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Crime Is as Smart and as Dumb as the Internet
Abstract
This chapter sets out why we should think about criminological risks as stemming from the configuration of technology, economic and social organisation, and cultural identity. ‘Cyber’ implies a set of rules and spaces separate from the real. A digital perspective shows how embedded the internet infrastructure is with day-to-day life and other systems. This means that costs and risks of crime are distributed more widely throughout society. Work is increasingly distributed through digital platforms designed for the purpose or repurposed from other platforms. This creates opportunities for new forms of work and reward, and risks of exploitation and misuse.
... Digital technologies can connect rule based cyberspace to real life applications. This configuration of technology in economic and social environment exposes new risk of cyber crimes [4]. One of the risks associated with digital payment technologies in banking is cyber fraud [5]. ...
With the growth of digital payments infrastructure in Indian banking sector, the volume and value of digital transactions have increased manifolds. Digital transactions are associated with the risk of cyber crimes known as digital payment frauds. Prevention of frauds is not solely a matter for customers to exercise diligence, but also for the banking institutions to take proactive fraud mitigation measures. To build the trust of customers, there is need for fraud risk management in the business security architecture of digital payments. In this paper, we have surveyed policy documents and status reports related to digital payment frauds from the perspective of Indian banking sector. The recent regulatory guidelines of Reserve Bank of India have highlighted new requirements of fraud data collection, sharing and use by banks for strengthening digital payments ecosystem. To streamline these requirements in fraud mitigation process, we present a scheme for fraud data collection and use by banks. It is an integration of five process levels, namely fraud monitoring, fraud prediction, fraud detection, fraud analysis and fraud reporting. The scheme relies on multi-stakeholders' partnership and fraud data collection as two resource pillars for fraud mitigation. We conclude with the future scope of research for securing digital payments.
This chapter explores the current challenges and transitional needs required to regulate digital entrepreneurship within the illicit economy by examining digital entrepreneurship relating to commercial sex and trafficking in human beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation. As such, new innovative digital technologies are transforming serious and organised crime operations and, thus, need to also change the way the law, enforcement, and the wider criminal justice system combat crime. The chapter seeks to expose contemporary practises of digitally-facilitated commercial sex and trafficking in human beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation, recent developments in law and policy in the area, emerging investigative and prosecution practises within digital online environments, as well as necessary future changes to the law and enforcement.
This chapter illustrates the understanding of cybercrime, recent trends in cybercrime,
and the measures by which these cybercrimes can be eliminated to a considerable
extent. The authors discuss various emerging cybercrime techniques,
including steganography, next-generation malwares, next-generation ransom wares,
social engineering attacks, and attacks using machine learning and IoT devices.
Chapter 11 concludes that lack of regulations dealing specifically with e-waste is
Does recent growth of darknet markets signify a slow reorganisation of the illicit drug trade? Where are darknet markets situated in the global drug supply chain? In principle, these platforms allow producers to sell directly to end users, bypassing traditional trafficking routes. And yet, there is evidence that many offerings originate from a small number of highly active consumer countries, rather than from countries that are primarily known for drug production. In a large-scale empirical study, we determine the darknet trading geography of three plant-based drugs across four of the largest darknet markets, and compare it to the global footprint of production and consumption for these drugs. We present strong evidence that cannabis and cocaine vendors are primarily located in a small number of consumer countries, rather than producer countries, suggesting that darknet trading happens at the »last mile», possibly leaving old trafficking routes intact. A model to explain trading volumes of opiates is inconclusive. We cannot find evidence for significant production-side offerings across any of the drug types or marketplaces. Our evidence further suggests that the geography of darknet market trades is primarily driven by existing consumer demand, rather than new demand fostered by individual markets.
Does recent growth of darknet markets signify a slow reorganisation of the illicit drug trade? Where are darknet markets situated in the global drug supply chain? In principle, these platforms allow producers to sell directly to end users, bypassing traditional trafficking routes. And yet, there is evidence that many offerings originate from a small number of highly active consumer countries, rather than from countries that are primarily known for drug production. In a large-scale empirical study, we determine the darknet trading geography of three plant-based drugs across four of the largest darknet markets, and compare it to the global footprint of production and consumption for these drugs. We present strong evidence that cannabis and cocaine vendors are primarily located in a small number of consumer countries, rather than producer countries, suggesting that darknet trading happens at the 'last mile', possibly leaving old trafficking routes intact. A model to explain trading volumes of opiates is inconclusive. We cannot find evidence for significant production-side offerings across any of the drug types or marketplaces. Our evidence further suggests that the geography of darknet market trades is primarily driven by existing consumer demand, rather than new demand fostered by individual markets.
The competitive pressures of neoliberal economies have compelled employers to devolve responsibilities to contractors and subcontractors. The rise information technology platforms have significantly accelerated this trend over past decade. “Sharing economy” companies have such widespread adoption of neoliberalism’s industrial relations that a new moniker—“the Gig Economy”—has taken root. Although shareholders and consumers have benefited, middle-class jobs have been squeezed in the process. This paper uses Uber as a case study to discuss how Sharing Economy entities are merely the latest iteration of companies to enact the neoliberal playbook, including (a) (mis)classifying workers, (b) engaging in regime shopping, and (c) employing the most economically vulnerable, rather than giving rise to a new world of work altogether. The result is a crowding out of middle-class employment by precarious ‘gigs’ that lack legal protections and benefits.
Most of cyberscam-related studies focus on threats perpetrated against the Western society, with a particular attention to the USA and Europe. Regrettably, no research has been done on scams targeting African countries, especially Nigeria, where the notorious and (in)famous 419 advancedfee scam, targeted towards other countries, originated. However, as we know, cybercrime is a global problem affecting all parties. In this study, we investigate a form of advance fee fraud scam unique to Nigeria and targeted at Nigerians, but unknown to the Western world. For the study, we rely substantially on almost two years worth of data harvested from an online discussion forum used by criminals. We complement this dataset with recent data from three other active forums to consolidate and generalize the research. We apply machine learning to the data to understand the criminals’ modus operandi. We show that the criminals exploit the socio-political and economic problems prevalent in the country to craft various fraud schemes to defraud vulnerable groups such as secondary school students and unemployed graduates. The result of our research can help potential victims and policy makers to develop measures to counter the activities of these criminal groups.
The damaging effects, for both the victims and perpetrators, of photographing sexual assault should be self-evident. However, in the cases of Rehtaeh Parsons, Jane Doe and Audrie Pott, photographs of sexual violence seem to have been taken and digitally disseminated without regard for the possible consequences. Thus, these cases pose disturbing questions about the ways that sexual violence is normalized and legitimized in western culture and the ways that new media is implicated in this process. These cases demonstrate how the ubiquity and permanence of digital photographs create new concerns for victims of sexual violence and new questions regarding the interpretive matrix of photographs. Using Judith Butler’s theory on photography, torture and framing, I argue that these cases are an example of what Butler refers to as the digitalization of evil. Through this framework, I will discuss the ways that new media exacerbates experiences of sexual violence and examine issues surrounding the interpretation of photographs of sexual violence.
In 1999, Carruthers and Stinchcombe provided the classic discussion of ‘the social structure of liquidity’: the institutional arrangements that support markets in which ‘exchange occurs easily and frequently’. Our argument in this paper is that the material aspects of these arrangements – and particularly the materiality of prices – need far closer attention than they normally receive. We develop this argument by highlighting two features of new assemblages that have been created in financial markets since 1999. First, these assemblages give sharp economic significance to spatial location and to physical phenomena such as the speed of light (the physics of these assemblages is Einsteinian, not Newtonian, so to speak). Second, they have provoked fierce controversy focusing on ultra-fast ‘high-frequency trading’, controversy in which issues of materiality are interwoven intimately with questions of legitimacy, particularly of fairness.
This chapter documents what we believe to be the first systematic study of the costs of cybercrime. The initial workshop paper was prepared in response to a request from the UK Ministry of Defence following scepticism that previous studies had hyped the problem. For each of the main categories of cybercrime we set out what is and is not known of the direct costs, indirect costs and defence costs – both to the UK and to the world as a whole. We distinguish carefully between traditional crimes that are now “cyber” because they are conducted online (such as tax and welfare fraud); transitional crimes whose modus operandi has changed substantially as a result of the move online (such as credit card fraud); new crimes that owe their existence to the Internet; and what we might call platform crimes such as the provision of botnets which facilitate other crimes rather than being used to extract money from victims directly. As far as direct costs are concerned, we find that traditional offences such as tax and welfare fraud cost the typical citizen in the low hundreds of pounds/euros/dollars a year; transitional frauds cost a few pounds/euros/dollars; while the new computer crimes cost in the tens of pence/cents. However, the indirect costs and defence costs are much higher for transitional and new crimes. For the former they may be roughly comparable to what the criminals earn, while for the latter they may be an order of magnitude more. As a striking example, the botnet behind a third of the spam sent in 2010 earned its owners around $2.7 million, while worldwide expenditures on spam prevention probably exceeded a billion dollars. We are extremely inefficient at fighting cybercrime; or to put it another way, cyber-crooks are like terrorists or metal thieves in that their activities impose disproportionate costs on society. Some of the reasons for this are well-known: cybercrimes are global and have strong externalities, while traditional crimes such as burglary and car theft are local, and the associated equilibria have emerged after many years of optimisation. As for the more direct question of what should be done, our figures suggest that we should spend less in anticipation of cybercrime (on antivirus, firewalls, etc.) and more in response – that is, on the prosaic business of hunting down cyber-criminals and throwing them in jail.
This paper focuses on criminals who could easily be labelled as entrepreneurs and who deal in compromised computer systems. Known as botmasters, these individuals use their technical skills to take over and control personal, business and governmental computers. These networks of hijacked computers are known as botnets in the security industry. With this massive computing power, these criminals can send large amounts of spam, attack web servers or steal financial data – all for a fee. As entrepreneurs, the botmasters' main goal is to achieve the highest level of success possible. In their case, this achievement can be measured in the illegitimate revenues they earn from the leasing of their botnet. Based on the evidence gathered in literature on legitimate and illegitimate markets, this paper sets to understand how reputation could relate to criminal achievement as well as what factors impact a heightened level of reputation in a criminal market.
The rise of cybercrime in the last decade is an economic case of individuals responding to monetary and psychological incentives. Two main drivers for cybercrime can be identified: the potential gains from cyberattacks are increasing with the growth of importance of the Internet, and malefactors' expected costs (e.g., the penalties and the likelihood of being apprehended and prosecuted) are frequently lower compared with traditional crimes. In short, computer-mediated crimes are more convenient, and protable, and less expensive and risky than crimes not mediated by the Internet. The increase in cybercriminal activities, coupled with ineffective legislation and ineffective law enforcement pose critical challenges for maintaining the trust and security of ourcomputer infrastructures.Modern computer attacks encompass a broad spectrum of economic activity, where various malfeasants specialize in developing specic goods (exploits, botnets, mailers) and services (distributing malware, monetizing stolen credentials, providing web hosting, etc.). A typical Internet fraud involves the actions of many of these individuals, such as malware writers, botnet herders, spammers, data brokers, and money launderers.Assessing the relationships among various malfeasants is an essential piece of information for discussing economic, technical, and legal proposals to address cybercrime. This paper presents a framework for understanding the interactions between these individuals and how they operate. We follow three steps.First, we present the general architecture of common computer attacks, and discuss the flow of goods and services that supports the underground economy. We discuss the general flow of resources between criminal groups and victims, and the interactions between different specialized cybercriminals.Second, we describe the need to estimate the social costs of cybercrime and the profits of cybercriminals in order to identify optimal levels of protection. One of the main problems in quantifying the precise impact of cybercrime is that computer attacks are not always detected, or reported. Therefore we propose the need to develop a more systematic and transparent way of reporting computer breaches and their effects.Finally, we propose some possible countermeasures against criminal activities. In particular, we analyze the role private and public protection, and the incentives of multiple stake holders.
By observing how covert financial networks operate in online games like World of Warcraft, we can learn about how they might function offline.
We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service. This second-generation Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the original design by adding perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, and a practical design for location-hidden services via rendezvous points. Tor works on the real-world Internet, requires no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. We briefly describe our experiences with an international network of more than 30 nodes. We close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication.
this article's publication, the prototype network is processing more than 1 million Web connections per month from more than six thousand IP addresses in twenty countries and in all six main top level domains. [7]
. This paper describes an architecture, Onion Routing, that limits a network's vulnerability to traffic analysis. The architecture provides anonymous socket connections by means of proxy servers. It provides real-time, bi-directional, anonymous communication for any protocol that can be adapted to use a proxy service. Specifically, the architecture provides for bi-directional communication even though no-one but the initiator's proxy server knows anything but previous and next hops in the communication chain. This implies that neither the respondent nor his proxy server nor any external observer need know the identity of the initiator or his proxy server. A prototype of Onion Routing has been implemented. This prototype works with HTTP (World Wide Web) proxies. In addition, an analogous proxy for TELNET has been implemented. Proxies for FTP and SMTP are under development. 1 Introduction This paper presents an architecture that limits a network's vulnerability to traffic a...
The infusion of digital technology into contemporary society has had significant effects for everyday life and for everyday crimes. Digital Criminology: Crime and Justice in Digital Society is the first interdisciplinary scholarly investigation extending beyond traditional topics of cybercrime, policing and the law to consider the implications of digital society for public engagement with crime and justice movements. This book seeks to connect the disparate fields of criminology, sociology, legal studies, politics, media and cultural studies in the study of crime and justice. Drawing together intersecting conceptual frameworks, Digital Criminology examines conceptual, legal, political and cultural framings of crime, formal justice responses and informal citizen-led justice movements in our increasingly connected global and digital society. Building on case study examples from across Australia, Canada, Europe, China, the UK and the United States, Digital Criminology explores key questions including: What are the implications of an increasingly digital society for crime and justice? What effects will emergent technologies have for how we respond to crime and participate in crime debates? What will be the foundational shifts in criminological research and frameworks for understanding crime and justice in this technologically mediated context? What does it mean to be a ‘just’ digital citizen? How will digital communications and social networks enable new forms of justice and justice movements? Ultimately, the book advances the case for an emerging digital criminology: extending the practical and conceptual analyses of ‘cyber’ or ‘e’ crime beyond a focus foremost on the novelty, pathology and illegality of technology-enabled crimes, to understandings of online crime as inherently social.
Background:
The use of new technology is frequently harnessed by drug suppliers to both increase profits and reduce risk. While a growing body of research has investigated drug sales through online pharmacies and cryptomarkets, despite growing media interest, no published research exists on how smartphone-enabled social media and messaging applications ('apps') are utilised in the drug economy. This study analyses the ways such apps (e.g. Snapchat, Instagram and WhatsApp) are utilised to supply and access drugs.
Methods:
Three data collection methods were employed: an international online survey of 358 drug users that had either used or considered using apps to access drugs; 'rapid' interviews (n = 20) with a similar population; and in-depth interviews (n = 27). Key issues explored were the perceived benefits and risks associated with sourcing drugs through apps, with specific attention paid to novel supply and purchasing practices.
Results:
Apps appear to provide a quick, convenient method for connecting buyer and seller. They were often viewed as a valuable intermediary option between cryptomarkets and street dealing, providing 'secure' features and the opportunity to preview product without the requirement for technical expertise. Apps are used in a range of novel and diverse ways, including as social networking spaces in which drugs are advertised, and as encrypted messaging services for communicating with known sellers and arranging transactions. Key anxieties related to potential for exposure to law enforcement and legitimacy of substances.
Conclusion:
Though 'social supply' through friends is still typically preferred and there is a degree of wariness toward app-mediated supply, our data indicate that apps are fast becoming a viable option for accessing drugs. Apps can provide an easily accessible platform that connects buyers with commercial drug suppliers and substances that may otherwise remain elusive. Potential harms can be reduced through the provision of information which demystify common-sense assumptions that apps are secure and that this 'visual' drug economy promotes safer purchasing practices.
Durkheim claimed that punishment of crime generates social cohesion as “honorable” people are united in emotional, passionate condemnation of those who transgress society’s moral boundaries. This study examines reactions to punishment in the punished group. Specifically, it examines how members of an online community responded when law enforcement shut down their websites. Drawing on data from three discussion forums, the author argues that the crackdowns produced solidarity and enhanced a particular moral worldview that strengthened the community and enabled it to survive by migrating en masse to new websites.
Sharing economy firms such as Uber and Airbnb facilitate trusted transactions between strangers on digital platforms. This creates economic and other value but raises concerns around racial bias, safety, and fairness to competitors and workers that legal scholarship has begun to address. Missing from the literature, however, is a fundamental critique of the sharing economy grounded in asymmetries of information and power. This Essay, coauthored by a law professor and a technology ethnographer who studies work, labor, and technology, furnishes such a critique and proposes a meaningful response through updates to consumer protection law.
This book examines how digital communications technologies have transformed modern societies, with profound effects both for everyday life, and for everyday crimes. Sexual violence, which is recognized globally as a significant human rights problem, has likewise changed in the digital age. Through an investigation into our increasingly and ever-normalised digital lives, this study analyses the rise of technology-facilitated sexual assault, ‘revenge pornography’, online sexual harassment and gender-based hate speech. Drawing on ground-breaking research into the nature and extent of technology-facilitated forms of sexual violence and harassment, the authors explore the reach of these harms, the experiences of victims, the views of service providers and law enforcement bodies, as well as the implications for law, justice and resistance. Sexual Violence in a Digital Age is compelling reading for scholars, activists, and policymakers who seek to understand how technology is implicated in sexual violence, and what needs to be done to address sexual violence in a digital age.
Using online participant observation, ad hoc conversations, and off-line interviews, this study explores the work of Adult/Asian Cam Models (ACMs) in the Philippines – women who present themselves live via Internet webcam to solicit customers to view the women naked or engaging in sexual activities. ACMs are commonly construed as trafficked pornographers or (digital) prostitutes. But, the models do not identify their work as prostitution or even as sex work; nor are they trafficked. Thus, ACMs challenge common perceptions about sex work and agency, revealing a range of possible social stigmas and self-identities associated with such work. The study goes on to a comparative exploration of several forms of sex work and presents reasons for a lack of occupational mobility within the Philippines’ sex industry for each form. In particular, because ACMs do not necessarily identify as sex workers, they are unwilling to move to other forms of sex work.
This study explores the rapidly expanding world of online illicit drug trading. Since the fall of the infamous Silk Road, a new generation of cryptomarkets can be found thriving on the dark net. Martin explores how these websites defy powerful law enforcement agencies and represent the new digital front in the 'war on drugs'.
For some drug policy scholars, including us, the online marketplace Silk Road and its
successors are inherently fascinating. When we first discovered Silk Road in 2011, on
opposite sides of the globe, we could not believe it was real: people were buying illegal drugs anonymously through a global marketplace that resembled eBay or Amazon. We were instantly hooked. Rather than addressing our fellow cryptomarket-obsessed colleagues who will no doubt already be devouring the 12 articles in the issue, we would like to address the remaining readership of the journal, who may not know much at all about cryptomarkets and may wonder what relevance cryptomarkets have to broader drug policy scholarship.
This article examines the views expressed by Australians relating to unauthorized digital access to the popular HBO series Game of Thrones. A detailed analysis is undertaken of the online responses to a 2013 Facebook post by the United States Ambassador to Australia, chastizing Australians for their ‘illegal’ behaviour. This analysis is used to critique the dominant framing of the activities of file-sharing, torrenting and unauthorized downloading as criminal and those involved in the activity as being influenced by sociological factors. In contrast, the research found that many of the justifications for these behaviours contained in the Facebook comments demonstrated an informed critique of the market mechanisms at work in the distribution networks.
The illicit drugs website, Silk Road, presents an ideal case study for how online communication technologies are transforming crime. This article seeks to locate the offences committed via Silk Road within existing cybercrime literature, and presents a new criminological concept – the cryptomarket – to outline the contours of this new generation of online illicit marketplace. Cryptomarkets are defined as a type of website that employs advanced encryption to protect the anonymity of users. The article also analyses the implications Silk Road has for drug consumers and law enforcement, as well as the potential changes to drug distribution networks that are likely to occur if Silk Road and other cryptomarkets continue to assume a greater share of the global trade in illicit drugs. In conclusion, it is argued that while Silk Road presents a less violent alternative to conventional drug distribution networks, the risks posed by the rapid proliferation of cryptomarkets more generally are largely unknown and require further research.
As consumers are increasingly using the Internet to manage their finances, there has been a concomitant increase in the risk of theft and fraud by cybercriminals. Hackers who acquire sensitive consumer data utilise information on their own, or sell the information in online forums for a significant profit. Few have considered the organisational composition of the participants engaged in the sale of stolen data, including the presence of managerial oversight, division of labour, coordination of roles and purposive associations between buyers, sellers and forum operators. Thus, this qualitative study will apply Best and Luckenbill's framework of social organisation to a sample of threads from publicly accessible web forums where individuals buy and sell stolen financial information. The implications of this study for criminologists, law enforcement, the intelligence community and information security researchers will be discussed in depth.
Cybercrime is an interesting term. It grabs headlines and attracts many column inches in its various forms. The spectre of the faceless criminal stealing money and identities, or enticing the unsuspecting victim to innocently engage in criminality themselves – for example, through the use of ‘bots’ – or even to risk their lives in face-to-face interaction, is a well-used tool of crime and horror writers. How can users defend themselves against an attack they may not recognise, from an attacker they do not know?
Centralized botnets are easy targets for takedown efforts by computer security researchers and law enforcement. Thus, botnet controllers have sought new ways to harden the infrastructures of their botnets. In order to meet this objective, some botnet operators have (re)designed their botnets to use Peer-to-Peer (P2P) infrastructures. Many P2P botnets are far more resilient to takedown attempts than centralized botnets, because they have no single points of failure. However, P2P botnets are subject to unique classes of attacks, such as node enumeration and poisoning. In this paper, we introduce a formal graph model to capture the intrinsic properties and fundamental vulnerabilities of P2P botnets. We apply our model to current P2P botnets to assess their resilience against attacks. We provide assessments on the sizes of all eleven active P2P botnets, showing that some P2P botnet families contain over a million bots. In addition, we have prototyped several mitigation strategies to measure the resilience of existing P2P botnets. We believe that the results from our analysis can be used to assist security researchers in evaluating mitigation strategies against current and future P2P botnets.
Between the crimes in the suites and the crimes in the streets lies the mostly unexplored terrain within which we find crimes
of ‘everyday life’. Not all of these are formally illegal, but all are generally seen as morally dubious. Most of the crimes
of everyday life are committed in the contemporary marketplace, and by those who think of themselves (and are mostly considered
by others) as respectable citizens. We contextualize normative orientations that are conducive to such types of behaviour
using a framework that links E. P. Thompson’s (1963) concept of the ‘moral economy’ with Institutional Anomie Theory (Messner and Rosenfeld 1994, 2007). Findings from a comparative survey study in three economic change regions (England and Wales, Western and Eastern
Germany) show that a syndrome of market anomie comprising distrust, fear and cynical attitudes toward law increases the willingness
of respectable citizens to engage in illegal and unfair practices in the marketplace.
Rational choice theories (RCTs) of crime assume actors behave in an instrumental, outcome-oriented way. Accordingly, individuals should weight the costs and benefits of criminal acts with subjective probabilities that these outcomes will occur. Previous studies either do not directly test this central hypothesis or else yield inconsistent results. We show that a meaningful test can be conducted only if a broader view is adopted that takes into account the interplay of moral norms and instrumental incentives. Such a view can be derived from the Model of Frame Selection (Kroneberg, 2005) and the Situational Action Theory of Crime Causation (Wikström, 2004). Based on these theories, we analyze the willingness to engage in shoplifting and tax fraud in a sample of 2,130 adults from Dresden, Germany. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that only respondents who do not feel bound by moral norms show the kind of instrumental rationality assumed in RCTs of crime. Where norms have been strongly internalized, and in the absence of neutralizations, instrumental incentives are irrelevant.
In this article I develop a proposal for the theoretical vantage point of the sociology of markets, focusing on the problem of the social order of markets. The initial premise is that markets are highly demanding arenas of social interaction, which can only operate if three inevitable coordination problems are resolved. I define these coordination problems as the value problem, the problem of competition and the cooperation problem. I show that these problems can only be resolved based on stable reciprocal expectations on the part of market actors, which have their basis in the socio-structural, institutional and cultural embedding of markets. The sociology of markets aims to investigate how market action is structured by these macrostructures and to examine the change of institutions, networks and cultural frames of market action.
Measuring the cost of cybercrime
- R Anderson
- C Barton
- R Böhme
- R Clayton
- M J Van Eeten
- M Levi
- Ross Anderson
Linguistic data analysis of 3 billion Reddit comments shows the alt-right is getting stronger
- T Squirrell
The origins and impacts of the Swedish file-sharing movement: A case study
- J Andersson
Source code for IoT botnet ‘Mirai’ released
- B Krebs
The democratization of censorship-Krebs on security
- B Krebs
Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime
- Ross Anderson
- Chris Barton
- Rainer Böhme
- Richard Clayton
- Michel J. G. van Eeten
- Michael Levi
- Tyler Moore
- Stefan Savage
An economic map of cybercrime (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 1997795). Retrieved from Social Science Research Network website
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