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1
“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Third World
Quarterly on September 28 2019, available online:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2019.1675503”
The Politics of Return: Exploring the Future of Syrian Refugees in Jordan, Lebanon,
and Turkey
Ahmet Içduygu
1
, Maissam Nimer
2
Abstract
Although the Syrian conflict continues, local and global stakeholders have already
begun to consider the return of the six million refugees, especially as neither the option of local
integration in the countries of first asylum nor that of resettlement to third countries is seen as
a real- istic possibility. Elaborating on the return debates in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, we
relate the politicisation of this question to the growing acceptance of the option of voluntary
and involuntary repatriation in the international refugee regime as well as to policies and public
opin- ion. We argue, based on empirical fieldwork, that any debate about the return of Syrian
refugees is problematic, since the conditions of safety, voluntariness and sustainability are not
fulfilled. Further, returns should not be left entirely to the individual hosting states and actors
in the region but should be carried out in collaboration with representative authorities in Syria
and the mediation of international organisations upon full resolution of conflict.
Keywords: Return, Syrian refugees, forced migration, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan
1
Migration Research Center, Koç University
2
Migration Research Center, Koç University and Istanbul Policy Center, Sabancı University
2
Introduction
Over the last eight years, academic and policy-related debates about the future of around
six million Syrian refugees living outside of their country directly refer to the three options
formulated by the traditional international refugee regime: local integration in the first country
of asylum, third-country resettlement, and voluntary repatriation. In light of the complex
interaction between domestic and international politics, it appears that the option of integration
in the first countries of asylum or that of resettlement in third countries gain limited currency
as viable possibilities. Instead, the idea of return increasingly becomes a politically preferred
one and is considered by various players, including governments and international agencies.
Despite the fact that the conflict continues in Syria, various observers emphasize an alarming
trend advocating for return, even forced or involuntary.
1
In fact, it is claimed that around
172,796 refugees have returned between 2016 and 2019.
2
Return seems to be voiced frequently
in a context of creating ‘safe zones’ in Syria for refugees to return to.
However, in the context of refugee repatriation, there are conditions that need to be
fulfilled. While the principle of non-refoulement is the most essential component of refugee
protection, the three conditions for viable return are voluntariness, safety, and sustainability.
3
Without a peaceful solution for Syria, any debate on the return of Syrian refugees to their
homes is, without any doubt, problematic. The tendency observed in Turkey, Lebanon, and
Jordan towards the idea of repatriation of Syrian refugees has not been a linear, straightforward,
and one-directional development but has involved considerable variation.
In this essay, we first analyze the conventional approaches to repatriation within the
traditional international refugee regime and critically review the changes observed in this
regime over the last decades, relating them to the return discourse in the three main host
countries of Syrian refugees. Second, we scrutinize the policies and practices of these countries
regarding reception, settlement and integration since 2011 and connect them to recent
3
developments whereby the return question has gradually gained momentum. Third, we study
the political and media discourses regarding Syrian refugees and their eventual return, looking
at perceptions of governments and host communities. We thus highlight the ways in which the
repatriation debate in these countries is associated with the dynamics and mechanisms of the
domestic and international political environment around Syrian refugee issues and varies over
time. After elaborating on the way in which public discontent has grown and official discourse
and practices have evolved concerning the return question, we discuss whether return is a viable
option, looking at conditions in Syria, and at the perceptions and experiences of Syrians
themselves in each of the neighboring states (Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan). We conclude by
stating that politically driven repatriation strategies fail to protect refugee rights and limit the
likelihood of successful integration and sustainable return. This paper is based on fieldwork
carried out during the first half of 2018. It involves analysis of official discourse related to the
question of return, namely review of official documents, newspaper reports, secondary sources,
complemented by interviews with government officials, experts and international organization
representatives in the three countries.
4
The Return Question: Changing Paradigms in the International Refugee Regime
The International Refugee Regime (IRR) is the collection of laws and treaties,
intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies and funding put in place during the post-
World War Two era to provide international protection and assistance to displaced from their
country by persecution or war.
5
Analytically speaking, the traditional IRR articulates three main
solutions for refugee situations: voluntary repatriation, local integration in the first country of
asylum, and third-country resettlement. It appears that the way in which the international
community treats these solutions is context-dependent. However, more strikingly, the formal
positions of international organizations and their member states vis-à-vis these three solutions
4
have been changing and so have their implications for the larger context of the refugee
regime in parallel to the paradigm shifts observed in the IRR over the past six
decades.
6
Similarly, we have witnessed a change in the content and context of these
options; indeed, over time involuntary repatriation has emerged as a possible solution.
7
In order to understand the return debates around Syrian refugees in the three main
hosting states (Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan), it is imperative to briefly revisit the related
literature on these refugee solution options and their changing status through the shifts in the
IRR. It is widely accepted that since the Second World War, there have been major paradigm
shifts in the refugee regime, which implies changing perceptions of solutions for refugee
situations.
8
Indeed, there have been three main periods in which perceptions on refugee
settlement have radically changed. For instance, Chimni
9
refers to the early period after the War
(from 1948 to 1991) as one in which industrialized countries preferred resettlement to
repatriation as a solution, even though voluntary repatriation was accepted as the preferred
solution. Frelick
10
similarly brought up the same period as one when the international refugee
regime benefited from the ‘exilic model’ in the absence of realistic hope of repatriation for
refugees in the Cold War period in the case of communist countries. During this period, the
IRR largely dealt with providing refugee rights in exile, mostly for those escaping authoritarian
regimes and conflict areas, finding solutions outside the country of
origin or establishing refugee camps.
With the end of the Cold War, the IRR transformed from an exilic model of response to
refugee situations to a source-country model focusing on the causes of refugee flows. It then
became unlikely to offer permanent asylum to refugees outside their home countries; instead,
they were provided with temporary protection close to the border or a ‘safe zone’ was created
inside the country of origin.
11
In the words of Chimni, ‘the notion of safe return was introduced
into the discourse’, and ‘in the continuum between voluntary and involuntary repatriation the
5
idea of safe return aspired to occupy the middle ground’.
12
It is assumed that the international
community, often under the hegemony of the single superpower of the United States, would be
able to intervene to change causes of refugee flows and consequently manage to return
displaced people, but the reality in other contexts, such as Afghanistan, has proved otherwise.
While voluntary repatriation increasingly came to be promoted as a solution, along with ideas
and practices of safe zones
13
, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw another paradigmatic shift in
the IRR: a ‘security-based exclusionary understanding’
14
began to prevail
whereby governments increasingly became against local integration and third-country
resettlement. As Chimni argued, in this period: ‘the doctrine of imposed return was aired by
UNHCR to draw attention to constraints which could compel it to accept the reality of
involuntary repatriation’.
15
However, supporting voluntary repatriation may lead to involuntary
or forced repatriations as refugees may not ultimately return to their countries of origin due to
various reasons.
16
The IRR has thus transformed from a liberal one implementing a selective
but integrative policy of access to a full status recognition with complete social rights,
permanent settlement, and right to access to citizenship, to one maximizing exclusion on entry
and with the perspective of a short stay, and return.
17
The case of Syrian refugee flows also confirms the dominance of exclusionary
approaches in the IRR. Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, while the countries in
the Global North have largely failed to offer a liberal framework for third-country resettlement,
Syria’s neighboring countries, hosting large numbers of refugees, tend to be reluctant to
promote integration. As a result, the idea of repatriation, even involuntary, has emerged. Within
the limitations of the conditions surrounding them (namely the IRR), refugees can also act as
agents who are able to exercise action
18
: individual refugees’ agency power can play significant
role in their decision-making about their journeys. Further, within this context, different nation
6
states can either play a more restrictive or a more liberal role with regards to return depending
on the socio-political and economic climates.
Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan: A Historical Synopsis
To understand the recent tendency towards return, it is vital to highlight the larger
setting in each of these three national contexts in the region (Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan) in
terms of the refugee flows and evolution of settlement policies. Across these countries, the
initial response was to allow the flow of refugees by maintaining an open-door policy. In
Lebanon and Jordan, the open-door policy came as a natural continuation of the prior bilateral
treaties between these countries and Syria permitting reciprocal freedom of movement and
work permits. Consequently, the UNHCR figures in 2013 indicated that the number of Syrian
refugees in each of these three countries reached over a quarter of a million. In 2018, there were
more than 3.5 million registered Syrian refugees in Turkey, nearly one million in Lebanon, and
more than a half million in Jordan.
With some exceptions, all three countries adopted a largely non-encampment
policy. The Turkish government initially adopted an encampment policy, but as the number of
arrivals continued to increase they could not accommodate them further. Currently only six per
cent of the refugees are in camps in Turkey. Jordan had initially refused to have camps, but then
established six camps hosting nearly one-fifth of refugees. In contrast, Lebanon consistently
refused to establish formal camps due to its previous experience with Palestinians.
19
Regarding
the legal status of the refugees, neither the Lebanese nor the Jordanian government are
signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention; as such, neither recognize refugees’ status. Turkey,
though a signatory of the 1951 Convention, retains the original geographical focus on Europe
7
and did not initially give Syrians official refugee status either but later granted them temporary
protection.
20
In the first years of the conflict, the policies of these three countries asserted the
temporariness of the refugees, based on the assumption that the crisis would end in a relatively
short period of time and the refugees would return. The approach started to differ between
countries as years progressed.
In the early years of the Syrian crisis, Turkey maintained a positive response to the
refugee flows from Syria, perceived as a humanitarian issue. An official discourse centering
around the notion of ‘guests’ prevailed. In 2013, the foreign minister at the time, Davutoğlu,
defined the Syrians as guests and brothers, stressing that closing the doors to them should be
ruled out.
21
In 2014, Deputy Prime Minister Kurtulmuş represented the hosting of refugees as
‘Ansar’.
22
In addition, the presence of Syrians was perceived as having a positive effect on
future Turkey-Syria relations.
23
The Lebanese government did not formalize a national
response to the refugee presence, instead transferring responsibility for the country’s refugees
to organizations such as the UNHCR.
24
The option of permanent settlement and integration was
never viable. Similarly, in Jordan, Minister for International Cooperation and Planning
Fakhoury insisted that there would not be a repeat of the level of integration enjoyed by
Palestinian refugees
25
from 1948.
26
However, the government views the refugee population as
an opportunity for national development, stressing the economic aspect of the refugee
presence.
27
As time progressed, the increasing numbers of refugees combined with fears about
potential security threats and spill-over of war from ISIS members across the border led to the
securitization of borders through tough visa requirements and surveillance mechanisms to block
migrants’ access to these three countries with air and ground military equipment. The entry
of Syrians was limited to ‘extreme humanitarian cases’.
8
Though Turkey implemented visa restrictions for Syrians entering the country as of
2015, as a response to the protracted refugee situation, it provided legal grounds for Syrians to
be classified as ‘persons under temporary protection’ and gave Syrians more rights than other
refugees in the country, including access to a work permit, health services and education.
28
This
indicates that the Turkish authorities circuitously accepted the likelihood of the long-
term settlement of Syrians, in contrast to the two other countries that kept the refugees in an
extremely vulnerable situation. It has continuously been developing strategies to integrate
refugees especially those with capitals. Since the Turkey-EU deal in 2016, EU-funded
initiatives were introduced to facilitate refugee access to education and employment. In
addition, it has been offering citizenship status to skilled migrants with economic and cultural
capital to retain them.
29
Jordan also closed its border, citing an ongoing security threat, and moved from a liberal
policy with regard to the employment of Syrians to a strict one.
30
However, since 2015, Syrians
have again been granted access to the labor market and various measures have been taken to
facilitate the issuance of permits,
31
as a part of the Compact deal of 2016, in return for billions
of dollars in grants, loans and preferential trade agreements with the EU.
32
In Lebanon, the
government took greater control over the presence of Syrians and adopted its first clear policy
in 2014 to decrease their number by reducing access to its territory and encouraging return to
Syria.
33
In May 2015, the Lebanese government instructed the UNHCR to suspend
the registration of Syrian refugees. This was accompanied by further restriction
of labor policies
34
and a stricter control of informal work at the municipal level. As a result, the
percentage of Syrian refugees with residency permits decreased, leaving them in a precarious
legal position. In 2017, the government assigned a State Ministry for Refugee Affairs and
partially repealed strict registration and labor policies.
35
Yet it continued to benefit from
humanitarian assistance on account of receiving refugees.
9
The policies of these three countries in terms of reception, encampment, and integration
present a shift from an open-door policy to a stricter political stance. They each developed
strategies, in the interplay between domestic and international constraints, weighing out costs
and benefits in terms of the presence of refugees. Yet, in all three countries, states and societies
began to feel the increasing weight of hosting large numbers of refugees and started to bring up
the issue of return in the absence of responsibility sharing from developed countries.
Rising Calls for Return: A Societal and Political Account
In all three countries, there has been a growing discontent within the host communities
to various degrees. The public rhetoric gradually worsened, xenophobic tendencies and
discrimination are perceived to be on the rise as follows. There has been an increasingly
growing sentiment that refugees are a burden on the economy and infrastructure. Citizens of
Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan feel that they are in competition with Syrian refugees for limited
resources and are demanding their welfare rights.
36
In Turkey, the solidarity of society toward Syrian refugees slowly faded,
37
especially as
the government progressively took steps to provide social services, employment rights and
citizenship, and the public perceived Syrians as competing for the same resources. These
feelings are further exacerbated by the fact that these decisions are often made by state officials
without consultation with the public and without giving details on implementation. Another
main reason behind the growing discontent is related to domestic politics in the country.
38
The
current Justice and Development Party (JDP) government has taken a hardline position in favor
of Syrians’ presence in Turkey. As such, those who oppose the government blame it for the
presence of refugees. According to the Syrians Barometer survey,
39
the Turkish public is not
10
sympathetic to the idea of sharing a future with Syrians (82 per cent). The vast majority of
Turkish people defended exclusionary options such as ‘they should live in safe zones inside
Syria’ (37 per cent), ‘they should be exclusively in the camps’ (28 per cent), or ‘they should all
be deported’ (12 per cent). In parallel, several reports have pointed out social tensions and
clashes in some neighborhoods. According to the latest ICG report,
40
incidents of
intercommunal violence increased threefold in the second half of 2017 compared to the same
period in 2016. Similarly, host communities developed negative perceptions regarding the
extended refugee presence in Lebanon. According to El Gantri and El Mufti,
41
many accuse
refugees of endangering their livelihoods and the national economy. In addition, perceptions of
Syrians are often attributed to past resentment due to the pre-2005 Syrian presence.
42
A
proportion of 92 per cent agreed that the presence of Syrian refugees is placing strain on
Lebanon’s resources, 42 per cent living in vulnerable areas reported knowing someone who
lost their job or business to a Syrian, and 49 per cent indicated that relations with Syrian
refugees have worsened since 2014.
43
For Jordanians, the highly visible presence of many
thousands of refugees has raised fears over competition for resources and opportunities,
44
especially in the northern governorates. Over the years, it appears that public opinion on Syrian
refugees has become increasingly critical. However, according to a survey of 1,600 Jordanian
citizens,
45
almost all consider Syrian refugees (‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’) as brothers. Yet, concerns
emerged relating to the economy and development followed by social, political and security
issues.
There appears to be growing discontent to a varying extent in public opinion in all three
countries. We postulate that this might be influencing official discourse and practices. It should
be noted that there is a significant body of literature on policy responsiveness suggesting that
policy makers tend to respond to the demands of the public, particularly in the field of
11
immigration and asylum issues, in order to ensure the support of their citizens.
46
Parallel to the
worsening public opinion, and in the absence of options of integration of refugees and of
resettlement to third countries, officials in the host countries have brought up the return
discourse and suggested concrete mechanisms.
In 2015, as Turkey was hosting nearly 2.5 million refugees and the European countries
facing refugee ‘flows’, were trying to protect their borders, the Turkish authorities would
highlight the question of ‘responsibility sharing against responsibility shifting’. It is within this
context that Turkey’s President Erdogan, visiting EU authorities in Brussels in 2015, demanded
support to solve the migration crisis:
Despite the huge refugee influx, which had so far costed Turkey around €8bn, Turkey
continues to maintain its open-door policy; but there is a need for European countries
to also take responsibility… The migrant crisis could be solved in three easy steps:
training and equipping the Syrian opposition, declaring a safe zone along the border
in northern Syria where Isis fighters would be cleared, and refugees could be resettled
by creating a no-fly zone.
47
It thus appears that the question of return of Syrian refugees was already on the agendas
of the Turkish authorities at that time. In 2016, after years of an open-door policy and after
having introduced integration policies, officials increasingly began to talk about return
48
. This
constituted a U-turn that possibly matched Turkey’s changing public opinion, the tensions
between native populations and Syrians, the country’s degrading economy and the highly tense
election period. It seemed that the government realized that the stay of Syrians in Turkey would
have a political and social cost and consequently changed its rhetoric. In parallel, Turkey’s
military incursions into northern Syria, which were framed as anti-terror missions, had
12
implications for return. President Erdoğan repeatedly mentioned the possibility of creating a
safe zone in northern Syria and returning the refugees. In February 2018, he said:
We want our refugee brothers and sisters to return to their land, to their homes. We
are not in the position to hide 3.5 million here forever… we’ll solve the Afrin incident,
we’ll solve [Syrian rebel-held] Idlib, and we would like our refugee brothers and
sisters to return to their own country.
49
Indeed, the previous Euphrates Shield Operation
50
by Turkey into Syria resulted in the
return of a large number of Syrians to the Jarablus region. Similarly, following actions in Afrin,
Turkey established refugee camps ahead of a possible influx according to Aksoy, Foreign
Ministry spokesperson.
51
He said: ‘The Turkish Red Crescent and AFAD (Disaster and
Emergency Management Authority) started preparations to set up camps to host 170,000
people near Idlib and the areas of [the] Euphrates Shield Operation’.
52
The return debate thus
appears to center on the creation of safe zones. Human Rights Watch highlighted that there had
been mass deportations, which were denied by the Directorate General of Migration
Management.
53
However, it seemed that the return question is always pronounced with a certain
degree of caution and remains rather latent.
In Lebanon, as political actors continue to ask for support from international donors, all
agree that the Syrians will not stay long-term. Foreign Minister Bassil has been calling for the
deportation of Syrian refugees since the beginning of the crisis: ‘Lebanon should stop receiving
refugees unless for exceptional cases and the Syrians already in Lebanon should be deported’.
54
His hostile position towards Syrian refugees aims to reassure his Christian Maronite voters that
the presence of a large predominantly Muslim Sunni population of a million refugees was only
temporary. Indeed, the demographic balance of Lebanon is a particularly sensitive topic. Over
13
the years, several propositions and mechanisms with regard to return have emerged. For
instance, both Labor Minister Azzi and then-Prime Minister Salam announced plans to send
refugees back to Syria over a two-year period. Minister of Social Affairs Bouassi suggested
giving incentives to Syrian families to go back. The anti-refugee rhetoric reached its highest
point in 2017, following fights with the Nusra Front group in Arsal. In response, non-state
actors, particularly Hezbollah, negotiated the repatriation of Syrian refugees with militant
groups, without the direct involvement of the Lebanese government or the United Nations.
About 10,000 people returned from Arsal and Shebaa.
55
According to Human Rights Watch,
many Syrians have returned under indirect pressure, namely harsh conditions, lack of legal
residency, restrictions on freedom of movement, and fear of random arrests.
56
Most recently,
Syrian refugees are being forced to tear down their own homes in the face of an aggressive new
campaign to pressure refugees into returning home.
57
Hezbollah and its allies present dialogue
and coordination directly with the Syrian government as prerequisites for the return of the
refugees.
58
The Lebanese government (especially the anti-Syrian regime parties) has been
unwilling to negotiate with the Syrian government so as not to jeopardize the
international community’s support. Prime minister, Hariri, instead advocates for mediation
from international agencies.
59
In addition, disagreement appears to be related to the perception
of safety. President Aoun considers that: ‘There are currently safe zones larger than Lebanon,
including agriculture lands, that one can work in’.
60
He also stated in 2017 at the UN General
Assembly that he believes that return should occur as early as possible. However, Hariri, on
many occasions, indicated being strongly opposed, questioning the safety of the refugees in
Syria and insisted that Lebanon would not force refugees to return but rather called for more
international help. However, in 2018, Hariri started expressing his support for efforts that are
being exerted to support refugees’ return.
61
In addition, all parties in Lebanon have been
advocating for de-escalation zones for the repatriation of Syrian refugees with the support of
14
international organizations. Merhebi, a member of Hariri’s Future Movement, Minister of
Affairs of the Displaced
62
voiced it as follows:
Lebanon supports UN efforts to settle the Syrian crisis and consequently ensure the
safe return of refugees to their country… If safe zones are established, we would
consider it a good thing because this would reduce the killings in Syria…There will
be no forceful repatriation by the Lebanese government, in line with our commitments
to international human rights.
Return seems to be the default option, among all parties, and some returns have already
taken place; in total, UNHCR reported 172,796 self-organized refugee returns to Syria between
2016 and 2019: 61,000 from Turkey, 39,000 from Lebanon, 36,000 from Jordan and 33,000
from Iraq
63
, however, the perception of safety and timing of the returns are strongly debated.
This has resulted in feuds between the Lebanese government and UNHCR, with the former
accusing the latter of standing in the way of voluntary return of Syrians.
64
The official discourse in Jordan seems the least unfavorable to the influx of refugees.
Minister of State for Media Affairs and Communications Momani states the following: ‘Jordan
is proud of its track record regarding hosting and helping refugees’.
65
Following the car bomb
attack in 2016, it was reported that deportations were carried out.
66
Around 2,300 were deported
in 2017.
67
However, Jordan rejected these claims, as Momani told the local media: ‘Jordan is
abiding by the international law in this regard…The return of the Syrian refugees is voluntary
and in such cases the return is to areas where there is no threat to their lives’.
68
In addition to deportations, economic difficulties may have also been the cause of some
returns. In 2017, similar to the two other neighboring countries, Jordan created safe zones in
15
southwest Syria to 'soften the flow of refugees into Jordan' and protect Jordanian territory from
pro-Iran militias in Syria'.
69
In February 2018, Prime Minister al-Mulki commented that Jordan
had reached its capacity to provide services, spend national resources, and expand social and
physical infrastructure to absorb refugees.
70
However, the situation, as in the case of the two
other countries, constitutes an opportunity for bargaining for support from international donors.
In this context, the return discourse was never officially brought up. Indeed, the Prime Minister
presents the prospect of return to Syria as an unlikely occurrence:
The prospects of an impending return to Syria … are still remote. Even if a peaceful
solution materializes, it will take years to rebuild Syria and for Syrians to resettle.
This means that Jordan will have to continue bearing the mounting costs of the crisis
and facing the ever-increasing challenges to the social and economic fabric of the
country.
71
In all cases, it is unclear to what extent returns have been voluntary or forced. In Turkey,
the return discourse has been tackled cautiously and linked to safe zones. In Lebanon, return
seems the default option among all parties, and some returns have already taken place.
However, the safety perceptions and the timing of the returns are strongly debated. The return
discourse is the least discussed in Jordan, despite some reports of deportations. Furthermore, in
2018, agreements were reached by the major players (Russia and the US) which ‘would see two
million Syrian refugees return to their lands and grant safety guarantees’.
72
Can Return be a Viable Option? Views from Syria and Syrian Refugees
As the crisis in Syria continues and Europe is guarding its borders and restricting
resettlement, neighboring countries are growing wearier of having to shoulder the presence of
Syrian refugees in the long-term. The return discourse, as we have demonstrated above, has
16
increasingly surfaced in host states. To assess its viability, we look at the conditions in Syria
and analyze the perceptions about return among Syrians in these three countries.
By examining the situation in Syria, it is difficult to argue that the conditions for safe
return are met. In the last eight years, the conflict has caused extensive damage to Syria’s
physical infrastructure, including the provision of water and electricity, and to its social
infrastructure such as schools and healthcare centers. It is estimated that the war has damaged
about a third of the housing stock and led to significant economic loss.
73
Over half of the
country’s pre-conflict population has been forcibly displaced. In early 2018, three main factors
characterized the situation in Syria. First, ISIS is substantially, but not completely, defeated and
some small areas in Syria are still under the control of ISIS. Second, the Assad regime seems
to stay in power, and controls the near totality of Syria’s territory. Third, despite peace talks,
clashes continue between the Assad regime, local opposition groups, and foreign powers. Given
this picture, some claim that a de-escalation deal will mark a step towards the final phase of the
Syrian civil war.
74
Many others, however, argue that the country is entering a dangerous and
much more volatile phase, characterized by key stakeholders seeking to protect their interests
and staking their hold on the ground.
75
In short, despite some major changes, a peaceful
resolution remains elusive. Although there have been instances of repatriations following
temporary procurements of security, through arrangements with state or non-state actors or
implementation of safe zones, Syria is still at war. In the second half of 2019, Idlib, the last
opposition stronghold, was losing ground under the offensive of Syrian government forces
backed by Russian airpower and this topic has become an internationally debated hot topic.
Despite the fact that Turkey hopes to return Syrian refugees to the northeastern area, which it
wants to extend 30 kilometers into Syrian territory, return is being rendered progressively much
more difficult, especially for government opposition. In fact, on the contrary, the Idlib offensive
17
could lead to a fresh wave of refugees and subsequent agreement between Turkey, Iran and
Russia on the formation of a committee to draft a new Syrian constitution to normalize the
situation in Syria and legitimize the regime
76
, renders the return progressively more difficult,
especially for government opposition members.
As such, when we talk of return, we need to consider that the Assad regime claims that
there are ‘definitely’ terrorists among the refugees. The mass exile of Syrians is a by-product
of a ‘legitimate war’ for Syria to become ‘a homogenous society’.
77
In addition, it introduced a
law (Law No. 10 of 2018) that requires property holders in Syria to formally prove ownership
of their private property within a period of 30 days (now extended to one year) or face
confiscation.
78
The fact that many may not be able to return to their own homes or will not be
able to get their properties back makes the sustainability of return questionable. More recently,
as of May 2018, Assad and his allies have been promoting the idea of return to fuel the
perception that the war is ending.
79
For instance, returnees from Lebanon are to be vetted by
Syrian intelligence, in coordination with Lebanon’s General Security intelligence agency and
return is to happen to regions under the control of Assad. This position is not shared by all
politicians in Lebanon as Hariri and those who oppose Assad insist the UN must oversee
returns.
Meanwhile, the perceptions of the Syrian refugees themselves concerning return need
to be considered in the context of the aforementioned discourse. Surveys looking at refugee
perceptions in each of these three countries indicate that Syrians would like to return as soon
as the situation in Syria improves. In a survey conducted by the UNHCR, a proportion of 63
per cent of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries said they would like to ‘one day’ return to
Syria.
80
While survey results should be considered with caution, as results depend on the
phrasing of the question, the Syrian Barometer survey
81
does seem to indicate that the majority
of interviewed Syrians in Turkey (61 per cent) will return to Syria if the war ends and a good
18
government is established. Only 16 per cent stated that they would not return to Syria under
any circumstances. Similarly, most refugees in Jordan hoped to return to Syria when it was safe
to do so.
82
In addition, many refugees stay in Lebanon despite the hardships in order to stay
close to Syria, hoping to return one day.
83
Further, the decision to return is not straightforward but varies according to socio-
economic status, age, religious affiliation, level of Turkish language and geographical region.
84
The primary factors that appear to play a determinant role in the decision to return is safety and
security.
85
According to research by Oxfam, most refugees from Syria in Lebanon stated that
they cannot go back because it is not safe.
86
Syrian refugees prioritize a durable solution to the
conflict. For that, they would need to receive reliable information on the situation.
Furthermore, Syrian refugees reject any proposals that could lead to Syria’s fragmentation and
have no confidence in safe zones.
87
There is fear of persecution under Assad’s regime and
young men fear conscription to the army.
88
Another main factor that determines return decisions
appears to be going back to their own regions; as such, the idea of safe zones in another area of
the country is not compatible with their views. Those who are most likely to go back are those
whose areas of origin have not been severely affected by the conflict. For others, return would
be difficult because of the destruction of their houses
89
and would require compensation for the
loss of property. The 2005 UN Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees
sets the expectation that individuals should be able to return not only to their countries of origin,
but to their actual homes.
90
This becomes even more difficult as Assad introduced Law n.10,
which may see the state confiscating the lands of millions of refugees.
91
It thus appears that the notion of a ‘voluntary return’ of refugees is not fully meaningful
at present. In addition, in light of current events, we might expect that if Assad stays in power,
the opposition members will not want or be able to return, even less so in the absence of
property rights. Finally here, one must recall that the UNHCR has an internationally recognized
19
key role in a well-functioning repatriation process,
92
however as emphasized earlier the three
conditions for viable return must be fulfilled, in addition, the violence on the ground must end
completely, and there needs to be a functioning political authority in Syria. Naturally, external
powers who are already heavily involved in the “Syrian crisis” also play a role in this question
of return. It is observed that there is a common push by external actors towards normalization
of the situation and repatriation, expecting to gain from reconstruction profit, even though the
three conditions for viable return are not met. For instance, it is argued that the payback for
Russia for its intervention will be through reconstruction profit.
93
Turkey also aggressively
wishes to take its part in Syrian reconstruction
94
. Some other countries, such as Iran, the US
and some Arab and EU countries also want to be part of the reconstruction process to different
degrees.
Conclusion
The option of return of Syrian refugees has increasingly emerged in the political
discourse in parallel to the relative absence of practices of integration of refugees in host
countries and of resettlement to third countries. It is further exacerbated by the politicization of
the IRR over time, particularly after experiencing the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe in
2015. Elaborating on the recent return debates, this paper highlights the politicization of the
return question in all three neighboring host countries to different degrees, often under the
influence of public opinion and international and domestic politics, which lead to the growing
acceptance of repatriation as a solution to the global Syrian refugee question. Though returns
are occurring and the situation in Syria is progressively portrayed in the media and official
discourse as coming close to an end, conditions are still far from acceptable in terms of safety,
voluntariness and sustainability. Indeed, Syria is still in a heavy conflict situation, its territories
20
are under the control of various internal or foreign forces, more than half of its population is
displaced, and its internationally recognized government retains a fragile grip on power. Within
this context, all three main refugee hosting countries have undertaken initiatives to create ‘safe
zones’ either through military interventions in Syria by states and non-state actors or advocated
for it with the support of international organizations. While securing borders with conflict zones
through ‘safe zones’ may offer minimal security, it cannot offer full protection, or a durable
solution to persecution and political exclusion. As noted by Davutoğlu, the main architect of
Turkey’s policies towards Syria,
95
returns to safe zones often mean a temporary arrangement,
a type of movement from a refugee situation to internal displacement, which necessitates
another settlement program in the post-conflict period. In the meantime, the refugees
themselves would want to return only when safety conditions are adequate and only to their
original homes. It seems that in the cases where ‘spontaneous’ returns did happen, the question
of voluntariness was not clear, as pressure also seem to have been exerted at least indirectly.
All three hosting countries are increasingly becoming less open to hosting large numbers of
refugees from Syria, as governments try to balance internal and regional politics. At the same
time, there are serious political agenda items that derive from long-established cleavages within
countries in the region associated with ethnicity, sect and other identity politics. This further
complicates the ‘politics of return’.
This issue leaves us with a policy question: can a successful and legitimate repatriation
program only be realized in a fully established post-conflict period when the satisfactory
conditions of return have been met, or might it be implemented through safe zones before
reaching an optimum post-conflict period? Although answering this question is not within the
scope of this paper, we argue that the return question has become highly politicized. Therefore,
we advocate for the creation of a framework that responds to contextual variations and to
changing conditions, without leaving it totally up to individual countries to decide, as decisions
21
may be driven by public opinion or political agendas. Instead, countries should act in
collaboration with international organizations and, most importantly, with the domestic
political authority in Syria for the question of property rights to be resolved. Indeed, according
to Long,
96
returns work best when people choose to go back through a gradual process.
The decision on safety and security can thus be considered through a triangulation of
actors. Ultimately, the main decisions are taken by the nation states of what happens within
their borders. However, for durable solutions, these decisions should be framed within the IRR
standards for return (as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, which contributed to it being
considered a relatively successful example of return).
97
Further, the refugee community should
be convinced of the viability of return.
In this case, as the Syrian regime is a cause of the conflict and a part of it is still in
power, collaboration remains uncertain. The Syrian regime is uneasy with the return of
refugees, most of which are considered opposition, and it will be difficult to guarantee their
security. One must remember that repatriation is only one of the solutions for the refugees, and
there are two other possibilities: integration into the host country and resettlement to a third
country. These, too, should be considered by all actors involved. There is the possibility of
implementing a 'Comprehensive Plan of Action' (CPA) in the future for these 6 million
displaced Syrians that includes some negotiated returns being accepted by the Assad Regime
(without disappearances), some local integration, and some third country resettlement, through
a UNHCR-led international cooperation, as per previous significant models considered
successful such as CIREFCA for Central American refugees and CPA for Indochinese
refugees
98
.
Acknowledgement: This work was supported by the Scientific and Technological Research
Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) under Grant [116K828] and under Grant [116K448].
22
Notes
1
Crisp, “It’s Far Too Early”; Marks, “Pushing Syrian Refugees.”
2
UNHCR, “Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response: Durable Solutions.”
3
Crisp and Long, “Safe and Voluntary.”
4
These interviews were carried out in the scope of various projects. The first, funded
by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), focuses on the
comparison of three mass refugee flows to Turkey and a second, funded by TUBITAK and
Research Council UK, focusing on Syrian youth integration in Turkey. Further interviews were
held within the scope of the Experts’ Workshop ‘What does the Global Compact on Refugees
mean for the MENA region?’ in February 2018.
5
Keely, “The International Refugee Regime(s).”
6
Chimni, “From Resettlement”; Chimni, “The Geopolitics”; Frelick, “Paradigm
Shifts.”
7
Barnett, “UNHCR and Ethics”; Hathaway, “Refugee Solutions.”
8
Examples of repatriation namely to Ethiopia (1977-83), Yugoslavia (1996-1998) and
Afghanistan (1990-2019) illustrate how the regime has evolved over time.
9
Chimni, “From Resettlement”; Chimni, “The Geopolitics.”
10
Frelick, “Paradigm Shifts.”
11
Chimni, “From Resettlement”; Frelick, “Paradigm Shifts.”
12
Chimni, “From Resettlement,” 55.
13
The first and most important application of safe zones was to protect the Kurds of
Northern Iraq in 1991 during the Gulf War.
14
Frelick, “Paradigm Shifts,” 3.
23
15
Chimni, “From Resettlement,” 55.
16
Duffy Toft, “The Myth.”
17
Chimni, “From Resettlement”; Frelick, “Paradigm Shifts.”
18
With the absence of the classical three solutions to refugee situation, large numbers
of Syrians, ‘voted with their feet’ by moving on to Europe (through Turkey) as in the summer
of 2015.
19
450,000 Palestinian refugees have come to Lebanon since 1948, 62 per cent of whom
live in 12 camps according to ‘Palestinians in Lebanon’ by Hanafi (2012).
20
İçduygu, “Syrian Refugees in Turkey.”
21
MoFA Turkey, “From Rep. of Turkey.”
22
An Islamic religious reference to the early Muslims who hosted the prophet
Muhammad when he emigrated from Mecca.
23
Memisoglu and Ilgit, “Syrian Refugees.”
24
The collaboration was regulated by the terms of a Memoranda of
Understanding signed between the UNHCR and Lebanon and Jordan to regulate the main
aspects of refugee protection.
25
Jordan is currently home to 2 million Palestinian refugees, more than 337,000 of
whom live in the country's 10 official refugee camps and are believed to have greatly
contributed to the Jordanian economy according to ‘Palestine refugees: locations and numbers’
in The New Humanitarian published in 2010 updated in 2018.
26
Lenner, “Blasts from the Past.”
27
Betts, Ali, and Memisoglu, “Local Politics.”
28
İçduygu, “Syrian Refugees in Turkey.”
29
Koser Akcapar and Simsek, “Politics of Syrian Refugees.”
30
Barbelet and Wake, “The Lives and Livelihoods.”
24
31
ILO, “Work Permits.”
32
Barbelet, Hagen-Zanker, and Mansour-Ille, “The Jordan Compact.”
33
Janmyr, “Precarity in Exile.”
34
As of 2016, Syrians are required to sign a pledge not to work and can only sustain
their livelihoods through humanitarian assistance provided by the Lebanese government and
with support from the international community.
35
Atallah and Mahdi, “Law and Politics.”
36
Abid, Manan, and Rahman, “A Flood of Syrians”; Erdogan, Suriyeliler Barometresi.
37
ICG, “Turkey’s Syrian Refugees.”
38
Memisoglu and Ilgit, “Syrian Refugees.”
39
Erdogan, Suriyeliler Barometresi.
40
ICG, “Turkey’s Syrian Refugees.”
41
El Gantri and El Mufti, “Not Without Dignity.”
42
A presence which started in 1976 during the civil war and ended in 2005 following
the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri
43
IFIPPIA, “Syrian Refugee Crisis.”
44
Carrion, “Syrian Refugees.”
45
Athamneh, Momani, and Radaideh, “Jordanians’ Perceptions.”
46
Morales, Pilet, and Ruedin, “The Gap.”
47
Cendrowicz, “Erdogan Shames EU.”
48
Icduygu and Ayasli, “Geri Dönüş Siyaseti: Suriyeli Mültecilerin Dönüş Göçü İhtimali
ve Gelecek Senaryoları.”
49
Daily Sabah, “Turkish Efforts.”
25
50
A cross-border operation by the Turkish military and Turkey-aligned Syrian
opposition groups in the Syrian Civil War, which led to the penetration of Turkish forces into
northern Syria.
51
Hürriyet, “Turkey.”
52
Karadeniz, “Turkey.”
53
HRW, “Turkey.”
54
Firstpost, “Lebanese Minister.”
55
Enders, “Lebanese Foreign Minister.”
56
HRW, “Lebanon.”
57
McKernan, “Syrian Refugees Forced.”
58
Al-Manar, “Sayyed Nasrallah.”
59
Reuters, “Lebanon.”
60
The Daily Star, “Syria Not Ready.”
61
Obeid, “Hariri.”
62
Kadi, “Lebanon.”
63
UNHCR, “Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response: Durable Solutions.”
64
Hamdan, “Lebanon-UNHCR Feuding.”
65
Jordanian Times, “Jordan.”
66
Su, “Why Jordan Is Deporting.”
67
UNHCR, “Inter-Sector Working Group.”
68
Al-Daameh, “Jordan Rejects HRW Accusations.”
69
Al-Makahleh, “Case for Safe Zones.”
70
Marks, “Pushing Syrian Refugees.”
71
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, “10th Meeting.”
72
The Daily Star, “Lebanon Must Benefit.”
26
73
World Bank, “The Toll of War.”
74
Kahl, Goldenberg, and Heras, “A Strategy.”
75
Calamur, “The Many Wars.”
76
Wilks, “Ankara Summit on Syria.”
77
Batrawi and Uzelac, “Four Ways.”
78
Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Syria’s New Property Law.”
79
Alfred, “Dangerous Exit.”
80
NRC et al, “Dangerous Ground.”
81
Erdogan, Suriyeliler Barometresi.
82
Barbelet and Wake, “The Lives and Livelihoods.”
83
El Gantri and El Mufti, “Not Without Dignity.”
84
Ciplak, Keser, and Erdurmaz, Suriyeli Siginmacilarin Gelecek Beklentisi.
85
El Gantri and El Mufti, “Not Without Dignity.”
86
Keith and Shawaf, “Still Looking.”
87
Yahya, Kassir, and El-Hariri, “Unheard Voices.”
88
Barish, “Return of Refugees.”
89
Bellamy et al., “The Lives and Livelihoods.”
90
Anderson, “The UN Principles.”
91
Ibrahim, “Syria: ‘Absentees Law.’”
92
Chimni, “Meaning of Words”; Zieck, UNHCR and Voluntary Repatriation.
93
Vohra, “Russia’s Payback Will Be Syria’s Reconstruction Money.”
94
Aslan, “Turkey’s Reconstruction Model in Syria.”
95
Interview date: 09.04.2018
96
Long, “Back.”
97
Harvey, “Return Dynamics in Bosnia1 and Croatia.”
27
98
Alexander Betts, “Comprehensive Plans of Action: Insights from CIREFCA and the
Indochinese CPA.”
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