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Arctic identity interactions: Reconfiguring dependency in Greenland's and Denmark's foreign policies
Abstract
This PhD dissertation investigates how Greenland’s and Denmark’s foreign policy identities interact in the light of the renewed global geopolitical attention towards the Arctic. A development, which is used to enhance their common and distinct positions in international politics, where their roles as key Arctic actors offer opportunities to have more frequent, direct interactions with the world’s most powerful state leaders. Something which is not common for a small state like Denmark and even rarer for a self-governing territory such as Greenland.
Whereas the Arctic is discursively highlighted in foreign policy identities of the two countries, it is so to quite different extends: In Greenland, it is ubiquitous and inevitable to the prevailing collective identity representation as well as in paradiplomatic relations to the outside world. In Denmark, the status as an Arctic state is conditioned upon Greenland’s geographic location and continuous membership of the Danish Realm. This difference reconfigures the dependency between the former colony and colonizer: It gives Greenland representatives an ‘Arctic advantage’ in the postcolonial negotiations, as to remain an Arctic state, Denmark must maintain the Danish Realm. This advantage is used to enhance Greenland’s foreign policy autonomy and to alter the relationship towards one of more equality. At the same time, the Government of Greenland welcomes the increased international Arctic attention as an opportunity to diversify dependency beyond Denmark, hence reducing the relevance of the Danish Realm and enhancing Greenland’s agency in international politics.
How Greenland’s and Denmark’s foreign policy representatives (inter)act - together and separately - in discursive Arctic contexts is examined through five different articles. These focus on discourse and praxis within the Arctic Council, circumpolar conferences and concrete tri- and bilateral relations, but also how e.g. proposed mining projects and questions of sustainability activate postcolonial nuances about who has the ultimate right to decide. As such, all the articles contribute to a better understanding of Greenland’s and Denmark’s Arctic affairs, while some of them are also part of other academic advancements contributing with new theoretically informed perspectives on circumpolar security developments and new understandings of how the concept of sustainability is used politically in the Arctic.
... Mens Norge var blandt de første til at placere Arktis øverst blandt sine udenrigspolitiske prioriteter, så skete det først cirka ti år senere i Danmark, hvor fokus nordpå traditionelt set har holdt sig mere snaevert til Grønland og Faerøerne (Jacobsen, 2016(Jacobsen, , 2019Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2018). 2016 var året, hvor Arktis for alvor blev prioriteret i den danske politiske diskurs, da en udredning -bestilt af den davaerende regeringkarakteriserede kongeriget som verdens 12. største nation (Taksøe- Jensen, 2016, s. 35) og anbefalede, at: "Vi skal udnytte vores position som arktisk stormagt til at påvirke udviklingen i Arktis til gavn for Kongeriget, regionen og det grønlandske og faerøske folk" (Taksøe- Jensen, 2016, ix). ...
... Saerligt to ting har fyldt i denne debat: for det første har der vaeret uenighed mellem Tórshavn og Nuuk om, hvorvidt Faerøernes selvkarakteristik som 'et arktisk folk' er et angreb på Grønlands nationale identitet og privilegerede forhandlingsposition i Arktis (Jacobsen, 2022). For det andet har Grønland aktivt anvendt det faktum, at Danmarks status som arktisk stat afhaenger af Grønlands geografiske placering og deltagelse i rigsfaellesskabet, til at udvide sit udenrigspolitiske manøvrerum (Jacobsen, 2019(Jacobsen, , 2020. Med det afsaet har Grønlands toneangivende diplomater tidligt slået fast, at Grønland skal vaere førerhunden i den faelles delegation i Arktisk Råd med reference til den traditionelle brug af hundeslaede. ...
... Med det afsaet har Grønlands toneangivende diplomater tidligt slået fast, at Grønland skal vaere førerhunden i den faelles delegation i Arktisk Råd med reference til den traditionelle brug af hundeslaede. Helt konkret handlede det krav laenge om, hvem der skulle vaere arktisk ambassadør: I sommeren 2023 blev en dansk karrierediplomat udpeget, hvilket skabte stor utilfredshed i Grønland, hvor man mente, at det bør vaere en grønlaender, der varetager denne vigtige post, da det vil sikre bedre repraesentation og forståelse for arktiske forhold (Jacobsen, 2019(Jacobsen, , 2020. I december 2024 indgik man så en ny aftale, der sikrer, at Kongeriget Danmarks arktiske ambassadør skal vaere af grønlandsk oprindelse og have kontor i både Nuuk og København i løbet af det toårige formandskab (Udenrigsministeriet, 2024). ...
... Fordi Grønland og Faerøerne er konstitutionelle hybrider, der befinder sig på en metaforisk mezzanin mellem en fortid som fuldt ud underlagt Danmark og en ønsket fremtid som selvstaendige stater (Jacobsen, 2019a;, så er denne tilgang oplagt til at analysere, hvordan deres respektive udenrigspolitiske repraesentanter søger at presse graenserne for, hvad de kan foretage sig på den internationale scene, uden Danmark er involveret. Her er fokus på den diplomatiske praksis, når eksempelvis opsaetningen af mødelokaler og gruppeportraetter er vigtige eksterne signaler om det interne repraesentationsforhold med potentiale til at påvirke omverdenens opfattelse af Grønlands og Faerøernes subjektivitet i international politik. ...
... Det skyldes ikke mindst, at det ikke er muligt for forskere at reservere plads til disse møder, hvor journalister nyder det privilegium at kunne få presseakkreditering. Således var det også i dette tilfaelde en aftale om at skrive freelance for den grønlandske avis Sermitsiaq, der gav mulighed for at foretage observationer, som samtidig kom vores forskning til gode (Jacobsen, 2019a). Derudover indgår i alt 35 interviews i denne artikels empiriarkiv (se appendiks), hvoraf de fem med ministrene ikke er anonymiseret, mens de 30 med diplomater er anonymiseret efter gensidig aftale. ...
Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands constitute one, single delegation in the Arctic Council, where they – separately and collectively – seek influence in the leading intergovernmental forum of the Arctic. This article analyzes how the delegation’s representation has changed since the Council’s establishment in 1996. By using the theory of sovereignty games, while drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data, the article elucidates how both substantive impacts and symbolic indicators to varying degrees reflect priorities and problems of the realm’s regional representation. While substantive impacts concern the agendas which the delegation aims to promote in the Council’s working groups and ministerial meetings, symbolic indicators are found, for instance, in the use of specific flags, titles, and positioning in official photos. Thus, the article focuses on the internal dynamics between Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands, where the two self-governing entities are still part of the Kingdom of Denmark but have the right to do foreign policy in certain areas. In light of their imminent Arctic Council chairship from 2025–2027, it is now particularly relevant to understand these internal power dynamics and their external impact on regional cooperation.
... Fordi Grønland og Faerøerne er konstitutionelle hybrider, der befinder sig på en metaforisk mezzanin mellem en fortid som fuldt ud underlagt Danmark og en ønsket fremtid som selvstaendige stater (Jacobsen, 2019a;, så er denne tilgang oplagt til at analysere, hvordan deres respektive udenrigspolitiske repraesentanter søger at presse graenserne for, hvad de kan foretage sig på den internationale scene, uden Danmark er involveret. Her er fokus på den diplomatiske praksis, når eksempelvis opsaetningen af mødelokaler og gruppeportraetter er vigtige eksterne signaler om det interne repraesentationsforhold med potentiale til at påvirke omverdenens opfattelse af Grønlands og Faerøernes subjektivitet i international politik. ...
... Det skyldes ikke mindst, at det ikke er muligt for forskere at reservere plads til disse møder, hvor journalister nyder det privilegium at kunne få presseakkreditering. Således var det også i dette tilfaelde en aftale om at skrive freelance for den grønlandske avis Sermitsiaq, der gav mulighed for at foretage observationer, som samtidig kom vores forskning til gode (Jacobsen, 2019a). Derudover indgår i alt 35 interviews i denne artikels empiriarkiv (se appendiks), hvoraf de fem med ministrene ikke er anonymiseret, mens de 30 med diplomater er anonymiseret efter gensidig aftale. ...
Danmark, Grønland og Færøerne udgør én samlet delegation i Arktisk Råd, hvor de hver især og sammen søger indflydelse i det førende interstatslige forum i Arktis. Denne artikel analyserer, hvordan delegationens repræsenta-tionsforhold har ændret sig siden rådets etablering i 1996. Ved hjælp af teorien om suverænitetsspil og kvalitativ såvel som kvantitativ empiri viser artiklen, hvordan både indholdsmæssige aftryk og symbolske markeringer i forskellig grad afspejler prioriteter og problemer i rigsdelenes regionale repræsentation. Mens de indholdsmæssige aftryk handler om, hvilke dagsordener delegationen søger at fremme i rådets arbejdsgrupper og ministermøder, så findes de symbolske markeringer eksempelvis i valgene af flag, navneskilte og placering på officielle fotos. Således stiller artiklen skarpt på de interne dynamikker mellem Danmark, Grønland og Færøerne, hvor de to selvstyrende områder stadig er underlagt staten Danmark, men med ret til at føre udenrigspolitik på overtagne områder. I lyset af, at de tre overtager formandskabet for Arktisk Råd i 2025–2027, er det nu særligt relevant at forstå disse interne magtforhold og deres eksterne påvirkning på det regionale samarbejde.
... Some of the events that have caused most public attention in this regard are Donald Trump's 2019 purchase idea, a U.S. economic package, and the opening of the American consulate in Nuuk in 2020. Through analyses of the Danish political discourses (Jacobsen, 2019a(Jacobsen, , 2019b(Jacobsen, , 2021Jacobsen & Lindbjerg, 2024;Lindbjerg, 2020), we have previously demonstrated how the U.S.' moves in relation to Greenland have caused a more reserved if not skeptical attitude among Danish parliamentarians towards the U.S. As such, a significant shift in the Danish foreign policy discourse took place particularly in the period following Donald Trump's purchase idea, where some politicians characterized the amplified American interest in Greenland and the Arctic as a potential wedge in the Danish-Greenlandic relationship. Whereas the U.S. is continuously described as a close ally, we have seen a more varied narrative emerge with articulations oscillating between portraying the U.S. as a friend, competitor, or a (potential) enemy (Jacobsen & Lindbjerg, 2024). ...
This article explores Danish X debates about U.S.' interests and involvement in Greenland, and compares it with our previous analysis of similar Danish parliamentary debates. Drawing on a mixed method research design using RStudio and qualitative content analysis, we analyze Danish tweets concerned with the U.S. and Greenland to uncover how users talk about American interests in Greenland. Our analysis reveals a Danish X discourse dominated by a critical stance towards U.S.' involvement in Greenland. When comparing it to our previous analysis of the Danish parliamentary debates, we observe a significant overlap in themes and issues between these two discursive arenas. However, X users tend to be more critical towards the U.S. and generally use a more direct and harsh tone, compared to the more polite and diplomatic tone we typically hear in the parliamentary debates.
... 9, this vol.). Furthermore, Greenland has challenged the framework by striving for more direct bureaucratic and political control over the foreign policy field (Jacobsen 2015(Jacobsen , 2019Jacobsen, Knudsen, and Rosing 2019;Kleist 2019;Olsvig and Gad 2021). ...
This chapter examines how the Government of Greenland and Greenland’s political parties envision the future of Greenland’s security framework. These visions are largely characterized by desecuritization in the sense of downplaying security and defense aspects of Greenlandic independence and instead highlighting economic aspects and civilian solutions. The tendency to downplay security as a mode of governance is underscored by the fact that defense and security issues have traditionally not played central parts in Greenlandic politics. As Jacobsen and Gad note, “When Greenlandic politicians make (rare) demands for military investments in Greenland, arguments mostly relate to ser- vices provided for civil purposes (fisheries control, search and rescue, oil spill response, etc.)” (Jacobsen and Gad 2018, 16). Additionally, the authors observe “the near-total absence of Russia in Greenlandic foreign policy narratives” (Jacobsen and Gad 2018, 16),3 while the idea that war and conflict is something imposed on Greenland from the outside rather than being an indigenous phenomenon. Both the focus on the civilian aspects of defense policy and the dismissal of adversarial thinking emphasize the prevalence of desecuritization.
... 27. Similar mechanisms have occurred in Greenland's bilateral relations with the EU (Gad 2014(Gad , 2017 and in its autonomous engagements in Arctic governance (Jacobsen 2015(Jacobsen , 2019a(Jacobsen , 2020. ...
The aim of this chapter is to provide the first coherent analysis of the defining acts shaping the development of U.S. security interests in Greenland during the past 200 years. In order to do so, we dissect how securitization acts and attempts have been carried out at specific times in history by pointing to perceived threats as legitimization of extraordinary means. When doing so, we employ the Copenhagen School’s analytical apparatus as explained in the introductory chapter while paying special attention to the scales, audiences, and cascading effects of the particular securitizations. This means that we are extra attentive to whether the perceived threats have been articulated as, for instance, an interna- tional, regional, or national matter, whether the securitizations have had effects beyond the described purposes, and who the United States has considered relevant recipients with agency to accept or refuse the securitization act. We believe that these three specific foci—which we will soon explain in more details—provide effective tools in finding answers to our research questions, which are: Why has United States securitized Greenland, how have securitizations been received, and with what consequences? When answering these questions, we show how securitizations have been discursively constructed as part of overarching security developments in which the U.S. has considered Greenland a geostrategic piece of land in the protection of U.S. self-interests and its balance of power against shifting enemies.
... Recently, however, a few eclectic realists have joined a handful of constructivists in beginning to mend this gap (Kristensen and Rahbek-Clemmensen 2019a). Like other similar recent book-length contributions (Jacobsen 2019;Gad 2016), the ambition to convey the nuances and peculiarities of the Greenlandic case has been pursued, supported by more or less eclectic theoretical approaches. This volume, in contrast, attempts a theoretically disciplined analysis of what we will call the Greenland security configuration, hence allowing us to both offer a comprehensive overview of the empirical security circumstances Greenland finds itself in, while simultaneously contributing new insights and advancements to ST. ...
Greenland is the most dynamic piece in the new Arctic jigsaw puzzle: insisting on a course toward statehood, hoping to be able to juggle relations to more metropoles without falling unilaterally under U.S. supremacy. Hence, for a nation of 56,000, Greenlandic security politics might prove surprisingly disruptive, if not to Arctic security as such, then for received ideas of the region and of how security unfolds.
With this volume, we offer a fuller and more precise understanding of where Greenland wants to go, but also the limitations to this ambitious polity put by the new Arctic. Our contention is that even if Greenland presents us with a unique clash of scales and ambitions, the way Greenland twists Arctic security provides valuable lessons for how we should approach security in other places off the beaten path in terms of geophysical territory, geopolitical position, colonial history, formal sovereignty, and political identity.
To better grasp the role of Greenland in Arctic security—both moving targets—this volume reboots our understanding by presenting an analysis that identifies security dynamics from scratch rather than accepting established labels. Specifically, we look for processes of securitization, that is, how issues and identities in and related to Greenland are elevated to a privileged security agenda, and processes of desecuritization, that is, how these issues and identities may again be allowed back into the humdrum of normal politics or fade to uncontroversial background.
Working with the securitization theory (ST) of the so-called Copenhagen School proves fruitful for our understanding of Arctic and Greenlandic security. This theory allows our volume to con- nect case studies across scales, taking perspectives from great powers to hunters along the coast of Greenland; across sectors, from geopolitical rivalry and climate change to identities, national and Indigenous; and across time, from coloniality to postcoloniality. In sum, we seek to account for and relate all the security dynamics framing Greenland or, in short, portray Greenland as a security configuration.
... ). Med andre ord placerede Danmark Thulebasen i en større international kontekst i forsøget på at fremprovokere et scenarie, hvor Danmark kunne involvere sig i arktisk storpolitik som arktisk stat gennem Grønland(Jacobsen, 2019;Taksøe-Jensen, 2016). I en sådan situation blev Danmark mere og mere opmaerksom på behovet for at afklare sin rolle som arktisk stat ved at opfatte Grønland som en vigtig kollega, som naturligt skal indgå i samarbejdet og beslutningsprocessen.Fra et geografisk perspektiv er Danmark ikke placeret i Det Arktiske Ocean. ...
Thulebasen er en strategisk vigtig amerikansk base med flere funktioner. Ikke kun for USA og Danmark, men også for Grønland – basens vært – der har status som medunderskriver af aftalen, som garanterer basens eksistens. Hvordan fik Grønland en sådan status inden for national sikkerhed, der ellers traditionelt betragtes som udelukkende et statsanliggende? I denne artikel diskuterer vi etablerede teorier og forklaringer af basepolitik, baseret på henholdsvis realismens fokus på magtforhold og sikkerhedstrusler og socialkonstruktivismens opmærksomhed på historisk og social genealogi af billeder og identitet i internationale relationer. Ved at nærlæse danske folketingsdebatter og lovtekster foreslår vi imidlertid, at det politiske klima og konventioner også udgør vigtige faktorer, som er vigtige at inkludere sammen med magt og billeder.
... Grønlandsk politisk identitet har på lange straek vaeret formet ikke bare af forholdet til Danmark, men i mindst lige så høj grad af forholdet til den bredere omverden og Danmarks forsøg på at holde det under kontrol (Heinrich, 2018;Petersen, 2006). De postkoloniale dynamikker internt i Rigsfaellesskabet har derfor de seneste godt og vel 15 år vaeret taet forbundne til udviklingen i Arktis (Jacobsen, 2019a). Forbindelsen går begge veje: For Grønlands ambition om øget selvstaendighed er det centralt at sprede sine relationer til omverdenen ud og selv tage kontrol med dem. ...
2021 bringer mindst to gode grunde til at udgive et temanummer om Rigsfællesskabets arktiske relationer. For det første er det 300 år siden, at Hans Egede gik i land på Haabets Ø – lidt uden for nutidens Nuuk – og dermed påbegyndte den kolonisering af Grønland, som stadig sætter rammerne for alle diskussioner af forholdet til Danmark. For det andet er det planen, at Danmarks, Grønlands og Færøernes regeringer skal blive enige om en fælles arktisk strategi i år.
... Et balancepunkt, der vil blive udgangspunkt for den fortsatte udvikling af, hvordan Danmark, Grønland og Faerøerne fremover forfølger forstaerket regional indflydelse -hver isaer og sammen. Denne artikel er en opdateret, omformuleret, oversat og mindre teoretisk version af en artikel (Jacobsen 2019a), som indgik i min ph.d.-afhandling(Jacobsen, 2019b). Analysen fra 2018 og frem er helt ny og indgår i min nuvaerende post.doc., finansieret af Carlsbergfondet. ...
Denne artikel undersøger, hvordan politiske beslutningstagere diskursivt har positioneret Danmark i relation til Arktis, som i dag er én af regeringens højeste udenrigspolitiske prioriteringer. Analysen viser, hvordan diskursen i perioden 2006-2020 har gennemgået flere skift, der hver især vægter de eksterne ambitioner i regionen og de interne hensyn i rigsfællesskabet på forskellig vis. Fra udelukkende at fokusere på det dansk-grønlandske forhold betonede man senere i stedet det regionale udsyn. Det indebar, at Danmarks autoritet blev fremhævet, mens de to andre rigsdeles internationale agens blev nedtonet. I takt med en mere eksplicit erkendelse af, at rigsfællesskabets sammenhængskraft er forudsætningen for Danmarks status som en arktisk stat, er Færøerne og Grønlands betydning blevet mere anerkendt. Det har resulteret i stadig større enighed på tværs af det politiske spektrum om, at et mere ligeværdigt forhold er værd at stræbe efter. En udvikling, der ikke mindst er blevet tilskyndet af omverdenens stigende opmærksomhed.
... Grønlandsk politisk identitet har på lange straek vaeret formet ikke bare af forholdet til Danmark, men i mindst lige så høj grad af forholdet til den bredere omverden og Danmarks forsøg på at holde det under kontrol (Heinrich, 2018;Petersen, 2006). De postkoloniale dynamikker internt i Rigsfaellesskabet har derfor de seneste godt og vel 15 år vaeret taet forbundne til udviklingen i Arktis (Jacobsen, 2019a). Forbindelsen går begge veje: For Grønlands ambition om øget selvstaendighed er det centralt at sprede sine relationer til omverdenen ud og selv tage kontrol med dem. ...
2021 bringer mindst to gode grunde til at udgive et temanummer om Rigsfællesskabets arktiske relationer. For det første er det 300 år siden, at Hans Egede gik i land på Haabets Ø – lidt uden for nutidens Nuuk – og dermed påbegyndte den kolonisering af Grønland, som stadig sætter rammerne for alle diskussioner af forholdet til Danmark. For det andet er det planen, at Danmarks, Grønlands og Færøernes regeringer skal blive enige om en fælles arktisk strategi i år. Disse to begivenheder tilskynder til på én gang at reflektere over, hvad Rigsfællesskabet kommer af, og se frem mod nye muligheder for international profilering, sammen og hver for sig. Rigsfællesskabet udgør fundamentet for Danmarks status som en arktisk stat, og indtil de grønlandske vælgere beslutter noget andet, udgør den danske stat Grønlands fundament for at optræde internationalt. Dette temanummer tilbyder læseren en række artikler, som giver indsigt i de interne dynamikker i Rigsfællesskabet – som på mange måder bliver mere og mere indviklede, efterhånden som Grønland agerer mere og mere selvstændigt – og i den udvikling i Arktis, som udgør en ikke uvæsentlig del af baggrunden for, at Rigsfællesskabet i disse år er under forandring.
Since 2017, shifting Danish governments have listed the Arctic as one of their top foreign and security policy priorities. With this, Danish attention toward Greenland has equally increased, as its geographic location and their shared realm legitimize Denmark’s status as an Arc- tic state. Consequently, Denmark has developed a foreign policy identity narrative more oriented toward the northernmost region, while seeking to sustain relations with the government in Nuuk. This development happened partly in response to the increased great power competition between the United States, Russia, and China, which has altered the regional security dynamics and amplified Greenland’s geostrategic significance. While Russia is upgrading its military capabilities and bases, China seeks influence through strategic investments, research initiatives, and by portraying itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’. In response, the two latest U.S. administrations have securitized these engagements and have thereby paved the way for enhanced American presence, which altogether caused a security dilemma and more frequent diplomatic exchanges. Whereas other chapters in the present anthology analyze the Chinese, Russian, American, and Greenlandic perspectives on this development, we1 will here scrutinize the official Danish reactions in 2018 and 2019. We therefore ask: How does Denmark relate to the United States, China, and Russia when discussing Greenland and the Arctic, and how have revised great power relations affected the Danish-Greenlandic relationship?
Rapporten viser, at den nuværende udvikling i Arktis, der er præget af stormagtsrivalisering mellem Rusland, Kina og USA, sætter Kongeriget i en svær situation. Som en lille stat har Kongeriget draget fordel af perioden med sikkerhedspolitisk lavspænding i Arktis. Den sikkerhedspolitiske lavspænding er nu under pres. Det er i Kongerigets interesse at forsøge at værne om de arktiske fora og samarbejdsrelationer, der har gjort lavspændingen muligt. Kongeriget må imidlertid også forholde sig til de nye sikkerhedspolitiske dynamikker i Arktis. Dette skaber behov for ændrede tilgange både i forhold til stormagterne og deres interesser i Arktis og i forhold til samarbejdet i Rigsfællesskabet.
Kongeriget må arbejde på at imødegå bekymrende russisk og kinesisk adfærd i Arktis. Endnu mere presserende for Kongeriget er imidlertid at håndtere de nylige amerikanske reaktioner på russisk og kinesisk adfærd i Arktis og ikke mindst de nye amerikanske krav og forventninger til dansk opgaveløsning i regionen, som følger med. Her bør Kongeriget handle hurtigt og proaktivt søge at holde kontrol med den amerikanske politik i forhold til Grønland og Færøerne. Det er i den forbindelse centralt, at Rigsfællesskabet formår at opretholde en fælles linje overfor stormagterne.
Through a poststructuralist perspective primarily inspired by Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and Ole Wæver, this MA thesis explores how the hegemonic and contingent identity discourse in Greenland has been used to constitute the Self Rule government’s foreign policy during the period 2009–2014.
Firstly, the analysis of the hegemonic identity discourse renders visible how the narrative of a unique Greenlandic identity is contingent and in position to be dislocated. Especially the common aim for increased independence, which seems to unite all the political parties, appears to only do so when independence is articulated with no further details. At the same time, the identity discourse also highlights a cultural core, consisting of the Greenlandic language, hunting traditions and, through this, the relationship with nature.
In a widened perspective, this core is, however, challenged by e.g. the notion of ‘non-Greenlandic speaking Greenlanders’, indicating that language cannot be used as a demarcation line. Furthermore, the climate changes represent a paradox, which, on the one hand, could benefit the state-building process while, on the other hand, threatening the traditional way of living.
Secondly, the analysis of Greenland’s foreign political communication shows how the cultural elements of the discourse are securitized and highlighted as a matter of societal security, which is used to legitimize extraordinary rights. These are achieved by referring to both Indigenous rights and the anticipated future with enhanced independence. Sometimes even in the same case, which seems paradoxical as the different arguments articulate different subject positions to the Greenlandic people as either a minority or an equal partner. This oscillation may be perceived as a cause of the relatively recent transition from Home Rule to Self Rule, but could also be seen as a strategy to gain the best possible bargaining position with the economy and state-building process as the underlying logic.
Greenland representatives successfully use the renewed international geostrategic interest in the Arctic to enhance Greenland’s foreign policy sovereignty. This is facilitated by Denmark’s dependence on Greenland’s geographic location and continuous membership of the Danish Realm for maintaining the status of an Arctic state, which recently has become one of the five most important security and foreign policy priorities. The dependency gives Greenland an ‘Arctic advantage’ in negotiations with Denmark, while turning circumpolar events into strategic arenas for sovereignty games in the aim to move the boundary of what Greenland may do internationally without Danish involvement. This article analyzes how these games unfold in the Arctic Council, at the high-level Ilulissat meetings and at circumpolar conferences where Greenland representatives articulate, act and appear more foreign policy sovereignty through outspoken discontent, tacit gestures and symbolic alterations. Altogether, this contributes to the expanding of Greenland’s foreign policy room for maneuver within the current legal frameworks, while enhancing Greenland’s international status and attracting external investments, important in their striving towards becoming a state with full formal Westphalian sovereignty.
In the beginning of the article, the legal and political framework for Greenland's international and foreign affairs actions under the current self-government act and the Danish constitution are introduced. Although Denmark, pursuant to the constitution possesses the competences of foreign affairs politics within the Kingdom, it is also made clear that reality is a bit more complicated and Greenland is not without its competences, rights and democratic responsibility to the Greenlandic people within foreign affairs. Based on Greenland's previous colonial status under the UN and international law for colonies, as well as the aforementioned legislation, the possibilities for Greenland's development within foreign affairs are dealt with in an independence perspective. The possibilities under a possible federal model or a Free Association relationship with Denmark are highlighted as worth striving for. The article does not go into depth with individual cases, but focuses on frameworks and relevant subjects, such as security policy, membership of international organizations and practical aspects like capacity considerations.
Introduction to an interdisciplinary special issue about the development of the Greenlandic society and the road to independence.
Arctic geopolitics is a moving target - and Greenland, determined to emerge as a sovereign nation state, is a particularly dynamic quantity. The choices currently made in language policy about how to prioritize the Greenlandic, Danish, and English languages will be putting Greenland on very different routes towards and beyond independence. The article modifies the analytical strategy prescribed by Copenhagen School Securitization Theory to produce a nuanced picture of national identity politics, the tensions involved, and scenarios for the future. Analysis of the 2002 and 2016 debates on language supplements the received image of what constitutes Greenlandic identity, centered on language and iconic material cultural practices, with conspicuously modern elements like democracy and welfare. Advancing formally from 'home rule' to 'self-government' has shifted the debate towards material challenges - prompting a more prominent role for the English language, in turn pointing Greenland towards new alliances in Arctic geopolitics.
The article develops a geopoetic approach to Russian Arctic politics. It rests on the empirical observation that due to climate change, the Arctic landscape is undergoing profound transformations, which has led to multilateral governance efforts but also unilateral pursuits. In this general heterogeneity, Russia’s policies have raised the most pressing questions regarding the country’s motivations to engage in the region. Cultural approaches to global politics are most suitable to create holistic understandings and explanations in this regard, but they lack discussing a spatial dimension of Russian identity. By developing a geopoetic account, the article complements this research through methodological insights from critical geography. Geopoetics focuses on the cultural roots and their cognitive-emotional dimension, on the basis of which claims to the Arctic and related policies resonate with a broader audience. The article argues that Russian policies have their foundation in a utopian ideal of Soviet socialist realism that was widely popularised in the 1920s and later decades. Applying the hermeneutic tool of topos, the article highlights that three features stand out that interweave into a coherent imaginary of the Arctic: first, the heroic explorer; second, the conquest of nature; and third, the role of science and technology. Analysts would do well to bear in mind how the Arctic becomes intelligible when commenting on policies.
‘Sustainability’ is often articulated in the Greenland and Nunavut mining discourses where the exploitation of mineral resources is perceived as a key component in their respective continuous nation-building processes. The concept is, to some degree, contested by Indigenous definitions, but the Brundtland Report’s 1987 description of sustainable development is generally the main point of reference, hence reproducing the hegemonic perception. By digging deeper into key mining documents and public hearings regarding the proposed Citronen Fiord zinc mine and the Mary River iron mine, this chapter shows how the referent object is placed on different scales and sectors within the two discourses. Whereas the national economy is given precedence in Greenland in the paramount aim for independence, the local social sustainability gets more attention in the Nunavut mining discourse, which further allows more room for disagreement. This reflects the different directions of their respective postcolonial developments, where Greenland is described as a ‘country’ on the way to ‘independence’, while Nunavut is a ‘territory’ with the declared goal of ‘devolution’. Denmark and Canada are largely left out of the respective communication, but in the few instances they are mentioned it is clear how sovereignty is central to the question of who gets to decide what to sustain. While Nunavut loyally respects Canada’s sovereignty and explicitly states that the mining projects sustain Canadian sovereignty in the North, Danish interference in the Citronen Fiord project triggers postcolonial concerns in Greenland.
Introduction to the book Politics of Sustainability in the Arctic, which sets out a theoretical framework for understanding and analysing sustainability as a political concept, and provides a comprehensive empirical investigation of Arctic sustainability discourses. Presenting a range of case studies from a number of Arctic countries including Greenland, Norway and Canada, the essays in this volume analyse the concept of sustainability and how actors are employing and contesting this concept in specific regions within the Arctic. In doing so, the book demonstrates how sustainability is being given new meanings in the postcolonial Arctic and what the political implications are for postcoloniality, nature, and development more broadly. Beyond those interested in the Arctic, this book will also be of great value to students and scholars of sustainability, sustainable development, identity and environmental politics.
The Politics of Sustainability in the Arctic argues that sustainability is a political concept because it defines and shapes competing visions of the future. In current Arctic affairs, prominent stakeholders agree that development needs to be sustainable, but there is no agreement over what it is that needs to be sustained. In original conservationist discourse, the environment was the sole referent object of sustainability; however, as sustainability discourses have expanded, the concept has been linked to an increasing number of referent objects, such as society, economy, culture, and identity. This book sets out a theoretical framework for understanding and analysing sustainability as a political concept, and provides a comprehensive empirical investigation of Arctic sustainability discourses. Presenting a range of case studies from Greenland, Norway, Canada, Russia, Iceland, and Alaska, the chapters in this volume analyse the concept of sustainability and how actors are employing and contesting this concept in specific regions within the Arctic. In doing so, the book demonstrates how sustainability is being given new meanings in the postcolonial Arctic and what the political implications are for postcoloniality, nature, and development more broadly. Beyond those interested in the Arctic, this book will also be of great value to students and scholars of sustainability, sustainable development, and identity and environmental politics. © 2019 Ulrik Pram Gad and Jeppe Strandsbjerg. All rights reserved.
This article argues the case for a new, region-building approach to regions, highlighting how a region is constantly defined and redefined, as a number of actors engage in a discourse which is never brought to a permanent standstill. Each actor tries to impose a definition of the region which places the actor as close as possible to its several cores. These cores are both territorial and functional, and the way to take hold of them goes through manipulation of knowledge and power.
This special issue of Politik aims to widen the debate on Arctic security relations through a more comprehensive dialogue inclusive of the many different types of security, their interactions, and their challenges by using the theoretical approach of the Copenhagen School. A better understanding of security dynamics in the circumpolar North today demands a critical analysis of those changes through a multidisciplinary and multi-modal lens. Each chapter in this special issue provides one layer of that multimodal lens of Arctic security that, together, weave a complex web of change. This special issue therefore continues to move the discourse of polar security beyond – but not excluding – the conventional debates of military capabilities and state sovereignty towards a more comprehensive definition of security, including its interacting environmental, economic, political, health and cultural dimensions.
By signing the Ilulissat Declaration of May 2008, the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean pre-emptively desecuritized potential geopolitical controversies in the Arctic Ocean by confirming that international law and geo-science are the defining factors underlying the future delimitation. This happened in response to a rising securitization discourse fueled by commentators and the media in the wake of the 2007 Russian flag planting on the geographical North Pole seabed, which also triggered harder interstate rhetoric and dramatic headlines. This case, however, challenges some established conventions within securitization theory. It was state elites that initiated desecuritization and they did so by shifting issues in danger of being securitized from security to other techniques of government. Contrary to the democratic ethos of the theory, these shifts do not necessarily represent more democratic procedures. Instead, each of these techniques are populated by their own experts and technocrats operating according to logics of right (law) and accuracy (science). While shifting techniques of government might diminish the danger of securitized relations between states, the shift generates a displacement of controversy. Within international law we have seen controversy over its ontological foundations and within science we have seen controversy over standards of science. Each of these are amplified and take a particularly political significance when an issue is securitized via relocation to another technique. While the Ilulissat Declaration has been successful in minimizing the horizontal conflict potential between states it has simultaneously given way for vertical disputes between the signatory states on the one hand and the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic on the other.
This chapter seek to frame different relevant theoretical concepts that are currently used to shed light on the question of sustainable development as it relates to mining. It elaborates upon multiple conceptual and theoretical frameworks that are employed throughout the chapters in this volume, and the relationships between them. Our analysis of mining within a sustainable development framework requires a complex set of theoretical understandings and concepts. These are discussed here in order to provide a foundation for the analytical chapters that follow. The basic concepts analysed in this volume are ‘sustainability in mining’, ‘sacrifice zones’ and ‘legitimacy’. Implicit in our analysis is the understanding that mining communities and mining projects need to deal with the complex understanding and valuation of landscapes and nature. This complexity can, of course, be understood by applying a number of different theories, of which we will present only a few. Some common threads that emerge from these different theoretical approaches include the importance of effective communication, the need to incorporate, acknowledge and understand diverse forms of knowledge, and the fact that legitimacy can be established in many different ways. This chapter, then, explores some of these perspectives.
Denmark's main strategic interests in the Arctic is to maintain and enhance good relations with Greenland, because the continuance of the Danish Realm is alpha and omega for the legitimisation of Denmark's presence in the region.
This paper demonstrates how different Greenlandic governments have exploited a narrative of a unique Greenlandic identity to shape and strengthen a foreign policy autonomous from Denmark. Central to this narrative is, on the one hand, the widespread anticipation of more independence in the future and, on the other hand, the notion of a common cultural core formed in the past. The three main elements of this core are the Greenlandic language, hunting traditions, and a particular relationship to nature. While the status of the three elements is often disputed in specific domestic policy debates, such as the commissions exploring future Greenlandic constitution and reconciliation with Denmark, on the international policy level there is a remarkable agreement about the narrative. Here the three elements are understood as a matter of societal security. They need to be protected from external threats in order to uphold the current Greenlandic society. In several cases, the elements are securitised. Hereby the nomination of external threats is used to successfully legitimise extraordinary rights, such as whaling, while the strive for independence substantiate more favourable CO2-reduction requirements. These different rights do, on the one hand, enhance Greenland’s individual position in the world, and hence also strengthen the nation-building process, while, on the other hand, making visible a paradox where increased CO2-emissions have negative implications for the traditional way of living. These implications mirror the complexity of the identity narrative, as the cultural core and the anticipated future independence sometimes contrast each other.
In recent years renewed global interest in the Arctic and the Arctic Council, in particular, has led to what can be called a 'Westphalianisation’ of Arctic politics. This Westphalianisation can be found in the increasing number of globally powerful states including China, Japan, and India as well as the European Union which have all sought a formal role in Arctic policymaking (specifically by seeking observer status on the Arctic Council - the most significant fully circumpolar intergovernmental regime). The Arctic Council itself has shifted from a high level forum to an intergovernmental regime which has begun to produce a number of binding agreements under its auspice. https://issuu.com/arcticportal/docs/ay2016_final/228
Contemporary Arctic transformations and their global causes and consequences have put international cooperation in the Arctic Council, the region’s most important forum for addressing Arctic affairs, at the forefront of research in Northern governance. With interest in Arctic regional affairs in world politics being at a historical high, the actual participation and contribution by interested actors to regional governance arrangements, such as the Arctic Council, has remained very much a blind spot. This article introduces and analyses a novel dataset on stakeholder participation in the Arctic Council (STAPAC) for all member states, Permanent Participants and observers in Ministerial, Senior Arctic Officials’ and subsidiary body meetings between 1998 and 2015. The article finds that participation in the Arctic Council varies significantly across meeting levels and type of actors, and that new admissions to the Council, a source of major contestation in recent debates, do not necessarily result in more actors attending. The article further discusses these findings in light of three prevalent debates in Arctic governance research, and shows the empirical relevance of the STAPAC dataset for the study of Arctic cooperation and conflict, observer involvement in the Arctic Council system and political representation of indigenous Permanent Participants.
The relationship between Greenland and the EU is to a great degree influenced by the image of Greenland being on the path towards independence from Denmark. In both countries, identity discourse idealizes the homogenous nation state, leaving the ‘community of the realm’ in need of a good explanation. However, attempts to explain Greenland’s continued reliance on outside help in its development towards independence continuously risk infantilizing the country. As climate changes are establishing the Arctic as a site of mineral extraction and commerce, Greenland is finding new ways of diversifying its dependence. Important in this regard is the way Greenland’s relationship to the EU is played out as a series of ‘sovereignty games’ that minimize Denmark’s role as intermediary. This book looks at changes to national identity discourse and foreign policy through four analytical strategies — identifying the core concepts of Danish and Greenlandic identity through discourse analysis; reading political debates as identity-political negotiations; using qualitative interviews with key actors to see how clashing identity discourses are managed in diplomatic practice; and approaching legal texts as the ‘frozen’ outcome of these ‘sovereignty games’. In conclusion, the book draws up scenarios for how the expiry date of the ‘community of the realm’ may be extended – by finding new metaphors that will facilitate equality, and by employing Danish diplomacy to make Greenland less dependent on Denmark.
This article assesses the Arctic Council’s role as a security actor in the context of a rapidly changing circumpolar region. It investigates how the Arctic Council uses security language, and which issues it depicts as relevant to Arctic security. The article does this by undertaking textual analysis of ‘securitizing moves’ represented in the Council’s publicly available online documents, including declarations and agreements, policy papers, working group reports, public statements, and other related sources. The findings offer empirical insights into the Arctic Council and the construction of Arctic security issues, as well as theoretical reflections on the analytical usefulness of securitization theory, and the dynamics of constructing unconventional security issues in a multilateral intergovernmental forum.
In UN climate change conferences, there exists a disconnect between the space for and use of Arctic cultural heritage as a catalyst for action and parallel international legal and financial support for climate adaptation and mitigation in the North. This article aims to unpack this divergence of creating a space for societal security discourse and producing tangible climate commitments to Arctic Indigenous peoples in UN climate negotiations. The article surveys and explores visual and textual narratives pertaining to Arctic heritage at COP21 focusing on regional Indigenous political organizations and representatives. It contends both that societal security is to maintain Arctic indigenous culture in its traditional state from changes in the climate and that societal security is to protect indigenous culture from harm or destruction while allowing it to live, change and develop in its own accord to assist with climate mitigation and adaptation actions. The article then turns to the resulting Paris Agreement and Paris Road Map to survey specific legal, financial, and policy support mechanisms for Arctic Indigenous peoples. The article argues that the space for and use of Arctic Indigenous societal security discourses at COP21 are uneven with the resulting global policy initiatives, and do not adequately support the security of current cultural practices and heritage in the Arctic.
The complex constitutional relationship between Greenland and Denmark has had no clearer manifestation than the last decade’s juridical and political wranglings over the control for uranium. In the article, we argue that the quarrel between Nuuk and Copenhagen found in their diverging uranium policies can be seen as what we term a ’securitization controversy’. That is, a form of negotiating process which delicately postpones securitization proper due to the entangled role of the uranium issue in the independence debate. Through narrative analysis of contemporary Danish and Greenlandic government policy documents (2008-2016) we thus demonstrate how Greenlandic documents attempt to desecuritize risks pertinent to extraction of uranium and REE while Danish government papers seek to risikfy uranium in order to keep the issue open to future securitization. In the analysis, we further show how certain risks in the policy papers are connected and constitute a narrative conflict involving identity and sovereignty. We argue, that the controversy found at policy level in turn is the result of the underlying ‘sovereignty game’ in the constitutional relationship between the two countries. The article introduces a methodological framework for studying such securitization controversies drawing on risk analysis and narratology. We argue that in order to account for the entangled and narrative nature of the discursive movements in the policy texts, structural narratology can be a viable methodological alternative to the Copenhagen School’s preferred method of discourse analysis.
This title was first published in 2000: The book analyses the development of arctic environmental cooperation since the late 1980s until the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996. The study is based on the discourse analysis of statement, documents and interviews by the different actors in the cooperation. In this book, the problem of the environment is seen as a problem of order: it is a problem of ordering relations among related actors, of ordering priorities of action and of ordering relations between different institutional arrangements locally, regionally and internally. Three discourses were found in the cooperation: discourses of sovereignty, knowledge and development. In the discourse of sovereignty, the development of relations between state and indigenous peoples in terms of international environmental cooperation is central. In the discourse of knowledge, the different forms of knowledge and the role of different producers of knowledge in cooperation has been discussed. The discourse of development focuses on the idea of sustainable development and its applications in defining the future of the Circumpolar North and the activities of the Arctic Council. The arctic cooperation can be understood as a regional effort to make an order of sustainability into practice.
British interest in the Arctic has returned to heights not seen since the end of the Cold War; concerns about climate change, resources, trade, and national security are all impacted by profound environmental and geopolitical changes happening in the Arctic. Duncan Depledge investigates the increasing geopolitical significance of the Arctic and explores why it took until now for Britain - once an 'Arctic state' itself - to notice how close it is to these changes, what its contemporary interests in the region are, and whether the British government's response in the arenas of science, defence, and commerce is enough. This book will be of interest to both academics and practitioners seeking to understand contemporary British interest and activity in the Arctic. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018. All rights reserved.
'Imagined Communities' examines the creation & function of the 'imagined communities' of nationality & the way these communities were in part created by the growth of the nation-state, the interaction between capitalism & printing & the birth of vernacular languages in early modern Europe.
Linked to the image of a wild and still-to-be-explored territory, as well as to images of the region as one of new economic opportunities, discourses on the Arctic also tie in with issues of climate change, cooperation and conflict, Arctic governance, international law and the situation and rights of indigenous people, as well as Great Power politics. Taken together, these aspects characterize a region whose formation is different from regionalization processes in other parts of the world. As the regional peculiarity of the Arctic is reflected by a variety and plurality of representations, discourses, perceptions and imaginaries, it can usefully be analyzed as a region of unfolding governmentality. The present article argues that the prospects for the Arctic are strongly intertwined with perceptions and depictions of it as an international region subject to emerging practices of governmentality. By drawing on both Foucault’s texts and governmentality studies in international relations (IR), we discuss how the Arctic is affected by governmental security rationalities, by specific logics of political economy and order-building, as well as becoming a subject for biopolitical rationalizations and imaginaries. The discourses and practices of governmentality that permeate the Arctic contribute to its spatial, figurative and political reframing and are aimed at making it a governable region that can be addressed by, and accessible for, ordering rationalities and measures.
In the period immediately before and after being admitted to the Arctic Council as formal observers in 2013, five states in the Asia-Pacific, namely China, India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea, were faced with the difficult task of demonstrating their commitment to engaging with the Arctic region in many areas of development and governance, while also dispelling concerns from the Arctic states that their interest in the circumpolar north was being guided solely by economic and strategic interests. Faced with these challenges, the “Asia-Arctic Five” (AA5) opted to pursue expanded “scientific diplomacy” in the Arctic, including constructing research bases and exploration vessels, as well as developing scientific cooperation with Arctic governments and other local actors. These endeavours have been varied but largely successful, but pressure remains on the five states to continue to demonstrate their Arctic identities even as they deepen their economic interests in the region.
Paradiplomacy has become a concept for regional governments acting within international relations, i.e. sub-national jurisdictions developing their own international agenda. As part of the "soft security" dimension within international relations, paradiplomacy can be seen as a subordinated concept with a focus on non-military collaboration and exchanges with regions in focus. Regions become involved in transnational organizations and participate in international conferences and networks. This chapter focuses on the case of Greenland as an Arctic player in the new era of geopolitics in the entire North. How does Greenland operate in international relations in different policy fields? What is the current political strategy for Greenland, while the focus is on hydrocarbon and mineral assets? What role does the Greenlandic government play in these Affairs?. © Lassi Heininen 2014 and their respective authors 2014. All rights reserved.
Current Arctic regimes are narrow and shallow, but the potential for increased cooperation seems high. In the areas of science, petroleum development, fisheries management, and marine protection, the predominance of strategic considerations is increasingly being challenged in key Arctic states. Groups such as scientists, industrial firms, and environmental organizations portray these problems in terms of cost efficiency rather than competition, and the assessment of national interests is less straightforward than before. In this situation, processes of regime formation will be less structured, and senior policymakers in the Arctic will be more influenced by situational factors. Today these are very favorable for cooperation, due to the sense of urgency present in certain areas, the entrepreneurial activity of some actors, and the presence in each issue area of cooperative salient solutions.
Is the sovereign state here to stay, or is it withering away? Frequently posed in terms of the consequences of globalization, this question has been one of the main sticking points within academic international relations and international law during the past decades. Unsurprisingly, the answers provided by different authors display a considerable variety, both in terms of their basic assumptions about the nature of sovereignty, as well as in terms of their conclusions about its future prospects (see e.g., Ayoob 2002; Cohen 2004; Agnew 2005; Sassen 2006). On the one hand, we find those scholars who remain convinced of the staying power of state sovereignty. To them, those new forms of political authority that are believed to challenge the predominance of the sovereign state are ultimately derivative of state sovereignty, and therefore indicative of its endurance rather than anything else. Thus, when properly defined and understood, the concept of sovereignty is likely to retain its analytical and normative relevance even in the future. On the other hand, we find scholars who argue that the state is unlikely to remain the main locus of sovereignty in the future. Sovereign statehood is challenged by new forms of political authority that eventually will transform the international system into something new and different.
In order to understand why Greenland is where it is now — having obtained self-government, still not a sovereign state, but within the Kingdom of Denmark — one has to take a look back at some of the events of Greenland’s past. There is no room for a complete account of the history of Greenland here, but a short review of some elements will help draw a picture of how Greenland has reached the point at which it currently stands. Having provided that historical context, this essay will also touch upon the Greenlandic perspective on several contemporary regional issues in the Arctic.
There are different visions of Greenland. For the inhabitants, Kalaallit Nunaat is a homeland with increasing autonomy and independence.1 For most of the world, Greenland is often reduced to its ice cap, a ‘global laboratory’ for science, and an emblem of climate change for environmental NGOs and, increasingly, global civil society. For Denmark, the island is a constituent part of the Danish Kingdom. For North Americans, especially the US military, Greenland is geographically, geologically, and continentally part of North America. For some representatives in the European Parliament or the European Commission, Greenland is part of Europe, offering a further window for the European Union to develop its Northern Dimension. For many new actors in the Arctic, whether for multi-nationals wanting to develop resources or Asian states such as China and South Korea, Greenland is depicted as a ‘newly-independent state’ seeking new partners for development.
The polar regions (the Arctic and Antarctic) have enjoyed widespread public attention in recent years, as issues of conservation, sustainability, resource speculation and geopolitical manoeuvring have all garnered considerable international media interest. This critical collection of new and original papers - the first of its kind - offers a comprehensive exploration of these and other topics, consolidating the emergent field of polar geopolitics.
Constitutional framework. Since 1979, Greenland has had a system of local autonomy, known as home rule, which in June 2009 by a new act on Greenland Self-Government was updated to self-government. The system of self-government means that it is possible for the Greenland government to assume authority over almost all areas of public life in Greenland. According to the Act on Self-Government, Greenland's Parliament has full legislative power in areas in which responsibility has been taken over by Greenland. According to the Danish constitution and the Act on Self-Government, however, some areas cannot be taken over and have to remain with the Danish government. Those areas are the following: The Constitution. Foreign affairs.Defense and security policy. The Supreme Court. Currency and monetary policy.
Thanks to global warming, the Arctic icecap is rapidly melting, opening up access to massive natural resources and creating shipping shortcuts that could save billions of dollars a year. But there are currently no clear rules governing this economically and strategically vital region. Unless Washington leads the way toward a multilateral diplomatic solution, the Arctic could descend into armed conflict.