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Infrastructure investment is one of the new sources of growth beside trade. However, the availability of infrastructure has become one of the major problems in the process of economic development in the region. Given the need for huge capital infrastructure in the region and the presence of the financing gap in infrastructure financing, the People Republic of Chinese (PRC) initiated the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Thus, AIIB is expected to accelerate economic development and integration of Asia through the promotion of investment in the infrastructure sector. AIIB have several priority areas include transport, energy, communication, industry, and agriculture. The study used qualitative methods to compare the performance of various Multi Development Banks (MDBs) that existed such as IMF, ADB, IDB and WB with AIIB work plan. The results of this study will be expected to produce policy recommendations related to the formation of AIIB. AIIB initiative is the establishment of a relevant step with the spirit of accelerating economic development and integration of Asia to promote investment in the infrastructure sector. AIIB priority areas including transportation, energy, communication, industry, and agriculture is also a priority in developing countries. Openness in terms of membership (open regionalism) also showed that AIIB not only managed exclusively by the emerging countries in Asia but also opened to countries outside the region. The prospects of AIIB will be determined by how far the founding of PRC government transparency in every process both on stage and in the establishment of operational AIIB, how funding of AIIB direction forward and ensure it will not happen tied financing. This condition will be considered countries in the Asian region to join as founding members of AIIB.
Although some analysts have emphasized the importance of China's becoming a " responsible stakeholder " in the international order, the United States has in effect blocked China's full participation in a range of existing international institutions and attempted to undermine China's efforts to create and lead new international institutions. In this article I examine those US efforts, particularly with regard to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, where the United States attempted to block other states from becoming members. I explore the difference between multi-faceted and aggression-limiting containment and propose that the United States apply the latter to help stabilize Sino-US relations.
The Asian Development Bank (adb) is engaged in development projects throughout the Greater Mekong Subregion, although for most of the past two decades it has boycotted Myanmar (Burma) because of donor government sanctions. Despite being criticised for its neoliberal focus and its lack of transparency and accountability, the adb’s operations compare favourably to those of the Myanmar government and many transnational corporations constructing and financing projects there. This article engages with the concept of risk, which increasingly frames how development in fragile states like Myanmar is understood, to critically analyse the adb’s nascent re-engagement in Myanmar according to the risks this poses for five constituencies: the adb itself; donor states; the Myanmar government and military; private capital; and marginalised communities. While deeper engagement in Myanmar poses different risks for each group, critical analysis suggests that the adb must increase the genuine participation of civil society actors in its activities to address the most significant risks of all, those facing marginalised communities.
What will be the future impact of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB), two multilateral banks created in 2014 outside the established Bretton Woods system, on multilateral lending shares? So far, the bulk of multilateral lending has been provided by institutions created and ruled by the west. Will the new institutions led by China and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) help rebalance multilateral development finance away from western dominance? The answer comes in three steps: first, the pressure for the BRICS to ‘exit’ rises with past, present and expected failure for ‘voice’ reform in the established international financial institutions (IFIs). Second, excess demand for multilateral soft loans and, third, the potential lending capacity by the AIIB and the NDB are quantified to assess how much relative business – hence political influence – the existing IFIs might lose in favour of the new competitors. Based on current evidence for loan-equity leverage ratios in established multilateral development banks (MDBs), it is estimated that the NDB and AIIB combined will attract sufficient cofinancing to rival the established MDBs in terms of annual lending. The combined loan portfolios (c. US$230 billion) of AIIB and NDB would equal the combined loan portfolios of ADB and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), according to a simple scenario presented in this survey article.
Over the past two decades, several regional cooperation programs were initiated by multilateral and bilateral donors to address concerns about the development gap in the Mekong subregion. Programs such as the Greater Mekong Subregion program of the Asian Development Bank and the Mekong–Japan Cooperation program focused first on improving physical connectivity through transport corridors, regional power development and grid connection, and telecommunications linkages, and were successful. However, as transport and trade facilitation became a priority, the weak institutional capacity of Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, and Vietnam resulted in a slow progress and is a major challenge to regional cooperation. Other challenges are the pressure on the use of Mekong water resources and the planned construction of mainstream dams, which could threaten the Mekong River Commission's role, the regional rivalry for energy sources, and the lack of attention to unskilled labor issues. The relations between Mekong regional cooperation programs and China are also a main issue to address if cooperation programs are not to become instruments of geopolitical rivalry.