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1 INTRODUCTION
Largeautonomousmerchantvesselsarestillonnot
forreal.However,inNorwaythebuildingcontractis
alreadysignedforYARABirkeland,thefirstMari‐time
Autonomous,SurfaceShip(MASS),anun‐manned
containerfeeder,scheduledtostarttestsin2020
(Kongsberg,2019).LackingIMOregulations,thetests
willhavetocommenceinnationalwaters,whichin
thiscasemeanstheGrenlandareaofPorsgunnand
LarvikinsouthernNorwaywithcomplexnarrow,
inshorearchipelagonavigation.Itisabusyindustrial
areawherealargeportionoftheshiptrafficconsists
ofgascarriersandvesselswithhazardouscargoand,
summertime,anabundanceofsmallleisurecraftsand
kayaks.Theseatrafficintheareaismonitoredbythe
BrevikVTSwhichin2015made623“interventions,”
meaningthattheVTSaskedforsomealterationfrom
theplannedsailingroute(StatisticsNorway,2016).
Conductingautonomousnavigationinsuchanareais
ahugechallenge.
Theprojectisambitious.The80meterslong,
unmanned,autonomousvessel,taking120containers
withafullyelectricpropulsionsystem,willreplace
some40,000truckhaulseveryyear.Thusmoving
heavytrafficfromroadtosea,fromfossilfuelto
hydrogeneratedelectricity.Theplaniscurrentlythat
shewillstarttestrunsin2020.Firstwithamanned
bridgeonboard,thenwiththesamebridgeliftedoff
tothequayside,remotelycontrollingthevessel,
beforefinallyattemptingtogoautonomouslyin2022
(Kongsberg,2019).
1.1 Unmanned,automaticandautonomous
Todaysmannedshipsmaybethoughtofas
“manual.”However,thelevelofautomationisin
manyshipsquitehigh.Withanautopilotin“track‐
following”mode,setsothattheshipcanexecute
turnsalongapre‐plannedroutewithout
acknowledgmentfromtheOfficeroftheWatch
(OOW)‐giventhatthevoyageplaniscorrectand
Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) and the
COLREGS: Do We Need Quantified Rules Or Is “the
Ordinary Practice of Seamen” Specific Enough?
T.Porathe
NorwegianUniversityofScienceandTechnology,Trondheim,Norway
ABSTRACT:MaritimeAutonomousSurfaceShips(MASS)iscurrentlyontheagendainseveralcountriesand
alsointheIMO.InNorwaya120TEUcontainerfeederisbeingbuildandwillstartsailingautonomouslyin
2022.Thechallengeishuge.Onequestioniswhetherornotthepresent,quantitative,collisionregulations
needstobeupdatedtoruleswhereexpressionsas“early”and“substantial”arequantified?Orifshipscansail
autonomouslyunderthepresentrules?AnotherquestionisifMASSshouldbemarkedtosignalthattheshipis
inautonomousmode?OrifitisenoughthatshefollowsCOLREGS?Thisdiscussionpaperwilltakeacloser
lookatthesequestionsandadvocateautomationtransparency,meaningthatthebehaviorofanautonomous
vesselhastomakesenseandbeunderstandabletohumanoperatorsonothermannedshipsandcrafts.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 13
Number 3
September 2019
DOI:10.12716/1001.13.03.04
512
validatedforasetunderkeelclearance.Thisisthe
waytheNorwegiancoastalexpressHurtigruten
navigatesduringmostofitsinshoreroutefrom
BergentoKirkenes(Porathe,pers.comm.).Butthe
OOWstillhastobepresentonthebridgetolookout
forandhandleencounterswithothershipsandcrafts.
Whatisneededtoremovetheoperatorcompletelyis
differentsensorsthatcanseeandidentifymoving,
unchartedobstaclesinthesea,andanautopilot
connectedwithacollisionavoidancemodule
programmedwiththeInternationalRegulationsfor
PreventingCollisionsatSea,COLREGSforshort
(IMO,1972).Withsuchasystemitisspeculatedthata
shipinautonomousmodemaynavigate
automatically.
However,suchan“automaticship”doesnotneed
tobeunmanned.Itmaycontainamaintenancecrew,
orevenareducednumberofnavigatorswhotake
manualwatchesduringdifficultconditions,ormaybe
daytimewatchesingoodconditions,savingthe
automationforthelongboringnightwatchesor
uneventfuloverseepassages.Withsuchapartly
mannedbridgetheshipwouldhavea“periodically
unattendedbridge”accordingtoIMO’slatest
definitions,(IMO,2018).
ThewatchcanalsobehandedovertoaShore
ControlCentre(SCC)thatcanaccesstheshipssensors
andcommunication,readytowakeuptheOOWif
somethingunexpectedhappens(inwhichcasethe
shipis“remotelymonitored”).Or,theSCCcouldbe
grantedaccesstotheautopilot,inwhichcasetheship
willbe“remotecontrolled”.Itisreasonabletothink
thatthiswillbeagradualevolutiontowardshigher
andhigherlevelsofautomation,maybea
combinationofremotemonitoringandcontrol,and
autonomy.
Itcanalsobeusefultoconsidertheconcept
“OperationalDesignDomain”(ODD)usedbythe
self‐drivingcarindustry(Rodseth&Nordahl,2017).
Inthemaritimedomain,itwouldmeanthattherewill
becertainshippinglanesandfairwayswerethe
automationhasbeenspecificallytrainedandwhich
havebeenspecificallyprepared,maybewith
designatedlanes,orbyspecifictechnical
infrastructure.Intheseareas,ashipmaynavigate
autonomously,whiletheshipinotherareasmust
navigatemanuallywithamannedbridgeorremote
controlledfromtheshore.
TheconceptofOODalsohasdeeperimplications
intothecultureofvesseltrafficinspecificareas.More
onthislater.
Forthediscussioninthispaperthefocuswillbe
onshipsin“autonomousmode”,regardlessof
whetheritispermanentoronlyperiodically.With“in
autonomousmode”Imeanthatacomputerpro‐gram
isnavigating,takingdecisionsandexecutingthem,
regardlessofwhetheranOOWisstandingbyonthe
bridge,orthecaptainisinhiscabinonboardorina
remotecentreashore.Thefocushereisonhowthe
shipautomationcanhandlesinteractionwithother
ships,andparticularlyhowitcouldfollowtherules
oftheroad,theCOLREGS.
2 THECOLREGS
Forseveralcenturiesshipscameandwent,sailing
withthesamewindandtideanditwasnotuntilthe
steamshipsturnedupinthebeginningofthe19th
centurythatcollisionregulationsbecamevital
(Crosbie,2006).In1840theLondonTrinityHouse
drewupasetofregulations,oneofwhichrequireda
steamvesselpassinganothervesselinanarrow
channeltoleavetheotheronherownporthand.The
otherregulationrelatingtosteamshipsrequired
steamvesselsondifferentcrossingcourses,soasto
involveriskofcollision,toaltercoursetostarboard
andpassontheportsideofeachother.Thetwo
TrinityHouserulesforsteamvesselswerecombined
intoasingleruleandincludedintheSteam
NavigationActof1846.Duringtheyearsanumberof
iterationsandinternationalizations,throughwhatis
nowtheInternationalMaritimeOrganization(IMO),
ledtothelatestrevisionoftheInternational
RegulationsforPreventingCollisionsatSea
(COLREGS)onaninternationalconferenceconvened
inLondonin1972.
Onemayaskifmaybenewrulesareneededfor
autonomousships?Ormaybethereshouldbema‐
chine‐to‐machinenegotiationsineveryindividual
caseofconflictingcourses?Thefinalanswertothat
questionisunknown,butitismyfirmopinionthatas
longasMASSwillinteractwithhumansonmanned
shipstherehastobealimitednumberofcommon
andeasytounderstandrulesknownto,andobeyed
by,allvesselsatsea.Onecandreamupotherrules,
butwhatwegot,andneedtoadhereto,isthe
COLREGS.Havingsaidthat,onemightconsiderif
extensionsorrevisionsmaybeneeded.
2.1 Qualitativerules
Thecollisionregulationsare,likelegaltextoftenis,
writteninageneralmannersoastobeapplicablein
asmanysituationsaspossible.Theprecise
interpretationhastobemadeinthecontextofthe
actualsituationjudgednotonlyonknowledgeofthe
rules,butalsoonexperienceandculture,whatthe
rulescall“theordinarypracticeofseamen,”asis
statedalreadyinthesecondrule.
ThequalitativenatureofCOLREGSwillbea
problemfortheprogrammerwhoistowritecodefor
thecollisionavoidancealgorithmsofautonomous
navigationmodules.Iwillinthissectionpointto
somethese“soft,”qualitative,clauseswherethese
problemswillbecomeapparent.
2.2 Rule2:theordinarypracticeofseamen
Rule2oftheCOLREGSisaboutresponsibility.Ithas
twosections.Section(a)state“NothingintheseRules
shallexonerateanyvessel,ortheowner,masteror
crewthereof,fromtheconsequencesofanyneglectto
complywiththeseRulesoroftheneglectofany
precautionswhichmayberequiredbytheordinary
practiceofseamen,orbythespecialcircumstancesof
thecase.”
Section(b)ofthesamerulestatesthat“In
construingandcomplyingwiththeseRulesdue
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regardshallbehadtoalldangersofnavigationand
collisionandtoanyspecialcircumstances,including
thelimitationsofthevesselsinvolved,whichmay
makeadeparturefromtheseRulesnecessarytoavoid
immediatedanger.”
Whatthisrulebasicallysaysisthatyoumustal‐
waysfollowtheserules,butthatyoumustalso
deviatefromtheseruleswhennecessarytoavoidan
accident.Inessence,ifyouhaveanaccidentitisa
goodchancethatyouhaveviolatedoneorbothof
thesesections.Theproblemforthenavigatorishow
long,orcloseintoanencounter,heorsheshould
followtheRulesandwhenitistimetoskiptherules
anddowhateverisnecessarytoavoidacollision.The
answeris:itdependsonthecircumstances.TheRules
givenohintastothenumberofcablesormiles,
minutesorseconds.Itdoesnoteventrytodefinethe
“ordinarypracticeofseamen.”
Similarsoftenumerationsarefoundforinstancein
Rules15,16and17.
2.3 Rule15to17,riskofcollision
Rule15oftheCOLREGStalksabout“crossing
situations”:“Whentwopower‐drivenvesselsare
crossingsoastoinvolveriskofcollision,thevessel
whichhastheotheronherownstarboardsideshall
keepoutofthewayandshall,ifthecircumstancesof
thecaseadmit,avoidcrossingaheadoftheother
vessel.”
Calculatingwhenacrossingsituationmayleadto
acollisionisprettystraitforwardgiventhatpresent
courseandspeedcanbeextrapolated.(Thisis,how‐
ever,inrealitynotalwaysthecaseastheintentionsof
theothershipmaynotbeknown.)Ifthebearingto
theothershipisconstantovertime,itcanbeassumed
thatthereexistsariskofcollision.Rule15alsodefines
whichvesselshouldtakeactiontoavoidcollision.
“Theonewhichhastheotheronherownstarboard
side.”
Thefollowingrulethendefineshowthisaction
shouldbedonebythe“give‐way”vessel(Rule16):
“Everyvesselwhichisdirectedtokeepoutoftheway
ofanothervesselshall,asfaraspossible,takeearly
andsubstantialactiontokeepwellclear.”
Thisactioncouldbeachangeofspeedorachange
ofcourse,butforthesoftwareprogrammerthe
problematickeywordshereare“earlyand
substantial”.Thereisnosuggestioninmilesorclock
minuteswhatconstitutes“early”,neitherhowlarge
coursechangeorspeedchangeconstitutes
“substantial”.
Rule17definestheactionsoftheshipthatisnot
obligedtoyield,“thestand‐on”vessel:“(a),(i)Where
oneoftwovesselsistokeepoutofthewaytheother
shallkeephercourseandspeed.(ii)Thelattervessel
may,however,takeactiontoavoidcollisionbyher
maneuveralone,assoonasitbecomesapparentto
herthatthevesselrequiredtokeepoutofthewayis
nottakingappropriateactionincompliancewith
theseRules.(b)When,fromanycause,thevessel
requiredtokeephercourseandspeedfindsherselfso
closethatcollisioncannotbeavoidedbytheactionof
thegive‐wayvesselalone,sheshalltakesuchaction
aswillbestaidtoavoidcollision.(c)Apower‐driven
vesselwhichtakesactioninacrossingsituationin
accordancewithsubparagraph(a)(ii)ofthisRuleto
avoidcollisionwithanotherpower‐drivenvessel
shall,ifthecircumstancesatthecaseadmit,notalter
coursetoportforavesselonherownportside.(d)
ThisRuledoesnotrelievethegive‐wayvesselofher
obligationtokeepoutoftheway.”
Thisruleaddstothecomplexitybyusingqualitative
definitionslike“assoonasitbecomesapparent,”
“findsherselfsoclosethatcollisioncannotbeavoided
bytheactionofthegive‐wayvesselalone,”“actionas
willbestaidtoavoidcollision”and“ifthe
circumstancesatthecaseadmit.”
Figure1.ThiswasthetrafficsituationatSkagen,thenortherntipofDenmarkat15:00on5November2018.Onemayreflect
onthedifficultiesofCOLREGalgorithmsneededtodocollisionavoidanceinsuchanareawheregivingwaytooneship
mightleadintoanotherconflictsituationinanunpredictable,cascadingmanner(screenshotfromMarineTraffic.com).
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Foraprogrammerprogrammingthecollision
avoidancemoduleofanautonomousnavigation
softwarethedifficultyisnotonlyinjudgingwhich
action,butalsowhentoexecuteit“early”and
“substantially”.Theanswerwillbethesameasitwas
intheprevioussection:itdependsonthe
circumstances.Arethereonlytwoshipsmeeting
aloneonthehighseasthetaskmightberelatively
simple,butattheotherendofthespectrum,inahigh
complexitysituation,e.g.inaconstrainedand
intenselytraffickedarealiketheStraitsofMalacca
andSingapore,thetaskisofanentirelydifferent
dimension.Notonlydoesthelargenumberofships
inalimitedspacechangethevalueofvariableslike
“early”and“substantial,”butanevasivemaneuver
foroneshipmayleadintoaclosequarterssituation
withanothershipandsoon,inacascading
interactioneffectwithunpredictableresults.Figure1
showsthecomplicatedtrafficsituationaround
SkagenonthenortherntipofDenmark.
Insomeareastherecanalsobeadifferentculture
ofhowthingsaredone(sometimesquitecontraryto
COLREGS).WhenthehighspeedferryStenaCarisma
traffickedtheGothenburg‐Fredrikshavnlinein30+
knots,anofficerIspoketosaid“Wealwayskeepout
ofthewayofeverythingthatmovesbecauseweare
sofastandmaneuverable”(Porathe,pers.comm.).
AlsointheSoundbetweenSwedenandDenmarkthe
Helsingborg‐Helsingorferrieshasacultureof
keepingoutofthewayinmostsituations(Porathe,
pers.comm.).
Apossiblestrategyforaprogrammertryingto
catch“earlyandsubstantial”aswellas“theordinary
practiceofseamen”foraspecificarea(anODD)could
betostudylargeamountsofAIS(Automatic
IdentificationSystem)dataforthespecificareain
questionsandfromthatdatadeducelimitsof“early”
and“substantialaction”.Ausefulconceptcouldthen
beships“safetyzones”whichisthezonearoundones
shipthatnavigatorstendnottoletothershipswithin.
“Azonearoundavesselwithinwhichallother
vesselsshouldremainclearunlessauthorized,”
(IALA,2008).Thiszonetendstobelargerontheopen
seathaninnarrowwatersorinaportandcanbe
studiedusingAISdata.UsingsuchAISstudies,
establishmentofazoneoutsidewhichanactioncan
beconsidered“early”couldbeattempted.Butthe
contextisimportant,notonlythestaticgeographical
context,butalsothetimedependenttrafficdensity
context.
TheNauticalInstitutementionsthat“Asageneral
guideline,attempttoachieveaCPA(closestpointof
approach)of2(nautical)milesintheopenseaand1
mileinrestrictedwaters”(Lee&Parker,2007,p.35).
Ifallshipsinsuchacomplexsituationwhere
autonomousandgovernedbycleveralgorithmsthere
isachancethatsuchacollisionavoidanceapplication
couldbesuccessful,butinamixedsituationwhere
mostormanyoftheshipsarecontrolledbyhumans,
whicharelesspredictable,theriskofabadoutcome
isevident.
2.4 Rule19,restrictedvisibility
ThefinalrulethatIwanttobringuphereisRule19,
“Conductofvesselsinrestrictedvisibility.”Thisisa
quitlengthyrulewhichsays:
“(a)ThisRuleappliestovesselsnotinsightofone
anotherwhennavigatinginornearanareaof
restrictedvisibility.”
Further“(b)Everyvesselshallproceedatasafe
speedadaptedtotheprevailingcircumstancesand
conditionsofrestrictedvisibility.Apower‐driven
vesselshallhaveherenginesreadyforimmediate
maneuver.”
“(c)Everyvesselshallhavedueregardtothe
prevailingcircumstancesandconditionsofrestricted
visibilitywhencomplyingwiththeRulesofSectionI
ofthisPart.”
“(d)Avesselwhichdetectsbyradaralonethe
presenceofanothervesselshalldetermineifaclose‐
quarterssituationisdevelopingand/orriskof
collisionexists.Ifso,sheshalltakeavoidingactionin
ampletime,providedthatwhensuchactionconsists
ofanalterationofcourse,sofaraspossiblethe
followingshallbeavoided:(i)analterationofcourse
toportforavesselforwardsofthebeam,otherthan
foravesselbeingovertaken;(ii)analterationof
coursetowardsavesselabeamorabaftthebeam.”
“(e)Exceptwhereithasbeendeterminedthata
riskofcollisiondoesnotexist,everyvesselwhich
hearsapparentlyforwardsofherbeamthefogsignal
ofanothervessel,orwhichcannotavoidaclose‐
quarterssituationwithanothervesselforwardsofher
beam,shallreduceherspeedtotheminimumat
whichshecanbekeptonhercourse.Sheshallif
necessarytakeallherwayoffandinanyevent
navigatewithextremecautionuntildangerof
collisionisover.”
TheDutchCouncilofTransportationhasaddedan
amplificationtothisruleforDutchmariners:“During
aperiodofreducedvisibilityunexpectedbehaviorof
othervesselsshouldbeanticipated.Thespeedandthe
correlatedstoppingdistancemustcorrespondwith
thissituation,”(vanDokkum,2016).
ThebigdifferencewiththisruleversusRule15
aboveisthatinrestrictedvisibilitybothvesselsare
suddenlygive‐wayvesselsandtheresponsibilityfor
avoidingacollisionisshared.Theproblemsherefora
quantitativeapproachliesinsofttermslike“safe
speed,”“dueregardtotheprevailingcircumstances
andconditionsofrestrictedvisibility”and“take
avoidingactioninampletime.”Butalsointhe
problemofdefining“restrictedvisibility.”Asa
meteorologicalphenomenon“restricted”isnot
defined,noris“safespeed”,althoughanassumption
mightbethatthevesselshouldbeabletostopwithin
thedistancethatcanbeoverlooked.Anassumption
thatcannotalwaysbefollowedasinmanypartsof
theworldshipsregularlynavigateinconditionsof
visibilitywhereeventheownshipsforecastle(front)
cannotbeseenfromthebridge.
Anotherreflectionisthat“restrictedvisibility”
referstohumanvisibilityoftheeye,whichinthe
autonomouscasecanbetranslatedtothevisibilityof
theday‐lightcameras.Section(d)inRule19which
referstowhenshipsaredetected“byradaralone”
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wasaddedin1960afteranumberof“radarassisted
accidents”(themostwell‐knownwastheStock‐holm‐
AndreaDoriaaccidentin1956).Anautonomous
vesselwillmostprobably,apartfromday‐light
cameras,AISandradar,alsohaveinfraredcameras
andmaybeLIDAR.Butevenifsensorresourcesonan
autonomousshipcouldbejudgedasbeingbetterthan
thehumaneye,thisrulemakesitnecessarytoinclude
visibilitysensorstodecideifRule19,“restricted
visibility,”ortherules11to18,“conductofvesselsin
sightofeachother,”shouldapply.Aconfounding
factorhere,thatneedstobetakenintoconsideration,
isthatfogoftenappearsinpatchesorbanks,soeven
iftheautonomousshipitselfmaybeinanareaof
goodvisibility,theothervesselmightbehiddenina
fogbank,inwhichcaseRule19apply.Apossible
solutionfortheMASSmightbetocompareradarand
cameraimages.
Aphenomenonworthtakenintoconsiderationis
thatwhileanautonomousvesselwillweighits
differentsensorinputsinanobjectivemanner
resultinginasightingwithaprobabilitymeasure,the
humanoperatoronamanualvesselhasacognitive
systemthatprefervisualegocentricinputthroughthe
eyesascomparedtoexocentricimagesfromradar
andelectronicchartsthatneedstobementallyrotated
tobeaddedtotheinnermentalmap,(Porathe,2006).
Anexampleofthisistheallisionofthecontainer
vesselCoscoBusanin2007withtheSanFrancisco
OaklandBayBridgeinheavyfogbutwithfully
workingradarandGNSS/AISsupport(NTSB,2009).
Thehumancognitivesystemhasotherlimitations
suchase.g.“normalitybias”and“confirmationbi‐
as.”(Poratheetal.,2018).Withthis,togetherwith
otherhumanshortcomingslikefatigue,aninclination
towardsshort‐cuts,andsometimessheerviolations,
theriskisthatthelistofpotentialinteraction
problemsbetweenhumanandmachineguided
navigationwillbelong.
3 QUANTITATIVECOLREGS
Thecodeforacollisionavoidancesoftwarethatisto
coverallpossiblesituationswillhavetobeverylong
andhewouldstillnotsuffice.Theunknown
unknowns,blackswans,wouldkeepappearing.
Fromacomputerprogrammer’spointofview,it
mightseemhelpfulifallqualitative,soft,
enumerationsofCOLREGScouldbequantifiedinto
nauticalmiles,degreesofarcandclockminutesonce
andforall.Thiswouldgreatlyfacilitatethe
developmentofthenecessaryalgorithmsthatwill
governfuturecollisionavoidancesystems.However,
suchaquantifiedregulatorytextwould,inthesame
way,havetobeverylengthyanditwouldstillnot
coverallpossiblesituations.InsteadCOLREGS,like
otherlegaltextwillneedtohaveageneralformatthat
isopentointerpretationsinacourtofmaritimelaw,
andtheoppositeof“theordinarypracticeofseamen,”
i.e.“goodseamanship,”includejuridicaloptionssuch
as“negligence”and“grossnegligence”,(van
Dokkum,2016).Shipstechnicalperformanceand
maneuverability,experienceandtrainingofseamen,
allevolvewithtime,sofortherulesoftheroadtobe
validtheymustbewritteninageneralmanner.
Insteaditisthealgorithmsofcollisionavoidance
applicationsthatneedtobepreciseandquantitative.
ByusingAISdataandlargescalesimulations,
applicationscanbemadetolearnthemosteffective
andefficientwayofmaneuveringindifferent
situations,stillfollowingtheCOLREGS.Itwould
probablybebeneficialifsuchmachinelearningwas
ongoing“lifelong”fortheAI(ArtificialIntelligence)
onthebridge,whichthenwouldbecomemoreand
moreexperiencedthroughtheyears.However,itis
unlikelythattheIMOwouldacceptanAIonthe
bridgewhichwasnotcertifiedandwhobehavedina
preciselypredeterminedwayforaspecificsituation
(evenifthiscouldbedefendedbycomparingtheAI
toatrainedandlicensedthirdmateworkinghisway
upthroughtheranksgainingmoreandmore
experience).
Anotherpointtopayattentiontoisthat,aslongas
therearemanualshipsgovernedbyhumansonthe
sea,theactionsofautonomousshipshastobe
predictableforthesehumans.Autonomous
navigation,supportedbyartificialintelligenceonthe
bridge,hasanumberofadvantagescomparedto
human,manualnavigation:improvedvigilance,
improvedsensingandperception,longerendurance,
anabilitytolookfurtherintothefutureandtokeep
morealternativeoptionsopenduringthedecision
makingprocess.Forinstance,bykeepingtrackofall
shipmovementsonaverylongrangeanAImightbe
abletopredictapossibleclosequarterssituation
severalhoursaheadofahumannavigatorbutmay
thereformakemaneuverswhichmightnotmake
sensetoanOOWonamanualshipinthevicinity.
Therefore,itisofoutmostimportancethat
autonomousshipsarepredictableandtransparentto
humans.
4 AUTOMATIONTRANSPARENCY
4.1 Anthropomorphism
Everyoneofusthatarestrugglingwiththe
complexityofdigitaltoolsknowthattheydonot
alwaysdowhatwewantorassumetheywilldo.
They“think”differentlyfromus.Aninnatetendency
ofhumanpsychologyistoattributehumantraits,
emotions,orintentionstonon‐humanentities.Thisis
calledanthropomorphism.Wedosobecauseitgivesus
asimple(butfaulty)methodto“understand”
machines.However,thechanceisthatifweknow
thatMASSalwayswillfollowCOLREGS,wecan
learntoknowtheirbehaviorandinahumanmanner
beabletounderstandtheirworking.Thisin
oppositiontonormal,mannedships,whereyou
alwayshavetobecautiousofmisunderstandingsor
violations.
4.2 Identificationlight
Inmyopinionitisthereforeimportantthatships
navigationinautonomousmodeshowsomekindof
identificationsignal.Itcouldbean“A”addedtotheir
AISiconinECDISorontheradarscreen.Duringdark
alightsignalcouldbeadded(e.g.apurplemast‐head
all‐aroundlight,seeFig.2).
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Theassumptionaboveisthatifautonomousships
alwaysfollowCOLREGStheirbehaviorwillbea
hundredpercentpredictable.Butaswehaveseen
above,thismightnotbetrueife.g.thespectrometers
onboardtheautonomousshipdoesnotinterpret
“restrictedvisibility”thesamewaywedo(and
thereforeRule19shouldorshouldnotbeused).
Figure2:Shouldshipsnavigatinginautonomousmode
carryaspecialidentificationlight?Thebehaviorofthe
navigationAImaybedifferentfromthebehaviorofnormal,
mannedships.Thelightcouldbepurplewhichisacolor
thatisnotusedforotherpurposes.Thesamediscussion
andcolorchoiceisdebatedintheautonomouscarindustry.
4.3 Intentions
Anotherimportantissueisunderstandingintentions.
Interpretingtheintentionsofothershipscorrectlyis
imperativetorulefollowing.Anoldaccidentinthe
EnglishChannel1972canserveasanexampleof
whatmisinterpretedintentions(andtherefore
applyingthewrongrules)mayleadto:
TheferrySt.Germain,comingfromDunkirkin
FranceanddestinedforDover,wasturningslowlyto
port,awayfromthestraitwesterlycoursetoDo‐ver.
Insteadhercaptainintendedtotakehersouth‐west,
downontheoutsideoftheTrafficSeparationScheme
(TSS),intheInshoreZone,inordertofindaclearer
placetocrosstheTSSata“rightangle”accordingto
Rule10oftheCOLREGS.ThebulkcarrierAdartewas
headingnortheastuptheTSSto‐wardstheNorthSea.
Thepilotonboardrecognizedtheradartargetasthe
Dunkirk‐Doverferryandassumed,quitewrongly,
thatshewouldcrossaheadofhimandthattherenow
existedariskofcollision(Rule15).Adartewouldthen
bethegive‐wayshipandwasobligedtogive‐wayby
turningtostarboard.AtthesametimeSt.Germain
startedherportturn,thepilotonAdartestartedto
madeaseriesofsmallcoursealternationstostarboard
togiveway(quitecontrarytothe“substantialaction”
requiredbyRule16).ButinsteadSt.Germain
continuedherportturnandthetwoshipscollided.St.
Germainsank,killinganumberofpassengers(Lee&
Parker,2007).
Thisaccidentisretoldtoillustratetheneedto
understandintentionsandthisgoesforbothmanned
andunmannedships.Iftheintentionoftheothership
isnotunderstood,theriskisthatCOLREGwillnot
saveasituation.Itisimportantthatautomationshare
informationaboutitsworkings,itssituation
awarenessanditsintentions.Questionslike:What
doestheautonomousshipknowaboutits
surroundings?Whatothervesselshasbeenobserved
byitssensors?Thesequestionscouldbeansweredby
e.g.alivechartscreenaccessibleon‐linethrougha
webportalbyothervessels,VTS,coastguardetc.See
Figure3.
Basedonitssituationawarenesstheautomation
willmakedecisionsonhowitinterpretstherulesof
collisionavoidance.Itwouldbeabenefitifthe
intentionsofshipscouldbecommunicated,asargued
inPorathe&Brodje(2015).Largeshipsobeyunder
IMO’sSOLASconvention.ASOLASship(asdefined
inMaritimeRulePart21)isanyshiptowhichthe
InternationalConventionfortheSafetyofLifeatSea
(SOLAS)1974applies;namely:apassengership
engagedonaninternationalvoyage,oranon‐
passengershipof500tons’grosstonnageormore
engagedonaninternationalvoyage(IMO,1980).
SOLASshipsmusttransmittheirpositionand
someotherinformationusingAIS.Inaddition,
SOLASshipsareusuallybigandmakegoodradar
targets,whichwillprovideasecondsourceof
information.Furthermore,allSOLASshipmustmake
avoyageplanfromporttoport.Severalpassedand
ongoingprojectsaimatcollectingvoyageplansand
coordinatingshiptrafficforreasonsofsafetyand
efficiency(e.g.EfficienSea,ACCSEAS,MONALISA,
SMARTnavigation,SESAME,andtheSTM
Validationprojects).Theseattemptsinrouteexchange
wouldmakeitpossibleforSOLASships–alsoMASS
‐tocoordinatetheirvoyagesandshowintentionswell
aheadoftimetoavoidenteringintoaclosequarters
situationwheretheCOLREGswillapply.
Fig.3:Exampleofautomationtransparency:Anon‐linechartportalshowingthesituationawarenessoftheautonomous
ship(hereAutomatExpress),whereshethinkssheis,whatothershipsandobjectsshehasobserved,andwhatintentionsshe
hasfortheclosefuture.An“A”isaddedtotheAISsymbolfor“Iamnavigatingautonomously”andtheintendedroute
showncouldalsobevisibleinECDISandradarsofshipsinthevicinity.
517
Routeexchangewouldforinstancealloweach
shiptosendanumberofwaypointsaheadofthe
shipspresentpositionthoughAIStoallshipswithin
radiorange.Allshipscanthenseeotherships
intendedroute(asinFig.3).IntheACCSEASproject
2014asimulatorstudywasmadewith11professional
British,SwedishandDanishbridgeofficers,harbor
masters,pilotsandVTSoperatorswithexperience
fromcomplextrafficinthetestareawhichwasthe
HumberEstuary.Thefeedbackfromtheparticipants
onthebenefitsofshowingintentionswereoverall
positive(Porathe&Brodje,2015).
5 CONCLUSIONS
Ihaveinthisdiscussionpointedatsomechallenges
facingdevelopersofcollisionavoidancesoftware.
Muchofthishastodowiththequalitativenatureof
COLREGSvisaviethequantitativeneedsofreallife
situations.
However,alsotheinteractionbetweentraditional
shipsin“manualmode”isfromtimetotime
problematic.Theintroductionofautonomousships
whichintheirnavigationfollowsamachine
interpretationofCOLREGSmightleadtomanymore
problemsifnotimplementedcarefully.
Itisofgreatimportancethatthemaneuversof
autonomousshipsarepredictabletohumanoperators
onmanualships.TheAIonbordhasapotentialto
becomemuch“smarter”thanhumans,andtobeable
toextrapolatefurtherintothefutureandthereby
behaveinawaythatmightsurprisepeople
(“automationsurprise”).Insteadthesoftwareshould
focusonbehavinginahumanlikemanner.
Suchautomationtransparencymightconsistof
MASSshowingitsnavigationmode(thepurplemast‐
headlight=inautonomousmode),thecontentofits
situationawareness(whichvesselsareobserved–and
therebywhicharenotobserved)anditsintentions.
Intentionscanbesharede.g.usingrouteexchange
technologydevelopedinrecente‐Navigationprojects
likeEfficienSea,ACCSEASandMONALISA.
Onlyifothermarinerscanunderstandthe
workingsofMASS,apeacefulcoexistenceispossible.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thisdiscussionpaperbuildsonapreviouspaperpublished
intheCOMPIT2019conference.However,thesolutions
andargumentationhasbeenfurtherdeveloped.The
researchisconductedwithintheSAREPTA(Safety,
autonomy,remotecontrolandoperationsoftransport
systems)projectfundedbytheNorwegianResearch
Council,whichisherebygratefullyacknowledged.
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