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Uncovering the Systematic Genocide Against the Hausa-Fulani and Muslims Groups in Nigeria



Objective: The objective of this study is to uncover the systematic but neglected genocide against the majority Hausa-Fulani and Muslims groups of Nigeria and alert all the stakeholders. Methodolgy: The used qualitative research (non-statistical) design to investigate and uncover the genocide. Secondary sources were used for the collection of the data from books, journals articles, press releases, rejoinders, public records and historical texts and materials; the data was also analysed using the qualitative and historical methods of data analysis. Results: The results show that over the years, there is factual systematic genocide against the Hausa-Fulani majority and the Muslims groups in Nigeria by the non-Muslims using various means and strategies – peaceful and violent, historical narratives, the media, public offices and positions; the various Nigerian state authorities have not been taking enough measures to avoid or stop the genocide. The genocidaires are and their actions are known to the Nigerian state authorities and in most instances move and operate with impunity. Implication: The study found evident systematic genocide against the Hausa-Fulani and Muslims in Nigeria. Immediate and remote legal, political and socio-economic measures must be taken by the Nigerian state authorities as the situation is further degenerating, and threatens humanity, Nigeria’s unity and sustenance.
Journal of Business and Social Review in Emerging Economies Vol. 5, No 2, December2019
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Journal of Business and Social Review in Emerging Economies
ISSN: 2519-089X (E): 2519-0326
Volume 5: No. 2, December 2019
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Uncovering the Systematic Genocide Against the Hausa-Fulani and Muslims Groups
in Nigeria
1 Isah Shehu Mohammed, 2 Muhammad Fuad bn Othman, 3 Nazariah binti Osman
1 General Studies Department, Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi, Bauchi State Nigeria,
2 School of International Studies, Universiti Utara, Malaysia,
3 School of International Studies, Universiti Utara, Malaysia,
Revised format: November 2019
Available Online:December 2019
Objective: The objective of this study is to uncover the systematic but
neglected genocide against the majority Hausa-Fulani and Muslims
groups of Nigeria and alert all the stakeholders.
Methodolgy: The used qualitative research (non-statistical) design to
investigate and uncover the genocide. Secondary sources were used for
collection of the data from books, journals articles, press releases,
rejoinders, public records and historical texts and materials; the data was
also analysed using the qualitative and historical methods of data analysis.
Results: The results show that over the years, there is factual systematic
genocide against the Hausa-Fulani majority and the Muslims groups in
Nigeria by the non-Muslims using various means and strategies peaceful
and violent, historical narratives, the media, public offices and positions;
the various Nigerian state authorities have not been taking enough
measures to avoid or stop the genocide. The genocidaires are and their
actions are known to the Nigerian state authorities and in most instances
move and operate with impunity.
Implication: The study found evident systematic genocide against the
Hausa-Fulani and Muslims in Nigeria. Immediate and remote legal,
political and socio-economic measures must be taken by the Nigerian state
authorities as the situation is further degenerating, and threatens humanity,
Nigeria‘s unity and sustenance.
© 2019 The authors, under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial 4.0
Hausa-Fulani, Muslims, Nigeria,
Genocide, Endangered Groups
JEL Classification:
Corresponding author‘s email address:
Recommended citation: Mohammed, I. S., Othman, M. F. B. and Osman, N. B. (2019). Uncovering the
Systematic Genocide Against the Hausa-Fulani and Muslims Groups in Nigeria. Journal of Business and Social
Review in Emerging Economies, 5 (2), 247-262
DOI: 10.26710/jbsee.v5i2.826
1. Introduction
Humankinds, a naturally violent specie have throughout history, been characterized by violence, especially killing
one another, as human psychology is created with the urge to humiliate, torment, wound and kill others (Glover,
1999:33). Thus, humans have come to terms with living in a world that requires, survives on and rewards
aggression and violence (Alvarez, 2010:104). Genocide has also been part of the early history of humankinds on
earth and with time, becomes more systematic, extensive and thorough (Jones, 2011:3-4; Weitz, 2003:8; Moses,
2008:8; Lattimer, 2007: xi). As the world becomes more sophisticated with technology, globalization, and
Journal of Business and Social Review in Emerging Economies Vol. 5, No 2, December 2019
development, so also do the human wickedness and cruelty increase. In less than a century (1900-1987), about 170
million people were killed in genocides and mass murder around the world (Rummel, 1994). Not only through
physical violence, genocide is also perpetrated and executed through diseases, malnutrition, starvation, forced
sterilization, dislocation, displacement and rape (Alvarez, 2010:7 & 12). The MHF groups of Nigeria are currently
faced with such genocide that is related to those of other Muslims in Chechnya, Rohingya, Uighurs/Turkic Chinese
minority Muslim, Bosnia (Bosnians and Armenians), and Cambodia and Vietnam (against the Monks religious
group) where between 90 and 95% of them were killed between 1975 and 1979 (Hinton, 2005:23). The United
Nations (UN) in 2017 confirmed that genocide is being executed against the Rohingyan Muslims in Myanmar.
Previous studies have mainly focused on ethno-religious conflicts on the northern Nigeria; the alleged decades long
genocide proclivity in northern Nigeria against the Igbos, Christians and other non-Muslims; use of exclusionary
ideology and imposition of the Sharia Islamic laws ―through enforced assimilation or extermination of Christians
and other non-Muslims who do not assimilate or adopt the Muslim ideology‖ Okoye (2013: xv). From available
literature, no extensive study has been conducted to explore the systematic genocide against MHF of Nigeria.
Therefore, this study uncovers the systematic, covert and overt genocide being executed against the MHF amidst
deliberate bad publicity, orchestration of conflicts and violence, hiding the Christian and other non-Muslims
atrocities, and a of game of blame the victims (Muslims) by the Christians and other non-Muslims, specifically
from the north and other parts of Nigeria. While the Igbos have been falsely using the alleged genocide against
them as a means of garnering local, international and ethno-religious sympathy and appeal (David, 2018:27).
The study is very significant and timely as the world is fast dipping into more and more, but systematic cases of
genocide, and as the former United Nations Secretary - General late Kofi Annan maintained, ―there can be no more
important issue, and no more binding obligation, than the prevention of genocide‖ (Kofi Annan, 2004).
Furthermore, Nigeria‘s unity and stability are further threatened by the genocide.
2. Statement of the Problem and Justifications for the Study
Genocide has been a major threat to not only individual states and societies, but also to the contemporary
international order and has been on the increase with escalations in the destruction of indigenous peoples‘ ways of
life and deprivation of peoples‘ human rights (Gallagher, 2013:18-9; Totten & Parsons, 2009:1; Weitz, 2003:8;
Gellately & Kiernan, 2003:3). While ethno-religious hostility is the worst form of violence in human history that
completely eliminates opponents/enemies (Midlarsky 2005:75), there is a systematic genocide against the MHF
groups of Nigeria. The groups are completely gripped in fear, uncertainty and pessimism, especially from the North
where hate, gruesome killings, guerilla war, and elimination have been declared and normalized against them;
thousands of children and women are being un-naturally turned orphans and widows; properties/investments worth
billions of Naira being destroyed,; they no longer travel around Nigeria freely as they are murdered/hacked to death
with impunity; they live in a state of hate, negative stereo-typing, and blame the victim game (Hassan, 2015:40).
Properties are being lost, and apart from the use of local weapons, there are increased use of sophisticated weapons
artillery guns, bazookas, and the deployment and use of ex-soldiers as fighters by the ethno-religious groups
against the MHF (Arowosegbe, 2016:7-8); between 1999 and 2015, over 5,500 Hausa-Fulanis were killed by the
Odua Peoples‘ Congress (OPC) and local vigilantes members in Oyo and Saki; within the same time, and about
12,000 Fulani pastoralists were killed by the OPC members in ―Ajegunle, Eruwa, Gaa Kondo, Igbo–Ora, Ijebu
Ode, Imeko, Ikenne, Iseyin, Mushin, Owode Egba, Oyo town, Saki, Sagamu, Sango–Ota, Waasinmi and Yewa‖ in
South-Western Nigeria (Arowosegbe, 2016:15).
There is a conspiracy of psychological genocide among the non-Muslims and the Nigerian Christian dominated
Media, especially the Southern based; some elements in the conventional security agencies are being used to
destroy/distort evidences and exhibits, frustrate cases/thwart investigations/complaints by the victims; nothing is
being done to the perpetrators of the genocide as most of the times, governments deliberately or otherwise aid and
abet genocide (Totten & Parsons, 2009:3).
This target groups which constitutes over 29% and 50% of Nigeria‘s ethno-religious groups composition are being
un-naturally and violently killed, scapegoated, despised, resented, stereo-typed, laced and mocked at in an
increasing and escalating rate (Mohammed, 2018:118, 119, 132).
Journal of Business and Social Review in Emerging Economies Vol. 5, No 2, December2019
3. Literature Review
The term genocide is derived from two Greek and Latin languages words - ‗Genos‘ meaning ‗race‘ or ‗tribe‘, and
‗cide‘ meaning ‗killing‘ respectively and both were coined by Raphael Lemkin (Card & Marsoobian, 2007:13, 15-
16; Mayersen, 2016:3, 5-6). Genocide is difficult and controversial to define because of relativities, variables and
dynamism involved in it; it changes as policies/means of destruction change in order to fit dynamic/evolving
environments and conditions (Alvarez, 2010:7-9; Gallagher, 2013; Alvarez, 2010; Totten & Parsons, 2009:3-4;
Jones, 2011:13; Shaw, 2015:4). Ervin Staub (as cited in Newman and Erber, 2002:13) has observed and asked why
a government or group turns against another and maintained that it has to do with difficult life conditions, harsh
economic situations, political conflicts, violence and war, decline in power/prestige and social disorganization.
For that, McGarry & O‘leary (1993:6-7) see genocide as systematic mass killing and or calculated destruction of a
group, and the conditions essential for its survival. This destruction can be through social, economic, biological.
Genocide is seen as the worst form of crime against humanity being ―the ultimate, supreme crime, and the crime of
all crimes‖ (Alvarez, 2010:1). For Gallagher (2013:1), genocide is simply ―the destruction of a group‖, adding that
prevention of genocide is apart from the ‗humanity perspective‘, necessary when national interests are threatened.
The UN Convention (Article II) defines genocide as:
Any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group.
Similarly, Article III provides punishable acts as: ―genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public
incitement to commit genocide; attempt to commit genocide; complicity in genocide‖.
Jones (2011:569-571) identifies warning signs/indicators of impending genocide as: past history of genocide and
inter-communal conflicts; mobilization along lines of communal cleavages; hate propaganda; unjust discriminatory
legislation and related measures; severe systematic state repression. Similarly, perpetrators of genocide come from
all parts and ranks of a society professionals, armed forces, political and business classes, and ordinary citizens
(Alvarez, 2010:103). Genocide is therefore, a collaborative enterprise and there are several causes/reasons why
individuals participate/engage in genocide as ―individual/personal and group‘s history and life experiences,
temperament and character, belief system, career and job, and family and community members‖ (Alvarez,
2010:105). In the same vein, Campbell (2001:11) laments that genocide is a trans-sovereign problem that threatens
the entire world and has overpowered the capability of states and organisations to contain it and punish the
perpetrators. Genocide has two phases: the destruction of the national pattern of the target group; and the
imposition of the national pattern of the genocidaire (Lemkin, 2005:79).
Genocide has common ideological elements as: the notions of past victimization belief of and historical suffering;
dehumanization viewing and treating self as more human and superior, and others as different, inferior or less
human; scapegoating the transfer of blame, woos and misdeeds unto others, rather than self in order to justify
casting out killing the other(s); absolutist worldview strong belief in un-compromise and non-accommodation of
others as characterized by fundamentalist of ethnic nationalism and religious faith; and Utopianism the
ideology/attempt to purify, create, recreate a perfect/ideal society or community based on politics, ethnicity,
religion, sectionalism (Alvarez, 2010:62-73; Midlarsky, 2005:74; Dutton, 2007:153).
Foundational to that, Mann (2005) has identified 9 types/categories of genocide perpetrators as: the ideological
perpetrators the social elites who believe in, sell, promote and justify the goals; bigoted perpetrators the
unimaginative and ordinary elements who join in the circumstances and become motivated to kill/harm others;
violent perpetrators individuals who like and enjoy violence and are excited to execute their violent craves;
careerist perpetrators those who participate in genocide to explore the chances and advance their
careers/opportunities for jobs, power; disciplined perpetrators the military, police, among others who work with
and are confined to state institutions with loyalty/order/command-obey structures irrespective of the meaning or
implications of such orders /commands; comradely perpetrators those related to disciplined perpetrators, who
participate in genocide on comradeship and spirit de corps basis with their sister institutions in solidarity;
Journal of Business and Social Review in Emerging Economies Vol. 5, No 2, December 2019
bureaucratic perpetrators (desk-murderers) who through the state machinery and institutions ignore the sufferings,
killings, close eyes on acts of the other perpetrators and authoritatively disregard the implications of such actions;
materialists (profiteer) perpetrators those who are stimulated to partake by material interests - greed, booty,
political/economic/religious/traditional powers; fearful perpetrators those who are forced by
situations/circumstances to participate not because they believe in or like doing so, but for fear of consequences for
refusal to participate in the genocide.
In the same vein, Okoya (2013:52-101), identifies causes of genocide as:
demographic factors, resource scarcity, and greed; threat and vulnerability; fear; in-group and
out-group identity; narcissism; groupthink, hate processes and dehumanization of ‗other‘;
manipulation and loyalty to authority; the human agency and collective evil; the nation-state;
imperialism, colonialism, and modernity; ideological influences; power politics and genocide
denial; humiliation; and race, racism, and crime.
Similarly, Sternberg (2003) maintains that hate is the main cause for many genocidal killings around the world and
can also be carried out through diseases, malnutrition, starvation, forced sterilization, dislocation, displacement and
rape (Alvarez, 2010:7 & 12). Hence, it involves both direct and indirect violence. Milgram (1960: xi) observes that
even individuals who do not believe/like violence against humanity can be easily involved in killing others when
authorities or influential others direct/order them to do so. However, for Smith (2007:109), it is self-deception that
stimulates and misleads individuals to human slaughter, especially for aching consciences, but despite partaking in
such inhuman actions, individuals delude themselves by still believing they are ‗compassionate, moral and pious‘.
This vivid description can be related to Nigerians who despite killing and leashing terror on others, still go to
worship centres claiming to be godly and following the virtues of their religions.
With respect to humankinds and their inherent natural character, Glover (1999:33) observes that ―deep in human
psychology, there are urges to humiliate, torment, wound and kill people‖, and this affirms Sigmund Freud (cited in
Smith, 2007:61) who also maintains that ―men are not gentle, friendly creatures wishing for love, who simply
defend themselves if they are attacked, but that a powerful measure of desire for aggression has to be reckoned as
part of their instinctual endowment‖. These reveal not only true character of humans, but also their fervent desire to
leash wickedness/cruelty on others.
The Duplex theory of hate identifies three triangular components of hate as: the negations of intimacy,
commitment, and passion (Sternberg, 2003). Where and whenever these three occur, what results is not only
violence, but also genocide against any target groups. Violence itself is caused by shame, ridicule, humiliation and
disrespect (Gilligan, 1996:110). For that, where genocide occurs or is likely to, its tendencies are increased if the
target group is seen as or appears to be related, sympathetic or supportive to the opposition/opponent/enemy
(Alvarez, 2010:37).
For Nigeria and Nigerians, they are afflicted by what Putnam (2007:144-149) describes as the ‗Constrict theory‘
which emphasizes that not only do heterogeneous settings increase mistrust among members, but also within the
groups and their members due to contact and or vulnerability to the larger and diverse settings. This is tied to
human interest in power and materialism and the fact that ―in any struggle for power and its spoils, there is a
usually thin line between one‘s moral position and one‘s concrete material interests‖ (Othman, 1984).
4. Methodology
This study used qualitative method in collection and the analysis of data. The study also used historical
documentation and design method to collect the data from secondary sources. The historical design and
documentation method enables a researcher to study and or search for facts from historically integrated and
substantiated records. The study the background and heterogeneity of the Nigerian state, ethno-religious rivalries
and conflicts which altogether boiled down to the genocide with theoretical framework built on Gain Strain theory.
The study also adopted the United Nations standard provisions and Articles on genocide, which defines and
specifies the various acts that constitute genocide. The study also analysed memoirs, press releases, and rejoinders
among others by the prominent Nigerian religious bodies - Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Jama‘atul
Nasril Islam (JNI), Nigeria Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), and National Christian Elders Forum
(NCEF) among others.
Journal of Business and Social Review in Emerging Economies Vol. 5, No 2, December2019
Other extensive and intensive literatures on genocide were also used for both quality and robustness of the data and
analysis of the study. Available literatures and studies are on ethno-religious conflicts and alleged genocidal
tendency against the Igbos of South-East Nigeria with non on the genocide against the MHF (Achebe, 2012:228;
Young & Isbell, 2000:33; Okoye, 2013; Okoye, 2014).
5. Background and History of the Hausa-Fulani, Muslims (HFM) and Islam in Nigeria
Nigeria is the result of the British colonial amalgamation of the two major areas of Niger River North and South.
The two were distinct in terms of geography, culture, religion, socio-political and economic settings, but were
joined to form united Nigeria on 1 January 1914. Consequent to this, hundreds of ethno-religious and geo-political
set ups were welded together into one country. Nwabueze (1993:21) notes that the heterogeneity of Nigeria is such
that there are over 300 groups with fundamental differences in attitude, outlook, character and ways of life, and
much more different than the English from Germans or French from the Italians. These differences and
complexities explain why Bourne (2015:ix) observes that ―anyone who claims to understand Nigeria is either
deluded, or a liar‖.
For centuries before advent of colonialism, Muslims from Central Sudan (later Northern Nigeria) with Kanuri,
Hausa and Fulani tribes characterized by Islamic scholarship and culture had been well established in trans-Sahara
trade (goods and slaves), arts and craftsmanship with presence and prominence in Timbuktu, Tripoli, Al-Quahira
(Cairo) among others (Levan & Utaka, 2018:20).
Similarly, there were also, before the 1804 Danfodio Jihad and later colonialism (from 1861), established Hausa
states since the thirteenth Century and had by then became popular and in much control of the areas around the
Central Sudan (Northern Nigeria), including the other multi-ethnic minorities and polities (Falola & Heaton, 2008).
Hausa then was the main language spoken in both official matters and lingua franca for the region. For centuries
before, and during colonialism, those Hausa states remained strategic in both commercial, socio-cultural and
scholarship linkages with the Maghreb, North Africa up to the Senegal Valley and the Far East of the Arabian
Peninsula (Mohammed, 2018: 18-20; Farrington, 1963).
The Kanem-Borno rulers were the first to accept and convert to Islam between the tenth and eleventh Century. The
Hausa Habe rulers also accepted Islam from around the fourteenth Century upward as interactions became
increasingly manifest and influential between the Borno Empire, Hausa states and their rulers, and the Maghreb,
North Africa, Middle East. The trade in the areas went simultaneously with the propagation of Islam, its values and
influence, acculturisation and cross-culturisation with the North African and the Arabs. Thus Islamic scholars have
gained and exercised much influence on the rulership in both the early Islamised Borno and the Hausa states that
followed. Borno itself was an Islamic Caliphate, rather than Empire for its ruler (the Mai) had received a ―Caliph‖
title from the Ottoman Empire around C1500 (Last in Levan & Utaka, 2018:20). In addition to highly developed
Islamic political system and Islamic scholarship (with specialization in the Holy Qur‘an and Islamic calligraphy),
Borno was the commercial centre/route and link for trans- Sahara trade just as Katsina and Kano also later became
centres (Mohammed, 2018:23; Last in Levan & Utaka, 2018:20-2; McCormick, 2010:438; Falola & Heaton,
2008:33). These states together with Borno then formed both centres and a network for trade in the Central Sudan
that linked the area up to Middle East. These explain the significant impacts and influence of Islam on the people,
geography, history, life, customs and traditions, statesmanship, political-culture, economy and sociology of the later
Northern Nigeria, comprising of Borno and other highly politically developed independent Hausa states of Kano,
Zaria, Katsina, Daura, Gobir, Zamfara (Levan & Utaka, 2018:21). However among all the states identified, Borno
has been the one with the oldest history of political evolution and development alongside Islamic scholarship. Last
in Levan and Utaka (2018:19) recalls and summarises that for over 2000 years, Northern Nigeria has been a centre
on the outer fringes of the Middle-East with various routes and linkages with people through the Sahara desert to
Egypt, Lake Chad, Phoenician Carthage and the Roman Empire. Additionally, by the 11 Century, Arabic has
become the formal language used for business, scholarship and communication with Islam as the dominant and
official religion in Kanem-Borno playing central role in politics, economy and scholarship.
On the other hand, different versions of stories on the origin and history of the Fulani and or their migration have
been advanced. The most popular is that which posits that the Fulanis trace their origin from North Africa (Kalu,
2008:34); they are a product of Middle Easterns from the family of Abraham who through migration in search of
pasture, moved and intermarried with the African Negroes, Egyptians, Hindus and Berbers, North Africa and the
Sudan (Junaidu, 1957; Last, 1967; Johnston 1967). However, in the recent, historians and historical developments
Journal of Business and Social Review in Emerging Economies Vol. 5, No 2, December 2019
have provided another version that the Fulanis are originally the people of Africa, and did not migrate from
anywhere. The population of Fulanis in Nigeria is a subject of controversy for they are dispersed and hardly
become largely concentrated in one large area, but in small settlements and migrating from one vegetative area to
another in search of good pasture, however, there are also substantial and increasing number of those who are
adapting sedentary life and farming/cattle rearing (Mohammed & Aisha, 2018:10-13). With that, Okello,
Majekodunmi, Malala, Welburn and Smith (2014) provide that their population is over 12 million. Similarly, the
largest number of the Fulanis are Muslims. There are, however Christians and traditional religionist among them
(Mohammed & Aisha, 2018:10-13; Johnston, 1967; Last, 1967).
Shiek Usman bn Fodio (1754-1817) was the most popular Jihadist and Islamic scholar/preacher in the history of the
Central Sudan, West Africa and Africa South of Sahara. He was from a renowned Toronkawa Fulani clan and
Muslim who were vastly learned in Islamic scholarship with over 30 eminent scholars among his kinsmen (Last in
Levan & Utaka, 2018:21). Usman bn fodio, whose Jihad in Hausaland commenced in 1804 established the most
significant and historic Islamic Caliphate in the Central Sudan serially ranked after the Khulafaur-Rasheedun, the
Banu Umayyad Dynasty, Abbasid Caliphate, and the Ottoman Empire respectively (Mohammed & Aisha,
2018:12). The 1804 Jihad revived and further strengthened the significance and influence of Islam on the Central
Sudan, which till date continues to impact on political economy, geography, ethno-religious, and socio-societal set
up of not only the Northern part of and Nigeria, but around the Lake Chad, parts of the Sahel (Niger and Mali) and
Central Africa (Cameroon and the Central African Republic, CAR). According to Okello et al. (2014:2) and
Nwabara (1963:231-242), the Fulanis, who together with the Hausas, are at the central of controversy in Nigerian
affairs and multi-dimensioned controversy, have a long and prominent association with politics, Islamic scholarship
and wealth/mercantilism. Thus after the commencement of the Jihad in 1804 and the Eastern and Western capitals
at Sokoto and Gwandu, Mohammed and Aisha (2018:12) note that the influence of the Fulani Islamic scholarship
strengthened Islam in many parts of present Nigeria, including the southern part, as well as neighbouring states on
the West and Central Africa.
The Europeans first came to what later in 1914 became Northern Nigeria in the middle of the sixteenth Century for
mercantile and Christian religious missions (Last in Levan & Utaka, 2018:19). Forceful conquest of the areas began
with the occupation of Lagos in 1861. By 1899, the British colonialists had established their rule and dominance in
the Northern part of the Nigeria and on 1 January 1900, the British hoisted the Union Jack (British flag) at Lokoja,
geographically located at the centre of Nigeria (Fafunwa, 1991:101). The Sokoto Caliphate which had reigned from
1804 with several Muslim Emirates under it was defeated at the Giginya Battle outside the Sokoto fortified walls on
15 March 1903. The British thereafter established indirect rule, but preserved both the Islamic religion and the
Sharia system (except for the criminal aspect dealing with Hudud/Quisas). The Colonialists actually understood the
advanced Northern Islamic/Caliphal system in relation to their earlier experiences in Egypt and India. It was
because of the high level of religious, political and socio-cultural settings and organization of the Emirates under
the Sokoto Caliphate that the colonialists not only preserved the rule, but also trusted and worked more or less
harmoniously with the Northern MHF during the Colonial/indirect rule period that lasted until independence. The
North was also fortunate to be the geographically largest, most populous, and richest in terms of solid minerals
compared to the southern (Eastern and Western) regions of the Nigeria. The latter, unlike the former, are smaller in
terms of both geography, population and less endowed with material resources, apart from oil (Mohammed,
2018:95-97; Mohammed & Aisha, 2018:16).
Essentially, while Islamic religion reached Northern Nigeria over a millennia ago from the Middle East through the
North Africa/Maghreb countries, Christianity was brought in by the colonialist/missionaries. Although history has
shown the presence of the Portuguese in the areas of present Nigeria from around 1471, Christianity as a religion
was brought in and spread by the Missionaries at about the same time with colonial conquest and occupation of the
areas around river Niger (Shehu & Buba, 2016:213). Hence, Nigeria has a predominance of Islam and Christianity
having reached the area as a result of trans-Sahara and trans-Atlantic contacts, trades, and evangelism. The two
religions form the basis of substantial character of the Nigerian state and its main regions (North and South), which
partly explains disharmonies in Nigeria. Noting the religious/regional disharmonies in Nigeria, Huntington (as cited
in Roskin, 2007:531) describes Nigeria as a ‗cleft country‘ that is divided between Islam and Christianity and
portraying ‗inter-civilisational disunity‘.
Related to that, about 80% of Nigerians belong to the two prominent religions (Mooney, Knox & Schacht,
2002:187 & 193). However, there exists a great and probably an un-ending controversy on the accurate percentage
Journal of Business and Social Review in Emerging Economies Vol. 5, No 2, December2019
of Muslims and Christians in Nigeria with varying and controversial figures provided as: Muslims 50.5%,
Christians 48.2% (Agbiboa, 2013:19) and Muslims 50%, Christians 40% (Trinscizki, 2016:54). Alternatively and in
the absence of accurate figures, the percentage of Muslims and Christians can be assumed to be more or less nearly
equal (Okoro, 2017:468). For the Northern region, although there are non-Muslim, especially among the minority
tribes, about 75% of its total population are Muslims (Babalola, 2019:51).
5.1 Colonial Policy and Legacy
Being a colonial state, Akindola and Ehinomen (2017) and (Unegbu, 2003) have maintained that Nigeria is not only
the result of colonial making, but still carrying the burden of difficult historical legacies of colonialism. The Hausa-
Fulani are generally considered to have been preferred by the British colonialists in terms of granting the north
indirect rule, preservation of their religion (Islam) and traditional system, and being the colonialists‘ lieutenants or
rather, agents of the colonialists (Turaki, 1993, Kukah, 1993; Ajayi, 2009; Okoye, 2013; Ochonu, 2008; Yahaya,
2016). However, as maintained by Mohammed and Aisha (2018:8 & 93), Kalu (2008:34) and Mohammed
(2018:134), the preference for the MHF by the British had to do with their precolonial established and developed
socio-political, economic and ethno-cultural advancements in comparison to the others from both the others. Just
like in India, the British colonialists had (during the colonial conquest) found a people with such an organized and
developed socio-political, economic and religious system and settings. Thus the legacy of Hausa-Fulani prominence
in both colonial and post-colonial era.
6. From Ethno-Religious/Regional Rivalry and Conflict to Systematic Genocide
From the 1914 amalgamation, the 1939 division of three protectorates of North, East and West, to the enactment of
the federal system of government in 1954 and the subsequent events, Nigeria has been engulfed in forms of
rivalries (Shehu, Othman & Osman, 2017; Elazar, 1987:77; Kalu, 2008:65, 68, 78). These have however, later
reached their peak and resulted in violence, relative injustice, and to some extent disaffection from the Nigerian
state. It is at that critical stage that systematic genocides evolved against the MHF who are made the scapegoats of
Nigeria‘s failure to reach the Promised Land. Thus, Shehu et al. (2017) maintain that the rivalry is ‗old and
creeping‘ also identify some of the dimensions rivalries as ethno-religious, economic, regional, and political and
In addition, ethno-religious/regional conflicts have become a dominant feature of the Nigerian state, especially
from the 1980s to date. Alubo (2006:9) provided that between May, 1999 and 2004 there have been more than 89
recorded cases of ethno-religious related conflicts that were all violent and fatal. More so, the largest number of
such conflicts occurred in the Northern states of Kano, Benue, Katsina, Borno, Adamawa, Plateau, Nassarawa,
Kaduna, Taraba and Kogi states. For the same conflicts, Aliyu and Shehu (2015:75-76) identify some of the major
ones which have been recurring since their first occurrences as those of Southern Kaduna, Jos, Tafawa-Balewa,
Bauchi (Yelwa), Kaduna, Taraba (Nigeria Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, NSCIA, 2018:1). There have also
been others related as those of Sagamu in Ogun State between the Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani and reprisals
(1999); bloody clash between Muslim and Christian over Sharia implementation in Kaduna (2000) and reprisals in
Eastern Nigeria; numerous clashes between OPC militants and Hausa/Fulani in Ajegunle, Lagos State; reprisal
attacks to Jos September 2001 killings in Eastern Nigeria; the Yelwan Shendam conflict with over 650 deaths;
ethno-religious conflict between OPC and Muslim community over building the Ogun Shrine in a Muslim praying
ground in Ipakodo, Lagos State (2005) among others (Halliru, 2012-216). Such conflicts and killings have not only
continued since the early 1980s, and from 1999 respectively, but also escalated in the recent years due several
factors identified below in this study.
On the other hand, with about 170 million people killed in genocides and mass murder around the world between
the years 1900 and 1987 as Rummel (1994) laments, subsequent genocides have proved that the world is
increasingly challenged by threats of and continuity of genocides against groups. The lives and fate of the MHF are
put under the same threat. Those have large been due to their majority population in Nigeria, popularity in political
power, and dominant role in national politics and being Muslims. In the recent, the groups have come under
increasing oral and physical attacks, with ethno-religious motives of hatred, ethno-religious nationalism, which
have increasingly become genocidal as manifested in various hate speeches, violent actions and reactions which
have consistently been enveloped in incessant attacks on the lives and properties of the group in many parts of
Nigeria. Such attacks have become a systematic genocide agenda in which the mass killings, carnages and hate
have measured up to both national and international standards of genocide which have also been admitted by
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Nigerian Army (Mohammed & Aisha, 2018:6, 104; Daily Trust, July 3, 2017, pp.1 & 53, March 2 & 3, 2018. pp.4
& 6).
7. The Systematic Genocide against the Hausa-Fulani and Muslims (HFM) Groups in Nigeria
Genocide does not only mean or limited to instant destruction of a group through mass killings, but also through
non-violent means and actions aimed at destroying the basis (economic, educational, psychological, socio-cultural,
ethno-religious, geo-physical among others) of life of the group; and then annihilating it (Lemkin, 2005:46).
According to Alvarez (2010:40), with exposure to the horrors of war, violence and then genocide, ―people become
desensitized to the realities of the violence; inhumanity becomes all too common and to all human. That which once
seemed extreme and unimaginable becomes routine and almost normal‖. This explains why violence and other
genocidal acts occur and escalate in Nigeria. The genocide execution against the MHF is both multi-dimensioned
and systematic and qualifies for the UN standard definition and classification of genocidal acts. These include
deliberate exclusions, killings, mental/psychological harm/manipulation and subjection to being (apologetic,
inferior, guilt concise, shame, scapegoating). Between 1980 and 2019, there occurred hundreds of mass killings of
the MHF in various parts of Nigeria with the highest number in Middle Belt/Central Nigeria; over 10 different fatal
clashes between the Hausa-Fulani and Yorubas in Lagos from 1999 to date; the Tafawa Balewa crises (1991, 1995,
2001 and 2011) in which tens of thousands of all the MHF were forced out and taking refuge in other towns and
cities while all their houses, the 45 daily and 3 Friday prayer mosques were destroyed, and from 2011 to date) not a
single Muslims lives in Tafawa Balewa - a town originally established by the MHF over a century ago (Mohammed
& Aisha, 2018:17); the MHF in many parts of the Plateau, especially Riyom, Jos North and Barikin-Ladi have
known no peace from 2001 to date with thousands dead, their families/communities broken and displaced,
businesses crippled; in Yelwan Shendam, as a result of the 2005 ethno-religious crisis in which over 650 were
killed; the MHF in many parts of Taraba state have been under siege, incessant and multi-faceted attacks by non-
Muslims, as they with their properties and farm lands worth billions of Naira are being killed and
destroyed/confiscated by the so called indigenous non-Muslims ethno-religionists; in 2017, there was the Mambilla
genocide against the Fulanis who were attacked without any prior form of contention or disagreement and over 800
of them were killed, hundreds of their animals hacked to death, their settlements completely razed while the
perpetrators celebrated with impunity (Saidu, Rasheed, Zakuan and Yusoff, 2019); and the serial attacks which
follow, but remain unreported or given little publicity due to media conspiracy which is part of the grand genocide.;
the enactment of Anti-Grazing/Night Grazing Laws in Benue, Taraba and Ekiti States which tactically deprived the
Fulani (largely Muslims) the rights to free movement and property, and dispossessed them of their legitimate
properties and means of livelihood; the multitude killings and carnages in other parts of the country Sabo and Ile-
Ife, Osun state, 2017).
There are deliberate orchestration of violence and provocation against this group to instill provocation and reprisal
in order to execute the systematic genocide, and then blame the victim (Hassan, 2015:40), while the atrocities
committed against the group are hidden. There is also collaborative conspiracy with the Media to close eye on the
genocide on one hand, but overblow any attempt/move by the group to counter such and or assert their rights. There
is also a brazen indecision by some Nigerian authorities to contain the atrocities against the group as characterized
by bureaucratic perpetration of the genocide. These have altogether in addition to the genocide against the
particular group, resulted in refuges problem, socio-economic dislocation and disorder, increased threat to national
security and stability.
7.1 Calumny, Manipulation of History and Historiography
The genocide has been preceded by and now goes simultaneously with campaigns of calumny, manipulation and
change of historiography of Northern Nigeria, especially the Middle Belt as the MHF image, character, historical
records and materials, are being rejected, damaged and tattered in museums and before other Nigerians and before
the world through both ethno-religious nationalism and writings (Suleiman, 2015; Okoye, 2014; Kukah, 1991;
Okoye, 2013; Turaki, 1993; Ochonu, 2008).
With the ethno-nationalist historiography, some sections of Nigeria and Nigerians, especially the Middle Belt, and
some ethno-religious nationalist are determined to change the course of history in order to re-define MHF in order
to further give the bad name and image before the non-Muslims and the World (Suleiman, 2015: 112-115, 127,
183-184, 217; Mohammed & Aisha, 2018: 90-96). This has reached an extent where visitors (non-Muslims) to the
Museum in Jos reject (as written in the Guest book) ‗Islamic symbolism‘ and resist archiving materials associated
with MHF. A reactionary historiography has been schemed and being written by both amateur historians and ethno-
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religionists in order to not only change the course of history, but create new stories and narratives of the past slave
raid and trade, the Jihad and re-define the past relations of the MHF, and the non-Muslims (Mohammed & Aisha,
2018; Suleiman, 2012; Suleiman, 2015; Blench, 2011). The desperation to re-write this history has been lamented
by Suleiman (2015:24, 216) and Mohammed & Aisha (2018:94-95) pointing out that even journalists, engineers
and civil servants have become involved the reactionary historiography, and ethno-religious/nationalist re-writing
of such history.
7.2 Pilot Indigene/Settler Conflicts
Nearly all endeavours of Nigerians with the ‗others‘ (religions, regions, groups) are associated with and subjected
to indigene/settler which has resulted in increased hatred, domination, instabilities and superiority/inferiority
complex among Nigerians (Aliyu & Shehu, 2015:74:75). Indigeneship has become a generator and trigger of
violence in most parts of Nigeria as Fourchard (2015:54) maintains, and it has particularly been one of the pilots of
the genocide against the HFM groups. Although not peculiar to the MHF alone, indigeneship has through the
history to this genocide level, hit them more than any other group in Nigeria having been living for centuries in
other lands in search of pasture, and engaged in trade and religious propagation.
Tied to the indigeneship is the deliberate social exclusion and denial to the MHF of even the basic rights entitled to
all citizens of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in most instances such as establishment of worship centres,
especially in the South Eastern part of Nigeria with predominantly Christian population, exclusion from public
employment opportunities even in their indigenous states such as Plateau, Taraba and Benue; and exclusion from
basic and social services; denial of indigeneship certificates, rights and non-recognition as bonafide citizens.
7.3 Scapegoating against the Hausa-Fulani and Muslims (HFM) on the Dilemma and Problems of
Scapegoating, which Alvarez (2010:68) describes as the ―practice of blaming individuals and groups for the
misfortunes befalling a society or community‖, has been a major element that is being used in executing the
genocide against the MHF. This is in line with Jones (2011:569) submission that ―When the material base of
peoples‘ lives is thrown into question, they are prone to seek scapegoats among minorities (or majorities); to heed
to an extremist political message; and to be lured by opportunities to loot, pillage, and supervene‖.
Similarly, when a society, group or community finds itself consumed into its own woos, it is maintained by
Douglas (1995:41), that due to ignorance of true causes of their suffering, such people look for explanations to why
such and in the process, if true reasons are hidden or not found, explanations that would sound and look appealing
to the people have to be given, which result in violence against scapegoats. Hence, the HFM who are more
prominent and dominant among the ethno-religious groups are put to blame, being cast out and killed in order to
arrive at an appealing and emotional cause of failures by the Nigerian state, and the other groups even where there
are no correlations with that. The scapegoating has two main dimension - national and regional. The national
dimension is between MHF, and the other Nigerian groups; while the regional has to do with the Northern Nigerian
minority groups. In either, the MHF are the orchestrated scapegoats for failures. Naturally, governments, groups,
leaders and individuals avoid taking responsibility of failures, but rather, put the blame on others (Alvarez,
2010:69; Douglas, 1995:41; Joseph & Randall, 2009). Many, particularly the Southerners, including their elites,
hold the belief that the North (MHF) is the power ‗dominating region‘ (Lenshie & Akipu, 2014; Kukah & Falola,
1996:49-50; Ajayi, 2009; Okoye, 20013; Ajayi, 2009; Kukah & Falola, 1996; Osaghae, 1998; Mohammed, 2018;
Paden, 1986; Clark, 1991). Therefore, what Alvarez (2010:68-70) identifies as the sins and misdeeds by Nigeria
and Nigerians through the years 1914 to date, are shouldered on the MHF groups in order to cast out, kill and
eliminate them. The group now viewed and treated as different and inferior with despise, stereotype and prejudice.
This has also resulted against the group in what Erik Erikson (as cited in Stevens 2004:43) and Alvarez (2010:66)
describe as pseudospeciation, i.e., the mentality of considering oneself or group as the superior or rightly/really
humans, and that other humans, especially those you do not like are inferior, or less human.
7.4 Brazen Lies, Fallacies and Conspiracies against Islam and the Hausa-Fulani and Muslims (HFM)
Out of ignorance, misconception and in the attempts to deliberately discredit the target group and Islam, numerous
submissions full of conspiracies, fallacies and concocted lies are forwarded. For instance, Eme (2012:191-203),
Ikegbu (2010:119-126) portray the clamour and implementation of Sharia for the Muslims as an agenda for
imposition of Islamic legal system and to Islamise Nigeria (Othman, Osman and Mohammed 2019:91), and link
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Boko Haram to the Muslims/Northern Nigeria generally. Others mischievously trace the Dan Fodio Jihad attempts
and maintain that the MHF see nothing good in anything/everyone except themselves as Lenshie & Akipu (2014)
portray the MHF as those who think ―nothing was good for the north which is not Muslim dominated‖.
Kukah and Falola (1996:2) present one of the misleading narratives stating that whereas both Islam and Christianity
aim at winning more converts, unlike Christianity and Christians in Nigeria, Islam and Nigerian Muslims (the
powerful Islamic elites) are a political force, ambitious and desirous to make Nigeria an Islamic state. Similarly,
Falola (1999: 169-170) also alleges that Muslims tried to make Abuja an ‗Islamic city‘ with construction of
mosques in strategic locations, and mounted some designs and structures according to Islamic architectural values,
in addition to hanging on to power in order to further promote Islam in Nigeria. In the same vein Kukah and Falola
(1996:195) tactically allege that violence is instituted in Islam and its propagation, and Muslims have adopted it
unlike the Christians and Christianity which teaches love and persuasion.
Further to that, Okoye (3013:142) alleges that Muslims do ‗exclusionary ideological stance‘ and further asks the
position of Christianity on such; and then answers herself that they do not, as the Muslims exclude Christians
because of Sharia. One then wonders whether the Christians should be included in the implementation of Sharia or
be allowed to practice their own (Chriistian) faith just as the Muslims want Sharia for themselves only. To her, it is
the Muslim extremists who exclude Christians because of Sharia, but one then questions if ―excluding the
Christians from Sharia issues and implementation is justice or injustice to them?‖ This is because they neither
belong to Islam nor like the Sharia.
7.5 The Use and Manipulation of the Social Media
The social media has throughout the world become a means used to spread propaganda, rumours, gossips, graffiti,
and hate political and religious speeches among others (Jones, 2011:570). For Nigeria, numerous texts, video and
audio clips, photographs from prominent religious clerics and ethno-regional leaders and elites are viral, calling on
and inciting their congregations and kinsmen to violence against the Fulanis, the HFM just as hate speeches have
become normalized among Nigerians (Mohammed & Aisha 2018:102; Osaghae 2017:50; Ezeibe & Ikeanyibe
2017; Mohammed & Aisha, 2018:104; Daily Trust, 8 January 2018, pp. 1 & 8; Gambari, Agwai, Ibrahim, Jega,
Kwaja, Fesse, Oyebode & Yau in Daily Trust 9 January 2018, pp. 10-11).
7.6 Given the Groups Bad Name, Publicity, and Blame the Victim Agenda
MHF, who are the actual victims of the genocide are tagged as ―the perpetrators‘ who ‗are intent to cleanse the
north of Christians, the Igbos and other non-Muslims through the exclusionary ideology of imposition of Sharia law
to force assimilation or extermination‖ as refutably asserted by Okoye (2014: xvi-xvii). As such, they have become
not only a subject of ridicule, but also pushed into the game of ‗blame the victims‘ by the Christians and others who
hide under the banner in executing the genocide, and thereupon blame the victims, especially in the North (Hassan,
2015:40). The blame is tactically put on the victims using the numerous, but biased media outfits and influence,
some state apparatus, propaganda, re-orchestration of such violence and conflicts, and killing and maiming them
(Mohammed & Aisha, 2018). On a particular note, it has been observed contrary to Okoye‘s alleged submissions
that the Igbos in particular, have been falsely using the alleged genocide against them as a propaganda aimed at
garnering local, international and ethno-religious sympathy and appeal for political, material and other motives
(David, 2018:27).
8. The Perpetrators in Action
There are several perpetrators of this systematic genocide some disgruntled members of the public service (retired
and serving), the private individuals as well as from the general public. While some of these perpetrators work for
the public and are paid from the public treasury, they are involved in as bureaucratic and working together with the
all other perpetrators as identified by Mann (2005). The case of Mambilla genocide against the over 800 Fulanis has
proved to the world that some Nigerian state authorities are involved in as bureaucratic (desk-murderers), the
ideological, bigoted, violent (the killers/destroyers), careerist, disciplined, comradely, materialists (profiteer), and
fearful perpetrators. The identified perpetrators include politicians, security agencies who leak official intelligence,
those who physically kill/destroy, beneficiaries in material and career forms, and those who involuntarily
participate for fear of being attacked if they refuse to participate in the genocide. Additionally, other common
citizens can be and are also involved in genocide as Milgram (1960:6) observes that ―ordinary people, simply doing
their jobs, without any particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terrible destructive process‖. Many
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of the Nigerian state authorities are not living up to their leadership responsibilities which entails responses to
changes (Chow, Salleh & Ismail, 2017).
A clear case involving collaboration of these perpetrators is that of Taraba state government in a letter dated 8
September 2017, the then Taraba State Attorney General and Commissioner of Justice, Mr. Yusufu N. Akirikwen
directed the state Police Commissioner to within 24 hours unconditionally release all the suspects earlier arrested
(in connection with the Mambilla genocide) by the Nigerian Army and handed over to the State Police Command.
All the suspects were instantly released. This was despite the fact that the survivors of the Mambillla genocide
identified and named most of the suspects as those who killed and destroyed their properties and the Nigerian Army
had instantly and formally alerted the Nigerian Federal Government of the act as genocide that was worse than the
Boko Haram atrocities.
In a related incidence, a member of the Nigerian Parliament had before the National Assembly informed the world
that some influential people, including politicians were involved in the perpetration of such acts against the Plateau
people, including purchase and importation of arms into Nigeria from Israel, establishment of training camps which
are used to train ethno-religious militias in certain locations and states across Nigeria, and financing the entire
actions. The parliamentarian offered to make himself available to Nigerian authorities and to prove (with
documents), but nothing was done by the authorities; in Benue state, the state government was found to have been
involved in establishing illegal training camps, training and sponsoring ethno-religious militias who kill and
torment people under banner of Fulani-herdsmenfarmers conflict. In all these and others, nothing was done by the
Federal government; not a single influential perpetrator was arrested, prosecuted and punished accordingly. Rather
than take necessary actions, what happened in some states is ignoring such facts and then continuous persecution,
attacks, exclusion and displacement of the MHF, especially in Taraba and Benue states, where the fate of the
Muslims is left into the hands of the Christian dominated/biased and overtly anti- MHF states governments, and the
CAN which is the major covert influencer of most public policies making in those states. Despite the secular
provisions in the Nigerian Constitution, CAN is covertly influencing nearly all decisions, appointments, resource
allocations among others in these state. This, it does deliberately and particularly to cast out the MHF. It was
through that medium that CAN influenced and fuelled the unconstitutional and use of both naked and manipulated
constitutional powers by the Benue, Taraba and Ekiti States governments to enact the unpopular Anti-Grazing and
Anti-Night Grazing Laws (Mohammed & Aisha, 2018:6, 70, 82, 83, 85 & 106). This was done to schematically and
completely exclude Fulanis from these states since they could not live where their cattle cannot graze around. The
other non-Hausa-Fulani, but indigenous Muslims of those states also have their gory stories and experience to tell.
The Nigerian state authorities are fully aware and have acknowledged the problem, while there are intelligence
reports and confessional statements from arrested individuals and submissions by citizens, including
parliamentarians; the perpetrators continue to execute the genocide with impunity, resistance and shield from
arrests; the other ethno-religious groups and bodies equally engage in issuance of press statements, rejoinders,
memos which altogether incite their members, promote hate speeches and texts, thereby facilitating the genocide
(Daily Trust, July 23, 25 & 26, 2017 pp.3 & 17, 11, 4, 42; CAN Press Statement, January 16, 2018; SCIA Press
Releases, January 30, 2018, p.1-8 & April 3, 2019, p.4; NCEF, 2018 pp.1-6).
9. The Génocidaires and their Targets
Relying on the UN definition/description of genocide and Alvarez‘s identification of the perpetrators of genocide,
Jones (2011:570) relates that genocidaires are identified by their words and deeds, and they are then challenged
consequently. The MHF are the main target of the genocide and it is the direct consequence of killing, exclusions,
intimidations, blame, giving bad name and publicity and discriminating against them wherever opportunity avails
irrespective of their constitutional/natural rights as humans and citizens of Nigeria. The genocidaires comprise of
some elements of Christians (Northern Christian minorities) and their Southern counterparts, the other southern
based ethnic groups and their apologists, politicians, public servant (retired and serving). The perpetrators have
succeeded in inculcating wrong notions of hatred, despise, resentment, disaffection and prejudices. These are in
addition to successfully scheming frame up of the MHF as the scapegoats of Nigeria‘s failure. Similarly, because of
the close affinity between ethnicity and religion as Yinger (1994) emphasizes, the perpetrators have also succeeded
in pitching many of the other ethno-religious groups together against the targets.
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10. The Way Forward
Having established the occurrence of systematic genocide against the Hausa-Fulani and Muslims of Nigeria, it is
imperative for the Nigerian state authorities to rise up to the challenge, apprehend all the culprits and prosecute
them accordingly and take other legal measures to stop the act. The possession (legal and illegal), proliferation and
use of arms among the Nigerian citizens should be strictly regulated and effectively monitored; the operation of
different groups (ethnic, religious, militia among others) and harassment of innocent Nigerian citizens by should all
be stopped; religious and social organisations should be enlightened to and preach peace, harmony, brotherhood.
The Federal Government of Nigeria (through appropriate avenues) should rise up to the challenge of enactment of
discriminatory, controversial and selective legislations which threaten the peaceful co-existence of Nigerians. The
rule of law should also be fully enforced on all Nigerians irrespective of whatever status, origin, religion or tribe.
11. Summary and Conclusion
No genocides occur overnight, but preceded by some clear indicators and only occur where the world, a state or
people close/turn their eyes or neglect such indicators and existing realities. With those, there is a systematic and
multi-dimensioned genocide being executed on both covert and overt ground against the MHF in Nigeria.
Evidences and measurement standards are available, robust and viral to prove this genocide against the target
group. The strategies being used are such that they are simultaneously executed having been preceded by rivalry
and conflicts. The role being played by some Nigerian state authorities is typical to bureaucratic perpetration of the
genocide and exactly what and how it had earlier occurred in other countries. Some elements/bureaucratic
perpetrators of the genocide within the Nigerian security agencies and other public services to cover up the
atrocities and thwart all efforts, destroy evidences towards proper investigations, prosecution and punishing the
culprits. With those, the targets are continuously being killed, economically crippled and impoverished, physically
displaced and psychologically traumatised.
All the perpetrators (their identities, whereabouts, and activities) in the genocide are known to the Nigerian state
authorities. There is a complicity between some Nigerian state officials (especially within the armed forces), CAN
and the other perpetrators to continue the systematic genocide in addition to instill Islamophobia, manufacture lies,
and destruction of the genocide evidences. The perpetrators are fully funded, harboured and public intelligence
reports are leaked to them. Their activities are covered up by their fellow culprits and strengthened by state
authority‘s negligence, inaction to prosecute those responsible. All past genocide records show that they started at
lowest levels, but neglected by the states and society after which they grew out of control and plunged states and
societies into savage, inhumanity and anarchy.
This study is limited to the general act of genocide against the HFM groups of Nigeria. Further studies can
investigate and reveal each of the issues raised in this study and conduct an in-depth investigation of the extent of
the genocide and the specificity of its systematic kind and nature.
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... The peculiar perils of Nigerian federalism have from pre-independence to date characterized and complicated it with several instances, occurrences and recurrencesoil rent dependent economy, difficult colonial burden of history and heritages, ethno-regional politics, recurrence of violence, rise of ethnic militias and separatist tendencies, and elites' competition and manipulation of state power and resources (Levan, 2013;Mohammed, et al, 2019). Added to that, Nigeria is a resource rent dependent federation with over dependence on oil which is explored from the Niger-Deltaan area already heated with minorities' suspicion, fear and resentment of the majority apart from resource conflict (Amusan, et. ...
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Objective: The objective is to make a comparative study of the Nigeria’s First Republic (1954-1966) and the post 1966 federalism. The two periods saw Nigeria practicing federalism with different power sharing and governmental components arrangements. The study is significant at this time of search for a viable federalism, incessant agitations for restructuring the Nigerian state, and increasing threats to her unity and cohesion over the federal arrangement. Methodology: The study used non-numerical, secondary and historically documented sources to collect data and also used the historical method and practical events in Nigeria’s journey of federalism to analyse the data. Result: In the First Republic, it was a fiscal federalism with greater regional autonomy and limited constitutional powers to the Central Government, while the post 1966 federalism had more and strategic powers constitutionally allocated to the Central Government. First Republic federalism was more disciplined in financial and residual matters and power with greater autonomy and competition between regions which greatly fostered development and accountability among them, with less constitutional frictions between the Central and Regions. Implication: The study fills an existing gap in the study of Nigeria’s federalism viz-a-viz more calls for restructuring and or true federalism, number of units and devolution of constitutional powers, corruption, slow and discouraged development, which result in over-reliance on statutory allocations from the Centre, and intensifies struggle for resource control, although it on the other hand controversially guarantees the unity of the Nigerian state.
... In the search for and adoption of viable systems, the most popular, especially in heterogeneous states and societies has been the worldwide adoption of federalism with decentralisation of powers, services and relative autonomy (Mohammed & Aisha, 2020;Othman & Osman, 2020;Makinde et al., 2016, p.306). Africa, the most ethnically diverse region in the world, is not left out in the search for and adoption of federalism, and Nigeria, with hundreds of ethnic groups, has the continent's largest of the ethnic groups and as such, the most ethnically antagonistic Saylor, 2016, p. 571;Mohammed et al., 2019b), which have, from pre-independence times, characterised the entity, and necessitated the adoption of federalism. When Nigeria gained its independence from its British colonial master, a federal system was chosen by the country. ...
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This article provides an overview of Nigerian federalism in relation to the imperatives and impediments of its practice, which it has been grappling with since the constitutional enactment of the system in October, 1954. This study utilized qualitative research method by way of analyzing historical archives and documents, including secondary data sources. Historical documentation method was used as the principal analysis tool in this study. The study found that federalism remains the most viable system for Nigeria based on the past and present experiences amongst the former Nigerian military regimes, politicians, British colonialists, nationalists and founding fathers of the Nigerian state. However, there has yet to be a nationally accepted arrangement to be used in operating the country's federal system. This is based on the heterogeneous nature and character of the Nigerian state. There are, however numerous impediments to the effective and efficient practice of federalism, including prolonged military rule, manipulation of religious differences and regional diversity, revenue and resource allocation politics and conflict, including poor intergovernmental relations. Thus, the search for a viable federal arrangement and its advancement continues to be explored.
Conference Paper
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The present fisheries management regime for shared fish stocks in the South China Sea is arguably fragmented, inadequate and ineffective as States bordering this semi-enclosed sea are still working in silos. Nevertheless, considering that all captured fish eventually need to be landed at port, the implementation of port State measures is seen as the most viable option to manage the said stocks sustainably. This paper aims to examine the prospect of establishing legally-binding regional cooperation to support the enforcement of port state measures for managing shared fish stocks in the South China Sea. It begins by providing the biological and migratory profiles of shared fish stocks in this regional maritime water. It then proceeds by examining the state of affairs of the current fisheries cooperation arrangement in implementing port State measures. Port State principles and measures prescribed in various international fisheries instruments, resolutions and conservation measures of regional fisheries management organization will be assessed. This approach is to generate a set of criteria of port States control regime for regional littoral States in South China Sea to refer to and employ when managing shared fish stocks. The discussions in this paper are also drawn on the lesson learnt from the port State control practices by individual States and regional fisheries organizations. This paper argues that the absence of legally binding regional agreement for implementing port state measures has been an obstacle in attaining the goal of sustainable conservation of shared fish stocks across their migratory range in the disputed waters.
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Conflicts are unhealthy competition for power, resources, and interests. By its very nature, conflicts are counterproductive. Indeed, the bases of conflicts in various parts of Africa; Particularly Nigeria, are closely related to their economic and political history. The festering areas of conflict ranges from resources control agitation at the Niger Delta Region, ethnic upheavals among rival tribes like the Tivs and Jukuns of the middle belt, The Ifes and Modakekes of the Southwest and nationals of Nigeria and Cameroon in the Bakassi region, to religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians in communities where people have co-existed for centuries. Women and Children suffer more the brunt of conflict relative to men. The issues faced during ethnic or racism conflict and civil disturbance include: violence, rape, hunger and disease, displacement etc. This paper is divided into several parts. It starts with Introduction, ethnicity in Nigeria, Ethnicity, Racism, worldwide Racial and ethnic struggles, Racism in Nigeria, major differences between ethnicity and Racism, followed by conclusion.
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The success or otherwise of any police system lies in the institutional structure upon which the institution is framed. As a federation, there is need to stress for devolution of power through restructuring for effective police system. This is necessary giving the heightened insecurity and centralise nature of the police institution in the country. The over centralisation of policing has made the institution to be control and influence at the discretion of the political head as provided in section 214 of the 1999 constitution as amended. On the other hand, giving the political immaturity in Nigeria, decentralising the national policing to give way to state police also has its own implication of over beardedness, possible political influence of the governors against oppositions, poor funding and formalisation of political thugs and party supports at the detriment of the security business. In view of these therefore, effective police system will be achieved through constitutional amendment of section 214 by removing the discretional command of the political heads which derogated. The institution should be place under justice system to be govern by rule of law.
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Objective: The main objectives of this paper are to explore the critical issues in the agitations/calls for restructuring Nigeria. A conceptual model is used and critical issues identified as influenced by many factors and interests with a special reflections on the background history, geography, heterogeneity and politics of the Nigerian state. Methodology: Secondary sources of data were used to and historical documentation method of data analysis was also used to analyse the data. Results: There are severally identified issues which are critical to and must be squarely addressed in order to arrive at a desired and mutually accepted stand on Nigeria’s geo-political, ethno-religious and socio-cultural composition, and a sustained unity and stability which are sought in the name of restructuring. Elites and political merchants’ prime interest in power and resources have however, shaped and dominated the restructuring agitations. Implications: The study is premised on the socio-economic, political and ethno-religious realities of the Nigerian state and society. Therefore, the study presented an outline and a roadmap for the Nigerian policy makers, politicians, citizens and other stakeholders in the Nigerian state. The study stated the most sensitive issues which are indispensable to any re-arrangement, negotiation, consensus and unity in the Nigerian state by the name of restructuring.
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One of the major characters of the Nigeria is the prominence of ethnicity, regionalism and religion in her formation from 1914, and the succeeding trends, particularly in her public affairs. These (ethnicity, regionalism and religion) have therefore, greatly been influencing her unity, cohesion, development and sustainability. Not only have these manifested and determined Nigerian state make up, structure and affairs, but also resulted in conflicts, threats to national cohesion, controversies, and unhealthy rivalry among the heterogeneous ethno-religious and regional groups in the country. This article explores ethno-religious and regional rivalry among Nigeria's prominent religions, major, small and minority ethnic groups. It also examined the factors responsible for, the effects of rivalry on Nigerian state and the policy measures put in place by various regimes to contain the rivalry. It is very clear from the study that the basic reasons for the rivalry are economic, political, power and fear of domination and supremacy by the others. The article also argues that although ethno-religious, regional rivalry has been a potent threat to Nigeria's unity and social bond, accommodation, stability and prosperity, it is also positively awakening individuals, religions, groups and regions to civic duties and political participation, stand for their rights, responsibilities, etc. The nature and extent to which the rivalry is pursued (either positive or negative) determines the consciousness and stimulation of drives by the groups to rise up to impending socioeconomic and political development, which in turn speeds up the progress and development of the state, or further threaten national unity, social bond, and stability of Nigeria.
Genocide is often used to describe the Igbo experience during the Biafra/Nigeria civil war, particularly within secessionist discourse. This has become a potent tool in gathering support among the Igbo youths – who did not witness the war and consequently rely on “available” narratives of the war. The classification of the war as a genocide presents certain polemics, some are: the difficulty of casting Biafra as vulnerable and lacking in agency; the framing of the war suffering as a universal Igbo experience; the presentation of Biafra as ethnically homogeneous, and that Biafra stimulated linear solidarity from its inhabitants as a force for absolute good. Employing insights from literature, this study reads the dimensions of violence in selected literary narratives of Biafra against International Criminal Court’s definition of genocide. It concludes that there were events that could be described as cases of war crimes narrated in the texts; but there was no intention to annihilate the Igbo. The texts narrate acts of brutality perpetrated by both belligerents. It finds also, that genocide was used as a tool for mobilizing support for the Biafran cause during the war. It was a propaganda tool to gain the attention of the world and to motivate a fight to the end.