No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
PELIMPAHAN WEWENANG YANG DILAKUKAN OLEH KEPALA DAERAH
Abstract
Penelitian hukum ini menggunakan statute approach dan conseptual approach. Sehingga, dalam penelitian ini dilakukan analisa, pembahasan serta telaah kritis terhadap berbagai peraturan perundang-undangan yang berkaitan dengan pendelegasian wewenang yang dilakukan oleh Kepala Daerah. Penelitian hukum ini bertujuan untuk menganalisia antinomi dalam Peraturan Bupati Bandung Nomor 17 Tahun 2018 tentang Pendelegasian Wewenang Penyelenggaraan Pelayanan Perizinan dan Non Perizinan Kepada Kepala Dinas Penanaman Modal dan Pelayanan Terpadu Satu Pintu Kabupaten Bandung (selanjutnya disebut dengan Perbup No. 17 tahun 2018) bertentangan dengan asas delegata potestas non potest delegari serta implikasi dari tidak diterapkannya asas delegata potestas non potestas delegari dalam Perbup No. 17 tahun 2018. Untuk itu, penelitian hukum ini memiliki manfaat teoritis dan praktis. Manfaat teoritis penelitian hukum ini berkaitan dengan pengembangan Hukum Administrasi Negara serta Hukum Tata Negara. Manfaat praktis penelitian hukum ini diharapkan berguna dalam penerapan asas delegata potestas non potest delegari terhadap peraturan perundang-undangan, serta sebagai referensi bagi organ pemerintah serta masyarakat luas dan pemerintah yang berkaitan dengan penyelenggaraan pelayanan perizinan dan Non Perizinan. Hasil penelitian hukum ini menyatakan bahwa upaya meratakan Pelayanan Terpadu Satu Pintu (PTSP) yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah berawal dari diberlakukannnya UU Pemda I, yang sebagaimana telah diubah menjadi UU Pemda II. Selanjutnya, pelaksanaan PTSP delegasikan oleh UU Pemda I dan UU Pemda II kepada Kepala Daerah melalui Perpres No. 97 tahun 2014. Setelah itu, munculah Peraturan Bupati Bandung Nomor 17 Tahun 2018. Dalam pelaksanaannya, dilakukan dengan pelimpahan wewenang kepada Kepala Dinas Penanaman Modal dan Pelayanan Terpadu Satu Pintu. Pelimpahan wewenang PTSP tersebut ditengarai melanggar asas delegata potestas non potest delegari (wewenang yang telah didelegasikan tidak dapat didelegasikan kembali). Meskipun demikian, pelimpahan wewenang ini tetap berlaku secara sah. Hal tersebut didasarkan dengan adanya asas praesumptio iustae causa yang artinya suatu keputusan pemerintah harus selalu dianggap benar dan sah sebelum ada keputusan hukum tetap yang menyatakan bahwa keputusan itu tidak berlaku. Implikasi dari tidak diterapkannya asas delegata potestas non potest delegari adalah sejak berlakunya keputusan yang baru (ex nunc).
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Of all constitutional puzzles, the nondelegation principle is one of the most perplexing. How can a constitutional limitation on Congress’s ability to delegate legislative power be reconciled with the huge body of regulatory law that now governs so much of society? Why has the Court remained faithful to its intelligible principle test, validating expansive delegations of lawmaking authority, despite decades of biting criticism from so many camps? This Article suggests that answers to these questions may be hidden in a surprisingly underexplored aspect of the principle. While many papers have considered the constitutional implications of what it means for Congress to delegate legislative power, few have pushed hard on the second part of the concept: what it means for an agency to have legislative power.
Using game theory concepts to give meaning to the exercise of legislative power by an agency, this Article argues that nondelegation analysis is actually more complicated than it appears. As a point of basic construction, a delegation only conveys legislative power if it (1) delegates lawmaking authority that is sufficiently legislative in nature, and (2) gives an agency sufficient power over the exercise of that authority. But, again using game theory, this Article shows that an agency’s power to legislate is less certain than it first appears, making satisfaction of this second element a fact question in every case.
This more complicated understanding of the nondelegation principle offers three contributions of practical significance. First, it reconciles faithful adherence to existing theories of nondelegation with the possibility of expansive delegations of lawmaking authority. Second, it suggests a sliding-scale interpretation of the Court’s intelligible principle test that helps explain how nondelegation case law may actually respect the objectives of existing theories of nondelegation. Third, it identifies novel factors that should (and perhaps already do) influence judicial analysis of nondelegation challenges.
Abuse of power is one of classic concepts in administrative law. According to the classical approach, this concept is based on the assumption that the scope of discretion of public administration bodies is defined, beside competence norms, procedural and legal grounds for action, also by the objective for which the discretionary powers was granted. The classic concept has evolved over the years. It is also evident that its importance has been in decline nowadays. The priority objectives of my study concerned more practical than theoretical aspects of the topic. The key issue of my work is to analyze how courts have changed their approach to the judicial review of the discretionary powers of public administration. I set myself two goals in this study: first, I would like to indicate the fundamental direction in which the classic concept of abuse of power evolves. Secondly, I would like to describe the contemporary role of this concept and to response whether it can still be an effective instrument to protect an individual from arbitrary decisions of the public administration.
Pancasila sebagai sumber segala sumber hukum sudah mendapatkan legitimasi secara yuridis melalui TAP MPR Nomor XX/MPRS/1966 tentang Memorandum DPR-GR Mengenai Sumber Tertib Hukum Republik Indonesia dan Tata Urutan Peraturan Perundang Republik Indonesia. Setelah reformasi, keberadaan Pancasila tersebut kembali dikukuhkan dalam Undang-Undang Nomor 10 Tahun 2004 yang kemudian diganti dengan Undang-Undang Nomor 12 Tahun 2011 tentang Peraturan Perundang-Undangan. Pancasila sebagai sumber segala sumber hukum memberi makna bahwa sistem hukum nasional wajib berlandaskan Pancasila. Akan tetapi, keberadaan Pancasila tersebut semakin tergerus dalam sistem hukum nasional. Hal demikian dilatarbelakangi oleh tiga alasan yaitu: pertama, adanya sikap resistensi terhadap Orde Baru yang memanfaatkan Pancasila demi kelanggengan kekuasaan yang bersifat otoriter. Kedua, menguatnya pluralisme hukum yang mengakibatkan terjadinya kontradiksi-kontradiksi atau disharmonisasi hukum. Ketiga, status Pancasila tersebut hanya dijadikan simbol dalam hukum. Untuk itu, perlu dilakukan upaya-upaya untuk menerapkan Pancasila sebagai sumber segala sumber hukum dalam sistem hukum nasional yaitu: pertama, menjadikan Pancasila sebagai suatu aliran hukum agar tidak terjadi lagi disharmonisasi hukum akibat diterapkannya pluralisme hukum. Kedua, mendudukkan Pancasila sebagai puncak peraturan perundang-undangan agar Pancasila memiliki daya mengikat terhadap segala jenis peraturan perundang-undangan sehingga tidak melanggar asas lex superiori derogat legi inferiori.
Pancasila as the source of all sources of law has obtained legitimacy legally through the Decree of the People’s Consultative Assembly Number XX / MPRS / 1966 on the Memorandum of the House of Representatives-Gotong Royong Regarding the Sources of Law and the Order of the Republic of Indonesia. After the reformation, the existence of Pancasila was re-confirmed in Law Number 10 Year 2004 which was subsequently replaced by Law Number 12 Year 2011 on Legislation Regulation. Pancasila as the source of all sources of law gives meaning that the national legal system must be based on Pancasila. However, now the existence of Pancasila is increasingly eroded in the national legal system. This is motivated by three reasons: first, the existence of resistance to the New Order that utilizes Pancasila for the sake of perpetuity of authoritarian power. Second, the strengthening of legal pluralism that resulted in legal contradictions or disharmony. Third, the status of Pancasila is only used as a symbol in law. Therefore, efforts should be made to implement Pancasila as the source of all sources of law in the national legal system: first, make Pancasila as a flow of law in order to avoid legal disharmonization due to the application of legal pluralism. Secondly, Pretend Pancasila as the top of legislation so that Pancasila have binding power against all kinds of laws and regulations so that it does not violate the principle of lex superiori derogat legi inferiori.
Law No. 30 of 2014 on Government Administration (Government Administration Law) has set the scope of discretion in Indonesian legal system. But the form of discretion is limited in scope government decision (KTUN) and factual actions of the government. The restriction implicates circulars or others policy rule is not a form of discretion. In addition, the provisions concerning the terms of use discretion, procedures and legal effect of discretion in the Government Administration Law are not applicable to the use of policy rule. In fact, the substance of discretion in policy rule (e.g. circulars and instructions) has the potential of conflicting laws and regulations and/or General Principles of Good Administration. The legal issues in this study are the constitutionality of the scope of discretion in Article 1 point 9 and Article 23 paragraph (1) of the Government Administration Law. This analysis showed that limits the scope of discretion in Government Administration Law contrary to formal elements, substantive, and control mechanisms within the rule of law. This analysis also suggests the expansion of the scope of discretion in the Government Administration Law and setting policy rules as the object of the petition for judicial review so that there is a control mechanism by trial to discretion in the form of policy rule.
Revocation of the right to vote and elected in public office for corruption convicted by the court is absolutely necessary, but in view of the limitations amongst them, the judge shall state how long the right is revoked, and provide a detailed reason why the relevant person shall be subject to an additional penalty of revocation, the non-regulation of the criteria of corruption convicts as to which additional crimes of impunity may be imposed and elected in public office in law. The removal of the right to vote and to be elected in public post is coherent with the progressive law conception that promotes the integration of law and the values of justice in society. The progressive step by the judge in the revocation of the right to vote and elected to the corruption convicts is absolutely necessary, with the legal pluralism approach to encourage pro justice and progressive law enforcement. Revision to the Criminal Code and Law no. 31 of 1999, especially regarding the criteria of what corruption convicts who can be sentenced to additional revocation of the right to vote and be elected is a necessity.
ABSTRAK
Keberadaan hukum ditentukan oleh perilaku, sifat, dan sikap yang berada dalam jiwa manusia sebagai kondrat berkehidupan dan bermasyarakat. Pengaturan kaidah hukum tentang tatanan manusia tidak hanya berpedoman kepada aturan baku yang diatur dalam ketentuan peraturan perundang-undangan saja, melainkan juga berpedoman kepada segala norma dan nilai moral yang melekat kepada setiap warga negara di dalam sebuah negara. Hukum dalam konteks negara Indonesia yang menganut sistem demokrasi menjunjung nilai-nilai keadilan yang ada didalamnya yang secara prinsip berkeadilan bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia. Sebagai hukum positif dalam suatu negara hukum, penegakan hukum dituntut agar dilakukan secara profesional, proporsional, baik, adil, serta bijak sehingga sesuai dengan kaidah-kaidah kemanfaatan, kebaikan dan kesetaraan dalam hukum itu sendiri. Negara yang demokratis mengedapankan konsep keadilan hukum dalam menciptakan negara hukum yang memberikan rasa adil kepada setiap warga negaranya dengan peraturan-peraturan yang teratur dalam penegakannya, sehingga menghasilkan hukum yang baik dan berkualitas demi mencapai tujuan keadialan serta kesejahteraan bagi rakyat Indonesia seutuhnya sebagai pemegang kekuasaan dan kedaulatan Negara.
Abstract
The existence of the law is determined by the behavior, character, and attitude that resides in the human psyche as an existance and society nature. The regulation of the rules of law of the human order is not just hold on to standard rules stipulated in the legislation, but in relation to the norms and moral values inherent to every citizen in a country. Law in the Indonesia's context embraces democratic system upholding the values of justice that is there in, in principle, justice for all Indonesian people. As the law of the State in State law requires law enforcement professional, proportionate, fair and good and wise in the rules of expediency, kindness, and equality in the law itself. Democratic state distinguished concept of legal justice in the law state that gives a sense of justice to every citizen with regular rules in enforcement, resulting in good quality and qualified that aims to achieve justice and prosperity for the people of Indonesia as a whole authority and sovereignty of the country.
Legal principles, legal values, and legal norms are essentially part of the same notion. Often in legal literature, legal principles are considered to be legal norms, general legal norms, legal values etc. In fact, legal principles are just legal norms that different from the latter are legal norms of general application that ignore specific legal facts. They can be considered as basic norms that represent the general consensus on basic society understandings. As such they are also kinds of default rules of behavior. From this perspective, the legal principles are rules of human behavior that used to be considered as just, before the law started being written. Thus, legal values would be considered a more general legal norms vis-à-vis legal principles and legal norms. Nonetheless, the coexistence of these three notions shows the complexity of their correlation and gives us an initial idea on what we will go through in out attempt to perform of comparative analysis between them.
The nondelegation doctrine is powerful-so powerful that the Supreme Court is afraid to use it. The doctrine holds that Congress cannot delegate its legislative power to agencies. If the Court were to enforce the doctrine, entire statutory provisions-and perhaps entire statutory schemes-would be at risk of invalidation. Yet there is no need for such a powerful, facial doctrine. Nondelegation can be refashioned to be as-applied. An as-applied nondelegation doctrine would work by treating statutory ambiguities, just as Chevron does, as implicit delegations-each of which can be independently assessed for a nondelegation violation. This approach would explain the so-called “major questions” exception to Chevron, but without any of the existing doctrine’s flaws. The implications of an as-applied nondelegation doctrine are numerous and highly attractive. It would replace the major questions doctrine, which the literature has rightly rejected, with a rigorous and coherent theory. It would better serve nondelegation interests by dramatically reducing any adverse consequences from finding a violation of the nondelegation doctrine. Finally, an as-applied nondelegation doctrine could be determinative in a handful of upcoming and important cases.
The nondelegation doctrine has been fought over for decades, yet scholars have not examined a foundational question: Can judicial doctrine materially shape legislative drafting practices Even if a strong nondelegation doctrine provides legislators an incentive to draft narrow statutes, they would have many reasons to persist in broad delegations, and it is not clear whether the doctrinal incentives predominate. Here, I examine the relationship between the nondelegation doctrine and lawmaking behavior at the state level using several novel datasets, including a collection of state session laws between 1990 and 2010, and a comprehensive survey of state nondelegation judicial decisions over the last 20 years. Contrary to the common assumption, I find that the robustness of the nondelegation doctrine appears essentially unrelated to legislative drafting practices. This pattern suggests the limited extent to which judicial doctrine can control legislative practices; it also suggests a revived nondelegation doctrine at the federal level is unlikely to effectuate the hopes of proponents or the fears of opponents.
The nondelegation doctrine is dead. It is difficult to think of a more frequently repeated or widely accepted legal conclusion. For generations, scholars have maintained that the doctrine was cast aside by the New Deal Court and is now nothing more than a historical curiosity. In this Article, we argue that the conventional wisdom is mistaken in an important respect. Drawing on an original dataset of more than one thousand nondelegation challenges, we find that, although the doctrine has disappeared at the federal level, it has thrived at the state level. In fact, in the decades since the New Deal, state courts have grown more willing to invoke the nondelegation doctrine. Despite the countless declarations of its demise, the nondelegation doctrine is, in a meaningful sense, alive and well.
During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. It is no longer the do main of a few isolated scholars in law and philosophy. Hundreds of scho lars from diverse fields attend international meetings on the subject. In some universities, large lecture courses of five hundred students or more study it. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal philosophy from both the Anglo American and European traditions. Not only does it help make some of the best work available to an international audience, but it also en courages increased awareness of, and interaction between, the two major traditions. The primary focus is on full-length scholarly monographs, aIthouogh some eidted volumes of original papers are also included. The Library editors are assisted by an Editorial Advisory Board of inter nationally renowned scholars.
In judicial review of administrative action, the pivotal distinction between decisions about “jurisdiction” (for the reviewing court) and “the merits of the case” (for the administrative decision maker) is a source of much confusion. This article argues that jurisdiction should be understood as the scope of legitimate authority, the best theory of which is Joseph Raz's service conception of authority. As well as explaining how to determine jurisdiction, this article explains that a legitimate authority's intra-vires decision “pre-empts” the reviewing court's judgment on the merits, and that the concept of jurisdiction precludes any standard of reasonableness for reviewing a legitimate authority.
The traditional portrait of the administrative state often features the politically-appointed agency head at its center: the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, for instance, or the Secretary of the Department of Labor. This picture of bureaucratic power, however, is incomplete. For much of that power is, in fact, subdelegated within the agency. The implication is that decision rights are often exercised not by statutory delegates, but rather by lower-level officials and tenure-protected career staff. The purpose of this work is to bring these background actors-like the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Director of Enforcement-squarely to the foreground. In doing so, this Essay develops a positive theory for how and why agency heads subdelegate their power and analyzes the resulting normative implications. The analysis draws on a rich social science literature to argue that delegations within agencies are best understood as credible commitment devices through which agency heads motivate better-informed but potentially biased subordinates. This decision to commit, however, is itself subject to the internal transaction costs of reviewing subordinate recommendations. These dynamics, in turn, suggest a role for courts to maximize high-quality information within agencies by taking credibility into account in their appointments and removal jurisprudence; deferring to subdelegations promulgated through transparent, deliberative procedures; and providing clearer ex ante guidance as to when internal subdelegations will be judicially enforced. At the same time, political actors (not courts) should police the countervailing concern that subdelegation can also be used as a tool of partisan entrenchment.
In the process of impeachment, Constitutional Court has the obligation to give its judgement to House of Representatives’s opinion regarding allegation of violation by the President and/or Vice President. Constitutional Court checks and judges House of Representatives’s opinion on whether or not the President and/or Vice President works fulfill Article 7A of Constitution of Republic Indonesia 1945 (UUD NRI 1945). The inspection done by Constitutional Court is the judicial process whose decision is in the form of justisil. The result of this impeachment process heavily depends on the judgement of People's Consultative Assembly in its plenary meeting which is also a politics forum, where President and/or Vice President could be dismissed or not. Constitutional Court’s judgement does not apply to People's Consultative Assembly, hence, the difference of Constitutional Court and People's Consultative Assembly’s judgement in plenary meeting that is very political by its nature is very likely to happen. Involvement of Constitutional Court in the procss of impeachment is, of course, different in each country. It depends on governance system in that particular country, it also relies on how much authority that is given by Constitution to Constitutional Court in the process of impeachment itself.Keyword: Authority, Constitutional Court, Impeachment.
The function of Philosophy State; The application Concept in State laws. One form of the modern state is a state law that is considered more modern and humane in comparison with ancient conception of the state power. However, not all countries have expressed and declared its country as having a basic law of the state or country state philosophy. Preferred the birth of Pancasila as the state, on the other hand the whole constitution in force ever and always include Pancasila and state law as the concept of the Indonesian state. This paper focuses on a critical analysis of the functioning of the state philosophy in the application of state law in the Indonesian context. Abstrak: Fungsi Falsafah Negara Dalam Penerapan Konsep Negara hukum. Salah satu bentuk negara modern adalah negara hukum yang dianggap lebih modern dan manusiawi dibandingkan dengan konsepsi kuno mengenai negara kekuasaan. Namun tidak semua negara yang menyatakan dan mendeklarasikan dirinya sebagai negara hukum mempuntai dasar negara atau falsafah negara. Pancasila kelahirannya sudah dikehendaki sebagai dasar negara, disisi lain seluruh konstitusi yang pernah dan sedang berlaku selalu mencantumkan pancasila dan negara hukum sebagai konsep negara Indonesia. Tulisan ini menfokuskan terhadap analisis kritis tentang fungsi falsafah negara dalam penerapan negara hukum dalam konteks Indonesia. DOI: 10.15408/jch.v1i1.1448
Notes on Administrative Law: French and English Experience
- Fasil Abebe
Abebe, Fasil. 2010. "Notes on Administrative Law: French and English
Experience." Mizan Law Review 4(1):8.
Constitutional Complaint Dan Constitutional Question Dalam Negara Hukum
- Asmaeny Azis
Azis, Asmaeny. 2018. Constitutional Complaint Dan Constitutional
Question Dalam Negara Hukum. 1st ed. Jakarta: Kencana.
Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems, Text, and Cases
- Stephen G Breyer
- B Richard
- Cass R Stewart
- Adrian Sunstein
- Michael Vermeule
- Herz
Breyer, Stephen G., Richard B. Stewart, Cass R. Sunstein, Adrian
Vermeule, and Michael Herz. 2017. Administrative Law and
Regulatory Policy: Problems, Text, and Cases. 8th ed. New York:
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business.
DELEGATION, AGENCY AND THE ALTER EGO RULE
- Marion L Dixon
Dixon, Marion L. 1987. "DELEGATION, AGENCY AND THE ALTER EGO
RULE." Sydney Law Reviw 11:327-47.
Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari A Maxim of American Constitusional Law
- Patrick W Duff
- Horace E Whiteside
Duff, Patrick W. and Horace E. Whiteside. 1929. "Delegata Potestas Non
Potest Delegari A Maxim of American Constitusional Law." Cornell
Law Review 14(2):168-96.
Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari A Maxim of American Constitutional Law
- Horst P Ehmke
Ehmke, Horst P. 1961. "Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari A Maxim
of American Constitutional Law." Cornell Law Review 47(50-61).
Administrative Law. Fourth
- Timothy Endicott
Endicott, Timothy. 2018. Administrative Law. Fourth. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Peraturan Delegasi Di Indonesia
- Moh Fadli
Fadli, Moh. 2011. Peraturan Delegasi Di Indonesia. Malang: UB Press.
Administrative Law I
- Andres Giménez
- Molina
Giménez, Andres Molina. 2010. Administrative Law I. Alicante.
Hukum Administrasi Negara: Di Era Citizen Friendly
- Nuria Harun
- Galang Siswi
- Taufani
Harun, Nuria Siswi, and Galang Taufani. 2018. Hukum Administrasi
Negara: Di Era Citizen Friendly. Surakarta: Muhammadiyah
University Press.
Delegation of Powers for Modern Government: Statutory Mechanisms, the 'Carltona' Principle and Suggestions for Reform
- Makoto Hong
- Cheng
- Huiwen Wong
- Denise
Hong, Makoto Cheng and Wong, Huiwen Denise. 2019. "Delegation of
Powers for Modern Government: Statutory Mechanisms, the
'Carltona' Principle and Suggestions for Reform." Singapore
Academy of Law 31(1):95.
Hukum Tata Pemerintahan
- Aminuddin Ilmar
Ilmar, Aminuddin. 2016. Hukum Tata Pemerintahan. Jakarta: Prenada
Media Group.
Resuscitating the Non-Delegation Doctrine: A Compromise and an Experiment
- A J Kritkos
Kritkos, A. J. 2017. "Resuscitating the Non-Delegation Doctrine: A
Compromise and an Experiment." Missouri Law Review 82(2):468.
Defeating the Executive Nondelegation Doctrine. 902. Florida
- Michael Morley
Morley, Michael. 2019. Defeating the Executive Nondelegation
Doctrine. 902. Florida.
Conceptual Analysis of Sub Delegation: An Overview
- Saad Sabti
- Abdulbaqi
- Yp Rama
- Subbaiah
Sabti, Saad Abdulbaqi and YP Rama Subbaiah. 2017. "Conceptual
Analysis of Sub Delegation: An Overview." International Journal of
Law 3(3):78.
Delegatus and Carltona Are Obsolete: The 'Modern Principle' Is the Only Tool Necessary to Determine Issues of Delegation
- Valerie Saunders
Saunders, Valerie. 2016. "Delegatus and Carltona Are Obsolete: The
'Modern Principle' Is the Only Tool Necessary to Determine Issues
of Delegation." University of London, London.
Hukum Tata Usaha Negara & Hukum Acara Peradilan Tata Usaha Negara Indonesia
- T Titik Triwulan
- Ismu Gunadi Widodo
T., Titik Triwulan and Ismu Gunadi Widodo. 2016. Hukum Tata Usaha
Negara & Hukum Acara Peradilan Tata Usaha Negara Indonesia.
1st ed. Jakarta: Kencana.
- C K Takwani
Takwani, C. K. 2004. Lectures on Administrative Law. III. New Delhi:
Eastern Book Co.
Hukum Administrasi Negara: Edisi Revisi. Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada
- Ridwan Hr
HR, Ridwan. 2018. Hukum Administrasi Negara: Edisi Revisi. Jakarta:
RajaGrafindo Persada.