Is the oil industry able to support a world that consumes 105 million barrels of oil per day in 2025?

Abstract

This paper investigates the significant risk of a supply crunch in the oil market by 2025 and beyond, given current pace of investment and growth of world demand. We focus particularly on today's upstream sector and the challenges it faces in meeting the ever-increasing demand for oil. We then study different production scenarios for U.S. unconventional oil potential and draw conclusions on its potential capability to offset the weakening context of conventional oil supply (declining production, declining discoveries, insufficient investment, persistent geopolitical risks and environmental pressures). We conclude that with growing oil demand, the probability of an oil crunch by 2025 is far from null.

Full text

Is the oil industry able to support a world that consumes
105 million barrels of oil per day in 2025?
Pierre Hacquard
1
, Marine Simoën
2,3
, and Emmanuel Hache
2,3,4,*
1
Equinor, Forusbeen 50, 4035 Stavanger, Norway
2
IFP Energies nouvelles, 1-4, avenue de Bois-Préau, 92852 Rueil-Malmaison Cedex, France
3
The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs, (IRIS), 75011 Paris, France
4
EconomiX-CNRS, University of Paris, Nanterre, France
Received: 10 October 2019 / Accepted: 8 November 2019
Abstract. This paper investigates the significant risk of a supply crunch in the oil market by 2025 and beyond,
given current pace of investment and growth of world demand. We focus particularly on today’s upstream
sector and the challenges it faces in meeting the ever-increasing demand for oil. We then study different
production scenarios for U.S. unconventional oil potential and draw conclusions on its potential capability
to offset the weakening context of conventional oil supply (declining production, declining discoveries, insuffi-
cient investment, persistent geopolitical risks and environmental pressures). We conclude that with growing oil
demand, the probability of an oil crunch by 2025 is far from null.
1 Introduction
The evolution and future of the global energy system has
always been at the heart of concerns of governments,
international institutions and energy companies due to its
fundamental role in economic, political, environmental
and climate issues. In 2018, worldwide oil production has
reached for the first time the amount of 100 million barrels
per day (mb/d) (IEA, 2018). Behind this symbolic bench-
mark is a constant trend spanning several decades: a grow-
ing economy that requires abounding amount of oil. Thus,
an ever-increasing need to expand the world’s supply of
cheap and accessible energy services in parallel with a push
to cope with the 2 °C objective of the Paris Agreement
implies strong uncertainties about the future of the global
energy system.
Being able to precisely understand the potential trajec-
tories of commodities supply and demand as well as their
associated uncertainties are the keys to provide decision
makers with relevant and exhaustive analysis. Thus, a sig-
nificant amount of prospective energy system modelling has
been carried out by a variety of actors such as research
institutions, inter-governmental organizations and private
energy companies. The model results are heavily dependent
on specific assumptions, covering macro-scenarios (e.g., eco-
nomic growth, demography, climate constraints, etc.)and
degrees of technological evolution. There is much room
for debate around those assumptions, as no model can truly
replicate the reality of the world’scomplexity(Grandjean
et al., 2019). However, they provide valuable insights on
major future trends and largely contribute to influence glo-
bal leaders’decisions and economic variables such as pri-
vate investments.
One of the most renowned institutions in energy
modelling is the International Energy Agency (IEA) founded
by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) in 1974 in reaction to the first oil shock and
the Middle East Crisis. Initially designed to anticipate and
react to physical oil supply disruption and as source of data
related to the oil market situation and other energy sectors,
the IEA is now a broad world policy advisor on energy
security, economic development and environmental protec-
tion. Consequently, every year the IEA publishes its World
Energy Outlook (WEO) in which all the energy-related
trends are analysed and assessed. Although it is now focused
on all kinds of energy sources, the oil market remains at the
heart of the institution’sconcernsanditsanalysisremains
the most awaited and read by the various stakeholders. Most
of the players of the oil industry (i.e.,ExxonMobil, Total,
Equinor, BP, DNV GL,etc.) use and compare their own
foresight and scenarios with the IEA analysis.
In this outlook, three main scenarios are described (IEA,
2018):
the Current Policies Scenario (CPS) solely based on
existing laws and regulations, therefore excluding
the ambitions and targets that have been declared
by governments around the world,
* Corresponding author: emmanuel.hache@ifpen.fr
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0),
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Oil & Gas Science and Technology –Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles 74, 88 (2019) Available online at:
ÓP. Hacquard et al., published by IFP Energies nouvelles, 2019 ogst.ifpenergiesnouvelles.fr
https://doi.org/10.2516/ogst/2019061
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the New Policies Scenario (NPS) providing a mea-
sured assessment of where today’s policy frameworks
and ambitions, together with the continued evolution
of known technologies, might take the energy sector in
the coming decades,
the Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS) is a
recent scenario exploring what it would take to reach
the sustainable development goals of the COP21 in
2015 to limit global warming below 2 °C and provid-
ing a universal access to modern energy by 2030.
The NPS being considered as a reference scenario, this
paper will aim to discuss its oil demand and supply assump-
tions. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that in
its current form this scenario is not compatible with the
2°C Paris agreement objective. The WEO 2018 NPS pro-
vides an overview of the evolution of demand and supply for
oil by 2025. From 99.2 million barrels per day (mb/d) in
2018, demand is expected to reach 106.4 mb/d. This repre-
sents an annual average growth rate of ca. 1.2 mb/d (1.2%)
and a total volume increase of 7.1 mb/d (IEA, 2019b). IEA
models then sweep away the eventuality of a peak in
demand by 2025 and foresee a sustained increase even in
a context of moderate economic growth. On the supply side,
it can be observed that by 2025, the natural decline rate of
already producing fields leads to an estimated 34 mb/d of
new output needed to meet the demand. This number
reaches 54 mb/d if the required investments to maintain
currentfacilitiesarenotsanctioned(Fig. 1). This corre-
sponds to an estimated 5.5–9mb/dtobereplacedevery
year and it represents the equivalent of 3–4 times the out-
put from Saudi Arabia, in just 6 years.
According to the IEA, at current rates of project
approval and if existing facilities are maintained, 19 mb/d
could be supplied by new projects, excluding U.S. uncon-
ventionals. Nevertheless, an additional 15 mb/d would still
be needed to avoid a supply crunch by 2025 and beyond.
Considering the current state of the oil market, only one
source of supply seems able to fill this gap in such a
short-time frame: the U.S. unconventional production.
But to achieve this amount of production, actual level of
production would have to double (7.419 mb/d estimated
by the U.S. Energy Information Administration in April
2019).
Thus, for the first time ever since its first publication,
the IEA clearly states the fortuity of a supply crunch by
2025: “The risk of a supply crunch looms largest in oil.
The average level of new conventional crude projects
approvals over the last three years is only half the amount
necessary to balance the market out to 2025, given the
demand outlook in the New Policies Scenario. US tight oil
is unlikely to pick up the slack on its own. Our projections
already incorporate a doubling in US tight oil from today
to 2025, but it would need more than triple to offset a con-
tinued absence of new conventional projects”(IEA, 2018).
In this context, it seems interesting to focus on the two
following questions: (i) why does the IEA not rely on other
sources of supply than the U.S. unconventional oil to match
the demand and (ii) can the U.S. unconventional oil truly
produce 15 mb/d by 2025?
In this paper, we will then highlight the main factors
that can limit the ability of U.S. unconventional oil to fill
the gap between a quickly declining production and a rising
demand.
The first section of this article will focus on analysing
the today’s upstream sector and the challenges it faces in
meeting the ever-increasing demand for oil. To probe the
ability of U.S. unconventional oil potential to offset this
Fig. 1. Crude oil demand and supply forecast in the NPS scenario*.
P. Hacquard et al.: Oil & Gas Science and Technology –Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles 74, 88 (2019)2

potential supply deficit, the second section will study differ-
ent production scenarios. Results are finally discussed in
Section 3, in parallel with unconventional oil production
limits for other regions. The conclusion of this article con-
firms the significant risk of a supply crunch by 2025 and
beyond at current pace of investment and growth of oil
demand.
2 Factors weakening the upstream sector
2.1 Declining conventional resources
The peak of conventional oil resources discoveries has been
reached decades ago, with number of discoveries steadily
decreasing since then (Fig. 2). If there are still conventional
discoveries nowadays (Rystad Energy, 2018)
1
, most of them
are non-conventional resources such as U.S. unconventional
oil or oil sands in Canada. Following the 2014 downturn of
oil prices, discoveries have hit a record low over the last
4 years with less than 9 billion of barrels oil equivalent
(bnboe) discovered per year (Rystad Energy, 2019).
Discovered volumes from high impact drilling (>100 mb
drilling targets) fell overall by 50% in this period compared
to the previous 5 years. The lower drilled well count which
fell by 28% over the period only account for less than a half
of this drop (Fig. 3), falling commercial success rates and
average discovery sizes accounted for the rest.
As a result, portfolio renewal has become a critical issue
for the oil industry. Over the last 5 years the commercial
success rate for frontier exploration
2
has just hit 6% for
154 wells at a cost of USD 11 billion (Westwood Global
Energy Group, 2019). The low success rate in exploration,
along with low oil prices, led the upstream industry to
reduce its exposure to risk by cutting exploration budget
from 20% of total investment in 2010 to a record low of
10% in 2018 (IEA, 2019a). Most of the main Exploration
and Production companies have increased their investment
in improving production from existing fields. Only a
handful of companies with significant levels of production
have been able to replace their produced reserves solely
through exploration (Westwood Global Energy Group,
2019). A direct consequence of this increased difficulty to
discover new reserves is also the rising trend in mergers
and acquisitions observed in the oil sector over the past
few years (Fosse et al., 2015).
On top of that, the average size of discoveries has in the
same time drastically fallen from 500–1000 mmboe
3
40 years
ago to 50–100 mmboe over the last 5 years. It steadily
decreased year after year and reached a historic low of
57 mmboe in 2018 (Westwood Global Energy Group,
2019).
Aconventionaloilfield will reach its peak of production
during the first year after commissioning before entering a
phase of irreversible exponential decline called the decline
phase. Estimation of the decline rate may vary depending
on the field characteristics between 3% and 9.5% per year.
Around 81% of the global liquid production is now in the
decline phase (BP, 2018;Fustier et al.,2016;IEA, 2018).
Nowadays, the global supply mix rely increasingly on
small fields. And the smaller the fields, the faster their
Source: Rystad Energy, 2018; 2019
Fig. 2. Historical of conventional oil discoveries.
1
In 2018, according to Rystad Energy most of the conventional
discoveries were located in Guyana (2 bnboe), Russia
(1.3 bnboe), the U.S. (0.746 bnboe), Cyprus (0.67 bnboe),
Oman (0.67 bnboe), Norway (0.5 bnboe), Australia (0.35 bnboe),
the United Kingdom (0.3 bnboe), Gabon (0.2 bnboe) and
Malaysia (0.19 bnboe).
2
A frontier exploration well is considered to target underex-
plored areas or concepts with high risks but high potential
discovery sizes.
3
Million Barrels of Oil Equivalent.
P. Hacquard et al.: Oil & Gas Science and Technology –Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles 74, 88 (2019) 3

production declines. Thus, the new fields have a decline rate
twice as high as what was observed 40 years ago on large
fields.
Consequently global conventional crude oil production
peaked in 2008 at 69 mb/d (IEA, 2018)andhassincefallen
by c.a. 2.5 mb/d without any expected recovery soon. Only
the developments of NGLs
4
, Extra-Heavy Oil & Bitumen
(EHOB) and Tight Oil have compensated this decline
and allowed the global economy to keep growing (IEA,
2018). To satisfy the demand without massive support from
U.S. unconventionals, at least 16 bnboe must be discovered
by 2025 every year. Almost twice as much as current levels
(IEA, 2018).
As mentioned before, the number of active conventional
andunconventionaldrillingrigsintheworldhasbeen
reduced by 28% since 2014 highs. Of the 2182 rigs in
operation in May 2019, half were located in North America
(of which 93% in the U.S., Fig. 3). Currently, 87.2% of the
U.S. rigs are dedicated to horizontal wells drilling, meaning
that about a half of all the wells drilled in the world today
are dedicated to unconventional resources (BHGE, 2019).
The number of rigs is relatively elastic and could quickly
increase again if oil prices and market conditions return
to more appealing levels. However, it is important to high-
light that most of this flexibility can be observed only in the
U.S. where the production’s factors can be mobilized
quickly.
2.2 Insufficient investment
Following 2014 and the drop of oil prices from more than
100$ per barrel to less than 45$ in annual average in 2016
(Fig. 4), capital expenditure in the upstream part of the
oil industry have been significantly reduced by around
USD 1–2trillion(Fig. 5). The consequences of this drastic
reduction are still uncertain and have not yet been felt on
global production.
In 2018, investments in the upstream sector were still
40% lower than those observed in 2014. Most of this
contraction is due to lower investment volumes. However,
companies also benefit from a favourable price environment
from their suppliers under pressure. Adjusted to current
upstream costs, it still represents a 12% lower investment
compared to the 2014 peak. Another major difference is
that Tight oil investments now represent 26% of all
upstream investments compared to 17% over 2010–2015
(IEA, 2019a).
There are many factors that can explain the decreasing
trend in investment following the oil crisis of 2014, (i) the
low oil price perspective due to unconventional crude oil
entering the market rapidly; (ii) this trend has also a
negative impact on Oil and Gas companies share prices
which then focus on maintaining dividend level (buy-back
program, etc.) and not investing in new projects; (iii) the
switch to renewable strategies for many Oil and Gas compa-
nies (BP, Total, Equinor, Royal Dutch Shell,etc.) impact-
ing the amount of their budget dedicated to Oil and Gas
project; (iv) the banking system has less and less incentives
to finance risked Oil and Gas projects due in particular to
social pressures coming from shareholders; (v) risk averse
strategies have lowered the exploration budget of most of
the big Oil and Gas companies, focusing on improving the
production of existing fields as well as doing near field
exploration (less capital intensive but lower volumes
discovered); (vi) the BP accident in the Gulf of Mexico
and the fine resulting of this accident (20 bn$+) had an
impact on budget dedicated to safety and HSE for most
4
Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) are components of natural gas
that are separated from the gas state in the form of liquids.
Fig. 3. Global rig count.
P. Hacquard et al.: Oil & Gas Science and Technology –Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles 74, 88 (2019)4

of the international companies; (vii) public pressure has
slowed down some processes in the world to provide
licenses and permit to drill (Lofoten islands in Norway for
example) and recently (viii) the trade war between
China and the U.S. has affected the world economic growth
perspectives and the oil consumption growth in the middle
run.
For another consecutive year, global investment growth
in upstream is then expected to remain moderate in 2019.
It is estimated between 3% and 8%, compared to exceeding
15% prior to the 2014 low point (IFPEN, 2019a). Moreover,
there are sizeable regional disparities, principally between
North America (investment growth rate of 18%) and the
rest of the world (+2%). This difference is simply explained
by massive investment in U.S. unconventional oil which
represents 21% of global investments in the U.S. (IEA,
2019a). The projects developed are carried out in a context
of depressed service prices and are mainly focused on
shallower, less capital-intensive offshore environments
(IFPEN, 2019a).
Fig. 4. Historical Brent oil price in nominal USD $ per Barrel.
Fig. 5. Global upstream oil and gas investment in nominal USD $ billion.
P. Hacquard et al.: Oil & Gas Science and Technology –Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles 74, 88 (2019) 5

2.3 Persistent geopolitical risks
Recent geopolitical instabilities and societal uncertainties
have also affected the supply capacity of important produc-
ers and it is highly probable that it will happen again in the
future. Overall, the geopolitics of energy lies at a crossroads
between the founding structural elements of the second half
of the 21st century, current economic factors and the
geopolitics resulting from the integration of renewable ener-
gies into the global energy mix (Bonnet et al.,2019;Hache,
2016;Hache et al., 2019a,b). Current concerns are concen-
trated in a few specific areas, mainly in the Middle-East and
more recently in the Hormuz Strait but also in Venezuela
and Libya.
Following their withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear
agreement established in 2015, the U.S. will aim at achiev-
ing a total halt on Iranian crude oil purchases. It was
associated with sanctions on countries that keep on buying
it, at the risk of tensions with several allies. The maximum
shortfall could cover a volume up to 2.7 mb/d, the average
exported volume recorded at the beginning of 2018.
More recently, tensions in the Hormuz Strait suggest
increasing disruptions in a region where around 20% of
the global oil production is transiting every day (EIA,
2019). In Libya, onshore drilling activities just resumed
after 3 years of interruption. Recent tensions casted doubt
on the ability of its industry to recover in a context of more
expensive and complex projects. Between 2012 and 2013,
production had already been divided by 6 (IFPEN,
2019b). Having seen one of the biggest ever annual declines
in 2018 (Fig. 6), production in Venezuela will continue to
fall as its economy lurches deeper into crisis. The cash
crunch at Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and poor reser-
voir management have already cut output by nearly
1.6 mb/d over the past 3 years. U.S. financial sanctions
enforced in January 2019 should compound the losses
(IEA, 2019b).
Such supply-side pressures are by nature very difficult
to anticipate and add significant uncertainties about the
stability of the global oil supply system in the short-run.
2.4 A new environmental deal
An important aspect of the risks that weigh on the future of
upstream capacities and that should not be taken lightly
are the climate and environmental issues we face and their
increasing influence on economies, consumer behaviour and
policy-makers. Consumers are increasingly in demand for
more transparency from states and institutions all over
the world. Intensive lobbyism and activism have led to
historical recent decisions that will affect long term oil sup-
ply. Recently, several commitments made by leading
oil majors, such as Equinor, BP or Royal Dutch Shell have
been observed at the Climate Action 100+ investor group
and more are to come. Other majors such as Total have
committed to become carbon neutral by 2030. It will
necessarily have an impact on their investments, which
will no longer be entirely dedicated to renewing their oil
reserves but also to develop new low-carbon businesses.
Some companies have even completely disengaged from
their fossil activities in the image of the French energy giant
Engie
5
.
Due to the poor image of the oil industry by younger
generations, raising fears of a shortage of talent in the com-
ing years is becoming a critical issue. The energy industry
was solely ranked sixth amongst the eight main industries
by Engineering and IT students and only one energy major
was among the world’s top 50 most attractive employer in
2018 (Universum, 2019).
Source: EIA, 2019
Fig. 6. Historical Venezuelan oil production.
5
The recent switch of strategy of Engie aiming to become a
leader in “Zero-Carbone”energy transition was followed by the
full divestment from all its E&P activities, sold to the UK
company Neptune in 2017.
P. Hacquard et al.: Oil & Gas Science and Technology –Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles 74, 88 (2019)6

Anti-oil policies are making their path through the
political landscape. In France, all exploration projects have
recently been banned from 2040 onwards. The Norwegian
sovereign fund, the largest in the world, has just announced
its withdrawal from all pure exploration players in the
coming years. In the financial sector many banks, mainly
European but also American, driven by shareholder
demands, have decided to withdraw from investing in the
Canadian Oil Sands or in U.S. unconventionals.
While these few examples may seem anecdotal in terms
of impact today, they constitute “weak signals”sent to the
rest of the international community for tomorrow. The dis-
investment in the upstream sector is likely to increase in the
future and is no longer solely a result of market price
variations.
These short and non-exhaustive factors underline the
increasing challenges of the upstream sector to match a
future growing oil demand. In addition to the decline in geo-
logical resources, many economical, societal and geopolitical
aspects are making the market more complex and uncertain
(Equinor, 2018;Hache et al., 2019b). Following the same
observations, the IEA states for the first time in the
WEO 2018 that at current pace of investment and discov-
eries, the industry will be able to provide the world with the
oil it needs only if the U.S. unconventionals double their
production by 2025. Indeed, with a relative political stabil-
ity, half of the world rig capacities, abundant source of cash
and an already developed industrial network and infrastruc-
tures, they appear as the only ones able to fill this gap in the
near term. But, despite technological progress and impor-
tant discovered reserves, can the U.S. unconventionals
alone compensate the inevitable decline of the conventional
fields? A closer look at the U.S. unconventional oil potential
will be presented in the following part based on historical
data and a new production potential model.
3 Methodology
To assess the potential of the U.S. unconventional oil and
answer the question of whether or not it can meet the grow-
ing demand for fossil fuels in the middle and long term, a
model has been developed. This latter does not aim at pre-
cisely forecasting the level of the U.S. unconventional oil
production in the coming years. Based on historical trends
it rather aims at estimating the limits of its capacities
within the current framework of technological and invest-
ment evolution. Tight oil reservoirs are characterized by
lower quality than conventional ones. They are compact
with low permeabilities and porosities requiring some
hydraulic fracking for producing their oil, resulting in very
low, rapidly falling production rates. Unlike conventional
fields where production ramps-up during several months
or years, a U.S. unconventional oil well will reach its peak
of productivity very quickly, about 1–2 months after its
commissioning. It will then decline exponentially and lose
up to 70% of its maximum productivity after the first year,
and 90% after the second year of production (EIA, 2019).
As a comparison, the average flow rates of unconven-
tional wells are 10–100 times lower than conventional ones,
leading to an increased number of wells required to achieve
the same production. Thus, the two main parameters
identified and used to calibrate and run the model, that
have the strongest influence on U.S. unconventional oil
production rate, are the number of horizontal wells drilled
per year and the average productivity per well over time.
Over 125 000 horizontal wells have been drilled to date
in the U.S. The data provided by the U.S. Energy Informa-
tion Administration (EIA) highlights two distinct linear
trends in annual drilling rates over the U.S. unconventional
oil boom period (2010 to now) (EIA, 2019). The first trend
associated with the 2010–2014 high oil prices has seen on
average c.a. 15 500 horizontal wells drilled per year. It is
the highest rate of horizontal well drilling observed so far
and will be considered as the “High Drilling Rate”in the
model. The current drilling trend can be observed follow-
ing the oil price downturn from 2014 to now with
c.a. 8000 Horizontal wells per year (Fig. 7). It is considered
as the “Low Drilling Rate”in our model.
On the other side, the average productivity per horizon-
tal well has tripled over the last 7 years in the U.S., offset-
ting the quick exponential decline in productivity after
commissioning and allowing the current records production
rate that no one had anticipated. Two hypotheses have
then been put forward regarding the evolution of the
productivity to assess the potential of the U.S. unconven-
tionals. One that makes room for productivity improve-
ments, where average productivity per well will continue
to increase. This hypothesis reflects the possible evolution
of the technology combined with an improved understand-
ing of the subsurface. This increase in productivity has been
set up following the average trend of improvement of the
last 7 years (c.a. +50 bpd at peak production) (Fig. 8).
The other one is considering that productivity will
remain stable and won’t increase or decrease over the com-
ing years. In 2018, the peak of productivity averaged
647 bpd per well.
The model has been computed on a monthly basis where
the production decline rate of a well is fixed for each month
of production based on historical performance from the last
7 years.
Four scenarios will be presented using the hypothesis
outlined above:
High Drilling Rate –Productivity Increase (HDR –PI);
High Drilling Rate –Stable Productivity (HDR –SP);
Low Drilling Rate –Productivity Increase (LDR –PI);
Low Drilling Rate –Stable Productivity (LDR –SP).
4 Results and discussions
At the end of 2025, the results of our modelling show that
the HDR-PI scenario, where production is constantly
increasing, reaches 14.1 mbopd. The HDR-SP scenario also
increases continuously but at a slower pace to reach
10.2 mbopd. In the LDR-PI scenario, production decreases
immediately before recovering, as the natural decline in
production is offset by productivity improvements in new
wells to reach 7.4 mbopd. The LDR-SP scenario sees its
P. Hacquard et al.: Oil & Gas Science and Technology –Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles 74, 88 (2019) 7

production continuously decreasing to reach 5.5 mbopd
(Fig. 9). In all the scenarios the U.S. unconventional oil pro-
duction is smaller than the 15 mbopd required according to
the IEA to balance supply and demand in the coming years.
The hypotheses used in the model can be considered as
optimistic when compared to additional parameters that
can negatively affect the U.S. unconventional oil
production:
it is not considered that after a certain time, as for
conventional fields, the most productive areas will
have all been put into production and operators will
Fig. 7. U.S. Horizontal wells drilling rate models.
Fig. 8. Historical average productivity per horizontal well over time. The 2019–2025 forecast is based on the average increase in
productivity per year over 2010–2018.
P. Hacquard et al.: Oil & Gas Science and Technology –Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles 74, 88 (2019)8

have to turn to less rich areas, which will necessarily
have an impact on breakeven prices and productivity
in the long term,
it has been demonstrated that because of the proxim-
ity of horizontal wells in unconventionals reservoirs,
newly drilled wells could “cannibalize”old wells
already in production and lower their productivity
(Matthews et al., 2019),
no economic cut-off is considered in the lifetime of
the wells, whereas, most of them are stopped after a
certain production time,
the unconventional activity remains very capital
intensive and after many years of high spending,
investors are beginning to focus on fiscal discipline,
which may limit investment in the future,
the financial environment, i.e., the low interest rate
conditions, could change unfavourably in future years,
to keep costs low, it is necessary to optimize all equip-
ment as much as possible, which implies the continu-
ous drilling of new wells. This means that companies
must constantly have new locations to drill. The com-
petition to acquire new drilling areas in the U.S. is
tough. This will have implications on the ability of
producers to keep breakeven low over the long term.
It should also be noted that since the beginning of its
boom, the U.S. unconventional activity has not been
profitable for a single year (Fig. 10). Although some play-
ers, notably the majors, can generate profits thanks to a
focus on highly productive and profitable acreages, in
May 2019, 90% of independent U.S. producers still did
not generate positive cash flow (Rystad Energy, 2019). It
can be directly linked to the 185 U.S. oil field services
bankruptcies that have been registered since 2015. With a
cumulated amount of debt of USD 65 billion, of which
USD 25 billion were unsecured that may not be reimbursed,
it increases the uncertainties regarding the future of invest-
ments in the U.S. unconventional industry (Haynes and
Boone’sEnergy,2019).
Regarding the last World Energy Outlook (WEO), the
IEA also carried out production projections for the U.S.
unconventional oil. Their model, which is intended to be
more predictive, is consistent with our results and forecasts
that production should reach a peak around 9 mb/d around
2023. When we take a closer look, some of their assump-
tions are also questionable. In particular, they consider a
drilling rate of about 20 000 wells per year. Sensitivity anal-
ysis shows that the number of wells drilled per year have the
greatest impact in our model. Using IEA drilling rate of
20 000 wells, our model reaches up to 17.8 mb/d in 2025
in the productivity increase scenario and 12.9 mb/d with-
out productivity increase. Nonetheless 20 000 wells can be
considered as a very optimistic assumption given current
and past trends. Considering the current number of active
rigs in the U.S. (Fig. 3), it seems very unlikely in the current
context of market prices that it will pick-up fast enough to
go further the 2011–2014 rates before 2025. On the other
hand, and from IEA’s point of view, productivity is likely
to decrease over time, considering the elements presented
above (IEA, 2018). On their side, the EIA is more
optimistic with a peak in production that should reach
around 12 mb/d by 2025 in their base case (EIA, 2019).
The orders of magnitude are then consistent with our
scenario HDR –PI.
In conclusion, through our analysis or the scenarios
provided by modelling energy agencies, no current model
allows the U.S. unconventionals to reach 15 mbopd of pro-
duction by 2025. In this context, would it be possible to
Fig. 9. U.S. Unconventionals historical production data and modelisation results of the different assessed scenarios.
P. Hacquard et al.: Oil & Gas Science and Technology –Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles 74, 88 (2019) 9

imagine that the exploitation of other non-conventional
resources could emerge in other countries in the same way
as in the U.S.? Interests for countries are numerous: energy
security, lower gas and electricity prices as well as many
jobs that would give a boost to any economy in the world.
Nevertheless the U.S. combined a number of factors in
favour of the rapid emergence of the unconventional indus-
try which is unlikely to be observed together elsewhere,
included: a close and rapid access to the domestic market
(the U.S are the first largest oil consumer in the world), an
already well-developed industry with numerous infrastruc-
tures (the U.S. is historically in the top three of world
producers), companies and universities with extensive
knowledge, skills and experience, half of the world drilling
rigs, a mature and important investment network, abun-
dant financing resources (large investors panel, highly
structured market) as well as specific mining rights giving
the subsurface ownership to the landlords (Bauquis, 2014).
In areas with high non-conventional production potential
(Argentina, China, Russia, etc.) it is unlikely that we will
see unconventional production emerge to the extent that
has been observed in the U.S., for one or more of the above
reasons, depending on local specificities. As an example,
China, which should have the means and the resources to
penetrate this industry quickly, recently had to reduce their
ambitions due to the difficulty of achieving their profitabil-
ity objectives (Trent, 2019).
In addition, as it was the case at the beginning of the
U.S. unconventionals boom, a rapid increase in unconven-
tional production will mechanically create an increase in
demand for all the products needed for their extraction such
as special sands, viscosifying agents for injection fluids,
drilling pipes, rig rental or wages. This increase in demand
will lead to higher prices and even supply problems that
could reduce the already fragile profitability of some pro-
jects (Bauquis, 2014). Therefore, a case-by-case assessment
of each country must be considered to assess their real
production potential in the medium term, as the factors
affecting production costs and project profitability are
numerous and different (e.g., rig costs, depth of the reser-
voir, wages, environmental regulations, state taxes and
royalties, resource ownership, etc.).
5 Conclusion
In the context of a declining conventional sector (declining
production, declining discoveries, insufficient investment,
persistent geopolitical risks and environmental pressure)
the U.S. unconventionals have emerged as the new opportu-
nity for the Oil and Gas industry to meet the assumed
increasing demand. Nevertheless, faced with a demand for
oil that would continue to grow in the coming years, the
probability of an oil crunch by 2025 is far from null. Accord-
ing to our study, it is unlikely that the U.S. will be able to
double their unconventionals production in future years,
and, it seems unlikely that another country will be able to
put such unconventionals oil volume into production within
afewyears.
Given the close link that currently exists between energy
consumption and global economic growth
6
,itisthendiffi-
cult to mention the possibility of an oil crunch without men-
tioning its main possible consequences. The literature
already provides analyses of the consequences, mainly
economic, of a lack of oil supply on our society, including
6
Indeed, the high rate of economic growth is generally due to
industrialization, urbanization, transportation infrastructure,
etc., which are mainly dependent on energy consumption such
as oil and coal. They are used to produce electricity, heat and
fuels for transport (see Waheed et al., 2019 for a complete review
of literature).
Source: IEA, World Energy Investment 2019
Fig. 10. U.S. Tight oil production, investment and free cash flow.
P. Hacquard et al.: Oil & Gas Science and Technology –Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles 74, 88 (2019)10

higher oil prices. While the impacts may vary considerably
from one sector and region to another, the transport sector
(air, maritime, passenger transport) will be one of the first
strongly affected because it is mainly based on the use of
liquid fuels. Operations and supply chains disrupted by price
increases could quickly result in significant financial losses or
bankruptcy. Resulting global high price inflation, combined
with uncertain markets, could trigger a world economic
recession or a financial crisis, leading to a reduction in global
wealth and social issues. Such perspectives and possible con-
sequences cannot be taken lightly and force us today to
anticipate and mitigate the risk of a global energy supply
contraction. New policies must be set up to minimize the
risk of a supply crunch and reduce as much as possible the
negative impacts on our societies of such an event.
In addition, the prospect of a slowdown in oil supply
strongly reaffirms, in line with global climate objectives,
the need for a transition towards an increasingly moderate
and efficient use of our energy and the deployment of more
renewable capacities. Countries will gain in energy indepen-
dency and partially reduce the impact of an oil crunch on
their economies.
Acknowledgments. This article received the financial support of
the French National Research Agency (ANR) through the
GENERATE project. The authors would like to thank the
anonymous reviewers whose comments and suggestion helped
us to improve this article. The authors are also very grateful
to Nathalie Keller, François Kalaydjian and Jerome Sabathier
for insightful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors
are of course ours. The views expressed herein are strictly those
of the authors and are not to be construed as representing those
of IFP Energies nouvelles or Equinor.
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