Is Disgust a “Conservative” Emotion?

Abstract

Extant political–psychological research has identified stable, context-independent differences between conservatives and liberals in a wide range of preferences and psychological processes. One consistent finding is that conservatives show higher disgust sensitivity than liberals. This finding, however, is predominantly based on assessments of disgust to specific elicitors, which confound individuals’ sensitivity and propensity to the experience of disgust with the extent to which they find specific elicitors disgusting. Across five studies, we vary specific elicitors of disgust, showing that the relations between political orientation and disgust sensitivity depend on the specific set of elicitors used. We also show that disgust sensitivity is not associated with political orientation when measured with an elicitor-unspecific scale. Taken together, our findings suggest that the differences between conservatives and liberals in disgust sensitivity are context dependent rather than a stable personality difference. Broader theoretical implications are discussed.

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https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167219880191
Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin
1 –17
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and Social Psychology, Inc
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DOI: 10.1177/0146167219880191
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Empirical Research Paper
Extant research suggests that political conservatives and lib-
erals differ not only in their ideological preferences but also
in various psychological dispositions and processes (e.g.,
Duckitt, 2001; Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014; Jost, Glaser,
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). One consistent finding is
that conservatives are more disgust sensitive than liberals
(Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Terrizzi, Shook, &
McDaniel, 2013). This finding is thought to underlie conser-
vatives’ relatively higher ethnocentrism (Navarrete &
Fessler, 2006), prejudice toward out-groups (e.g., Schaller,
2006), and voting preferences (Shook, Oosterhoff, Terrizzi,
& Brady, 2017).
However, conceptual and theoretical uncertainties remain
as it is not clear what “disgust sensitivity” actually describes
(e.g., Olatunji, Cisler, Deacon, Connolly, & Lohr, 2007; van
Overveld, de Jong, Peters, Cavanagh, & Davey, 2006). Are
conservatives more intensely disgusted than liberals by all
stimuli/elicitors? Are they disgusted by a wider range of
stimuli compared with liberals? Do they experience disgust
as more unpleasant than liberals?
Most studies investigating the conservatism–disgust asso-
ciation examine the intensity of disgust reactions toward par-
ticular stimuli (e.g., Ahn et al., 2014; Haidt, McCauley, &
Rozin, 1994; Olatunji, Williams, et al., 2007; Oosterhoff,
Shook, & Ford, 2018; Shook, Ford, & Boggs, 2017; Shook,
Oosterhoff, et al., 2017; Shook, Terrizzi, Clay, & Oosterhoff,
2015; Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, & Hibbing, 2011;
Terrizzi et al., 2013). In doing so, these studies confound the
propensity/sensitivity to the experience of disgust with the
extent to which individuals find particular stimuli disgusting
(e.g., van Overveld et al., 2006). It is, therefore, unclear
whether conservatives are more disgusted than liberals by
the specific stimuli examined, or generally differ in the inten-
sity, or unpleasantness, of the experience of disgust.
Moreover, the content of the specific disgust elicitors
used in such studies may in itself produce overly generalized
conclusions regarding the existence and direction of the rela-
tion between disgust sensitivity and conservatism. The dis-
gust elicitors used in past research were mostly limited to
specific elicitors within specific disgust domains (e.g., core
disgust, animal reminders). Although these findings con-
vincingly demonstrate the conservatism–disgust relation
regarding specific elicitors, they do not allow for more gen-
eralized conclusions of context-independent differences
between conservatives and liberals in disgust sensitivity.
The current project proposes that a cleaner examination of
the conservatism–disgust association requires (a) a systematic
variation in the stimuli used to measure disgust sensitivity and
880191PSPXXX10.1177/0146167219880191Personality and Social Psychology BulletinElad-Strenger et al.
research-article2019
1Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
2Friedrich-Schiller University Jena, Germany
*J.T. and J.E-S. share first authorship on this article.
Corresponding Author:
Julia Elad-Strenger, Department of Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University,
Ramat Gan 5290002, Israel.
Email: eladstj@biu.ac.il
Is Disgust a “Conservative” Emotion?
Julia Elad-Strenger1* , Jutta Proch2*, and Thomas Kessler2
Abstract
Extant political–psychological research has identified stable, context-independent differences between conservatives and
liberals in a wide range of preferences and psychological processes. One consistent finding is that conservatives show higher
disgust sensitivity than liberals. This finding, however, is predominantly based on assessments of disgust to specific elicitors,
which confound individuals’ sensitivity and propensity to the experience of disgust with the extent to which they find specific
elicitors disgusting. Across five studies, we vary specific elicitors of disgust, showing that the relations between political
orientation and disgust sensitivity depend on the specific set of elicitors used. We also show that disgust sensitivity is not
associated with political orientation when measured with an elicitor-unspecific scale. Taken together, our findings suggest
that the differences between conservatives and liberals in disgust sensitivity are context dependent rather than a stable
personality difference. Broader theoretical implications are discussed.
Keywords
disgust, conservatism, liberalism, social norms
Received September 18, 2018; revision accepted September 4, 2019

2 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
(b) a clearer distinction between general sensitivity to the
experience of disgust and disgust reactions to specific stimuli.
In five studies, we replicate previous findings suggesting that
disgust sensitivity can be positively associated with conserva-
tism, but show that it can also be negatively associated with
conservatism or even unrelated to political orientation. This
depends on whether disgust sensitivity is measured using elic-
itor-specific or elicitor-unspecific scales, and on the content of
the chosen elicitors. Taken together, our findings demonstrate
that the relation between political orientation and disgust sen-
sitivity is context dependent, rather than reflecting general dif-
ferences between liberals and conservatives.
Disgust Sensitivity and Political
Orientation
Disgust is an evolved, cross-cultural human emotion, which
involves the subjective feeling of revulsion and thoughts of
potential contamination, as well as physiological, expres-
sive, and behavioral reactions of avoiding or removing
potentially contaminating entities (Darwin, 1872; Rozin,
Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). Although disgust is rooted in
evolution, it was also conceptualized as representing a more
complex notion of “offensiveness,” extending to concerns
about purity of the human body and soul (e.g., reminders of
humans’ animalistic nature) and to concerns about the purity
of society (e.g., societal transgressions; Haidt et al., 1994;
Haidt, Rozin, Mccauley, & Imada, 1997; Miller, 2004; Rozin
& Fallon, 1987; Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009;
Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban, & DeScioli, 2013). Although
there is some debate on whether social transgressions evoke
disgust per se (e.g., Bloom, 2004), brain and behavioral
research suggests that disgust is triggered by violations of
social norms alongside threats of pollution and body con-
tamination (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009;
Marzillier & Davey, 2004; Moll et al., 2005; Schaich Borg,
Lieberman, & Kiehl, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005).
In the past decade, research has shown positive relations
between conservatism and disgust responses to various types
of disgust elicitors (e.g., Ahn et al., 2014; Inbar et al., 2009;
Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012; Oosterhoff et al., 2018;
Smith et al., 2011; Tybur et al., 2016; Tybur, Inbar, Güler, &
Molho, 2015; see Terrizzi et al., 2013, for a meta-analysis).
Explanations for this association are based on two different
lines of research. Moral foundations theory (MFT; Graham,
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) suggests that conservatives are more
concerned with “purity”-related moral violations than liber-
als (e.g., Graham et al., 2009), which supposedly underlies
their relatively higher disgust sensitivity (e.g., Inbar et al.,
2009). According to the behavioral immune system (BIS) lit-
erature (Schaller & Duncan, 2007), disgust has evolved to
facilitate the detection and avoidance of pathogens before
they can enter the body (Terrizzi et al., 2013). To minimize
the risk of contamination or infection, the BIS is character-
ized by hypersensitivity and overgeneralization toward
potential risk (Schaller & Duncan, 2007). Individuals with
an active BIS tend to adopt more conservative worldviews,
as an evolutionary disease-avoidance strategy.
Disgust Sensitivity and Political
Orientation: Reasons for Skepticism
Closer inspection of these studies’ methodology raises some
skepticism regarding the generalizability of the observed
conservatism–disgust correlations and to the conclusions
drawn from these findings. What are the possible interpreta-
tions of these seemingly consistent findings demonstrating
higher levels of disgust among conservatives?
One interpretation is that conservatives have generally
higher sensitivity and propensity to the experience of dis-
gust. This interpretation has not been properly empirically
examined, because disgust sensitivity was primarily mea-
sured with regard to specific elicitors. The experience of dis-
gust toward a certain stimulus consists of two components
(Olatunji, Williams, et al., 2007): the properties of the spe-
cific stimulus (whether one finds it disgusting, a “state” dis-
gust component with regard to a specific stimulus) and one’s
tendency to find disgusting experiences unpleasant or
intense, over and above specific elicitors (general disgust
propensity and sensitivity, a “trait” component). A similar
argument has been made with regard to the experience of
fear, which includes both fear toward the particular stimulus
and the individual’s tendency to find the experience of fear
distressing (Reiss & McNally, 1985). Responses to elicitor-
specific disgust measures, thus, reflect both “trait” and
“state” disgust, making it unclear whether the observed cor-
relations reflect conservatives’ general tendency to be dis-
gust sensitive or to respond strongly to particular disgust
elicitors (Olatunji, Williams, et al., 2007). Because the “trait”
component cannot be isolated from the “state” component in
elicitor-specific disgust measures, one cannot conclude of a
general (trait) difference, extending beyond the elicitors
examined in a particular study. To summarize, whereas
responses to elicitor-specific disgust measures are affected
by general disgust sensitivity as well as elicitor-specific
properties, elicitor-unspecific disgust measures (e.g., the
Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale–Revised [DPSS-R];
Olatunji, Cisler, et al., 2007) include only a general disgust
component. Therefore, to properly show that conservatives
are generally more disgust sensitive over and above the con-
tent of the stimulus, one should examine the association
between political orientation and elicitor-unspecific, rather
than elicitor-specific, disgust sensitivity.
Shook, Oosterhoff, et al. (2017) examined the relations
between conservatism and the propensity and sensitivity
toward the emotional reaction of disgust, independent of any
specific elicitor, reporting relatively low correlations between
social conservatism and disgust propensity/sensitivity (r =
.13-.14). However, this study did not examine whether this
correlation persists when controlling for elicitor-specific

Elad-Strenger et al. 3
disgust, as the elicitor-specific and elicitor-unspecific scales
were used as a composite measure. As disgust experiences
toward specific stimuli are based on the properties of the
stimuli and the general sensitivity to the experience of dis-
gust, elicitor-specific measures share a significant amount of
variance with the elicitor-unspecific measure.
Another possible interpretation is that conservatives are
more disgusted than liberals by all disgust elicitors, which
can be easily disconfirmed by identifying stimuli by which
liberals are more disgusted than conservatives. Physiological
and behavioral research demonstrating a positive relation
between conservatism and disgust responses focused primar-
ily on the contamination/core domains (e.g., mutilated body
parts, dog feces; Ahn et al., 2014; Oosterhoff et al., 2018;
Smith et al., 2011). These findings convincingly demonstrate
a positive correlation between conservatism and disgust
toward specific elicitors within these domains, but the ques-
tion remains whether it extends to other elicitors or domains.
Other studies used self-report disgust measures which
cover a wider range of disgust domains (Crawford, Inbar, &
Maloney, 2014; Inbar et al., 2009; Inbar et al., 2012; Terrizzi
et al., 2013; Tybur et al., 2016; Tybur et al., 2015). One
example is the Three-Domain Disgust Scale (TDDS; Tybur
et al., 2009), which measures disgust on the pathogen, moral,
and sexual domains. This scale produced mixed findings
regarding the relations between pathogen disgust and conser-
vatism (e.g., Shook, Ford, & Boggs, 2017; Shook et al., 2015
and Tybur et al., 2016 vs. Tybur, Merriman, Hooper,
McDonald, & Navarrete, 2010). In fact, in one study, this
relation was fully mediated by sexual disgust (Tybur, Inbar,
Güler, & Molho, 2015). Authors explain that pathogen avoid-
ance leads to more monogamous (vs. promiscuous) mating
strategies that steer individuals to adopt socially conserva-
tive ideologies to support their reproductive interests.
Openness to norm violations in the sexual domain is, how-
ever, strongly confounded with political ideology, as uncon-
ventional sexual practices are considered a conservative
norm violation (e.g., Wilson, 1973). Thus, measuring disgust
sensitivity to sexual norm violations confounds disgust sen-
sitivity with political ideology, although sexual disgust elici-
tors are not explicitly political.
Such elicitors (e.g., homosexuality) were also included in
the frequently used 32-item Disgust Scale (DS; Haidt et al.,
1994). Acknowledging this potential political bias, some
studies (e.g., Inbar et al., 2009) demonstrated that the posi-
tive correlation between disgust sensitivity and conservatism
remained even after removing these items (see also the
25-item revised version of the DS [DS-R]; Olatunji, Williams,
et al., 2007). However, if one constructs a disgust sensitivity
scale using politically loaded items (e.g., homosexuality) as
“criteria” (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955), it is likely that other
items on the scale share common variance with these politi-
cally biased items. In such cases, the disgust–conservatism
correlations will remain even if one would delete the “crite-
ria” items from the scale (Olatunji, Williams, et al., 2007),
and even if other elicitors included in the scale do not corre-
late with conservatism.
A more rigorous examination of the association between
elicitor-specific disgust sensitivity and conservatism must
therefore be based on a broader range of stimuli. Furthermore,
if indeed social conservatism helps promote disease avoid-
ance by maintaining group norms and traditions (Terrizzi
et al., 2013; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014), this relation should
also be demonstrated with regard to norm violations that are
not associated with conservatism, and particularly to those
associated with liberalism. One may argue, of course, that
counterexamples in which conservatism is unrelated or nega-
tively related to disgust reactions are merely exceptions to
the rule, which, in fact, prove the rule. Indeed, single exam-
ples of liberals being more disgusted by specific stimuli
hardly disprove a general tendency. However, evidence for a
systematic reverse correlational pattern between political
orientation and disgust sensitivity indeed disproves such
general assumptions by indicating that the direction of this
association is elicitor dependent, rather than general.
However, no studies have been conducted yet to examine
this hypothesis.
The Present Research
The present research examines the hypothesis that the mea-
sures used to assess disgust sensitivity affect the observed
association between disgust and political orientation. Across
five studies, we examined whether liberals’ and conserva-
tives’ experience of disgust is independent or dependent on
the nature of the disgust elicitors chosen to measure disgust
sensitivity. In Studies 1 to 4, we also examined whether con-
servatism and disgust sensitivity are related once disgust
sensitivity is measured independent of specific elicitors.
Studies 1 and 2
Studies 1 and 2 tested two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Disgust sensitivity and political orienta-
tion will not be correlated when disgust sensitivity is mea-
sured independent of specific elicitors, using a scale
assessing the general propensity and sensitivity to the
experience of disgust.
Hypothesis 2: Conservatism can be either positively or
negatively correlated with disgust toward specific elici-
tors, depending on the content of these elicitors.
To examine the second hypothesis, we created two sets of
disgust elicitors. The first set included elicitors, which poten-
tially trigger stronger disgust in liberals (e.g., environmental
pollution, animal abuse, tax evasion, nationalistic symbols).
As this was based on our intuitions, this set of “liberal”-dis-
gust elicitors was pilot tested in Study 1 among students, and
used in Study 2 with a more diverse sample. Study 2

4 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
examined participants’ disgust reactions to a second set of
elicitors, which was hypothesized to evoke stronger disgust
reactions among conservatives (e.g., drug use, homeless peo-
ple, homosexuality). Conservatism was hypothesized to cor-
relate positively with disgust toward “conservative”-disgust
elicitors and negatively with disgust toward “liberal”-disgust
elicitors.
To isolate the unique relations between political orienta-
tion and the distinct emotion of disgust, we controlled for
participants’ anger responses, as anger is often highly corre-
lated with disgust (Chapman et al., 2009; Russell & Giner-
Sorolla, 2013; Simpson, Carter, Anthony, & Overton, 2006;
Tybur et al., 2009). Despite these correlations, individuals
are able to make clear distinctions between anger and disgust
(e.g., Hutcherson & Gross, 2011).
Method
Participants. Study 1 was conducted among 112 German psy-
chology students, in exchange for course credit: 83% female,
Mage = 22.06 years (SD = 2.53 years), 55% leftists, 33%
centrists, 12% rightists.1
Study 2 aimed to replicate the findings of Study 1 with a
more politically diverse sample, using a snowball online
sample of students from disciplines outside psychology. Our
sample included 118 participants: 39% female, Mage = 22.81
years (SD = 2.78 years), 36.6% leftists, 31.5% centrists,
32% rightists. Ninety-two percent of the participants from
Study 2 were students, most of them studying economics,
business administration, or engineering (79%).
Power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner,
& Lang, 2009) indicated that sample sizes were sufficient for
detecting a medium-sized effect (0.5) in a dependent sample
t test (N = 34), a medium-sized effect (0.3) in a bivariate
normal model (N = 84), and a medium-sized effect in mul-
tiple regression (N = 55) based on standard alpha (.05) and
power (80%). The same analysis was used to determine sam-
ple sizes in subsequent studies.
Procedure and materials. In Study 1, participants rated their
disgust and anger responses to various disgust-eliciting sce-
narios, completed an elicitor-unspecific disgust sensitivity
scale, and rated their political orientation. In Study 2, the
disgust-eliciting scenarios and the elicitor-unspecific disgust
scale were counterbalanced (see Supplemental Appendix for
all items).
Reactions to disgust-eliciting scenarios. Two sets of disgust
elicitors were used: “liberal”-disgust elicitors were used in
Studies 1 and 2 and “conservative”-disgust elicitors were
used in Study 2 only.
Thirteen “liberal”-disgust elicitors were used in Study 1,
referring to topics such as tax evasion, environmental pollu-
tion, animal abuse, xenophobia, racism, and capitalism (e.g.,
“During the last ten years a large industrial company has
evaded taxes to the tune of millions”). Based on the findings
of Study 1, nine of these scenarios were used in Study 2. In
Study 2, participants also read nine “conservative”-disgust
elicitors, referring to homosexuality, consuming illegal
drugs, disturbing a church service, or a homeless person beg-
ging for money (e.g., “A person has sex with same-sex part-
ners”). Items from both sets of elicitors were presented in
random order. In addition, we included “control” (nondis-
gusting) scenarios (two items in Study 1 and four items in
Study 2; e.g., “A person donates a large amount of money to
Doctors without Borders”). These items were used as a com-
parison standard for the liberal/conservative disgust items.
a. Disgust toward each scenario was measured using
two items (“I feel disgusted” and “It disgusts me”;
State Disgust Scale; Ihme & Mitte, 2009), rated on a
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (strongly). Both
items were moderately to highly correlated for all
scenarios (.62 < rs < .89 in Study 1, .57 < rs < .92
in Study 2) and were averaged for each scenario.
Composite disgust scores were computed for all
“liberal”-disgust scenarios (α = .88 for Study 1, α =
.82 for Study 2), for all “conservative”-disgust sce-
narios (α = .75 for Study 2), and for all control sce-
narios (r = .75 for Study 1, α = .75 for Study 2).2
b. Anger at each scenario was measured using two items
(“I am angry” and “It enrages me”), rated on a scale
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (strongly). Both items
were highly correlated for all scenarios (.78 < rs <
.91 in Study 1, .70 < rs < .97 in Study 2) and were
averaged for each scenario. Composite anger scores
were computed for all “liberal”-disgust scenarios (α
= .86 for Study 1, α = .78 for Study 2), “conservative”-
disgust scenarios (α = .71 for Study 2), and control
scenarios (r = .72 for Study 1, α = .75 for Study 2).
Elicitor-unspecific disgust sensitivity was measured using
the German translation of the 16-item DPSS-R (Olatunji,
Cisler, et al., 2007). This scale measures propensity and sen-
sitivity to the experience of disgust independent of specific
elicitors (e.g., “I avoid disgusting things” and “I am easily
disgusted”). Participants rated each item on a scale ranging
from 1 (never) to 5 (always), such that higher scores indicate
higher disgust sensitivity (α = .82 for Study 1, α = .79 for
Study 2).3
Political orientation was assessed using two measures:
(a) an ideological self-placement item ranging from 1 (politi-
cal left) to 7 (political right) and (b) as the BIS should only
be correlated with social (but not economic) conservatism
(Terrizzi et al., 2013), we also used the German version of
the 24-item Wilson–Patterson Conservatism Scale (Schiebel,
Riemann, & Mummendey, 1984; Wilson & Patterson, 1968),
which assesses different facets of social conservatism. Each
item represents a certain topic (e.g., “abortion,” “lifelong
marriage”), which participants rated on a scale ranging from

Elad-Strenger et al. 5
1 (total disapproval) to 5 (total approval). Some items were
reverse-coded, such that higher scores indicate higher con-
servatism (α = .81 for Study 1, α = .78 for Study 2).
In both studies, the two measures were strongly and posi-
tively correlated (Study 1: r = .64, p < .001; Study 2: r =
.48, p < .001), indicating that leftists in our samples are rela-
tively liberal and rightists relatively conservative. Therefore,
we calculated a mean “political orientation” score (based on
standardized scores) to be used in subsequent analyses, with
higher scores representing more conservative/rightist
orientation.
Results
Preliminary analyses. Table 1 (Study 1) and Table 2 (Study 2)
show means, standard deviations, and zero-order correla-
tions. Disgust toward “liberal”-disgust scenarios and disgust
toward “conservative”-disgust scenarios were positively cor-
related (r = .33, p < .001; Table 2). DPSS-R was positively
correlated with disgust toward “liberal”-disgust scenarios
(r = .22, p = .020 in Study 1; r = .17, p = .070 in Study 2)
and disgust toward “conservative”-disgust scenarios (r =
.21, p = .020 in Study 2), suggesting that elicitor-unspecific
disgust sensitivity is related to higher ratings of disgust
toward specific elicitors, regardless of their content. Finally,
as expected, anger and disgust toward “liberal”-disgust and
“conservative”-disgust scenarios were highly correlated in
both studies (r > .70).
Paired samples t tests revealed significantly stronger dis-
gust to “liberal”-disgust elicitors compared with control sce-
narios (Study 1: t(111) = 36.18, p < .001, 95% confidence
interval [CI] of difference = [1.54, 2.06]; Study 2: t(117) =
26.53, p < .001, 95% CI of difference = [1.33, 1.54]), and
significantly stronger disgust to “conservative”-disgust elic-
itors compared with control scenarios (Study 2: t(117) =
19.61, p < .001, 95% CI of difference = [0.85, 1.04]).4
Disgust toward the control scenarios did not correlate with
political orientation in both studies. These findings suggest
that the “liberal”-disgust and “conservative”-disgust sce-
narios seemed to work well as elicitors of disgust.5 A paired
t test also revealed that in Study 2, disgust toward liberal
elicitors was significantly higher than disgust toward con-
servative elicitors (t(117) = 8.73, p < .001, 95% CI of dif-
ference = [0.38, 0.60]). However, this main effect was
qualified by opposite correlations between political ideol-
ogy and disgust toward each set of elicitors, as will be dis-
cussed below.
Hypotheses testing. As hypothesized, political orientation was
negatively correlated with disgust toward “liberal”-disgust
elicitors in Studies 1 and 2 (rs > −.41, ps < .001), such that
the more conservative participants were, the lower their dis-
gust was to these elicitors. In contrast, political orientation
was positively correlated with disgust toward “conservative”-
disgust elicitors in Study 2 (r = .41, p < .001), indicating that
the more conservative participants were, the higher their dis-
gust was to these elicitors. As hypothesized, political orienta-
tion showed no significant correlation with DPSS-R in both
studies (see Tables 1 and 2).6
Finally, we conducted multiple regression analyses to test
whether DPSS-R, disgust toward “liberal”-disgust scenarios,
and disgust toward “conservative”-disgust scenarios predict
political orientation, controlling for anger at both sets of sce-
narios (see Table 3). As expected, disgust toward “liberal”-
disgust elicitors negatively predicted political orientation
(Studies 1 and 2), whereas disgust toward “conservative”-
disgust elicitors positively predicted political orientation
(Study 2), controlling for elicitor-unspecific disgust and
anger toward both sets of scenarios. In both studies, DPSS-R
did not significantly predict political orientation when all
other predictors were controlled for.7
We then collapsed the “liberal”- and “conservative”-dis-
gust elicitors used in Study 2 to create one disgust sensitivity
scale (α = .80) and one anger scale (α = .74). The combined
disgust scale was not correlated with political orientation
(r = .02, p = .833). A multiple regression analysis revealed
that neither the combined disgust scale (b = 0.32, SE = 0.27,
β = .16, t = 1.19, p = .238) nor the combined anger scale
(b = −0.48, SE = 0.30, β = −.21, t = −1.61, p = .109), or
DPSS-R (b = 0.10, SE = 0.17, β = .05, t = 0.570, p =
.570), predicted political orientation when all predictors
were included.
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations Between the Study Variables (Study 1).
M (SD)123456
1. DPSS-R 2.69 (0.51) 1
2. Disgust toward liberal scenarios 3.01 (0.51) .22* 1
3. Disgust toward control (nondisgusting)
scenarios
1.06 (0.16) −.18 −.26** 1
4. Anger at liberal scenarios 3.01 (0.51) .20* .80** −.26** 1
5. Anger at control (nondisgusting) scenarios 1.02 (0.12) −.19* −.13 .69*** −.21* 1
6. Political orientation 0.01 (0.92) −.00 −.60*** .02 −.57*** −.08 1
Note. DPSS-R = Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale–Revised.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

6 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
Discussion
Two studies assessed disgust sensitivity toward various elici-
tors and independent of any specific elicitor (i.e., DPSS-R).
Consistent with our first hypothesis, elicitor-unspecific dis-
gust sensitivity was not significantly correlated with political
orientation in either of the two studies. Consistent with our
second hypothesis, conservatism and disgust correlated posi-
tively when using one set of elicitors (e.g., homosexuals,
drug abuse) and negatively when using another set of elici-
tors (e.g., animal abuse, environmental pollution). When
these disgust elicitors were collapsed into one disgust sensi-
tivity scale, no significant correlation emerged. Finally, we
found that disgust toward the two sets of elicitors had unique
and opposite effects on political orientation, even when con-
trolling for anger toward these elicitors and for elicitor-
unspecific disgust sensitivity. Taken together, these results
challenge the notion that conservatives are generally more
disgust sensitive than liberals. Instead, the conservatism–
disgust association can be either positive or negative, or non-
significant, depending on the nature of the disgust sensitivity
scale used and the specific content of disgust elicitors.
One may argue that these results were obtained because
the scenarios we constructed evoked moral disgust rather
than core disgust. Insofar as these scenarios represent vio-
lations of societal norms associated with liberalism or con-
servatism, one may argue, they are politically biased in
nature and, thus, do not reflect the relations between ideol-
ogy and disgust per se. We certainly agree that some of
these items may be seen as norm violations, but argue that
they are seen as such precisely because they represent the
disgust elicitors that serve as the basis on which such moral
norms are created. In line with the BIS literature (Terrizzi
et al., 2013; Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2010), we argue that
disgust sensitivity facilitates the adoption of norms that
promote avoidance of exposure or contact with the disgust
eliciting stimuli. Disgust sensitivity thus influences ideo-
logical preferences precisely because it renders certain acts
or stimuli as socially and morally unacceptable. Hence,
even core-disgust elicitors transfer into the moral domain
via the norms they create. Although some core-disgust elic-
itors (e.g., maggots) may not seem to bear ideological con-
tent, we can never know for certain that individuals’ disgust
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations Between the Study Variables (Study 2).
M (SD)12345678
1. DPSS-R 2.42 (0.47) 1
2. Disgust toward liberal scenarios 2.50 (0.53) .17 1
3. Disgust toward conservative
scenarios
2.01 (0.52) .21* .33*** 1
4. Disgust toward control
(nondisgusting) scenarios
1.07 (0.20) .17 .01 .17 1
5. Anger at liberal scenarios 2.71 (0.52) .06 .70*** .09 −.01 1
6. Anger at conservative scenarios 1.94 (0.46) .19* .13 .79*** .11 .15 1
7. Anger to control (nondisgusting)
scenarios
1.04 (0.14) .04 .05 .11 .66*** .05 .03 1
8. Political orientation 0.00 (0.86) .06 −.41*** .38*** .13 −.47*** .41*** .03 1
Note. DPSS-R = Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale–Revised.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 3. Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Political Orientation (Studies 1 and 2).
Study 1 (R² = .40) Study 2 (R² = .50)
b SD βt p value 95% CI b SD βt p value 95% CI
DPSS-R 0.26 0.14 .14 1.87 .064 [–0.02, 0.53] 0.04 0.13 .02 0.33 .743 [–0.21, 0.29]
Anger at liberal
scenarios
−0.40 0.22 −.27 −2.18 .032 [0.04, 0.93] −0.48 0.18 −.29 −2.67 .009 [–0.83, –0.12]
Disgust toward liberal
scenarios
−0.75 0.22 −.41 −3.32 .001 [0.30, 1.19] −0.51 0.18 −.33 −2.77 .007 [–0.87, –0.14]
Anger at conservative
scenarios
— 0.51 0.23 .28 2.23 .028 [0.05, 0.94]
Disgust toward
conservative scenarios
— 0.50 0.22 .30 2.22 .028 [0.06, 0.97]
Note. Anger to and disgust toward conservative scenarios were only measured in Study 2. DPSS-R = Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale–Revised;
CI = confidence interval.

Elad-Strenger et al. 7
reaction to such elicitors are not tainted by political opin-
ions, as these disgust elicitors are so intrinsically related to
preexisting ideologically related social norms. Therefore,
just as conservative value systems function as a means to
avoid certain disgust elicitors (e.g., bodily contamination)
by encouraging adherence to certain social norms (e.g., out-
group avoidance; Terrizzi et al., 2013), liberal value sys-
tems may help protect against other elicitors (e.g.,
environmental pollution, animal husbandry) by promoting
a different set of norms (e.g., environmental and animal
protection).
Study 3
Study 3 aimed to replicate the findings of Studies 1 and 2
using additional elicitor-specific disgust measures that do
not include explicit socio-moral content. Again, we hypoth-
esized that conservatism will be either positively related,
negatively related, or unrelated to disgust sensitivity depend-
ing on the nature and content of the disgust sensitivity mea-
sure used, rather than showing a general systematic positive
correlation.
Extending Studies 1 and 2, this study included the German
version of the Haidt et al. (1994) Disgust Scale and the
Pathogen Disgust subscale of the Three-Domain Disgust
Scale (TDDS-P; Tybur et al., 2009). We examined the cor-
relation between conservatism and total disgust scores on
these scales, and also conducted item-by-item analyses to
examine whether these correlations apply to all elicitors
included in these scales, or rather limited to specific
elicitors.
Method
Participants. Study 3 was conducted among 190 German stu-
dents: 60% female, Mage = 23 years (SD = 4.6 years), 71%
leftists, 19% centrists, and 10% rightists.
Procedure and materials. Participants completed the disgust
sensitivity scales (in random order), followed by measures of
political orientation (see Supplemental Appendix for all
items).
Reactions to disgust-eliciting scenarios. Participants read
eight “liberal”-disgust scenarios, eight “conservative”-dis-
gust scenarios, and one control scenario, taken from Studies
1 and 2.8 Participants rated their disgust (two items; .55 <
rs < .89) and anger (two items; .73 < rs < .89) toward these
scenarios. Composite disgust scores and composite anger
scores were computed for all “liberal”-disgust scenarios
(disgust: α = .76, anger: α = .81) and for all “conservative”-
disgust scenarios (disgust: α = .67, anger: α = .64).
Elicitor-unspecific disgust sensitivity was measured using
the German version of the 16-item DPSS-R (Olatunji, Cisler,
et al., 2007; α = .84), as in Studies 1 and 2.
The German version of the Disgust Scale (Schienle,
Dietmaier, Leutgeb, & Ille, 2010) includes 37 items measur-
ing core (i.e., body products, food) and animal reminder (i.e.,
death, envelope violations) disgust (e.g., “you see a person
not washing their hands after visiting the toilet”), rated on a
1 (not at all disgusting) to 5 (very disgusting) scale (α =
.93).9
Pathogen disgust was assessed using the Pathogen sub-
scale of the TDDS (TDDS-P; Tybur et al., 2009), which
includes seven disgust elicitors (e.g., “standing close to a
person who has body odor”) rated on a 1 (not at all disgust-
ing) to 5 (very disgusting) scale (α = .73).
Political orientation was assessed using the conservatism
scale (α = .82) and ideological self-placement used in
Studies 1 and 2 (r = .61, p < .001). A mean “political orien-
tation” score was calculated with higher scores representing
conservative/rightist orientations (α = .85).
Results
Preliminary analyses. Table 4 shows means, standard devia-
tions, and zero-order correlations. Consistent with Studies 1
and 2, disgust toward “liberal”-disgust and disgust toward
“conservative”-disgust scenarios were marginally positively
correlated, and both were positively correlated with DPSS-
R. In addition, the DS and the TDDS-P were highly posi-
tively correlated (r = .79, p < .001) and both were correlated
with the DPSS-R scale (rs ≥ .51, ps < .001), with disgust
toward “conservative” scenarios (rs ≥ .39, ps < .001), and
more weakly with disgust toward “liberal” scenarios (.10≤
rs ≤ .17, ps ≥ .021).
As in Study 2, paired samples t tests revealed that partici-
pants reported higher disgust to “liberal”-disgust scenarios
compared with the control scenario, t(189) = 53.81, p <
.001, 95% CI of difference = [2.01, 2.16], and to
“conservative”-disgust scenarios compared with the control
scenario, t(189) = 27.33, p < .001, 95% CI of difference =
[0.77, 0.86].10 Disgust toward the control scenario did not
correlate with political orientation.
As in Study 2, a paired t test revealed that disgust toward
“liberal” scenarios was significantly higher than disgust
toward “conservative”-disgust scenarios, t(189) = 29.52,
p < .001, 95% CI of difference = [1.18, 1.34]. However, this
main effect was qualified by opposite correlations between
political ideology and disgust toward each set of elicitors, as
will be discussed below.
Hypotheses testing. Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, political
orientation correlated negatively with disgust toward
“liberal”-disgust scenarios (r ≥ −.38, p < .001) and posi-
tively with disgust toward “conservative” scenarios (r = .45,
p < .001). Again, political orientation showed no significant
correlation with DPSS-R.
Consistent with previous studies (see Terrizzi et al., 2013),
DS and TDDS-P showed relatively low but significant

8 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
correlations with political orientation (.20 ≤ rs ≤ .22, ps ≥
.008). Item-by-item correlations (see Supplemental
Appendix) revealed, however, that only 13 of the 37 DS
items, and only three of the seven TDDS-P items were sig-
nificantly correlated with political orientation (DS: −.00 ≤ rs
≤ .35, TDDS-P: .02 ≤ rs ≤ .21).
Finally, we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis
to predict political orientation from all disgust scales, con-
trolling for anger toward “conservative”-disgust and
“liberal”-disgust elicitors. First, we excluded DS and
TDDS-P from the analysis to replicate the results of Study 2
(Model 1; Table 5) and subsequently included these scales
(Model 2; Table 5). Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, in both
models, disgust toward “liberal”-disgust scenarios nega-
tively predicted political orientation, whereas disgust toward
“conservative”-disgust elicitors positively predicted political
orientation, controlling for other disgust scales and for anger.
In both models, DPSS-R, DS, and TDDS-P did not signifi-
cantly predict political orientation when other predictors
were controlled for.11
Discussion
Study 3 replicates the results of Studies 1 and 2 by demon-
strating that conservatism can be either positively or nega-
tively related to disgust sensitivity, depending on the content
of the disgust elicitors. These opposite correlation patterns
remained when controlling for anger responses to these elici-
tors and for other disgust scales assessed in this study.
Finally, disgust sensitivity was not correlated with conserva-
tism when measured using an elicitor-unspecific scale.
Our results replicate previous findings (Terrizzi et al.,
2013) demonstrating positive correlations between conser-
vatism and total disgust scores on scales measuring core dis-
gust (TDDS-P; DS) and animal reminders disgust (DS).
These correlations, however, were relatively low, particu-
larly compared with the positive and negative correlations
between political orientation and disgust toward
“conservative”-disgust elicitors and “liberal”-disgust elici-
tors, respectively. Furthermore, a closer inspection of the
correlations between disgust reactions and conservatism for
each individual elicitor within these scales revealed that only
a minority of them were significantly correlated with politi-
cal orientation, most of which were associated with bad per-
sonal hygiene (see Supplemental Appendix). Finally, total
disgust scores on the DS and TDDS-P did not predict politi-
cal orientation when controlling for other disgust sensitivity
measures.
Although these findings suggest that conservatism may
indeed be positively associated with disgust toward certain
elicitors in certain domains, they do not support the general
conclusion of a systematic, context-independent positive
association between conservatism and disgust sensitivity.
One could argue that our findings suggest that conservatives
Table 4. Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations Between the Study Variables (Study 3).
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. DPSS-R 2.53 (0.54) 1
2. German version of
Disgust Scale
2.89 (0.64) .64*** 1
3. TDDS-P 2.87 (0.69) .51*** .79*** 1
4. Disgust toward
liberal scenarios
3.13 (0.47) .19** .17* .10 1
5. Disgust toward
conservative
scenarios
1.87 (0.41) .21** .41*** .39*** .12 1
6. Disgust
toward control
(nondisgusting)
scenario
1.04 (0.21) .03 −.03 .08 −.09 .25** 1
7. Anger at liberal
scenarios
3.07 (0.55) .10 .13 .06 .75*** .03 −.14 1
8. Anger at
conservative
scenarios
1.79 (0.41) .16* .36*** .30*** .12 .77*** .16* .27*** 1
9. Anger at control
(nondisgusting)
scenario
1.03 (0.12) .05 −.03 .07 −.14 .21** .90*** −.17* .12 1
10. Political orientation 0.00 (0.46) .06 .20* .22** −.38*** .44*** .13 −.37*** .32*** .14 1
Note. DPSS-R = Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale–Revised; TDDS-P = Three-Domain Disgust Scale–pathogen disgust elicitors.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Elad-Strenger et al. 9
are disgusted by more disgust domains compared with liber-
als. Although this is possible, it contradicts the claim that
conservatives are in general more disgust sensitive than lib-
erals. A proper test of this claim would necessitate assessing
the broadest possible range of disgust elicitors and domains,
and showing that conservatives show stronger disgust reac-
tions to a wider range of stimuli than liberals. However, the
use of a broad range of disgust elicitors, as in the present
study, reveals nonsignificant and even negative relations
between conservatism and disgust sensitivity.
Another potential critique is that in Europe (particularly
in Germany), political conservatives may not typically show
higher disgust sensitivity compared with liberals. As most
relevant studies were conducted in the United States (see
Terrizzi et al., 2013), it is possible that Europeans diverge
from these theoretical intuitions. Naturally, if only conserva-
tives from the United States show a general tendency toward
higher disgust sensitivity, it cannot be claimed that such a
trend is context independent. Nevertheless, we set out to rep-
licate the findings of Study 3 using a U.S. sample.
Study 4
Study 4 replicates the findings of Study 3 using a U.S. sam-
ple. Again, we hypothesized that conservatism can be posi-
tively related, negatively related, or unrelated to disgust
sensitivity, depending on the nature and content of the dis-
gust sensitivity measure. As an extension of Study 3, we
included two additional disgust sensitivity measures: disgust
in the sexual domain (TDDS-S), which was found to be posi-
tively related to conservatism (Tybur et al., 2015), and moral
disgust (TDDS-M), which supposedly represents “politically
neutral” socio-moral content. Finally, as the English version
(as opposed to the German version) of the conservatism scale
also includes items assessing economic conservatism, we
included an additional conservatism measure in this study,
which distinguishes social from economic conservatism.
Method
Participants. Study 4 was conducted online among 202
American MTurk workers, 43% female, Mage = 37 years
(SD = 11.24 years), 39% liberals, 16% centrists, and 45%
conservatives.
Procedure and materials. Participants completed disgust sen-
sitivity scales and four political orientation measures, in ran-
dom order (see Supplemental Appendix for all items).
Reactions to disgust-eliciting scenarios. Participants rated
the extent to which they experienced disgust (two items; .72
< rs < .91) and anger (two items; .71 < rs < .92) toward
nine “liberal”-disgust scenarios, nine “conservative”-disgust
scenarios, and four control scenarios, as in Study 2. Compos-
ite disgust scores and composite anger scores were computed
for all “liberal”-disgust scenarios (disgust: α = .80; anger:
α = .84), for all “conservative”-disgust scenarios (disgust:
α = .84; anger: α = .87), and for all control scenarios (dis-
gust: r = .96; anger: r = .97).
Elicitor-unspecific disgust sensitivity was measured using
the DPSS-R (Olatunji, Cisler, et al., 2007a), as in Studies 1 to
3 (α = .92).
DS (Haidt et al., 1994; Part I) included 16 items describ-
ing elicitors of core and animal reminder disgust, which were
rated on a 0 (not at all disgusting) to 100 (very disgusting)
scale (α = .82).
Table 5. Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Political Orientation (Study 3).
Model 1 (R² = .41) Model 2 (R² = .44)
b SD βt p value 95% CI b SD βt p value 95% CI
DPSS-R −0.02 0.05 −.02 −0.311 .757 [–0.12, 0.09] −0.07 0.07 −.08 −1.04 .300 [–0.14, 0.73]
Anger at liberal
scenarios
−0.15 0.09 −.18 −1.73 .086 [–0.32, –0.02] −0.21 0.09 −.25 −2.34 .021 [–0.38, –0.03]
Disgust toward
liberal
scenarios
−0.31 0.09 −.32 −3.30 .001 [–0.50, –0.13] −0.27 0.10 −.28 −2.78 .006 [–0.46, –0.08]
Anger at
conservative
scenarios
0.10 0.12 .09 0.842 .401 [–0.13, 0.33] 0.11 0.12 .10 0.951 .343 [–0.12, 0.34]
Disgust toward
conservative
scenarios
0.50 0.12 .44 4.33 .000 [0.27, 0.73] 0.43 0.12 .38 3.67 .000 [0.20, 0.67]
German version
of Disgust
Scale
0.07 0.08 .09 0.848 .398 [–0.09, 0.22]
TDDS-P 0.05 0.07 .08 0.805 .422 [–0.08, 0.18]
Note. CI = confidence interval; DPSS-R = Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale–Revised; TDDS-P = Three-Domain Disgust Scale–pathogen disgust
elicitors.

10 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
For the TDDS (Tybur et al., 2009), participants rated the
extent to which they are disgusted by seven sexual disgust
elicitors (TDDS-S; e.g., “Watching a pornographic video”;
α = .89), seven moral disgust elicitors (TDDS-M; e.g., “A
student cheating to get good grades”; α = .94), and seven
pathogen disgust elicitors (TDDS-P; e.g., “Shaking hands
with a stranger who has sweaty palms”; α = .88) on a 1 (not
at all disgusting) to 7 (very disgusting) scale.
Political orientation was assessed using the 28-item
Wilson–Patterson Conservatism Scale (Wilson & Patterson,
1968; α = .86) and ideological self-placement item used in
Studies 1 to 3 (r = .70, p < .001). A mean “political orienta-
tion” score was calculated such that higher scores represent
more conservative/rightist orientation (α = .88).
Social and economic conservatism was measured using
the 12-item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale
(SECS), which was validated using a U.S. sample (Everett,
2013). Participants rated the extent to which they feel nega-
tively (0) or positively (100) toward seven items representing
social conservatism (e.g., the family unit, religion; α = .90)
and five items representing economic conservatism (e.g.,
business; gun ownership; α = .75).
Results
Preliminary analyses. Table 6 shows means, standard devia-
tions, and zero-order correlations. Political orientation was
highly correlated with social conservatism (r = .71) and with
economic conservatism (r = .66).
Consistent with Studies 1 to 3, disgust toward “liberal”-
disgust scenarios and by “conservative”-disgust scenarios
were positively correlated, and both were positively corre-
lated with DPSS-R. DS and TDDS-P were very highly cor-
related (r = .71, p < .001). DS and all subscales of the TDDS
(moral, sexual, pathogen) were correlated with the DPSS-R
scale (.25 ≤ rs ≤ .52, ps < .001), with disgust toward “con-
servative” scenarios (.31 ≤ rs ≤ .59, ps < .001), and with
disgust toward “liberal” scenarios (.17 ≤ rs ≤ .40, ps ≥
.018).
As in Studies 2 to 3, paired samples t tests revealed that
participants were more disgusted by “liberal”-disgust sce-
narios compared with the control scenarios, t(197) = 26.76,
p < .001, 95% CI of difference = [1.37, 1.58], and by
“conservative”-disgust scenarios compared with the control
scenarios, t(197) = 16.63, p < .001, 95% CI of difference =
[0.65, 0.82].12 Disgust toward control scenarios did not cor-
relate with political orientation, social conservatism, or eco-
nomic conservatism.13
Again, a paired t test revealed higher disgust toward lib-
eral scenarios than disgust toward conservative scenarios,
t(197) = 14.27, p < .001, 95% CI of difference = [0.64,
0.84]. However, this main effect was qualified by opposite
correlations between political ideology and disgust toward
each set of elicitors, as will be discussed below.
Hypotheses testing. Consistent with Studies 1 to 3, all conser-
vatism scales were negatively correlated with disgust toward
“liberal”-disgust scenarios (−.27 ≤ rs ≤ −.19, ps < .009),
and positively with disgust toward “conservative”-disgust
scenarios (.34 ≤ rs ≤ .54, ps < .001). Again, elicitor-unspe-
cific disgust sensitivity was not significantly correlated with
political orientation or economic conservatism, but margin-
ally correlated with social conservatism (r = .14, p = .047).
Consistent with Study 3, DS and the three TDDS scales
correlated with political orientation (.13 ≤ rs ≤ .34, ps ≤
.081). All four scales were more strongly correlated with
social conservatism (.19 ≤ rs ≤ .40, ps ≤ .009) than with
economic conservatism (.04 ≤ rs ≤ .16, .026 ≤ ps ≤ .630;
see Terrizzi et al., 2013; Tybur et al., 2016). Nevertheless,
item-by-item correlations revealed that political orientation
was only correlated with three of the 16 DS items, with the
homosexuality item showing the highest correlation (r =
.55, p < .001). Consistently, political orientation correlated
with five of the seven TDDS-S items, with one of the seven
TDDS-M items, and with two of the seven TDDS-P items.
Social conservatism was correlated with 13 of 16 of the
DS items, whereas economic conservatism was correlated
with four of the 16 items, again with the homosexuality item
correlating highest with both conservatism scales (social: r
= .58, p < .001; economic: r = .29, p < .001). The Social
Conservatism Scale was also correlated with most items in
the TDDS scales, whereas the economic conservatism scale
correlated with a minority of the items (see Supplemental
Appendix).
Finally, we conducted three multiple regression analyses
to predict political orientation, social conservatism, or eco-
nomic conservatism from all disgust scales, controlling for
anger responses to “conservative”- and “liberal”-disgust sce-
narios (Table 7). Consistent with Studies 1 to 3, disgust
toward “liberal”-disgust scenarios negatively predicted all
conservatism scales, whereas disgust toward “conservative”-
disgust scenarios positively predicted all conservatism scales,
controlling for all other disgust scales and for anger toward
both sets of scenarios. DS positively predicted social conser-
vatism, and the TDDS-P positively predicted both social and
economic conservatism, when other predictors were con-
trolled for.14 As in Studies 1 to 3, DPSS-R was not associated
with political orientation when controlling for other predic-
tors, and was even negatively associated with social and eco-
nomic conservatism, such that liberals showed higher
sensitivity and propensity to the experience of disgust.
Discussion
Using a U.S. sample, Study 4 provides further evidence that
the relation between conservatism and disgust sensitivity can
be positive, negative, or nonsignificant depending on the
nature and content of the disgust sensitivity measure. As an
extension of Studies 1 to 3, Study 4 shows that the measures

Elad-Strenger et al. 11
chosen to assess conservatism also affect the conservatism–
disgust association: Social conservatism demonstrates the
strongest relations (both positive and negative) to all disgust
measures compared with a general political orientation and
to an economic conservatism measure (see Terrizzi et al.,
2013). Social conservatism was also weakly correlated with
elicitor-unspecific disgust sensitivity, as opposed to the other
two indicators of conservatism. However, when controlling
for all other disgust sensitivity scales, the effects of elicitor-
unspecific disgust sensitivity on conservatism reversed, such
that liberals were more disgust sensitive than conservatives.
Because Study 4 included many disgust sensitivity measures,
which were administered in random order, rating the elicitor-
specific disgust items may have primed participants with
specific disgusting stimuli, and thus affected ratings on the
elicitor-unspecific measure. By controlling for the elicitor-
specific measures, we could control for these methodological
effects and isolate the effects of the elicitor-unspecific
(“trait”) component on ideology. The direction of these
effects can be attributed to the fact that most of these elicitor-
specific disgust scales are positively related to conservatism
(in terms of total disgust scores), and by controlling for these
scales, we in fact controlled for “conservative content.”
Although the findings of Study 4 provide further support
for our hypotheses in another sociocultural context, the fol-
lowing objection may arise: The “liberal”-disgust scenarios,
the only set of elicitors showing a systematic negative rela-
tion to conservatism in Studies 1 to 4, included (but was not
limited to) items bearing explicit politically related content.
It has been suggested (e.g., Olatunji, Williams, et al., 2007b)
that such items (e.g., homosexuality) should be omitted from
disgust sensitivity scales to produce a nonbiased examina-
tion of the conservatism–disgust relation. Indeed, Study 4
demonstrates that the strongest positive correlations between
conservatism and disgust sensitivity were obtained with elic-
itors describing homosexuality. Nevertheless, it has been
shown that after omitting such items from the disgust sensi-
tivity scale, the positive correlation between political conser-
vatism and disgust sensitivity remains (e.g., Inbar et al.,
2009). It is not surprising, however, that this correlation
remains even after removing politically loaded items from
these scales, if they were constructed such that these items
serve as reliability criteria (e.g., internal consistency, factor
structure). In such cases, total disgust scores may be posi-
tively associated with conservatism even if many of the
included elicitors do not correlate (or even correlate
Table 6. Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations Between the Study Variables (Study 4).
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. DPSS-R 2.51 (0.79) 1
2. Disgust Scale 52.08 (18.35) .45*** 1
3. TDDS-P 4.51 (1.33) .46*** .72*** 1
4. TDDS-M 3.96 (1.68) .25*** .21** .38*** 1
5. TDDS-S 3.36 (1.64) .52*** .55*** .63*** .50*** 1
6. Disgust
toward liberal
scenarios
2.70 (0.59) .33*** .17* .28*** .40*** .29*** 1
7. Disgust toward
conservative
scenarios
1.96 (0.66) .47*** .31*** .35*** .41*** .59*** .32*** 1
8. Disgust
toward control
(nondisgusting)
scenarios
1.23 (0.58) .47*** .09 .11 .20** .28*** .13 .50*** 1
9. Anger at liberal
scenarios
2.58 (0.65) .35*** .23** .30*** .39*** .33*** .87*** .37*** .17* 1
10. Anger at
conservative
scenarios
1.79 (0.68) .50*** .35*** .36*** .38*** .59*** .29*** .90*** .54*** .45*** 1
11. Anger at
control
(nondisgusting)
scenarios
1.24 (0.64) .46*** .10 .10 .20** .28*** .10 .49*** .94*** .16* .54*** 1
12. Political
orientation
−0.01 (0.47) .14 .21** .14* .13 .34*** −.27*** .54*** .12 −.16* .51*** .12 1
13. Social
conservatism
61.92 (26.05) .14* .39*** .37*** .19** .40*** −.19** .51*** .02 −.07 .48*** −.00 .71*** 1
14. Economic
conservatism
60.04 (21.17) .02 .16* .16* .04 .13 −.27*** .34*** −.03 −.21** .29*** −.01 .66*** .64*** 1
Note. CI = confidence interval; DPSS-R = Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale–Revised; TDDS-P = Three-Domain Disgust Scale–pathogen disgust
elicitors; TDDS-M = Three-Domain Disgust Scale–moral disgust elicitors; TDDS-S = Three-Domain Disgust Scale–sexual disgust elicitors.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

12
Table 7. Results of Regression Analyses Predicting Political Orientation, Social Conservatism, and Economic Conservatism (Study 4).
Political orientation (R² = .53) Social conservatism (R² = .50) Economic conservatism (R² = .32)
b SD βt
p
value 95% CI b SD βt
p
value 95% CI b SD βt
p
value 95% CI
DPSS-R −0.03 0.04 −.05 −0.771 .441 [–0.11, 0.05] −5.64 2.22 −.17 −2.58 .011 [–9.96, –1.34] −3.63 2.09 −.13 −1.73 .085 [–7.75, 0.50]
Disgust toward
conservative
scenarios
0.44 0.10 .59 4.48 .000 [0.25, 0.63] 22.88 5.47 .57 4.18 .000 [12.09, 33.67] 17.38 5.16 .53 3.37 .001 [7.20, 27.57]
Anger at
conservative
scenarios
0.04 0.10 .05 0.373 .709 [–0.16, 0.24] −1.17 5.75 −.03 −0.204 .839 [–12.52, 10.18] 0.36 5.45 .01 0.067 .947 [–10.38, 11.11]
Disgust toward
liberal
scenarios
−0.42 0.10 −.54 −4.29 .000 [–0.62, –0.23] −22.65 5.52 −.52 −4.11 .000 [–33.54,
–11.76]
−12.21 5.21 −.34 −2.34 .020 [–22.49, –1.92]
Anger at liberal
scenarios
0.04 0.09 .05 0.379 .705 [–0.15, 0.22] 4.95 5.30 .12 0.934 .352 [–5.50, 15.40] −2.81 5.03 −.09 −0.559 .577 [–12.73, 7.11]
Disgust Scale 0.00 0.00 .09 1.11 .267 [–0.00, 0.01] 0.27 0.11 .19 2.46 .015 [0.05, 0.49] 0.08 0.11 .07 0.729 .467 [–0.13, 0.29]
TDDS-P −0.03 0.03 −.07 −0.869 .386 [–0.08, 0.03] 3.61 1.64 .19 2.20 .029 [0.38, 6.85] 3.21 1.56 .20 2.06 .041 [0.13, 6.29]
TDDS-M 0.01 0.02 .03 0.499 .618 [–0.03, 0.04] 0.62 0.99 .04 0.62 .535 [–1.34, 2.58] 0.02 0.95 .00 0.02 .985 [–1.86, 1.90]
TDDS-S 0.03 0.02 .12 1.44 .153 [–0.01, 0.08] 0.65 1.30 .04 0.495 .621 [–1.93, 3.22] −1.98 1.25 −.15 −1.58 .115 [–4.45, 0.49]
Note. CI = confidence interval; DPSS-R = Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale–Revised; TDDS-P = Three-Domain Disgust Scale–pathogen disgust elicitors; TDDS-M = Three-Domain Disgust
Scale–moral disgust elicitors; TDDS-S = Three-Domain Disgust Scale–sexual disgust elicitors.

Elad-Strenger et al. 13
negatively) with conservatism. Study 5 aimed to demonstrate
that elicitor-specific disgust sensitivity scales can be posi-
tively or negatively associated with conservatism, even when
items bearing political content are removed from these
scales.
Study 5
The goal of the study was to construct two distinct and inter-
nally consistent disgust sensitivity measures, which correlate
either positively or negatively with conservatism, even when
items bearing political content are removed from these scales.
Construction of these scales included four stages: First, we
created a diverse pull of disgust elicitors representing as little
political content as possible. Second, participants rated the
extent to which they are disgusted by these stimuli, alongside
two clearly politically loaded items: one related to homosexu-
ality (perceived as more disgusting by conservatives; e.g.,
Haidt et al., 1994) and one to Nazism (perceived as more dis-
gusting by liberals), to be used as anchors for the
“conservative”-disgust and “liberal”-disgust scales, respec-
tively. Third, we chose the “politically neutral” items that cor-
related most positively and loaded most strongly onto one
factor with either of the political anchors, to create a “liberal”-
disgust scale (negatively associated with conservatism) and
“conservative”-disgust scale (positively associated with con-
servatism). Fourth, we removed the politically loaded anchors
from these scales, to demonstrate that even in their absence,
the scales are internally consistent and correlate as expected
(either negatively or positively) with political orientation.
Method
Participants. Study 5 was conducted among 114 German psy-
chology students in exchange for course credit, 82% female,
Mage = 21.17 years (SD = 2.75 years).
Procedure and materials. Participants rated their disgust
toward various scenarios and their political orientation, in
random order (see Supplemental Appendix for all items).
Reactions to disgust eliciting scenarios. Participants rated
the extent to which they feel disgusted by 50 disgust elici-
tors on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a great
extent). Two of these elicitors were politically loaded and
used as anchors for the “conservative”-disgust and “liberal”-
disgust scales (“watching a male homosexual couple having
sex” and “sitting next to a person covered in Nazi tattoos
on the subway,” respectively). The politically neutral items
included items generated by a group of experts with the goal
of creating the widest possible range of nonpolitical disgust
elicitors (e.g., cleaning the bottom of an old man, eating a
dish prepared from nonspoiled products taken out of garbage
bins), alongside 15 nonpolitical items taken from the original
DS (Haidt et al., 1994).
Political orientation was measured using the two scales
used in Studies 1 to 4: the German version of the 24-item
Wilson–Patterson Conservatism Scale (α = .80) and an ideo-
logical self-placement item ranging from 1 (political left) to
7 (political right). Both correlated highly (r = .63, p < .001)
and were used as a composite measure with higher scores
representing more conservative/rightist ideology.
Results
Disgust toward the “conservative anchor” and disgust toward
the “liberal anchor” were more strongly correlated with
political orientation than the other 48 items (homosexuality:
r = .41, p < .001; Nazism: r = −.37, p < .001).
We first constructed initial “conservative”-disgust and
“liberal”-disgust scales, each including the relevant “anchor”
item and all items that positively correlated with the anchor
item (total of 18 “conservative”-disgust items and 13
“liberal”-disgust items).
Next, we conducted a factor analysis for all 31 items using
principal component analysis with varimax rotation, set on a
two-factor solution. We removed all items that loaded below
.500 on each of the factors to create two scales. The final
scales (see Supplemental Appendix) included seven
“conservative”-disgust items (α = .79) and nine “liberal”-
disgust items (α = .81). The “conservative”-disgust and
“liberal”-disgust scales were not significantly correlated
(r = .07, p = .458), but were correlated with political orien-
tation in the expected directions (r = .46, p < .001 and r =
−.23, p = .013, respectively).
Finally, we removed the “anchor” items from the scales to
create politically neutral “conservative”-disgust (α = .75)
and “liberal”-disgust (α = .78) scales. These final scales cor-
related very highly with the original scales (the ones which
included the “anchor” items; r = .98, p < .001 and r = .99,
p < .001, respectively). After removing the anchor items,
political orientation correlated positively with the
“conservative”-disgust scale (r = .42, p < .001) and nega-
tively with the “liberal”-disgust scale (r = −.19, p = .046).
Discussion
The goal of this study was to demonstrate that elicitor-spe-
cific disgust sensitivity scales can be constructed such that
they correlate either positively or negatively with conserva-
tism, even after removing political content from the scales.
The items of these internally consistent disgust sensitivity
scales can retrospectively be grouped into broader disgust
domains: The “liberal”-disgust scale included elicitors asso-
ciated with animal body parts, personal hygiene, environ-
mental pollution, and moral violations such as child abuse.
The “conservative”-disgust scale included elicitors associ-
ated with sex, exposure to a threat of infectious disease, and
moral violations such as drug use. In retrospect, some of
these elicitors (e.g., child abuse, sexual fetishism) may

14 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
appear consistent with norms associated with either liberal-
ism or conservatism. Indeed, and consistent with BIS
(Terrizzi et al., 2013), we would argue that these elicitors, as
do disgust elicitors in general, serve the basis for the creation
of norms aimed at minimizing exposure to these elicitors.
Nevertheless, as opposed to Nazism and homosexuality,
these items did not represent explicit political content. More
precisely, if sexuality or harming the weak can be seen as
representing political content just because they serve as basis
for norm creation, a similar claim can be made regarding
pathogens. These findings, therefore, reveal how one can
construct disgust sensitivity scales that correlate either posi-
tively or negatively with conservatism (i.e., are consistent
with conservative or liberal norms), even when their final
version does not include explicit political content.
General Discussion
Extant political–psychological research suggests that disgust
is predominantly a conservative emotion, such that conserva-
tives are generally “more easily disgusted than liberals”
(e.g., Inbar et al., 2009, p. 714). We raised conceptual and
methodological skepticism concerning this generalized con-
clusion and addressed it in five studies.
Our main critique is that most previous studies examined
the relation between conservatism and disgust sensitivity
with regard to specific disgust elicitors in specific disgust
domains (Ahn et al., 2014; Shook, Ford, & Boggs, 2017;
Shook et al., 2015; Terrizzi et al., 2013). Far from question-
ing the validity of these findings, we argue that the conclu-
sions drawn from them regarding systematic positive
correlations between conservatism and disgust sensitivity
may be too generalized. The present research was based on
the assumption that a deeper examination of the relations
between conservatism and disgust sensitivity requires (a)
distinguishing disgust reactions to specific stimuli from the
general tendency to respond strongly to disgusting stimuli
(over and above specific elicitors) and (b) closely examining
the relation between conservatism and disgust toward a
wider range of domains and stimuli, which may uncover
more complex correlation patterns.
Across five studies, using a variety of disgust elicitors and
different indicators of conservatism, we show that the rela-
tion between conservatism and elicitor-specific disgust can
be positive or negative depending on the content of the dis-
gust elicitors. We find that conservatives and liberals are dis-
gusted by different stimuli, rather than demonstrating
context-independent, general differences in disgust sensitiv-
ity. In addition, we show (Studies 1-4) that disgust sensitivity
does not predict conservatism when measured using an elic-
itor-unspecific scale, and may even negatively predict con-
servatism (Study 4) when controlling for its shared variance
with elicitor-specific scales, which correlate positively with
conservatism.
Taken together, our findings suggest that elicitor-specific
disgust sensitivity measures should be used with caution
when investigating the disgust–conservatism association, as
the chosen elicitors may conceptually overlap with ideology
and determine the direction of the relation. More broadly,
any measurement of elicitor-specific emotions should con-
sider the distinction between general sensitivity or propen-
sity to the emotional experience (“trait” emotion) and the
nature of a given emotion-eliciting stimulus, which may con-
ceptually overlap with the dependent variable in question
(e.g., psychopathology, as in Van Overveld et al., 2006).
With regard to disgust and conservatism, our findings sug-
gest that even scales that do not seem to include politically
loaded socio-moral content may inflate the relations between
political orientation and conservatism if politically loaded
items are used as criteria in constructing these scales and
later removed from their final version (Study 5).
One could argue that the observed reverse correlations
between conservatism and disgust sensitivity can be attrib-
uted to our particular selection of stimuli. This, however, was
precisely our intention, as we set out to demonstrate that the
selection of stimuli is what determines the direction of this
relation. More broadly, sampling across a broader range of
issues is necessary for confirming or challenging general
relations between constructs (Wells & Windschitl, 1999). Of
course, some of the elicitors that we used to demonstrate a
negative relation between conservatism and disgust can be
seen as representing socio-moral content consistent with lib-
eral norms (e.g., Nazi symbols). Nevertheless, other elici-
tors, which were rather politically neutral (e.g., seeing the
decapitated head of a dead lion hanging on someone’s wall,
drinking from the common cup in church), showed a similar
pattern. More generally, and consistent with BIS (Terrizzi
et al., 2013; Terrizzi et al., 2010), we would argue that any
disgust elicitor (even in the core-disgust domain) can be seen
as representing some societal norm violation, as disgust sen-
sitivity transfers into the moral domain via the creation of
certain norms aimed at minimizing exposure to these partic-
ular elicitors.
Interestingly, we found that participants were on average
more disgusted but “liberal”-disgust elicitors compared with
“conservative”-disgust elicitors, in all studies. One potential
explanation stems from MFT, according to which liberals
and conservatives are relatively equally concerned with vio-
lations of individualizing moral foundations (e.g., Graham
et al., 2009). Another possibility could be that our “liberal”-
disgust scenarios were more severe, or more intense, than the
“conservative”-disgust scenarios. Although making both
types of scenarios equal in terms of intensity would not have
changed the general correlation patterns, as the assumption
of homoscedasticity is central to linear regression models,
we encourage future studies to compare disgust scenarios
which are parallel in terms of emotionality and frequency to
increase the generalizability of our findings.

Elad-Strenger et al. 15
Importantly, the correlations between disgust toward these
scenarios and conservatism remained significantly positive or
negative with or without controlling for anger toward these
scenarios. Furthermore, when controlling for anger responses
to the “liberal”-disgust and “conservative”-disgust scenarios,
we did control not only for their shared “affect” component
but also for the “political content” component that anger
toward these scenarios shares with disgust toward these sce-
narios. Thus, controlling for anger produced a relatively clean
examination of the emotional experience of disgust.
In addition to demonstrating reverse correlations between
conservatism and disgust sensitivity, our findings suggest
that the positive correlations between conservatism and dis-
gust apply only to specific elicitors in the animal reminder
and core domains, but not to others (Studies 3 and 4). These
findings further support our conclusion that the choice of
elicitors plays a central role in determining the direction and
even the existence of the conservatism–disgust correlation. A
wider sampling of stimuli in these domains could potentially
reveal more instances of systematic reverse correlations.
Considering our results, the following question arises:
Where do these strong intuitions about disgust sensitivity
and political orientation originate from? Proponents of MFT
(Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007) argue that con-
servatives are more sensitive to disgust because they are
more concerned with purity-related norms than liberals. A
closer inspection of the items that measure the purity founda-
tion (Graham et al., 2009) reveals, however, that they cover
a relatively restricted range of purity domains, focusing pri-
marily on violations of conservative norms (e.g., “Chastity is
an important and valuable virtue”). Although not all possible
norm violations can be considered, including a wider range
of purity violations (e.g., environmental pollution) is neces-
sary to properly examine this claim.
Another explanation for the conservatism–disgust associa-
tion originates in the idea that adopting conservative world-
views serves as an evolutionary disease avoidance strategy by
individuals who are particularly sensitive to disgust (Terrizzi
et al., 2013). Accordingly, to avoid any risk of contamination
or infection with pathogens (Schaller & Duncan, 2007), indi-
viduals develop a hypersensitivity to norm violations, which
is considered a conservative (rather than liberal) tendency.
What is considered a norm violation is, however, a function
of the norms individuals endorse. Whereas conservatives
might consider being a homosexual or a foreigner a norm vio-
lation, liberals might consider being homophobic or xenopho-
bic a norm violation. This would imply that the BIS theory
could have broader areas of application, as both conservatives
and liberals may act in ways consistent with the theory,
depending on the norms that are being violated.
Finally, our findings have broader implications for research
on individual differences. Following Wells and Windschitl
(1999), sampling stimuli is as important as sampling partici-
pants to rule out confounds and to generalize scientific find-
ings (see also Elad-Strenger & Shahar, 2017; Proch,
Elad-Strenger, & Kessler, 2019, with regard to political ideol-
ogy). Therefore, any study that aims to identify general differ-
ences between individuals should promote broad stimuli
sampling, in both measurement and scale construction.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Julia Elad-Strenger https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8906-0039
Supplemental Material
Supplemental material is available online with this article.
Notes
1. These percentages are based on ratings on an ideological self-
placement item (1 = left, 4 = center, 7 = right).
2. Disgust and anger ratings for the “control” scenarios were also
used to create scales serving as comparison standards for the
conservative/liberal disgust scales despite their low reliability,
which can be attributed to the low variance in their scoring (Ms
< 1.15, SDs < 0.35).
3. Because factor analyses revealed that the Disgust Sensitivity
(DS) and Disgust Propensity (DP) subscales did not load
onto two distinct factors in any of the studies, we used the
composite Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale–Revised
(DPSS-R) score in our analyses.
4. Anger at the liberal scenarios was also higher than anger at
neutral scenarios, Study 1: anger t(111) = 36.18, p < .001,
95% confidence interval (CI) of difference = [1.84, 2.05];
Study 2: anger t(117) = 36.66, p < .001, 95% CI of difference
= [1.62, 1.81]), and anger at conservative scenarios was also
higher than anger at neutral scenarios, Study 2: anger t(117) =
20.09, p < .001, 95% CI of difference = [0.80, 0.98].
5. Paired t tests revealed that in Study 1, “liberal”-disgust sce-
narios evoked similar levels of anger and disgust, t(117) =
0.232, p = .817, 95% CI of difference = [−0.05, 0.07]. In
Study 2, “liberal”-disgust scenarios evoked more anger than
disgust, t(117) = −5.70, p < .001, 95% CI of difference =
[−0.29, −0.14], whereas the conservative scenarios evoked
more disgust than anger, t(117) = 2.49, p = .014, 95% CI
of difference = [0.02, 0.13]. These mixed results are not sur-
prising, as “disgust” and “anger” are often highly correlated
(Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). The fact that anger ratings were
higher than disgust ratings for some scenarios is also not sur-
prising, as individuals tend to perceive anger as a more benign
and generalized emotion than disgust, and tend to use it more
frequently as a description of negative emotional experiences
(Averill, 1983).
6. Although Terrizzi, Shook, and McDaniel (2013) criti-
cized the use of single-item ideology measures to assess the

16 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
conservatism–disgust relation, we also conducted these analy-
ses using the ideological self-placement item only, arriving at
similar results to the ones obtained using the combined ideol-
ogy measure in all studies. Using the two DPSS-R subscales
instead of the composite DPSS-R score evinced similar results
to the ones obtained with DPSS-R as a composite measure, in
all studies.
7. The regression analyses in all studies evinced similar results
when DS and DP were entered into the regression analyses
instead of the composite DPSS-R, when a single-item ideol-
ogy measure was entered as the dependent variable instead
of the composite political ideology measure, and when we
excluded anger from the analyses.
8. As we introduced two additional scales to this study, we only
used 17 of the 26 disgust-eliciting scenarios used in Studies 1
and 2 to keep the survey relatively short and decrease partici-
pant dropout.
9. This version of the scale does not include sexual disgust items,
similar to the DS-R (Olatunji, Williams, et al., 2007).
10. Anger at the liberal scenarios was also higher than anger at the
neutral scenario, t(189) = 48.57, p < .001, 95% CI of differ-
ence = [1.96, 2.12], and anger at the conservative scenarios
was also higher than anger at the neutral scenario, t(189) =
25.05, p < .001, 95% CI of difference = [0.70, 0.82]. Paired
samples t tests revealed that the “liberal” scenarios and “con-
servative” scenarios evoked significantly more disgust than
anger, t(189) = 2.45, p = .015, 95% CI of difference = [0.01,
0.12]; t(189) = 4.19, p < .001, 95% CI of difference = [0.05,
0.13], respectively.
11. Similar results were obtained when only DS or Pathogen
Disgust subscale of the Three-Domain Disgust Scale
(TDDS-P) was included in the model, and when both were
removed from the model.
12. Anger at the liberal scenarios was also higher than anger at the
neutral scenarios, t(197) = 22.52, p < .001, 95% CI of differ-
ence = [1.22, 1.45], and anger at conservative scenarios was
also higher than anger at the neutral scenarios, t(197) = 12.24,
p < .001, 95% CI of difference = [0.46, 0.64].
13. Paired samples t tests revealed that as in Study 3, the “liberal”
and “conservative” scenarios evoked significantly more dis-
gust than anger, t(197) = 5.39, p < .001, 95% CI of difference
= [0.08, 0.17]; t(197) = 7.94, p < .001, 95% CI of difference
= [0.13, 0.21]), respectively.
14. Similar results were obtained when Three-Domain Disgust
Scale–sexual disgust elicitors (TDDS-S) and Three-Domain
Disgust Scale–moral disgust elicitors (TDDS-M) were
excluded from the analyses, or when the DS and all TDDS
scales were excluded from the analyses.
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