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Can Africa ever achieve continental sovereignty in the shifting West-to-East strategic
landscape? The geopolitics of integration and autonomy
BABATUNDE FAGBAYIBO
(Forthcoming book chapter: in Kornegay Francis & Mthembu Philani (eds.) “Geopolitics
and Empire Building: What Can We Learn From the Past to Achieve Global Peace” 2020)
‘So, first things first. If we don’t have the power, we can’t implement whatever type of
society we choose to have in Africa. If we don’t create enough power to guarantee our
autonomy, we can implement only such reforms as the bigger powers advocate or tolerate.’
Chinweizu, 2011: 95
Introduction
For decades, the process around the quest for continental integration in Africa has
remained a puzzle to observers. This puzzle stems mainly from the inherent contradictions
that have marked attempts to put into practice the rhetoric on pan-African unity. This has,
in turn, raised questions regarding the feasibility of navigating some of these contradictions
in order to bring to life a qualitative and truly transformative continentalism. These
questions have revolved around issues such as the dependence of regional institutions on
external funding; the routine disrespect of fundamental regional norms and practices by
member states; the exclusion of civil society from the crafting and implementation of
regional norms; the continued inability of the African Union (AU) to successfully harmonise
the standards and policies of regional economic communities (RECs); the lack of consensus
on the institutional nature of continental integration; and the role of global actors from the
East and West blocs in shaping national and regional agendas (Fagbayibo, 2017; Fagbayibo,
2018; Karbo & Murithi, 2018: 1–9; Olukoshi, 2010).
Cumulatively, these issues have in the past decade intensified efforts in the transnational
policy development space regarding the determination of processes that will strengthen the
geopolitics of African integration and autonomy in global realpolitik. Drawing from the
transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the AU in 2002, with an
institutional mechanism projected to provide supranational regionalism, these processes
have prompted an avalanche of policy proposals. The proposals have covered matters such
as democratic governance, peace and security, free trade, free movement of persons and
reform of the AU, including its financing. The AU’s Agenda 2063, adopted in 2015 by the AU
Assembly, is the most recent push towards the goal of collective continental sovereignty.
Under Aspiration 2 of its Seven Aspirations agenda, the document stipulates the imperative
of an integrated Africa (AUC, 2015a: 4), and defers a decision on the type of continental
government to be established until 2030 (AUC, 2015a: 7). Working within the context of the
aspirational goals of Agenda 2063, a number of activities have been embarked upon in the
three years up to 2019. Chief among these are the institutional reforms of the AU, led by
Paul Kagame (Kagame, 2017); the 2018 adoption of the Protocols of Free Trade and Free
Movement (AU, 2018a, and the adoption of the Donald Kabureka report on financing the AU
(AU, 2016).
The call for the reform of the AU is seen as the central motif of achieving true continental
sovereignty in Africa, or, in alternative words, a supranational continental organisation that
is able to establish binding norms on the continent and also assert itself as a global authority
on African issues. Such reform is expected to be carried out within the context of
increasingly complex global realpolitik, where global actors such as China, Russia, European
Union (EU), United States of America (USA) and other powers are engaged in various
activities in Africa aimed at enhancing their global influence. Coupled with this are internal
uncertainties that are currently determining the global projection of these powers. These
include the rise of right-wing parties in many parts of Europe and their anti-immigration
stances; the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU; and the populist position of
Donald Trump in the US. In spite of these trends, Africa remains an object of interest. Its
natural resources endowment; proximity to Europe and the Middle East; the destructive
presence of terrorist groups in North, East and West Africa; and burgeoning population all
combine to make the continent a turf for global actors to flex their geopolitical muscles,
build alliances and settle geostrategic scores (Bach, 2017: 140–3; Karbo & Murithi, 2018: 3–
5; The Economist, 2019, 18–20).
The extent to which the policy interventions turn into an active, geo-strategic plan for
achieving continental integration is dependent on how political elites are able to balance
what this chapter considers to be the ‘triptych dynamics’. These are internal dynamics
(issues such as enhancing the AU’s technocratic efficiency, self-restraint mechanisms and
bottom-up regionalism); external dynamics (the role of global actors on current and future
issues that affect regionalism in Africa, including domestic uncertainties determining the
global projection of these powers); and the syncretic dynamics (which speaks to a practical
policy position on balancing both internal and external dynamics and determining the
suitability of application). In addressing these, the chapter starts with a discussion of
approaches to the idea of continental sovereignty in Africa. It then proceeds to analyse the
internal, external and syncretic dynamics of achieving qualitative and transformative
continental integration, and how these could provide a useful methodology for achieving
continental autonomy.
Approaches to continental integration Africa
Scholars, political elites and transnational technocrats (whom Tieku (2017) refers to as
‘Africrats’) have over the years adopted a number of epistemic framings for understanding
Africa’s quest for continental integration. The questions and intervention strategies have
been around the issue of the pace, nature and the context of continental integration. With
regard to pace, the questions have centred on whether or not the continental integration
should proceed at a gradual or a much faster speed. On the nature of the continental
integration process, the debate has always been around whether continental regionalism
should be state-centric, supranational, (con)federal, or built around the strength of the
RECs. Finally, others have pointed out the imperative of continental integration responding
to an Afrocentric approach, one that is rooted in Pan-African knowledge systems and
contextual realities. These points are elaborated on in the following paragraphs.
The evaluation of the pace of continental integration is one rooted in the robust debates
and engagements that preceded the establishment of the OAU in 1963. Kwame Nkrumah’s
‘unite or perish’ (Nkrumah, 1973: 234) aphorism came to define the doctrinal approach of
those who argued that the only way to counter neo-imperial interference in African affairs,
and the diminished continental sovereignty flowing from such interference, is dependent on
moving with transnational institutional development at a much faster speed (Nkrumah,
1963). Kwame Nkrumah regarded sub-regional integration and attachment to national
sovereignties as nothing more than ‘a form of balkanisation on a grand scale’ (Nkrumah,
1963: 214). In this regard, he pushed for continental instead of sub-regional federalism
(Nkrumah, 1963: 214–15):
The idea of regional federations in Africa is fraught with many dangers. There is
the danger of the development of regional loyalties, fighting against each other.
In effect, regional federations are a form of balkanisation on a grand scale … the
best means … is to begin to create a larger and all-embracing loyalty which will
hold Africa together as a united people with one government and one destiny.
Although Nkrumah’s quest for a much faster and rapid continental integration process failed
to materialise, it inspired others such as the late Muammar Ghaddafi to pursue the same
line of thought.
As a counterpoise to the demand for a faster pace is the idea of an incremental approach,
one that has become the dominant feature of Africa’s continental integration process. The
incremental approach advances the imperative of building continental integration from
sub-regional levels, with a phased transfer of powers to continental organisations. The AU’s
Agenda 2063 is built around this ideology, as it encourages the gradual attainment of goals
and the deferment of a position on the type of continental government to 2030 (AUC,
2015a: 7). It could be argued that since the adoption of the AU Agenda 2063 in 2015, the
gradualist approach has encompassed a more pragmatic ideological component. Composed
of ‘Africrats’ and national political elites, this pragmatic component has introduced far-
reaching reform measures; ensured the adoption of the African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA), and the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community
Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment; and
the decision to finance the AU through 0.2 per cent import levy on all ‘eligible imports’ into
the continent (AU, 2016; AU, 2018b). This is further evidenced by the increasing acceptance
of some of these policies as shown through rapid ratification and implementation. An
example is the coming into force of the AfCFTA on 30 May 2019, at the point of ratification
by the minimum number of 22 member states, about a year after its adoption. However,
there have been criticisms levelled against the institutional reform process that was led by
President Paul Kagame of Rwanda. According to Adebajo (2017), the report is:
… rushed, lacks substance, and its fluffy recommendations are on a level of
vacuity as to be of no real utility. These are physicians who are proposing half-
baked cures to ills that have not been properly diagnosed.
The former South African president, Thabo Mbeki, also expressed concerns about the
reform process, noting that it will likely turn the AU into a more technocratic, UN-like
organisation rather than a truly politically autonomous organisation (cited in Onyango-
Obbo, 2019).
The discourse around the nature of the continental integration process remains the most
topical of the three approaches. In addressing the question of the nature of the integration
process, scholars have employed two analytical prisms: intergovernmental (or state-driven)
and supranational (technocratic driven) (Tieku, 2017: 221–2). The former speaks to a state-
driven regional integration process where member states are the supreme rule-making
structures, while the latter denotes the empowerment of neutral, technocratic, regional
institutions to make binding rules and regulations. This binary analysis has defined
continental integration from the time of the OAU through to recent processes aimed at
implementing Agenda 2063. While there exists no consensus on the type of continental
government, the recent adoption of norms on free trade, free movement and the need to
transfer more powers to the AU indicates a symbolic acceptance of supranational
integration, albeit in a more manageable and gradual fashion. The tilt towards
supranationalism is as informed by Kwame Nkrumah’s federalist approach to Africa as it is
influenced by the European integration process. This process provided the template for the
transformation of the OAU to AU in 2002, and it continues to influence continental
integration through the EU’s continued financial assistance and the colonial heritage of
regionalism in Africa (Bach, 2017: 81–2; Hansen & Jonsson, 2018). Until 2017, AU member
states only contributed about 27 per cent of the organisation’s budget, while external
donors bore the remaining cost (Vanheukelom, 2019a). The EU alone contributed 63 per
cent of the entire external donation to the AU budget (Madu, 2017). Such influence
continues to undercut the agency of continental authority (Olukoshi, 2010: 53; Staeger
2016: 993; Vanheukelom, 2016: vi), and has thus informed the policies and processes of the
transformation of the AU. However, the AU took a decision in 2018 to reduce its 2019
budget by 12 per cent, increasing member states’ contribution to 46 per cent, with the
remaining 54 per cent covered by development partners (AU, 2018a).
It should, however, be emphasised that there is a range of perspectives within the Afro-
supranationalism school of thought. The continental-federalist approach, which advances
the establishment of a ‘United States of Africa’, remains the most extreme element of the
supranational paradigm (Nkrumah, 1963; Diop, 1987). Another element is the ideological
expectation of a supposed supranational continental government. While some advance a
leftist ideology, others argue for a neoliberal approach that is more in tune with
globalisation (Taylor, 2003; Adesina, 2004; Fagbayibo, 2018: 631–3). The latter approach
continues to define transnational policy development processes in Africa, with the AU
Agenda 2063 markedly affirming this approach (Fagbayibo, 2018: 632). There also exists
another paradigm that sees an EU-like supranational AU as either an imperative
precondition for the creation of a ‘United States of Africa’ or as a more feasible substitute
(Tieku, 2017: 222). This paradigm subscribes to the idea that sub-regional organisations are
building blocks for continental unity, enhancement of democratic governance in member
states and a strategic intergovernmental approach that can be carefully utilised in firming
the foundations of continental supranationalism (Fagbayibo, 2011; Tieku, 2017: 222; Byiers
et al., 2019: 16).
The last approach, or context, is one that speaks to the imperative of building continental
regionalism around Africa’s peculiar contexts and in particular the adoption of indigenous
knowledge systems in the development of policies and processes. As some scholars have
emphasised, regional integration is essentially an idea built around the EU’s experience and
history and has had little successful application elsewhere (Agyeman, 1990; Acharya, 2012:
7; Draper, 2012). This school of thought notes that epistemological lessons from pre-colonial
African kingdoms and African societies in general on state-building, trade practices,
resolution of conflicts and diplomatic processes are essential pointers (Chinweizu, 2011: 83;
Ochonu, 2015; Ani, 2019: 145–7). The adoption of theories and practices of European
integration, the prescription of either leftist or neoliberal approaches to African integration,
and the unbridled attachment to Westphalian sovereignty, are seen as antithetical to
achieving an authentic Pan-African integration (Chinweizu, 2011: 83; Ndhlovu, 2017). This
approach, however, does not necessarily call for the wholesale abandonment of all external
knowledge systems, rather it advocates for what Ndhlovu refers to as ‘translative
adaptation’, which is (2017: 106):
an innovative blending and integration … of these development models into
home-grown, Africa-centred theories and philosophies that are rooted in
endogenous linguistic and material cultures in order to enhance the unlocking of
local creative capabilities and potentials for innovation.
Relatedly, Chinweizu (2011: 83) observes that in addition to pre-colonial Africa, lessons can
also be gleaned from non-African countries such as modern Japan, Sweden, Cuba and China.
While numerous transnational documents and norms have emphasised the need to
recognise and take into account African traditional values and principles in the
implementation of strategies, there exist no serious measures for achieving this. For
example, under Aspiration 5 of AU Agenda 2063, it is stipulated that African cultural heritage
will be at the centre of strategies aimed at facilitating Pan-African approaches (AU, 2015a:
8). The practicalities of achieving this task are missing from the implementation documents
of Agenda 2063 and other transnational development blueprints (AUC, 2015b). What
remains prioritised is the adoption of Eurocentric and neoliberal strategies that seek the
integration of African economies into global markets (Taylor, 2003; Adesina, 2004; Nzongola-
Ntalaja, 2014: 43–4).
A triptych analysis of the feasibility of meaningful continental autonomy
The ability of a continental regionalism to project meaningful power and autonomy within
and outside Africa is predicated on numerous fundamentals. However, this chapter adopts a
triptych lens, one that views external and internal strands as continuous and contiguous.
Internal dynamics: Repositioning the centre
The politics of the internal management of the continental integration process has in recent
years become more focal. At the core of this is the question of agency, in particular the
extent to which this informs the ownership and quality of decisions on the direction of
continental regionalism. The lack of such agency is often linked to the excessive influence of
external parties, including uncertainties around the parties’ national political and economic
processes, and how these negatively alter the calculus of continental integration. This point
will be further explored in the next subsection. Of significant importance in this subsection
is an understanding of the critical internal pillars that will determine the shape of
continental regionalism. The first is the technocratic context and competence of continental
regionalism. This factor speaks to the imperative of determining what role transnational
technocratic agencies should play in driving the continental integration process.
According to the Kagame Report on institutional reform, the functions and priorities of the
AU should be streamlined and limited to issues such as political affairs, peace and security,
economic integration, and Africa’s global representation (Kagame, 2017: 7). In furtherance
of this objective, Kagame proposed that the chairperson of the AU Commission should be
empowered to appoint his or her own deputy and commissioners (Louw-Vaudran, 2018).
This recommendation was rejected by the AU Assembly (Louw-Vaudran, 2018). The
Assembly, however, approved the recommendation to reduce the number of
commissioners from eight to six (Louw-Vaudran, 2018). In addition, it was recommended
that the second annual AU Assembly should be solely dedicated to a coordination meeting
between the AU and its RECs (Louw-Vaudran, 2018). Another development was the
adoption, by the AU Executive Council on 19 March 2018, of the AU African common
position on negotiating a post-Cotonou trade agreement with the EU (AU, 2018c). This
common position proposes that Africa should negotiate as a group, to be represented by
the AU, separately from the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states (AU, 2018c).
Carbone (2018: 487), however, notes that the common position was far from being
consensual as member states were divided between removing Africa from the ACP or
remaining within the group.
In assessing the nexus between these measures and continental regionalism, a number of
points are worth considering. One is the recruitment and appointment process, one that
balances politics and meritocracy, and also places relevant AU organs such as the Pan-
African Parliament (PAP) at the heart of the quality-control process (Fagbayibo, 2012: 24–5).
Another is whether the functions should be delivered along corporate lines (like a private
sector organisation), facilitatory ones (where the AU’s role is only to facilitate the correct
application of norms at sub-regional and national levels), or a blend of intergovernmental
and supranational elements (where roles are strategically assigned and shared between
national and transnational agencies). Each of these elements has measures that could be
useful for sharpening the AU. The corporate model brings to the table the prioritisation of
lean, efficient and performance management-driven organisational processes. Together
with the facilitatory model, it highlights the need to carefully identify feasible governance,
security and capacity-building measures, and, therefore, deploy resources towards
achieving such objectives. Lastly, the blend of supranational and intergovernmental
elements brings together the corporate and facilitatory models by identifying issues of low
and high politics, and then strategically mainstreaming continental integration goals into
sub-regional and national processes. Another dimension to this is the imperative of learning
lessons from sub-regional bodies. For example, the AU could adopt and adapt useful
operational methods of organisations such as the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC) in the implementation of its
protocols on free movement, free trade and private sector involvement in continental
integration.
The second pillar deals with the need to strengthen self-restraining institutional and
normative measures. Mazrui used the term ‘self-pacification’ to denote the imperative of
devising political methods of preventing the escalation of competition to conflicts or large-
scale civil wars in Africa (1994: 39). Building on Mazrui’s thesis, the AU has developed
governance and security platforms such as the Peace and Security Council (and its early
warning systems mechanism), the African Standby Force (ASF), the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) to stem the spate of
conflicts. Furthermore, the AU Agenda 2063 envisages the resolution of conflicts by 2020.
While quantitatively speaking the number of conflicts has reduced on the continent, the AU
still struggles to effectively curb excesses that have the potential of snowballing into conflict
and other humanitarian disasters in member states. These include the manipulation of
elections, autocratic tendencies and the brutal suppression of dissenting voices. In addition,
the AU’s supposed promotion of democratic values is further undercut by its inability to
prevent leaders with questionable democratic credentials from either heading the AU
Assembly or driving programmes aimed at improving integrative objectives (Fagbayibo,
2017: 166–7). In essence, the AU has only marginally moved away from its predecessor’s
regime-boosting and club-diplomacy approach, which emphasises solidarity among heads of
state over and above affirming democratic tenets.
The third pillar speaks to investing in bottom-up continental regional integration initiatives.
One of the essential features of Africa’s integration process is its elite driven, top-down
approach, with very little room for civil society to make effective contributions. Beyond the
nominal recognition of civil society platforms in the AU, there remains little or no
consideration of citizen participation in the articulation and implementation of integrative
goals. Some relevant issues remain peripheral concerns, such as referenda on continental
integration measures; coordination and mainstreaming of various private sector activities
into a well-articulated continental agenda; utilisation of traditional authorities in enhancing
awareness; promotion of the use of African languages in driving continental integration
(Diop, 1987: 11–14; Ndlhovu, 2017); incorporation of informal cross-border trades into the
architecture of continental free trade arrangements; and exploring realistic ways through
which citizens can fund and benefit from continental programmes. The absence of these
explain the disconnection between and regionalisation. The former refers to official
programmes and policies aimed at consolidating regional institutions, while the latter
describes interactive engagements among non-state actors in processes that do not
necessarily involve regional organisations or state actors (Acharya, 2012: 12; Bach, 2017: 5–
6). The issue of devising bottom-up effective processes for regional integration in Africa is
discussed below.
These three pillars are further impacted by two key variables. One is the extent to which the
AU is able to manage and eventually harmonise the structures of the eight recognised RECs
under a continental umbrella. This point has been a key issue since the establishment of the
AU in 2002. The legal framework, the ‘Draft Protocol on the Relations Between the African
Union and the Regional Economic Communities’ (2007), is yet to be adopted, and its
provisions on the primacy of the AU regarding intervention are ambiguous (ICG, 2017: 15;
Kaaba & Fagbayibo, 2019: 29). Furthermore, these RECs are at different stages of
development, thereby making a definitive time period of harmonisation almost impossible
(Byiers et al., 2019: 2–3). As Byiers et al. (2019: 3–6) note, issues of geography (contiguous
boundaries and resources, geo-strategic calculations to access bigger markets and gain
influence) and history (shared colonial inheritance of regional structures) play important
roles in participation in RECs. In addition, there have been cases of rivalry and competition
between AU and RECs regarding subsidiarity functions and access to substantial resources
from donor organisations (ICG, 2017: 14–16). These issues have raised the question of
whether RECs, having attained the requisite level of success and influence, would be willing
to cede powers to the AU. The answer to this lies in a pragmatic understanding of what
continental integration means. In other words, it speaks to accepting the diversity and
different dynamics that continue to push and pull regional integration efforts at the RECs,
and how these connect with AU objectives. This would require the acceptance of the
strength of certain RECs regarding AU objectives on free trade, free movement and
infrastructure development, and then proceeding to place such RECs at the heart of the
continental implementation of those projects, with the AU managing the quality-control
process.
The second variable is the North Africa/Sub-Saharan Africa divide that has been in existence
since the creation of the OAU. The politics of many North African countries (which looks
towards the Arab world and Euro-America), and the treatment of black Africans in those
countries, have enhanced the perceptions that North African states such as Morocco, Egypt,
Tunisia and Libya do not consider themselves as part of the continent (Lambert & Ramadan,
2015; Sawahel, 2019; Minority Rights Group International, 2019: 31). The discovery of ‘slave
markets’ in Libya, where black African refugees and migrants were sold at auctions by
Libyans further highlighted the problematic issue of racism and discrimination in North
Africa (Quackenbush, 2017). Although the limited participation of North African states in AU
activities has in recent times changed, with Morocco’s re-admission into the AU, and Egypt
becoming the chair of the AU Assembly for 2019, there are still concerns about how these
will change the perceptions of division. Another problematic issue is that a platform such as
the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which is one of the eight recognised AU RECs and is
composed of North African countries, is essentially inoperative due to internal wrangling
and conflicts among member states. An effective AMU could have provided a platform
through which North Africans are able to play a more meaningful role in continental
integration.
This line of division is one that undermines the possibility of a strong continental unit. The
way out of this quagmire is to utilise the increasing engagement of pivotal states, such as
Egypt, in continental integration activities as a platform for combatting the scourge of
racism and discrimination. This will require policies that legislate against discrimination and
racism in North African countries; promote people-to-people interaction and raise
awareness around the idea of pan-Africanism; and place continental integration agenda at
the heart of national programmes through the adoption and implementation of
programmes on free movement and trade.
External dynamics: Navigating the shifting West-to-East strategic landscape
The AU’s relationship with external actors remains an integral, albeit controversial,
component of its institutional existence. Okumu and Makinda identify three key contexts in
which Africa and its continental organisations engage with external parties (cited in Makinda
et al., 2016: 141). The first is whether such partners view Africa as a source of problem or a
source of opportunity (Makinda et al., 2016: 141). The second speaks to the extent of the
genuineness of respect shown by external partners towards African core values, equality
and joint ownership of projects and policies (Makinda et al., 2016: 141). The third relates to
competition by external actors in pursuit of interests across Africa (Makinda et al., 2016:
141). The issue is not so much about the need for external engagement as it is about the
quality of such interaction. In other words, the overriding question is whether such
interaction enhances the legitimacy of the AU. The organisation’s programmes and projects
are excessively funded by external partners, thereby bringing into question the credibility of
its existence, and its claim to being the prime driver of integration in Africa.
As things stand, the EU provides the bulk of the funding for the AU’s peace and security
budget, and also funds a number of governance, human rights and democracy-building
initiatives by the organisation (ICG, 2017). Since the inception of the AU Peace and Security
Architecture (APSA), the EU has remained its biggest funder by allocating EUR 50 million
annually to APSA for the 2014–2020 programme phase (Vanheukelom, 2019b: 7). Other
partners such as China, Japan, India and individual EU member states also provide strategic
financial support. Although China prioritises bilateral arrangements with individual African
countries, it has in the past decade funded continental integration projects such as the
building of the AU secretariat, the China-Africa Peace and Security Fund, the Pan-African
Infrastructure Development Fund, and the development of information technology
infrastructure (Monyae, 2018: 288–9). These external funding sources remain the lifeline of
many AU activities, thereby putting the organisation in a vulnerable and compromising
position in terms of the sustainability of projects, and also in asserting itself as the primary
driver of continental sovereignty within and outside the continent. While this reality has
spurred initiatives such as a 0.2 per cent import tax levy, the readjustment of member state
contribution, and a substantial decrease of the AU budget, the practicability of the
proposals and the tepid commitment of member states to decisions remains a key concern.
The increasing interest in African issues is seen by some as the new scramble for Africa.
External actors are increasing their diplomatic presence on the continent in an
unprecedented fashion. Between 2010 and 2016, more than 230 embassies and consulates
were opened across the continent (The Economist, 2019: 18). The ‘new scramble for Africa’
description is not far off the mark considering how some of the global actors openly
question each other’s (mercantilist) motives. Such contestation is sometimes akin to parents
– global actors – jostling over the custody of the children, which in this case is Africa.
Introducing the new White House strategy on Africa, the then US national security adviser,
John Bolton, described the Chinese and Russian involvement in Africa as predatory and
exploitative. He said it has only encouraged corruption, deepened debt crisis in many
African states, and thus poses a threat to US national security (Pilling, 2018; The Economist,
2019: 18). While the volume of Chinese investment has been a major source of concern to
countries in the global north, its expanding military presence on the continent, particularly
in Djibouti, remains a bigger nagging issue for the US government (Osborne, 2018; The
Economist, 2019: 18). For Washington it is seen as a way of entrenching China’s political and
economic interests in Africa to the exclusion of the US (Osborne, 2018), apart from seeing
China’s military presence as a rival to the US African Command (AFRICOM).
While the top sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa are from companies in the
US, Britain and France, China has recorded an impressive increase in its African investments
by reaching a $40 billion mark in 2016 (The Economist, 2019: 19). The EU has responded to
China’s growing presence in Africa by adopting the geo-strategic option of cooperating
rather than competing with China on African issues (Hooijmaaijers, 2018: 448–9). However,
this has not prevented the EU from privately expressing reservations that despite huge
European contributions to continental integration, the AU seems to always give preferential
treatment to China (ICG, 2017: 20). Observers have raised questions about China’s pursuit of
its national geopolitical interests in Africa; the presumed neo-colonial elements of its
relations with African countries; the lack of consideration of democratic governance and
human rights in its dealings with AU member states, and the link between its loans and the
growing debt crisis in some Africa states (Chutel, 2018; Were, 2018; Dahir, 2019).
These external support sources are not particularly altruistic as certain situations have
shown how their operations have been used to undermine the legitimacy of the AU. For
example, it is alleged that after handing over the AU secretariat building, China deliberately
left open the AU computer network, a factor that allowed it to spy on the organisation from
January 2012 to January 2017 (Tilouine & Kadiri, 2018). Through its extensive funding, the
EU has also engaged in many activities calculated at undermining the legitimacy of the AU.
These include channelling funds to regional security arrangements outside the purview of
the AU security framework; choosing to negotiate its economic partnership agreements
(EPAs) with sub-regional groupings rather than an AU-composed negotiating team, and the
cherry-picking which projects to support, regardless of compatibility with continental
integration priorities (Sicurelli, 2010: 183; Vanheukelom, 2016: 11; ICG, 2017: 12–13;
Carbone, 2018: 491).
In addition to the factors noted above are uncertain global trends that will, in the medium-
to-long term, have varied impact on relations with Africa. China currently faces sluggish
economic growth, a ballooning debt problem, and growing domestic concerns regarding the
spending of taxpayers’ money abroad (Dahir, 2019). The rise of right-wing, racist and
xenophobic parties across Europe, with strong anti-immigration sentiments that are fuelled
by the influx of African and Middle East refugees into Europe, is increasingly influencing the
EU’s approach to security and migration policies on Africa (ICG, 2017: 8–9). In this respect,
the EU has channelled more funds towards military operations, securitisation of borders and
the offering of incentives for stemming migratory flow to repressive governments in Africa
(ICG, 2017: 8). Similarly, the present US government is unabashedly opposed to migratory
flows from Africa and the Middle East. As expressed in its new African strategy, the US is
more concerned about funding security and anti-terrorist programmes, and securing US
business interests in Africa (Pilling, 2018). What these point to is that global actors have
intensified the paradigmatic lenses of security and business for engaging with Africa, and
would not hesitate to remove any obstacles to achieving such objectives. The vacuum
created by poor and compromised leadership at national levels further aids the deepening
of this skewed and non-beneficial relationship (Murithi, 2018: 304–06).
As these global actors continue to extend and deepen their tentacles around the continent,
with the AU compromised by its dependence on their funding, the pertinent issue is how to
reset and re-centre the calculus of engagement. In its current state, the AU is even in a
weaker position than some small member states to follow through on measures that
promote power and autonomy. This is further accentuated by the peripheral negotiating
role played by the AU in forums such as the Forum of China-African Cooperation (FOCAC),
the Tokyo International Cooperation on African Development (TICAD), the India-Africa
Forum Summit (IAFS) and the EPAs. Navigating this fraught West-to-East landscape requires
a refocused AU, one that is properly situated at the centre of the integration matrix, with
the powers to take binding strategic decisions in, and on behalf of, member states. This is
the focus of the next subsection.
Syncretic dynamics: Towards ‘strategic hybridisation’
The last frames for assessing the feasibility of continental sovereignty is what this chapter
terms ‘strategic hybridisation’. Strategic hybridisation is premised on the logic that both the
external and internal dynamics affecting feasibility are interlocking, and as such require a
pragmatic approach that centres African peculiarities and issues in internal and external
dealings. The reality is that many of the external factors that directly and indirectly
negatively impact continental sovereignty and autonomy have become entrenched, and
thus require careful planning to address. For example, issues such as the military presence
of external powers; France’s (paternalistic) hold over its former colonies; growing Chinese
investment and loans, and how they diminish good governance; the debt crisis that has
made some African governments beholden to external parties, and the AU’s continued
reliance on EU funding are some of the intricate variables.
It is against this background that this chapter proposes three broad objectives to guide the
feasible implementation of ‘strategic hybridisation’. These objectives weave together
strands of engagement that seek to balance internal and external dynamics, out of which a
beneficial strategic approach can be developed. It has to be emphasised that these
suggestions are not a one-size-fits-all idea considering the diversity of the continent and
how this informs the dynamics of regionalism. Rather, the suggestions are a response to
these dynamics, having at their essence adaptation and flexibility of implementation. Thus,
while the central goal is continental integration, the design and implementation of these
suggestions should be flexible and based on the context of particular regions and member
states. This then requires member states and/or RECs that are already advanced in terms of
the suggested measures to come on board and to share strategies and lessons with the rest.
The central role of the AU in terms of assessing implementation and overseeing quality
control is key.
The three objectives are investment in area studies. prioritisation of an Afrocentric
epistemic framework in the design and implementation of continental objectives, and a
feasible guideline for the adaptation of best practises from elsewhere to move ahead with
continental regionalism. The importance of area studies should not be underemphasised in
the matrix of building continental sovereignty. One of the ways in which external parties
have been able to extend and entrench their national geopolitical interests is by carefully
studying and gaining acute knowledge of the variables that shape the continent. This is
especially done through governmental and non-government research institutes, funding of
projects, and the funding of programmes that enable their citizens to explore the African
continent. The EU, US, China, Japan and individual EU member states all invest aggressively
in area studies programmes, and have been able to use this to enhance their soft power
status across the continent (Tella, 2016a; Tella, 2016b). The task now is for Africa to move
beyond being the object of study by sharpening its own tools to qualitatively explores the
intentions and approaches of others. In this respect, the AU should be at the forefront of
partnering with research and academic institutions across the continent on programmes
that explore the intimate link between the (inter)national dynamics of external actors and
how these impact on regional integration programmes. Another key component of area
studies is the need to take programmes that build the negotiating capacity of stakeholders
across different sectors. Beyond corruption, one major impediment to managing external
political and economic relations in Africa is that many African countries lack well-trained
negotiating teams. Addressing this requires a multidimensional understanding that
encompasses the acquisition of technical negotiating skills as an integral element of
knowing who and what the other party is. The AU should also encourage its Pan African
University (PAU), situated in Africa’s five geographical regions, to have in-built programmes
that encourage area studies. The PAU has already started operations in West, East, Central
and North Africa, and the process of establishing the Southern African wing is ongoing
(University of Pretoria, 2018). The AU should, in the process of establishing and operating
these institutions, be mindful of the risks associated with outsourcing the financing of these
programmes to external parties.
The second objective speaks to the imperative of positioning Afrocentric initiatives and
methods at the core of continental regionalism. This should go beyond the oft-repeated
platitudes in normative documents and political rhetoric. The first measure in this respect
would be to build a broad-based movement of non-state actors that continues to scrutinise
aspects of continental regionalism, and ways in which grassroots ideas and strategies could
help make a substantial contribution. Issues that require immediate concern include citizen
funding of continental integration programmes; the direct elections (and granting of binding
legislative powers) of PAP representatives; design of curriculum on the nexus between
indigenous knowledge systems and the advancement of continental regionalism;
investment in innovative technology ideas that enhance people-to-people connections and
also provide solutions to issues obstructing regionalism; and the involvement of traditional
authorities in the dissemination and implementation of integration values at community
level. A follow-up step would be for the AU to develop an effective communication stream
that collates and feeds these discussions into AU structures and processes. For example, the
AU might adopt innovative communication channels to transmit its objectives, and then
allow for a window period to allow citizens to present their views; next the AU can provide a
final report to address concerns and issues raised. In this respect, the AU would have
created an effective two-track interactive system that balances engagements with both
state and non-state actors. These bottom-up processes could help provide continental
regionalism with much needed legitimacy and momentum to address some of Africa’s
challenges. They also help bring into sharp focus the need to translate national policy
priorities into transnational policy dialogues for the attainment of policy sovereignty at
continental level.
The third objective provides that in order to turn continental integration into a truly
transformative phenomenon, Africa, in the words of Mazrui (2008), ‘must stand ready to
selectively borrow, adapt, and creatively formulate its strategies for planned development’.
Such ‘translative’ process is one that recognises the centrality of Africa’s cultural contexts
and peculiarities, but is also mindful that external interactions and ideas could serve useful
purposes. Infrastructure development and management, agriculture, energy,
communication technology and poverty alleviation strategies are some of the measures that
for which one cannot ignore lessons from the rest, especially from countries in the Global
South. The AU has thus far failed to properly situate some of its adopted policies and
programmes within a cultural/contextual feasibility paradigm. The AU has adopted
neoliberal, Eurocentric strategies on trade, socio-economic development, negotiations with
external parties and its institutional set-up without systematically assessing these measures
against its oft-stated pan-Africanism philosophy. In going forward, the organisation would
benefit from being more introspective and critical by developing assessment mechanisms
that include discursive platforms where ideas are rigorously debated before application.
Conclusion
In terms of its population size, diversity of cultures and landmass, Africa remains one of the
biggest continents in the world. In addition, its peculiar geo-strategic advantage continues
to attract the global light beam. The challenge of turning its geo-strategic placement to its
advantage rather than providing the turf for traditional and emerging global players to whet
their resource-seeking appetite is an issue of urgent concern. Moghalu (2013: 21–3) refers
to this as the imperative of a strategic review of Africa’s worldview, one that places
enlightened self-interest at the heart of its relationship with others. It is this strategic
worldview that is at the heart of Chinweizu’s (2011: 95) call for Africa to ‘create enough
power to guarantee [its] autonomy’. It is impossible to create such power without a
pragmatic understanding and control of the dynamics that shape how the African continent
relates within itself, and then use this as a platform for strategically engaging others. The
link between autonomy and power is one that essentially speaks to getting one’s house in
order before interacting with outsiders. The inability to show unity and strength of purpose
continues to expose the continent to incalculable exploitation and diminished stature in the
global matrix of power relations.
It is against this backdrop that this chapter has shown the essential points that are
necessary for a viable continental integration process. It is only through an effective and
efficient continental integration process that Africa can build the capacity to drive
sustainable socio-economic and political development. In advancing this framing, the
chapter adopted a ‘triptych’ notion of discourse. These are the internal, external and
syncretic dynamics. Under the internal dynamics, variables such as technocratic context and
competence of continental regionalism, strengthening self-restraining measures, and
bottom-up approaches to continental integration were considered. External dynamics
looked at the influence of global actors on processes that impact on continental sovereignty
and autonomy. Syncretic dynamics viewed both external and internal dynamics as
continuous and contiguous, and thus recommended a methodical approach that balances
both in order to provide a feasible strategic path for realising meaningful continental
autonomy. It termed this approach ‘strategic hybridisation’. It includes measures such as
investment in area studies, prioritisation of an Afrocentric epistemic framework in the
design and implementation of continental objectives, and feasible guidelines for the
adaptation of best practices. The implementation agenda of continental integration, in
particular the AU’s Agenda 2063, cannot afford to ignore these variables, and actors will
have to be innovative in applying them. To paraphrase Julius Nyerere, Africa has no choice
but to ‘run while others walk’ (cited in Mkandawire, 2011: 9) towards the goal of enhancing
its position as a key player in the global political and economic order.
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