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Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict
Pathways toward terrorism and genocide
ISSN: 1746-7586 (Print) 1746-7594 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rdac20
What is (not) asymmetric conflict? From
conceptual stretching to conceptual structuring
Christofer Berglund & Emil Aslan Souleimanov
To cite this article: Christofer Berglund & Emil Aslan Souleimanov (2019): What is (not)
asymmetric conflict? From conceptual stretching to conceptual structuring, Dynamics of
Asymmetric Conflict, DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2019.1680855
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2019.1680855
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 04 Nov 2019.
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What is (not) asymmetric conflict? From conceptual stretching
to conceptual structuring
Christofer Berglund
a
and Emil Aslan Souleimanov
b
a
Department of Global Political Studies, Malmö University, Malmö, Sweden;
b
Institute of Political Studies,
Charles University, Jinonice, Praha, Czechia
ABSTRACT
In the second half of the 1990s, the label “asymmetric”conflict rose
to prominence among scholars and strategists, as a term for captur-
ing the rising challenge that violent non-state actors posed to the
liberal world order. However, the concept soon became a catch-
phrase for a range of disparate phenomena, and other buzzwords
arose to describe the threats of concern to decision-makers.
Conceptual confusion beset the field. This article dissects the notion
of asymmetric conflicts, and distinguishes between asymmetries
involving differences in (1) status, (2) capabilities, or (3) strategies
between belligerents. It argues that “asymmetric”conflicts can take
numerous forms depending on the combination of differences
present, and offers a blue-print for keeping track of the meaning
of this concept in the hope of bringing greater precision to future
debates.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 15 May 2019
Accepted 10 October 2019
KEYWORDS
Asymmetric conflict;
non-state actor;
insurgencies; terrorism;
concept structure
Introduction
As the Cold War drew to a close in the late-1980s, clashes involving direct battles between
centralised state armies became a more distant prospect, and irregular conflicts emerged
as the main challenge to the liberal world order (OECD, 2012, p. 18). Scholars and
government-affiliated strategists in the West scrambled to find labels for describing the
threat emanating from violent non-state actors, often possessing weak capabilities, but
organised in a decentralised fashion and adept at adapting their strategies to make the
most of their position as an underdog. Some identified this turn of events as “fourth-
generation warfare”(Lind, Schmitt, & Wilson, 1989), others considered them emblematic
of “low-intensity conflicts”(Dixon, 1989), “small wars”(Olson, 1990), “protracted social
conflicts”(Azar, 1990), or “new wars”(Kaldor, 1999). Still others preferred to call them
“asymmetric conflicts”(Mitchell, 1991). Use of the latter concept peaked in the late-1990s,
when “asymmetric”warfare could refer to terror attacks, rebel bombings, computer
viruses, nuclear proliferation and everything in-between, as long as antagonists failed to
“fight fair”(Wilson, 1998)or“deviated from the norm”(Grange, 2000).
Intellectuals engaged in this debate often presented asymmetric warfare as a recent
phenomenon, different from the traditional conflicts of the past, when frontlines had
been transparent (see, for instance, Kaldor, 1999, pp. 14–30). Others applied the term to
CONTACT Christofer Berglund christofer.berglund@mau.se
DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT
https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2019.1680855
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any med-
ium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
regular wars between states possessing “unequal power resources”(Paul, 1994, p. 3).
However, since antagonists never have equal capabilities at their disposal, prudent
strategists have –since time immemorial –aspired to leverage their own strengths and
to exploit their opponent’s weaknesses (Blank, 2003, p. 4). “Labelling wars as asymmetric”,
Smith (2008, p. 6) concludes, “is to me something of a euphemism to avoid acknowl-
edging that my opponent is not playing to my strengths and I am not winning”. Crane
(2013, p. 5) reaches the same conclusion, but expresses it in less diplomatic terms: “[t]here
are [just] two approaches to waging war, asymmetric and stupid. Every competent
belligerent looks for an edge over its adversaries”. Scholars thus dispute whether asym-
metry is an unprecedented feature specific to modern warfare or a commonsensical
occurrence present in conflicts between unequal belligerents since the dawn of time.
As the term could take on numerous and often outright incongruent meanings, it no
longer helped structure strategic thinking on the challenges facing decision-makers. In
the outset of the 2000s, the notion of “asymmetric conflicts”almost disappeared from the
U.S. national security strategies, eclipsed by the attention dedicated to counterterrorism
operations and counterinsurgencies (COIN operations) after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and
the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Buffaloe, 2006, pp. 3–6; Kilcullen, 2005). Nonetheless,
in the latter half of the 2000s, the term made a comeback, both in the U.S. national
security strategies and among academics (Arrequin-Toft, 2005). Despite the presence of
a large range of other buzzwords competing for attention, “asymmetric conflict”serves as
a convenient umbrella term for describing warfare between belligerents where legal
status differences, power imbalances, or contrasting strategies are glaring.
But what do these asymmetries entail? And which of them should be considered as the
defining characteristic(s) of “asymmetric conflict”? Since stable concepts are essential
building blocks that enable researchers to accumulate knowledge, rather than speaking
past one another, there is an urgent need to tackle these questions. We undertake this
conceptual investigation in five steps. We first introduce the logic of concept structures
(Goertz, 2006). Next, we operationalise conflicts where belligerents have different legal
status; where one actor has much greater capabilities than the other; and where the
parties pursue contrasting strategies. The last section catalogues the possible patterns of
interaction between these three asymmetries. We refrain from proposing a definite
definition of “asymmetric”conflicts and from mapping out its empirical extension, and
instead stop at the conclusion that scholars and strategists alike should be more mindful
of the shifting meanings attached to this contested concept if it is to remain a useful
building block in their intellectual endeavours.
Detecting concept structures
As the notion of asymmetric conflicts caught on in the 1990s, it soon ran into “the travelling
problem”. That is, as scholars and strategists designated an ever growing number of
episodes as “asymmetric”conflicts, the meaning of the term became diluted. In his seminal
article, Sartori (1970) argues that a concept denoting a larger number of cases must obtain
a looser connotation, since it must be associated with fewer attributes if it is to “travel”
further. This stance became conventional wisdom among social scientists until Collier and
Mahon (1993) revisited his claims. Sartori had assumed that concepts are defined by an
intersecting set of attributes, but his critics demonstrate that some concepts are defined by
2C.BERGLUNDANDE.A.SOULEIMANOV
the presence of one or another attribute from a longer list of associated traits. Goertz (2006,
pp. 1–50) explains the difference between these concept structures.
For Sartori and those using classic concepts, “to define a concept is to give the
conditions necessary and sufficient for something to fit into that category”(Goertz,
2006, p. 7). According to this logic, a set of attributes must be present for something to
constitute an asymmetric conflict. If one trait from this set is missing, then the situation
falls short of the definitional requirements. For Collier and Mahon (1993, p. 847) and those
using family resemblance concepts, “there may be no single attribute that category
members all share”. According to this logic, no feature might be present in all asymmetric
conflicts, but certain commonalities bind them together. If one trait is missing, then the
presence of some other substitutable attribute is enough for the situation to meet the
definitional requirements. As a result, concepts associated with more attributes could, in
fact, “travel”further.
Even though concept structures can differ along these lines, most scholars are content
with listing the features associated with “asymmetric conflicts”. However, without stating
what traits are necessary, sufficient, or substitutable, and explaining whether inclusion
into this concept is a dichotomous matter of being either in or out, or a question of
continuous degree, readers are left guessing at the latent concept structure. This problem
is common in the literature in asymmetric conflicts, and explains much of the confusion in
debates on the topic.
Nonetheless, asymmetric warfare is often understood as conflicts involving belliger-
ents who differ either in terms of their legal status, power capabilities, or strategies (see,
for instance, the definitions offered in Buffaloe, 2006, p. 17; Gross, 2010, p. 13; Metz &
Johnson, 2001, p. 5).
1
In practice, this implies warfare between a state actor and a non-
state actor; warfare between an actor possessing strong capabilities and an actor with
scarce resources; or warfare between actors pursuing different strategic campaign plans
in the confrontation. When all these features are present, it is easy to recognize an
“asymmetric conflict”. But is it enough for two, or just one, of these attributes to be
present for a conflict to be included into this class of conflicts? Is one dimension perhaps
more fundamental than the others? Intellectuals disagree with one another over these
important questions. The connotations associated with asymmetric conflicts are repre-
sented in Figure 1.
If we start from a classic concept structure, then only conflicts featuring all three
attributes (in the central intersection in Figure 1) are “asymmetric”. Those missing one
trait fail to meet the definition. However, if we start from a family resemblance concept
structure, then the label can be extended to a much wider range of conflicts, since these
can be more or less “asymmetric”as long as at least one of the three characteristics are
present. Of course, some scholars see certain traits as more important that others, and
thus position themselves in-between these poles. Regardless, Figure 1 enables us to trace
the confusion afflicting debates on “asymmetric”conflicts, and sketch out the contours of
this contested concept in the subsequent sections.
Differences in legal status
“Asymmetric”conflicts are associated with confrontations between belligerents with
different legal status (Gross, 2010, p. 13; Mack, 1975; Stepanova, 2008, p. 19). In the
DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 3
modern Westphalian international order, the principal dividing line runs between state
actors and non-state actors. State actors are recognized as sovereign inside their territorial
jurisdiction and possess centralized armed forces whereas non-state actors lack interna-
tional recognition and operate under a more diffuse chain of command. State-led coun-
terinsurgencies and counterterrorism operations are hence both asymmetric
confrontations, albeit of somewhat different strands (Amidror, 2010; Sloan, 1998). State-
led efforts to supress separatists also ought to fall under this label, even though the non-
state actor in this situation aspires for recognition as a state actor –different from, but
equal to, the state from which it seeks independence (Stepanova, 2008, pp. 28–53). If
confrontations between state actors and non-state actors are “asymmetric”, then
Colombia’s struggle against FARC guerrillas, the U.S. fight against Al-Qaeda terrorists,
and Croatia’s war on separatists in the Republic of Serbian Krajina should all fit the label.
Metz and Johnson (2001, p. 11) assume that states have the moral high ground in such
conflicts, and see non-state challengers as dark knights. Gross (2010, p. 14) takes a similar
stance, describing states as “the building blocks of the international order and the only
legitimate purveyor of armed force”. State actors thus possess a moral advantage when
fighting terrorists, but the tables are turned in “wars of national liberation”, when
separatists can appeal to the principle of self-determination (Gross, 2010, p. 14). In
conflicts with guerrillas, states often retain the moral upper hand, unless using their
firepower against opponents for dubious ends, as the U.S. did in Vietnam, when conduct-
ing aerial bombardment of civilian localities using napalm (Mack, 1975, p. 186).
Winter (2011, p. 488) has investigated the discourse on “asymmetric”conflicts and
concludes that the concept, in particular among government-affiliated strategists, is used
to “distinguish between civilized and uncivilized warfare, an idiom that converts [. . .]
differences between state and non-state actors into moral and civilizational hierarchies”,
in effect enabling “states to be portrayed as victims of non-state actors”.Some states have,
in fact, sought to change international laws governing the conduct of warfare to lessen
the protections afforded to non-state combatants (Pfanner, 2005; Schmitt, 2007; von
Heinegg, 2011).
2
Whether this is an attempt from state actors to transfer their moral
Different
legal status
Different
strategies
Different
capabilities
Figure 1. Attributes associated with belligerents participating in “asymmetric”conflicts.
4C.BERGLUNDANDE.A.SOULEIMANOV
advantage into the legal domain or an appropriate response to non-state actors, who
themselves have grown ever more adroit in flouting the laws of war, is a matter of
interpretation.
However, this pressing normative debate should be decoupled from the definition of
asymmetric conflict. Scholars are disputing the ethical implications that stem from the
legal status of the belligerents, rather than the claim that conflicts between state actors
and non-state actors are “asymmetric”.Differences in legal status are, on the other hand,
often linked to differences in capabilities and differences in strategies, to which we turn
next.
Differences in capabilities
Conflicts between actors possessing different capabilities are also seen as “asymmetric”
(Buffaloe, 2006, p. 17; Metz & Johnson, 2001, p. 10; Paul, 1994, p. 3). Capabilities first and
foremost refer to armaments, but also to technological, economic, demographic, and
other structural resources that can be converted for power projection on the battlefield
and its domains.
3
Material imbalances of this kind are, of course, present in almost all
conflicts. Rational actors “go to war when they feel they have the upper hand”, as Gross
(2010, pp. 13–14) observes, but in asymmetric conflicts the difference in capabilities is
“glaring”or outright “monopolistic”(see also Stepanova, 2008, pp. 17–18). The weaker
actor lacks sophisticated armaments, such as aircraft carriers, long-range missiles, radars,
or networked command and control systems, and cannot muster the manpower, eco-
nomic resources, technological competence, or other structural assets required to con-
front the stronger actor on equal terms.
Differences in capabilities often reflect differences in legal status. State actors are more
powerful than non-state actors, as a rule of thumb. States can gather manpower through
conscription, finance its armed forces through taxation, and produce or at least purchase
advanced armaments on the international market. Unless the non-state actor controls
a specific territorial domain in which the draft is enforced, soldiers have to be attracted
either through ideological appeals or with the lure of cash. Moreover, their economic
resources can seldom compete with the coffers of the state. Even non-state actors skilled
at amassing funds from extortion, organized crime, or smuggling face difficulties in
procuring high-tech armaments, unless another state steps in as their patron. As
a result, states often wield armed forces capable across all domains of warfare whereas
non-state actors make do with firearms and improvised explosive devices, as in the case of
the Israel-Palestinian conflict.
However, confrontations between actors possessing different capabilities need not
involve actors of different legal status. According to Paul (1994, p. 3), conflicts “in which
two states with unequal power resources confront each other on the battlefield”are also
“asymmetric”. He points to the 1982 British-Argentine war over the Falklands as an
example. Pfanner (2005, p. 152) lists the 1990–91 Gulf War between the U.S.-led coalition,
equipped with state of the art precision-guided munitions, and Iraq as another case in
point. On the other hand, some non-state actors are so successful in accumulating
capabilities that their deficit on the battlefield no longer seems “glaring”. Consider the
Republic of Transdniestria, an unrecognized de facto state with ample access to Russian
munitions and thousands of men in arms, who have fended offMoldova’sclaims over this
DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 5
jurisdiction for almost three decades (Blakkisrud & Kolsto, 2011; King, 2001). Thus, “asym-
metric”conflicts can entail either differences in legal status, differences in capabilities, or
differences in both aspects.
Differences in strategies
It gets more complicated, however, because belligerents pursuing different strategies
towards one another are also considered as participants in “asymmetric”conflicts
(Arreguin-Toft, 2001,2005; Cassidy, 2003,p.7,2008). In these confrontations, actors aspire
to “maximize one’s own advantages [or] exploit an opponent’s weaknesses”(Metz &
Johnson, 2001, p. 5). To be sure, belligerents have done this ever since Sun Tzu (1910/
2000) complied his insights into “The Art of War”over two millennia ago (Buffaloe, 2006,
pp. 7–8),
4
but in “asymmetric”conflicts the parties use different tactical tools to pursue
altogether different campaign plans. In short: one actor pursues direct strategies targeting
their opponent’sfighting capabilities whereas the other actor opts for indirect strategies
targeting their opponent’sfighting willingness (Bartholomees, 2008, p. 34).
Differences in strategies often reflect both differences in legal status and in capabilities.
In the classical case, a strong state actor, whose raison d’état is to defend its territorial
borders, uses a centralized chain of command to plan for pitched battles on established
frontlines but instead confronts a weak non-state actor using decentralized command
structures to plan for hit-and-run operations. The armed forces of a state, consisting of
tens of thousands of soldiers or more, are reliant on an intricate web of support functions,
which in turn presume hierarchical control. State actors thus prefer direct, concentrated,
or “Clausewitzian”battles, in which their overwhelming firepower can be applied. In order
to avoid confronting a stronger state actor on its terms, weaker non-state actors favour
indirect, dispersed, or “Fabian-Maoist”battles consisting of hit-and-run attacks (Cassidy,
2003,p.7,2008). Since holding terrain leaves them vulnerable to retaliation, insurgents
scatter to sustain their scarce resources. These tactics are often successful when rebels
operate in familiar terrain and obtain support from locals. As Mao Tse-tung (1937)
concluded: guerrillas should move amongst the people as fish swimming in the sea. Non-
state actors thus benefit from blurring the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants.
Insurgents have another strategic resource that their state opponents often lack:
a readiness to accept sacrifice, or Opferbereitschaft as Münkler (2005) calls it. Most states
are loath to accept the surrender of non-state actors, let alone to negotiate with them, as
this risks legitimizing their actorhood (Bartholomees, 2008, p. 33). But the greater the
sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the greater resistance he will put up, von
Clausewitz (1873/1976, p. 81) reminds us.
5
As a result, rebels often see no option but to
continue their struggle until the bitter end. States can seldom muster the same degree of
determination, in particular when bringing in soldiers from distant lands (Betts, 2000,
p. 46; Mack, 1975, p. 177). This pattern is reflected in the French fight against the Algerian
National Liberation Front in the 1960s, the Russian struggle against Chechen separatists in
the 1990s, the U.S.-led battle against Iraqi insurgents in the 2000s, and in other cases
when the armed forces of the metropolitan state no longer were defending their home
turf or families –other than in an allegorical sense. The main challenge facing states is
therefore to maintain morale among its soldiers and popular support for the engagement
6C.BERGLUNDANDE.A.SOULEIMANOV
back home. Insurgents are cognizant of this fact and do not seek to defeat their oppo-
nents on the battlefield, but to drain their willingness to fight through prolonged wars of
attrition (Arreguin-Toft, 2001).
6
If outgunned non-state actors avoid confronting stronger state actors in pitched
battles, and succeed in undermining their determination, then insurgents can emerge
victorious. “[T]he guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does
not win”, as Kissinger (1969, p. 39) once concluded. Research suggests that democracies,
in particular, are prone to lose counterinsurgencies due to the electoral impact of war
weariness (Merom, 2003).
7
Even states with superior capabilities thus risk being outwitted
through strategic manoeuvring. But advice is inconsistent. Galula (1964) recommends
counterinsurgencies to focus on winning the hearts and minds of the locals (see also
Buffaloe, 2006, p. 16). Arreguin-Toft (2001, p. 109) argues that retribution against civilians
could induce them to cease supporting rebels, though this tactic often backfires. He
therefore advises decision-makers to create special operation forces trained for COIN-
missions; a counsel taken up in the U.S., which set up the Marine Corps Forces Special
Operations Command in 2006.
8
Souleimanov (2015) and Souleimanov and Aliyev (2015,
2017) instead stress the importance of co-opting former rebels into the state’s embrace as
a means of gathering inside knowledge and thus prevent insurgencies from gathering
steam.
However, confrontations between actors pursuing different strategies also occur
when belligerents share the same legal status, when both parties have similar capabil-
ities at their disposal, or both. According to Gross (2010,pp.19–20), states “sometimes
find it advantageous to let others do their fighting”and therefore engage their oppo-
nent using proxies. He points to Hezbollah, a militant Shiite organization representing
Iran’s interests in the Levant, as one example. It has directed hit-and-run attacks against
U.S. and Israeli targets, including civilian ones, designed to drain their willingness, rather
than their capabilities, to fight. Russia has also made use of proxies to stop countries in
the near abroad from leaving its orbit. It has utilized state-owned corporations as agents
of influence, dispatched “little green men”to Ukraine, conducted “active measures”to
sow polarization, and coaxed organized crime groups into doing the Kremlin’s bidding
abroad (Galeotti, 2017a,2017b; Thornton, 2016). In both these cases, one actor is
resorting to indirect strategies in otherwise regular conflicts to avoid retaliation and
to undermine the political determination of their opponents to persist in the
confrontation.
Conclusions
Much ink has been spilled on the topic of “asymmetric”warfare since scholars and
strategists began dedicating their intellectual energies to irregular conflicts in the
1990s. Yet, there is no consensus as to the meaning of this concept, despite –or perhaps
because of –its widespread usage. All to often, authors offer a laundry list of associated
features and sporadic examples, thus forcing readers to engage in text exegesis. In order
to reduce the conceptual confusion besetting the field, this article set out to dissect the
notion of “asymmetric”conflicts.
Based on a close reading of the prior academic literature, it distinguishes between
three asymmetries involving belligerents possessing (1) different legal status, (2) different
DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 7
capabilities, or (3) using different strategies. What do each of these differences entail? In
the first case, the confrontation stands between a state actor and a non-state actor.In
the second instance, the conflict involves a strong actor, equipped with advanced arma-
ments and technological, economic, demographic, and other structural resources that can
be put to use on the battlefield, fighting a weak actor with a glaring lack of access to these
same capabilities. In the third and final conflict situation, one actor adheres to direct
strategies targeting their opponent’sfighting capabilities whereas the other actor makes
use of indirect strategies targeting their opponent’sfighting willingness.
Since scholars seldom state which (combination of) features should be present for
a conflict to count as “asymmetric”, this article offers a blue-print for tracing the connota-
tion of this contested concept. The possible interaction effects, first plotted in Figure 1, are
catalogued in Table 1. It maps out the spectrum of possible “asymmetries”, from those
involving just one difference (white rows) to those featuring two differences (grey rows)
and, last but not least, those where the entire set of differences are present at once (the
dark row).
Table 1 illustrates that “asymmetric”conflicts can take on numerous meanings depend-
ing on the latent concept structure (Goertz, 2006, pp. 39–50). If we start from a classic
concept structure, then the term “asymmetric”should be reserved for those conflicts
where all three differences are present, as in the case of the First Chechen War between
the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. It is the intersection of all
features that makes a confrontation “asymmetric”.If we start from a family resemblance
concept structure, then the label can extend to conflicts where either one of the three
differences are present. Each attribute can substitute for the others. Choosing between
these standpoints is no simple task as both have good and bad consequences.
Restricting the connotation of the term to its classical meaning has the benefitof
imbuing it with clear contents and preventing conceptual stretching, or “vague, amor-
phous conceptualizations”as Sartori (1970, p. 1034) calls them. It becomes easier to see
what asymmetric conflicts are not if confrontations missing one trait fall short of the
definition. But, we also risk missing the chance to make fruitful comparisons, since the
concept is discarded in cases where significant similarities are at hand (Collier & Mahon,
1993, p. 852). If membership in the class of asymmetric conflicts is not a dichotomous “all
or nothing”matter, but rather an issue of degrees, then we need to build a continuous
concept to detect the existence of borderline cases (Goertz, 2006, pp. 29, 34). As a result, it
might seem prudent to conclude that it is enough for either attribute to be present for the
conflict to be “asymmetric”, thus permitting usage of the concept in its peripheral sense
(see Table 1).
Table 1. Types of asymmetric conflicts.
Different legal status Different capabilities Different strategies
Yes No No
No Yes No Peripheral meaning
No No Yes
Yes Yes No
No Yes Yes Regular meaning
Yes No Yes
Yes Yes Yes Classical meaning
8C.BERGLUNDANDE.A.SOULEIMANOV
Yet, differences in legal status, capabilities, and strategies are so common that the
concept then is in danger of overextension. Most modern wars involve non-state actors
challenging state authorities (PRIO, 2018). Almost all confrontations involving the
U.S. could, due to its superior capabilities, be labelled “asymmetric”(Stepanova, 2008,
p. 15). And the search for strategic leverage can propel actors, even in regular conflicts,
to use proxies for draining the political determination of their opponents (Jonsson &
Seely, 2015,pp.4–5). It is dubious if cases as disparate as the conflict over Serbian
Krajina, the British-Argentine Falklands War, and Russia’s subversion efforts in Ukraine
belong under the same label. Perhaps it is wiser to require that two of the three
differences are present so that conflicts are “asymmetric”in the more regular use of
the term (see Table 1).
Even in the latter case, there is a need to decide whether all dimensions can
substitute for one another, if one feature should be weighted as more important, or if
one difference is so essential that its presence is required for a conflict to be “asym-
metric”. For instance, some authors assume that differences in capabilities generate
differences in legal status and differences in strategies, hence assigning the former
dimension a primordial role. It is outside the remit of this article to inspect all these
possibilities, to arrive at a definite definition of the concept, and to map its empirical
extension. But our conceptual blue-print serves to highlight the shifting meaning
attached to the notion of “asymmetric”conflicts. It could, thus, help inject greater
precision into future debates if scholars focus on assessing how its constituent dimen-
sions combine to form the overarching concept.
Notes
1. RAND’s(n.d.) conceptualization of “asymmetric warfare”takes notice of all three dimensions:
“conflicts between nations or groups that have disparate military capabilities and strategies”.
2. A case in point is the U.S. debate on the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques”under
George W. Bush.
3. Strategists often speak of five distinct domains: land, sea, air, space, and information
operations.
4. “All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when
using our forces, we must seem inactive. [. . .] If he is in superior strength, evade him. [. . .]
Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected”, Sun Tzu (1910/
2000,p.3–4) recommends the readers of his treatise.
5. “Awar fought for great purposes implies willingness to accept casualties even in large
numbers”, as Luttwak (1995) has phrased it.
6. Some scholars suggest that this preference for indirect tactics of attrition, drawing on a larger
dose of communal Opferbereitschaft,reflect an “Asian”or “Eastern”strategic mindset, differ-
ent from the “American”or “Western”preference for direct and decisive battles (Metz &
Johnson, 2001, p. 12; Cassidy, 2003, p. 53).
7. Autocrats controlling the media can conceal their own losses and use of retributive tactics
against rebels.
8. However, even the best trained and equipped special units face difficulties in operating in
unfamiliar terrain, in particular if the local population does not support them.
DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 9
Acknowledgments
This article is an outcome of a project supported by Charles University’s research centres pro-
gramme no. UNCE/HUM/037: The Human-Machine Nexus and Its Implications for the International
Order. The authors would also like to express their gratitude to the Institute of International
Relations Prague, and to the Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities, for
facilitating their collaboration on this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This work was supported by the Charles University’s research centres programme: The Human-
Machine Nexus and Its Implications for the International Order [UNCE/HUM/037]; The Royal Swedish
Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities [Va2019-0007].
Notes on contributors
Christofer Berglund is Assistant Professor at the Department of Global Political Studies, Malmö
University, and has published articles on ethnic conflicts and state-building for Nations and
Nationalism, Nationalities Papers, Demokratizatsiya, and several other outlets.
Emil Aslan Souleimanov is Associate Professor at the Institute of Political Studies, Charles University,
and has published articles on conflicts and insurgencies for World Politics, International Security,
Post-Soviet Affairs, Third World Quarterly, and numerous other journals.
ORCID
Christofer Berglund http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9923-0775
Emil Aslan Souleimanov http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1200-0203
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