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Nudging and Autonomy: Analyzing and Alleviating the Worries

DOI:10.1007/s13164-019-00450-z
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Bart Engelen at Tilburg University
Bart Engelen
Thomas Nys
Thomas Nys
Thomas Nys
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Abstract

One of the most pervasive criticisms of nudges has been the claim that they violate, undermine or decrease people’s (personal) autonomy. This claim, however, is seldom backed up by an explicit and detailed conception of autonomy. In this paper, we aim to do three things. First, we want to clear up some conceptual confusion by distinguishing the different conceptions used by Cass Sunstein and his critics in order to get clear on how they conceive of autonomy. Second, we want to add to the existing discussion by distinguishing between ‘autonomy’ as the ability to set your own ends and ‘autocracy’ as the ability to actually realize those ends (which is what most of the current discussion is actually focusing on). This will allow for a more careful ethical evaluation of specific nudge interventions. Third, we will introduce the idea of ‘perimeters of autonomy’ in an attempt to provide a realistic account of personal autonomy and we will argue that it can alleviate most of the worries about nudging being autonomy-undermining.
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Nudging and Autonomy: Analyzing
and Alleviating the Worries
Bart Engelen
1
&Thomas Nys
2
Published online: 16 December 2019
#Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract
One of the most pervasive criticisms of nudges has been the claim that they violate,
undermine or decrease people’s (personal) autonomy. This claim, however, is seldom
backed up by an explicit and detailed conception of autonomy. In this paper, we aim to
do three things. First, we want to clear up some conceptual confusion by distinguishing
the different conceptions used by Cass Sunstein and his critics in order to get clear on
how they conceive of autonomy. Second, we want to add to the existing discussion by
distinguishing between ‘autonomy’as the ability to set your own ends and ‘autocracy’
as the ability to actually realize those ends (which is what most of the current discussion
is actually focusing on). This will allow for a more careful ethical evaluation of specific
nudge interventions. Third, we will introduce the idea of ‘perimeters of autonomy’in
an attempt to provide a realistic account of personal autonomy and we will argue that it
can alleviate most of the worries about nudging being autonomy-undermining.
Keywords Nudging .Sunstein .Manipulation .Autonomy.Autocracy .Perimeters of
autonomy
1 Introduction
One of the most pervasive criticisms of nudges has been the claim that they violate,
undermine or decrease people’s (personal) autonomy. In this paper, we analyze what
Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2020) 11:137–156
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-019-00450-z
*Bart Engelen
B.Engelen@tilburguniversity.edu
Thomas Nys
T.R .V.N ys @ uv a.n l
1
Tilburg Center for Moral Philosophy, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Department of
Philosophy, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, Tilburg, The Netherlands
2
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, Oude
Turfmarkt 143, 1012 GCAmsterdam, The Netherlands
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
... My definition, however, adds a feature regarding the fact that choice autonomy is the fact of being able to match one's intentional states with one's action at each moment in time. Choice autonomy is also superficially similar to the concept of 'autocracy' discussed by Engelen and Nys (2020). More on this below. ...
... The distinction between choice autonomy and value autonomy is at first sight very similar to Engelen and Nys's (2020) distinction between autonomy (or 'selfrule') and autocracy. As their account is the most recent discussion of the relationship between BPPs (restricted to the case of nudges) and autonomy, it is worth explaining why the two distinctions are not equivalent. ...
... 20 This social choice framework permits exploring the relationship between value autonomy and paternalism in the context of BPPs. In particular, it allows making relatively clear why purely paternalistic BPPs may be viewed as problematic from some moral point of view, even if we grant Engelen and Nys's (2020) claim that behavioral interventions such as nudging are compatible with allowing everyone to form a definite conception of the good. Consider the characteristics of a fully paternalistic collective choice rule R. By definition, such a rule is exclusively concerned with each person's good under the assumption that there are no conflicting claims between persons in the population, e.g. ...
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... Second threat: market nudges can unduly intervene in people setting personal ends So far we have established that market nudges can inhibit consumers in pursuing their values and ends, for example by playing into their weakened wills. Here, we ask whether there is a more fundamental kind of influence that marketers can have, namely whether they can interfere in how people come to adopt their underlying value commitments and ends (Engelen and Nys 2020). If market nudges succeed in changing our behaviour, they may be able to do the same to our values and conceptions of the good life (see for example Schor 1998;George 2001;Lindstrom 2011). ...
... As a general claim about nudges, this is too strong. While we are surely nudged to buy stuff we do not need (Schor 1998), typically this does not inhibit us to take a break every now and then, ask what it is that we need and set our own priorities in life (Engelen and Nys 2020). In specific instances, however, this claim is very plausible. ...
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Behavioural techniques or ‘nudges’ can be used for various purposes. In this paper, we shift the focus from government nudges to nudges used by for-profit market agents. We argue that potential worries about nudges circumventing the deliberative capacities or diminishing the control of targeted agents are greater when it comes to market nudges, given that these (1) are not constrained by the principles that regulate government nudges (mildness, sensitivity to people’s interests and public justifiability) and (2) are often ‘stacked’ – they come in great numbers that overwhelm agents. In addition, we respond to possible objections and derive several policy suggestions.
View
... 4 One might think that nudges such as CAFETERIA and RETIREMENT are "paternalistic" only in a weak sense because they do not involve interfering with the liberty or autonomy of agents (Dworkin, 2020). In response, one might insist that nudges do interfere with autonomy (see Engelen & Nys (2020) for an overview). Alternatively, one might deny the interference with liberty and autonomy as a necessary condition for paternalistic acts (e.g. ...
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... Critical voices toward nudging in health behavior raise concerns about the underlying consequentialism which ranks well-being and better health above autonomy. Ethically justified nudging policy insists on implementing choice architectures deliberatively and transparently (Engelen & Nys, 2020). ...
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... Apart from the question of whether nudging health is always morally justified, ethical discussions around nudges often conflate various conceptions of nudging and autonomy, and this has led to conceptual confusion (Engelen and Nys, 2020). Insights from a previous study indicate that ethical concerns about nudging and autonomy can be grouped into three dominant autonomy conceptualisations in nudging discussions: (1) freedom of choice, (2) agency, and (3) self-constitution (Vugts et al., 2018). ...
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... Es cierto que se han estudiado los nudges que inducen comportamientos positivos para la salud pública (10)(11)(12)(13), sin embargo, todavía se puede profundizar más en el análisis ético sobre sus aspectos cognitivos. Los principales retos éticos que se derivan de la aplicación de nudges en contextos de salud pública tienen que ver con la libertad en la toma de decisiones (10,14) y en la obligatoriedad/inevitabilidad de los nudges (15). En este apartado se abordarán estos aspectos. ...
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In behavioral science, the term nudge refers to any aspect of decision architecture that predictably alters people's behavior to improve the chooser's own welfare without forbidding or significantly restricting their choices. Its promoters invoke libertarian paternalism, which means, on the one hand, that the behavior of the individual is guided without counting on his autonomy, but, on the other hand, that this form of influence does not reach the point of restricting freedom of choice when it is manifest. This paper analyzes the role of nudges in the field of health policies. A cognitive analysis of these nudges is carried out and are distinguished the clinical nudges (those that take place within the healthcare professional and patient relationship) from the public health nudges (specific to public health policies). The ethical aspects of both categories of nudge will be analyzed to point out some of their virtues and the ethical challenges they face. This study focuses in particular on public health nudges, to consider whether it is reasonable, and with what limits, their implementation in health crises (for example, pandemics). Analyzing that public policies face the dilemma between preserving freedom at the expense of health or, on the contrary, prioritize health to the point of limiting freedom. It is raised whether in this context greater restrictions on individual freedoms should be allowed (for example, through mandatory lockdowns and quarantines, imposed vaccinations, forced tests) or whether to use nudges as an intermediate solution and less harmful to individual rights to promote health measures.
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... There is a rich literature on the question of whether it is ethical to nudge people since this seems to be interfering with their autonomy and freedom of choice (e.g. Engelen & Nys, 2020;Hausman & Welch, 2010;John et al., 2013), especially in cases in which individuals might not share the values of the technologies or the designers of these technologies. ...
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View
... There is a rich literature on the question of whether it is ethical to nudge people since this seems to be interfering with their autonomy and freedom of choice (e.g. Engelen & Nys, 2020;Hausman & Welch, 2010;John et al., 2013), especially in cases in which individuals might not share the values of the technologies or the designers of these technologies. ...
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