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The Costs of Organizing Social Cooperation
... These, in turn, may incorporate to various degrees socially-and culturally-specific prescrip- tions. Sugden (1993), Kliemt (1990), Basu (1995and Raub and Voss (1990) are again but a few examples of this view. Sugden explains the selection of the Pareto efficient equilibrium outcome in a coordination problem in terms of players being also concerned with the best social outcome and not merely with the individually optimal one. ...
We study a model of partnership with costly commitment in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework. We introduce various types of cooperative players with different degrees of strategic sophistication. We find that a necessary condition for cooperation at the social equilibrium is that the probability of a high opportunity value falls below a certain critical threshold. Such condition, however, is not sufficient. If players are too naively cooperative, the permanence of cooperation at the equilibrium is put at risk because naive cooperation entails playing inefficient responses to other equilibrium strategies. As a consequence, naive cooperation will be present at the equilibrium selected by the social dynamics only under somewhat special conditions. If cooperators are more flexible, in that they remain in the partnership only if mated to a first stage cooperator and only in lack of favorable outside opportunities, cooperation is almost granted provided that it is Pareto efficient (perverse lock in cases under unfavorable initial conditions are possible). Finally, the selection of Pareto superior cooperation with certainty may be granted by a certain norm-oriented type of strategically sophisticated behavior, that we call Rawlsian altruism.
Max Weber definierte die Soziologie als eine Wissenschaft, die zwei Aufgaben zu erfüllen hat. Sie soll idealtypische Begriffe
bilden und nach generellen Regeln des Geschehens suchen (Weber 1980: 9). In diesem Beitrag werde ich mich auf das Problem
der Begriffsbildung bei Max Weber und Hartmut Esser konzentrieren. Es geht mir um eine Analyse der Logik der Typenkonstruktion
(also der Beziehung zwischen den Handlungs-, Interaktions-, Institutionstypen und den Typen der sozialen Ordnung) sowie um
eine Analyse des Inhalts dieser Idealtypen.
We need new governance solutions to help us improve public policies and services, solve complex societal problems, strengthen social communities and reinvigorate democracy. By changing how government engages with citizens and stakeholders, co-creation provides an attractive and feasible approach to governance that goes beyond the triptych of public bureaucracy, private markets and self-organized communities. Inspired by the successful use of co-creation for product and service design, this book outlines a broad vision of co-creation as a strategy of public governance. Through the construction of platforms and arenas to facilitate co-creation, this strategy can empower local communities, enhance broad-based participation, mobilize societal resources and spur public innovation while building ownership for bold solutions to pressing problems and challenges. The book details how to use co-creation to achieve goals. This exciting and innovative study combines theoretical argument with illustrative empirical examples, visionary thinking and practical recommendations.
Are Max Weber's action concepts nowadays still useful for sociological analysis? Two strategies can be applied to decide the importance of Weber's ideal types for modern sociology. First, several researchers have tried to clarify Weber's ambiguous concepts by using his terminology. I will discuss some of these attempts and propose a new classification of Weber's action types. However, I am skeptical that Weber's concepts are useful even in clarified form. Therefore, I will follow a second strategy to replace his concepts with more advanced modern concepts. Here Parsons's further development of value-rational action, Schutz's investigation of traditional behavior, and the economic concept of altruism in relation to affectual behavior are specifically important. It can be shown that Weber's non-rational traditional and affectual behavior follow specific logical rules and therefore cannot be described as non-rational. A description of Max Weber's action theory is not an easy task. The reason is mainly the unfinished character of his action theory. Weber relatively late in his life (between 1909 and 1913) turned his research interest from history to a generalizing sociology (Sato 2004: 29ff.). Until the »Energetische« Kulturtheorien of 1909, Weber in his methodological writings took the position of historian with the aim of interpreting (verstehende Erklärung) singular historical phenomena based on sociological concepts and known regularities. In 1913 in his paper Ueber einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie he replaced the position of a historian with the position of a generalizing sociologist. His aim was no longer only to apply the general concepts and "laws" but also to locate and define them. Weber's aim was the construction of an action theory as a useful tool for the search for causal regularities and for heuristic application in historical analyses. This was a revolutionary approach of Weber's, because he gave sociology for the first time an action-theoretic foundation. However, although it is not the author's intention to disparage Weber's achievement, it should be stated that Max Weber's action types are nowadays too ambiguous and vague to be used in the social sciences. We shall first discuss several interpretations of Max Weber's action types before considering several specifications of his typology. ' Wolfgang Schluchter (1979) made one of the first attempts to interpret Max Weber's four types of action in a systematic way by developing a classification system. He ordered instrumentally rational action, value-rational action, affectual behavior, and traditional behavior Graduate Student,
»Umweltpolitik als Akteurshandeln« rekonstruiert die Entstehung und Entwicklung der Umweltpolitik im Kontext einer modernen individualistischen Handlungstheorie. Dazu wird eine individualistisch fundierte Steuerungstheorie entwickelt, in deren Kontext die Entstehung politisch relevanter Präferenzen, die Artikulation entsprechender Interessen durch die Akteure und die hieran anschließende Institutionalisierung von Interessenkonflikten analysiert werden. Für die Umweltpolitik der Bundesrepublik wird gezeigt, wie die zunächst im Kontext der innovativen Begründung des neuen Politikfeldes relativ großen Handlungsmöglichkeiten staatlicher Akteure durch Lernprozesse aller Akteure abnehmen und Umweltpolitik zunehmend in Handlungssystemen stattfindet, in denen Steuerungsakteure und Steuerungsadressaten die Ziele politischer Steuerung kooperativ aushandeln.
Steuerungstheoretisch wird eine Perspektive der umweltpolitischen Selbststeuerung der Gesellschaft entworfen, in welcher der Staat als Steuerungsakteur eine nur sehr beschränkte Bedeutung hat. Gleichzeitig werden die Bedingungen herausgearbeitet, unter denen umweltpolitische Konflikte von sozialen Akteuren konstruiert und institutionalisiert werden.
Az általános szociológia vázlata című (1991-ben megjelent) könyvben vagy jegyzetben már felvázoltam egy alapvetően új szemléletmódot képviselő általános szociológiai elmélet legfőbb gondolatmenetét, és ezt az elméletet akkor a társadalmi viszonyok elméletének neveztem. A társadalmi viszonyok: Az intézményes szociológia elmélete című könyvben már részletesebben kidolgoztam a szóban forgó elméletet. Az 1997-es változatában az elméletet már az intézményes szociológia elméletének nevezem, és az adott elméletben képviselt szemléletmódot intézményes szemléletmódnak, mert ebben az elméletben bár alapvetően a társadalmi viszonyokból, de végső soron e viszonyokat létrehozó intézményekből magyarázom a társadalmi jelenségeket. Később az elmélet ezen változatát is átdolgoztam, illetve átdolgozom, de az elmélet főbb gondolatmenete és szerkezete alapvetően változatlan marad. A könyv négy nagyobb részből áll. A szociológiai szemléletmód kérdéseivel foglalkozó, bevezető jellegű első fejezet után az első rész az egyén és a környezet, az intézmények és a társadalmiság, valamint a cselekvés, a társadalmi cselekvés és az emberi élet szféráival foglalkozik. A második rész az érdekeket és az érdekviszonyokat, a társadalmi erőket és az erőviszonyokat, valamint az érdekek és az erők egyesítését tárgyalja. A harmadik rész tárgyát tulajdonképpen a társadalmi viszonyok és a társadalmi helyzetek, valamint a társadalmi jelenségek e viszonyok és helyzetek általi meghatározottsága képezi. A negyedik részben a társadalmi csoportokkal, a társadalmi struktúrával, a társadalmi- és a rendi rétegződéssel, a társadalmi élet szféráival, valamint a társadalmi alakulat fogalmával és típusaival foglalkozom.
Coleman's Foundations of Social Theory is based on a theory of rational action in the specific version of utility maximization embedded in a macro-micro-macro-framework. This approach is logically and empirically deficient in the following aspects: The social constitution of the situation and the actor himself is excluded from the theoretical consideration (macro to micro transition). Limitations to rationality remain implicit and are not integrated into an empirically founded theory of bounded rationality (microtheory). The dynamics of non-equilibrium systems are outside the realm of the theory (micro to macro transition). Central concepts of social theory, as for instance rights and norms, are reduced to a power based balance of interests. This results in a dissolution of social structure and in an infinite regress of contingent conditions.
Soziale Differenzierungen sind im alltäglichen sozialen Handeln allgegenwärtig. Neue Techniken und Produkte werden erfunden und finden ihre Märkte — wie der PC; neue private Lebensformen kommen auf — wie die nichteheliche Lebensgemeinschaft, die Ein-ElternFamilie oder die Wohngemeinschaft; neue Formen der gesetzlichen Sozialversicherung werden beschlossen — wie die Pflegeversicherung. Arbeitsabläufe werden zerlegt, akademische und schulische Disziplinen untergliedert, Hierarchien verbreitert und verlängert, Parteien und Verbände spalten sich. In tausend Formen erfahren wir soziale Prozesse, die sich als soziale Differenzierung verstehen lassen.
In the field of game theoretical research in sociology, there are two different approaches, rational choice approach and evolutionary approach. Rational choice approach postulates actors' high caluculas ability and they are assumed to select Nash equilibria with consideration before the game. On the other hand, in evolutionary approach, actors only have bounded rationality and they select better strategy after the game in repeated games.
These two approaches have been believed to be methodologically different. But recent advance in evolutionary game theory combines these two approaches. It is clarified that Stable States in an evolutionary game correspond to Nash equilibria in one-shot game, so actors with bounded rationality can select Nash equilibria. These two approach should be called “rational choice theory in the wide sense” and they can go together fruitfully.
A noncooperative game model of organizations for social cooperation is presented based on Selten’s (1973) model of cartel formation. The possibility of organization with enforcement costs is studied in an n-person prisoners’ dilemma situation.