ArticlePDF Available

Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) and the COLREGS: Do We Need Quantified Rules Or Is “the Ordinary Practice of Seamen” Specific Enough?

Authors:

Abstract and Figures

Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) is currently on the agenda in several countries and also in the IMO. In Norway a 120 TEU container feeder is being build and will start sailing autonomously in 2022. The challenge is huge. One question is whether or not the present, quantitative, collision regulations needs to be updated to rules where expressions as “early” and “substantial” are quantified? Or if ships can sail autonomously under the present rules? Another question is if MASS should be marked to signal that the ship is in autonomous mode? Or if it is enough that she follows COLREGS? This discussion paper will take a closer look at these questions and advocate automation transparency, meaning that the behavior of an autonomous vessel has to make sense and be understandable to human operators on other manned ships and crafts.
Content may be subject to copyright.
511
1 INTRODUCTION
Largeautonomousmerchantvesselsarestillonnot
forreal.However,inNorwaythebuildingcontractis
alreadysignedforYARABirkeland,thefirstMaritime
Autonomous,SurfaceShip(MASS),anunmanned
containerfeeder,scheduledtostarttestsin2020
(Kongsberg,2019).LackingIMOregulations,thetests
willhavetocommenceinnationalwaters,whichin
thiscasemeanstheGrenlandareaofPorsgunnand
LarvikinsouthernNorwaywithcomplexnarrow,
inshorearchipelagonavigation.Itisabusyindustrial
areawherealargeportionoftheshiptrafficconsists
ofgascarriersandvesselswithhazardouscargoand,
summertime,anabundanceofsmallleisurecraftsand
kayaks.Theseatrafficintheareaismonitoredbythe
BrevikVTSwhichin2015made623“interventions,”
meaningthattheVTSaskedforsomealterationfrom
theplannedsailingroute(StatisticsNorway,2016).
Conductingautonomousnavigationinsuchanareais
ahugechallenge.
Theprojectisambitious.The80meterslong,
unmanned,autonomousvessel,taking120containers
withafullyelectricpropulsionsystem,willreplace
some40,000truckhaulseveryyear.Thusmoving
heavytrafficfromroadtosea,fromfossilfuelto
hydrogeneratedelectricity.Theplaniscurrentlythat
shewillstarttestrunsin2020.Firstwithamanned
bridgeonboard,thenwiththesamebridgeliftedoff
tothequayside,remotelycontrollingthevessel,
beforefinallyattemptingtogoautonomouslyin2022
(Kongsberg,2019).
1.1 Unmanned,automaticandautonomous
Todaysmannedshipsmaybethoughtofas
“manual.”However,thelevelofautomationisin
manyshipsquitehigh.Withanautopilotin“track
following”mode,setsothattheshipcanexecute
turnsalongapreplannedroutewithout
acknowledgmentfromtheOfficeroftheWatch
(OOW)‐giventhatthevoyageplaniscorrectand
Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) and the
COLREGS: Do We Need Quantified Rules Or Is “the
Ordinary Practice of Seamen” Specific Enough?
T.Porathe
NorwegianUniversityofScienceandTechnology,Trondheim,Norway
ABSTRACT:MaritimeAutonomousSurfaceShips(MASS)iscurrentlyontheagendainseveralcountriesand
alsointheIMO.InNorwaya120TEUcontainerfeederisbeingbuildandwillstartsailingautonomouslyin
2022.Thechallengeishuge.Onequestioniswhetherornotthepresent,quantitative,collisionregulations
needstobeupdatedtoruleswhereexpressionsas“early”and“substantial”arequantified?Orifshipscansail
autonomouslyunderthepresentrules?AnotherquestionisifMASSshouldbemarkedtosignalthattheshipis
inautonomousmode?OrifitisenoughthatshefollowsCOLREGS?Thisdiscussionpaperwilltakeacloser
lookatthesequestionsandadvocateautomationtransparency,meaningthatthebehaviorofanautonomous
vesselhastomakesenseandbeunderstandabletohumanoperatorsonothermannedshipsandcrafts.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 13
Number 3
September 2019
DOI:10.12716/1001.13.03.04
512
validatedforasetunderkeelclearance.Thisisthe
waytheNorwegiancoastalexpressHurtigruten
navigatesduringmostofitsinshoreroutefrom
BergentoKirkenes(Porathe,pers.comm.).Butthe
OOWstillhastobepresentonthebridgetolookout
forandhandleencounterswithothershipsandcrafts.
Whatisneededtoremovetheoperatorcompletelyis
differentsensorsthatcanseeandidentifymoving,
unchartedobstaclesinthesea,andanautopilot
connectedwithacollisionavoidancemodule
programmedwiththeInternationalRegulationsfor
PreventingCollisionsatSea,COLREGSforshort
(IMO,1972).Withsuchasystemitisspeculatedthata
shipinautonomousmodemaynavigate
automatically.
However,suchan“automaticship”doesnotneed
tobeunmanned.Itmaycontainamaintenancecrew,
orevenareducednumberofnavigatorswhotake
manualwatchesduringdifficultconditions,ormaybe
daytimewatchesingoodconditions,savingthe
automationforthelongboringnightwatchesor
uneventfuloverseepassages.Withsuchapartly
mannedbridgetheshipwouldhavea“periodically
unattendedbridge”accordingtoIMO’slatest
definitions,(IMO,2018).
ThewatchcanalsobehandedovertoaShore
ControlCentre(SCC)thatcanaccesstheshipssensors
andcommunication,readytowakeuptheOOWif
somethingunexpectedhappens(inwhichcasethe
shipis“remotelymonitored”).Or,theSCCcouldbe
grantedaccesstotheautopilot,inwhichcasetheship
willbe“remotecontrolled”.Itisreasonabletothink
thatthiswillbeagradualevolutiontowardshigher
andhigherlevelsofautomation,maybea
combinationofremotemonitoringandcontrol,and
autonomy.
Itcanalsobeusefultoconsidertheconcept
“OperationalDesignDomain”(ODD)usedbythe
selfdrivingcarindustry(Rodseth&Nordahl,2017).
Inthemaritimedomain,itwouldmeanthattherewill
becertainshippinglanesandfairwayswerethe
automationhasbeenspecificallytrainedandwhich
havebeenspecificallyprepared,maybewith
designatedlanes,orbyspecifictechnical
infrastructure.Intheseareas,ashipmaynavigate
autonomously,whiletheshipinotherareasmust
navigatemanuallywithamannedbridgeorremote
controlledfromtheshore.
TheconceptofOODalsohasdeeperimplications
intothecultureofvesseltrafficinspecificareas.More
onthislater.
Forthediscussioninthispaperthefocuswillbe
onshipsin“autonomousmode”,regardlessof
whetheritispermanentoronlyperiodically.With“in
autonomousmode”Imeanthatacomputerprogram
isnavigating,takingdecisionsandexecutingthem,
regardlessofwhetheranOOWisstandingbyonthe
bridge,orthecaptainisinhiscabinonboardorina
remotecentreashore.Thefocushereisonhowthe
shipautomationcanhandlesinteractionwithother
ships,andparticularlyhowitcouldfollowtherules
oftheroad,theCOLREGS.
2 THECOLREGS
Forseveralcenturiesshipscameandwent,sailing
withthesamewindandtideanditwasnotuntilthe
steamshipsturnedupinthebeginningofthe19th
centurythatcollisionregulationsbecamevital
(Crosbie,2006).In1840theLondonTrinityHouse
drewupasetofregulations,oneofwhichrequireda
steamvesselpassinganothervesselinanarrow
channeltoleavetheotheronherownporthand.The
otherregulationrelatingtosteamshipsrequired
steamvesselsondifferentcrossingcourses,soasto
involveriskofcollision,toaltercoursetostarboard
andpassontheportsideofeachother.Thetwo
TrinityHouserulesforsteamvesselswerecombined
intoasingleruleandincludedintheSteam
NavigationActof1846.Duringtheyearsanumberof
iterationsandinternationalizations,throughwhatis
nowtheInternationalMaritimeOrganization(IMO),
ledtothelatestrevisionoftheInternational
RegulationsforPreventingCollisionsatSea
(COLREGS)onaninternationalconferenceconvened
inLondonin1972.
Onemayaskifmaybenewrulesareneededfor
autonomousships?Ormaybethereshouldbema
chinetomachinenegotiationsineveryindividual
caseofconflictingcourses?Thefinalanswertothat
questionisunknown,butitismyfirmopinionthatas
longasMASSwillinteractwithhumansonmanned
shipstherehastobealimitednumberofcommon
andeasytounderstandrulesknownto,andobeyed
by,allvesselsatsea.Onecandreamupotherrules,
butwhatwegot,andneedtoadhereto,isthe
COLREGS.Havingsaidthat,onemightconsiderif
extensionsorrevisionsmaybeneeded.
2.1 Qualitativerules
Thecollisionregulationsare,likelegaltextoftenis,
writteninageneralmannersoastobeapplicablein
asmanysituationsaspossible.Theprecise
interpretationhastobemadeinthecontextofthe
actualsituationjudgednotonlyonknowledgeofthe
rules,butalsoonexperienceandculture,whatthe
rulescall“theordinarypracticeofseamen,”asis
statedalreadyinthesecondrule.
ThequalitativenatureofCOLREGSwillbea
problemfortheprogrammerwhoistowritecodefor
thecollisionavoidancealgorithmsofautonomous
navigationmodules.Iwillinthissectionpointto
somethese“soft,”qualitative,clauseswherethese
problemswillbecomeapparent.
2.2 Rule2:theordinarypracticeofseamen
Rule2oftheCOLREGSisaboutresponsibility.Ithas
twosections.Section(a)state“NothingintheseRules
shallexonerateanyvessel,ortheowner,masteror
crewthereof,fromtheconsequencesofanyneglectto
complywiththeseRulesoroftheneglectofany
precautionswhichmayberequiredbytheordinary
practiceofseamen,orbythespecialcircumstancesof
thecase.”
Section(b)ofthesamerulestatesthat“In
construingandcomplyingwiththeseRulesdue
513
regardshallbehadtoalldangersofnavigationand
collisionandtoanyspecialcircumstances,including
thelimitationsofthevesselsinvolved,whichmay
makeadeparturefromtheseRulesnecessarytoavoid
immediatedanger.”
Whatthisrulebasicallysaysisthatyoumustal
waysfollowtheserules,butthatyoumustalso
deviatefromtheseruleswhennecessarytoavoidan
accident.Inessence,ifyouhaveanaccidentitisa
goodchancethatyouhaveviolatedoneorbothof
thesesections.Theproblemforthenavigatorishow
long,orcloseintoanencounter,heorsheshould
followtheRulesandwhenitistimetoskiptherules
anddowhateverisnecessarytoavoidacollision.The
answeris:itdependsonthecircumstances.TheRules
givenohintastothenumberofcablesormiles,
minutesorseconds.Itdoesnoteventrytodefinethe
“ordinarypracticeofseamen.”
Similarsoftenumerationsarefoundforinstancein
Rules15,16and17.
2.3 Rule15to17,riskofcollision
Rule15oftheCOLREGStalksabout“crossing
situations”:“Whentwopowerdrivenvesselsare
crossingsoastoinvolveriskofcollision,thevessel
whichhastheotheronherownstarboardsideshall
keepoutofthewayandshall,ifthecircumstancesof
thecaseadmit,avoidcrossingaheadoftheother
vessel.”
Calculatingwhenacrossingsituationmayleadto
acollisionisprettystraitforwardgiventhatpresent
courseandspeedcanbeextrapolated.(Thisis,how
ever,inrealitynotalwaysthecaseastheintentionsof
theothershipmaynotbeknown.)Ifthebearingto
theothershipisconstantovertime,itcanbeassumed
thatthereexistsariskofcollision.Rule15alsodefines
whichvesselshouldtakeactiontoavoidcollision.
“Theonewhichhastheotheronherownstarboard
side.”
Thefollowingrulethendefineshowthisaction
shouldbedonebythe“giveway”vessel(Rule16):
“Everyvesselwhichisdirectedtokeepoutoftheway
ofanothervesselshall,asfaraspossible,takeearly
andsubstantialactiontokeepwellclear.”
Thisactioncouldbeachangeofspeedorachange
ofcourse,butforthesoftwareprogrammerthe
problematickeywordshereare“earlyand
substantial”.Thereisnosuggestioninmilesorclock
minuteswhatconstitutes“early”,neitherhowlarge
coursechangeorspeedchangeconstitutes
“substantial”.
Rule17definestheactionsoftheshipthatisnot
obligedtoyield,“thestandon”vessel:“(a),(i)Where
oneoftwovesselsistokeepoutofthewaytheother
shallkeephercourseandspeed.(ii)Thelattervessel
may,however,takeactiontoavoidcollisionbyher
maneuveralone,assoonasitbecomesapparentto
herthatthevesselrequiredtokeepoutofthewayis
nottakingappropriateactionincompliancewith
theseRules.(b)When,fromanycause,thevessel
requiredtokeephercourseandspeedfindsherselfso
closethatcollisioncannotbeavoidedbytheactionof
thegivewayvesselalone,sheshalltakesuchaction
aswillbestaidtoavoidcollision.(c)Apowerdriven
vesselwhichtakesactioninacrossingsituationin
accordancewithsubparagraph(a)(ii)ofthisRuleto
avoidcollisionwithanotherpowerdrivenvessel
shall,ifthecircumstancesatthecaseadmit,notalter
coursetoportforavesselonherownportside.(d)
ThisRuledoesnotrelievethegivewayvesselofher
obligationtokeepoutoftheway.”
Thisruleaddstothecomplexitybyusingqualitative
definitionslike“assoonasitbecomesapparent,”
“findsherselfsoclosethatcollisioncannotbeavoided
bytheactionofthegivewayvesselalone,”“actionas
willbestaidtoavoidcollision”and“ifthe
circumstancesatthecaseadmit.”
Figure1.ThiswasthetrafficsituationatSkagen,thenortherntipofDenmarkat15:00on5November2018.Onemayreflect
onthedifficultiesofCOLREGalgorithmsneededtodocollisionavoidanceinsuchanareawheregivingwaytooneship
mightleadintoanotherconflictsituationinanunpredictable,cascadingmanner(screenshotfromMarineTraffic.com).
514
Foraprogrammerprogrammingthecollision
avoidancemoduleofanautonomousnavigation
softwarethedifficultyisnotonlyinjudgingwhich
action,butalsowhentoexecuteit“early”and
“substantially”.Theanswerwillbethesameasitwas
intheprevioussection:itdependsonthe
circumstances.Arethereonlytwoshipsmeeting
aloneonthehighseasthetaskmightberelatively
simple,butattheotherendofthespectrum,inahigh
complexitysituation,e.g.inaconstrainedand
intenselytraffickedarealiketheStraitsofMalacca
andSingapore,thetaskisofanentirelydifferent
dimension.Notonlydoesthelargenumberofships
inalimitedspacechangethevalueofvariableslike
“early”and“substantial,”butanevasivemaneuver
foroneshipmayleadintoaclosequarterssituation
withanothershipandsoon,inacascading
interactioneffectwithunpredictableresults.Figure1
showsthecomplicatedtrafficsituationaround
SkagenonthenortherntipofDenmark.
Insomeareastherecanalsobeadifferentculture
ofhowthingsaredone(sometimesquitecontraryto
COLREGS).WhenthehighspeedferryStenaCarisma
traffickedtheGothenburgFredrikshavnlinein30+
knots,anofficerIspoketosaid“Wealwayskeepout
ofthewayofeverythingthatmovesbecauseweare
sofastandmaneuverable”(Porathe,pers.comm.).
AlsointheSoundbetweenSwedenandDenmarkthe
HelsingborgHelsingorferrieshasacultureof
keepingoutofthewayinmostsituations(Porathe,
pers.comm.).
Apossiblestrategyforaprogrammertryingto
catch“earlyandsubstantial”aswellas“theordinary
practiceofseamen”foraspecificarea(anODD)could
betostudylargeamountsofAIS(Automatic
IdentificationSystem)dataforthespecificareain
questionsandfromthatdatadeducelimitsof“early”
and“substantialaction”.Ausefulconceptcouldthen
beships“safetyzones”whichisthezonearoundones
shipthatnavigatorstendnottoletothershipswithin.
“Azonearoundavesselwithinwhichallother
vesselsshouldremainclearunlessauthorized,”
(IALA,2008).Thiszonetendstobelargerontheopen
seathaninnarrowwatersorinaportandcanbe
studiedusingAISdata.UsingsuchAISstudies,
establishmentofazoneoutsidewhichanactioncan
beconsidered“early”couldbeattempted.Butthe
contextisimportant,notonlythestaticgeographical
context,butalsothetimedependenttrafficdensity
context.
TheNauticalInstitutementionsthat“Asageneral
guideline,attempttoachieveaCPA(closestpointof
approach)of2(nautical)milesintheopenseaand1
mileinrestrictedwaters”(Lee&Parker,2007,p.35).
Ifallshipsinsuchacomplexsituationwhere
autonomousandgovernedbycleveralgorithmsthere
isachancethatsuchacollisionavoidanceapplication
couldbesuccessful,butinamixedsituationwhere
mostormanyoftheshipsarecontrolledbyhumans,
whicharelesspredictable,theriskofabadoutcome
isevident.
2.4 Rule19,restrictedvisibility
ThefinalrulethatIwanttobringuphereisRule19,
“Conductofvesselsinrestrictedvisibility.”Thisisa
quitlengthyrulewhichsays:
“(a)ThisRuleappliestovesselsnotinsightofone
anotherwhennavigatinginornearanareaof
restrictedvisibility.”
Further“(b)Everyvesselshallproceedatasafe
speedadaptedtotheprevailingcircumstancesand
conditionsofrestrictedvisibility.Apowerdriven
vesselshallhaveherenginesreadyforimmediate
maneuver.”
“(c)Everyvesselshallhavedueregardtothe
prevailingcircumstancesandconditionsofrestricted
visibilitywhencomplyingwiththeRulesofSectionI
ofthisPart.”
“(d)Avesselwhichdetectsbyradaralonethe
presenceofanothervesselshalldetermineifaclose
quarterssituationisdevelopingand/orriskof
collisionexists.Ifso,sheshalltakeavoidingactionin
ampletime,providedthatwhensuchactionconsists
ofanalterationofcourse,sofaraspossiblethe
followingshallbeavoided:(i)analterationofcourse
toportforavesselforwardsofthebeam,otherthan
foravesselbeingovertaken;(ii)analterationof
coursetowardsavesselabeamorabaftthebeam.”
“(e)Exceptwhereithasbeendeterminedthata
riskofcollisiondoesnotexist,everyvesselwhich
hearsapparentlyforwardsofherbeamthefogsignal
ofanothervessel,orwhichcannotavoidaclose
quarterssituationwithanothervesselforwardsofher
beam,shallreduceherspeedtotheminimumat
whichshecanbekeptonhercourse.Sheshallif
necessarytakeallherwayoffandinanyevent
navigatewithextremecautionuntildangerof
collisionisover.”
TheDutchCouncilofTransportationhasaddedan
amplificationtothisruleforDutchmariners:“During
aperiodofreducedvisibilityunexpectedbehaviorof
othervesselsshouldbeanticipated.Thespeedandthe
correlatedstoppingdistancemustcorrespondwith
thissituation,”(vanDokkum,2016).
ThebigdifferencewiththisruleversusRule15
aboveisthatinrestrictedvisibilitybothvesselsare
suddenlygivewayvesselsandtheresponsibilityfor
avoidingacollisionisshared.Theproblemsherefora
quantitativeapproachliesinsofttermslike“safe
speed,”“dueregardtotheprevailingcircumstances
andconditionsofrestrictedvisibility”and“take
avoidingactioninampletime.”Butalsointhe
problemofdefining“restrictedvisibility.”Asa
meteorologicalphenomenon“restricted”isnot
defined,noris“safespeed”,althoughanassumption
mightbethatthevesselshouldbeabletostopwithin
thedistancethatcanbeoverlooked.Anassumption
thatcannotalwaysbefollowedasinmanypartsof
theworldshipsregularlynavigateinconditionsof
visibilitywhereeventheownshipsforecastle(front)
cannotbeseenfromthebridge.
Anotherreflectionisthat“restrictedvisibility”
referstohumanvisibilityoftheeye,whichinthe
autonomouscasecanbetranslatedtothevisibilityof
thedaylightcameras.Section(d)inRule19which
referstowhenshipsaredetected“byradaralone”
515
wasaddedin1960afteranumberof“radarassisted
accidents”(themostwellknownwastheStockholm
AndreaDoriaaccidentin1956).Anautonomous
vesselwillmostprobably,apartfromdaylight
cameras,AISandradar,alsohaveinfraredcameras
andmaybeLIDAR.Butevenifsensorresourcesonan
autonomousshipcouldbejudgedasbeingbetterthan
thehumaneye,thisrulemakesitnecessarytoinclude
visibilitysensorstodecideifRule19,“restricted
visibility,”ortherules11to18,“conductofvesselsin
sightofeachother,”shouldapply.Aconfounding
factorhere,thatneedstobetakenintoconsideration,
isthatfogoftenappearsinpatchesorbanks,soeven
iftheautonomousshipitselfmaybeinanareaof
goodvisibility,theothervesselmightbehiddenina
fogbank,inwhichcaseRule19apply.Apossible
solutionfortheMASSmightbetocompareradarand
cameraimages.
Aphenomenonworthtakenintoconsiderationis
thatwhileanautonomousvesselwillweighits
differentsensorinputsinanobjectivemanner
resultinginasightingwithaprobabilitymeasure,the
humanoperatoronamanualvesselhasacognitive
systemthatprefervisualegocentricinputthroughthe
eyesascomparedtoexocentricimagesfromradar
andelectronicchartsthatneedstobementallyrotated
tobeaddedtotheinnermentalmap,(Porathe,2006).
Anexampleofthisistheallisionofthecontainer
vesselCoscoBusanin2007withtheSanFrancisco
OaklandBayBridgeinheavyfogbutwithfully
workingradarandGNSS/AISsupport(NTSB,2009).
Thehumancognitivesystemhasotherlimitations
suchase.g.“normalitybias”and“confirmationbi
as.”(Poratheetal.,2018).Withthis,togetherwith
otherhumanshortcomingslikefatigue,aninclination
towardsshortcuts,andsometimessheerviolations,
theriskisthatthelistofpotentialinteraction
problemsbetweenhumanandmachineguided
navigationwillbelong.
3 QUANTITATIVECOLREGS
Thecodeforacollisionavoidancesoftwarethatisto
coverallpossiblesituationswillhavetobeverylong
andhewouldstillnotsuffice.Theunknown
unknowns,blackswans,wouldkeepappearing.
Fromacomputerprogrammer’spointofview,it
mightseemhelpfulifallqualitative,soft,
enumerationsofCOLREGScouldbequantifiedinto
nauticalmiles,degreesofarcandclockminutesonce
andforall.Thiswouldgreatlyfacilitatethe
developmentofthenecessaryalgorithmsthatwill
governfuturecollisionavoidancesystems.However,
suchaquantifiedregulatorytextwould,inthesame
way,havetobeverylengthyanditwouldstillnot
coverallpossiblesituations.InsteadCOLREGS,like
otherlegaltextwillneedtohaveageneralformatthat
isopentointerpretationsinacourtofmaritimelaw,
andtheoppositeof“theordinarypracticeofseamen,”
i.e.“goodseamanship,”includejuridicaloptionssuch
as“negligence”and“grossnegligence”,(van
Dokkum,2016).Shipstechnicalperformanceand
maneuverability,experienceandtrainingofseamen,
allevolvewithtime,sofortherulesoftheroadtobe
validtheymustbewritteninageneralmanner.
Insteaditisthealgorithmsofcollisionavoidance
applicationsthatneedtobepreciseandquantitative.
ByusingAISdataandlargescalesimulations,
applicationscanbemadetolearnthemosteffective
andefficientwayofmaneuveringindifferent
situations,stillfollowingtheCOLREGS.Itwould
probablybebeneficialifsuchmachinelearningwas
ongoing“lifelong”fortheAI(ArtificialIntelligence)
onthebridge,whichthenwouldbecomemoreand
moreexperiencedthroughtheyears.However,itis
unlikelythattheIMOwouldacceptanAIonthe
bridgewhichwasnotcertifiedandwhobehavedina
preciselypredeterminedwayforaspecificsituation
(evenifthiscouldbedefendedbycomparingtheAI
toatrainedandlicensedthirdmateworkinghisway
upthroughtheranksgainingmoreandmore
experience).
Anotherpointtopayattentiontoisthat,aslongas
therearemanualshipsgovernedbyhumansonthe
sea,theactionsofautonomousshipshastobe
predictableforthesehumans.Autonomous
navigation,supportedbyartificialintelligenceonthe
bridge,hasanumberofadvantagescomparedto
human,manualnavigation:improvedvigilance,
improvedsensingandperception,longerendurance,
anabilitytolookfurtherintothefutureandtokeep
morealternativeoptionsopenduringthedecision
makingprocess.Forinstance,bykeepingtrackofall
shipmovementsonaverylongrangeanAImightbe
abletopredictapossibleclosequarterssituation
severalhoursaheadofahumannavigatorbutmay
thereformakemaneuverswhichmightnotmake
sensetoanOOWonamanualshipinthevicinity.
Therefore,itisofoutmostimportancethat
autonomousshipsarepredictableandtransparentto
humans.
4 AUTOMATIONTRANSPARENCY
4.1 Anthropomorphism
Everyoneofusthatarestrugglingwiththe
complexityofdigitaltoolsknowthattheydonot
alwaysdowhatwewantorassumetheywilldo.
They“think”differentlyfromus.Aninnatetendency
ofhumanpsychologyistoattributehumantraits,
emotions,orintentionstononhumanentities.Thisis
calledanthropomorphism.Wedosobecauseitgivesus
asimple(butfaulty)methodto“understand”
machines.However,thechanceisthatifweknow
thatMASSalwayswillfollowCOLREGS,wecan
learntoknowtheirbehaviorandinahumanmanner
beabletounderstandtheirworking.Thisin
oppositiontonormal,mannedships,whereyou
alwayshavetobecautiousofmisunderstandingsor
violations.
4.2 Identificationlight
Inmyopinionitisthereforeimportantthatships
navigationinautonomousmodeshowsomekindof
identificationsignal.Itcouldbean“A”addedtotheir
AISiconinECDISorontheradarscreen.Duringdark
alightsignalcouldbeadded(e.g.apurplemasthead
allaroundlight,seeFig.2).
516
Theassumptionaboveisthatifautonomousships
alwaysfollowCOLREGStheirbehaviorwillbea
hundredpercentpredictable.Butaswehaveseen
above,thismightnotbetrueife.g.thespectrometers
onboardtheautonomousshipdoesnotinterpret
“restrictedvisibility”thesamewaywedo(and
thereforeRule19shouldorshouldnotbeused).
Figure2:Shouldshipsnavigatinginautonomousmode
carryaspecialidentificationlight?Thebehaviorofthe
navigationAImaybedifferentfromthebehaviorofnormal,
mannedships.Thelightcouldbepurplewhichisacolor
thatisnotusedforotherpurposes.Thesamediscussion
andcolorchoiceisdebatedintheautonomouscarindustry.
4.3 Intentions
Anotherimportantissueisunderstandingintentions.
Interpretingtheintentionsofothershipscorrectlyis
imperativetorulefollowing.Anoldaccidentinthe
EnglishChannel1972canserveasanexampleof
whatmisinterpretedintentions(andtherefore
applyingthewrongrules)mayleadto:
TheferrySt.Germain,comingfromDunkirkin
FranceanddestinedforDover,wasturningslowlyto
port,awayfromthestraitwesterlycoursetoDover.
Insteadhercaptainintendedtotakehersouthwest,
downontheoutsideoftheTrafficSeparationScheme
(TSS),intheInshoreZone,inordertofindaclearer
placetocrosstheTSSata“rightangle”accordingto
Rule10oftheCOLREGS.ThebulkcarrierAdartewas
headingnortheastuptheTSStowardstheNorthSea.
Thepilotonboardrecognizedtheradartargetasthe
DunkirkDoverferryandassumed,quitewrongly,
thatshewouldcrossaheadofhimandthattherenow
existedariskofcollision(Rule15).Adartewouldthen
bethegivewayshipandwasobligedtogivewayby
turningtostarboard.AtthesametimeSt.Germain
startedherportturn,thepilotonAdartestartedto
madeaseriesofsmallcoursealternationstostarboard
togiveway(quitecontrarytothe“substantialaction”
requiredbyRule16).ButinsteadSt.Germain
continuedherportturnandthetwoshipscollided.St.
Germainsank,killinganumberofpassengers(Lee&
Parker,2007).
Thisaccidentisretoldtoillustratetheneedto
understandintentionsandthisgoesforbothmanned
andunmannedships.Iftheintentionoftheothership
isnotunderstood,theriskisthatCOLREGwillnot
saveasituation.Itisimportantthatautomationshare
informationaboutitsworkings,itssituation
awarenessanditsintentions.Questionslike:What
doestheautonomousshipknowaboutits
surroundings?Whatothervesselshasbeenobserved
byitssensors?Thesequestionscouldbeansweredby
e.g.alivechartscreenaccessibleonlinethrougha
webportalbyothervessels,VTS,coastguardetc.See
Figure3.
Basedonitssituationawarenesstheautomation
willmakedecisionsonhowitinterpretstherulesof
collisionavoidance.Itwouldbeabenefitifthe
intentionsofshipscouldbecommunicated,asargued
inPorathe&Brodje(2015).Largeshipsobeyunder
IMO’sSOLASconvention.ASOLASship(asdefined
inMaritimeRulePart21)isanyshiptowhichthe
InternationalConventionfortheSafetyofLifeatSea
(SOLAS)1974applies;namely:apassengership
engagedonaninternationalvoyage,oranon
passengershipof500tons’grosstonnageormore
engagedonaninternationalvoyage(IMO,1980).
SOLASshipsmusttransmittheirpositionand
someotherinformationusingAIS.Inaddition,
SOLASshipsareusuallybigandmakegoodradar
targets,whichwillprovideasecondsourceof
information.Furthermore,allSOLASshipmustmake
avoyageplanfromporttoport.Severalpassedand
ongoingprojectsaimatcollectingvoyageplansand
coordinatingshiptrafficforreasonsofsafetyand
efficiency(e.g.EfficienSea,ACCSEAS,MONALISA,
SMARTnavigation,SESAME,andtheSTM
Validationprojects).Theseattemptsinrouteexchange
wouldmakeitpossibleforSOLASshipsalsoMASS
‐tocoordinatetheirvoyagesandshowintentionswell
aheadoftimetoavoidenteringintoaclosequarters
situationwheretheCOLREGswillapply.
Fig.3:Exampleofautomationtransparency:Anonlinechartportalshowingthesituationawarenessoftheautonomous
ship(hereAutomatExpress),whereshethinkssheis,whatothershipsandobjectsshehasobserved,andwhatintentionsshe
hasfortheclosefuture.An“A”isaddedtotheAISsymbolfor“Iamnavigatingautonomously”andtheintendedroute
showncouldalsobevisibleinECDISandradarsofshipsinthevicinity.
517
Routeexchangewouldforinstancealloweach
shiptosendanumberofwaypointsaheadofthe
shipspresentpositionthoughAIStoallshipswithin
radiorange.Allshipscanthenseeotherships
intendedroute(asinFig.3).IntheACCSEASproject
2014asimulatorstudywasmadewith11professional
British,SwedishandDanishbridgeofficers,harbor
masters,pilotsandVTSoperatorswithexperience
fromcomplextrafficinthetestareawhichwasthe
HumberEstuary.Thefeedbackfromtheparticipants
onthebenefitsofshowingintentionswereoverall
positive(Porathe&Brodje,2015).
5 CONCLUSIONS
Ihaveinthisdiscussionpointedatsomechallenges
facingdevelopersofcollisionavoidancesoftware.
Muchofthishastodowiththequalitativenatureof
COLREGSvisaviethequantitativeneedsofreallife
situations.
However,alsotheinteractionbetweentraditional
shipsin“manualmode”isfromtimetotime
problematic.Theintroductionofautonomousships
whichintheirnavigationfollowsamachine
interpretationofCOLREGSmightleadtomanymore
problemsifnotimplementedcarefully.
Itisofgreatimportancethatthemaneuversof
autonomousshipsarepredictabletohumanoperators
onmanualships.TheAIonbordhasapotentialto
becomemuch“smarter”thanhumans,andtobeable
toextrapolatefurtherintothefutureandthereby
behaveinawaythatmightsurprisepeople
(“automationsurprise”).Insteadthesoftwareshould
focusonbehavinginahumanlikemanner.
Suchautomationtransparencymightconsistof
MASSshowingitsnavigationmode(thepurplemast
headlight=inautonomousmode),thecontentofits
situationawareness(whichvesselsareobservedand
therebywhicharenotobserved)anditsintentions.
Intentionscanbesharede.g.usingrouteexchange
technologydevelopedinrecenteNavigationprojects
likeEfficienSea,ACCSEASandMONALISA.
Onlyifothermarinerscanunderstandthe
workingsofMASS,apeacefulcoexistenceispossible.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thisdiscussionpaperbuildsonapreviouspaperpublished
intheCOMPIT2019conference.However,thesolutions
andargumentationhasbeenfurtherdeveloped.The
researchisconductedwithintheSAREPTA(Safety,
autonomy,remotecontrolandoperationsoftransport
systems)projectfundedbytheNorwegianResearch
Council,whichisherebygratefullyacknowledged.
REFERENCES
Crosbie,J.W.2006.LookoutVersusLights:SomeSidelights
ontheDarkHistoryofNavigationLights.Journalof
navigation59(1):17.
vanDokkum,K.2016.TheCOLRGSGuide(6thed.).
Vlissingen,TheNetherlands:DokMarMaritime
Publisher.
IALA,theInternationalAssociationforAidstoNavigation
andLighthouseAuthorities.2008.VTSManual.
https://www.iala
aism.org/wiki/dictionary/index.php/Ship_Safety_Zone
[Acc.20190210]
IMO,theInternationalMaritimeOrganization.1972.
ConventionontheInternationalRegulationsforPreventing
CollisionsatSea,1972,(COLREGs).London:IMO.
IMO.1980.TheInternationalConventionfortheSafetyofLifeat
Sea(SOLAS)1974.London:IMO.
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConv
entions/Pages/InternationalConventionfortheSafety
ofLifeatSea(SOLAS),1974.aspx[Acc.20190210]
IMO.2018.RegulatoryscopingexercisefortheuseofMaritime
AutonomousSurfaceShips(MASS).MSC100/5/6,12
October2018.London:IMO.
Kongsberg.2019.Autonomousshipproject,keyfactsabout
YARABirkeland.https://www.km.kongsberg.com/ks/
web/nokbg0240.nsf/AllWeb/4B8113B707A50A4FC12581
1D00407045?OpenDocument[Acc.20190210]
Lee,G.W.U.&Parker,J.2007.ManagingCollisionAvoidance
atSea.London:NauticalInstitute.
NTSB,NationalTransportationSafetyBoard.2009.Allision
ofHongKongRegisteredContainershipM/VCoscoBusan
withtheDeltaToweroftheSanFrancisco–OaklandBay
BridgeSanFrancisco,CaliforniaNovember7,2007.
WashingtonDC:AccidentReportNTSB/MAR09/0,
PB200991640.
Porathe,T.2006.3DNauticalChartsandSafeNavigation.
Vasteras:MalardalenUniversityPress.
Porathe,T.&Brodje,A.2015.HumanFactorAspectsinSea
TrafficManagement.InV.Bertram(ed.),Proceedingsof
the14thInternationalConferenceonComputerApplications
andInformationTechnologyintheMaritimeIndustries
(COMPIT‘15).TechnischeUniversitätHamburg‐
Harburg.
Porathe,T.,Hoem,A.,Rodseth,O.,Fjoltoft,K.&Johnsen,
S.O.2018.Atleastassafeasmannedshipping?
Autonomousshipping,safetyand“humanerror.InS.
Haugenetal.(eds),SafetyandReliabilitySafeSocietiesin
aChangingWorld.London:Taylor&FrancisGroup.
StatisticsNorway.2016.Variousindicatorsfromtheoperational
areaofVTScentres.https://www.ssb.no/191461/various
indicatorsfromtheoperationalareaofvtscentres[Acc.
20190210]
RodsethO.J.&NordahlH.2017.Definitionforautonomous
merchantships.Version1.0,October10.2017.Trondheim:
NorwegianForumforAutonomousShips.
http://nfas.autonomousship.org/resourcesen.html[Acc.
20190210].
... The International Maritime Organization (IMO) created the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) in 1972 to prevent ship collisions and ensure safe passage of ships. COLREGs came into effect in 1977 [30] and comprises the qualitative rules and ordinary practice of seamen [52,72]; as such, COLREGs is rules at sea for the safe navigation of vessels by avoiding risks based on the decision-making by seamen [79]. ...
... This has led the IMO to revise COLREGs to the latest revision at an international conference held in London in 1972 to prevent collisions at sea [30]. Navigators who perform navigation commonly agree that a clear understanding of the provisions of COLREGs is crucial for preventing collision accidents to realize MASSs [52]. ...
... The misunderstandings about the collision situation were confirmed to occur owing to the rule's intention and coverage. This intentional misunderstanding allows the free interpretation of wide arrangements in complex collision prevention scenarios without excessive limitation for designers of MASS collision prevention, as presented in Appendix 1 [22,52,72]. However, the difference bearing from own ship between the researchers of collision-avoidance algorithm and the sailing rule interpretation of navigators is likely to lead to marine accidents [67]. ...
Article
Full-text available
The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) comprises rules to prevent collisions at sea and is based on the qualitative rules and ordinary practice of seamen. However, because the criteria of the sailing rule interpretation are different, the problem of misunderstanding occurs owing to the difference in the interpretation between navigators and collision-avoidance algorithm designers. Therefore, this study aims to clarify the collision situations by understanding in the sailing rule interpretation of COLREGs. To identify the understanding of collision situations, we surveyed the navigators’ understanding of collision situations and reviewed the collision-avoidance algorithms used in recent studies. The survey results were analyzed based on head-on and crossing (HC) and crossing and overtaking (OC) situations. Results showed that navigators were unsure about whether the HC situation sailing rule should be applied to incoming vessels from the 008° and whether the overtaking or crossing situation should be applied to coming vessels at 160°. In OC situations, as the angle increased from 130°, it became difficult for navigators to interpret the navigation rules. A notable disparity emerged between the navigators’ understanding and the automated collision-avoidance algorithms. Moreover, it was confirmed that practical navigators exhibited divergent interpretations of these regulations. This study contributes to provide an understanding of COLREGs sailing rules based on the understanding of navigators and researchers.
... However, there are also definitional gaps in various other policy instruments (Komianos [49] provides a valuable overview of gaps in various maritime policy instruments in relation to MASS). While this paper focuses on the concept of seaworthiness, other research addresses the definition gaps and hurdles for MASS in other policies such as The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COL-REGs) [30,49,67,97] and the ISPS Code [49]. As will be pointed out in Section 3.1, these legal hurdles are similar to the challenges concerning the seaworthiness concept. ...
... Though, it does not seem to be clear whether cyber-attacks are to be considered "perils of the sea" based on the definition provided in the Marine Insurance Act 1906, First Schedule, para 7 [53], in combination with Thompson v [29], require the ship to be properly manned, which is arguably controversial in regard to MASS [11,98]. Similar challenges for MASS occur in relation to the COLREGs [30,49,67,97] and the ISPS Code [49]. Hannaford et al. [30], who surveyed 223 licensed deck officers, find that the COLREGs would likely need to be amended in order to fit for MASS. ...
... Research in this direction is already progressing (see, e.g. [30,49,67,97]), yet many issues require attention from policy-makers. ...
Article
This paper provides a thorough literature review of maritime cyber-risks and the maritime cyber-security policy framework, focusing on the concept of seaworthiness. Policy instruments in force, do not focus on cyber-threats, and the industry addresses relevant challenges, with recommendations and expertise from third parties. Moreover, increased digitization of operations, as well as the advent of marine autonomous surface ships (MASS), imply higher relevant risks and require new mitigation strategies. This work demonstrates that the prevailing definitions of seaworthiness do not suffice in the contemporary context of operations characterized by a high degree of automation. In this regard, the term cyber-seaworthiness is newly introduced and defined with the aim of addressing the identified gaps. This novel approach shall enhance certainty levels to the industry and serve as a basis for future research, legal argumentation, as well as policy making.
... Herein, the issue of interpreting or amending the COLREG has been raised. It is sometimes assumed that autonomous ships will always follow COLREG [42] just like any other machine following its instructions. ...
... As a matter of fact, whether unmanned marine vehicles can be considered vessels under COLREG Rule 3a has also been challenged [44]. Some technical solutions are also proposed to highlight the fact that the behavior of MASS may differ from manned vessels [42], but the suggestion does not appear to be based on anything but the opinion of the original author. ...
Article
Full-text available
With the development of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS), considerable research is undertaken to secure their safety. One of the critical aspects of MASS is collision avoidance, and multiple collision avoidance algorithms have been developed. However, due to various reasons, collision avoidance of autonomous merchant vessels appears to be far from resolved. With this study, we aim to discuss the current state of Collision Avoidance Methods (CAMs) and the challenges lying ahead—from a joint academic and practical point of view. To this end, the key Rules from International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG) have been reviewed with a focus on their practical application for MASS. Moreover, the consideration of the COLREG Rules in contemporary collision avoidance algorithms has been reviewed. The ultimate objective is to identify aspects of COLREG requiring additional attention concerning MASS developments in terms of collision avoidance. Our conclusions indicate that although a lot of progress has been achieved recently, the feasibility of CAMs for MASS remains questionable. Reasons for so are the ambiguous character of the regulations, especially COLREG, as well as virtually all existing CAMs being at best only partly COLREG-compliant.
... That is, what does "ample time" mean in this context? And how does one quantify "good seamanship" (Porathe, 2019b;Zhou et al., 2020)? Furthermore, Rule 2 "Responsibility" states: "In construing and complying with these Rules due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances, including the limitations of the vessels involved, which may make a departure from these Rules necessary to avoid immediate danger." ...
Article
Full-text available
Ongoing trends in society point towards the adoption of intelligent agents across safety critical industries. In the maritime domain, artificially intelligent agents may soon be capable of autonomously performing collision and grounding avoidance (CAGA); a task traditionally performed by humans. Consequently, the role of humans is anticipated to change from those performing collision avoidance to those supervising an agent performing collision avoidance. One of the key concerns with regards to human factors is avoiding the out-of-the-loop performance problem where humans lose situation awareness (SA) and become susceptible to misinterpreting the agent's decisions and planned actions. Despite previous research addressing human factors in autonomous shipping and remote control, few studies have focused on how to support the humans' mental processes in this new role. Therefore, this study performed a goal-directed task analysis addressing goals, decisions, and SA requirements for human-supervised collision avoidance. Data was obtained from in situ observations and interviews with nine navigators onboard passenger ferries, an appraisal of the collision regulations, and of relevant company documentation. The task analysis identified specific SA requirements to make agents, capable of collision and grounding avoidance, transparent to their users. The results further indicate a change towards increased cognitive activities required to verify agent performance. Therefore, providing insight into the agents' internal reasoning and actions becomes a key consideration in supporting future supervisors. Given the trends towards the application of artificially intelligent agents capable of autonomous behaviour, this study anticipates that transparency becomes an essential prerequisite for safe and effective human-autonomy system oversight.
... In close encounters and restricted waters, this can be a challenging task, and at higher speeds, and especially for shallow waters, the complexity of interaction manoeuvres may also be affected by ship-to-ship generated wave forces (DeMarco Muscat-Fenech et al., 2022). Likewise, the crew on a conventional ship may also have problems with understanding an autonomous ship's intention and plans (Porathe, 2019a). The main challenge in these cases is the asymmetric access to information on the two ships: how each ship understands its environment and what plans the other ship has. ...
Article
Automatic controllers work best when the system they control can be sufficiently well modelled. This is a problem for control of autonomous ships in mixed traffic situations where the autonomous ship interacts with conventional ships, as the crew on other ships can and will exert unexpected behaviour that cannot be easily modelled. This paper analyses the problem of information acquisition, situational assessment and how to predict other ship's actions for autonomous ships that need to interact with conventional ships. We identify causes for the interaction problem and classify these into a decision making model. We also identify possible measures to overcome the problems and based on an impact analysis where technical, procedural and regulatory aspects are considered, we discuss and propose some possible ways to reduce or solve this problem. The conclusion is that the most likely and effective short-term solution is to assist the autonomous ships with human operators and the best longer-term solution may be to improve the information exchange between the ships, complemented with changes in COLREGs.
... In a high complexity situation however such as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore where there is heavy vessel traffic in a constrained sea space, an evasive manoeuvre for one ship may lead into a close quarters situation with another ship, resulting in a cascade of complex and unpredictable interactions and outcomes. In [15], it is suggested that a study of Automatic Identification System (AIS) data for a given area could be undertaken to elucidate the effective outcomes of "early and substantial" actions undertaken in a manner that is consistent with "the ordinary practice of seamen" for the area. By combining learning from recent AIS data with large number of digital simulations, developers would be able to ensure that the limits identified are up-to-date with respect with respect to the "ordinary practice of seamen" in the area, which will evolve as the overall vessel demography changes with increase in adoption of autonomous technologies. ...
Article
Full-text available
For Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS), a key area that has seen active development is in the use of autonomous capabilities for vessel navigation and control. This can range from a simple use case of waypoint navigation, which takes into account bathymetry and navigation markers, to complex collision avoidance scenarios where the autonomous systems are required to detect, evaluate and execute evasive manoeuvres based on time and spatially varying dynamic behaviour of other vessels. In Singapore, it has been identified that there is a need to carry out accurate digital testing of MASS navigation safety before sea trials. This is where a vessel developer is required to demonstrate that the MASS is able to carry out the sea trials safely, and to stress test high risk scenarios that may not be practicably tested in the sea trials. A study has been carried out to develop recommendations for the digital testing, which takes into consideration the need for accurate representation of the actual MASS being built, as well as the verification of the autonomous navigation algorithm’s capabilities to safely control the vessel in real-world scenarios. Based on the study, a three-stage framework is proposed. Firstly, the accuracy of the digital model in representing the dynamic responses of the actual vessel is verified and any discrepancy with benchmark data is to be quantified. Secondly, tests are carried out to ascertain that the autonomous navigation algorithm is able to control (virtually) the dynamically-accurate vessel from one point to another, taking into account the real-world environmental loads. Lastly, the ability of the autonomous navigation algorithm in carrying out collision detection and avoidance is verified. As part of the study, a review of the current state-of-art and engagement with the industry has been carried out. These details are described in this paper.
Article
Introduction. The article deals with the issues of training professional personnel for marine economic activities in the new economic conditions. The aim of the work is to develop the concept of training professional personnel for MARINET in the current conditions of the civilizational war of Western countries with Russia and the revision of the national policy in the field of education, including the attitude to the Bologna process and the transition to mobilization innovation in the economy. Materials and Methods. Of the Marinet NTI Roadmap of Russia for the period up to 2035, the concept of the special course program of additional professional education "Fundamentals of designing under the MARINET program" is proposed, taking into account modern trends in the development of the general configuration of online - offline education in the world. A key feature of the program is the principle of continuity of "vocational education for life", which includes the early involvement of children and young people in the marine economic sphere of the country's economy, taking into account its great potential, and an interdisciplinary approach to the formation of training modules. In the concepts of ESG and STEM education with a focus on joint programs of universities and business partners, a transition from project-oriented education to product-oriented education aimed at creating and mastering in a short time the production of specific new products demanded by the market is proposed. Results. The MARINET DPO program, designed for 72 hours, includes 9 module blocks: 1) an introductory block – prerequisites for the transition to a product-oriented DPO, 2) marine bioresources and marine ecology, 3) fishing, fishing equipment and materials, 4) innovative shipbuilding, 5) digital navigation and communication, 6) aquaculture, 7) marine energy, 8) integrated processing of marine bioresources, 9) deep processing of secondary marine bioresources. Approbation of the MARINET DPO program at the Kaliningrad State Technical University makes it possible to solve the problems of reorienting the vocational education system into STEM competency profiles, taking into account innovative entrepreneurship. Discussion and Conclusions. The introduction of the proposed program in maritime education will be one of the stages of accelerated development of the innovation system of the MARINET track of the National Technology Initiative (NTI) of Russia. The systematic organization of professional marine engineering education in close cooperation with vocational education organizations, research institutes, design bureaus, with the business community will allow to implement product-oriented education aimed at training personnel ready to work in the innovative economy of the country's marine industry.
Chapter
While work on maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS) regulation has commenced, regulation of autonomous navigational systems—the primary future driver of ship safety performance—remains unexplored. This paper seeks to address this gap. The chapter analyzes MASS as technological artefacts. In addition, the chapter assesses the utility and future of rules-based and performance-based instruments for MASS navigational safety regulation. To this end, the chapter argues that as MASS navigational systems are complex cyber-physical data processing assemblages containing both hardware, traditional software and machine learning software components, future regulatory frameworks will likely converge a layered regulatory design. The design will consist of performance standards verified by simulation MASS navigation, buttressed by performance real-world testing environment and online tests and limited rules-based technical standards. Autonomous navigation subsystems (ANS) technological complexity and machine learning software components will likely entail that only comprehensive simulation-based testing allows regulators to explore navigational edge cases in sufficient detail to ensure safe operation. However, the simulation-based tests will be buttressed by real-world testing both in trial areas and in real traffic. Crucial questions over required safety levels, testing environment parameter specifications, and operating responsibilities remain open. Further research and regulatory drafting work should concentrate on these areas.KeywordsMaritime autonomous surface shipsNavigationRegulationSimulation-based regulation
Chapter
The application of new technologies in the shipping industry, particularly artificial intelligence, will soon usher in a new era of the carrier’s liability. While autonomous ships and conventional ones will begin to coexist in the seas soon, the green light has already been given to the use of smart containers in the shipping industry. It is an indisputable fact that the use of new and emerging technologies will have a profound impact on the current legal system. This paper first submits the definition of autonomous ships, their legal status and some pioneering initiatives. Then, it explains the control centre and its legal status. Ultimately, it seeks to answer how the carrier’s obligation to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship and take care of the cargo under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules should be interpreted in the age of emerging technologies and to what extent new standards for the carrier’s liability should be adopted.
Conference Paper
Full-text available
A paradigm shift is presently underway in the shipping industry promising safer, greener and more efficient ship traffic with unmanned, autonomous vessels. In this article, we will look at some of these promises. The expression “autonomous” and “unmanned” are often used interchangeably. We will therefore start out by suggesting a taxonomy of automation and manning of these ships. We will then go on examining the promise of safety. An hypotheses of increased safety is often brought forward and we know from various studies that the number of maritime accidents that involves what is called “human error” ranges from some 70–90 percent. If we replace the human with automation, can we then reduce the number of accidents? And is there a potential for new types of accidents to appear? Risk assessment will be a valuable tool, but will only reach as long as to the “known unknowns”.
Article
Full-text available
In spite of all electronic navigation devices on a modern ship bridge, navigators still lose their orientation. Reasons for this might be excessive cognitive workload caused by too many instruments to read and compile, navigation information that is displayed in a cognitively demanding way, short decision times due to high speed or fatigue due to minimum manning and long work hours. This work addresses the problem of map information displayed in a less than optimal way. Three new concepts are presented: the bridge perspective, the NoGo area polygons and a dual lane seaway network. Map reading can be difficult due to the problem of mental rotations. By allowing a 3-D nautical chart to be viewed from an egocentric bridge perspective, the need for mental rotations can be removed. The cognitively demanding calculations necessary to find out if there is enough water under the keel can be made by the chart system and the result displayed as of free water and NoGo areas. On land car driving is facilitated by a road-network and a sign system. This notion can be further developed on sea and make navigation easier and safer. These concepts were then tested in a laboratory experiment, in interviews and in a prototyping project. The results were very promising. The experiment in a laboratory maze showed that map reading from an egocentric perspective was more efficient than using traditional paper and electronic maps. Interviews and expert evaluation of prototypes also showed great interest from practitioners in the field.
Article
Before the middle of the 19th Century, sailing vessels under way at night did not set a light. This paper investigates the reasons for this practice and explains the development of navigation lights which culminated in the requirement for both steamships and sailing vessels to display lights at night.
Autonomous ship project, key facts about YARA Birkeland
  • Kongsberg
Kongsberg. 2019. Autonomous ship project, key facts about YARA Birkeland. https://www.km.kongsberg.com/ks/ web/nokbg0240.nsf/AllWeb/4B8113B707A50A4FC12581 1D00407045?OpenDocument [Acc. 2019-02-10]
Managing Collision Avoidance at Sea. London: Nautical Institute
  • G W U Lee
  • J Parker
Lee, G.W.U. & Parker, J. 2007. Managing Collision Avoidance at Sea. London: Nautical Institute.
Human Factor Aspects in Sea Traffic Management
  • T Porathe
  • A Brodje
Porathe, T.& Brodje, A. 2015. Human Factor Aspects in Sea Traffic Management. In V. Bertram (ed.), Proceedings of the 14th Inter-national Conference on Computer Applications and Information Technology in the Maritime Industries (COMPIT '15). Technische Universität Hamburg-Harburg.
Safety and Reliability - Safe Societies in a Changing World
  • Haugen
Haugen et al. (eds), Safety and Reliability - Safe Societies in a Changing World. London: Taylor & Francis Group.
Various indicators from the operational area of VTS centres
  • Statistics Norway
Statistics Norway. 2016. Various indicators from the operational area of VTS centres. https://www.ssb.no/191461/variousindicators-from-the-operational-area-of-vts-centres [Acc. 2019-02-10]
Trondheim: Norwegian Forum for Autonomous Ships
  • O J Rodseth
  • H Nordahl
Rodseth O.J. & Nordahl H. 2017. Definition for autonomous merchant ships. Version 1.0, October 10. 2017. Trondheim: Norwegian Forum for Autonomous Ships.
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974
  • Imo
IMO. 1980. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974. London: IMO.