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Building relationships through accountability: An expanded idea of accountability

November 2019
Organizational Psychology Review 9(2-3):184-206

DOI:10.1177/2041386619878876

Authors:

Danni Wang

University College London

David Waldman

Arizona State University

Blake E Ashforth

Arizona State University

Previous literature has focused on how external forces impose accountability on individuals (i.e., holding individuals to account), but has not considered the possibility of internal, personal accountability. We explain how an internalized sense of accountability, which we term internally assumed accountability, can enrich our understanding of why some organizational members might assume ownership for organizational problems, even ones that they did not actually cause. We offer a typology of accountability in organizations based on contrasting relationship norms and personal orientations. Our article concludes with a discussion on connections between different kinds of accountability and stakeholder relationships, suggesting a number of avenues for further investigation and practice.

A categorization of accountability based on exchange and communal norms.

…

Overall theoretical framework.

…

Comparison between personal orientations.

…

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Article

Building relationships through

accountability: An expanded

idea of accountability

Danni Wang

Rutgers University, USA

David A. Waldman

Blake E. Ashforth

Arizona State University, USA

Abstract

Previous literature has focused on how external forces impose accountability on individuals (i.e.,

holding individuals to account), but has not considered the possibility of internal, personal account-

ability. We explain how an internalized sense of accountability, which we term internally assumed

accountability, can enrich our understanding of why some organizational members might assume

ownership for organizational problems, even ones that they did not actually cause. We offer a typology

of accountability in organizations based on contrasting relationship norms and personal orientations.

Our article concludes with a discussion on connections between different kinds of accountability and

stakeholder relationships, suggesting a number of avenues for further investigation and practice.

Keywords

accountability, typology, communal and exchange norms, trust and commitment, stakeholder

relationships

A body of men holding themselves accountable to

nobody ought not to be trusted by anybody.

Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man (1792/

2010)

Accountability, as a general principle, serves

as a bond to connect our social systems (Frink

& Klimoski, 1998). Aristotle raised the notion

of misconduct accountability when discussing

Paper received 8 February 2019; revised version accepted 8 September 2019.

Corresponding author:

Danni Wang, Rutgers Business School–Newark and New Brunswick, Rutgers University, 1 Washington Park,

Newark, NJ 07102, USA.

Email: dwang@business.rutgers.edu

Organizational Psychology Review

2019, Vol. 9(2-3) 184–206

ªThe Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/2041386619878876

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Organizational

Psychology

Review

justice and punishment (Schlenker, Britt, Pen-

nington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994). Schedler

(1999) posited that individuals such as decision

makers should fulfill their obligations by being

accountable for their actions. However, although

public and company policies attempt to hold

organizational members—and particularly lead-

ers—accountable for increasing incidents of

business scandals and other performance fail-

ures, members are often unwilling to assume a

personal sense of accountability for their actions

or those of their firms.

For example, the former CEO of British

Petroleum, Tony Hayward, was reluctant to

assume any personal accountability for his

company’s mistakes during the Gulf of Mexico

oil spill crisis (Lubin, 2010; Wray, 2010).

Moreover, although the former Volkswagen

CEO Martin Winterkorn took responsibility for

the “irregularities” found in diesel engines, he

did not admit any wrongdoing on his part.

Nevertheless, Winterkorn ultimately resigned

from the CEO position. Arguably, leaders

should “own” such crises and be willing to take

personal accountability (Fredberg, 2011; Leader-

Chive´e, 2014). Leaders, and organizational

members more generally, could take personal

accountability by admitting the mistakesthat they

or their firms have made and accepting blame,

rather than hiding or minimizing mistakes

(Cavuto, 2014).

It is understandable that in some instances,

because of personal legal liability and the risk

to personal credibility, leaders and other

organizational members might be reluctant to

assume personal accountability for wrongdoing

associated with their firms. Such is the case

when firm actions result in serious harm to

customers, employees, or the greater commu-

nity. However, in other instances (e.g., poor

firm performance re legal liability issues,

industrial accidents re personal credibility

issues), these risks may not come into play, and

thus, one might expect to see more personal

accountability.

Although accountability has been much

discussed in practice, the organizational litera-

ture has fallen behind on its development as a

concept. Accountability has been defined as

“the implicit or explicit expectation that one be

called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and

actions to others” (Tetlock, 1992, p. 331). Thus,

traditional thinking on the nature of account-

ability is based on expectations and obligations

whereby other people dictate the extent and

nature of accountability that is placed upon

individuals (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999)—that is,

the extent to which individuals are “held to

account” by others. However, as we can see

from the above business examples, being held

accountable by others does not necessarily

ensure that people will take personal ownership

of an issue. Moreover, based on the common

tendency to defensively attribute problems to

external causes (Jones, 1972), organizational

members may handle accountability by blam-

ing others for performance failures. Or they

may simply apologize without taking any cor-

rective actions.

Therefore, to better understand account-

ability, we will provide a new direction regard-

ing how people take personal ownership or

internalize accountability toward others, and in

so doing, we propose a broader perspective on

accountability. That is, we not only consider

externally imposed accountability (i.e., the tra-

ditional way of thinking about accountability)

but also introduce what we term internally

assumed accountability. This allows us to cap-

ture the breadth of how and why accountability

occurs, while furthering our understanding of the

potential ramifications of (different types of)

accountability for organizational outcomes.

In the sections below, we first review the

current research pertaining to accountability

based on an external expectation-based per-

spective and identify the limitations of this

research. We then provide an alternative con-

ceptualization of accountability and compare it

with other constructs that appear to be similar.

Wang et al. 185

Moreover, based on social cognitive theory

(Bandura, 2001), we propose contextual and

individual predictors of different forms of

accountability. Finally, we discuss how differ-

ent types of accountability may lead to different

perceptions of the organization by stakeholders.

Current accountability literature

In the management literature, accountability is

considered in both formal and informal terms.

Employees at all levels of the firm are

monitored with accountability systems (Frink

& Klimoski, 1998, 2004), including formal

mechanisms (e.g., reward/punishment proce-

dures and rules/policies), as well as informal

mechanisms (e.g., organizational cultures and

client vigilance). For instance, accountability

can involve procedures in a performance-

reward system (Castilla, 2015).

The majority of accountability research is

based on the social contingency model of

accountability proposed by Tetlock (1992),

wherein the pressure to justify one’s actions

to others may drive one’s behaviors and

judgments. We refer to this predominant con-

ceptualization of accountability as “externally

imposed accountability” because of the indi-

vidual’s expectation that others could evaluate

him/her, and thus, that he/she needs to justify

his/her actions to other people (Lerner & Tet-

lock, 1999). An employee’s externally imposed

accountability is his/her subjective belief about

how external forces, such as top-level manag-

ers, coworkers, subordinates, or “the system,”

hold him/her accountable for actions and

performance.

Lerner and Tetlock (1999) argued that an

organizational member can be held accountable

because people at different organizational lev-

els (e.g., top managers and subordinates) can

potentially identify the individual’s behaviors,

and superiors, in particular, can evaluate that

individual’s decisions, behaviors, and outcomes.

Therefore, the individual needs to provide jus-

tifications for why he/she implements certain

strategies or makes certain decisions. Moreover,

those evaluations involve potential rewards or

sanctions (Hall & Ferris, 2011). Thus, account-

ability has been further defined as a “perceived

expectation that one’s decisions or actions will

be evaluated by a salient audience and that

rewards or sanctions are believed to be con-

tingent on this expected evaluation” (Hall &

Ferris, 2011, p. 134). Hall, Frink, and Buckley

(2017) provided a review of the externally

imposed accountability literature (i.e., what they

referred to as felt accountability).

Problems with how accountability

is traditionally conceptualized

As we see from the above section, traditional

thinking on the nature of accountability is based

on expectations and obligations (Lerner &

Tetlock, 1999)—that is, the extent to which

individuals are “held to account” by others.

Although predominantly focusing on externally

held (i.e., external to the individual) expecta-

tions, Hall et al. (2017) proposed that these

expectations could potentially emanate from

oneself as well. As such, the traditional

accountability concept mixes others’ and one’s

own expectations together without making a

clear distinction between one’s internal motive

or sense of ownership and one’s perceptions of

external expectations. In addition, external

expectations about the appropriate rewards and

punishments are contingent upon others’ eva-

luations (Ferris et al., 2009; Frink & Klimoski,

1998), while ignoring people’s own inter-

nalized acceptance of rewards and disciplinary

actions. In a nutshell, researchers still largely

ignore the extent to which people may accept

and take ownership of responsibility (i.e., “the

buck stops here”), as well as the associated

rewards or disciplinary actions, in their dis-

cussion of externally imposed accountability.

Moreover, being held accountable by others

does not necessarily ensure that people will take

personal ownership of a performance issue. For

example, although a firm may maintain a policy

186 Organizational Psychology Review 9(2-3)

of holding people accountable when there is an

actual performance failure, employees may

justify a failure in a way that avoids personal

ownership in order to maximize their monetary

rewards from the company (Mattila & Patter-

son, 2004). Employees might still expect

returns from the company, despite a failure to

satisfy stakeholders. Indeed, we will argue

below that the “exchange norms” within a firm

are likely to lead employees to avoid personal

accountability by offering external attributions

for performance failures regarding stakeholders.

For example, during the 2008 financial crisis,

some financial firms such as Lehman Brothers

typically did not hold people to account for the

misery that they caused, at least in part, for sta-

keholders. Instead, leaders in those companies

externally blamed the greater economy, gov-

ernment policies, and even the customers

themselves (e.g., customers who “frivolously”

took on too much debt). In such a context, it

should not be surprising that employees would

not attempt to assume personal accountability.

Defining and extending conceptions

of accountability

Given the limitation in the manner in which

accountability is currently conceived, we pro-

vide a new direction regarding how people may

take ownership and internalize accountability

toward others. This internally assumed account-

ability goes beyond external expectations that

are placed on people by emphasizing their

personal ownership of performance, especially

performance failures. Specifically, we define

internally assumed accountability as personal

ownership for performance failure, and accep-

tance of negative personal repercussions (if

any) that may follow. Performance failures

include adverse performance, business scan-

dals, mistakes, and accidents. As discussed

further below, although not part of our defi-

nition, an individual with high internally

assumed accountability is more likely to take

corrective action, even if the individual is not

the direct source of the failure.

This characterization of accountability is

evident in a quote from Mary Kelly, a com-

mander in the U.S. Navy:

Mistakes are opportunities to show fabulous ser-

vice. Ensure that your company policy accommo-

dates customers and cares for their needs. In the

event of poor interaction, accept responsibility

and improve the process. Be accountable for your

products and the work of those who report to you.

(Kelly, 2015)

We can see a sense of personal ownership in

Kelly’s words, rather than one simply being

held to account through the expectations or

demands of others.

By having internally assumed account-

ability, an individual will accept negative per-

sonal repercussions (rather than engaging in

external attributions) for failing to meet

stakeholders’ expectations, as long as those

repercussions are seen as fair, that is, “the

punishment fits the crime.” Thus, when there is

a performance failure, organizational members

with high internally assumed accountability

take personal ownership of mistakes, rather

than offering excuses to justify their actions. In

sum, by taking more personal ownership, indi-

viduals not only accept negative repercussions

(e.g., a reprimand) but also are more likely to

commit to making amends to restore stake-

holder confidence—even if these individuals

were not the source of the problem.

Comparing internally assumed

accountability with other similar constructs

As a construct, accountability has sometimes

been used interchangeably with responsibility

(e.g., Hackman & Oldham, 1975). However,

internally assumed accountability differs from

responsibility. Responsibility tends to empha-

size entities toward whom individuals feel a

need to represent the best interests of those

Wang et al. 187

entities (Winter, 1991). For example, leaders

can have a sense of responsibility to represent

the interests of various constituents, such as

shareholders, customers, and the greater com-

munities (Pless, Maak, & Waldman, 2012). Put

differently, responsibility pertains to whom a

person should have obligations—either by his/

her own admonition or in the eyes of others.

With that said, internally assumed account-

ability focuses on how an individual takes

personal ownership or acceptance of perfor-

mance outcomes that are relevant to different

stakeholders. Such performance is subject to

individuals’ perceptions of to whom they have

responsibility. It could be narrowly defined

performance, such as productivity, or more

broadly defined performance dealing with the

needs of multiple stakeholder groups. There-

fore, internally assumed accountability is based

on a sense of responsibility toward one or more

stakeholder groups, but it goes beyond this

sense of responsibility by focusing on one’s

personal ownership regarding performance

outcomes as well as associated rewards and

punishments. We also believe that internally

assumed accountability is a specific form of

personal ownership in that it is a context-

specific application, focusing on ownership of

negative performance and any negative per-

sonal outcomes that may follow.

For people in leadership roles, internally

assumed accountability overlaps to some

degree with ethical leadership. Ethical leader-

ship refers to “the demonstration of norma-

tively appropriate conduct through personal

actions and interpersonal relationships, and the

promotion of such conduct to followers through

two-way communication, reinforcement, and

decision-making” (Brown, Trevin

˜o, & Harri-

son, 2005, p. 120). Thus, a leader is perceived to

be ethical if he/she cares about followers’ best

interests and makes balanced decisions (Brown

et al., 2005). Internally assumed accountability

and ethical leadership are similar, because they

both emphasize caring about others. For

example, a leader can show concern for

followers by accepting the ownership of poor

team performance, rather than blaming fol-

lowers. In this way, the accountable leader is

likely to be viewed as ethical (Brown et al.,

2005). Nevertheless, internally assumed leader

accountability and ethical leadership focus on

different behaviors. The former is more con-

cerned with leaders’ ownership regarding per-

formance without actively promoting ethics to

followers, while ethical leadership emphasizes

communicating ethical standards to followers

and being an ethical role model.

This internal sense of accountability is

also related to, but different from, people’s

perception of justice. Justice refers to percep-

tions of how outcomes are allocated, the

procedures involved in allocating outcomes,

and interpersonal treatment during the process

(Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng,

2001). Folger and Cropanzano (2001) proposed

that accountability is implicitly related to the-

ories of justice since a central issue of justice is

how blame and its repercussions should be

assigned when there is mistreatment. Also,

demands for justice underscore issues that are

thought to merit accountability. For example,

an organizational member’s high expectations

regarding the need for interactional justice in

dealing with clients are likely to be associated

with his or her higher sense of internally

assumed accountability to clients regarding

their actual interpersonal treatment. In addition,

having a high sense of internally assumed

accountability may increase one’s sense that

justice is being done when one accepts

responsibility for organizational failures and

the consequences that follow. However, justice

is not isomorphic with internally assumed

accountability in that an individual can have

high expectations for any or all forms of justice

but she/he may believe that accountability

should only be internally assumed when she/he

is the actual cause of a performance failure.

Finally, the concepts of intrinsic and

extrinsic motivation do not overlap with our

consideration of internally assumed

188 Organizational Psychology Review 9(2-3)

accountability. An individual could intrinsi-

cally love his or her work (having an intrinsic

belief about the value of work) and the fact that

it benefits other people. However, that does not

necessarily imply that he/she will have a strong

sense of internally assumed accountability for

performance failures. Likewise, if somebody is

extrinsically motivated by rewards, this has

little or nothing to do with whether he/she

perceives that the system is stressing externally

imposed accountability.

A typology for determining accountability

By proposing a new perspective on account-

ability, we are not abandoning the traditional

idea of externally imposed accountability.

Instead, we offer an expanded framework of

accountability by focusing on internally assumed

accountability. Moreover, we explore causes of

different accountability behaviors and provide

explanations of why and how organizational

members may account to stakeholders differ-

ently by being subjected to alternative combi-

nations of organizationally based culture norms

(Sadri & Lees, 2001) and personal orientations

(Bryan, Hammer, & Fisher, 2000). Based on

Bandura’s (2001) social cognitive theory of

interactive agency, behaviors result from both

contextual norms and personal orientation. We

introduce how exchange and communal norms

may influence different forms of account-

ability, consider the role of personal orientation

and accountability, and discuss the interactive

effect of norms and personal orientation.

Exchange and communal norms. Researchers

have identified and called into question the

ubiquitous application of reciprocity or

exchange norms in workplace relationships

(Shore, Tetrick, Lynch, & Barksdale, 2006),

suggesting that communal norms can comple-

ment the current relational framework regard-

ing reciprocation (Coyle-Shapiro & Shore,

2007). We address a limitation of the current

relationship literature (Coyle-Shapiro & Shore,

2007) by integrating exchange and communal

relationship norms vis-a`-vis their relationships

with accountability.

The work relationship literature has focused

largely on exchange norms between employees

and their stakeholders (Blau, 1964; Coyle-

Shapiro & Shore, 2007). From an exchange

viewpoint, mutual benefits between a firm (e.g.,

profits) and its stakeholders (e.g., satisfaction

of needs) are paramount to the relationship

(Ferris et al., 2009; McWilliams & Siegel,

2001). However, researchers have suggested

that the exclusive use of exchanges to build

relationships may be limiting (Coyle-Shapiro &

Shore, 2007). Organizational members who

work in a culture of strong exchange norms are

likely to pay less attention to stakeholders’

social and emotional needs (Meshram &

O’Cass, 2013), treating such needs as second-

ary (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Waldman &

Siegel, 2008). Because taking care of stake-

holders’ welfare may not be fully considered,

exchange theory is of limited use in explaining

the building of strong relationships with stake-

holders. Therefore, Clark and Mills (1979)

proposed another type of relationship norm,

communal norms, which deal with people’s

concerns for the welfare of others in building

relationships.

The basic rule of communal norms is dif-

ferent from exchange norms. While exchange

norms focus on reciprocity, communal norms

involve responding to people’s needs without

expecting specific returns or being contingent

on immediate reciprocity (Clark & Mills,

1979). People who build relationships that are

influenced by communal norms are concerned

with others’ benefits and are motivated to

enhance the welfare of others (Clark & Mills,

1979). For example, a communal relationship

with stakeholders would be guided more by

a felt need to serve the interests of those sta-

keholders, rather than doing so because of

immediate revenue, stakeholder praise, online

ratings of service/product performance, and so

forth. Moreover, communal norms have been

Wang et al. 189

found to be more prevalent in collectivistic

cultures, whereas exchange norms are more

prevalent in individualistic cultures (Miller

et al., 2014; Triandis, 1989). Thus, in an

organization with a collectivistic culture,

employees tend to put greater emphasis on

helping increase others’ welfare, rather than

stressing reciprocation.

Exchange and communal norms are treated

as mutually exclusive in the interpersonal

relationship literature (Clark & Mills, 1979,

2011). Some research has considered them as

two ends of a single continuum (Batson, 1993).

However, both exchange and communal norms

may vary in strength and guide different

individual actions (Mills & Clark, 2013).

Thus, while correlated, these norms are inde-

pendent and both could guide behavior (Clark

& Mills, 2011; Johnson & Grimm, 2010). As

illustrated in Figure 1, we consider a 2 2

categorization of exchange and communal

norms. While both norms are continuous

variables, for pedagogical purposes, we con-

sider high versus low categories. Specifically,

we propose how and why each combination of

high and low relationship norms relates to

different types of accountability.

High communal and low exchange norms: Internally

assumed accountability. We suggest that people

who are in an organizational culture of high

communal norms and low exchange norms will

assume the highest level of accountability,

namely, what we have characterized as internally

assumed accountability. As suggested above,

internally assumed accountability involves a

sense of personal ownership by accepting sanc-

tions for poor performance.

Organizations with a prominent social mis-

sion, such as nonprofit social ventures, may have

high communal and low exchange norms (Lee,

Bolton, & Winterich, 2017). That said, we do not

limitourframeworktosuchventuressincewe

maintain that communal norms can be present in

a range of organizations. An organizational

member who is influenced by communal norms

is likely to possess internally assumed account-

ability to serve the needs/interests of stake-

holders. Further, she/he is likely to take steps to

correct wrong behaviors or outcomes that sta-

keholders have experienced, even if she/he was

not the source of the problem.

Members who are subject to high communal

and low exchange norms will likely care about

stakeholders’ benefits without asking for

High

Communal Norms

Low

Communal Norms

Low

Exchange Norms

High

Exchange Norms

Internally-assumed

Accountability

Mixed-loci

Accountability

Lack of

Accountability

Externally-imposed

Accountability

Figure 1. A categorization of accountability based on exchange and communal norms.

190 Organizational Psychology Review 9(2-3)

tangible benefits in return or expecting reci-

procity. These individuals are more likely to

prioritize stakeholders’ interests and sacrifice

their own benefits to serve stakeholders (Mills,

Clark, Ford, & Johnson, 2004). Therefore,

when poor outcomes occur, members are more

likely to feel a sense of guilt or shame (de

Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2007; de

Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2008;

Tangney, 1991)—that is, moral emotions—and

to sincerely assume ownership of those out-

comes. Along these lines, research has shown

that people who seek to build more communal

and less exchange-based relationships may be

more empathetic and provide more social sup-

port to others, including stakeholders, without

asking for direct returns (Crocker & Canevello,

2008; Meshram & O’Cass, 2013). In short, they

are more responsive to others’ needs (Lemay,

Clark, & Feeney, 2007).

High communal and high exchange norms: Mixed-

loci accountability. We suggest that organiza-

tional members who are instead guided by both

high communal and high exchange norms in

their culture may display mixed-loci account-

ability. For example, companies with both

strong profit and social missions may have a

high communal and exchange norm culture

(Lee et al., 2017). Members in such cultures are

concerned with the benefits of stakeholders and

act upon their interests, but they also expect

reciprocity/returns for serving the needs of

stakeholders. Researchers have indicated that

communal and exchange norm-based percep-

tions could be combined to predict behaviors

suggestive of mixed motivations and goals

(Johnson & Grimm, 2010). The dual concerns

model (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) suggests that

members can simultaneously have a high con-

cern for others (e.g., stakeholders’ welfare) and

a high concern for self (e.g., getting more

benefits from the company). Accordingly,

people who are influenced by both communal

and exchange norms may take ownership for

bad outcomes pertaining to stakeholders, but

with concomitant instrumental goals.

When a firm emphasizes communal norms,

while concomitantly stressing exchanges, ela-

borate or strict metrics are likely to be estab-

lished to ensure that employees are truly

serving the needs of stakeholders. This in-line

with the manner in which accountability has

been traditionally defined in the literature (Ler-

ner & Tetlock, 1999). However, by emphasizing

metrics, employees may learn to “play” to the

measurement process (e.g., find ways to

manipulate the system to make their perfor-

mance look good), which can lead to confused or

mixed motives regarding how they view their

accountability. In other words, while they feel a

need to take ownership for mistakes and to serve

stakeholders, they may also feel a need to

“game” the system that measures their perfor-

mance in order to avoid negative repercussions

from the organization. The end result is what we

term mixed-loci accountability.

Low communal and high exchange norms:

Externally imposed accountability. Organizations

that are instead characterized by low communal

and high exchange norms represent an eco-

nomic model of the firm (McWilliams &

Siegel, 2001). In such organizations, employee

exchanges are based predominantly on the

extent to which the individual contributes to

production or profit-based goals. Stakeholders’

needs and satisfaction are typically seen as a

means to ensure productivity and profits, rather

than as intrinsic ends in themselves. Accord-

ingly, organizational members in such firms are

likely to be held to account through externally

imposed accountability, whereby the firm holds

them accountable for stakeholder relations, but

only to the extent that monetary and other

returns can be gained by these individuals.

Therefore, they will tend to care greatly about

reciprocation from the firm and less about sta-

keholders’ interests. High exchange norms

make it more legitimate for members to use

excuses to reduce or eliminate their ownership

Wang et al. 191

of any performance failure that could nega-

tively affect stakeholders (Scott & Lyman,

1968) in order to maximize their exchanges.

Thus, they are not likely to take personal

ownership by admitting mistakes and solving

problems pertaining to stakeholders. Instead, to

justify their actions to stakeholders and satisfy

their company’s expectations, they may blame

others for mistakes and suggest that others take

ownership and accept any repercussions.

An example of an individual who apparently

acted under high exchange and low communal

norms is the former CEO of British Petroleum,

Tony Hayward (Lubin, 2010; Wray, 2010),

mentioned earlier. During the Gulf of Mexico

oil spill crisis, he appeared not to be strongly

concerned with maintaining communal rela-

tionships with stakeholders, while being more

concerned with how the company could main-

tain profit-based returns. Accordingly, he did

not show deep concern for people who were

affected by the accident. Further, he seemed

reluctant to assume any personal repercussions

for his company’s mistakes.

Low communal and low exchange norms: Lack of

accountability. Lastly, organizational members

who are subject to low communal and low

exchange norms will possess a lack of

accountability toward stakeholders. A company

with low communal and exchange norms may

place few strongly enforced expectations on

members. In the absence of such expectations,

members may not be concerned with stake-

holders’ benefits or returns from stakeholders.

Under these loose norms, employees are less

likely to assume accountability for poor per-

formance because there is greater tolerance for

deviance (Gelfand, Lim, & Raver, 2004). Thus,

they may avoid solving stakeholders’ problems.

They may take little or no ownership of mis-

takes and avoid giving an explanation for fail-

ure to achieve outcomes that are important to

stakeholders. Further, they may draw stake-

holders’ attention away from real problems by

“beating around the bush” or being vague when

dealing with stakeholder issues. This lack of

accountability is characterized by not taking

remedial actions and leaving problematic per-

formance issues unaddressed (Ashforth & Lee,

1990).

The combination of low communal and low

exchange norms, and resulting widespread lack

of accountability, may be uncommon in busi-

ness contexts because these organizations will

probably find it difficult to survive. Specifi-

cally, as detailed below, stakeholder relations

are likely to suffer to the point of making such

firms noncompetitive. However, organizations

in other sectors, especially the public sector,

may be able to survive even with a widespread

lack of accountability. For example, individuals

in government-based agencies in the U.S., such

as the Internal Revenue Service and Federal

Bureau of Investigation, have been characterized

in recent years as lacking accountability

(O’Connor, 2018). Many employees who work in

such agencies are not held to account for perfor-

mance or ethical transgressions, and they may

display a lack of internally assumed account-

ability toward their stakeholders by either leaving

problems unsolved or making excuses for mis-

takes (Fund, 2018; Vecchione & Valvo, 2018). A

lack of accountability has been recognized as one

of the common barriers to government agencies’

productivity, and indeed, performance in such

contexts may be difficult to measure, making

accountability all the more difficult (Ammons,

1985). Overall, we suggest that a lack of

accountability (either externally imposed or

internally assumed) is possible in many organi-

zations, and it is largely the result of a combina-

tion of low communal and exchange norms.

Individual differences affecting

accountability

Similar to communal and exchange relationship

norms, Clark, Oullette, Powell, and Milberg

(1987) proposed that there are individual dif-

ferences that are relevant to individuals’ ten-

dencies to follow communal versus exchange

192 Organizational Psychology Review 9(2-3)

norms in their relationships with others. As

presented in Table 1, individuals with a duty

orientation have an intrinsic desire to provide

care to others, including those with whom they

have close relationships, as well as strangers

(Bryan et al., 2000). Duty orientation, as a rela-

tively stable trait, represents one’s willingness to

serve others voluntarily and faithfully and to

sacrifice one’s own benefits for the sake of col-

lective goals (Hannah, Jennings, Bluhm, Peng,

& Schaubroeck, 2014; Waldman & Balven,

2014). When organizational members have a

strong duty orientation, they often go above and

beyond the expectations and specific requests of

stakeholders. Moreover, members with a strong

duty orientation focus on long-term relation-

ships, even sacrificing their own interests to

serve others. We suggest that it is likely that

people with a high duty orientation will tend to

display more internally assumed accountability

to better serve stakeholders’ interests.

In contrast, Table 1 depicts how individuals

with an exchange orientation expect to have

their actions and efforts reciprocated by others

in terms of immediate or comparable rewards

(Murstein, Cerreto, & MacDonald, 1977).

Organizational members with a strong exchange

orientation may serve customers to simply attain

tangible benefits (Schwartz, 1983). Thus, they

are more likely to ask for something in return or

to focus on short-term reciprocity from their

organization based on customer satisfaction

(Shamir, 1991). Therefore, members with a high

exchange orientation may only adhere to exter-

nally imposed accountability toward customers,

rather than developing a sense of internally

assumed accountability.

Bandura’s (1986, 1989) social cognitive

theory would suggest that the influence of

relationship norms on employee accountability

might vary depending on differences in indi-

viduals’ duty and exchange orientations. When

the normative cues are strong and clear (either

high communal/low exchange or low commu-

nal/high exchange), people are more likely to

conform to the norms (Meyer, Dalal, & Her-

mida, 2010; Mischel, 1973). Moreover, people

are more likely to pursue norm-driven beha-

viors when there is a consistency between the

norm and their own personal orientation. For

example, high duty-oriented people may find it

easier to stick to strong communal norms and

behave consistently. Thus, the relationship

between high communal/low exchange norms

and internally assumed accountability may be

enhanced by a high duty orientation on the part

of organizational members, because such an

orientation is more consistent or fits with high

communal norms. Similarly, the effect of the

combination of high exchange and low

Table 1. Comparison between personal orientations.

Duty orientation Exchange orientation

Definitions An intrinsic desire to give care to others,

including those with whom they have

close relationships, as well as strangers

(Bryan et al., 2000)

Desire to have one’s actions and efforts

reciprocated by others in terms of

immediate or comparable rewards

(Murstein et al., 1977)

Example behaviors Go above and beyond the expectations

and specific requests of stakeholders

Focus on short-term reciprocity, and do

what is expected in terms of a quid pro

quo

Likely outcomes in

terms of follow-up

and corrective

actions

Engage in corrective action toward

negatively affected stakeholders, and

address the root causes of

performance failures

Reluctance to admit and fix performance

failures or only fix failures to obtain

extrinsic (e.g., monetary) returns

Wang et al. 193

communal norms on individuals’ perceptions of

externally imposed accountability may be

strengthened if members have a strong exchange

orientation.

However, when the situational cues are

ambiguous or equivocal, there is inherently

more individual discretion to behave con-

sistently with one’s personal orientation (Meyer

et al., 2010; Mischel, 1973). The high com-

munal/high exchange norms context can be

considered a weak situation because the two

relationship norms send mixed signals to

organizational members. Members can choose

to follow either high communal or high

exchange norms based on their personal

orientation. Therefore, members with a high

duty orientation may act more consistent with

communal norms and thus have more intern-

ally assumed accountability. Conversely, mem-

bers with a high exchange orientation may act

more in line with exchange norms and only react

to the externally imposed accountability that is

stressed in their organizations.

Similarly, a context that is characterized by

low communal/low exchange norms provides

especially weak situational cues because there

are few if any signals about which norms to

follow. No particular accountability toward

customers is stressed by such a context. There-

fore, people are more willing to rely on their

personal orientation to act. Thus, if an organi-

zational member has a strong duty orientation,

under low communal/low exchange norms, she/

he is likely to enact more internally assumed

accountability. However, if a member has a

strong exchange orientation, she/he is not likely

to adhere to externally imposed accountability

toward customers. This occurs because the

absence of exchange norms means that the

organization will tend not to recognize and

reward member behavior, thus removing the

incentive to adhere to externally imposed

accountability. In short, this context will

accentuate a tendency toward a lack of any sort

of accountability on the part of the exchange-

oriented person.

Possible stakeholder outcomes of the

different types of accountability

Accountability, when expressed via concrete

behavior, likely influences how stakeholders

perceive a firm. Here, we focus on two aspects

of stakeholder perceptions that manifest stake-

holder relationships: trust and commitment.

Specifically, trust and commitment appear to

be the most important factors in determining

employee-stakeholder relationships (Morgan

& Hunt, 1994; see also Pirson & Malhotra,

2011). As compared to other attitudes, such as

satisfaction, trust and commitment are more

strongly related to stakeholders’ future inten-

tions to build long-term relationships with the

organization (Garbarino & Johnson, 1999).

Drawing from Mayer, Davis, and Schoor-

man’s (1995) integrative model of trust, stake-

holders’ trust toward organizational members is

based on three aspects of members’ trust-

worthiness: (1) ability to perform, (2) integrity,

and (3) benevolence in serving stakeholders. If

members are high on these three dimensions,

they are more likely to be trusted by stake-

holders (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007).

This appears most likely in the case of

internally assumed accountability. First, such

accountability reflects members’ intention to

ensure the benefits of stakeholders. A mem-

ber’s internally assumed accountability toward

stakeholders will likely increase stakeholders’

trust because it shows that the member has the

ability, or at least the intention, to correct

wrongdoings and perform better, especially

when the wrongdoings are relevant to his/her

competence (Kim, Dirks, Coopers, & Ferrin,

2006).

Second, internally assumed accountability

for negative outcomes implies that organiza-

tional members acknowledge what they—or

their organizations—did wrong. This can

increase members’ integrity in the eyes of sta-

keholders, because the members are willing to

accept negative repercussions for unwanted

actions. Integrity may be especially important

194 Organizational Psychology Review 9(2-3)

for prospective stakeholders, such as people in

the greater community, who do not have first-

hand information regarding the organizational

members who are serving them (Pirson &

Malhotra, 2011).

Lastly, internally assumed accountability

implies that organizational members deeply

consider stakeholders’ welfare and serve their

interests, which is likelytoincreasestake-

holders’ perceptions of the benevolence of

members. In particular, if there is a failure to

serve stakeholders’ needs, members are pre-

disposed to put stakeholders’ welfare above

their own. Further, Gillespie and Dietz (2009)

indicated that acknowledging failure, and sin-

cerely expressing apology, may repair breaches

in trust.

Moreover, internally assumed accountability

may relate to stakeholders’ commitment toward

organizational members. Stakeholders’ com-

mitment refers to an explicit or implicit promise

of building consistent relationships between

stakeholders and members (Dwyer, Schurr, &

Oh, 1987). There are three types of commit-

ment: affective, continuance, and normative

(Meyer & Allen, 1991). Stakeholders’ affective

commitment reflects their emotional attach-

ment to members (Buchanan, 1974); con-

tinuance commitment refers to stakeholders’

cost-induced bond with members (Meyer &

Allen, 1984); and normative commitment is

stakeholders’ perceived responsibility and

loyalty to members (Wiener & Vardi, 1980).

Internally assumed accountability is likely to

be associated with each of these aspects of

commitment as follows.

First, internally assumed accountabilityshows

members’ concerns and responsiveness to sta-

keholders’ needs, thus increasing stakeholders’

affective commitment. For instance, researchers

have found that stakeholders may develop more

affective commitment with members if those

members are reliable and responsive to their

needs (Gruen, Summers, & Acito, 2000).

Second, by accepting sanctions and commit-

ting to corrective action to amend a relationship

with stakeholders, organizational members

increase stakeholders’ continuance commit-

ment. More specifically, members’ acceptance

of negative repercussions for performance

problems demonstrates their goals and concerns

for increasing stakeholders’ benefits; thus, sta-

keholders may expect continued benefits from

staying in the relationship (Sharma, Young, &

Wilkinson, 2006).

Third, internally assumed accountability is

also likely to increase normative commitment

on the part of stakeholders. By accepting

ownership of responsibility and any negative

sanctions for performance failures, organiza-

tional members connect with stakeholders by

showing moral concern for stakeholders’ needs.

If members have genuine concern for stake-

holders and do not act opportunistically (Groza,

Pronschinske, & Walker, 2011), stakeholders

are more likely to internalize those members’

values and goals and identify with their moral

activities (Sen, Bhattacharya, & Korschun,

2006). This internalization and identification

bind stakeholders with members and increase

stakeholders’ perceived responsibility and loy-

alty to members (Wiener, 1982).

In contrast, high mixed-loci accountability

may lead to ambivalent trust and commitment.

We define ambivalent trust and commitment as

simultaneously high and low trust and com-

mitment (cf. Ashforth, Rogers, Pratt, & Pradies,

2014). Stakeholders may develop ambivalent

attitudes toward organizational members’

mixed-loci accountability actions because

those actions reflect members’ contradictory

goals and values (Ashforth et al., 2014; Lee

et al., 2017; Sluss & Ashforth, 2007). Stake-

holders may be confused about the intentions

behind members’ actions, since members may

find ways to avoid negative repercussions

from the organization while serving stake-

holders. Along similar lines, researchers have

found that stakeholders may develop different

attitudes toward employees’ different service

strategies (e.g., a positive attitude toward being

served sincerely, while forming a negative

Wang et al. 195

attitude toward fake emotions) (Grandey,

2003; Groth, Hennig-Thurau, & Walsh, 2009).

On the one hand, if employees display

mixed-loci accountability, stakeholders may

feel more trust and commitment toward them

because they show concern for stakeholders’

benefits by demonstrating ownership of poor

performance. On the other hand, stakeholders

mayalsobeabletodetecttheinstrumental

component of employees’ actions (Ekman,

2009). Thus, they may feel that employees

are acting opportunistically to look good in

terms of how their organization is assessing

and rewarding stakeholder satisfaction (Pless

et al., 2012), and therefore develop less trust

and commitment toward them (Groza et al.,

2011).

Both externally imposed accountability and

lack of accountability toward stakeholders are

likely to decrease trust and commitment on

the part of stakeholders. To fulfill and satisfy

expectations from the organization, members are

likely to blame external circumstances or others

for mistakes or actions that could be detrimental

to stakeholders. In the British Petroleum exam-

ple mentioned earlier, Tony Hayward even

appeared to blame other companies (e.g., con-

tractors) for mistakes so that he might avoid

personal blame, and he attempted to be person-

ally excluded from the oil spill event. With that

said, we return to our earlier caveat that orga-

nizational members may eschew internally

assumed accountability to avoid legal liability

and personal credibility issues. Nevertheless, in

many circumstances, fears of legal liability are

not relevant, and we discuss the more nuanced

risks to personal credibility and one’s career in

the “Discussion” section.

In any event, organizational members/lead-

ers are likely to violate stakeholders’ ethical

standards if members try to mitigate their

ownership of performance failures by blaming

others for reasons that stakeholders perceive as

illegitimate (Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003).

Thus, stakeholders may have little trust and

commitment toward those members. In addition,

for members with no accountability toward

stakeholders, a lack of ownership for failures

may be perceived as badly as actually blaming

others. Ignoring the problem does not mean that

the problem has been resolved, and stake-

holders may become very concerned about if

and when the problem will be solved. Research

indicates that stakeholders are likely to have

negative reactions if organizational members

fail to give sufficient explanations for mis-

conduct or poor performance (Shaw et al.,

2003). Stakeholders attribute this to members

not caring if they fail to exhibit an appropriate

level of effort. Clearly, this attribution will hurt

their relationship with the members.

Discussion

The literature stresses externally imposed

accountability whereby others (or a system)

hold individuals to account for their perfor-

mance. In this article, we address a critical

limitation of accountability research by offering

a new perspective on accountability; specifi-

cally, internally assumed accountability. More-

over, based on a typology of two types of

relational norms in organizations (i.e., com-

munal vs. exchange), we propose four different

types of accountability that commonly exist

in organizations, including internally assumed

accountability, mixed-loci accountability, exter-

nally imposed accountability, and lack of

accountability. In addition, we propose that

individual orientations can predispose individ-

uals to either a strong sense of internally

assumed accountability (i.e., duty orientation),

or alternatively, a strong sense of externally

imposed accountability (i.e., exchange orienta-

tion). In turn, and in line with social cognitive

theory, these individual orientations help deter-

mine how individuals will react to the different

relational norms that may be stressed in an

organizational context. We further considered

the possible outcomes of the different types of

accountability in terms of stakeholders’ trust and

commitment, given the importance of these two

196 Organizational Psychology Review 9(2-3)

aspects of relationship norms to long-term sta-

keholder relationships. Our overall framework

is shown in Figure 2.

Suggestions for future research

Extending the accountability construct. Future

research should extend our notion of account-

ability in several ways. First, our model directs

attention to accountability for negative perfor-

mance outcomes. Future efforts might extend

the typology to positive outcomes and deter-

mine how accountability dynamics may con-

verge and diverge for positive and negative

outcomes. Second, we only discussed generic

stakeholders, given our interest in stakeholder

relationships. Future research may be extended

to multiple types of stakeholders involved in

accountability actions. It is possible that dif-

ferent stakeholders, such as shareholders

and suppliers, may have somewhat conflicting

interests. Members may need to decide which

group(s) of stakeholders matter more (Agle,

Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999) or try to balance/

optimize the interests of multiple stakeholder

groups in different ways (Bundy, Shropshire, &

Buchholtz, 2013). Further, members may have

alternative forms of accountability (i.e., exter-

nallyimposedvs.internallyassumed)todiffer-

ent stakeholders based on different norms. How

broadly people assume their accountability

across stakeholder types may also be an inter-

esting research question to explore.

Third, although we focused on the relation-

ship between organizational members and sta-

keholders, this accountability typology could

Accountability

Internally-

assumed

Accountability

Ambivalent Trust

Ambivalent Commitment

High Communal /

Low Exchange

High Communal /

High Exchange

Mixed-loci

Accountability

Low Communal /

High Exchange

Low Communal /

Low Exchange

Externally-

imposed

Accountability

Lack of

Accountability

High Trust

High Commitment

Low Trust

Low Commitment

Personal Orientations

Figure 2. Overall theoretical framework.

Wang et al. 197

also be applied to stakeholders within the

organization (i.e., internal stakeholders), such

as leaders, peers, and followers (Leana & Van

Buren, 1999). This suggests some interesting

research questions pertaining to accountability

at the higher leader level. For example, research

pertaining to inspirational or visionary leader-

ship (Sully de Luque, Washburn, Waldman, &

House, 2008) has not explored which precise

behaviors are perceived as inspirational (Van

Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2013). We propose that

accountability may serve as one behavioral

indicator of inspiration. Leaders who are will-

ing to internally assume accountability could

be perceived as more inspirational, while

leaders who lack a sense of internally assumed

accountability might be seen as much less

inspirational. Moreover, instead of looking at

unidirectional accountability, future research

can explore bilateral or mutual accountability

between two or more parties.

Accountability and corrective action. Contexts

(i.e., high exchange norms) and individuals

(i.e., high exchange orientation) that stress

externally imposed accountability may not

engender corrective action on the part of the

individual to improve performance issues.

Instead, immediate victims of poor perfor-

mance (e.g., negatively affected customers) and

underlying causes of a performance problem

may not be addressed. Conversely, it is possible

that individuals (i.e., high duty orientation) in

contexts (i.e., high communal norms) that are

more conducive to internally assumed account-

ability will be more likely to take corrective

action toward negatively affected stakeholders,

and moreover, address the root causes of per-

formance issues. With that said, future research

is necessary to disentangle the connection

between different forms of accountability and

corrective actions that might be taken by

individuals.

Moreover, whether people will take further

corrective actions may depend on their attri-

bution styles. Individuals can be characterized

by internal/external and stable/variable attri-

bution styles (cf. Kent & Martinko, 1995;

Peterson et al., 1982). People who internally

assume accountability, but make internal-

variable attributions (i.e., where the cause is

within themselves but not stable, such as

insufficient effort), are likely to engage in

constructive responses since they believe that

they can rectify the problem. However, intern-

ally assumed accountability combined with

internal-stable attributions (i.e., where the

cause is within the individual but stable, such as

insufficient skill) is more likely to be destruc-

tive since the attributions may contribute to

rumination and depression, potentially foster-

ing a pessimistic attributional style (e.g.,

“What’s the point of trying?”; Harvey,

Madison, Martinko, Crook, & Crook, 2014;

Seligman, 1998). Thus, no further actions may

be implemented. It follows that individuals with

internal-stable attributions for performance

failures will be less likely to take corrective

actions. However, research indicates that

training can change a pessimistic attributional

style into more of an optimistic style (i.e.,

where negative events are less likely to be

attributed to internal and stable causes)

(Proudfoot, Corr, Guest, & Dunn, 2009).

Communal norms and their antecedents. Given

the potential importance and benefits of com-

munal norms to accountability, how best to

build high communal norms also deserves

future research. For example, following insti-

tutional theory (Tolbert & Zucker, 1999),

organizational communal norms could be

derived from higher level industry norms. If

communal norms are popular in a specific

industry, it follows that companies in that

industry are more likely to follow those norms.

Lower level collective communal norms within

an organization could also be influenced by

higher level exemplars (e.g., CEOs) who model

such norms (Kahneman & Miller, 1986).

Moreover, communal norms could be sparked

by critical events happening in the organization

198 Organizational Psychology Review 9(2-3)

or by important actions displayed by lower

level employees (Dutton, Worline, Frost, &

Lilius, 2006; Feldman, 1984). Further, if

employee s proactively displayinfluential actions

that are more communal, they may, over time,

shift the organization’s norms toward communal

relationships (Schneider, 1987). These and other

ways of enhancing communal norms should

be explored.

Managerial implications

Understanding accountability and how it forms,

as well as its importance in building long-term

stakeholder relationships, has important man-

agerial implications for organizations. In recent

times, a number of people in various industries

have been accused of taking limited account-

ability when facing scandals (Sloan, 2015). Our

research explicates how limited accountability

is likely to result from some types of organi-

zational cultures. For example, there may be

high exchange norms that cause members to not

internally assume accountability. Or alter-

natively, low communal and exchange norms

likely result in employees simply not being

exposed to externally imposed accountability

nor assuming internal accountability. Accord-

ingly, organizations could increase account-

ability by attempting to identify and correct

cultural causes, although we recognize that

changing culture is an arduous process (Alvesson

& Sveningsson, 2016).

With that said, it may be possible for man-

agers to gradually encourage employees to

assume internal accountability by cultivating

more communal norms in their relationship

development with others. Leader behaviors can

serve as important cues to guide organizational

members’ behaviors. To serve as accountability

role models, CEOs or top-level managers should

adopt more internally assumed accountability

rather than blaming others or taking no

accountability. Thus, in hiring and selection

processes, recruiting teams should select lead-

ers with a track record or sincere belief in

internally assumed accountability. Further,

organizations need to highlight the importance

of developing internally assumed account-

ability to managers in their training programs.

In addition, organizational reward and punish-

ment systems can encourage members to

assume more internalized accountability. Cur-

rently, such systems are often designed to

enforce externally imposed accountability,

rather than encouraging members to internalize

accountability. Rewards such as promoting

individuals who take ownership for mistakes,

even if not their own, send a strong cultural

signal about what is valued in the organization.

Moreover, we noted that personal factors

such as duty orientation may influence how

members internalize those contextual norms.

Personnel selection processes might therefore

emphasize the hiring of people with a general-

ized—and therefore more trait-like—sense of

duty orientation, thereby fostering person–

organization fit and making communal norms

more effective in enhancing stakeholder rela-

tionships. However, because survey measures

of duty orientation may be easily “gamed” by

job applicants (i.e., applicants would likely

sense the social desirability of endorsing a duty

orientation), behavioral or situational inter-

views may provide a better avenue for assessing

one’s orientation (e.g., “Tell me about a time

that a customer of yours was unhappy with your

department”; “What would you do if you dis-

covered that you had made a big mistake on a

report that had already been sent out?”) (Dip-

boye, Wooten, & Halverson, 2004). Further, in

the spirit of how “the people make the place”

(Schneider, 1987, p. 437), by selecting people

with a strong duty orientation, norms of an

organization could shift over time toward

communal norms. Because a generalized duty

orientation is more trait-like and therefore more

or less stable, it is likely less amenable to

training. That said, the cultural signals noted

above may well enhance a more context-

specific state-like sense of duty (Hannah

et al., 2014) that may become institutionalized

Wang et al. 199

over time both in the expectations of the orga-

nization and in the behaviors and attitudes of

organizational members.

Finally, organizations should pay more

attention to the negative consequences of

externally imposed accountability and lack of

accountability. Members who have externally

imposed accountability may think opportunis-

tically that stakeholders may forgive them if

they attempt to shift the blame for negative

stakeholder outcomes to others—either internal

or external to the organization. Or members

who try to escape punishment by being vague in

terms of ownership may imagine that stake-

holders will forget their lack of accountability

as time passes. However, this lack of internally

assumed accountability is likely to reduce

stakeholders’ trust and commitment. Stake-

holders may subsequently move their rela-

tionships to other organizations if members

with whom they interact blame others or avoid

actively facing relevant performance prob-

lems. Thus, members should not be implicitly

or explicitly rewarded for withdrawing their

personal accountability for performance

problems.

Career outcomes of internally assumed accountability.

While internally assumed accountability was

argued to foster customer trust and commit-

ment, it should be noted that it may carry risks

to the individual’s personal credibility and

career. In a high exchange norm-based culture

or a culture that does not encourage account-

ability, individuals who internally assume

accountability may endanger their career

because accepting blame is not normative and,

thus, such individuals are easy to single out

and vilify. Accordingly, individuals may be

deterred from displaying internally assumed

accountability. As Kerr (1975) famously

argued, it is not reasonable for managers to hope

for A (in this case, internally assumed account-

ability) while rewarding B (externally assumed

accountability or lack of accountability).

What about internally assumed account-

ability in a high communal norm-based culture?

Here, such accountability for performance

failures may actually enhance one’s credibility

and career prospects because owning failures is

expected of organizational members. That said,

significant or repeated performance failures

may nonetheless damage one’s credibility and

career even while one’s internally assumed

accountability is lauded. From the standpoint of

the individual, then, mixed-loci accountability

may be a more likely stance in the face of sig-

nificant or repeated performance failures in

order to balance his or her self-interest with

other interests. That is, if internally assumed

accountability can be thought of as an aspira-

tional goal, career concerns in the face of sig-

nificant or repeated performance failures may

induce him or her to settle for mixed-loci

accountability—to exercise judgment when

selectively accepting responsibility for perfor-

mance failures. Similarly, in a culture that

promotes both communal and exchange norms,

the latter provide some cover for the individual

such that judiciously applying mixed-loci

accountability becomes an attractive means

of mitigating the risk of negative career out-

comes caused by credibility-threatening per-

formance failures.

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the

organization, given the importance of stake-

holders’ trust and commitment, organizations

should encourage their members to assume

more internal accountability by building a

high communal norm-based culture. Such

a culture would generally make it more

acceptable and less damaging career-wise for

individuals to internally assume account-

ability—and with careful selection, training,

and performance management, the likelihood

of significant or repeated performance fail-

ures would be lessened.

In conclusion, our framework offers an

expanded view of accountability that centers on

norms, personal orientations, and relationships.

Our hope is that this article will inspire more

200 Organizational Psychology Review 9(2-3)

theoretical and empirical work emphasizing the

connection between accountability and stake-

holder relationships.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the

research, authorship, and/or publication of this

article.

ORCID iD

Danni Wang https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5436-

6495

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Author biographies

Danni Wang is an assistant professor of man-

agement and global business at Rutgers Busi-

ness School–Newark and New Brunswick,

Rutgers University. She received her PhD from

Arizona State University. Her research interests

focus largely on leadership and teams, account-

ability, and organizational neuroscience. She has

published in journals such as Academy of Man-

agement Journal,Journal of Applied Psychol-

ogy,andPersonnel Psychology.

David A. Waldman is a professor of manage-

ment in the W. P. Carey School of Business at

Arizona State University. Currently, his

research and applied interests focus largely

on leadership and applications of organiza-

tional neuroscience to organizational beha-

vior. He has approximately 125 articles in

such journals as Academy of Management

Journal,Academy of Management Review,

Journal of Applied Psychology,Personnel

Psychology,Administrative Science Quar-

terly,andOrganization Science. According

to Google Scholar, his work has been cited

over 25,000 times. He has also published five

books on topics including 360-degree feed-

back, leadership, organizational neuroscience,

and corporate social responsibility. He has

been a principal investigator on grants approx-

imating US$1.6 million. He is on the editorial

review boards of Academy of Management

Journal,Academy of Management Review,

Academy of Management Perspectives,Jour-

nal of Applied Psychology,Personnel Psy-

chology,andThe Leadership Quarterly.He

is a Fellow of the American Psychological

Association and the Society for Industrial and

Organizational Psychology.

Blake E. Ashforth is the Horace Steele Ari-

zona Heritage Chair in the W. P. Carey

School of Business, Arizona State University.

He received his PhD from the University of

Toronto. His research concerns the ongoing

dance between individuals and organizations,

including identity and identification, sociali-

zation and newcomer work adjustment, and

the links among individual-, group-, and

organization-level phenomena. Recent work

has focused on dirty work, ambivalence, and

respect. He is a Fellow of the Academy of

Management, and he won the Lifetime

Achievement Award from the Academy’s OB

Division as well as the Distinguished Scholar

Award from the Academy’s MOC Division.

206 Organizational Psychology Review 9(2-3)

The roles of accountability and transparency on public trust in the village governments: The intervening role of COVID-19 handling services quality

Article

Full-text available

Aug 2022

This study aims to examine the relationship between accountability and transparency during the COVID-19 pandemic towards public trust in village governments through the quality of COVID-19 handling services as an intervening variable. This research was conducted among village governments in the Yogyakarta Special Region Province, Indonesia. The data were collected by distributing survey questionnaires, with 116 village governments participating in this study. Respondents in this study were represented by two groups, where village officials measured accountability and transparency practices, while members of the Village Representative Council measured the quality of COVID-19 handling services and public trust variables. Partial Least Square (PLS) was then used to test the hypotheses. The results showed that accountability for managing the COVID-19 response budget only had an indirect positive relationship with public trust through the quality of COVID-19 handling services. Meanwhile, the direct relationship between accountability and trust was negatively significant. Furthermore, transparency in the management of the COVID-19 response budget was not associated with the public trust, either directly or indirectly.

Opening Up: New Theory and Evidence on the Role of Self-Disclosure in Organizations

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Opening up: New theory and evidence on the role of self-disclosure in organizations

Conference Paper

Aug 2023

New venture employee accountability: an analytic-holistic cognition theory

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Robert J. Pidduck

A Goffmanian analysis of impact of unclear professional identity and role negotiation of pharmacists in primary care: A multiple case study

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May 2024
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Strive for rewards or keep them accountable? Motivating employees’ effort and performance

Article

Jul 2023

Organizations often turn to extrinsic motivators to improve employee effort and performance, with mixed results. In this research, performance-based benefits and accountability are explored to assess whether they differentially affect where effort is exerted and how they influence overall performance. The study proposes that effort can be divided into two components—strategic effort and execution effort—and that each component will influence overall performance differently. The study uses a scenario-based experiment involving a complex and unfamiliar task. The results indicate that workers motivated by performance-based benefits increase the use of strategic effort, which improves performance through the identification of critical problems, and they develop a better overall strategy relative to workers who are held accountable. The study also indicates that while accountability increased the use of execution effort, the additional effort did not improve performance in the complex task setting. The study highlights the importance of aligning an extrinsic motivator to the type of effort desired for a particular task.

The role of CEO accounts and perceived integrity in analysts’ forecasts

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May 2023
ORGAN BEHAV HUM DEC

Although holding oneself accountable is deemed important for effective leadership, CEOs tend to demonstrate a self-serving tendency when reporting their company’s performance to the financial community. Leaders do so by providing internal accounts for favorable performance and external accounts for unfavorable performance. The effects of this strategy on the financial community’s judgments of a company’s value, however, is frequently mixed. Guided by the actor-observer perspective, we propose that observers (i.e., analysts) are likely to provide higher forecasts for firms whose CEOs attribute unfavorable organizational outcomes to internal factors and favorable outcomes to external factors. Integrating this conceptual perspective with attribution theory, we predicted that CEO accounts will have a stronger influence on analysts’ forecasts when the company performs unfavorably versus favorably. Results of archival data analysis (N = 35,676 quarterly earnings conference calls) generally supported our hypothesis, and were then replicated in a pre-registered follow-up field experiment (Study 2; N = 307), showing that analysts’ perceptions of the leader’s integrity mediated the effects of CEO accounts on analysts’ evaluation of the company. The mediating role of leader integrity was only significant when the company performed unfavorably (versus favorably). The present research adds to theory on causal accounts and perceived leader integrity, while offering guidance on how leaders’ accounts can relate to observers’ evaluations of those leaders and their companies.

Mindful Educational Leadership: Contemplative, Cognitive, and Organizational Systems and Practices

Book

Mar 2023

Sharon D. Kruse

Transparency and community trust in village government: Does corruption perception matter?

Article

Nov 2022

When Indonesian village governments were granted authority, independence, and decentralized budget from the central government through Village Law No. 6 of 2014, most people predicted that it would not promote better village development. Instead, such a policy would increase corruption cases and subsequently persuade people not to trust the village government. It might interfere with the legitimacy of the village government's autonomy. Insufficient institutionalization of good governance in the village was one of the reasons. Hence, this study aims to examine the association between transparency after village governance reform—as one of the good governance principles—and village community trust intervened by corruption perception of villagers. This study employed a survey method and involved 128 village governments in the Special Region of Yogyakarta Province, Indonesia, as the samples. The Partial Least Square technique was used for hypothesis testing. This study discovered that transparency was positively associated with low corruption perception and high village community trust. Moreover, corruption perception from villagers was negatively associated with community trust and had a role as a partial intervening variable.

Physicians Towards Colleagues and Vice Versa

Chapter

Oct 2022

Medicine is fundamentally a moral endeavor. Correspondingly, those who practice medicine are bound by professional ethics (or professionalism), each of its agents individually, and all of them together, collectively.

The Triangle Model of Responsibility

Article

Full-text available

Oct 1994

Responsibility acts as a psychological adhesive that connects an actor to an event and to relevant prescriptions that should govern conduct. People are held responsible to the extent that (a) a clear, well-defined set of prescriptions is applicable to an event (prescription–event link); (b) the actor is perceived to be bound by the prescriptions by virtue of his or her identity (prescription–identity link); and (c) the actor is connected to the event, especially by virtue of appearing to have personal control over it (identity–event link). Studies supported the model, showing that attributions of responsibility are a direct function of the combined strengths of the 3 linkages (Study 1) and that, when judging responsibility, people seek out information that is relevant to the linkages (Study 2). The model clarifies prior multiple meanings of responsibility and provides a coherent framework for understanding social judgment.

Moral Affect: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

Article

Full-text available

Oct 1991

June P Tangney

The relations among 3 moral affective personality characteristics—shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and empathic responsiveness—were examined in 4 independent studies of undergraduates. Results indicate that shame and guilt are distinct affective experiences that have important and quite different implications in the interpersonal realm. There was a substantial positive correlation between shame-proneness and guilt-proneness. Nonetheless, as predicted, other-oriented empathic responsiveness was negatively related to proneness to shame but positively correlated with proneness to guilt. In contrast, an index of more self-oriented personal distress was positively linked to shame-proneness. Taken together, these results add a new dimension to the ugliness of shame but suggest that guilt may not be that bad after all, at least in the interpersonal domain.

Testing the "side-bet theory" of organizational commitment: Some methodological considerations

Article

Full-text available

Aug 1984

Two studies were conducted to demonstrate that both the instruments used to measure commitment––those scales developed by G. Ritzes and H. M. Trice (1969) and by L. G. Hrebiniak and J. A. Alutto ––and the side-bet indexes (age and tenure) used in previous tests of the side-bet theory of H. S. Becker are inappropriate for that purpose. In Study 1, 64 undergraduate scenarios in which an employee was described as being high or low in continuance commitment and high or low in affective commitment and responded to several commitment instruments as they felt the employee would respond. As expected, the continuance commitment manipulation accounted for a relatively small portion of the variance in scores on the 2 commitment scales, whereas the affective commitment manipulation accounted for a substantially larger portion. The continuance manipulation did, however, account for a large portion of the variance in scores on an author-developed continuance commitment scale (CCS). In Study 2, 130 university employees completed the same commitment instruments. As predicted, the 2 commitment scales correlated significantly with measures of affective commitment but not with the CCS. Also as predicted, age and tenure correlated with the commitment scales and with the affective commitment measures but not with the CCS. (22 ref)

Justice at the Millennium: A Meta-Analytic Review of 25 Years of Organizational Justice Research

Article

Full-text available

Jun 2001

The field of organizational justice continues to be marked by several important research questions, including the size of relationships among justice dimensions, the relative importance of different justice criteria, and the unique effects of justice dimensions on key outcomes. To address such questions, the authors conducted a meta-analytic review of 183 justice studies. The results suggest that although different justice dimensions are moderately to highly related, they contribute incremental variance explained in fairness perceptions. The results also illustrate the overall and unique relationships among distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational justice and several organizational outcomes (e.g., job satisfaction, organizational commitment, evaluation of authority, organizational citizenship behavior, withdrawal, performance). These findings are reviewed in terms of their implications for future research on organizational justice.

2 Conceptualizing Accountability

Chapter

Feb 1999

Andreas Schedler

On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B

Chapter

Jun 2007

Steven Kerr

The Development and Evaluation of a Scale to Measure Organizational Attributional Style

Chapter

May 2018

Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships

Article

Apr 1987
J MARKETING

Marketing theory and practice have focused persistently on exchange between buyers and sellers. Unfortunately, most of the research and too many of the marketing strategies treat buyer-seller exchanges as discrete events, not as ongoing relationships. The authors describe a framework for developing buyer-seller relationships that affords a vantage point for formulating marketing strategy and for stimulating new research directions.

The Different Roles of Satisfaction, Trust, and Commitment in Customer Relationships

Article

Apr 1999
J MARKETING

Several theories of relationship marketing propose that customers vary in their relationships with a firm on a continuum from transactional to highly relational bonds. Few empirical studies have segmented the customer base of an organization into low and high relational groups to assess how evaluations vary for these groups. Using structural equation analysis, the authors analyze the relationships of satisfaction, trust, and commitment to component satisfaction attitudes and future intentions for the customers of a New York off-Broadway repertory theater company. For the low relational customers (individual ticket buyers and occasional subscribers), overall satisfaction is the primary mediating construct between the component attitudes and future intentions. For the high relational customers (consistent subscribers), trust and commitment, rather than satisfaction, are the mediators between component attitudes and future intentions.

The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing

Article

Jul 1994
J MARKETING

Relationship marketing—establishing, developing, and maintaining successful relational exchanges—constitutes a major shift in marketing theory and practice. After conceptualizing relationship marketing and discussing its ten forms, the authors (1) theorize that successful relationship marketing requires relationship commitment and trust, (2) model relationship commitment and trust as key mediating variables, (3) test this key mediating variable model using data from automobile tire retailers, and (4) compare their model with a rival that does not allow relationship commitment and trust to function as mediating variables. Given the favorable test results for the key mediating variable model, suggestions for further explicating and testing it are offered.

Building relationships through accountability: An expanded idea of accountability

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