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The Human Factors Analysis & Classification System (HFACS) is arguably the most popular accident analysis method within Human Factors and Ergonomics. This literature review examines and reports on peer reviewed studies that have applied HFACS to analyse and understand the cause of accidents in a diverse set of domains. Four databases (PubMed, ScienceDirect, Scopus, Web of Science) were searched for articles published up to the date 31 July 2018. A total of 43 HFACS studies were included. The most popular accident contexts were aviation, maritime, and rail. A greater number of contributory factors were found at the lower end of the sociotechnical systems analyzed, including the human operator and operating environment levels. Notably, more than 60% of the studies used HFACS in a modified form to analyse how a network of interacting latent and active factors contributed to the occurrence of an accident.
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Accident analysis in practice: A review of Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) applications in the
peer reviewed academic literature
Adam Hulme*1, Neville A. Stanton2, Guy H. Walker3, Patrick Waterson4, Paul M. Salmon1
1University of the Sunshine Coast, Sippy Downs, Australia
2University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom
3Heriot-Watt University, Scotland, United Kingdom
4Loughborough University, Leicestershire, United Kingdom
The Human Factors Analysis & Classification System (HFACS) is arguably the most popular accident
analysis method within Human Factors and Ergonomics. This literature review examines and reports on
peer reviewed studies that have applied HFACS to analyse and understand the cause of accidents in a
diverse set of domains. Four databases (PubMed, ScienceDirect, Scopus, Web of Science) were searched
for articles published up to the date 31 July 2018. A total of 43 HFACS studies were included. The most
popular accident contexts were aviation, maritime, and rail. A greater number of contributory factors were
found at the lower end of the sociotechnical systems analyzed, including the human operator and operating
environment levels. Notably, more than 60% of the studies used HFACS in a modified form to analyse how
a network of interacting latent and active factors contributed to the occurrence of an accident.
INTRODUCTION
Accident analysis methods are used to reconstruct accident
scenarios to identify contributory factors and support the
development of interventions designed to prevent further
similar occurrences. The Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS) is one such method that was
originally developed for use in aviation but has since been
applied in many safety-critical domains. The development of
HFACS can be traced back to Reason’s (1990) theory of latent
and active failures (i.e., the so-called ‘Swiss cheese’ model).
Latent failures include factors such as deficient organizational
management practices, inadequate or missing resources,
supervisory violations, poor equipment design, and
insufficient staff training protocols and procedures.
Conversely, active failures include unsafe acts such as human
errors and violations that that take place closer in time to the
occurrence of an accident.
Although highly popular, Reason’s (1990) model is
theoretical in nature, and prior to HFACS inception, did not
provide a classification system to classify contributory factors.
In response to this, Shappell and Wiegmann (2001) developed
an aviation specific method (i.e., HFACS) which adopted the
Swiss cheese levels along with categories of failure modes
across four levels: (i) unsafe acts; (ii) preconditions for unsafe
acts; (iii) unsafe supervision; and, (iv) organizational
influences. Each of the four levels contain at least three
categories of contributory factors, with a total of 17 original
categories that were later extended to 19 via the addition of
environmental factors (Li and Harris, 2006). When applying
HFACS, analysts classify the human (active) errors and the
related latent failures across levels of the work system. This
process offers a formal structure to facilitate factor
identification and categorization.
HFACS is arguably one of the most commonly applied
accident analysis methods in the last two decades. Given this,
as well as wider discussions around the fitness for purpose of
contemporary accident analysis methods (Salmon et al., 2017),
it is timely to review the scholarly literature from a current
state of the science perspective. Doing so will provide insight
into what contexts HFACS has been applied to, as well as how
this approach has evolved over time. In addition, any
limitations identified will support further methodological
development. Therefore, the aim of this literature review is to
examine and report on peer reviewed studies that have applied
HFACS to analyse and understand the cause of accidents in a
diverse set of domains.
METHODS
This paper formed part of a broader study involving a
comprehensive review of accident analysis methods since
1990 (Hulme et al., 2019). The following methods section has
been amended from its original to reflect the identification,
inclusion, and synthesis of HFACS studies.
Electronic search
Four databases (PubMed, ScienceDirect, Scopus, Web of
Science) were searched for published journal articles up to the
date 31 July 2018. Database limits were imposed on both the
published language and document type to maintain a
manageable and relevant search strategy (i.e., the search was
restricted to include peer reviewed journal articles).
Eligibility criteria
To be eligible for inclusion, studies were required to comply
with the following criteria:
Analyses involved an application of HFACS. Domain-
specific adaptations to the original terminology and/or
taxonomy was permitted (e.g., HFACS-RR is a modified
version of HFACS for railroad accidents (Reinach and
Viale, 2006);
Analyses aimed to understand the cause of accidents
(singular events or aggregated datasets) from the
perspective of both latent and active failures;
Outcomes included documented accidents ranging from
major events (e.g., multiple fatalities) to relatively minor
incidents and anomalies (e.g., component failures,
personal injury); and,
Information sources were original peer-reviewed journal
articles published in English.
Data extraction
Extracted study information included: (i) study/date; (ii)
accident context; (iii) data sources/year; (iv) the version of the
method (e.g., HFACS-RR); (v) number of accidents analyzed;
(vi) errors; (vii) categories; and, (ix) relationships among
factors including any unique features of the approach taken
such as the use of additional theories, analyses, or statistical
techniques.
Data organization and interpretation
An overview of the HFACS studies in the review is presented
in Table 1. The non-weighted and weighted mean proportion
of a given HFACS category was computed (Figure 1).
Calculating a weighted mean proportion (Eq. 1) and weighted
standard deviation (Eq. 2) was performed as the number of
accidents analyzed with HFACS varied across studies. Studies
providing information about the frequency of the presence of
each HFACS category, as well as the number of accidents
analyzed, were eligible for a quantitative synthesis:
Where x is the frequency of a HFACS category for a given
study (calculated manually where necessary), and w is the
weighted factor based on the total number of accidents. The
relative quality of the data, as well as the nature and severity
of accidents, were treated as equal given that the purpose was
only to understand where classification efforts have been
concentrated on HFACS.
RESULTS
Study identification
After searching four databases, a total of 690 articles were
identified. After removing 197 duplicates and examining 493
titles and abstracts, a total of 43 HFACS studies were
included. There were 14 studies published between the years
2000 and 2009, and 29 studies published between the years
2010 and 31 July 2018, inclusive (Table 1).
Study overview
Domains
Most studies aimed to understand the human and
organizational factors underpinning aviation (n=15) and
maritime (n=10) accidents. Studies in the mining (n=7), rail
(n=6), construction (n=2), nuclear power (n=2), and industrial
(n=1) work domains were identified. The sources of accident
data and type and severity of accidents varied across studies.
Modifications
In terms of HFACS framework modifications, eight studies
incorporated an additional fifth level above the organizational
level (Reinach and Viale, 2006; Patterson and Shappell, 2010;
Chauvin et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2013; Theophilus et al.,
2017; Verma and Chaudhari, 2017; Yıldırım et al., 2017;
Zhang et al., 2018). This fifth level included the categories of,
for example, ‘outside factors’, ‘external factors’, and
regulatory and statutory’ influences. Thirty-four studies used
a traditional four level HFACS framework that included
between 17 and 20 individual categories. One study modified
the HFACS framework to include 28 categories across the
traditional four levels (Batalden and Sydnes, 2014).
Table 1: Authors, date, and context of 43 HFACS studies
ordered by ascending publication date
Study
Context
Accidents
Wiegmann & Shappell (2001)*†‡
Aviation
119
Gaur (2005)*†‡
Aviation
48
Dambier & Hinkelbein (2006)
Aviation
239
Li & Harris (2006)*‡
Aviation
523
Reinach & Viale (2006)
Rail
6
Tvaryanas et al. (2006)
Aviation
221
Shappell et al. (2007)*‡
Aviation
1020
Baysari et al. (2008)*†‡
Rail
23
Gibb & Olson (2008)
Aviation
124
Lenne et al. (2008)*‡
Aviation
169
Li et al. (2008)*‡
Aviation
41
Tvaryanas & Thompson (2008)
Aviation
48
Baysari et al. (2009)*†‡
Rail
19
Celik (2009)
Maritime
1
Patterson & Shappell (2010)*‡
Mining
508
Wang et al. (2011)
Maritime
2
Hale et al. (2012)
Construction
26
Lenne et al. (2012)*†‡
Mining
263
Chauvin et al. (2013)*‡
Maritime
27
Chen et al. (2013)
Maritime
1
Hooper & O'Hare (2013)*‡
Aviation
288
Li & Harris (2013)*‡
Aviation
523
Wang et al. (2013)
Maritime
1
Akhtar & Utne (2014)
Maritime
93
Akyuz & Celik (2014)
Maritime
1
Equation 1:
𝑥𝑤=%(𝑥𝑖𝑤𝑖)
𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
Equation 2:
𝑠𝑤= .𝑛%𝑤𝑖(𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑤)2
𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝑛
𝑖=0
Batalden & Sydnes (2014)
Maritime
94
Daramola (2014)*
Aviation
42
Gong et al. (2014)
Aviation
2
Kim et al. (2014)*†‡
Nuclear
38
Yunxiao & Yangke (2014)*‡
Mining
107
Madigan et al. (2016)*†‡
Rail
74
Wong et al. (2016)*
Construction
52
Akyuz (2017)
Maritime
1
Al-Wardi (2017)*‡
Aviation
40
Fu et al. (2017)
Mining
1
Theophilus et al. (2017)*‡
O&G
11
Verma & Chaudhari (2017)*‡
Mining
102
Yıldırım et al. (2017)
Maritime
257
Yoon et al. (2017)
Nuclear
1
Zhan et al. (2017)
Rail
1
Zhou & Lei (2017)*‡
Rail
407
Mirzaei Aliabadi et al. (2018)
Mining
295
Zhang et al. (2018)
Mining
94
*, indicates 22 studies eligible for a quantitative HFACS categorization
summary as visualized in Figure 1; , indicates 19 studies included in Table
2; , indicates 20 studies included in Table 2
Table 2 provides a summary of the total accident, error, and
HFACS category frequencies, as well as measures of central
tendency applicable only to studies reporting the necessary
information.
Table 2: Summary of accidents, errors, and HFACS category
frequencies across studies. Errors indicates the total number of
causal/contributory factors identified, whereas categories refer
to the total HFACS categories/causal codes identified
Total
Range
Median
Mean
Accidents
5,965
1-1,020
48
139 (203)
Errors
6,938
15-2,868
153
365 (681)
Categories
15,720
55-2,686
324
786 (868)
, , includes only those studies indicated in Table 1
Supplementary HFACS analyses
Twenty-seven (62.8%) studies modelled interactions across
errors and/or HFACS categories (Table 3). The aim was to
analyse and understand how a network of interacting latent
and active factors contributed to the occurrence of an accident.
The approaches and techniques to visualize and model
relationships among factors included traditional statistical
modelling (e.g., chi-squared test, Fisher’s exact test, logistic
regression analyses), hierarchical decision-making process
methods (e.g., Analytical Network Process, Fuzzy Analytic
Hierarchy Process), and quantitative probability modelling
(e.g., Bayesian networks).
Table 3: Authors, date, and other analyses reported in 27
HFACS studies ordered by ascending publication date
Study
Other analyses
Li & Harris (2006)
χ2, λ
Tvaryanas et al. (2006)
χ2, Cramer’s V, LR
Lenne et al. (2008)
χ2, FET, LR
Li et al. (2008)
χ2, λ
Tvaryanas & Thompson (2008)
PCA, PM
Celik (2009)
FAHP, PW, FC
Wang et al. (2011)
BN, CPT, FAHP
Lenne et al. (2012)
FET
Chauvin et al. (2013)
χ2, MCA, HC, CTA
Chen et al. (2013)
WBA
Hooper & O'Hare (2013)
χ2, λ, LR
Wang et al. (2013)
BN, CPT, FAHP
Akhtar & Utne (2014)
BN, CPT
Akyuz & Celik (2014)
CM matrix, GCV, NCV
Daramola (2014)
χ2
Gong et al. (2014)
Qualitative, AcciTree
Kim et al. (2014)
χ2
Madigan et al. (2016)
χ2, ASR
Wong et al. (2016)
FET, LCA
Akyuz (2017)
ANP
Theophilus et al. (2017)
χ2, FET, correlations
Verma & Chaudhari (2017)
Fuzzy Reasoning
Yıldırım et al. (2017)
χ2, CA
Zhan et al. (2017)
F-DEMATEL, ANP
Zhou & Lei (2017)
χ2, λ
Mirzaei Aliabadi et al. (2018)
BN, CPT
Zhang et al. (2018)
FET, QM
χ2, chi-squared test; λ, Goodman & Kruskal’s lambda; ANP, Analytical
Network Process; ASR, Adjusted Standardized Residuals; BN, Bayesian
Network; CM, Cognitive Mapping; CPT, Conditional Probability Table;
CTA, Classification Tree Analysis; FAHP, Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy
Process; FC, Factor Clustering; F-DEMATEL, Fuzzy Decision Making Trail
& Evaluation Laboratory; FET, Fisher Exact Test; GCV, Global Centrality
Value; HC, Hierarchical Clustering; ICAM, Incident Case Analysis Method;
LCA, Latent Class Analysis; LR, Logistic Regression; MCA, Multiple
Correspondence Analysis; NCV, Normal Centrality Value; PCA, Principal
Component Analysis; PW, Priority Weights; WBA, Why-Because Analysis
HFACS general classifications
A total of 22 (51.2%) studies reported the frequency of the
presence of a HFACS category (Figure 1). The weighted mean
proportions and standard deviations of 18 HFACS categories
are based on 4,456 accidents (i.e., 74.7% of the total accidents
analyzed). In terms of the weighted mean proportions, skill-
based error (53.5%), decision error (36.5%), physical
environment (30.6%), violation (27.2%), and inadequate
supervision (25.5%) were the most frequently coded HFACS
categories. The lowest proportions were found for
physiological state (3.4%), supervisory violation (4.9%),
failed to correct a known problem (5.6%), organizational
climate (8.9%), and physical and mental limitation (9.3%).
DISCUSSION
This review has examined and reported on peer reviewed
studies that have applied HFACS to analyse and understand
the cause of accidents in a diverse set of domains. The
findings show that HFACS has progressively found its way
outside of the aviation context and into other domains of
application. Clearly, researchers and practitioners with a bona
fide interest in maritime, rail, and mining recognize the value
and utility of this approach to support accident analysis
efforts. Indeed, HFACS offers a relatively complete taxonomy
that can be readily adapted to meet the needs of a given work
system. Despite its routine adaptation, the lack of a focus on
the wider sociotechnical system beyond the organizational
Figure 1: Non-weighted and weighted mean proportions of 18 HFACS categories across 22 studies (aviation n=10, rail n=4, mining n=4, maritime n=1, construction
n=1, nuclear power n=1, industrial n=1). AMS, Adverse Mental State; APS, Adverse Physiological State; CRM, Crew Resource Management; DEr, Decision Error;
FCP, Failed to Correct a Known Problem; ISu, Inadequate Supervision; OCl, Organizational Climate; OPr, Organizational Process; ORM, Organizational Resource
Management; PEn, Physical Environment; PEr, Perceptual Error; PIO, Planned Inappropriate Operation; PML, Physical-Mental Limitation; PRe, Personal Readiness;
SEr, Skill-based Error; SVi, Supervisory Violation; TEn, Technological Environment; Vi, Violation
level has equally resulted in the extension of HFACS to
account for externaland outsidefactors. This is a limitation
of the traditional HFACS approach, especially when other
accident analysis methods (e.g., AcciMap (Rasmussen, 1997)
and STAMP (Leveson, 2004)), include the government,
legislative, and regulatory levels of a system.
Another aspect to HFACS that has been absent since its
formalization is the modelling of pathways and relationships
between contributory factors. Notably, over 60% of the studies
applied some form of quantitative or statistical technique to
better understand the relationships and/or strength to which
higher level organizational determinants influenced factors at
the lower end of a system. For example, Li and Harris (2006)
used relatively basic asymmetric measures of association to
quantify the relationships between latent and active failures.
Since then, the use of more sophisticated forms of statistical
and probability modelling (e.g., regression analyses, FAHP
algorithms including priority weighting procedures, BN
modelling) have become more common. In short, HFACS is
being adapted and improved upon to better understand
accident etiology. Many of the modifications ostensibly
represent attempts to bring the HFACS method up to date with
contemporary models of accident causation which place
emphasis on the interactions between decisions and actions
across entire work systems.
A final observation is the identification of a greater
number of contributory factors at the sharp end of the work
systems relative to the number of factors identified at the
supervisory, organizational, and external levels. For example,
in the studies reviewed, many contributory factors were
identified at the ‘unsafe acts’ and ‘preconditions for unsafe
acts’ levels, including skill-based errors, decision errors,
violations, and factors related to the physical environment.
This may be a function of the information and data available
to analysts rather than a consistent feature of accident
causation. The limited number of factors identified at higher
system levels suggests that HFACS analyses and the resulting
prevention interventions could be overlooking the potential
benefit of going upstream where arguably some of the greatest
differences could be made. A disproportionate focus on factors
at the sharp end is not necessarily consistent with the HFACS
philosophy which also emphasizes the role of organizational
factors and latent determinants.
CONCLUSION
Whilst HFACS can help analysts to identify both latent and
active factors underpinning accidents, modifications to the
method have been introduced, and there has been more of a
focus on the identification of skill-based and decision errors
relative to other categories. It is concluded that there may be a
need to revisit the method to incorporate a structured approach
for examining the relationships between contributory factors.
This will support consistent applications of the method that
can be compared across different domains and datasets.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported by an Australian Research Council
(ARC) Discovery Project (DP180100806).
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... Based on the flexibility of HFACS for modification, it is considered feasible to integrate the SA aspect into the HFACS taxonomy [19]. Considering that HFACS is a proven framework in investigating systemic factors influencing human factors of an accident on a systematic literature review [20], integrating SA error taxonomy into HFACS will give a solid theoretical basis for investigating the systemic factors (personal, situational, and organizational) influencing SA in upstream oil and gas accidents. ...
... Supervisory violation refers to the intentional disregard of supervisors for existing rules and instructions [19]. This factor was identified among the lowest proportions and occurrence in several HFACS studies [20] and considered a minor effect on worker behavior [21]. ...
... This factor refers to a personal aspect that includes limited personnel capability to perform the task, such as visual limitation, insufficient reaction time, and incompatible physical capacity. This factor was identified among the lowest proportions and occurrence in several HFACS studies [20]. ...
... Posteriormente, se identificaron todas las interacciones durante el desempeño humano con sistemas y componentes, mediante un análisis de tareas y escenario, donde cualquier factor que influyera en el desempeño humano, se designó como condición latente y para su estudio se dividió en tres clases: externas, internas y estresores. Se adoptó para documentar la relación entre fallos activos y condiciones latentes la taxonomía denominada Sistema de Análisis y Clasificación de Factores Humanos (Human Factors Analysis and Classification System, HFACS) con amplio uso en la industria aeronáutica [16]. El proceso seleccionado se descompuso en acciones simples para predefinirle tasas de error y estimar los efectos de las condiciones latentes. ...
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... In this modified approach, the human factor is considered the main and most important reason in the operating system for an accident to occur (Hulme et al., 2019a;Li et al., 2019;Salmon & Lenné, 2009). According to Grabbe et al. (2020), the introduction of the human factor into the investigation and analysis of accidents greatly improves understanding and contributes to the application of the method in more complex accident scenarios. ...
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Effective food safety (FS) management relies on the understanding of the factors that contribute to FS incidents (FSIs) and the means for their mitigation and control. This review aims to explore the application of systematic accident analysis tools to both design FS management systems (FSMSs) as well as to investigate FSI to identify contributive and causative factors associated with FSI and the means for their elimination or control. The study has compared and contrasted the diverse characteristics of linear, epidemiological, and systematic accident analysis tools and hazard analysis critical control point (HACCP) and the types and depth of qualitative and quantitative analysis they promote. Systematic accident analysis tools, such as the Accident Map Model, the Functional Resonance Accident Model, or the Systems Theoretical Accident Model and Processes, are flexible systematic approaches to analyzing FSI within a socio‐technical food system which is complex and continually evolving. They can be applied at organizational, supply chain, or wider food system levels. As with the application of HACCP principles, the process is time‐consuming and requires skilled users to achieve the level of systematic analysis required to ensure effective validation and verification of FSMS and revalidation and reverification following an FSI. Effective revalidation and reverification are essential to prevent recurrent FSI and to inform new practices and processes for emergent FS concerns and the means for their control.
... As per the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), teenagers, who represent a relatively small portion of the total driving population, are disproportionately involved in fatal traffic crashes [4]. The most common causes for fatal teen crashes include recognition errors (including visual scanning errors and distractions), decision errors (like misjudging following distances and speeding), and performance errors (such as losing control of the vehicle) as primary types of driver errors [5][6][7][8][9]. These errors are often attributed to a lack of driving experience, inadequate situational awareness, and an immature decision-making process, common among novice teenage drivers [6]. ...
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This exploratory study investigated whether using the Pedals Emergency Stop© interactive driving simulator exercise improved the understanding and performance of emergency braking among novice teen drivers. Seventy-one high school driver education students (aged 15–19) participated. All of the teens completed the Pedals Emergency Stop© interactive exercise driving simulator task and then an on-road ABS exercise in a driver’s education vehicle; there was no control group. Students’ ability to complete the simulator-based emergency braking task increased from an initial passing rate of only 18.3% to a maximum of 81.7% by the end of the simulation exercise. A positive trend was observed over successive simulator trials, with the linear effect explaining 51.1% of the variance in emergency stopping “pass” rates using the simulator task. In addition, participants who passed more trials during the Pedals Emergency Stop© simulator exercise were 12.3% more likely to fully activate the ABS during the on-road emergency stop activity using the driver’s education vehicle. Post-study surveys revealed that 95% of the participants improved their understanding of ABS as a result of the simulation-based training, and 98% felt there was a positive impact from the driving simulation exercise on their real-world emergency braking capabilities. Participants highly endorsed the Pedals Emergency Stop© exercise for ABS education and refresher training, with a rating of 4.7 out of 5. This study emphasizes the potential benefits of incorporating simulator-based exercises into driver education and training, with the long-term goal of promoting safe driving behaviors and outcomes.
... It underscores that the HFACS method stands out as one of the most widely adopted and reliable techniques for human factor analysis. Furthermore, in another study by Hulme et al. (2019b et al.) [24], 43 studies were examined, using the HFACS tool across various domains. The findings revealed that the HFACS method is extensively applied within the realms of aviation, the maritime sector, and rail transportation. ...
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Chapter
This book chapter provides a comprehensive exploration of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), covering its development, tiers, nanocodes, brief application in an aviation case study, and adaptations. The journey begins with an in-depth look at the evolution and intricacies of HFACS development, tracing its roots and conceptual framework. The subsequent section navigates through the various tiers of HFACS, unraveling the structured layers that contribute to a systematic understanding of human factors in accident causation. The chapter sheds light on the integration of HFACS Nanocodes, a practical approach enabling finer data collection. This section discusses how these nanocodes enhance the granularity of information, thereby providing a more detailed and nuanced analysis of human factors contributing to accidents. Drawing on real-world application, the chapter presents a brief aviation case study employing HFACS. This case study illuminates the practical application of HFACS in a specific context, showcasing its efficacy in dissecting and analyzing aviation incidents. The exploration extends further into the discussion of HFACS adaptations and extensions. This section explores how HFACS, as a robust framework, can be adapted and extended to suit diverse industries and contexts, underlining its versatility as a tool for human factors analysis. In summary, this book chapter provides a comprehensive and multifaceted examination of HFACS, from its developmental stages to its practical application in a specific industry.
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Purpose Weick and Sutcliffe identified five principles that enable high-reliability organizations (HROs) to address environmental complexity and manage unexpected events. The current study aims to adopt this sensemaking perspective to analyze accidents within a typical HRO sector, namely maritime transport. Design/methodology/approach Through a retrospective case study analysis, this study focused on seven oil tanker accidents, using them as illustrative examples. Findings Findings show how the five principles contributed to the accidents' occurrence, explaining how failures in sensemaking affected the crew's capability to both prevent errors and cope with their consequences, thus leading to disasters. Research limitations/implications Overall, the study offers an applicative contribution showing how this model may provide a reliable framework for analyzing the psychosocial factors affecting an accident. This approach deepens the understanding of how latent factors are enacted and how the prevention and error management phases interrelate within a comprehensive flow of the entire accident sequence. Furthermore, the study emphasizes consistent patterns that emerge across multiple accidents within the same sector, in order to learn valuable lessons to improve safety measures in the future. Originality/value This study constitutes an exemplary application in support of how Weick and Sutcliffe’s model is valuable for investigating HROs. It offers a second-order interpretative framework to understand accidents and underscores the interplay among these factors during the dynamic development of an accident.
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Introduction: This systematic review examines and reports on peer reviewed studies that have applied systems thinking accident analysis methods to better understand the cause of accidents in a diverse range of sociotechnical systems contexts. Methods: Four databases (PubMed, ScienceDirect, Scopus, Web of Science) were searched for published articles during the dates 01 January 1990 to 31 July 2018, inclusive, for original peer reviewed journal articles. Eligible studies applied AcciMap, the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), the Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) method, including Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST), and the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM). Outcomes included accidents ranging from major events to minor incidents. Results: A total of 73 articles were included. There were 20, 43, six, and four studies in the AcciMap, HFACS, STAMP-CAST, and FRAM methods categories, respectively. The most common accident contexts were aviation, maritime, rail, public health, and mining. A greater number of contributory factors were found at the lower end of the sociotechnical systems analysed, including the equipment/technology, human/staff, and operating processes levels. A majority of studies used supplementary approaches to enhance the analytical capacity of base applications. Conclusions: Systems thinking accident analysis methods have been popular for close to two decades and have been applied in a diverse range of sociotechnical systems contexts. A number of research-based recommendations are proposed, including the need to upgrade incident reporting systems and further explore opportunities around the development of novel accident analysis approaches.
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This study aimed to provide a greater understanding of the systemic factors involved in coal mine accidents and to examine the relationships between the contributing factors across all levels of the system. Ninety-four extraordinarily major coal mine accidents that occurred in China from 1997 to 2011 were analyzed using the human factors analysis and classification system (HFACS). The empirical results showed that the frequencies of unsafe behaviors, inadequate regulation, and failure to correct unsafe behaviors were the highest among five levels, fourteen categories, and forty-eight indicators, respectively. The odds ratio (OR) technique was applied to quantitatively examine the relationships between contributing factors. Various statistically significant associations were discovered and should receive greater attention in future attempts to develop accident measures. In addition, several strategies concerning the main contributing factors and routes to failure are proposed to prevent accidents from reoccurring in an organization.
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This study proposes a new method for modelling and analysing human-related accidents. It integrates Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), which addresses most of the socio-technical system levels and offers a comprehensive failure taxonomy for analysing human errors, and activity theory (AT)-based approach, which provides an effective way for considering various contextual factors systematically in accident investigation. By combining them, the proposed method makes it more efficient to use the concepts and principles of AT. Additionally, it can help analysts use HFACS taxonomy more coherently to identify meaningful causal factors with a sound theoretical basis of human activities. Therefore, the proposed method can be effectively used to mitigate the limitations of traditional approaches to accident analysis, such as over-relying on a causality model and sticking to a root cause, by making analysts look at an accident from a range of perspectives. To demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed method, we conducted a case study in nuclear power plants. Through the case study, we could confirm that it would be a useful method for modelling and analysing human-related accidents, enabling analysts to identify a plausible set of causal factors efficiently in a methodical consideration of contextual backgrounds surrounding human activities.
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A comparative study is conducted to compare the theory and application effect of two accident causation models, the human factors analysis and classification system (HFACS) and the accident causation “2-4” model (24Model), as well as to provide a reference for safety researchers and accident investigators to select an appropriate accident analysis method. The two models are compared in terms of their theoretical foundations, cause classifications, accident analysis processes, application ranges, and accident prevention strategies. A coal and gas outburst accident is then analyzed using both models, and the application results are compared. This study shows that both the 24Model and HFACS have strong theoretical foundations, and they can each be applied in various domains. In addition, the cause classification in HFACS is more practical, and its accident analysis process is more convenient. On the other hand, the 24Model includes external factors, which makes the cause analysis more systematic and comprehensive. Moreover, the 24Model puts forward more corresponding measures to prevent accidents.
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The oil and gas industry has been beset with several catastrophic accidents, most of which have been attributed to organisational and operational human factor errors. The current HFACS developed for the aviation industry, cannot be used to simultaneously analyse regulatory deficiencies and emerging violation issues, such as sabotage in the oil and gas industry. This paper presents an attempt to improve the existing HFACS investigation tool and proposes a novel HFACS named the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System for the Oil and Gas Industry (HFACS-OGI). Result found the HFACS-OGI system to be suitable for categorising accidents, following the analysis of 11 accident reports from the US Chemical Safety Board (US CSB). The HFACS-OGI system moreover revealed some significant relationships between the different categories. Furthermore, the results indicated that failures in national and international industry regulatory standards would automatically create the preconditions for accidents to occur.
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Background: The mining industry is known worldwide for its highly risky and hazardous working environment. Technological advancement in ore extraction techniques for proliferation of production levels has caused further concern for safety in this industry. Research so far in the area of safety has revealed that the majority of incidents in hazardous industry take place because of human error, the control of which would enhance safety levels in working sites to a considerable extent. Methods: The present work focuses upon the analysis of human factors such as unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe leadership, and organizational influences. A modified human factor analysis and classification system (HFACS) was adopted and an accident predictive fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA)-based system was developed to predict the likelihood of accidents for manganese mines in India, using analysis of factors such as age, experience of worker, shift of work, etc. Results: The outcome of the analysis indicated that skill-based errors are most critical and require immediate attention for mitigation. The FRA-based accident prediction system developed gives an outcome as an indicative risk score associated with the identified accident-prone situation, based upon which a suitable plan for mitigation can be developed. Conclusion: Unsafe acts of the worker are the most critical human factors identified to be controlled on priority basis. A significant association of factors (namely age, experience of the worker, and shift of work) with unsafe acts performed by the operator is identified based upon which the FRA-based accident prediction model is proposed.
Article
Purpose: The present study was aimed to analyze human and organizational factors involved in mining accidents and determine the relationships among these factors. Materials and methods: In this study, Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) with Bayesian network (BN) were combined in order to analyze contributing factors in mining accidents. BN was constructed based on a hierarchal structure of HFACS. The required data were collected from a total of 295 cases of Iranian mining accidents and analyzed using HFACS. Afterwards, prior probability of contributing factors was computed using the expectation–maximization algorithm. Sensitivity analysis was applied to determine which contributing factor had a higher influence on unsafe acts to select the best intervention strategy. Results: The analyses showed that skill based errors, routine violations, environmental factors, and planned inappropriate operation had a higher relative importance in the accidents. Moreover, sensitivity analysis revealed that environmental factors, failed to correct known problem, and personnel factors had a higher influence on unsafe acts. Conclusion: The results of the present study could provide guidance to help safety and health management by adopting proper intervention strategies to reduce mining accidents.
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The effectiveness and the safety of railway operations depend on many factors and latent errors pose the greatest risk to system safety. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) has been widely used as an analytical framework for the investigation of the role of human errors in railway accidents/incidents; however, relatively few published studies with empirical evidence formally describe the independences between human factors by HFACS. Meanwhile, the occurrence frequencies of human factors and their main norms should be estimated with a large number of accidents/incidents data according to various professions and accidents. We collect and filter 407 railway accident/incident reports in China between the year of 2003 and 2014 using the HFACS framework. The results show that the four errors with the largest percentage of occurrence in the railway system are ‘organization process’, ‘inadequate supervision’, ‘personal readiness’ and ‘skill-based errors’. Several interesting relationships and the pattern of the ‘paths between categories’ at the four levels in HFACS are explored by this analysis for preventing or reducing the number of human errors. The methodology is useful in presenting how a railway accident/incident or near miss occurs and revealing significant interdependences between human factors. This study highlights a way for the rail industry to look more closely at latent factors at the supervisory and organizational levels when investigating active errors of the accidents.
Article
It is important to establish all the causes of marine accidents, but this is sometimes quite difficult. Therefore, analyzing the causes by examining as many accidents as possible using a common classification system and submission of proposals is extremely essential. Overall, the study is an examination of collision and grounding accidents using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). In the first phase of the study, the frequency and distribution of the causes of collision and grounding accidents were examined by HFACS categories. In the second phase, unsafe acts, which have been identified as the most important categories, and preconditions for unsafe acts are evaluated by bridge crew structure. The Chi-Square Test of Compliance and Independence and Simple Correspondence Analysis are used as statistical methods. As a result of study, the most important causes are identified as human factor differences between collision and grounding accidents, decision errors, resource management deficiencies, violations, skill-based errors and miscommunication.