evidence is that FTAs can play
a role at the margin in enticing foreign investors, provided the other preconditions
on the supply side are met.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no nancial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of
this article.
Notes
1. WTO RTA database (http://rtais.wto.org/UI/Charts.aspx).
2. A CU is an FTA with the member countries imposing a common external tariff on a
given product (European Union (EU), Central American Common Market (CACM)
and Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are examples). Given the common external
tariffs, transhipment is not an issue relating to the CUs.
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