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The Duterte method: A neoclassical realist guide to understanding a small power’s foreign policy and strategic behaviour in the Asia-Pacific
Abstract
In the contemporary Asia-Pacific context, the fault lines leading to the Thucydides trap can be attributed to the continuing strategic competition between a seemingly declining United States and a rising China. Failure to circumvent this trap can ultimately result in a war of all against all. Against this backdrop, this article investigates how a small power re-evaluates its foreign policy and strategic behaviour using neoclassical realism theory. In particular, I examine President Rodrigo Duterte’s method which is characterized by four key elements: cultivating a more favourable image for China; moderating the country’s American-influenced strategic culture; mobilizing state-society relations supportive of ‘Sinicization’; and reorienting the country’s Western-based institutions to better accommodate Chinese pressures and incentives. Does a China-centric approach give a small power an indispensable strategic capital to successfully navigate and exploit both the challenges and opportunities of the impending new order? Do the Philippines’ shifting rules of engagement under the Duterte administration represent a forward-thinking strategic outlook rather than a defeatist and naïve stance? The article answers these questions by examining the factors and dynamics underpinning the conception and construction of the Duterte method, as well as its implications a vis-a-vis a small power’s foreign policy and strategic behaviour.
... Duterte brought a new face to the Philippines beyond the backdrop of negativity, especially in his foreign policies. It was also through Duterte that the Philippines began exploring and benefitting from forging stronger alliances with China and Russia (Balboa, 2020;De Castro, 2019;Lopega, 2019;Magcamit, 2020) while maintaining relations from its old allies like the United States of America and the European Union. It is interesting to note how Duterte put forward his country's interest in dealing with foreign relations. ...
... If there is a daring and almost unheard act from any president before him, it is Duterte's pivot to China. He cultivated a more favorable stance for China (Magcamit, 2020). De Castro (2016) described it as an equi-balancing policy on China, the opposite of the previous administration's dealing with its neighbor. ...
... As a consequence, the bilateral relations between both countries worsened, with China even banning some imported products from the Philippines, causing losses for the latter. However, Duterte came in as a good neighbor bringing a friendly stance that paved the way for what Magcamit (2020) called an equi-balancing policy. As a result, Duterte's government solidified bilateral arrangements leading to numerous investments from China to the Philippines. ...
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte is one of the Philippines' most popular yet controversial presidents. His foreign policies received contrasting reactions from domestic and international sectors. The key goal of this systematic review is to explore President Duterte's foreign policies and how he manages to advance the interests of the Philippines in the global arena. From the initial 979 articles, 13 were finally selected after passing the rigorous evaluation guided by the review protocols. Five themes emerged after analyzing the articles concerning Duterte's foreign policies. These are care for Overseas Filipino Workers, pivot to China, non-reliance with the West, political strategy, and advancing national interests. Though he did not get much support from local and international critics, his dealings with China and Russia allowed the Philippines to increase alliances while maintaining good relations with long-time allies, such as the US and European Union. Duterte's unpopular and sometimes controversial foreign policies challenge scholars for in-depth inquiry and discussion on existing international relations and political theories.
... Various authors have used a plethora of terms ranging from appeasement to fascism to describe and explain Duterte's efforts in redefining the country's foreign relations with the world's two biggest powers (Baviera 2016;Bello 2017;de Castro 2019). In my 2019 article investigating the present administration's foreign policy strategy, I argued that Duterte's China-centric approach signified a small state's attempt in securing its own interests amid the 'Thucydides trap' created by the continuing strategic competition between a rising Beijing and a seemingly declining Washington (Magcamit 2019; see also , Allison 2017). This 'Duterte Method' of foreign policy comprised of four key elements, namely: (1) cultivating a more favourable image for China; (2) mobilising state-society relations supportive of 'Sinicisation'; (3) moderating the country's American-influenced strategic culture; and (4) reorienting the country's Western-based institutions to accommodate Chinese pressures and incentives better (Magcamit 2019, 1). ...
... To deflect criticisms at home and rationalise his action, Duterte had personally relayed Xi's warning to those who would force China to recognise the Hauge Ruling and use it to pursue their interests, including the Philippines' plan to drill oil in the disputed parts of the WPS/SCS (Phillips, Holmes, and Bowcott 2016;Mogato 2017). Xi's persistent rejection of the tribunal's decision as 'illegal and invalid' compelled the Duterte administration to downplay the importance of the ruling when entering into bilateral agreements with China despite the latter's more recent calls for Beijing's compliance (Baviera 2016;Magcamit 2019;Tomacruz 2020b). ...
... Convinced that he has no chance of changing Xi's position, Duterte has repeatedly framed the WPS/SCS disputes as a zero-sum game that would ultimately end badly for the Philippines. Thus, even as Beijing continues to act as the sole rightful owner of the disputed territories by building air and naval bases, conducting military drills, and renaming the features and districts in the WPS/SCS, the Philippine government has remained largely acquiescent to Xi's authority (Chandran 2017;Chellaney 2018a).The country's commander-in-chief went as far as questioning the capacity and resolve of the Armed of the Philippines (AFP) in defending the Filipinos against Beijing in case of a war, claiming that such a prospect would be a 'suicide mission' (Romero 2018;Magcamit 2019). At one point, Duterte even accused some AFP members of planning to stage a revolt should they be sent to the disputed areas of the WPS/SCS to fight the Chinese, insisting that his military would rather oust him than lose their troops (Corrales 2018a). ...
The ongoing shifts in the global distribution of material and normative powers, particularly between the United States and China, have significant repercussions on the foreign policy strategies of smaller, weaker actors in the international system. Due to their limited capacity for dictating international politics in ways that could guarantee their survival, many in IR have argued that they usually prefer to operate within the prevailing status quo rather than attempting to revise it. Nevertheless, the Philippines, under the leadership of President Rodrigo Duterte, seems to disprove this observation by dramatically pivoting towards Beijing and away from Washington, at least rhetorically. This paper moves beyond the commonly cited systemic factors and domestic intervening variables affecting the states’ foreign policies by examining the neglected emotions and emotional beliefs that help shape these instruments. My investigation of these unseen, albeit existing mechanisms, reveals the centrality of Duterte’s emotionally constituted and strengthened beliefs in providing a more complete and realistic explanation to his China-centric (as opposed to US-centric) foreign policy stance. As I argue and demonstrate throughout the paper, because emotions and emotional beliefs are powerful engines of human behaviour, they exert enormous influence on any state leader’s foreign policy motivations, decisions, and actions.
... His dramatic policy shifts have been seen as largely due to less institutionalized, personalistic, and reactive foreign policy decision-making, a characteristic of developing countries (Heydarian, 2017). However, it must be pointed out that such shifts could also occur in developed countries such as the United States under Trump and South Africa under Zuma, and that small powers tend to maximize security and engage in a pro-establishment approach (Magcamit, 2019). ...
... A foreign policy guided by a grand strategy "identifies, prioritizes, and matches national resources to national interests against potential threats" (Dueck, 2015: 15). Duterte's alienation of the United States and pivot to China and Russia have been deemed indicative of a strategic behavior amidst a shifting global power distribution and touted by Duterte's administration as calculated and forward-thinking (Magcamit, 2019). Had Duterte consistently pursued such positioning, a kind of implicit grand strategy would have been discernible, but foreign policy decisions made at the height of the pandemic revealed the opposite. ...
This article contributes a new layer to the existing analyses of Duterte's foreign policy by arguing that he epitomized a transactionalist approach to Philippine foreign policy. This approach favored bilateral to multilateral relations, focused on short-term wins rather than long-term foresight, adhered to a zero-sum worldview, rejected value-based policymaking, and did not follow a grand strategy. Most of these qualities have been apparent in Duterte's relationship with China, Russia, and the United States but became even more prominent during the COVID-19 crisis. The analysis revealed that Duterte's transactionalist foreign policy rhymed with his domestic politics, and his obsession with winning now resulted in contradictions in his foreign policy, indicating a lack of a grand strategy that informed his decision-making. This article contributes a real-world case of a transactionalist foreign policy while considering whether it would persist in future policymaking in the Philippines.
... Finally, the growing literature of neoclassical realist analyses of small states would benefit from reconnecting with the realist classics (see, e.g., Edström et al., 2018 ;Gvalia et al., 2019 ;Magcamit, 2020 ;Steinsson, 2017 ;Wivel & Crandall, 2019 ). The iconic works discussed earlier are more explorative and less analytical than more recent contributions, but precisely because of that they open up 'thinking spaces' in regard to the study of small states in international relations and allow us to (re-)connect with the broader IR discipline and the big and important questions in international relations. ...
This chapter argues that realism offers important insights for the study of small states. By looking into four iconic realist works, we show that the popular view that small states defy realist expectations because these states can ‘punch above their weight’ is mistaken. Realists do not dismiss the ability of lesser powers to overachieve under certain systemic or state-specific circumstance. In contrast, realists specify how small states can overachieve under certain systemic or state-specific circumstances such as intense competition among great powers, possession of assets of value to great powers, national morale and character, high-quality diplomacy and a good reputation. Our argument proceeds in three steps. First, we map current debates in the study of small states in international affairs identifying central positions and lacunas in the literature. Second, we present a reading of iconic realist works showing how they help us to fill the lacunae of current debates. Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion of implications for the study of small states and international relations.
... Finally, the growing literature of neoclassical realist analyses of small states would benefit from reconnecting with the realist classics (see, e.g., Edström et al., 2018 ;Gvalia et al., 2019 ;Magcamit, 2020 ;Steinsson, 2017 ;Wivel & Crandall, 2019 ). The iconic works discussed earlier are more explorative and less analytical than more recent contributions, but precisely because of that they open up 'thinking spaces' in regard to the study of small states in international relations and allow us to (re-)connect with the broader IR discipline and the big and important questions in international relations. ...
... The claim of the debt trap emanates from the basis of "China-centric" loan agreements as a lender to high-cost major infrastructure projects. With the trend of China's BRI in its acquisition of property rights as collateral for the inability to pay debts, the Philippines, through the CRPIP and the Kaliwa Dam, would be at risk of falling under the debt trap (Magcamit, 2019 China controls Sri Lanka's seaports due to its inability to pay debts. For instance, Article 8, section 1 of the loan agreement is deemed problematic as it indicates that the Borrower-the Philippines-has consented to surrender its patrimonial assets or properties that would be dedicated for commercial use should it be enforced in an arbitration award. ...
With the rising tension from the disputed islands in the South China Sea or the West Philippine Sea, it is unexpected that bilateral agreements with China would propagate under the Duterte administration. The use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) shifted into the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) since the Duterte administration's goal of a closer relationship with China to help the administration attain its goal of the "Golden Age" of infrastructure development in the Philippines. China's foreign aid has been emphasized through China's Belt and Road Initiative program that aims to connect Asia, Africa, and Europe to increase trade and stimulate economic growth. This article then presents an in-depth study of the financial resource system in the Philippines, given the existing tension in the Philippine-China Relations, especially in its participation in the BRI, which garnered controversial instances where participating states failed to repay debts, and surrendered sovereignty rights. A thematic and document analysis has been applied on why the Duterte administration pivots to China and how the Philippines could manage its financial resources to negate the possibility of a debt trap. This study focuses on how the Philippines manages its Official Development Assistance from China's Belt and Road Initiative by displaying the effects of the relationship with the conclusion that the resulting agreements are disadvantageous for the Philippines but is still unlikely that it would lead to a debt trap in the Philippines' current economy.
... In January 2020, Duterte ordered the termination of the US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), hinting at a desire to establish similar agreements with China and Japan (Cook, 2019, p. 2;Valente, 2021). However, in a dramatic reversal that June, Foreign Minister Teddy Locsin announced Manila's decision to suspend withdrawal from the VFA for 6 months, citing heightened superpower competition and the global pandemic (Locsin, 2020). In August 2020, Duterte prohibited the Philippine Navy from participating in joint military exercises with the United States and others in the South China Sea and insisted that Manila would not choose sides in the brewing superpower conflict ('Philippines Bars Military from Joint Naval Exercises in South China Sea Cruz de Castro, 2020, p. 19 While Aquino III's impulse to upgrade defense ties with Washington and initiate international legal action against Beijing's maritime claims indicated a clear balancing strategy, Duterte's frequently incongruous 'independent foreign policy' reflects several conditions of hedging: 'an insistence on not taking sides among competing powers' and 'adopting opposite and counteracting measures. . ...
Contrary to predictions that smaller powers will balance against or bandwagon with external threats, Southeast Asian states are hedging by deepening their security cooperation with both the United States and China. Prevailing accounts of hedging do not adequately explain the persistence of such policy choices given growing threat perceptions of China and mounting bipolar pressures. After considering the limitations of existing theories, this article contends that a neoclassical realist approach to hedging better integrates the domestic and international factors that inform decision-makers’ preferences. It operationalizes this theoretical framework in three case studies: Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines. A neoclassical realist approach takes the role of individual perceptions and bureaucracies seriously, without dismissing the significance of variables identified by neorealism, including security threats, treaty alliances, and economic benefits. Ultimately, a more complete and accurate understanding of what continues to propel hedging in Southeast Asian states can mitigate the risks of great power conflict.
... From a FPA perspective, Duterte's personality as a leader highlights the implementation of the Philippines' independent foreign policy. Duterte's deep suspicion of the West kept him closely within China's orbit and he further realised that it was strategically more appropriate to turn towards China and away from the West (Magcamit, 2020). Thus, his foreign policy rhetoric generally emphasised his pro-China position and anti-West sentiment (Balboa, 2020). ...
This paper examines Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte government (2016–2022). During this period, Philippine foreign policy is widely acknowledged to have undergone dramatic shifts, with the government making friendly overtures towards China at the cost of its traditional alliance with the US. From a foreign policy analysis perspective, this paper explicitly focuses on the role of political leadership in guiding national foreign policy. This paper argues that the Duterte government made strategic use of political marketing in promoting its populist foreign policy. Thus, political marketing is used as an analytical lens with which to examine much of the rhetoric and behaviour
of the Duterte government, particularly in regard to its response to the
US–China rivalry. By engaging in this supposedly diplomatic game, the
Duterte government tried to sell its foreign policy promises and outcomes as
products even when its rhetoric was at times disconnected from its actual
performance. Overall, this paper develops an alternative perspective from
which to add to our understanding of the role of populist foreign policy initiatives
in a fragile democratic setting.
... The Philippine policy differed between the Aquino III (2010-2016) and the Duterte (2016-2022) administrations. In contrast to Aquino III's policy of internationalising the issue and attracting other states' attention, especially from the US, Duterte sought to set this aim aside and nurture a softer, more positive image for China (Magcamit, 2020). ...
Most relations among states are asymmetric due to a disparity of capacities. This does not mean the strong can crush the weak at will, as the cost could outweigh the gain. If the weaker side sees an issue as more important than the stronger side, the former is likely to invest more attention into building a more robust will and tougher stance against the pressure at hand. However, China’s South China Sea (SCS) policy and neighbouring states’ responses to it demonstrate another scenario: small states may lose the advantages of heightened attention if the great power shifts its focus onto the same issue, dedicating more political resources to it. This represents a missing piece in the established theory of asymmetric politics. The present article examines pertinent policy adjustments by the Philippines and Vietnam before and after Chinese diplomacy gravitated towards prioritising the SCS from 2014 to 2016, especially after the 2016 Arbitration. I argue that, with the US increasingly presence in the region, China’s attention shift to the SCS reflects Beijing’s decision to put more diplomatic resources and time into forming a consistent strategy to replace its uncoordinated policies out of the inattention, which previously motivated small states to make significant policy adjustments in response. In analysing Philippine and the Vietnamese stances on the South China Sea, I gauge the reasons for the two countries’ policy changes from a proactive stance in internationalising the issue to a low-profile posture as an attempt to mend fences with China after the attention shift. Hence, this study aims to reveal the motives behind small states’ policy adjustments, as well as to expand the explanatory scope of the theory of asymmetric attention.
... Yapılan çalışmalarda güçlü Amerikan karşıtı retoriği nedeniyle, Chavez rejimi bu araştırmalarda başlıca örnek vaka olarak öne çıkmıştır. Popülist partiler diğer bölgelerde iktidara geldikçe, Modi, Orban, Erdoğan ve Duterte gibi ülkelerinin dış politika gündemlerini neredeyse tek başlarına belirleyen diğer liderler de çalışılmaya başlanmıştır Özpek ve Tanrıverdi Yaşar, 2018;Magcamit, 2019). ...
... 6 These binary narratives are embedded in national debates about the Duterte regime's policies such as the bloody anti-illegal drugs campaign, persecution of media critics, decision to place the whole of Mindanao under martial law following the terrorist siege of the city of Marawi, appointment of uniformed personnel to civilian posts, public denunciation of drug suspects without sufficient evidence, and suspension of peace talks with the communist CPP-NPA-NDF. They are also embedded in Duterte's foreign policy preferences, whether in nurturing close ties with (authoritarian) China and Russia in the name of an "independent foreign policy" while "separating" from (liberal) United States and Europe, or in the decision to forgo the South China Sea arbitration (rule of law) in favor of pragmatic cooperation with China, the rising power, through-among other things-BRI cooperation (Magcamit 2020). ...
... On the issue of the West Philippine Sea, Duterte is a realist when it comes to international relations (Magcamit 2019). He understands the position of the country in the Asia-Pacific region. ...
The focus of this study is the radical politics of President Rodrigo Duterte. The leader has clashed with influential businessmen on critical issues. This investigation examines the president's battle against the oligarchy in the country. This research will try show that the rise to power of the first president from Mindanao is a reaction to elite rule. It seeks to reveal that the style of leadership of Duterte is reflective of the historical context that the critics of the president fail to account for. In arguing the case for Duterte's non-conventional approach in overhauling Philippine politics and society, the issues involving some conglomerates in the country are mentioned. In terms of method, the interpretive and analytical approach will be used, citing the available literature and documents to strengthen the article's arguments. The significance of this study has something to do with the idea of good governance. It argues that in the pursuit of a truly democratic society, the foundations of the basic structure must be strengthened. The pragmatic leadership of Duterte is a reflection of the deeper kind of radical change or substantive transformation that is needed to fight elite rule.
... Duterte's at times unpopular at home, but yet effective, foreign policy approach strongly reflects the features of defensive neorealism that leads states to survive in a chaotic system. This survival is based on "self-help" (Magcamit, 2018) and using non-military means to build up relative power with respect to other states. ...
Rodrigo Duterte won the Philippines' 2016 presidential elections thanks to a well-orchestrated campaign and his populist appeal among Filipinos. Soon after he assumed the presidency, he surprised and upset most of his domestic and western international audiences by pragmatically rejecting the pro-Western approach followed by the previous Aquino administration and adopting a China-friendly one. Adopting Critical Discourse Analysis, this research reveals President Duterte's bicephalous leadership: populist in domestic policies, and pragmatic but unpopular in foreign relations. To qualitatively describe the dichotomy between the populist and pragmatic nature of Duterte's leadership, this article surveys the Philippines' mainstream media from 2016 to 2019. Furthermore, this analysis shows that Duterte is using a defensive neorealist approach in building Philippines-China relations and that Filipinos are willing to consider China as a constructive partner for their country.
... What the Duterte Administration opted to do instead is to promote the so-called "independent foreign policy" mentioned in the 2018 National Security Strategy. 4 While it aims to change the direction of Philippine foreign policy, scholars seem to agree that its focus is geared toward China's appeasement (Baviera 2016;Bautista 2016Bautista , 2018de Castro 2016de Castro , 2017Magcamit 2019). For instance, it has been noted that the Duterte administration is willing to sacrifice some of the gains of the previous administration by casting aside the legal victory of the Philippines against China in establishing bilateral relations with Beijing ( de Castro 2016;Bautista 2016Bautista , 2018. ...
Soft power is the use of cultural values to promote and foster better state relations (Nye 2009, 2010). In terms of soft power, one of the leading states possessing great influence in international affairs is the United States, as it remains the only superpower and military juggernaut in current times. Aside from the US, other states such as Japan, South Korea, and China also practice soft power politics in East Asia. The use of soft power by Southeast Asian states has far reaching implications in terms of the receiving countries’ perception and norm formation. The Philippines is one of the recipients of these influences in the region. However, due to its geopolitical position in the Asia Pacific region, it is also in the middle of ongoing rivalry between major and middle powers. Given the perilous situation of the Philippines, it relies on the rules-based international order to promote its interests in the region. While there have been some gains in that aspect, there is also a need for the Philippines to look for other ways to promote its interests in the international arena. One suggestion is for the Philippines to tap into the use of soft power. This essay will explore the possibility of utilizing soft power in Philippine foreign policy. The discussion will focus on the following: First, it will highlight current geopolitical realities the country is facing. It will be followed by a discussion of how power is viewed in existing literature, and how soft power is utilized by states to advance its interests. The paper will then present the need for the Philippines to promote its own soft power in the region. Lastly, the essay will discuss the possible impact of soft power on the country’s foreign policy.
During the Duterte presidency from June 2016 to June 2022, the government of the Philippines limited its affinity with the United States and pursued an ostensibly pro-China policy. This bold move took place amid the ongoing US–China rivalry. This paper carries out a retrospective examination of Duterte's China policy from the perspective of Philippine domestic politics. Specifically, we assess the international relations literature on hedging as a foreign policy strategy and argue that domestic factors play a major role in filtering systemic influences and leaving state leaders with sufficient room for strategic discretion and maneuvering. This is particularly the case with the Philippines, where strong presidentialism gives clout to the president in foreign policy development. We argue that much of the “audacious” behavior in the foreign policy of the Duterte government can simultaneously be understood as pragmatic, as it was believed to better serve the regime's short-term goals. While the alliance with the United States remained largely intact, the Duterte government emphasized its success in stabilizing Sino–Philippine relations.
This article examines why Indonesia’s vision of the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) was not properly developed in accordance to its strategic response to the increased rivalry between China and the USA in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the GMF initially focussed on achieving domestic agendas, Indonesia’s implicit intention is to utilise the GMF as a hedge in order to strengthen economic cooperation with China while keeping the USA engaged in the region’s security architecture. My article seeks to go beyond the existing literature’s employment of primarily structural realist analysis to understand Indonesia’s strategic behaviour by applying a neoclassical realist approach to Indonesia’s case, which better demonstrates current conditions exhibiting how conflicting elite interests generate political discord which in turn hinders the state’s ability to extract and mobilise domestic resources, ultimately hampering Indonesia’s ability to achieve its GMF goals. Although certain threats and opportunities within the international system have manifested themselves to actively encourage the proper implementation of GMF, this strategy remains underdeveloped since the time of its launch. Neoclassical realism provides a better explanation that enhances our understanding of how Indonesia assesses and responds to its strategic environment.
In the wake of North Korea’s progressive missile testing that set even the usually stoic Japanese people into a panic mode, Japan has found itself at the mercy of its former enemies. In an ironic twist of fate, Tokyo’s security outlooks seem to have become hostage to the strategic calculations of its fiercest nemesis in the past. This paper asks whether Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s desire for constitutional change is precipitated mainly by the resurgence of Japanese nationalist sentiments as what many of his critics claim, or if there are genuinely rational justifications for revising the country’s 72-year old Constitution. And if so, why has it been so elusive for many Japanese leaders? Using neoclassical realism theory, I analyze the structural contexts and domestic intervening variables that simultaneously drive and prevent the realization of constitutional change in Japan. I argue that state leaders like Abe and those who have come before him have always been prone to acquiring flawed and inaccurate perceptions of the systemic stimuli; susceptible to making irrational and unsound decisions; and ineffective at mobilizing the national resources demanded by their preferred policies and strategies. Thus, despite having rational justifications, the quest for constitutional change has remained elusive for many Japanese leaders. Success will require Abe to carefully harmonize domestic and international expectations; prudently balance Japan’s benign security intentions and hawkish military strategies; and shift away from his pragmatic–ambivalent style of domestic politics.
This article anchors neoclassical realism (NCR) as a solid theoretical framework which departs from Wendtian constructivism, Moravcsik's liberal theory, and Putnam's two-level game liberalism. NCR moves away from these other approaches by bridging three divides: the spatial (domestic–international), the cognitive (matter-ideas), and the temporal (present–future). What matters is not what states have to do because the structure compels them so (as Waltz and Wendt would want us to believe). Looking at what domestic interest groups want states to do (as Moravcsik and Putnam suggest) is also unsatisfactory. Rather, what can states do to represent domestic economic interests within the predefined geopolitical context? The argument here is that a version of geopolitical structure is external to the state and binds. However, a perceptual layer at the level of state policymaker affects the operationalization of that structure. Domestic economic forces make themselves felt through state-level policymakers, but only within the predefined context of binding structural factors that constrain. The findings from this study are vastly different from previous studies, suggesting that NCR's triple bridging identity distinguishes it from other IR theories.
This paper presents a model of the international behavior of a middle power located in a regional hegemony. Integration of structural realist and game-theoretic paradigms is used to derive hypotheses about the expected behavior of a middle power in a dispute involving the regional hegemon and another middle or small power in the region. Among the attractions of such an approach are that 1) actor preferences are derived parsimoniously, and 2) structural realist hypotheses are formulated in a rigorous and testable fashion. Four hypotheses are developed, each corresponding to different versions of the regional hegemony game. The explanatory power of the model is illustrated by two Latin American cases, chosen because the international relations literature has emphasized the constraints on middle and small powers' ability to disagree with the United States. The cases examine Brazilian and Mexican behavior when the U.S. attempted to pressure a right-wing government (Argentina during World War II) and a left-wing government (Cuba in the 1960s). Shifts in Brazilian and Mexican foreign policy closely correspond with the predictions of the model.
This article provides an overview of diplomatic efforts by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China to reach an agreement on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. The article covers the period from 1992, when ASEAN issued its first statement of concern on the South China Sea, to September 2013 when the two sides commenced formal consultations on the Code of Conduct. The article concludes that the process is likely to be protracted if not interminable.
This book examines small states' security conceptually, theoretically and empirically.
The emerging transition from unipolarity to a more multipolar distribution of global power presents a unique and unappreciated problem that largely explains why, contrary to the expectations of balance of power theory, a counterbalancing reaction to U.S. primacy has not yet taken place. The problem is that, under unipolarity and only unipolarity, balancing is a revisionist, not a status quo, behavior: its purpose is to replace the existing unbalanced unipolar structure with a balance of power system. Thus, any state that seeks to restore a global balance of power will be labeled a revisionist aggressor. To overcome this ideational hurdle to balancing behavior, a rising power must delegitimize the unipole's global authority and order through discursive and cost-imposing practices of resistance that pave the way for the next phase of full-fledged balancing and global contestation. The type of international order that emerges on the other side of the transition out of unipolarity depends on whether the emerging powers assume the role of supporters, spoilers, or shirkers. As the most viable peer competitor to U.S. power, China will play an especially important role in determining the future shape of international politics. At this relatively early stage in its development, however, China does not yet have a fixed blueprint for a new world order. Instead, competing Chinese visions of order map on to various delegitimation strategies and scenarios about how the transition from unipolarity to a restored global balance of power will develop.
This study integrates elements of neorealist and neoliberal theories with a model of institutional balancing that identifies the conditions under which this form of soft balancing occurs. Institutional balancing, i.e. countering pressures or threats through initiating, utilizing, and dominating multilateral institutions, is a new realist strategy for states to pursue security under anarchy. The interplay between the distribution of capabilities and strong economic interdependence shapes states' decisions on when and how to employ this strategy. Historical examples include: inclusive and exclusive efforts by Third World states and the superpowers to organize voting blocs in the UN during the Cold War; inclusive institutional balancing of ASEAN states to constrain China and ensure US support in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) after the Cold War; exclusive institutional balancing of ASEAN states against the US in the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit after the Southeast Asian financial crisis. These examples illustrate the logic of institutional balancing under the conditions of bipolarity, incipient multipolarity, and unipolarity.
International Security 29.2 (2004) 159-201
During the late 1630s, Charles I concentrated his energies on the construction of a new royal palace at Whitehall. Designed in the classical style by John Webb, the new Whitehall was to be the fulfillment of the king's lifelong dream to replace the sprawling and obsolete palace that he had inherited from the Tudors with one that would match the splendor and majesty of the Louvre or the Escorial. Charles I desired nothing else than that his surroundings should reflect the magnificence of his rule: "Here, at last, would be a seat of government appropriate to the system of 'Personal Rule' Charles I had established since dispensing with Parliament in 1629. At least until 1639, it was from here that Charles could expect to govern his realms, resplendent amid Webb's Baroque courtyards and colonnades, during the next decade and beyond."
In making such ambitious plans, Charles I displayed supreme confidence that his regime would not only survive but thrive well into the future. Unfortunately for the king, his reign did not last out the 1630s. If the conventional historical wisdom that "the collapse of Charles I's regime during the 1630s appeared 'inevitable'" is correct, then Charles obviously suffered from self- delusion—an unreality all too characteristic of remote and isolated rulers.
International politics, too, has seen many instances of this type of folly, where threatened countries have failed to recognize a clear and present danger or, more typically, have simply not reacted to it or, more typically still, have responded in paltry and imprudent ways. This behavior, which I call "underbalancing," runs directly contrary to the core prediction of structural realist theory, namely, that threatened states will balance against dangerous accumulations of power by forming alliances or building arms or both. Indeed, even the most cursory glance at the historical record reveals many important cases of underbalancing. Consider, for instance, that none of the great powers except Britain consistently balanced against Napoleonic France, and none emulated its nation-in-arms innovation. Later in the century, Britain watched passively in splendid isolation as the North defeated the South in the American Civil War and as Prussia defeated Austria in 1866, and then France in 1871, establishing German hegemony over Europe. Bismarck then defied balance of power logic by cleverly creating an extensive "hub-and-spoke" alliance system that effectively isolated France and avoided a counterbalancing coalition against Germany. The Franco-Russian alliance of 1893 emerged only after Bismarck's successor, Leo von Caprivi, refused to renew the 1887 Reinsurance Treaty with Russia for domestic political reasons and despite the czar's pleadings to do otherwise. Thus, more than twenty years after the creation of the new German state, a balancing coalition had finally been forged by the dubious decision of the new German chancellor combined with the kaiser's soaring ambitions and truculent diplomacy.
Likewise, during the 1930s, none of the great powers (i.e., Britain, France, the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Japan) balanced with any sense of urgency against Nazi Germany. Instead, they bandwagoned, buck-passed, appeased, or adopted ineffective half measures in response to the growing German threat. A similar reluctance to check unbalanced power characterizes most interstate relations since 1945. With the exception of the U.S.-Soviet bipolar rivalry, a survey of state behavior during the Cold War yields few instances of balancing behavior. As K.J. Holsti asserts: "Alliances, such a common feature of the European diplomatic landscape since the seventeenth century, are notable by their absence in most areas of the Third World. So are balances of power." Holsti further notes: "The search for continental hegemony is rare in the Third World, but was a common feature of European diplomacy under the Habsburgs, Louis XIV, Napoleon, Wilhelmine Germany, Hitler, and Soviet Union and, arguably, the United States." In a continuation of this pattern, no peer competitor has yet emerged more than a decade after the end of U.S.- Soviet bipolarity to balance against the United States. Contrary to realist predictions, unipolarity has not provoked global alarm to restore a balance of power.
If most states inside and outside...
Drawing upon philosophy and social theory, Social Theory of International Politics develops a theory of the international system as a social construction. Alexander Wendt clarifies the central claims of the constructivist approach, presenting a structural and idealist worldview which contrasts with the individualism and materialism which underpins much mainstream international relations theory. He builds a cultural theory of international politics, which takes whether states view each other as enemies, rivals or friends as a fundamental determinant. Wendt characterises these roles as 'cultures of anarchy', described as Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian respectively. These cultures are shared ideas which help shape state interests and capabilities, and generate tendencies in the international system. The book describes four factors which can drive structural change from one culture to another - interdependence, common fate, homogenization, and self-restraint - and examines the effects of capitalism and democracy in the emergence of a Kantian culture in the West.
All academic disciplines periodically appraise their effectiveness, evaluating the progress of previous scholarship and judging which approaches are useful and which are not. Although no field could survive if it did nothing but appraise its progress, occasional appraisals are important and if done well can help advance the field. This book investigates how international relations theorists can better equip themselves to determine the state of scholarly work in their field. It takes as its starting point Imre Lakatos's influential theory of scientific change, and in particular his methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP). It uses MSRP to organize its analysis of major research programs over the last several decades and uses MSRP's criteria for theoretical progress to evaluate these programs. The contributors appraise the progress of institutional theory, varieties of realist and liberal theory, operational code analysis, and other research programs in international relations. Their analyses reveal the strengths and limits of Lakatosian criteria and the need for metatheoretical metrics for evaluating scientific progress.
Neoclassical realism is an important new approach to international relations. Focusing on the interaction of the international system and the internal dynamics of states, neoclassical realism seeks to explain the grand strategies of individual states as opposed to recurrent patterns of international outcomes. This book offers the first systematic survey of the neoclassical realist approach. The editors lead a group of senior and emerging scholars in presenting a variety of neoclassical realist approaches to states' grand strategies. They examine the central role of the 'state' and seek to explain why, how, and under what conditions the internal characteristics of states intervene between their leaders' assessments of international threats and opportunities, and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies those leaders are likely to pursue.
The 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy was written to update the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the EU's overall foreign policy strategy. This article offers a comparative analysis of the two documents through the prism of four 'conceptual pairs': Strategic culture and human security; war on terror and terror as crime; preventive engagement and hedging; and effective multilateralism and normative power. It is argued that the revised strategy is a sign that the EU may be shifting towards an overall strategy of 'hedging' strategy vis-à-vis the great powers. While admirably succeeding in asserting an independent EU approach to foreign and security policy, it does so at the cost of re-submerging the Union's strategic ambition in ambiguity. By adopting a hedging strategy, the EU can be seen as seeking to opt out of the turbulence usually associated with a systemic shift towards multipolarity.
In the age of growing global populism, the continued popularity and relevance of a populist government is anchored on the ability of its populist leader to convince the voters that the primary objective of his foreign policies is to secure the interests of the state and its citizens. However, without an adequate level of state power, pursuing realist foreign policies to improve the state’s relative gains and position in the international system can pose significant risks even for the most influen- tial populist leader. Hence, the question is, how do populist leaders acquire an adequate level of state power to implement realist foreign policies, without ulti- mately losing their political capital and institutional legitimacy in the process? To answer this question, I develop a model that illustrates the three-way linkage between populism, securitization, and realism. I use this model to explain the rationale behind President Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine, as well as its implications for U.S. foreign policy making. I argue that “populist securitization” is a conduit through which populist leaders formulate, execute, and justify their realist foreign policies. Using Trump’s securitization of the U.S. economy as a case study, I reveal how a populist securitization act can trigger the illiberal tendencies and nativist sentiments of the nationalistic voters, which, in turn, allow populist leaders to maintain their popularity and legitimacy among these voters while they experiment with realist foreign policies.
This book examines why and how small powers link their security interests and trade agendas, and how security threats influence the facilitation and outcome of their trade activities. In doing so, it analyses the increasingly complex connections between trade and security, demonstrating how these linkages affect the overall security of four small but important states in East Asia. Focusing on the role of high levels of internal and external insecurities, marginal geo-economic size and peripheral geopolitical position, and multidimensional and multidirectional security contexts and threats, the author concludes that for every security enhancement that a linkage creates a consequent security risk is generated. In other words, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines are effectively trading their security. This innovative book will appeal to political scientists, economists, and security and trade experts.
Neoclassical realism is an important new approach to international relations. Focusing on the interaction of the international system and the internal dynamics of states, neoclassical realism seeks to explain the grand strategies of individual states as opposed to recurrent patterns of international outcomes. This book offers the first systematic survey of the neoclassical realist approach. The editors lead a group of senior and emerging scholars in presenting a variety of neoclassical realist approaches to states' grand strategies. They examine the central role of the 'state' and seek to explain why, how, and under what conditions the internal characteristics of states intervene between their leaders' assessments of international threats and opportunities, and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies those leaders are likely to pursue.
Neorealists, with their focus on the international structure and the relative capabilities of the great powers, have tended to neglect the impact of domestic political forces – such as public opinion, the legislature, and privileged interest groups – on foreign security policy. Recently, however, a new generation of realists has begun to draw upon the comparative political economy literature to account for the impact of domestic political considerations and to introduce the problematique of state autonomy to security studies. As chapter 1 indicates, though, this neoclassical realist literature is still underdeveloped. In particular, it needs to address five critical questions about the role of domestic actors in determining policy: (1) Which domestic actors matter most in the construction of foreign security policy? (2) Under what international circumstances will they have the greatest influence? (3) Under what domestic circumstances will domestic actors have the greatest influence? (4) In what types of states will they matter most? (5) How is their influence likely to manifest itself? In this chapter, I provide preliminary answers to these questions with the goal of building a theory of domestic actors and the national security state, although I do not build such a theory here. Specifically, I explain when domestic political factors affect foreign security policy and which domestic groups and actors matter most.
How do states perceive international threats? Which domestic actors are the most important in threat definition? What happens when domestic actors and interests disagree on the nature of threats? As we state in chapter 1, these are central questions to the neoclassical realist agenda and require a theory of the state to answer. In this chapter I will develop a neoclassical realist theory of threat assessment to fill this gap and illustrate it with reference to the British experience between the two world wars. Neorealist theories are theories of international outcomes. They highlight the role of polarity and international structure, black box the state, and focus on shifts in aggregate military power or threat. Debates include whether bipolar or multipolar distributions of power are more war-prone; whether anarchy encourages states to maximize relative power or security; whether equal or unequal distributions of power contribute to war; and the prevalence of buck-passing or balancing against threats. Proponents of balance of power theory and balance of threat theory would argue that prior to World War I Britain balanced against the rising power (or threat) of Wilhelmine Germany in the form of the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale, the Triple Entente, and the naval arms buildup. Granted, prior to 1914, balancing may not have happened in an optimal fashion. Balance of power theory and balance of threat theory, at least in their current forms, predict a general tendency toward balancing and do not expect an efficient or quick balancing process under all circumstances.
For over sixty years the United States has been the largest economy and most powerful country in the world. However, there is growing speculation that this era of hegemony is under threat as it faces huge trade deficits, a weaker currency, and stretched military resources. America's Global Advantage argues that, despite these difficulties, the US will maintain its privileged position. In this original and important contribution to a central subject in International Relations, Carla Norrlof challenges the prevailing wisdom that other states benefit more from US hegemony than the United States itself. By analyzing America's structural advantages in trade, money, and security, and the ways in which these advantages reinforce one another, Norrlof shows how and why America benefits from being the dominant power in the world. Contrary to predictions of American decline, she argues that American hegemony will endure for the foreseeable future.
Neorealist theory holds that the international system compels states to adopt similar adaptive strategies—namely, balancing and emulation—or risk elimination as independent entities. Yet states do not always emulate the successful practices of the system's leading states in a timely and uniform fashion. Explaining this requires a theory that integrates systemic-level and unit-level variables: a “resource-extraction” model of the state in neoclassical realism. External vulnerability provides incentives for states to emulate the practices of the system's leading states or to counter such practices through innovation. Neoclassical realism, however, suggests that state power—the relative ability of the state to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society—shapes the types of internal balancing strategies that countries are likely to pursue. State power, in turn, is a function of the institutions of the state, as well as of nationalism and ideology. The experiences of six rising or declining great powers over the past three hundred years—China, France, Great Britain, Japan, Prussia (later Germany), and the United States—illustrate the plausibility of these hypotheses.
What turns rich nations into great powers? How do wealthy countries begin extending their influence abroad? These questions are vital to an understanding of the emergence of a new power - a source of instability in international politics. In this text, Fareed Zakaria seeks to answer these questions by examining one of the most puzzling cases of a rising power in modern history - that of the United States. If rich nations routinely become great powers, Zakaria asks, then how do we explain the strange inactivity of the United States in the late 19th century? By 1885, the US was the richest country in the world. And yet, by all military, political and diplomatic measures, it was a minor power. To explain this descrepancy, Zakaria considers a variety of cases between 1865 and 1908 when the US considered expanding its influence in such diverse places as Canada, the Dominican Republic and Iceland. Consistent with the realist theory of international relations, he argues that the President and his administration tried to increase the country's political influence abroad when they saw an increase in the nation's relative economic power. But they frequently had to curtail their plans for expansion, he shows, because they lacked a strong central government that could harness that economic power for the purposes of foreign policy. It was not until late in the century, when power shifted from states to the federal government and from the legislative to the executive branch, that leaders in Washington could mobilize the nation's resources for international influence.
Michael Beckley's article deserves attention for challenging the view that the United States is declining because China is rising. Its ambiguous definition of decline, however, sends the wrong impression about the distribution of economic and military power between the United States and China. Without being explicit, Beckley implies that the United States is not declining because the absolute difference of economic, military, and technological capabilities between the United States and China is growing. In contrast, both theory and history suggest that it is more important that the relative distribution of economic and military capabilities between the United States and China is falling: as I propose below, decline is best defined as a decrease in the ratio of economic and military capabilities between two great powers. As a result, even if the United States maintains a large advantage in absolute capabilities, the fact that U.S. capabilities are decreasing relative to China's means that (1) China will find it easier to advance its interests where U.S. and Chinese goals diverge, while (2) the United States' ability to pursue its own interests in world affairs will be increasingly constrained by Chinese power.
The remainder of this letter proceeds in four sections. First, I challenge Beckley's definition of decline and emphasize the need to analyze the relative distribution of capabilities when assessing the decline phenomenon. Using historical examples, I next demonstrate that the relative distribution of power better captures the ability of states to compete with one another. Subsequently, I show that the United States is declining relative to China across several measures of economic and military power. Finally, I propose that the United States' relative decline suggests a different response to China's rise, namely, U.S. retrenchment.
In his article, Beckley does not define what he means by "decline." He implies, however, that decline occurs when the absolute difference in capabilities between two states falls (pp. 44-55). For example, Beckley states that it is "significant that the average Chinese citizen is more than 37,300 in 1991 to $41,600 in 2011 (in constant 2010 dollars).
Few participants in the decline debate argue that China is likely to overtake the United States across all measures of economic and military power. More representative of mainstream views in the debate is the National Intelligence Council's Global 2025 report, which argues, "Although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the United States' relative strength [. . .] will decline and US leverage will become more constrained." In other words, the policy discussion centers on whether China's growth is making it relatively harder for the United States to pursue its interests without other states opposing its actions—not whether the United States is losing out to China in absolute terms.
Furthermore, for purposes of international relations theory, scholars usually distinguish between decline as an absolute loss of power and decline as a relative loss of capabilities. Many also assume that there is a threshold above which a state is a...
It has become the new truth of our age that the western world we have known is fast losing its pre-eminence to be replaced by a new international system shaped by China and increasingly determined by the economic rise of Asia. This at least is how many economists, historians and students of world politics are now viewing the future of the larger international system. This essay does not dispute some self-evident economic facts nor assume that the world will look the same in 50 years time as it does now. It does, however, question the idea that there is a power shift in the making and that the West and the United States are in steep decline. The world has a long way to go before we begin to live in a ‘post-western’ world.
Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political actors veto power over policy choices. Drawing richly on game theory, he develops a scheme by which governments can thus be classified. He shows why an increase in the number of "veto players," or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo. Policy stability affects a series of other key characteristics of polities, argues the author. For example, it leads to high judicial and bureaucratic independence, as well as high government instability (in parliamentary systems). The propositions derived from the theoretical framework Tsebelis develops in the first part of the book are tested in the second part with various data sets from advanced industrialized countries, as well as analysis of legislation in the European Union. Representing the first consistent and consequential theory of comparative politics, Veto Players will be welcomed by students and scholars as a defining text of the discipline.
Two assumptions dominate current foreign policy debates in the United States and China. First, the United States is in decline relative to China. Second, much of this decline is the result of globalization and the hegemonic burdens the United States bears to sustain globalization. Both of these assumptions are wrong. The United States is not in decline; in fact, it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991. Moreover, globalization and hegemony do not erode U.S. power; they reinforce it. The United States derives competitive advantages from its hegemonic position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit. The United States should therefore continue to prop up the global economy and maintain a robust diplomatic and military presence abroad.
This article explores two starkly contrasting analytic approaches to assessing the performance of U.S. security strategy in East Asia since 1991: a positivesum approach, emphasizing the danger of security dilemmas and spirals of tension, and a zero-sum approach, emphasizing power competition and the long-term dangers posed by China's rise. In the policy world, the differences between these apparently irreconcilable perspectives are not so clear. Certain policiesfor example, maintaining a strong U.S.-Japan allianceflow from either logic. Moreover, each approach sometimes counsels counterintuitive policy prescriptions that are generally associated with the other. Relatively assertive U.S. security postures apparently have furthered positive-sum regional goals by catalyzing China to adopt reassuring policies toward its neighbors as a hedge against potential U.S. encirclement. From a zero-sum perspective, the United States often competes more effectively for regional influence by cooperating with China than it would by seeking to contain China's economic growth and diplomatic influence.
Neoclassical realism is often criticized by non-realists for being an ad hoc and theoretically degenerative effort to explain away anomalies for neorealism. In this paper, I argue instead that neoclassical realism is a logical extension and necessary part of advancing neorealism. Structural realism argues that the system constrains but does not determine state action and where foreign policy departs from what would be ideal behavior given a state's structural position, domestic politics and ideas are generally the cause. This focus on mistakes and maladaptive behavior, seen in such neoclassical realist concepts as over-or under-balancing, is necessary to avoid falling into the trap of merely using domestic politics and ideas to make neorealism more determinate and explain residual variance in foreign policy choice unaccounted for by structure. The article attempts to correct the mistaken presumption that particular paradigms own domestic politics and ideas, asserting instead that each paradigm has access to these variables but must make them their own.
Thomas Christensen's Useful Adversaries provides a new analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were so hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. Employing extensive documentation from the United States and China, it offers a fresh approach to long-debated questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Communists, why the United States aided Chiang Kai-shek's KMT on Taiwan, why the Korean War escalated into a Sino-American conflict, and why Mao shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, thus sparking a major crisis with the United States.
Although international relations theory has been dominated for two
decades by debates over theories of international politics, recently
there has been a surge of interest in theories of foreign policy.
These seek to explain, not the pattern of outcomes of state
interactions, but rather the behavior of individual states. The author
surveys three prominent theories of foreign policy and shows how
the works under review set out a compelling alternative, one that
updates and systematizes insights drawn from classical realist
thought. Neoclassical realism argues that the scope and ambition
of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the
country's relative material power. Yet it contends that the impact of
power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex,
because systemic pressures must be translated through
intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers'
perceptions and state structure. Understanding the links between
power and policy thus requires close examination of both the
international and the domestic contexts within which foreign policy
is formulated and implemented.