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A comparison of ISIS foreign fighters and supporters social media posts: an exploratory mixed-method content analysis
Abstract
This paper compares the social media posts of ISIS foreign fighters to those of ISIS supporters. We examine a random sample of social media posts made by violent foreign fighters (n = 14; 2000 posts) and non-violent supporters (n = 18; 2000 posts) of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (overall n = 4,000 posts), from 2009 to 2015. We used a mixed-method study design. Our qualitative content analyses of the 4,000 posts identified five themes: Threats to in-group, societal grievances, pursuit for significance, religion, and commitment issues. Our quantitative comparisons found that the dominant themes in the foreign fighters' online content were threats to in-group, societal grievances, and pursuit for significance, while religion and commitment issues were dominant themes in the supporters' online content. We also identified thematic variations reflecting individual attitudes that emerged during the 2011-2015 period, when major geopolitical developments occurred in Syria and Iraq. Finally, our quantitative sentiment-based analysis found that the supporters (10 out of 18; 56%) posted more radical content than the foreign fighters (5 out of 14; 36%) on social media. ARTICLE HISTORY
... For example, many Kurdish foreign fighters are motivated to participate in the fight against ISIS because the conflict provided them with an avenue to do something meaningful for others (Tuck et al., 2016). Similarly, Dillon et al. (2019) found the pursuit for significance as one of the major themes amongst the social media posts of those who travelled to join ISIS as foreign fighters. ...
... Data collection was undertaken from March to June 2015. The search methodology utilised in this study is similar to previous research that examined terrorists' social media accounts (e.g., Dillon et al., 2019;Klausen, 2015;Knight et al., 2019). An initial sample of 59 accounts was identified using purposive sampling. ...
... These studies provide an in-depth investigation of the factors that influence an individual's radicalisation pathway. g) Case study analysis of how ISIS exploited the internet (e.g.,Berger & Morgan, 2015;Bodine-Baron et al., 2016;Callimachi, 2015;Carter et al., 2014;Dillon et al., 2019;Freeman et al., 2017;Pearson, 2018;Prucha, 2016;Vidino & Hughes, 2015;Winter, 2015). h) Case study analysis of how right-wing groups exploited the internet (e.g.,Bowman-Grieve, 2009;Caiani & Kröll, 2015;Crosset et al., 2018;Koch, 2019;Tuck et al., 2016).i) ...
The ubiquity of online radicalisation warrants the need for law enforcement to learn how to harness open-source intelligence to assess the threat posed and identify potential terrorists in advance. Although much is known about the online radicalisation process, there is a lack of risk assessment instruments developed specifically for online radicalisation, as well as little empirical research in this field. To address these research gaps, this thesis aims to articulate a set of person-centric and psychosocial risk factors and protective factors for identifying radicalisation in social media posts. Five studies were conducted. The first study (chapter 3) involved the use of a modified Delphi technique and literature review to derive a list of 12 factors and 42 indicators. The second study (chapter 4) served as a pilot to map the said factors and indicators to two groups of supporters of terrorists who have been influenced by radical online propaganda. These two groups comprise individuals who travelled to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS] (i.e., foreign fighters), and individuals who did not travel to join ISIS (i.e., sympathisers). Next, the third study (chapter 5) built upon study 2 and incorporated changes to the research design (e.g., use of multidimensional scaling, logistic regression) to map the factors and indicators to a larger sample of ISIS foreign fighters and sympathisers. The fourth study (chapter 6) was designed to replicate the research methodology of study 3 using a different sample (i.e., Kurdish fighters) to compare against ISIS fighters. Finally, the fifth study (chapter 7) detailed a survey conducted with members of the community (NTU undergraduates and MTurk workers) on their perceptions towards the indicators and their general understanding of online radicalisation and terrorism. The practical, methodological, and theoretical implications of this research as well as suggestions for future studies are discussed in chapter 8.
... On a content level, peer pressure and exploitation within extremist groups were utilised to recruit suicide bombers, especially female extremists . Furthermore, the perception of the in-group being threatened appeared to have an energising effect on individuals, consequently engaging in extremist violent behaviour (Dillon et al, 2020;Yustisia et al, 2020;Ebner et al, 2022;Pfundmair et al, 2022). ...
... Dhumad et al (2020) did not directly study the loss of significance, but in their interpretation, they contextualised deprivation and other justifications brought forward by the investigated offenders (n = 160) with the task of reinstating an individual's significance. This central driving dynamic appears to be a significant factor for individuals on the pathway towards an extremist offence compared to those who merely endorse extremist views (Dillon et al, 2020). ...
... Dillon and colleagues (2019) analyzed the tweets of 14 ISIS Foreign Fighters (FTFs) and 18 non-violent ISIS sympathizers worldwide between 2009 and 2015 using a mixed-methods approach. The authors found that these tweets predominantly contain violent language and radical content (Dillon et al., 2019). Moreover, Al-Rawi and Groshek (2018) analyzed 23,249 Arabic tweets from 11,728 ISIS supporters between 2014 and 2017 using a mixed-methods approach. ...
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) effectively uses online magazines for propaganda, leveraging advanced internet technologies to disseminate its message in multiple languages. This study investigates ISIS's use of online magazines to promote its self-proclaimed jihad and attract recruits globally. While existing research examines ISIS's multilingual magazines, few studies comprehensively compare them across languages. This study conducts a text analysis of Dabiq and Rumiyah in English and Konstantiniyye in Turkish. The findings reveal that all magazines construct distinct “us” versus “them” identities, focusing on religion and justification. Konstantiniyye, targeting Turkish Muslims, emphasizes stronger religious themes compared to Dabiq and Rumiyah. Overall, these magazines discuss legal systems, jihad, state structure, and social order, advocating for Muslim unification under a single “caliphate.” This analysis sheds light on ISIS's diverse propaganda strategies tailored to different linguistic contexts.
... The terrorist organizations of Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jund al-Khalifa, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Ansar Dine, Tablighi Jamaat, the Islamic Party of Turkestan and Jamaat Ansarullah, they are a direct threat to the security of the countries of the region and have extensive instruments for propaganda and recruitment. These groups have become attractive to foreign terrorist fighters [17], who make up 40% of their forces. ...
Relevance. The relevance of the published study is due to the large-scale and consistent conceptualization of the problems of regional specific features of international terrorism and extremism in Central Asia over the past decades. Purpose. This publication is aimed at a thorough analysis of the current situation and the probable future of international terrorism and extremism in Central Asia, taking into account regional peculiarities. Methodology. The methodology for investigating regional features of international terrorism and extremism in Central Asia was to refer to the most represented scientific databases, first of all Cochrane Library, Campbell Collaboration, ERIC, JSTOR, NCJRS, ProQuest, PsycInfo, SCOPUS, ScienceDirect, IEEE Xplore, Web of Science. The selection of valid studies and surveys was carried out using the method of snowball. Results. The key findings highlight the historical context and current challenges posed by international terrorist organizations in Central Asia. The data underscores the threat of extremism and terrorism in the region, emphasizing the return of foreign fighters from conflict zones and the complex dynamics of radicalization and recruitment within Central Asian countries. Additionally, the repatriation efforts by governments showcase the ongoing struggle to address the risks associated with terrorism and extremism in the region. Conclusions. The conclusion of the research article emphasizes the threat of international terrorism and extremism in Central Asia, exacerbated by the support of radical movements by the local population, and highlights the challenges of identifying common drivers of radicalization while calling for further in-depth research into the regional characteristics of terrorism and extremism. Keywords: radicalization of society; security hazard; regional situation; endopathic causes; political power; foreign fighters Orumbayeva M, Kurmangali A. International terrorism and extremism in Central Asia: Regional specific features. Sci Herald Uzhhorod Univ Ser Phys. 2024;(56):527-534. DOI: 10.54919/physics/56.2024.52bye7
... Consequently, it is crucial to delve into the factors that drive individuals toward such acts of violence. International studies have delved into the realm of violence and aggression in sports, exploring the influences and consequences of both prosocial and antisocial behaviors within this context (e.g., Carriedo et al., 2021;Darabi & Shahri, 2020;Dere & Türen, 2020;Dillon et al., 2020;Firdaus & Trilia, 2020;Güler, 2020;Karakullukcu & Yildiz, 2020;Kavussanu & Al-Yaaribi, 2021;Küçük et al., 2017;Parent & Fortier, 2018;Reyhan et al., 2020;Şeker & Uslu, 2020;Turegun & Efek, 2021). ...
... Dieser Aspekt der Voraussage -oder auch Prädiktionunterscheidet automatisierte Methoden der Textanalyse von anderen Formen der Ihnen aus dem Studium bekannten quantitativen Methoden empirischer Sozialforschung wie zum Beispiel Regressionsanalysen. Auch wenn hier der Duktus vorherrscht, dass mithilfe automatisierter Verfahren latente Sinnstrukturen in Texten objektiv erkannt, ohne menschliches Zutun extrahiert, interpretiert und sogar prognostiziert werden können, so kommen auch Verfahren der automatisierten quantitativen Textanalyse nicht ohne Interpretationsleistungen von Forscher*innen aus. Einige Forscher*innen greifen mittlerweile sogar bewusst auf Methoden der qualitativen Sozialforschung zurück, um die Grobkörnigkeit der Analyseergebnisse automatisierter quantitativer Textanalysen auszugleichen und reflektieren dabei, wie eine Integration automatisierter Methoden und qualitativer Methoden möglich ist (Andreotta et al. 2019;Dillon et al. 2020;Fawcett et al. 2019;Lauer et al. 2018;Schneiker et al. 2019). Das ist vor allem der Erkenntnis geschuldet, dass die Ergebnisse automatisierter Methoden häufig schlecht für den Menschen interpretierbar sind, Inhalte und Themen unplausibel sind, oder Muster offenbaren, die der Intuition der Forschenden widersprechen und damit auf Fehler in den Daten oder theoretischen Ansätzen hindeuten. ...
Das Open Access Buch bietet für Einsteiger*innen Erklärungen darüber, wie eine geeignete qualitative oder quantitative inhaltsanalytische Methode abhängig von a) Forschungsinteresse und b) Datenumfang ausgewählt werden kann. Teil 1 definiert Auswertungstechniken und zeigt Möglichkeiten und Grenzen sozialwissenschaftlicher Inhaltsanalysen auf. Teil 2 stellt digital unterstützte und teilautomatisierte Techniken, Teil 3 die automatisierten Techniken Korrespondenzanalyse, Sentiment Analyse und Topic Modeling vor. Alle Einführungen erfolgen mit Beispielen und Softwareanwendungen (AntConc, MAXQDA, Python, RStudio oder VosViewer).
... When the literature is examined, it is seen that many international (Carriedo et al., 2021;Darabi and Shahri, 2020;Dillon et al., 2020;Firdaus and Trilia, 2020;Karakullukcu and Yildiz, 2020;Parent and Fortier, 2018) and national (Dere and Türen, 2020;Güler, 2020;Küçük et al., 2017;Reyhan et al., 2020;Şeker and Uslu, 2020) studies have been conducted to reveal, analyze aggression and violence in sports. In most studies, the subjects were selected from amateur athletes or students with less participation. ...
The study aimed to examine the levels of aggression and violence of students and other professional groups who are Düzcespor football fans. For the research model, the survey model, one of the quantitative research types, was chosen. The study's data collection process was carried out during the 2019-2020 season of the Turkey Football Federation, and the population of the study consisted of Düzcespor fans between the ages of 12-68. The sample of the study, on the other hand, consists of 498 people who voluntarily participated in the study using the random sample selection technique. As a result of normality tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro Wilk), it was determined that the scores obtained from the scales did not show a normal distribution. For this reason, non-parametric tests Mann Whitney-U Test, Kruskal Wallis Test, and Bonferroni Test, one of the Post Hoc tests, were used to determine which group caused the significant difference between the groups as a result of the analysis. Frequency, percentage, minimum, maximum, average, and standard deviation values were also used to analyze the data. The level of significance was determined as p < 0.05. The study's findings showed that Düzcespor supporters had moderate aggression and violent behaviors. There was a significant difference between the variables of gender, age, education level, occupation and income, and aggression and violent behavior. The study results revealed that aggression and tendency to violence are higher in males, younger people, high school students and people with low income.
This systematic review explores the utilization of crowdsourcing for geoinformation in enhancing awareness and mitigating terrorism-related disasters. Out of 519 studies identified in the database search, 108 were deemed eligible for analysis. We focused on articles employing various forms of crowdsourcing platforms, such as Twitter (now known as X), Facebook, and Telegram, across three distinct phases of terrorism-related disasters: monitoring and detection, onset, and post-incident analysis. Notably, we placed particular emphasis on the integration of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms in studying crowdsourced terrorism geoinformation to assess the current state of research and propose future directions. The findings revealed that Twitter emerged as the predominant crowdsourcing platform for terrorism-related information. Despite the prevalence of natural language processing for data mining, the majority of studies did not incorporate ML algorithms in their analyses. This preference for qualitative research methods can be attributed to the multifaceted nature of terrorism, spanning security, governance, politics, religion, and law. Our advocacy is for increased studies from the domains of geography, earth observation, and big data. Simultaneously, we encourage advancements in existing ML algorithms to enhance the accurate real-time detection of planned and onset terrorism disasters.
Researchers and policymakers have increasingly recognized foreign fighter mobilization as a national security threat to foreign states and domestic populations. Yet, scholars remain divided on the motivations of foreign combatants, arguing that fighters may be motivated by grievances, opportunity, or material incentives. The motivations of foreign fighters may be especially complex, as they are engaging in a conflict outside of their state. I analyze how historical and present-day group exclusionary policies and opportunity shape mobilization. To do so, I leverage novel data consisting of individual fighter data of Islamic State volunteers fighting in Iraq and Syria. Consistent with my theoretical framework, I find that a higher rate of Islamic State fighters come from areas where Sunni Muslims were denied access to political power and have greater state capacity.
The main objective of this research is to identify and classify the opinions of Persian-speaking Twitter users related to drought crises in Iran and subsequently develop a model for detecting these opinions on the platform. To achieve this, a model has been developed using machine learning and text mining methods to detect the opinions of Persian-speaking Twitter users regarding the drought issues in Iran. The statistical population for the research included 42,028 drought-related tweets posted over a one-year period. These tweets were extracted from Twitter using keywords related to the drought crises in Iran. Subsequently, a sample of 2,300 tweets was qualitatively analyzed, labeled, categorized, and examined. Next, a four-category classification of users` opinions regarding drought crises and Iranians' resilience to these crises was identified. Based on these four categories, a machine learning model based on logistic regression was trained to predict and detect various opinions in Twitter posts. The developed model exhibits an accuracy of 66.09% and an F-score of 60%, indicating that this model has good performance for detecting Iranian Twitter users' opinions regarding drought crises. The ability to detect opinions regarding drought crises on platforms like Twitter using machine learning methods can intelligently represent the resilience level of the Iranian society in the face of these crises, and inform policymakers in this area about changes in public opinion.
Women affiliated with ISIS in a voluntary role, often hailing from the West, are often presented either as passive accessories and victims or as deviant, gender-norm-defying monsters.1 In fact, women are an indispensable component of ISIS, taking up roles both as perpetrators of violence and as mothers and educators of the next generation of ISIS fighters. Through the creation of an original database, I examine the roles and experiences of ISIS-affiliated women before, during, and after their time in the organization. I make connections between individuals’ roles and experiences and highlight identifiable trends in the behavior of these women. These findings suggest that there are misunderstandings in current counterterrorism efforts and policies. The data and hypotheses presented in this study provide a foundation for future data collection efforts and for the construction of fuller accounts of the nature and determinants of the behavior of this important category of women.
The development of social media technologies has had a significant impact on individuals , organizations and societies. However, social media has not only affected people and communities, but also terrorist organizations have started to use social media platforms effectively. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (isis) is one such group that actively utilizes social media. Social media has played a critical role in formulating and disseminating isis's strategies. Twitter is one of the most effective social media platforms used by isis, and it actively uses Twitter in predominantly Muslim countries such as Turkey. In this article, I use a dictionary-based method to compare and analyze 29,419 tweets from English-speaking supporters of isis and 40,526 tweets from Turkish supporters of isis between 2015 and 2016. Keywords Twitter analysis-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (isis)-Turkish and English-speaking isis supporters on Twitter-dictionary-based analysis
Social media platforms have become a part of people's daily lives. However, developing social media technologies have affected not only people but also terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and social media has become an essential part of ISIS's strategies. ISIS effectively uses many social media platforms, especially Twitter, for propaganda, recruitment, and creating fear among people. ISIS also actively uses Twitter in Turkey. However, the number of academic studies focusing on the behavior, structure, communication, and relationship networks of ISIS sympathizers in Turkey is limited. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to reveal the structure, behavior, communication, and relationship networks of ISIS's Turkish sympathizers. Accordingly, this study focuses on the structure, behavior, communication, and relationship networks of ISIS's Turkish sympathizers. I will analyze them within four main analytical steps. The basic characteristics, structures, behaviors, and relationship networks of 2079 Turkish ISIS sympathizers are examined with the R computer program, and many remarkable findings are reached as a result of the analysis.
Background
Most national counter‐radicalization strategies identify the media, and particularly the Internet as key sources of risk for radicalization. However, the magnitude of the relationships between different types of media usage and radicalization remains unknown. Additionally, whether Internet‐related risk factors do indeed have greater impacts than other forms of media remain another unknown. Overall, despite extensive research of media effects in criminology, the relationship between media and radicalization has not been systematically investigated.
Objectives
This systematic review and meta‐analysis sought to (1) identify and synthesize the effects of different media‐related risk factors at the individual level, (2) identify the relative magnitudes of the effect sizes for the different risk factors, and (3) compare the effects between outcomes of cognitive and behavioral radicalization. The review also sought to examine sources of heterogeneity between different radicalizing ideologies.
Search Methods
Electronic searches were carried out in several relevant databases and inclusion decisions were guided by a published review protocol. In addition to these searches, leading researchers were contacted to try and identify unpublished or unidentified research. Hand searches of previously published reviews and research were also used to supplement the database searches. Searches were carried out until August 2020.
Selection Criteria
The review included quantitative studies that examined at least one media‐related risk factor (such as exposure to, or usage of a particular medium or mediated content) and its relationship to either cognitive or behavioral radicalization at the individual level.
Data Collection and Analysis
Random‐effects meta‐analysis was used for each risk factor individually and risk factors were arranged in rank‐order. Heterogeneity was explored using a combination of moderator analysis, meta‐regression, and sub‐group analysis.
Results
The review included 4 experimental and 49 observational studies. Most of the studies were judged to be of low quality and suffer from multiple, potential sources of bias. From the included studies, effect sizes pertaining to 23 media‐related risk factors were identified and analyzed for the outcome of cognitive radicalization, and two risk factors for the outcome of behavioral radicalization. Experimental evidence demonstrated that mere exposure to media theorized to increase cognitive radicalization was associated with a small increase in risk (g = 0.08, 95% confidence interval [CI] [−0.03, 19]). A slightly larger estimate was observed for those high in trait aggression (g = 0.13, 95% CI [0.01, 0.25]). Evidence from observational studies shows that for cognitive radicalization, risk factors such as television usage have no effect (r = 0.01, 95% CI [−0.06, 0.09]). However, passive (r = 0.24, 95% CI [0.18, 0.31]) and active (r = 0.22, 95% CI [0.15, 0.29]) forms of exposure to radical content online demonstrate small but potentially meaningful relationships. Similar sized estimates for passive (r = 0.23, 95% CI [0.12, 0.33]) and active (r = 0.28, 95% CI [0.21, 0.36]) forms of exposure to radical content online were found for the outcome of behavioral radicalization.
Authors' Conclusions
Relative to other known risk factors for cognitive radicalization, even the most salient of the media‐related risk factors have comparatively small estimates. However, compared to other known risk factors for behavioral radicalization, passive and active forms of exposure to radical content online have relatively large and robust estimates. Overall, exposure to radical content online appears to have a larger relationship with radicalization than other media‐related risk factors, and the impact of this relationship is most pronounced for behavioral outcomes of radicalization. While these results may support policy‐makers' focus on the Internet in the context of combatting radicalization, the quality of the evidence is low and more robust study designs are needed to enable the drawing of firmer conclusions.
Extremism has grown as a global problem for society in recent years, especially after the apparition of movements such as jihadism. This and other extremist groups have taken advantage of different approaches, such as the use of Social Media, to spread their ideology, promote their acts and recruit followers. The extremist discourse, therefore, is reflected on the language used by these groups. Natural language processing (NLP) provides a way of detecting this type of content, and several authors make use of it to describe and discriminate the discourse held by these groups, with the final objective of detecting and preventing its spread. Following this approach, this survey aims to review the contributions of NLP to the field of extremism research, providing the reader with a comprehensive picture of the state of the art of this research area. The content includes a first conceptualization of the term extremism, the elements that compose an extremist discourse and the differences with other terms. After that, a review description and comparison of the frequently used NLP techniques is presented, including how they were applied, the insights they provided, the most frequently used NLP software tools, descriptive and classification applications, and the availability of datasets and data sources for research. Finally, research questions are approached and answered with highlights from the review, while future trends, challenges and directions derived from these highlights are suggested towards stimulating further research in this exciting research area.
Extremism research has grown as an open problem for several countries during recent years, especially due to the apparition of movements such as jihadism. This and other extremist groups have taken advantage of different approaches, such as the use of Social Media, to spread their ideology, promote their acts and recruit followers. Natural Language Processing (NLP) represents a way of detecting this type of content, and several authors make use of it to describe and discriminate the discourse held by this groups, with the final objective of detecting and preventing its spread. This survey aims to review the contributions of NLP to the field of extremism research, providing the reader with a comprehensive picture of the state of the art of this research area. The content includes a description and comparison of the frequently used NLP techniques, how they were applied, the insights they provided, the most frequently used NLP software tools and the availability of datasets and data sources for research. Finally, research questions are approached and answered with highlights from the review, while future trends, challenges and directions derived from these highlights are suggested.
Understanding how extremist Salafists communicate, and not only what, is key to gaining insights into the ways they construct their social order and use psychological forces to radicalize potential sympathizers on social media. With a view to contributing to the existing body of research which mainly focuses on terrorist organizations, we analyzed accounts that advocate violent jihad without supporting (at least publicly) any terrorist group and hence might be able to reach a large and not yet radicalized audience. We constructed a critical multimodal and multidisciplinary framework of discourse patterns that may work as potential triggers to a selection of key cognitive biases and we applied it to a corpus of Facebook posts published by seven extremist Salafists. Results reveal how these posts are either based on an intense crisis construct (through negative outgroup nomination, intensification and emotion) or on simplistic solutions composed of taken-for-granted statements. Devoid of any grey zone, these posts do not seek to convince the reader; polarization is framed as a presuppositional established reality. These observations reveal that extremist Salafist communication is constructed in a way that may trigger specific cognitive biases, which are discussed in the paper.
Objectives Social media platforms such as Facebook are used by both radicals and the security services that keep them under surveillance. However, only a small percentage of radicals go on to become terrorists and there is a worrying lack of evidence as to what types of online behaviors may differentiate terrorists from non-violent radicals. Most of the research to date uses text-based analysis to identify "radicals" only. In this study we sought to identify new social-media level behavioral metrics upon which it is possible to differentiate terrorists from non-violent radicals. Methods: Drawing on an established theoretical framework, Social Learning Theory, this study used a matched case-control design to compare the Facebook activities and interactions of 48 Palestinian terrorists in the 100 days prior to their attack with a 2:1 control group. Conditional-likelihood logistic regression was used to identify precise estimates, and a series of binomial logistic regression models were used to identify how well the variables classified between the groups. Findings: Variables from each of the social learning domains of differential associations, definitions, differential reinforcement, and imitation were found to be significant predictors of being a terrorist compared to a nonviolent radical. Models including these factors had a relatively high classification rate, and significantly reduced error over base-rate classification. Conclusions Behavioral level metrics derived from social learning theory should be considered as metrics upon which it may be possible to differentiate between terrorists and non-violent radicals based on their social media profiles. These metrics may also serve to support textbased analysis and vice versa.
In recent years, researchers have shown a vested interest in developing advanced information technologies, machine-learning algorithms, and risk-assessment tools to detect and analyze radical content online, with increased attention on identifying violent extremists or measuring digital pathways of violent radicalization. Yet overlooked in this evolving space has been a systematic examination of what constitutes radical posting behaviors in general. This study uses a sentiment analysis-based algorithm that adapts criminal career measures – and is guided by communication research on social influence – to develop and describe three radical posting behaviors (high-intensity, high-frequency, and high-duration) found on a sub-forum of the most conspicuous right-wing extremist forum. The results highlight the multi-dimensional nature of radical right-wing posting behaviors, many of which may inform future risk factor frameworks used by law enforcement and intelligence agencies to identify credible threats online.
The article reviews Cas Mudde's 'The Far Right Today' (2019). It is published in the March 2020 issue of e-Extreme, the Newsletter of the ECPR Standing Group on Extremism and Democracy, volume 21, issue 1. The issue can be found/downloaded from here: https://standinggroups.ecpr.eu/extremismanddemocracy/newsletter/
Researchers have previously explored how right-wing extremists build a collective identity online by targeting their perceived “threat,” but little is known about how this “us” versus “them” dynamic evolves over time. This study uses a sentiment analysis-based algorithm that adapts criminal career measures, as well as semi-parametric group-based modeling, to evaluate how users’ anti-Semitic, anti-Black, and anti-LGBTQ posting behaviors develop on a sub-forum of the most conspicuous white supremacy forum. The results highlight the extent to which authors target their key adversaries over time, as well as the applicability of a criminal career approach in measuring radical posting trajectories online.
Using a dataset of over 1.9 million messages posted on Twitter by about 25,000 ISIS sympathizers, we explore how ISIS makes use of social media to spread its propaganda and recruit militants from the Arab world and across the globe. By distinguishing between violence-driven, theological, and sectarian content, we trace the connection between online rhetoric and key events on the ground. To the best of our knowledge, ours is one of the first studies to focus on Arabic content, while most literature focuses on English content. Our findings yield new important insights about how social media is used by radical militant groups to target the Arab-speaking world, and reveal important patterns in their propaganda efforts.
There is a growing recognition for the important role played by qualitative research and its usefulness in many fields, including the emergency care context in Africa. Novice qualitative researchers are often daunted by the prospect of qualitative data analysis and thus may experience much difficulty in the data analysis process. Our objective with this manuscript is to provide a practical hands-on example of qualitative content analysis to aid novice qualitative researchers in their task.
The current crises in Syria has led to a number of Britons travelling abroad to fight with groups such as Isis. Capitalising on this growth, Isis are now increasingly fighting an online cyber war, with the use of slick videos, online messages of hate and even an app that all aim to radicalise and create a new generation of cyber jihadists. These modern day tools are helping Isis spread their propaganda and ideology to thousands of online sympathisers across the world. Indeed, the group has actively been using social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube to recruit new would be members. This is being done through images and the streaming of violent online viral videos filmed and professionally edited that are targeting young and impressionable people. Portraying a glamorised and ‘cool’ image, Isis fighters are beginning to act as the new rock stars of global cyber jihad. The Internet therefore is becoming the virtual playground for extremist views to be reinforced and act as an echo chamber. This study analysed 100 different Facebook pages and 50 Twitter user accounts which generated over 2050 results and helped the author create a typology of seven key behaviour characteristics and motivations. The findings in this study confirmed the author’s original hypothesis, i.e. online hate is being used by groups such as Isis for a variety of reasons such as recruitment and propaganda. Moreover, this material is coordinated and controlled by Isis as a means for publishing and sending out key messages.
As violent extremists continue to surface in online discussion forums, law enforcement agencies search for new ways of uncovering their digital indicators. Researchers have both described and hypothesized a number of ways to detect online traces of potential extremists, yet this area of inquiry remains in its infancy. This study proposes a new search method that, through the analysis of sentiment, identifies the most radical users within online forums. Although this method is applicable to web-forums of any type, the method was evaluated on four Islamic forums containing approximately 1 million posts of its 26,000 unique users. Several characteristics of each user’s postings were examined, including their posting behavior and the content of their posts. The content was analyzed using Parts-Of-Speech tagging, sentiment analysis, and a novel algorithm called ‘Sentiment-based Identification of Radical Authors’, which accounts for a user’s percentile score for average sentiment score, volume of negative posts, severity of negative posts, and duration of negative posts. The results suggest that there is no simple typology that best describes radical users online; however, the method is flexible enough to evaluate several properties of a user’s online activity that can identify radical users on the forums.
In an effort to better understand the risk of individuals being radicalised via the internet, this paper re-examines the phenomenon of online radicalisation by focusing on four considerations of interest: individual, online environment, interactions between individual and the online environment, and protective elements. A key premise of the discussion presented is that the different theoretical assumptions and linkages underlying each consideration are not only reconcilable but that together they provide a more comprehensive understanding of assessing risk of radicalisation via the internet than any perspective by itself. Implications for operationalising these four considerations and their associated factors to identify individuals at risk of being radicalised via the internet will also be discussed.
Social Media has become an important source for information about people and real-world events. Its importance is driven largely by the enormous number of people generating and updating content in Social Media platforms. In this report, we measure the extent to which we can accurately measure the salience of topics/concepts that might be of interest to an analyst, and evaluate whether concepts like positive and negative sentiment can be meaningfully extracted from Social Media content. As a test case, we examined Twitter content generated by female users who are sympathetic to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The basic technique proposed here can be developed further to create a more fine-grained exanimation of Social Media content.
Some scholars and others are skeptical of a significant role for the Internet in processes of violent radicalization. There is increasing concern on the part of other scholars, and increasingly also policymakers and publics, that easy availability of violent extremist content online may have violent radicalizing effects. This article identifies a number of core questions regarding the interaction of violent extremism and terrorism and the Internet, particularly social media, that have yet to be adequately addressed and supplies a series of six follow-up suggestions, flowing from these questions, for progressing research in this area. These suggestions relate to (1) widening the range of types of violent online extremism being studied beyond violent jihadis; (2) engaging in more comparative research, not just across ideologies, but also groups, countries, languages, and social media platforms; (3) deepening our analyses to include interviewing and virtual ethnographic approaches; (4) up-scaling or improving our capacity to undertake “big data” collection and analysis; (5) outreaching beyond terrorism studies to become acquainted with, for example, the Internet Studies literature and engaging in interdisciplinary research with, for example, computer scientists; and (6) paying more attention to gender as a factor in violent online extremism.
In an attempt to help find meaning within qualitative data, researchers commonly start by coding their data. There are a number of coding systems available to researchers and this reflexive account explores my reflections on the use of two such techniques. As part of a larger investigation, two pilot studies were undertaken as a means to examine the relative merits of open coding and template coding for examining transcripts. This article does not describe the research project per se but attempts to step back and offer a reflexive account of the development of data coding tools. Here I reflect upon and evaluate the two data coding techniques that were piloted, and discuss how using appropriate aspects of both led to the development of my final data coding approach. My exploration found there was no clear-cut ‘best’ option but that the data coding techniques needed to be reflexively-aligned to meet the specific needs of my project. This reflection suggests that, when coding qualitative data, researchers should be methodologically thoughtful when they attempt to apply any data coding technique; that they do not assume pre-established tools are aligned to their particular paradigm; and that they consider combining and refining established techniques as a means to define their own specific codes.
DOI:10.2458/azu_jmmss_v6i1_blair
This study seeks to develop a screening guide for jihadi terrorism with the intention of streamlining the huge amounts of raw intelligence into smaller amounts of data for further analysis. On the basis of the authors’ collective experience in dealing with terrorists, and a review of the literature and pre-attack indicators developed by law enforcement agencies worldwide, 53 features of jihadi terrorism belonging to three domains (behaviour ideology, group psychology and operational preparatory) were identified. These features were then mapped against 30 jihadi attacks from different parts of the world. The frequency distribution of each feature across the 30 attacks were analysed using Pearson’s χ
2 test. Three significant features were identified: (i) individuals pushing for terrorist ideals through violence; (ii) individuals showing a desire for revenge; and (iii) the presence of a leader figure who espouses terrorist ideology. Results further revealed that features from the behaviour-ideology domain had higher prevalence estimates across the 30 attacks. Recommendations are made for operationalising these features as a potential early screening guide for the interpretation of data.
Within a fairly short amount of time, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) has managed to put large swaths of land in Syria and Iraq under their
control. To many observers, the sheer speed at which this "state" was
established was dumbfounding. To better understand the roots of this
organization and its supporters we present a study using data from Twitter. We
start by collecting large amounts of Arabic tweets referring to ISIS and
classify them into pro-ISIS and anti-ISIS. This classification turns out to be
easily done simply using the name variants used to refer to the organization:
the full name and the description as "state" is associated with support,
whereas abbreviations usually indicate opposition. We then "go back in time" by
analyzing the historic timelines of both users supporting and opposing and look
at their pre-ISIS period to gain insights into the antecedents of support. To
achieve this, we build a classifier using pre-ISIS data to "predict", in
retrospect, who will support or oppose the group. The key story that emerges is
one of frustration with failed Arab Spring revolutions. ISIS supporters largely
differ from ISIS opposition in that they refer a lot more to Arab Spring
uprisings that failed. We also find temporal patterns in the support and
opposition which seems to be linked to major news, such as reported territorial
gains, reports on gruesome acts of violence, and reports on airstrikes and
foreign intervention.
Policymakers and scholars fear that the Internet has increased the ability of transnational terrorists, like al Qaeda, to attack targets in the West, even in the face of increased policing and military efforts. Although access to the Internet has increased across the globe, there has been no corresponding increase in completed transnational terrorist attacks. This analysis examines the causal logics—which have led to the conventional wisdom—and demonstrates both theoretically and empirically that the Internet is not a force multiplier for transnational terrorist organizations. Far from being at a disadvantage on the Internet, state security organs actually gain at least as much utility from the Internet as terrorist groups do, meaning that at worst the Internet leaves the state in the same position vis-à-vis terrorist campaigns as it was prior to the Internet.
In discourse about countering terrorism, the term "radicalization" is widely used, but remains poorly defined. To focus narrowly on ideological radicalization risks implying that radical beliefs are a proxy—or at least a necessary precursor—for terrorism, though we know this not to be true.Different pathways and mechanisms of terrorism involvement operate in different ways for different people at different points in time and perhaps in different contexts. This article explores the problems in defining radicalization and radicalism, and suggests that radicalization—and more specifically, involvement in terrorism—might best be viewed as a set of diverse processes. It goes on to review several potentially promising theories that might support further study of those processes, including social movement theory, social psychology, and conversion theory. Finally, it describes some possible frameworks for understanding how the processes might facilitate terrorism-related behavior.
Based on the terror management notion that cultural icons are part of a system that provides protection from fears about one's mortality, it was hypothesized that reminding subjects of their mortality would make it more difficult for them to use cultural icons in an inappropriate way. Subjects responded to questions about either their own mortality or television, and then participated in two problem-solving tasks involving the culturally inappropriate use of cultural icons (a flag and crucifix) or the use of neutral objects. Although mortality salience did not affect actual use of the objects, it did increase the amount of time required to solve the problems, the number of alternative solutions generated, and the extent to which subjects expressed reluctance to use the icons. Mortality salience also increased subjects' reports of task difficulty and tension when the optimal solutions of the problems required inappropriate use of the cultural icons.
This study aims to investigate how Al Qaeda uses the Internet for military training and preparation. What kind of training material is available on jihadi webpages, who produces it, and for what purpose? The article argues that in spite of a vast amount of training-related literature online, there have been few organized efforts by Al Qaeda to train their followers by way of the Internet. The Internet is per today not a “virtual training camp” organized from above, but rather a resource bank maintained and accessed largely by self-radicalized sympathizers.
Terrorists fight their wars in cyberspace as well as on the ground. However, while politicians and the media have hotly debated the dangers that cyberterrorism poses to the Internet, surprisingly little is known about the threat posed by terrorists' use of the Internet. Today, as this report makes plain, terrorist organizations and their supporters maintain thousands of websites, exploiting the unregulated, anonymous, and easily accessible nature of the Internet to target an array of messages to a variety of audiences. Our study identifies no fewer than eight different ways in which terrorists are using the Internet to advance their cause, ranging from psychological warfare to recruitment, networking to fundraising. In each case, the report not only analyzes how the Internet can facilitate terrorist operations but also illustrates the point with examples culled from an extensive exploration of the World Wide Web. Today, all active terrorist groups have established their presence on the Internet. Terrorism on the Internet is a very dynamic phenomenon: websites suddenly emerge, frequently modify their formats, and then swiftly disappear—or, in many cases, seem to disappear by changing their online address but retaining much the same content. Using these websites, online terrorists target three different audiences: current and potential supporters; international public opinion; and enemy publics. Finally, while we must better defend our societies against cyberterrorism and Internet-savvy terrorists, we should also consider the costs of applying counterterrorism measures to the Internet. Such measures can hand authoritarian governments and agencies with little public accountability tools with which to violate privacy, curtail the free flow of information, and restrict freedom of expression, thus adding a heavy price in terms of diminished civil liberties to the high toll exacted by terrorism itself.
In this article, the authors describe procedures used in the development of a new scale of militant extremist mindset. A 2-step approach consisted of (a) linguistic analysis of the texts produced by known terrorist organizations and selection of statements from these texts that reflect the mindset of those belonging to these organizations and (b) analyses of the structural properties of the scales based on 132 selected statements. Factor analysis of militant extremist statements with participants (N = 452) from Australia, Serbia, and the United States produced 3 dimensions: (a) justification and advocacy of violence (War factor), (b) violence in the name of God (God factor), and (c) blaming Western nations for the problems in the world today (West factor). We also report the distributions of scores for the 3 subscales, mean differences among the 3 national samples, and correlations with a measure of dogmatism (M. Rokeach, 1956).
To evaluate whether happiness can spread from person to person and whether niches of happiness form within social networks.
Longitudinal social network analysis.
Framingham Heart Study social network.
4739 individuals followed from 1983 to 2003.
Happiness measured with validated four item scale; broad array of attributes of social networks and diverse social ties.
Clusters of happy and unhappy people are visible in the network, and the relationship between people's happiness extends up to three degrees of separation (for example, to the friends of one's friends' friends). People who are surrounded by many happy people and those who are central in the network are more likely to become happy in the future. Longitudinal statistical models suggest that clusters of happiness result from the spread of happiness and not just a tendency for people to associate with similar individuals. A friend who lives within a mile (about 1.6 km) and who becomes happy increases the probability that a person is happy by 25% (95% confidence interval 1% to 57%). Similar effects are seen in coresident spouses (8%, 0.2% to 16%), siblings who live within a mile (14%, 1% to 28%), and next door neighbours (34%, 7% to 70%). Effects are not seen between coworkers. The effect decays with time and with geographical separation.
People's happiness depends on the happiness of others with whom they are connected. This provides further justification for seeing happiness, like health, as a collective phenomenon.
Study 1 investigated the effect of mortality salience on support for martyrdom attacks among Iranian college students. Participants were randomly assigned to answer questions about either their own death or an aversive topic unrelated to death and then evaluated materials from fellow students who either supported or opposed martyrdom attacks against the United States. Whereas control participants preferred the student who opposed martyrdom, participants reminded of death preferred the student who supported martyrdom and indicated they were more likely to consider such activities themselves. Study 2 investigated the effect of mortality salience on American college students' support for extreme military interventions by American forces that could kill thousands of civilians. Mortality salience increased support for such measures among politically conservative but not politically liberal students. The roles of existential fear, cultural worldviews, and construing one's nation as pursing a heroic battle against evil in advocacy of violence were discussed.
The emergence and actions of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS) has received widespread news coverage across the World, largely due to their capture of large swathes of land across Syria and Iraq, and the publishing of execution and propaganda videos. Enticed by such material published on social media and attracted to the cause of ISIS, there have been numerous reports of individuals from European countries (the United Kingdom and France in particular) moving to Syria and joining ISIS. In this paper our aim to understand what happens to Europe-based Twitter users before, during, and after they exhibit pro-ISIS behaviour (i.e. using pro-ISIS terms, sharing content from pro-ISIS accounts), characterising such behaviour as radicalisation signals. We adopt a data-mining oriented approach to computationally determine time points of activation (i.e. when users begin to adopt pro-ISIS behaviour), characterise divergent behaviour (both lexically and socially), and quantify influence dynamics as pro-ISIS terms are adopted. Our findings show that: (i) of 154K users examined only 727 exhibited signs of pro-ISIS behaviour and the vast majority of those 727 users became \emph{activated} with such behaviour during the summer of 2014 when ISIS shared many beheading videos online; (ii) users exhibit significant behaviour divergence around the time of their activation, and; (iii) social homophily has a strong bearing on the diffusion process of pro-ISIS terms through Twitter.
This study applies the method of sentiment analysis to the online media released by the Islamic State (IS) in order to distinguish the ways in which IS uses language within their media, and potential ways in which this language differs across various online platforms. The data used for this sentiment analysis consist of transcripts of IS-produced videos, the text of IS-produced online periodical magazines, and social media posts from IS-affiliated Twitter accounts. It was found that the language and discourse utilised by IS in their online media is of a predominantly negative nature, with the language of videos containing the highest concentration of negative sentiment. The words and phrases with the most extreme sentiment values are used as a starting point for the identification of specific narratives that exist within online IS media. The dominant narratives discovered with the aid of sentiment analysis were: 1) the demonstrated strength of the IS, 2) the humiliation of IS enemies, 3) continuous victory, and 4) religious righteousness. Beyond the identification of IS narratives, this study serves to further explore the utility of the sentiment analysis method by applying it to mediums and data that it has not traditionally been applied to, specifically, videos and magazines.
Social media increasingly plays a role in conflict and contentious politics. Politicians, leaders, insurgents, and protestors all have used it as a tool for communication. At the same time, scholars have turned to social media as a source of new data on conflict. I provide a framework for understanding social media’s influence on conflict through four interrelated points: (1) social media reduces the costs of communication, (2) it increases the speed and dissemination of information, (3) scholars should focus on the strategic interaction and competitive adaption of actors in response to communication technology changes, and (4) the new data that social media provides are not only an important resource, but also fundamentally change the information available to conflict actors, thereby shaping the conflict itself. In sum, social media’s influence on conflict defies simplistic explanations that argue that it privileges incumbents or challengers.
Recent terrorist attacks carried out on behalf of ISIS on American and European soil by lone wolf attackers or sleeper cells remind us of the importance of understanding the dynamics of radicalization mediated by social media communication channels. In this paper, we shed light on the social media activity of a group of twenty-five thousand users whose association with ISIS online radical propaganda has been manually verified. By using a computational tool known as dynamic activity-connectivity maps, based on network and temporal activity patterns, we investigate the dynamics of social influence within ISIS supporters. We finally quantify the effectiveness of ISIS propaganda by determining the adoption of extremist content in the general population and draw a parallel between radical propaganda and epidemics spreading, highlighting that information broadcasters and influential ISIS supporters generate highly-infectious cascades of information contagion. Our findings will help generate effective countermeasures to combat the group and other forms of online extremism.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has made great use of the Internet and online social media to spread its message and encourage others, particularly young people, to support the organization, to travel to the Middle East to engage in combat or to join the group by playing a supporting role—a role often carved out for young women persuaded to join ISIS. Social media has proven to be an extremely valuable tool for the organization and is perfectly suited for ISIS’ target audience—the “Millennial generation,” and now more often, those from Western countries. What messages from jihadists convince young people to become involved with the terrorist group? How is it that so many are drawn in over the Internet by ISIS operatives—people they’ve never met face-to-face? And yet these young people (many still in their teens) are willing to leave their families and comfortable life styles to join remote communities half way around the world to engage in war. Understanding the characteristics that can put young people at particular risk of being lured by ISIS will help the U.S. and other nations to identify at-risk individuals and implement improved preventative measures.
Our personal, financial and civic interactions are increasingly digitally mediated, and more and more objects come embedded with chips and sensors. As a result, a new layer of power has arisen: that of the algorithm. Software-human-constructed, often invisible and progressively pervasive-not only mediates our lives, it is increasingly used to make decisions in a diverse group areas ranging from sociality to employment to health to relationships. While automation's social, political and economic impacts have long been debated, there is now a new layer that requires consideration: algorithms, often aided by big data, now make decisions in subjective realms where there is no right decision, and no anchor with which to judge outcomes. What is good? What is relevant? What is important? Who is right? What is desirable? What is valuable? These questions with philosophical roots that go to beginning of civilization are now turned over to algorithms that bring about a new set of structural biases and issues. This new phase in pervasive computing raises significant questions and challenges, and important areas of research.
This research paper focuses on the importance of the Internet serves for operations of various terrorist groups. The Internet offers terrorists a form of safe haven similar to that of territorial safe haven where they can train, recruit and perform a multitude of operational tasks. Some of the benefits, such as strategic communications and fundraising, can theoretically be conducted almost completely online, while the utility of the Internet for performing other functions is also well established. Clearly, the Internet is being harnessed by terrorist groups. This research details various functions performed by terrorist groups.
Qualitative interviews are increasingly being utilized within the context of intervention trials. While there is emerging assistance for conducting and reporting qualitative analysis, there are limited practical resources available for researchers engaging in a group coding process and interested in ensuring adequate Intercoder Reliability (ICR); the amount of agreement between two or more coders for the codes applied to qualitative text. Assessing the reliability of the coding helps establish the credibility of qualitative findings. We discuss our experience calculating ICR in the context of a behavioural HIV prevention trial for young women in South Africa which involves multiple rounds of longitudinal qualitative data collection. We document the steps that we took to improve ICR in this study, the challenges to improving ICR, and the value of the process to qualitative data analysis. As a result, we provide guidelines for other researchers to consider as they embark on large qualitative projects.
Social media have played an essential role in the jihadists’ operational strategy in Syria and Iraq, and beyond. Twitter in particular has been used to drive communications over other social media platforms. Twitter streams from the insurgency may give the illusion of authenticity, as a spontaneous activity of a generation accustomed to using their cell phones for self-publication, but to what extent is access and content controlled? Over a period of three months, from January through March 2014, information was collected from the Twitter accounts of 59 Western-origin fighters known to be in Syria. Using a snowball method, the 59 starter accounts were used to collect data about the most popular accounts in the network-at-large. Social network analysis on the data collated about Twitter users in the Western Syria-based fighters points to the controlling role played by feeder accounts belonging to terrorist organizations in the insurgency zone, and by Europe-based organizational accounts associated with the banned British organization, Al Muhajiroun, and in particular the London-based preacher, Anjem Choudary.
We present a model of radicalization and deradicalization based on the notion that the quest for personal significance constitutes a major motivational force that may push individuals toward violent extremism. Radicalization is defined as the process of supporting or engaging in activities deemed (by others) as in violation of important social norms (e.g., the killing of civilians). In these terms, radicalization (1) is a matter of degree (in which mere attitudinal support for violence reflects a lower degree of radicalization than actual engagement in violence); (2) represents a subjective judgment proffered by those for whom the violated norms seem important but not by those who have devalued or suppressed the norms in question.
Our radicalization/deradicalization model contains three crucial components: (1) the motivational component (the quest for personal significance) that defines a goal to which one may be committed, (2) the ideological component that in addition identifies the means of violence as appropriate for this goal's pursuit, and (3) the social process of networking and group dynamics through which the individual comes to share in the violence‐justifying ideology and proceeds to implement it as a means of significance gain. We present empirical evidence consistent with our model's assumptions and discuss its implications for policies of preventing radicalization and effecting deradicalization.
In this study among Dutch Muslim youth (N = 131), we focus on the process of radicalization. We hypothesize that this process is driven by three main factors: (a) personal uncertainty, (b) perceived injustice, and (c) perceived group threat. Using structural equation modeling, we demonstrate that personal uncertainty, perceived injustice, and group‐threat factors are important determinants of a radical belief system (e.g., perceived superiority of Muslims, perceived illegitimacy of Dutch authorities, perceived distance to others, and a feeling of being disconnected from society). This radical belief system in turn predicts attitudes toward violence by other Muslims, which is a determinant of own violent intentions. Results are discussed in terms of the role of individual and group‐based determinants of radicalization.
The Internet is often singled out as the key means through which extremists and terrorists are radicalised. Yet, argue Charlie Edwards and Luke Gribbon, research thus far has fallen short of unearthing the actual mechanisms through which this radicalisation takes place. Using examples from a wider study, they explore different ways in which individuals have used the Internet in their processes of radicalisation and point out that policy-makers and researchers need to focus their efforts on understanding not merely the content that is available online, but the ways in which this content is used in the process of radicalisation.
The main applications and challenges of one of the hottest research areas in computer science.
This article studies variation in conflict theater choice by Western jihadists in an effort to understand their motivations. Some militants attack at home, whereas others join insurgencies abroad, but few scholars have asked why they make these different choices. Using open-source data, I estimate recruit supply for each theater, foreign fighter return rates, and returnee impact on domestic terrorist activity. The tentative data indicate that jihadists prefer foreign fighting, but a minority attacks at home after being radicalized, most often through foreign fighting or contact with a veteran. Most foreign fighters do not return for domestic operations, but those who do return are more effective operatives than nonveterans. The findings have implications for our understanding of the motivations of jihadists, for assessments of the terrorist threat posed by foreign fighters, and for counterterrorism policy.
While the use of the internet and social media as a tool for extremists and terrorists has been well documented, understanding the mechanisms at work has been much more elusive. This paper begins with a grounded theory approach guided by a new theoretical approach to power that utilizes both terrorism cases and extremist social media groups to develop an explanatory model of radicalization. Preliminary hypotheses are developed, explored and refined in order to develop a comprehensive model which is then presented. This model utilizes and applies concepts from social theorist Michel Foucault, including the use of discourse and networked power relations in order to normalize and modify thoughts and behaviors. The internet is conceptualized as a type of institution in which this framework of power operates and seeks to recruit and radicalize. Overall, findings suggest that the explanatory model presented is a well suited, yet still incomplete in explaining the process of online radicalization.
This article reviews the state of the art of available theories and data regarding the psychology of terrorism. Data and theoretical material were gathered from the world’s unclassified literature. Multiple theories and some demographic data have been published, but very few controlled empirical studies have been conducted investigating the psychological bases of terrorism. The field is largely characterized by theoretical speculation based on subjective interpretation of anecdotal observations. Moreover, most studies and theories fail to take into account the great heterogeneity of terrorists. Many practical, conceptual, and psychological barriers have slowed progress in this important field. Nonetheless, even at this early stage of terrorism studies, preliminary reports suggest that modifiable social and psychological factors contribute to the genesis of the terrorist mind-set. Psychological scholarship could possibly mitigate the risk of catastrophic attack by initiating the long overdue scientific study of terrorist mentalities.
The growing presence of modern terrorism on the Internet is at the nexus of two key trends: the democratization of communications driven by user-generated content on the Internet; and the growing awareness of modern terrorists of the potential of the Internet for their purposes. How best can the terrorists’ use and abuse of the Internet be countered? As this article argues, the answer to violent radicalization on the Internet lies not in censorship of the Internet, but in a more sophisticated and complicated strategy, relying on the theoretical notion of “noise” in communication process theory.
Terrorism is a tactic much more likely to be used when combatants have asymmetric numerical strength and weaponry. Only if one side is comparatively very weak will it use terror tactics. This weakness requires a means of controlling strong incentives for free-riding or defection from the weaker side. There are two (nonexclusive) answers: (1) Atttract or inculcate recruits with an innate preference for cooperation, even if it results in the recruit's own death (2) Create a set of incentives that reward loyalty, by giving access to excludable near-public (“club”) goods. Culture is the key to achieving either of these solutions. Culture is defined here as the set of “inherited” beliefs, attitudes, and moral strictures that a people use to distinguish outsiders, to understand themselves and to communicate with each other. The primary question is whether culture creates a preference for cooperation as a primitive, or accommodates incentives such as excludable club goods that can only be obtained by cooperation. The difference between the two accounts matters greatly for determining the correct strategy to fight terrorism. If terrorists are selected for having unusual (cooperative, from the perspective of the terror group) preferences, then recruitment must be disrupted somehow. If, on the other hand, terrorists allow themselves to be recruited to gain access to club goods, then the intervention strategy must be the disruption of social networks that credibly guarantee access to those club goods. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006
Measuring the impact of ISIS social media strategy
- M Alfifi
- P Kaghazgaran
- J Cavarlee
- F Morstatter
Alfifi, M., Kaghazgaran, P., Cavarlee, J., & Morstatter, F. (2018). Measuring the impact of ISIS social
media strategy. SemanticScholar. Retrieved from http://snap.stanford.edu/mis2/files/MIS2_
paper_23.pdf
Jihad' in Syria: Fallacies of ISIS' end time prophecies. RSIS Commentaries (149/2014)
- M Ali
Ali, M. (2014). Jihad' in Syria: Fallacies of ISIS' end time prophecies. RSIS Commentaries (149/2014).
Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Retrieved from https://www.rsis.edu.
sg/rsis-publication/rsis/jihad-in-syria-fallacies-of-isis-end-time-prophecies/#.XMzFlOhKg2w
Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger
- B Atassi
Atassi, B. (2013, June 9). Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger. Alijazeera. Retrieved from
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/06/2013699425657882.html