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Preschoolers’ honesty and prosocial behavior determined by a sense of wealth and poverty
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Abstract
Numerous studies of adults indicate that people who perceive themselves as rich are less prosocial than those who describe themselves as belonging to the poorer classes. Furthermore the state of being rich or poor affects immoral behavior. Surprisingly little is known regarding whether having more or less resources affects children’s behavior towards others. Presented study verify whether preschool children with an experimentally created sense of being rich or poor would present different social behaviors. Findings suggest that immoral behavior appears more often among children with a created sense of wealth and is an indirect effect between the prosocial behavior and the sense of wealth and poverty.
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Drawing on recent research on the psychology of social class, I argue that the material conditions in which people grow up and live have a lasting impact on their personal and social identities and that this influences both the way they think and feel about their social environment and key aspects of their social behaviour. Relative to middle-class counterparts, lower/working-class individuals are less likely to define themselves in terms of their socioeconomic status and are more likely to have interdependent self-concepts; they are also more inclined to explain social events in situational terms, as a result of having a lower sense of personal control. Working-class people score higher on measures of empathy and are more likely to help others in distress. The widely held view that working-class individuals are more prejudiced towards immigrants and ethnic minorities is shown to be a function of economic threat, in that highly educated people also express prejudice towards these groups when the latter are described as highly educated and therefore pose an economic threat. The fact that middle-class norms of independence prevail in universities and prestigious workplaces makes working-class people less likely to apply for positions in such institutions, less likely to be selected and less likely to stay if selected. In other words, social class differences in identity, cognition, feelings, and behaviour make it less likely that working-class individuals can benefit from educational and occupational opportunities to improve their material circumstances. This means that redistributive policies are needed to break the cycle of deprivation that limits opportunities and threatens social cohesion.
The present research examined the consequences of telling young children they have a reputation for being smart. Of interest was how this would affect their willingness to resist the temptation to cheat for personal gain as assessed by a temptation resistance task, in which children promised not to cheat in the game. Two studies with 3- and 5-year-old children (total N = 323) assessed this possibility. In Study 1, participants were assigned to one of three conditions: a smart reputation condition in which they were told they have a reputation for being smart, an irrelevant reputation control condition, or a no reputation control condition. Children in the smart reputation condition were significantly more likely to cheat than their counterparts in either control condition. Study 2 confirmed that reputational concerns are indeed a fundamental part of our smart reputation effect. These results suggest that children as young as 3 years of age are able to use reputational cues to guide their behavior, and that telling young children they have a positive reputation for being smart can have negative consequences.
Expectations that others will reciprocate to the benefits they received from us play a crucial role for the establishment of stable reciprocal exchange within social relationships. In the current study, 3- to 5-year-old preschool children allocated in a first phase more resources to one recipient than to another recipient. Subsequently, they had the possibility to ask one of them for valuable resources. The results of Experiment 1 show that already by 3.5 years of age children expect others to reciprocate and strategically ask the ones they benefitted more to share with them. Experiment 2 demonstrates that there was no selective resource request when the recipients were absent during children’s resource allocations. Experiment 3 showed that children focused on the absolute amount of resources given to the recipients, but did not monitor their own relative generosity in judging to whom of the recipients they had been nicer. This study provides first evidence that already preschool children possess reciprocity expectations and point thus to the strategic nature of early social behavior.
Poverty remains one of the most pressing problems facing the world; the mechanisms through which poverty arises and perpetuates
itself, however, are not well understood. Here, we examine the evidence for the hypothesis that poverty may have particular
psychological consequences that can lead to economic behaviors that make it difficult to escape poverty. The evidence indicates
that poverty causes stress and negative affective states which in turn may lead to short-sighted and risk-averse decision-making,
possibly by limiting attention and favoring habitual behaviors at the expense of goal-directed ones. Together, these relationships
may constitute a feedback loop that contributes to the perpetuation of poverty. We conclude by pointing toward specific gaps
in our knowledge and outlining poverty alleviation programs that this mechanism suggests.
Whereas members of high-status racial groups show ingroup preference when attitudes are measured implicitly, members of low-status racial groups-both adults and children-typically show no bias, potentially reflecting awareness of the ingroup's low status. We hypothesized that when status differences are especially pronounced, children from low-status groups would show an implicit outgroup bias, the strength of which might relate to attitudes toward status. We tested these predictions among 6- to 11-year-old Black and Coloured (i.e., multiracial) children from South Africa, a country marked by extreme status differentials among racial groups. As a measure of implicit intergroup bias, children (N = 78) completed an Implicit Association Test (IAT), a speeded categorization task that assesses the relative strength of association between 2 target groups (in the present study, either Whites vs. Blacks or Whites vs. Coloureds) and positive vs. negative evaluation. Children also completed explicit (i.e., self-report) measures of attitudes toward racial groups as well as toward rich and poor people (a measure of attitudes toward status). Both groups of children showed an implicit outgroup-favoring (i.e., pro-White) bias, suggesting that children were sensitive to the extent of status differences. The only instance in which implicit pro-White bias did not emerge involved Black children's evaluations of Whites vs. Coloureds, both higher-status outgroups. Explicit preference for high status predicted implicit pro-White bias, particularly when the IAT contrasted 2 outgroups. The impact of status on the development of implicit and explicit intergroup bias is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).
[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 51(2) of Journal of Counseling Psychology (see record 2007-16897-001). On page 134, line 8, right column, under the heading Checklist for Evaluating Mediation Analyses Using Multiple Regression, the question incorrectly asks, "Was the relation between the predictor and the outcome (Path b) greater than or equal to the relation between the predictor and the mediator (Path a)?" The correct question is "Was the relation between the mediator and the outcome (Path b) greater than or equal to the relation between the predictor and the mediator (Path a)?"]
The goals of this article are to (a) describe differences between moderator and mediator effects; (b) provide nontechnical descriptions of how to examine each type of effect, including study design, analysis, and interpretation of results; (c) demonstrate how to analyze each type of effect; and (d) provide suggestions for further reading. The authors focus on the use of multiple regression because it is an accessible data-analytic technique contained in major statistical packages. When appropriate, they also note limitations of using regression to detect moderator and mediator effects and describe alternative procedures, particularly structural equation modeling. Finally, to illustrate areas of confusion in counseling psychology research, they review research testing moderation and mediation that was published in the Journal of Counseling Psychology during 2001. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved) (journal abstract)
Lower social class (or socioeconomic status) is associated with fewer resources, greater exposure to threat, and a reduced sense of personal control. Given these life circumstances, one might expect lower class individuals to engage in less prosocial behavior, prioritizing self-interest over the welfare of others. The authors hypothesized, by contrast, that lower class individuals orient to the welfare of others as a means to adapt to their more hostile environments and that this orientation gives rise to greater prosocial behavior. Across 4 studies, lower class individuals proved to be more generous (Study 1), charitable (Study 2), trusting (Study 3), and helpful (Study 4) compared with their upper class counterparts. Mediator and moderator data showed that lower class individuals acted in a more prosocial fashion because of a greater commitment to egalitarian values and feelings of compassion. Implications for social class, prosocial behavior, and economic inequality are discussed.
The current research examined whether young children engage in unethical behavior to a greater extent when they have a prosocial justification for doing so. Participants (3- and 5-year-olds, N = 240) played a guessing game in which they were tempted to cheat to win a prize after promising not to do so. In Study 1, children were randomly assigned to either an experimental prosocial condition in which they were told that the prize would be given to a child who was unable to play the game or a control condition in which they were told that they would get to keep the prize for themselves. The 5-year-olds, but not the 3-year-olds, were more likely to cheat in the prosocial condition than in the control condition. Studies 2a and 2b revealed that older children's tendency to engage in prosocial cheating was driven by their concern with signaling to others that they are prosocial. These findings suggest that the tendency to act unethically to benefit others emerges early in development and that this tendency may reflect children's interest in prosocial signaling.
When designing a study, the planned sample size is often based on power analyses. One way to choose an effect size for power analyses is by relying on pilot data. A-priori power analyses are only accurate when the effect size estimate is accurate. In this paper we highlight two sources of bias when performing a-priori power analyses for between-subject designs based on pilot data. First, we examine how the choice of the effect size index (η², ω² and ε²) affects the sample size and power of the main study. Based on our observations, we recommend against the use of η² in a-priori power analyses. Second, we examine how the maximum sample size researchers are willing to collect in a main study (e.g. due to time or financial constraints) leads to overestimated effect size estimates in the studies that are performed. Determining the required sample size exclusively based on the effect size estimates from pilot data, and following up on pilot studies only when the sample size estimate for the main study is considered feasible, creates what we term follow-up bias. We explain how follow-up bias leads to underpowered main studies.
Our simulations show that designing main studies based on effect sizes estimated from small pilot studies does not yield desired levels of power due to accuracy bias and follow-up bias, even when publication bias is not an issue. We urge researchers to consider alternative approaches to determining the sample size of their studies, and discuss several options.
The circumstances surrounding poverty-tight financial challenges, instability of income and expenses, low savings, no insurance, and several other stressors-translate into persistent and cognitively taxing hardship for people in poverty contexts. Thoughts about money and expenses loom large, shape mental associations, interfere with other experiences, and are difficult to suppress. The persistent juggling of insufficient resources affects attention, cognitive resources, and ensuing decisions. Despite the demanding struggle with challenging circumstances, people in poverty encounter disdain rather than admiration, and obstacles rather than support. Societal appreciation for the power of context, along with behaviorally informed programs designed to facilitate life under poverty, are essential for those in poverty contexts to be able to make the most of their challenging circumstances.
People can get their needs broadly satisfied in two ways: by close communal ties and dealings with people in the marketplace. These modes of relating—termed communal and market—often necessitate qualitatively different motives, behaviors, and mindsets. We reasoned that activating market mode would produce behaviors consistent with it and impair behaviors consistent with communal mode. Communal behavior was measured by prosocial helpfulness and generosity. Market behavior was measured by performance and effort. Money—the market mode cue—was presented to Polish and US children ages 3-6 in five experiments and one study. Results showed that handling money (versus other objects) facilitated children’s laborious effort, and hindered helpfulness and generosity. Money prime effects were not due to mood, money liking, or task engagement. This work is the first to demonstrate that young children possess tacit understandings of market mode and that money is a cue to shift into it.
To gain new perspective on the development of understandings and perceptions of income inequality, this study compared the reactions of six, eight, and 10‐year‐olds to a rich man and a poor man and the winners and losers of a contest of skill and a game of chance. Age differences in attributions for outcomes reflected a strengthening with age of the skill–luck distinction and of equity thinking about wealth. Although men with good outcomes were generally perceived more positively than men with bad outcomes, and likeability was affected only by outcome, 10‐year‐olds differentiated most sharply among different types of ‘winners’ or ‘losers’, viewing the rich and poor men as more like the winner and loser of a contest of skill than like the winner and loser of a game of chance. Overall, the findings suggest that differential evaluation of rich and poor people may begin as affective tagging based on good or bad life outcomes and later be associated with justifications grounded in an equity perspective on income inequality that emphasizes the role of personal qualities such as ability in wealth accumulation.
How impressionable are in-group biases in early childhood? Previous research shows that young children display robust preferences for members of their own social group, but also condemn those who harm others. The current study investigates children's evaluations of agents when their group membership and moral behavior conflict. After being assigned to a minimal group, 4- to 5-year-old children either saw their in-group member behave antisocially, an out-group member act prosocially, or control agents, for whom moral information was removed. Children's explicit preference for and willingness to share with their in-group member was significantly attenuated in the presence of an antisocial in-group member, but not a prosocial out-group member. Interestingly, children's learning decisions were unmoved by a person's moral behavior, instead being consistently guided by group membership. This demonstrates that children's in-group bias is remarkably flexible: while moral information curbs children's in-group bias on social evaluations, social learning is still driven by group information.
Cooperative behavior depends in part on a preference for equitable outcomes. Recent research in behavioral economics assesses variables that influence adult concerns for equity, but few studies to date investigate the emergence of equitable behavior in children using similar economic games. We tested 288 3- to 6-year olds in an anonymous Dictator Game to assess how the value of the currency used affects equity preferences in children. To manipulate value, children played the game with their most or least favorite stickers. At all ages, we found a strong value effect with children donating more of their least favorite stickers than their favorite stickers. We also found a dramatic increase with age in the percentage of children who were prosocial (i.e. donated at least one sticker). However, children who were prosocial tended to give the same proportion of stickers at all ages – about half of their least favorite stickers and 40% of their favorite stickers. These findings highlight the influence of resource value on children's preference for equity, and provide evidence for two different processes underlying altruistic giving: the decision to donate at all and the decision about how much to donate.
Poor Choices
Two categories of reasons for why poor people make economically unsound choices, such as obtaining a payday loan at an extraordinarily high rate of interest, reflect, first, the environment: Poor people are more likely to be living in poor neighborhoods with higher rates of crime and lower rates of social services. Second, they reflect the individual: People are poor in part because of their own psychological dispositions toward impatience and impulsiveness. For both cases, obtaining causal evidence in controlled experiments has been challenging. Shah et al. (p. 682 ; see the Perpective by Zwane ) propose a third category of reasons whereby being poor exerts a bias on cognitive processes and provide evidence for it in laboratory experiments performed in scenarios of scarcity.
This study focused on the content (rather than the frequency) of sibling conflict, conflict initiation, and conflict resolution during middle childhood. Sibling similarity and heritability of children’s perceptions of sibling conflict were also examined. One hundred and eight school-aged sibling pairs were interviewed using a semi-structured interview format (average ages were 11.1 years and 8.2 years, respectively). Children’s responses were coded using 16 categories extracted from the literature and interviews. Results showed that descriptions of disagreements revolved around issues between the siblings (e.g., sharing personal possessions and physical aggression) rather than parental favoritism. Parental intervention, on the other hand, was cited as the most common outcome. Children in the same family rarely mentioned the same issues and only six out of 16 of the topics showed a pattern suggesting heritability. The importance of the school-aged sibling relationship to children’s sense of self, personal rights, and social understanding is discussed.
Seven studies using experimental and naturalistic methods reveal that upper-class individuals behave more unethically than lower-class individuals. In studies 1 and 2, upper-class individuals were more likely to break the law while driving, relative to lower-class individuals. In follow-up laboratory studies, upper-class individuals were more likely to exhibit unethical decision-making tendencies (study 3), take valued goods from others (study 4), lie in a negotiation (study 5), cheat to increase their chances of winning a prize (study 6), and endorse unethical behavior at work (study 7) than were lower-class individuals. Mediator and moderator data demonstrated that upper-class individuals' unethical tendencies are accounted for, in part, by their more favorable attitudes toward greed.
Despite a decline in explicit prejudice, adults and children from majority groups (e.g., White Americans) often express bias implicitly, as assessed by the Implicit Association Test. In contrast, minority-group (e.g., Black American) adults on average show no bias on the IAT. In the present research, representing the first empirical investigation of whether Black children's IAT responses parallel those of Black adults, we examined implicit bias in 7-11-year-old White and Black American children. Replicating previous findings with adults, whereas White children showed a robust ingroup bias, Black children showed no bias. Additionally, we investigated the role of valuing status in the development of implicit bias. For Black children, explicit preference for high status predicted implicit outgroup bias: Black children who explicitly expressed high preference for rich (vs. poor) people showed an implicit preference for Whites comparable in magnitude to White children's ingroup bias. Implications for research on intergroup bias are discussed.
Two studies are reported that examine the hypothesis that children construct representations of poverty based on a theory of causal essentialism. One hundred and twenty Chilean kindergartners, half from low socio-economic status (SES) schools and the other half from high-SES schools, participated in the study. The results showed children's tendency towards an essentialist reasoning about poverty. All children in the study privileged internal features over external ones when deciding who is poor, and also used wealth category as a preferred clue to make inferences about people's attributes. However, only high-SES children's answers were consistent with the belief that poverty is inherited and resistant to growth. Implications of these findings for theory and practice, as well as remaining questions, are addressed.
The question of why people are motivated to act altruistically has been an important one for centuries, and across various disciplines. Drawing on previous research on moral regulation, we propose a framework suggesting that moral (or immoral) behavior can result from an internal balancing of moral self-worth and the cost inherent in altruistic behavior. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to write a self-relevant story containing words referring to either positive or negative traits. Participants who wrote a story referring to the positive traits donated one fifth as much as those who wrote a story referring to the negative traits. In Experiment 2, we showed that this effect was due specifically to a change in the self-concept. In Experiment 3, we replicated these findings and extended them to cooperative behavior in environmental decision making. We suggest that affirming a moral identity leads people to feel licensed to act immorally. However, when moral identity is threatened, moral behavior is a means to regain some lost self-worth.
Four studies examined whether Israeli 5-year-olds (N = 88) and adults (N = 48) drew inferences about psychological properties based on a character's social category, personality trait, or physical appearance trait. Study 1 revealed that while children drew inferences mostly by social category, adults did it by personality trait. Study 2 showed that the children's pattern was not due to how the categorical information was conveyed. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that for kindergarteners, labels, not appearances, are determinant of the inductive potential of social categories. Studies indicated that "Jew" and "Arab" were the most inductively powerful social categories for both children and adults. The results carry implications for the roles of language, appearances, and culture in the conceptualization of "human kinds."
Hurricanes strike some houses and spare others, lotteries are won and lost, and children are born into wealthy and poor families. Rationally, there is no reason to prefer people who are lucky to those who are unlucky. In fact, the explicit codes of ethics by which modern societies govern themselves emphasize neutrality or even a favoring of the least advantaged (Rawls, 1971). But rationality is not always a quality of human minds (Simon, 1957; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and this is so even when decisions involve the dimension of right versus wrong (Banaji & Bhaskar, 2000). Understanding how children think about other people who experience luck or misfortune can provide a window into the origins of attitudes and preferences toward social groups that vary in privilege. Accordingly, we tested children's preferences for lucky versus unlucky individuals. Then we pushed further to test the generalization of such preferences beyond the individuals themselves to others who shared a group marker (same colored T-shirt).
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