Justice for the People? How Justice Sensitivity Can Foster and Impair Support for Populist Radical‐Right Parties and Politicians in the United States and in Germany

Abstract

Many people argue that support for populist radical‐right political agents is motivated by people feeling “left behind” in globalized Western democracies. Empirical research supports this notion by showing that people who feel personally or collectively deprived are more likely to hold populist beliefs and anti‐immigration attitudes. Our aim was to further investigate the psychological link between individuals' justice concerns and their preferences for populist radical‐right political agents. We focused on stable individual differences in self‐oriented and other‐oriented justice concerns and argue that these should have opposing correlations with preferences for populist radical‐right parties. We tested our hypotheses in two national samples, one from the United States (N = 1500) and one from Germany (N = 848). Sensitivity to injustice towards oneself enhanced the likelihood of preferring Trump (United States) and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) (Germany) via increased anti‐immigration attitudes and increased populist attitudes. Sensitivity to injustice towards others reduced the likelihood of preferring Trump and AfD via decreased anti‐immigration attitudes. We discuss our findings in regard to how stable individual differences in the evaluation of fairness can motivate intra‐ and interpersonal political conflicts in modern western societies and how politics and mass media can fuel these conflicts.

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Political Psychology, Vol. xx, No. xx, 2019
doi: 10.1111/pops.12632
Justice for the People? How Justice Sensitivity Can Foster and
Impair Support for Populist Radical-Right Parties and Politicians
in the United States and in Germany
Tobias Rothmund
Friedrich-Schiller University Jena
Laurits Bromme
University of Koblenz-Landau
Flávio Azevedo
Friedrich-Schiller University Jena
New York University
Many people argue that support for populist radical-right political agents is motivated by people feeling “left
behind” in globalized Western democracies. Empirical research supports this notion by showing that people
who feel personally or collectively deprived are more likely to hold populist beliefs and anti-immigration
attitudes. Our aim was to further investigate the psychological link between individuals’ justice concerns and
their preferences for populist radical-right political agents. We focused on stable individual differences in
self-oriented and other-oriented justice concerns and argue that these should have opposing correlations with
preferences for populist radical-right parties. We tested our hypotheses in two national samples, one from the
United States (N=1500) and one from Germany (N=848). Sensitivity to injustice towards oneself enhanced the
likelihood of preferring Trump (United States) and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) (Germany) via increased
anti-immigration attitudes and increased populist attitudes. Sensitivity to injustice towards others reduced the
likelihood of preferring Trump and AfD via decreased anti-immigration attitudes. We discuss our findings in
regard to how stable individual differences in the evaluation of fairness can motivate intra- and interpersonal
political conflicts in modern western societies and how politics and mass media can fuel these conflicts.
KEY WORDS: social justice, populism, individual differences, justice
sensitivity, anti-immigration attitudes, political communication, radical right
The rise of populist radical-right agents (parties and politicians) in Europe and the United States
has inspired a considerable amount of research. A central aim of this research is to better under-
stand why people are willing to vote for these politicians. Scholars generally distinguish between
demand-side explanations and supply-side explanations as different perspectives on that question.
Research on supply-side explanations is concerned with how structural features of party competition
(e.g., electoral systems, political finance regulations, ballot access laws) or party communication
ABSTRACT

2Rothmund et al.
(e.g., communication strategies) contribute to the rise of the populist right (see also Golder, 2016).
Research on demand-side explanations focuses on whether and how political attitudes and psycho-
logical motivations in voters foster proclivities for populist radical-right agents. In the present article,
we aim to contribute to the latter line of research from a social justice perspective.
Theoretically, it is reasonable to assume that social justice concerns can motivate voting for
populist radical-right parties (e.g., Pettigrew, 2017). This idea is especially plausible given a growing
inequality in the distribution of wealth in postindustrial economies. Pettigrew (2017) highlighted
the importance of perceived injustice as a psychological motivation for supporting Trump in the
U.S. Presidential Elections. He argues that “Trump adherents feel deprived relative to what they
expected to possess at this point in their lives and relative to what they erroneously perceive other
‘less deserving’ groups have acquired” (p. 111). There is some evidence that the experience of depri-
vation relative to other social groups can foster populist sentiments (e.g., Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016;
Spruyt, Keppens, & Droogenbroeck, 2016) and anti-immigration attitudes (e.g., Ellemers, 2002;
Jetten, Mols, & Postmes, 2015; Taylor, 2002). However, when it comes to understanding the psy-
chological link between social justice concerns and preferences for populist radical-right political
agents, two questions remain unanswered: First, do dispositional justice concerns predict populist
radical-right voting preferences? There is research indicating that personality dispositions contribute
to the explanation of individual differences in voting for populist radical-right parties and politi-
cians (e.g., Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; Bakker, Rooduijn, & Schumacher, 2016; Fatke, 2019;
Heiss & Matthes, 2017). We aim to complement this evidence from the perspective of social justice
research by focusing on justice sensitivity—a measure of dispositional justice concerns. Research
on justice sensitivity distinguishes between the sensitivity to experience injustice towards oneself
(JS-Self) and the sensitivity to experience injustice towards others (JS-Others). To get a better un-
derstanding of how dispositional justice concerns impact populist radical-right voting preferences,
we systematically differentiate between these two dispositional notions of justice. Second, which
components of a populist radical right ideology mediate the link between justice concerns and pref-
erences for populist radical-right political agents? Scholars have argued that nativism, populism and
authoritarianism constitute a populist radical right belief system and that these three components
reflect the ideological basis for voting forpopulist radical-right parties and politicians (e.g., Mudde,
2007). Previous research on the relation between social justice concerns and support for populist rad-
ical-right parties has focused on single ones of these components in isolation. To better understand
the underlying psychological link, we investigate all three components in parallel. By doing so, we
aim to test whether each component of this belief system accounts for independent psychological
effects of justice concerns on preferences for populist radical-right political agents.
Social Justice Concerns and Justice Sensitivity
There is a fairly broad consensus in political science and psychology that justice notions reflect
key elements of political attitudes and ideology and that they provide a strong motivation for political
action (for an overview, see Rothmund, Becker, & Jost, 2016). Importantly, the cognitive, emotional,
and behavioral reactions to social injustice are not only predicted by boundary conditions of a given
situation (e.g., the level of inequality) but also by stable individual differences (for a review, see
Baumert & Schmitt, 2016). Justice sensitivity has been introduced as a multidimensional personal-
ity construct (Schmitt, Baumert, Gollwitzer, & Maes, 2010; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach,
2005) that taps into dispositional justice notions from four social perspectives, namely a self-oriented
victim perspective (sensitivity to oneself being treated unfairly) and three other-oriented perspec-
tives, namely an observer perspective (sensitivity to others being treated unfairly), a beneficiary per-
spective (sensitivity to benefiting from others being treated unfairly), and a perpetrator perspective
(sensitivity to treating others unfairly). All four dimensions are linked to a specific social perspective

3
Justice for the People
in which social injustice can be perceived. Empirical research supports the usefulness of distinguish-
ing between these dimensions. For example, justice sensitivity from each of these perspectives is
highly stable over time (Schmitt et al., 2005, 2010), and correlations between the dimensions indicate
a substantial amount of unique variance (Baumert & Schmitt, 2016). Even more importantly, differ-
ent dimensions of justice sensitivity predict different kinds of psychological reactions and behaviors.
The most fundamental difference has been established between the psychological functioning of
the self-oriented justice sensitivity from a victim perspective compared to the other-oriented justice
sensitivities from an observer, beneficiary, or perpetrator perspective. In the present article, we argue
that these differences follow from different motivational underpinnings of self-oriented justice con-
cerns and other-oriented concerns that are enlightening to better understand the political psychology
of populist radical-right proclivities.
Self-oriented justice concerns reflect concerns about social justice for oneself or one’s own
social group and corresponding affective reactions (e.g., anger, fear of exploitation). In line with
social-exchange theories, these kinds of justice concerns should be motivated by self-interest (for a
review, see Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). In order to serve self-interest, it is highly func-
tional to monitor the ratio of costs and benefits in social interactions. Self-oriented justice concerns
should be triggered when people think that they deserve more than they received in terms of personal
or group-based benefits. Relative deprivation theory (e.g., Walker & Smith, 2002) is based on this
assumption. It describes situations in which people or groups feel deprived because they compare
themselves with groups or individuals who are better off. High levels of self-deprivation are linked to
personal or group-based anger that can translate into political opposition (Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin,
& Bialosiewicz, 2012). Low levels of relative deprivation allow individuals to be less concerned
about their own self-interest and to show more solidarity with others who are similarly deprived.
Justice sensitivity from a victim perspective (JS-Self) can be considered as a dispositional tendency
to experience relative deprivation. It involves individual tendencies to fear of being deprived or ex-
ploited (Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 2005), to feel anger about personal or group-
based deprivation (e.g., Gollwitzer & Rothmund, 2011; Rothmund, Stavrova, & Schlösser, 2017),
and to retaliate when disadvantaged (e.g., Baumert et al., 2014).
Other-oriented justice concerns reflect concerns about social justice for other individuals or
groups and corresponding affective reactions (e.g., outrage, compassion, guilt). These concerns can
be considered as moral concerns that guide people’s political thinking and behavior independently of
their individual or collective interests (Baumert, Rothmund, Thomas, Gollwitzer, & Schmitt, 2013).
Although there is hardly a shared definition of morality, scholars generally assume that moral con-
cerns “must bear on the interest or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other
than the judge or agent” (Gewirth, 1984, p. 978). Research indicates that justice sensitivity from
other-oriented perspectives (JS-Others) is related to empathy and social responsibility (Schmitt et al.,
2005) and that it predicts prosocial reactions to unequal allocations in the context of economic games
(Baumert, Schlösser, & Schmitt, 2014; Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; Lotz, Baumert, Schlösser,
Gresser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011; Lotz, Schlösser, Cain, & Fetchenhauer, 2013). For example, persons
high on JS-Others give a substantial share of their endowment to powerless other persons, even when
they are tempted to act selfishly (Lotz et al., 2013).
It is important to note that JS-Self and JS-Others are correlated (Baumert & Schmitt, 2016;
r=.22–.52), which has been interpreted as evidence of a general justice motive that underlies both
self-oriented and other-oriented justice concerns (for an overview, see Ellard, Harvey, & Callan,
2016). Despite this correlation, we argue that JS-Self and JS-Others provide opposing motivations
when it comes to supporting populist radical-right parties and politicians: JS-Self should increase
and JS-Others should decrease people’s preferences to vote for populist radical-right parties and
politicians. In the following paragraph, we hypothesize how these links are mediated by political
attitudes that constitute a populist radical right ideology.

4Rothmund et al.
Populist Radical Right Ideology and Justice Sensitivity Towards Self Versus Others
In what is now a seminal work, Mudde (2007) postulated three core elements of a populist
radical-right ideology: nativism, populism, and authoritarianism, where nativism is considered the
most central feature. It reflects the individual’s belief “that states should be inhabited exclusively
by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are
fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (p. 19). While the concept of nativism is
essentially subjective upon who or what is (non-)native, it includes a combination of nationalism and
xenophobia and is often expressed in anti-immigration sentiments. Authoritarianism reflects a belief
in a strictly ordered society, in which conventions must be enforced and infringements of authority
are to be punished severely (Mudde, 2007). The historical roots of this concept lie in the work of
Adorno and colleagues (1969) who defined authoritarianism as “a general disposition to glorify, to be
subservient to and remain uncritical toward authoritative figures of the ingroup and to take an attitude
of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some moral authority” (p. 228). Continuing and ex-
tending this work, the concept of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) has been defined by Altemeyer
(1981) who postulated three constituent elements, namely submission to “strong” or charismatic
leaders (authoritarian submission), aggression against deviants and “weak” scapegoats (authoritarian
aggression), and the holding of traditional, conventional views about politics and morality (author-
itarian conventionalism). Finally, populism is considered a unique set of ideas, in which politics is
seen as a Manichean struggle between the will of the people and a conspiring elite (Hawkins, 2009).
It is generally defined as a “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be separated into two
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues
that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde,
2004, p. 543). As a thin-centered ideology, populism can be combined with different host ideologies
such as, for example, a radical-right political belief system (Stanley, 2008).
There is empirical evidence that each of these three attitude dimensions predicts the willingness
of people to vote for populist radical-right parties. For example, scholars have demonstrated rela-
tions with nativist attitudes (e.g., Cutts, Ford, & Goodwin, 2011; Ford, Goodwin, & Cutts, 2012;
Ivarsflaten, 2008), authoritarian attitudes (e.g., Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000; Smith & Hanley, 2018),
and populist attitudes (e.g., Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014; Ford, Goodwin, & Cutts, 2012).
Only few studies have been conducted to test whether these attitude dimensions complement each
other’s predictive validity. For example, van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018) provided evidence that
populist attitudes, cultural conventionalism, and anti-immigration sentiments can serve as indepen-
dent predictors of voting for populist radical-right parties in different European countries.
Following this line of research, we assume that populist attitudes, authoritarian attitudes, and
nativist attitudes can serve as independent mediators between justice concerns and preferences for
populist radical-right parties and politicians. In the subsequent paragraphs, we outline research that
links social justice concerns to these components of populist radical-right ideology (see Figure 1 for
an overview of our hypotheses).
Populist Attitudes
Globalization makes western societies change extremely fast. Many scholars have argued that
these changes trigger psychological uncertainty, grievances, and frustrations, which in turn make
populist thinking attractive (e.g. Golder, 2016; Mudde, 2007). Pettigrew (2017) linked this line of
argumentation to relative deprivation theory. He argues that globalization makes some people feel as
losers in the sense that they feel deprived of what they perceive themselves to be entitled to. But how
can relative deprivation foster populist attitudes? When behavioral reactions to relative deprivation
(e.g., collective action) is not possible or not successful, relative deprivation can motivate cognitive

5
Justice for the People
coping strategies such as blaming other individuals or outgroups (see Smith et al., 2012). A feeling
of relative deprivation due to societal change might translate into populist thinking and scapegoat-
ing of politicians. In two Belgian samples, Spruyt and colleagues showed that people who experi-
enced group-based (Spruyt, Keppens, & Droogenbroeck, 2016) or personal deprivation (Elchardus
& Spruyt, 2016) were more inclined to report populist attitudes. The authors argue that blaming “the
establishment” and “politics” for privileging others and for tolerating and covering up social injustice
can serve as a psychological coping strategy for people who feel relatively deprived. We aim to com-
plement and extend the work done by Spruyt and colleagues in three ways. First, we focus on the link
between populist attitudes and stable individual differences in people’s propensity to feel relatively
deprived. By doing so, our research enhances the understanding of populist thinking from a personal-
ity perspective. We argue that JS-Self should foster populist thinking. There is some preliminary sup-
port for this assumption (Agroskin, Jonas, & Traut-Mattausch, 2015; Traut-Mattausch, Guter, Zanna,
Jonas, & Frey, 2011). For example, Agroskin et al. (2015) demonstrated that people high on JS-Self
tended to oppose political reforms because they were more likely to distrust political elites and attri-
bute sinister motives to political agents with opposing opinions. Second, we do not only assess popu-
list attitudes but also party and candidate preferences. This allows us to test whether the link between
justice concerns and populist attitudes translates into preferences for populist radical-right parties and
politicians. Third, we investigate different attitude components of populist radical-right ideology in
parallel. This allows us to test whether populist attitudes are a mediator of justice concerns on populist
radical-right voting preferences even when we control for the effect of the other components.
H1: Individual differences in JS-Self positively predict populist attitudes and, thus, preferences
for populist radical-right political agents.
Nativist Attitudes
There is a compelling body of evidence linking relative deprivation and nativist attitudes, espe-
cially anti-immigration attitudes and prejudice against ethnical outgroups (for a meta-analysis, see
Smith et al., 2012). The most well-documented effect is that collective deprivation experiences can fos-
ter anti-immigration sentiments (e.g., Ellemers, 2002; Jetten, Mols, & Postmes, 2015; Taylor, 2002).
For example, Jetten et al. (2015) used a hypothetical society paradigm and showed that people who
perceived themselves to be deprived relative to other parts of society were more opposed towards im-
migrants than participants in a moderate wealth group condition. Consistent with this finding, political
Figure 1. Theoretical model. Arrows with“+”indicate an expected positive relation, arrows with “–” indicate an expected
negative relation, and arrows with no symbol indicate no expected relation.

6Rothmund et al.
economy researchers have argued that attitudes towards immigrants are affected by the extent to which
immigrants are perceived to threaten material self-interest (Mayda, 2006; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001).
Similar findings have also been reported from an individual differences perspective. In the context of
the German reunification and the introduction of a solidarity tax (an additional income tax aimed at
alleviating the economic disparities between former East and West), JS-Self among the residents of
former West Germany was positively related to the fear of a negative future and to the anger about the
residents of former East Germany (Süssenbach & Gollwitzer, 2015; Study 1). This effect extends to
attitudes toward migrant groups, with Germans high on JS-Self being more likely to experience anger
at migrant groups when these groups are presented as having exploitative motives (Süssenbach &
Gollwitzer, 2015; Study 2). Accordingly, we hypothesize that stable individual differences in people’s
sensitivity to feel personally or collectively deprived predict anti-immigration sentiments.
Recently, Anderson, Stuart, and Rossen (2015) provided evidence for a negative relation be-
tween other-oriented justice concerns and nativist attitudes. Using an Australian sample, they showed
that preferences for social fairness predicted positive attitudes towards asylum seekers over and
above social dominance orientation and RWA. Research on justice sensitivity also indicates that JS-
Others is a positive predictor of higher solidarity with disadvantaged outgroups (Rothmund et al.,
2017). During the Euro Crisis, Germans high on JS-Others were more likely to support solidarity
with countries in need of financial support. These correlations were mediated by reduced resent-
ments towards debtor countries and increased empathy towards the outgroup. An opposing pattern
was found for JS-Self, which was negatively related to solidarity with debtor countries. The latter
effect was mediated by increased nationalistic concerns and increased resentments towards debtor
countries. Based on these findings, we hypothesize that JS-Self and JS-Others have opposing effects
on nativist attitudes and, thus, on preferences to vote for populist radical-right parties and politicians.
H2: Anti-immigration attitudes are positively predicted by JS-Self and negatively predicted by
JS-Others. Opposing effects of JS-Self and JS-Others on preferences for populist radical-right
political agents are mediated by anti-immigration attitudes.
Authoritarian Attitudes
Duckitt and Sibley (2010) proposed a theoretical model in which they argue that RWA reflects
a way of coping with existential threat (see also Sibley, Osborne, & Duckitt, 2012). People high on
JS-Self are especially sensitive to perceive and experience threatening social cues. For example,
they rated faces with neutral expressions as less trustworthy and underestimated the cooperativeness
of strangers of whom they saw only short video clips (Gollwitzer, Rothmund, Alt, & Jekel, 2012).
Based on these findings, we expect a positive relation between JS-Self and RWA.
There have also been some attempts to investigate how RWA relates to fairness as a moral prin-
ciple (Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt, 2013; Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014). Both studies
found substantial correlations between RWA and group-binding moral foundations (loyalty, author-
ity, purity). Concerning relations with fairness, results are mixed. Whereas Kugler et al. (2014) found
small to medium negative correlations of fairness with RWA, Federico et al. (2013) presented small
positive correlations. Because these studies do not show a consistent pattern of relations between
RWA and social justice concerns, we do not propose specific hypotheses on the relation between
JS-Others and RWA.
H3: Right-wing authoritarian attitudes are positively predicted by individual differences in JS-
Self. Positive effects of JS-Self on preferences for populist radical-right political agents are in
part mediated by RWA.

7
Justice for the People
Data and Measures
We tested our hypotheses in two national samples, one in the United States and one in Germany.
Both samples were recruited using quota sampling to represent the adult population of each country
in regard to age, gender, and level of education. The U.S. data was collected during the 2016 presi-
dential election campaign by a professional survey firm (SSI; www.surve ysamp ling.com) between
August 16 and September 9, 2016, yielding a total number of N=1500 participants with valid cases.
The German sample was recruited between October 21 and October 28, 2016 by the professional
survey firm Respondi (https ://www.respo ndi.com). The total number of valid cases was N= 848.
Both samples show an adequate fit with the distribution of the quoted variables in the general public
of the respective country (for an overview on the sampling procedure and the sample characteristics,
see the online supporting information). The data of both studies, scripts and detailed information on
the surveys can be freely accessed (https://osf.io/e2cmb/).
Measures
The exact wording of all items, descriptive analyses, andthe estimates of reliability and intercor-
relationof all scales in the United States and in Germany are reported in the online supporting infor-
mation. Preference for populist radical-right political agents was measured differently in the United
States and in Germany. In the United States, participants were asked which candidate of the 2016
presidential election best represented their views. Participants could choose from a list of eight candi-
dates: Jeb Bush, Hillary Clinton, Ted Cruz, Gary Johnson, Rand Paul, Austin Petersen, Bernie Sanders,
and Donald Trump.1 In Germany’s multiparty system, we asked participants which political party they
were most likely to vote for if federal elections were held at that point in time. Eight options were
proposed, namely CDU/CSU, SPD, Die Linke, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, FDP, AfD, Piratenpartei, and
NPD. We considered Donald Trump (the choice of 29.6% of the sample) and AfD (17.5%) as the
populist radical-right vote choices. Despite these agents’ different contexts and characteristics, both
Trump and AfD share a political view characterized by the amalgamation of nativism, populism, and
authoritarianism (Golder, 2016). Most prominently, Trump and AfD explore cultural cleavages to
defend “the nation” from invading foreigners threatening the homogeneity of its people as well as its
culture and traditions. As for the populist component, both agents frame their set of political ideas by
juxtaposing a moralized version of “the people” and “the elite,” with a marked preference for the
former all the while invoking an interpretation of democratic processes that argues political decisions
should be taken according to the will of the people. In addition, in terms of modus operandi, both
agents are guided by anti-establishment, anti-muslim, anti-media, and anti-immigration rhetoric.
Justice sensitivity was assessed with an eight-item short scale by Baumert et al. (2014). In both
samples, the two items indicating victim sensitivity were combined to measure justice sensitivity
towards the self (e.g., “It makes me angry when others are undeservingly better off than me”). The
other six item (indicating observer sensitivity, beneficiary sensitivity, and perpetrator sensitivity)
were combined to measure justice sensitivity towards others (e.g., “I am upset when someone is un-
deservingly worse off than others”; “I feel guilty when I am better off than others for no reason”; “I
feel guilty when I enrich myself at the cost of others”). Validity of the German versions of the short
scales has been reported by Baumert et al. (2014) and by Beierlein, Baumert, Schmitt, Kemper, and
1In the U.S. election system, the relation between candidate preference and voting intention is different from the relation be-
tween party preference and voting intention in the German election system. By measuring candidate preference (and not
voting preference), we aimed to minimize the effect of party identification on the dependent variable. Although some of the
candidates had already been out of the race at the time of our survey, we aimed to maximize the potential variance in candidate
preference by including most prominent candidates in the list.

8Rothmund et al.
Rammstedt (2013). Validity of the English versions has been provided using the 10-item original
versions of the scales (e.g., Decety & Yoder, 2016; Yoder & Decety, 2014).
We assessed populist attitudes with the same six-item populist attitudes short scale (PASS-6) in
both samples. The scale consisted of two items for each of three facets of populist thinking, namely
antiestablishment sentiments, belief in the will of the people, and a Manichean worldview. Our scale
provides strict measurement equivalence between both national samples. Information on the items,
the item selection process, construct validity, and measurement invariance across the two countries
are provided in the online supporting information. In the United States, we measured RWA with
the 12-item scale by Funke (2005). In Germany, we used the nine-item KSA-3 scale by Beierlein,
Asbrock, Kauff, and Schmidt (2014). In both countries, we used the same two items to measure
anti-immigration attitudes (“Borders should be closed for asylum seekers”; “Immigrants increase
crime rates”).
Results
We started our analyses by investigating the mean levels of attitude measures and justice sensi-
tivity in participants with preferences for populist radical-right political agents compared to the rest
of the sample. All variables were z-standardized. Mean levels are displayed in Figure 2. The results
indicate that participants with a preference for Trump (United States) or AfD (Germany) reported
higher means on populist attitudes, RWA, and anti-immigration attitudes compared to the rest of the
sample. This pattern is in line with the general assumption that all three attitude dimensions provide
a demand for populist radical-right parties and politicians. Focusing on the mean levels of justice
sensitivity, the findings are not totally in line with our theoretical predictions. As expected, we do
find that participants with a preference for Trump (United States) or AfD (Germany) reported lower
means on JS-Others. The findings on JS-Self are mixed. Participants with a preference for AfD
Figure 2. z-transformed group means. Error bars indicate standard error of means.

9
Justice for the People
reported higher means on JS-Self compared to the rest of the German sample. However, participants
with a preference for Trump reported lower means on JS-Self compared to the rest of the U.S. sample.
As noted before, we should keep in mind that JS-Self and JS-Others are substantially correlated
(r=.30 in Germany, r= .49 in the United States; bivariate correlations between all variables are
displayed in Table 1). Due to this correlation, opposing effects of JS-Others and JS-Self on populist
radical-right voting preferences might be suppressed when we look at the mean differences only (see
Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004, for a detailed analysis on how correlated personality
predictors can create suppressor situations). We calculated logistic regression analyses to test this
assumption directly.
Effects of JS-Self and JS-Others on Voting Preferences
We regressed preference for Trump (and AfD, respectively) on JS-Self and JS-Others in two
logistic regression models, including age, sex, income, and level of formal education as control
variables. Justice sensitivity predicted preferences for populist radical-right political agents inde-
pendent of the controls in the United States and in Germany. Focusing on the specific relations, we
found the same pattern in both countries: JS-Self was a positive predictor of preferences for Trump
in the United States (b=0.10; p=.039; odds ratio [OR]=1.11) and for AfD in Germany (b=0.20;
p=.004; OR=1.22). In other words, for each unit increase in JS-Self, the odds of supporting Trump
(AfD) compared to the other candidates (parties) increased by 11% (22%), holding all other variables
constant. At the same time, JS-Others decreased the odds to vote for Trump (b=−0.37; p<.001;
OR=0.69) and AfD (b=−0.45; p<.001; OR=0.64). In other words, for each unit increase in JS-
Others, the odds of supporting Trump (AfD) compared to the other candidates (parties) decreased by
31% (36%), holding all other variables constant. In a second model, we added the interaction term
of JS-Self and JS-Others as an additional predictor. Interaction effects were nonsignificant in both
countries (see the online supporting information).
Effects of Populist Radical-Right Attitude Dimensions on Political Preferences
To test the indirect effects of justice sensitivity via attitude dimensions on political preferences,
we specified and analyzed the same path model using the German and the U.S. dataset (see Figure 1).
In line with previous research indicating that populist attitudes, anti-immigration attitudes, and RWA
are correlated substantially (Rooduijn, 2014), we allowed for correlations between these variables
in the statistical model. Control variables (age, sex, income, and level of formal education) were
included as predictors in all paths leading to populist attitudes, anti-immigration attitudes, RWA,
and preference for populist radical-right agents. We restricted direct effects of JS-Self and JS-Others
on political preferences to zero. Models with direct effects can be found in the online supporting
information. There are no meaningful differences in the parameters between the models with and
without direct effects. We interpret this as evidence for the robustness of our model. Since our de-
pendent variable is dichotomous, we used WLSMV estimation (cf. Beauducel & Herzberg, 2006).
Both models showed a good fit (United States: χ2(2)=3.98, p=.14; RMSEA=.026; SRMR=.004;
CFI= .998; Germany: χ2(2)=10.00, p= .007; RMSEA=.069; SRMR=.013; CFI= .980; cf. Hu
& Bentler, 1999). The path coefficients for both models are depicted in Figure 3 (U.S. model) and
Figure 4 (German model). A complete report of parameter estimates can be found in the online sup-
porting information.
In the U.S. model, all three attitude dimensions of a populist radical-right ideology predicted
preferences for Trump (see Figure 3). In other words, populist attitudes (OR=1.09), anti-immigra-
tion attitudes (OR=1.20), and RWA (OR=1.21) increased the likelihood of preferring Trump over
the other candidates independent of each other. In the German model, we found a slightly different

10 Rothmund et al.
Table 1. Intercorrelations Between Sociodemographic Variables and Scales
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
1. Age – .02 .01 .21** −.24** −.03 .08 −.11* .11* −.06
2. Sex .20** – −.04 .12* .02 −.21** .02 .00 −.03 .04
3. Education .21** .09** – .27** −.13** −.07 −.28** −.28** −.19** −.15**
4. Income .23** .09** .48** – −.18** −.11* −.12* −.10 .03 −.03
5. Justice sensitivity (Self) −.31** −.17** −.13** −.18** – .30** .20** .29** .22** .09
6. Justice sensitivity (Others) −.22** −.22** −.11** −.14** .49** – .05 −.04 −.02 −.12*
7. Populist attitudes .19** .07* −.10** −.02 .06* −.03 – .52** .34** .26**
8. Anti-immigration attitudes .17** .09** −.15** −.01 .02 −.24** .34** – .43** .42**
9. Right-wing authoritarianism .24** .08** −.10** .00 −.13** −.23** .27** .62** – .08
10. Preference for Trump/AfD .23** .13** −.07* .02 −.09** −.20** .27** .47** .41** –
Obs.: Upper diagonal: Germany; Lower diagonal: United States; AfD = “Alternative für Deutschland”; Sex: Higher values indicate “male.”
*p<.05; **p<.01.

11
Justice for the People
pattern. Again, all three attitude dimensions predicted the likelihood to prefer AfD over other politi-
cal parties (see Figure 4). As expected, populist attitudes (OR=1.07) and anti-immigration attitudes
(OR= 1.31) increased the likelihood of a preference for AfD. Contrary to our expectations, RWA
was a negative predictor of preferences for the AfD in the German dataset (OR=0.74). Keeping all
other variables constant, increasing RWA reduced the likelihood that the participants in our sample
preferred AfD over other political parties. We calculated tests for multicollinearity in order to rule out
statistical explanations for this contra-intuitive effect. Since all variance inflation factors (VIF) are
relatively low (all VIFs<2, see the online supporting information) in comparison to the cutoffs that
are discussed in the literature (cf. O’Brien, 2007), we do not assume multicollinearity to be problem-
atic for the interpretation of our findings.
Indirect Effects of JS-Selfon Voting Preferences
The path model indicates positive relations of JS-Self with populist attitudes and anti-immi-
gration attitudes in the United States and in Germany (see Figures 3 and 4). We calculated indirect
effects in order to assess whether and how JS-Self can translate into political preferences by means
of enhancing these attitude dimensions. In the United States, we found indirect effects of JS-Self on
preferences for Trump via anti-immigration attitudes (OR=1.07) and populist attitudes (OR=1.01).
There was no significant indirect effect via RWA. Interpreting the odds ratio, we can say that—all
Figure 3. Path model in the U.S. sample explaining preference for Donald Trump as presidential candidate. Coefficients are
standardized estimates. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.
Figure 4. Path model in the German sample explaining voting preference for the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland).
Coefficients are standardized estimates. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

12 Rothmund et al.
other predictors held constant—increasing the JS-Self scale by one unit enhances the odds of prefer-
ring Trump over the other candidates by 1% via increased populist attitudes and by 7% via increased
anti-immigration attitudes. In Germany, we found the same indirect effects of JS-Self on preferences
for AfD via populist attitudes (OR=1.01) and anti-immigration attitudes (OR=1.16). Increasing the
JS-Self scale by one unit enhances the odds of preferring AfD over the other candidates by 1% via
increased populist attitudes and by 16% via increased anti-immigration attitudes. In Germany, RWA
operated as an additional mediator, with higher values in JS-Self leading to higher RWA, which in
turn inhibited preference for the AfD (OR=0.96).
Summing up, we found support for our first and second hypotheses (H1, H2): Effects of JS-Self
on preferences for Trump and the AfD were mediated by populist attitudes and anti-immigration
sentiments. Our findings are not in line with the third hypothesis (H3): We find no evidence that self-
oriented justice concerns foster preferences for populist radical-right parties or politicians via RWA.
Indirect Effects of JS-Others on Voting Preferences
We found negative relations of JS-Others with anti-immigration attitudes and RWA in Germany
and the United States (see Figures 3 and 4). Indirect effect analyses revealed that JS-Others reduced
the odds of preferring Trump over other candidates in the United States via lower anti-immigration
attitudes (OR= 0.89) and lower RWA (OR =0.95). Interpreting the odds ratio, we can say that—
all other predictors held constant—increasing the JS-Others scale by one unit reduces the odds of
preferring Trump over the other candidates by 11% via reduced anti-immigration attitudes and by
5% via lower RWA. In the German model, we found a negative indirect effect of JS-Others via anti-
immigration attitudes (OR=0.87) and a small positive effect via RWA (OR=1.03). Increasing the
JS-Others scale by one unit reduces the odds of preferring Trump over the other candidates by 13%
via reduced anti-immigration attitudes and enhances the odds of preferring Trump over the other
candidates by 3% via lower RWA.
On a general level, we gathered support for our second hypothesis in regard to JS-Others (H2):
Negative relations between JS-Others and preferences for Trump and the AfD were mediated by
anti-immigration sentiments in both samples.
Discussion
The primary aim of this article was to investigate the motivational antecedents of populist radi-
cal-right sentiments and voting preferences from the perspective of social justice research. Our stud-
ies complement previous research by focusing on relatively stable individual differences in justice
sensitivity, a multidimensional personality concept that taps into how sensitive people are in experi-
encing and responding to injustice from different social perspectives (Baumert & Schmitt, 2016). We
summarize our main findings and discuss how these speak to the research questions.
Do dispositional justice concerns predict populist radical-right voting preferences? Justice sen-
sitivity predicts support for Donald Trump in the United States and for AfD in Germany. This finding
complements existing research by showing that preferences for populist radical-right political agents
are not only related to temporal states of perceived injustice (i.e., relative deprivation) but also to
stable individual differences in how people evaluate social justice issues. In doing so, our research
contributes to a current discussion whether personality measures can predict preferences for popu-
list radical-right parties across different national contexts (see Rooduijn, 2018). It adds to a grow-
ing body of evidence linking personality and populist voting (e.g., Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016;
Bakker et al., 2016; Heiss & Matthes, 2017). Whereas previous studies have primarily focused on
relations with Big Five personality dispositions (e.g., Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; Bakker et al.,
2016; Fatke, 2019; Heiss & Matthes, 2017), our study is the first to show that preferences for populist

13
Justice for the People
radical-right political agents can be linked to stable individual differences in how people perceive
and evaluate fairness in the distribution of resources in society. Importantly, there is evidence that
individual differences in justice sensitivity do not substantially overlap with Big Five facets (Schmitt
et al., 2005).
The present findings indicate that dispositional justice concerns are conversely related to prefer-
ences for populist radical-right political agents. Self-oriented justice concerns were positive predic-
tors of preferences for Trump (United States) and AfD (Germany). This finding supports and extends
the notion that feelings of relative deprivation can foster populist radical-right voting preferences
(Pettigrew, 2017). It indicates that having a dispositional tendency to feel deprived can motivate peo-
ple to support populist radical-right political parties and politicians. Other-oriented justice concerns
were negative predictors of preferences to vote for Trump (United States) and AfD (Germany). This
finding can be interpreted as evidence that being genuinely concerned about social justice (not only
for oneself but also for others) motivates people to oppose populist radical-right parties or politicians.
In our analyses, JS-Self and JS-Others did not interactively predict populist radical-right pref-
erences—the effects of JS-Self are independent of the level of JS-Others within a given person and
vice versa. We suggest we take this as preliminary evidence for two conclusions: First, the higher the
levels of both, JS-Others and JS-Self within a given person, the more likely these people are experi-
encing an intrapersonal conflict about whether to support or to oppose populist radical-right political
agents. Since both dimensions of justice sensitivity are correlated (r=.30 in Germany, r=.49 in the
United States), these conflicts should occur in a substantial amount of justice-sensitive individuals.
This perspective on intrapersonal justice conflicts preceding populist radical-right voting prefer-
ences complements existing literature arguing that new forms of interpersonal conflicts follow from
globalization (e.g., Kriesi et al., 2012). Second, whether individuals with high JS-Self and high JS-
Others are inclined to support or to oppose populist radical-right political agents in a given context is
likely to depend on the social perspective that is salient in the individual’s social environment. This
assumption is based on evidence that the effects of justice sensitivity on attitudes and behavior are
generally conditional to situational cues (for an overview, see Baumert & Schmitt, 2016; Gollwitzer,
Rothmund, & Süssenbach, 2013). In the case of preferences for populist radical-right parties and
politicians, these contextual influences might result from a variety of different variables, such as
individual development of socioeconomic status (e.g., employment, income), communication with
friends and family, or mass media consumption.
Which components of a populist radical-right ideology mediate the relation between justice
concerns and preferences for populist radical-right political agents? Empirical research from the
demand-side perspective has aimed to identify a set of political attitudes that predicts voting for pop-
ulist radical-right parties and politicians. Mudde (2007) proposed three candidates for such a pop-
ulist radical-right ideology, namely nativism, populism, and authoritarianism. Our findings support
this theoretical assumption for nativism and populism by showing that both ideological components
contribute independently to the prediction of voting preferences for Donald Trump in the United
States and for AfD in Germany. In both samples, anti-immigration sentiments had the highest unique
explanatory power. This result is in line with the theoretical claim that nativism is at the heart of a
populist radical-right ideology (Mudde, 2007).
In our analyses, anti-immigration attitudes mediate opposing effects of JS-Self and JS-Others.
This finding suggests that nativism provides a “battleground” for justice conflicts in modern western
societies (see Practical Implications). We also found evidence for indirect effects of self-oriented
justice concerns via populist attitudes. This finding extends previous research in two important ways.
First, it supports the notion of populism as a thin-centered attitude that is generally independent of
right-wing political attitudes (e.g., Mudde, 2007). In other words, there are two independent psy-
chological pathways for how self-oriented justice concerns promote preferences for populist radi-
cal-right parties and politicians: via nativism and via populism. Social justice research does provide

14 Rothmund et al.
some theoretical explanations for the latter link: For example, people high on JS-Self are more in-
clined to attribute sinister motives to political agents with opposing views (Agroskin et al., 2015).
A different explanation is based on the assumption that blaming political elites provides a psycho-
logical coping strategy for people who experience personal or group-based relative deprivation
(Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016). Second, our research indicates that populism accounts for a smaller
mediation effect compared to nativism. This is not only due to a weaker link between populist atti-
tudes and preferences for Trump or AfD. There is also a weaker link between JS-Self and populist
sentiments compared to anti-immigration attitudes. This could indicate that populism is generally
less powerful in translating self-oriented justice concerns into preferences for populist radical-right
agents. However, we think that this interpretation should be made with caution because the absolute
size of effects might also depend on narratives of populist radical-right parties and politicians that
change over time.
Contrary to our expectations, RWA was a negative predictor of AfD preferences in Germany.
We suggest a theoretical explanation for this finding. Recently, there has been some evidence that
the link between RWA and radical-right political thinking varies and can even be reversed depending
on the predominant cultural norm in the respective society. Roets, Au, and Van Hiel (2015) showed
that in Singapore, where political authorities explicitly and relentlessly endorses diversity, RWA was
positively related to support of multiculturalism. In a similar vein, there is a strong cultural norm in
Germany that radical-right parties must not attain political power on a nation-wide level due to the
historical experiences in Nazi-Germany. This norm is strongly endorsed by authorities and might
explain why increasing RWA—keeping all other predictors constant—results in a reduced likelihood
for preferring the AfD over other political parties. On a more general level, this interpretation opens
up a novel and provocative perspective on the widely adopted postulate that authoritarianism is inev-
itably positively predictive of preferences for populist radical-right parties and politicians (see also
Bilewicz, Soral, Marchlewska, & Winiewski, 2017).
Limitations
This research comes with some limitations. Importantly, our data is correlational. We believe
that the causal pathways we tested are the most plausible ones. However, we cannot rule out that a
different causal relation accounts for this pattern of findings. For example, political attitudes might
translate into justice concerns and not vice versa. However, there is evidence that justice sensitivity
is highly stable over time (e.g., Schmitt et al., 2010). This speaks against that interpretation. Another
limitation can be seen in the fact that we used different measures of RWA in Germany and the United
States. Although both scales have been validated and are widely accepted in their national contexts,
we cannot rule out that they measure different notions of authoritarianism and that this is the reason
for some of the unexpected findings related to RWA. We also measured the construct of nativism
in a rather narrow sense. Anti-immigration sentiments are supposed to be a cornerstone of nativist
thinking. However, there are potentially other components of nativism such as protectionist attitudes
or nationalism that our measure did not reflect in an adequate manner (see Mudde, 2007).
Practical Implications
The present research has practical implications for political communication, conflict resolution,
and political counseling. From the perspective of communication, our studies suggest that different
ways of discussing migration politics (especially in regard to political refugees) are likely to trig-
ger different justice notions in citizens. It is plausible to assume that the framing of immigration
issues from either a national security perspective (self-oriented justice concerns) or a human rights

15
Justice for the People
perspective (other-oriented justice concerns) can emphasize different justice notions and, thus, be
potentially impactful in influencing the political leanings of individuals and even societies.
Political attitudes in the general public are increasingly polarized, especially in the United States
(Pew Research Center, 2014). Political polarization is likely to come along with interpersonal and
intergroup conflicts, and one of the pressing political questions is how to deal with these kinds of
conflicts. Improving the psychological understanding of how different justice notions can fuel socie-
tal conflicts could provide a fruitful avenue. For example, Montada (2007) suggested that individual
differences in justice notions must be qualified and put into perspective. By doing so, individuals are
likely to understand how subjective evaluations of social justice differ based on social perspectives.
This should foster mutual understanding in justice conflicts and decrease the likelihood that conflicts
lead to aggression and violence.
From the perspective of political counseling, one way to deal with our findings could be to
counteract self-oriented social justice concerns about immigration politics. This could be done by
providing people and municipalities with additional resources to foster the wealth and social stand-
ing of those people who are directly or indirectly involved in the integration process. Importantly,
these resources should not be used for the integration of immigrants but rather to improve the living
conditions of those residents who are likely to feel deprived by immigration. By doing so, politics
might be able to buffer and counteract fears of deprivation and disadvantages that are triggered by
immigration, especially in individuals with self-oriented justice concerns.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Tobias Rothmund, Friedrich-Schiller
University Jena, Ernst-Abbe-Platz 8, 07743 Jena, Germany. E-mail: tobias.rothmund@uni-jena.de
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Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher’s
web site:
Sample Information and Inclusion Criteria (US)
Table 1: Population and sample distribution of quota variables (age, sex, education, income, PID)
in the US sample
Sample Information and Inclusion Criteria (Germany)
Table 2: Population and sample distribution of quota variables (age, sex, education) in the German
sample
List of Item Wordings (US)
Table 3: Item wording and response codes of the US items
List of Item Wordings (Germany)
Table 4: Item wording and response codes of the German items
Descriptive Statistics of Scales
Table 5: Descriptive Statistic of Scales (US)
Table 6: Descriptive Statistic of Scales (Germany)
Intercorrelations between Constructs
Table 7: Intercorrelations between all sociodemographic variables and relevant scales
Software Report
Construction and Validation of the PASS-6
Table 8: Wording and sources for all 13 populist attitude items
Figure 1: Screeplot of exploratory factor analyses
Table 9: Item loadings if the three factor solution for the US data
Table 10: Item loadings if the three factor solution for the German data
Table 11: Six-item scale of populist attitudes (US)
Table 12: Intercorrelations between items (US)
Table 13: Six-item scale of populist attitudes (Germany)
Table 14: Intercorrelations between items (Germany)
Table 15: Fit indices of measurement equivalence models
Table 16: Overview of items used for construct validation (US)
Table 17: Overview of items used for construct validation (Germany)
Table 18: Construct validity (US)
Table 19: Construct validity (Germany)
Table 20: Stepwise logistic regression model to predict preference for populist candidates (US)

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Justice for the People
Table 21: Stepwise logistic regression model to predict preference for populist parties (Germany)
SEM Including Direct Effects (US)
Figure 2. Path diagram of SEM including direct effects (US).
SEM Including Direct Effects (Germany)
Figure 3. Path diagram of SEM including direct effects (Germany).
SEM without Direct Effects (US)
Figure 4. Path diagram of SEM without direct effects (US).
SEM without Direct Effects (Germany)
Figure 5. Path diagram of SEM without direct effects (Germany).
Logistic Regression on Justice Sensitivity (US)
Logistic Regression on Justice Sensitivity (Germany)
Logistic Regression on Justice Sensitivity with Interaction (US)
Logistic Regression on Justice Sensitivity with Interaction (Germany)
Tests of Multicollinearity
Table 22: VIF values for predictors of preference for Trump (US data):
Table 23: VIF values for predictors of preference for AfD (German data):