Envy: An Adversarial Review and Comparison of Two Competing Views

Abstract

The nature of envy has recently been the subject of a heated debate. Some researchers see envy as a complex, yet unitary construct that despite being hostile in nature can lead to both hostile and non-hostile reactions. Others offer a dual approach to envy, in which envy’s outcomes reflect two types of envy: benign envy, involving upward motivation, and malicious envy, involving hostility against superior others. We compare these competing conceptualizations of envy in an adversarial (yet collaborative) review. Our goal is to aid the consumers of envy research in navigating the intricacies of this debate. We identify agreements and disagreements and describe implications for theory, methodology, and measurement, as well as challenges and opportunities for future work.

Full text

https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073919873131
Emotion Review
1 –19
© The Author(s) 2019
ISSN 1754-0739
DOI: 10.1177/1754073919873131
https://journals.sagepub.com/home/emr
Scholars agree that envy is an unpleasant emotion resulting
from self-relevant, upward social comparisons. However, the
conceptualization, nature, and outcomes of envy are debated.
Historically, envy has mostly been viewed as motivating hostile
reactions (i.e., cognitive, behavioral, and emotional ways of ful-
filling the motivational goals inherent in envy), such as harming
the envied person or the desired resource. Nevertheless, envy
also predicts nonhostile reactions, such as increased effort to
self-improve. This diversity has aroused a debate regarding
whether these various reactions result from one envy type or
from different types of envy. In this article, we compare two
such approaches to envy.1
Traditionally, researchers considered envy as one emotion,
referred to here as the unitary approach. In this approach, the
experience of envy involves pain and hostile feelings (for
reviews, see Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017b; Miceli &
Castelfranchi, 2007; Silver & Sabini, 1978b; Smith & Kim,
2007) designed to alarm people to their relatively inferior posi-
tion and to motivate behaviors designed to eliminate this inferi-
ority and the pain it entails. Some researchers from this approach
maintain that envy motivates hostile and nonhostile reactions
alike, explaining the wide range of reactions to envy. Therefore,
they differentiate between the hostile feelings that envious indi-
viduals experience and reactions to envy, which do not have to
Envy: An Adversarial Review and
Comparison of Two Competing Views
Jan Crusius*
Department of Psychology, University of Cologne, Germany
Manuel F. Gonzalez*
Department of Psychology, Baruch College, USA
The Graduate Center, The City University of New York, USA
Jens Lange*
Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Yochi Cohen-Charash*
Department of Psychology, Baruch College, USA
The Graduate Center, The City University of New York, USA
Abstract
The nature of envy has recently been the subject of a heated debate. Some researchers see envy as a complex, yet unitary construct
that despite being hostile in nature can lead to both hostile and nonhostile reactions. Others offer a dual approach to envy,
in which envy’s outcomes reflect two types of envy: benign envy, involving upward motivation, and malicious envy, involving
hostility against superior others. We compare these competing conceptualizations of envy in an adversarial (yet collaborative)
review. Our goal is to aid the consumers of envy research in navigating the intricacies of this debate. We identify agreements and
disagreements and describe implications for theory, methodology, and measurement, as well as challenges and opportunities for
future work.
Keywords
adversarial collaboration, benign envy, envy, malicious envy, social comparison
*Author note: All authors contributed equally to the writing of this article.
Corresponding authors: Jan Crusius, Department of Psychology, University of Cologne, Richard-Strauss-Str. 2, Cologne, 50931, Germany. Email: jan.crusius@uni-koeln.de
Yochi Cohen-Charash, Department of Psychology, Baruch College & the Graduate Center, The City University of New York, Box B8-215, 55 Lexington Ave, New York, NY 10010,
USA. Email: Yochi.cohen-charash@baruch.cuny.edu
873131EMR0010.1177/1754073919873131Emotion ReviewCrusius et al.
research-article2019
ARTICLE

2 Emotion Review
be hostile (Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017a, 2017b; Leach,
2008; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; Parrott & Smith, 1993; Tai,
Narayanan, & McAllister, 2012).
Recently, a typological approach to envy has gained signifi-
cant popularity. This dual approach proposes that two distinct
forms of envy—benign and malicious envy—can explain envy’s
diverse outcomes. Specifically, malicious envy entails hostile
feelings, thoughts, and action tendencies aimed at harming the
superior position of the envied other, whereas benign envy
entails feelings, thoughts, and action tendencies aimed at
improving the outcome of the envier. Thus, this account maps
divergent characteristics of envious reactions on qualitatively
different forms of envy (for reviews, see Crusius & Lange,
2017; Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018; Van de Ven, 2016).
Lately, it has been further suggested that these subtypes of envy
share a common element of pain about inferiority (Lange,
Weidman, & Crusius, 2018), which may explain why layper-
sons refer to them under the inclusive label “envy” in everyday
language (e.g., Van de Ven, 2016). Others in this approach have
suggested that, additionally, envy can be conceptualized and
measured as general envy, subsuming the specific forms (Van
de Ven, 2016).
Reflecting evolutionary thinking and social comparison the-
ories, both the unitary and the dual approaches maintain that
envy2 can be adaptive for the envious individual. Both posit that
the painful experience of envy alerts the envious individual to
self-evaluation threats or to being in an unfavorable position
with regard to important resources, motivating corrective action
(Heider, 1958; Hill & Buss, 2008; Tai et al., 2012; Tesser, 1991).
In line with social-functional approaches to emotions (A. H.
Fischer & Van Kleef, 2010; Keltner & Haidt, 1999), the func-
tions of envy may also be conceptualized at higher levels of
analysis (e.g., Foster, 1972; Schoeck, 1969). For example, envy
may contribute to and be shaped by how people navigate social
hierarchies (Crusius & Lange, 2017; Fiske, 2010; Steckler &
Tracy, 2014) or motivate economic growth (e.g., “keeping up
with the Joneses”; Foster, 1972; Gershman, 2014). However,
the two approaches reflect different takes on how envious reac-
tions evolve and contribute to social functioning.
Thus, there is no consensus about how to conceptualize, oper-
ationalize, and measure envy. Furthermore, disagreements also
exist within each approach, as reflected by inconsistencies in how
each group of researchers has conceptualized and operationalized
envy. These discrepancies have fueled both confusion and debates
regarding envy’s nature, measurement, and nomological network
(for reviews, see Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017a, 2017b; Lange,
Weidman, & Crusius, 2018; Van de Ven, 2016).
As proponents of envy as a unitary construct (Cohen-Charash
and Gonzalez) and proponents of distinguishing benign and
malicious envy (Crusius and Lange), we will compare these
competing conceptualizations of envy in an adversarial (yet col-
laborative) review. We do not intend to resolve this debate in the
current article. Instead, our goal is to enable a direct comparison
of the two approaches to facilitate informed decisions on how to
conceptualize and examine envy, which will hopefully facilitate
a resolution of the debate. To this goal, each group of writers
will answer the same questions, first by the unitary approach,
followed by the dual approach (which Cohen-Charash and
Gonzalez refer to as the typology approach).
Question 1: What Is the Nature of Envy?
The Unitary Approach
Envy has received numerous definitions over decades of theory
and research. Here, we define envy as:
A painful emotion that involves the beliefs that (a) one lacks a desired
object that another person has, and (b) the desired object is important to
the person’s self-concept or competitive position. Envy includes the
motivation to reduce the pain it entails and to improve one’s relative
standing. (Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017b, p. 26)
We view envy as involving both psychological pain (Takahashi
et al., 2009) and hostile feelings (e.g., Castelfranchi & Miceli,
2009; Smith, Parrott, Ozer, & Moniz, 1994). The pain results
from lacking the ego-relevant resource and being inferior to
another on that particular resource (e.g., Leach & Spears, 2008;
Parrott, 1991; Parrott & Smith, 1993; Smith et al., 1994; Tai
et al., 2012; Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988), which hurts one’s
self-concept (Smith et al., 1994). Another reason for the pain is
the perceived violation of the ought force—how things should
be (Heider, 1958; Tai et al., 2012). Thus, the pain is a compound
of unpleasant emotions, such as anger (e.g., Leach, 2008);
unhappiness, disapproval of the emotion (Parrott & Smith,
1993); resentment, inferiority (e.g., Smith & Kim, 2007); shame
and guilt regarding one’s inferiority (e.g., Parrott, 1991; Smith,
2004); disappointment (e.g., Salovey & Rodin, 1986); and
depression (e.g., Smith et al., 1994), among others.
Many researchers in the unitary approach also agree that
envy requires hostile feelings (e.g., Cohen-Charash, 2009;
Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; Smith & Kim, 2007), although
some dispute it (e.g., D’Arms & Kerr, 2008; Leach, 2008).
Hostile feelings can emerge for various reasons, such as associ-
ating one’s inferiority with the mere presence of the envied
other and wishing that the inferiority-arousing gap with the
other would disappear (Castelfranchi & Miceli, 2009), or per-
ceiving either the other’s relative advantages or one’s own rela-
tive inferior status as unfair (Smith, 1991; Smith et al., 1994).
However, even though envious individuals may feel hostile
toward the envied, this does not mean that they will be moti-
vated to harm the envied (e.g., Hill & Buss, 2008; Miceli &
Castelfranchi, 2007; see Question 3 for a discussion of context
and reactions to envy), which is a major difference between the
unitary and typology approaches.
The major motivation of the envious person derives from the
pain and hostile feelings characteristic of envy, itself a neces-
sary part of envy: to eliminate the gap with the other person and
the pain this gap entails (Heider, 1958). Whereas some research-
ers argue that envious individuals feel they cannot achieve the
resource, and can only eliminate the inferiority in hostile ways,
effectively taking away the envied’s resource (e.g., Castelfranchi
& Miceli, 2009), others believe that envy involves hope to
achieve the resource (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Leach, 2008), which
can lead to nonhostile reactions. Yet others differentiate the

Crusius et al. Envy 3
emotion of envy (“what envy is”) from its various outcomes
(“what envy does”; Tai et al., 2012, p. 107). We (Cohen-Charash
and Gonzalez) belong to the last camp, noting that neither the
evolutionary, social comparison, or appraisal approaches depict
hostile reactions as inherent outcomes of envy. Thus, we believe
that envious individuals can eliminate the gap and reduce the
pain in various ways, many of which are nonhostile (see
Question 3). Thus, contrary to Lange, Weidman, and Crusius’s
(2018) treatment of pain and hostility as distinct approaches to
envy (i.e., envy as pain or envy as malicious, in their terminol-
ogy), we view both pain and hostility as belonging to the same
approach (e.g., Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; Tai et al., 2012).
In our (Cohen-Charash and Gonzalez) view, envy is a com-
plex, formative or aggregate construct, in that it is caused by
the combination of feelings, cognitions, motivations, and other
components that typically comprise an emotion (see Edwards
& Bagozzi, 2000).3 Therefore, envy does not occur if one of
these components is missing. For example, people can feel pain
and hostility without an upward social comparison, such as
when a goal is blocked (e.g., Berkowitz, 1993) or one is treated
unfairly (Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008). Similarly, upward
social comparisons can cause emotions other than envy, such as
admiration, pride (e.g., Tesser & Collins, 1988), or happiness
for the other (firgun; e.g., Cohen-Charash, Larson, Natale,
Scherbaum, & Erez, 2019). Since we do not advocate for causal
relationships between the components of envy, Lange,
Weidman, and Crusius’s depiction that in the unitary approach
pain leads to action tendencies (e.g., Figure 4 in Lange,
Weidman, & Crusius, 2018) is erroneous.
Additionally, Lange, Weidman, and Crusius (2018) advo-
cated for separately examining the feeling and comparison
dimensions of Cohen-Charash’s (2009) Episodic Envy Scale—
which she theorized and found to jointly constitute envy— and
stated that these dimensions conceptually map onto malicious
and benign envy, respectively. We disagree and see benign and
malicious envy as labels for different strategies for dealing with
envy, or methods for fulfilling the motivational goals of envy
(i.e., eliminate the gap, reduce the pain), rather than two types of
envy or components of it (see Question 3).4 We agree with our
coauthors that conceptualizations and operationalizations of
envy should capture its various components, given that envy is
complex and consists of various emotions (Johnson-Laird &
Oatley, 1989; Parrott & Smith, 1993), cognitions (e.g.,
Castelfranchi & Miceli, 2009; Lazarus, 1991), and action ten-
dencies (e.g., Heider, 1958; Lazarus, 1991). However, we
believe that separately examining these components provides an
incomplete and inaccurate picture of envy (see our response to
Question 4, for more information).5
Finally, we believe that data supporting the dual approach do
not contradict or negate the unitary approach. In fact, data show
that envy, operationalized as a unitary construct, can predict simi-
lar outcomes as both benign and malicious envy (see Question 3).
The Dual Approach
The notion that upward comparisons can result in two distinct
forms of envy has a long history (e.g., Parrott, 1991; Protasi,
2016), yet empirical research has begun only recently (for
reviews, see Crusius & Lange, 2017; Sterling, Van de Ven, &
Smith, 2017; Van de Ven, 2016). A central idea is that benign
envy motivates people to emulate superior others, whereas mali-
cious envy involves the wish that others lose their good fortunes.
From a functional perspective, Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, and
Pieters (2009) argued that these forms of envy aim at reducing
differences with superior others in distinct ways: by leveling
oneself up or by leveling them down, respectively.
Several research lines support a dual conceptualization and
often directly contradict a unitary model. One approach focuses
on distinct words that, in many languages, reflect this distinc-
tion. For example, participants recalled benign and malicious
envy episodes prompted by the respective Dutch (Van de Ven
et al., 2009; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2012) and
German (Crusius & Lange, 2014) words, or rated episodic envy
using such words in Urdu (Khan, Bell, & Quratulain, 2017).
The episodes differed in components that define emotions
across theories (Keltner & Gross, 1999; Niedenthal & Ric,
2017): cognitions, feelings, goals, and action tendencies. Benign
envy involved higher appraisals of control, more positive
thoughts about superior others, wishing to improve, and upward
action tendencies. Malicious envy involved lower appraisals of
the other’s deservingness and hostile thoughts, feelings, and
action tendencies. Nevertheless, benign and malicious envy also
overlapped: Both entailed painful inferiority about self-relevant,
upward comparisons with similar others (Crusius & Lange,
2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009), distinguishing them from admi-
ration (which has positive valence) and resentment (which does
not require inferiority).
Parallel findings emerged in Spanish and English (Falcon,
2015; Van de Ven et al., 2009)—languages with only one word
for envy. Specifically, episodes labelled as envidia or envy,
respectively, reflected two discrete benign and malicious envy
categories instead of one continuous dimension in latent pro-
files (Van de Ven et al., 2009) and more conservative taxometric
analyses (Falcon, 2015). These findings emerged in methodo-
logically diverse studies using recall and event-contingent expe-
rience sampling designs.
Another approach is to factor-analyze responses to envy
measures. If envy comprises distinct constructs, there should be
systematic variation in how different envy components relate to
each other. Conversely, a unitary conceptualization implies
highly correlated components. Research on dispositional inclina-
tions to experience envy (Çırpan & Özdoğru, 2017; Kwiatkowska,
Rogoza, & Volkodav, 2018; Lange & Crusius, 2015a; Sawada &
Fujii, 2016; Sterling et al., 2017) found two-factor solutions sup-
porting a dual conceptualization. Furthermore, the factors are
often not or only modestly correlated (e.g., rs = −.07 to .32;
Lange & Crusius, 2015a), suggesting that dispositional benign
and malicious envy are largely independent.
For state envy, Cohen-Charash (2009) also found a two-fac-
tor solution that we (Crusius and Lange) interpret as consistent
with the dual approach. Specifically, one factor (labeled “com-
parison component” by Cohen-Charash) included items such as
“feeling lacking some of the things [the envied person] has” or
the “desire to have what [the envied person] has.” This factor

4 Emotion Review
predicted improvement motivation. Another factor (labeled
“feeling component”) included items such as having “some
hatred” and “rancor (resentment, ill will)” toward the envied.
This factor predicted hostility and aggressive inclinations.
Semantically, these components seem to overlap with benign
and malicious envy, respectively. Furthermore, their shared var-
iance was modest (rs = .32 to .38).
Earlier research selected potential components of envy via
theory-driven reasoning. Consequently, the search space for
what envy entails may have been restricted. There might be
additional elements, relationships between them, or even other
forms of envy that could not manifest. Addressing this limita-
tion, Lange, Weidman, and Crusius (2018) applied a data-driven
approach, avoiding theoretical constraints. We exhaustively
sampled potential envy items from lay people (by asking them
to list elements of envy) and experts (by collecting all items
used in prior research). Reflecting previous conceptualizations
(Smith & Kim, 2007; see also the definition of our coauthors),
these items included cognitions (e.g., opinions about the other,
thoughts about relative inferiority), feelings (e.g., torment,
desire), and motivation (e.g., emulative and hostile tendencies).
Then, other participants rated envy episodes on these items.
Factor analyses supported previous theory-driven research sug-
gesting benign and malicious envy as independent forms of
envy (rs = −.16 to .19). Importantly, the analyses revealed pain
(i.e., feelings about inferiority and torment) as a third factor
positively predicting both benign and malicious envy.
Based on these findings, Lange, Weidman, and Crusius
(2018) developed the Pain-driven Dual Envy (PaDE) theory.
It integrates previous, conflicting research by clarifying the
relationship of benign with malicious envy as distinct forms
of envy that share a common core of painful inferiority (see
Figure 1). Based on these results, we advance a data-driven
definition of envy: Envy involves burdensome pain about
being inferior to another person. It occurs as benign envy,
entailing a longing to improve oneself and emulate the envied
person, and malicious envy, entailing hostile thoughts and
intentions directed at harming the other.
Taken together, the findings refute that envy reflects a uni-
tary construct. Consistently, unitary models were incompatible
with the data. Instead, ample evidence shows that envy entails
multiple, partly independent elements. That is, benign and mali-
cious envy share several appraisals and painful inferiority.
However, they also involve different thoughts, feelings, motiva-
tions, and action tendencies, explaining the striking diversity in
envious responding.
Question 2: What Are the Predictors of
Envy?
The Unitary Approach
We draw from social comparison, balance, and appraisal theo-
ries, and the self-evaluation maintenance model to discuss pre-
dictors of envy. An upward social comparison is the basic
requirement of envy (e.g., Heider, 1958; Tesser, 1991). The
way this comparison is appraised determines whether envy
will occur (e.g., Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001; Roseman &
Smith, 2001). Specifically, most envy researchers assert that
envy occurs when a person (a) knows or sees a comparison
Figure 1. The dual approach as proposed in the Pain-driven Dual Envy (PaDE) Theory (Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018).
Note. Bolded appraisals (deservingness and control) indicate higher relative importance in contributing to the overlapping forms of envy.

Crusius et al. Envy 5
other who (b) has a resource that the person wants, but lacks,
and (c) that is ego-relevant and important to the person’s self-
evaluation (e.g., self and social esteem, achieving life goals;
e.g., Heider, 1958; Lazarus, 1991; Salovey & Rodin, 1984,
1991; Tesser, 1991). These conditions comprise envy’s core-
relational theme: “wanting what someone else has and feeling
deprived of it but justified in having it” (Lazarus & Cohen-
Charash, 2001, p. 55).
Surprisingly, there is scant systematic research on these and
other predictors of envy (for a review, see Alicke & Zell, 2008).
One exception comes from research on stereotype content,
which shows that envy is predicted to occur when outgroup
members who threaten one’s social standing are perceived as
high in competence but low in warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, &
Xu, 2002). Several researchers have examined trait self-esteem
as a predictor of envy (Barth, 1988; Salovey & Rodin, 1991),
but did not always find it to be related to envy (Cohen-Charash,
2000; but see also Question 3). Research on dispositional envy
(e.g., Smith, Parrott, Diener, Hoyle, & Kim, 1999) also suggests
that some people are predisposed to frequently experience envy
in general.
One potential predictor of envy, the actual or perceived
unfairness of the situation, drew a relatively large amount of
research, some of which shows that unfairness can cause envy
(Wilkin & Connelly, 2015). However, perceived injustice may
relate to envy in additional ways (for reviews, see Mishra,
Whiting, & Folger, 2017; Smith, 1991), such as moderating
reactions to envy, being a component of envy, or even being an
outcome of envy (e.g., Harris & Salovey, 2008; see Question 3).
A major point of disagreement between the unitary and
typology approaches pertains to the roles of deservingness and
control potential in envy. In the typology approach, deserving-
ness and control potential determine whether a person experi-
ences benign or malicious envy (Van de Ven et al., 2012). In the
unitary approach, they serve a more complex role. For example,
some scholars argue that people can envy others regardless of
whether they deserve their good fortune (Rawls, 1971). Indeed,
whereas some researchers found that low deservingness of the
envied and high deservingness of the self, increase envy (e.g.,
Lieblich, 1971), others found that when the comparison other is
undeserving, the resulting emotion is resentment rather than
envy (Feather & Nairn, 2005; Feather & Sherman, 2002).
Furthermore, envious individuals may sometimes rationalize
their inferiority by reappraising the other’s success as unde-
served, making envy the cause of perceived undeservingness
rather than vice versa (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992; Miceli & Castelfranchi,
2007), though researchers have not examined this assertion
empirically. Thus, deservingness can predict envy, potentially
moderate reactions to envy, and even occur as an outcome of
envy (see Question 3).
Regarding control potential, Smith (2004) suggested that
envy requires appraisals of low perceived control, whereas
Lazarus (1991) maintained that appraising the desired resource
as attainable (i.e., one has some control over the situation) will
lead to envy rather than to sadness and depression. While
researchers in the unitary approach have given limited empirical
attention to control potential, we consider it a moderator of
strategies and reactions to envy (see Question 3). Importantly,
despite its major role in the typology approach, research sug-
gests that control potential does not reliably predict benign and
malicious envy. For example, Van de Ven et al. (2009) found
that more than half of both benign and malicious envy episodes
that participants recalled involved low perceived control,
whereas Lange, Crusius, and Hagemeyer (2016, Study 4) found
that perceived control positively predicted both benign and
malicious envy. Thus, we believe that the role of control poten-
tial in the typology approach needs further clarity.
The Dual Approach
Envy stems from upward comparisons. Social comparison
research (Corcoran, Crusius, & Mussweiler, 2011; Garcia, Tor,
& Schiff, 2013; Tesser, 1991) implies that dispositional and
contextual factors that make such comparisons more likely and
impactful fuel benign and malicious envy. Indeed, people with
higher chronic comparison orientation (Lange & Crusius,
2015a) and those seeking and feeling entitled to social status are
more prone to benign and malicious envy (Lange, Redford, &
Crusius, 2019). The content of sampled envy episodes also
points to perceived similarity to the superior person and domain
relevance as precursors of both kinds envy (Crusius & Lange,
2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009, 2012). Situationally salient coun-
terfactuals about envy-eliciting situations (“It could have been
me”) increase pain in envy (Van de Ven & Zeelenberg, 2015).
Similarly, competitions (Garcia et al., 2013) should fuel the
impact of upward comparisons. More causal evidence about the
relative effects of these factors on pain, benign, and malicious
envy is needed, however.
A central hypothesis in the dual approach is that specific
appraisals of the relevant social comparison then shape envy.
Appraisal theories argue that a limited number of appraisal
dimensions contribute to the unfolding of emotional episodes
(Clore & Ortony, 2013; Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda,
1986). Perceived control and deservingness are key appraisal
dimensions contributing to benign and malicious envy. In short,
when people perceive high control about improving their own
outcome and if they regard the superior’s outcome as deserved,
benign envy is more likely than malicious envy and vice versa
(Lange et al., 2016; Van de Ven et al., 2009, 2012). The evidence
suggests relative differences in the importance of these apprais-
als: control is more strongly linked to benign envy, whereas
deservingness is more strongly linked to malicious envy (Lange
et al., 2016). As control and deservingness are not necessarily
correlated, benign and malicious envy can co-occur.
Distal moderators affecting these key appraisals should con-
sequentially predict the outcome of envy-eliciting situations.
For example, information about merit reduces malicious envy
(Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011a). Similarly, when
superior others express authentic pride (signaling that success is
attributable to effort), benign envy is more likely. Conversely,
signals of hubristic pride (signaling stable attributions to talent)
increase malicious envy (Lange & Crusius, 2015b). Thus, con-
textual variables can clarify how an episode of envy evolves.

6 Emotion Review
How people perceive others’ superiority also hinges on dis-
positions (Crusius & Lange, 2017; Lange, Blatz, & Crusius,
2018). For example, basic motivational tendencies related to
how people construe opportunities for goal pursuit, such as
hope for success and fear of failure, predict benign and mali-
cious envy, respectively (Lange & Crusius, 2015a). Related
findings stem from research on varieties of narcissism.
According to the narcissistic admiration and rivalry concept
(Back et al., 2013), grandiose narcissism entails two related
but distinct traits: narcissistic admiration (narcissists’ assertive
inclinations to maintain a grandiose self) and narcissistic
rivalry (narcissists’ antagonistic inclinations to self-enhance).
These facets of grandiose narcissism relate differently to the
two forms of envy, mediated via their central appraisal dimen-
sions (Lange et al., 2016). Narcissistic admiration predicts
perceived control, mediating its relationship with benign envy.
Narcissistic rivalry predicts lower perceived deservingness of
others’ superiority, mediating its relationship with malicious
envy (Lange et al., 2016). Similarly, different forms of trait
self-esteem distinctively related to optimism or defensiveness
show specific relationships with benign and malicious envy
(Smallets, Streamer, Kondrak, & Seery, 2016; Vrabel, Zeigler-
Hill, & Southard, 2018). These examples suggest that core
appraisals can integrate a diverse set of predictors and out-
comes of envy.
Nevertheless, many questions remain about the elicitation
of benign and malicious envy. First, more causal evidence on
the interaction of deservingness and control appraisals is
needed. Some evidence suggests, for example, that perceptions
of undeservingness may sometimes override perceptions of
control (Van de Ven et al., 2012). Second, there might be addi-
tional processes that shape how an episode of envy evolves.
For example, counterfactuals fuel both benign and malicious
envy by highlighting inferiority (Van de Ven & Zeelenberg,
2015), and qualitatively distinct counterfactuals also seem to
contribute to the specific forms of envy. Specifically, additive
counterfactuals about the self (“I should have done X”)
increase benign envy, whereas counterfactuals about others
(“She should have/not have done X”) increase malicious envy
(Crusius & Lange, 2019). Finally, that state benign and mali-
cious envy are not correlated (Lange, Weidman, & Crusius,
2018) implies they are not mutually exclusive, posing ques-
tions about the elicitation and the consequences of mixed emo-
tional states of benign and malicious envy.
Question 3: What Are the Consequences of
Envy?
The Unitary Approach
Envy motivates the envious to alleviate the pain and eliminate
the inferiority-causing gap with the other. As Figure 2 illus-
trates, these interrelated goals can be accomplished through
myriad strategies, such as elevating the self’s position, lowering
the other’s position, distancing oneself from the situation, and
“owning” or accepting one’s envy, among others (e.g., Berman,
2007; Cohen-Charash, 2009; Exline & Zell, 2008; Heider, 1958;
Leach, 2008; Parrott & Smith, 1993). These strategies drive
behavioral, emotional, and cognitive reactions, such as working
harder, harming the other’s reputation, avoiding the other, and
reappraising the situation (e.g., Cohen-Charash, Gonzalez,
Larson, Lee, & Alenick, 2019; see Figure 2). Indeed, research
shows that envy motivates various reactions, which some
researchers classify as hostile and nonhostile (e.g., Leach, 2008;
Parrott & Smith, 1993), or constructive and destructive (Tai
et al., 2012). To embrace a broader array of strategies and reac-
tions, we will discuss other-demotion, self-promotion, and addi-
tional cognitive, emotional, and regulatory reactions.
Most research in the unitary approach centers on other-
demoting strategies and reactions that harm the envied (e.g.,
Salovey & Rodin, 1984) and/or the resource (e.g., Elster, 1991;
Wobker, 2015; Zizzo & Oswald, 2001). These reactions can be
overt, such as undermining or punishing the envied (Duffy,
Scott, Shaw, Tepper, & Aquino, 2012; Eissa & Wyland, 2016;
Gino & Pierce, 2010; Kim & Glomb, 2014), or covert, such as
withholding or providing wrong or low-quality information to
the envied (Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2011; P. Fischer,
Kastenmüller, Frey, & Peus, 2009; Moran & Schweitzer, 2008).
Researchers have also examined self-promoting strategies
and reactions, such as intending to or actually performing better
at work (Cohen-Charash, 2009; Lee & Duffy, 2019; Schaubroeck
& Lam, 2004), enhancing one’s body or appearance (Arnocky,
Perilloux, Cloud, Bird, & Thomas, 2015; Chan & Sengupta,
2013), and expending greater effort during job searches (Dineen,
Duffy, Henle, & Lee, 2017). Notably, self-promoting behaviors
can sometimes be socially undesirable and even unethical, such
as résumé fraud (Dineen et al., 2017), theft (Wilkin & Connelly,
2015), and cheating (Gino & Pierce, 2010).
Another class of reactions to envy include, but are not lim-
ited to, cognitive, emotional, and self-directed reactions that do
not clearly fit within the categories of other-demotion and self-
promotion. Cognitive reactions include reappraising the
resource as unimportant or the envied other as incomparable to
the self (e.g., Kets De Vries, 1992), allocating greater attention
to and better recalling adaptational information (Hill & Buss,
2006; Hill, Delpriore, & Vaughan, 2011), and developing
implicit attitudes toward the envied (e.g., Chan & Sengupta,
2013). Potentially, these cognitive reactions could regulate the
envious individual’s behavior, such as reappraising the situation
to suppress socially undesirable reactions, although this point
requires further research.6 Envy predicts self- and other-directed
emotional reactions, such as schadenfreude at the envied’s mis-
fortune (e.g., Smith, Powell, Combs, & Schurtz, 2009), depres-
sion (Smith et al., 1994), and anxiety (Cohen-Charash, 2009).
Envy also predicts self-directed behaviors, such as pursuing
social support in order to self-protect (Berman, 2007). Lastly,
given the social stigma around envy, people often hide their
envy from others (Silver & Sabini, 1978a, 1978b) and from
themselves, for example, by masquerading it as socially accept-
able emotions, such as anger at or happiness for the other
(Cohen-Charash, Larson, & Fischer, 2013; A. H. Fischer &
Cohen-Charash, 2009).

Crusius et al. Envy 7
These three major classes of reactions are neither exhaustive nor
mutually exclusive. For example, envy predicts social loafing
(Duffy & Shaw, 2000), which could reflect withdrawal (self-
directed regulatory reaction) or harming the envied (other-demo-
tion). Likewise, in zero-sum contexts, gaining the resource
(self-promotion) entails making the envied other lose it (other-
demotion; Foster, 1972). Furthermore, reactions from different
classes can co-occur, even competing ones, such as disliking the
other while improving one’s performance (Schaubroeck & Lam,
2004), and holding negative attitudes toward the other while
attempting to improve one’s appearance (Chan & Sengupta, 2013).
Research suggests that personal factors (e.g., traits, atti-
tudes, beliefs, perceptions) and situational factors (e.g., cul-
tural norms, time) determine when different reactions occur.
We focus here on classes of moderators, rather than offering a
core set of moderators, given that, theoretically, limitless fac-
tors can affect the strategies and reactions that an envious
individual will use (see also Figure 2). When answering
Question 2, we included deservingness and control potential
among such moderators. For example, we have found that envy
predicts higher levels of both harming the envied other and task
performance when the envied was undeserving, rather than
deserving (Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2015, Study 4), and that
envy more strongly predicts perceived unfairness (Gonzalez &
Cohen-Charash, 2019) and harming behavior (Cohen-Charash
& Larson, 2011, Study 2) in situations involving high (rather
than low) control potential.
Some influential personal factors include trait self-esteem
(Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2011, 2015; Cohen-Charash &
Mueller, 2007); perceived capability of gaining the resource,
entitlement to the resource, and awareness and acceptance of
one’s envy (Berman, 2007); core self-evaluations (Lee & Duffy,
2019); perceived organizational support (Tai et al., 2012); social
identification with others and moral disengagement (Duffy
et al., 2012); emotionality (Wilkin & Connelly, 2015); and level
of job performance (Eissa & Wyland, 2016). Perceived unfair-
ness is a subset of personal factors that has yielded mixed
research findings, such that when unfairness is high, envy has
been found to predict greater harming in some circumstances
(Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007), and less harming in other
circumstances (Khan, Quratulain, & Bell, 2014).
Situational factors impose physical and/or psychological
constraints on the types of strategies and reactions the envious
can engage in. For example, time pressure, work market oppor-
tunities, and job type can predict the extent to which envious
job seekers resort to résumé fraud or to effortful job search
behaviors (Dineen et al., 2017). Social norms serve as another
such constraint. For example, envy predicts more undermining
behavior when such behavior is normative (Duffy et al., 2012),
and less prosocial behavior when such behavior is counternor-
mative (e.g., in competitive climates; Eslami & Arshadi, 2016).
The changeability of the situation (Larson, Gonzalez, & Cohen-
Charash, 2018) and one’s physical proximity to the envied
(Larson, 2013) are other situational determinants of strategies
and reactions to envy. Thus, we believe that researchers should
identify boundary conditions that determine when various
strategies and reactions to envy occur, rather than doing so by
dividing envy into multiple types.
Figure 2. Theoretical goal hierarchy of envious individuals, based on theory and research within the unitary approach, with more proximal strategies
and reactions reflected at lower levels of the hierarchy. Contextual moderators are proposed to influence (a) which regulatory strategy/strategies envy
motivates, and (b) which reactions evolve from each regulatory strategy. The darker-shaded boxes represent how we (Cohen-Charash and Gonzalez) see
benign and malicious envy not as different envy types, but as strategies residing within this model. The strategies, reactions, and contextual moderators
in this model are only examples, and many more are possible and should be theorized and examined.

8 Emotion Review
The Dual Approach
The motivational power of envy is well known. Much evidence
documents antisocial outcomes (Smith & Kim, 2007). Neverthe-
less, envy sometimes also predicted nonhostile inclinations.
For example, envy can relate to improvement motivation
(Cohen-Charash, 2009), better performance (Schaubroeck &
Lam, 2004), desire for status-related goods (Crusius &
Mussweiler, 2012), or even the intention to help superior others
(Hareli & Weiner, 2002). Although these studies employed uni-
tary envy measures, the predicted outcomes were diverse and
partially contradicted the notion that envy is hostile. According
to the dual approach, this diversity in envious consequences
reflects the duality of envy. This implies a need to disentangle
the envy forms in measurement. Doing so should account for
the diversity in correlates and outcomes of envy-eliciting situa-
tions. In particular, these should be in line with respective func-
tions of the envy forms.
Indeed, manipulations and measures of malicious envy pre-
dict outcomes that may serve to bring superior others down.
These include hostile action such as choosing punishing tasks
(Lange & Crusius, 2015b), counterproductive work behaviors
(Braun, Aydin, Frey, & Peus, 2016; Khan et al., 2014; Sterling
et al., 2017), and indirect forms of disparagement, such as gos-
sip (Lange et al., 2016) or schadenfreude (Lange, Weidman, &
Crusius, 2018; Van de Ven et al., 2015). Conversely, benign
envy predicts outcomes that may serve to level up the self. They
include attentional bias toward means for achievement (Crusius
& Lange, 2014), higher risk-taking for goal pursuit (Kwon,
Han, & Nam, 2017), being inspired (Meier & Schäfer, 2018),
increased goal setting (Lange & Crusius, 2015a), and more
effort, persistence, and better performance (Khan et al., 2017;
Lange & Crusius, 2015a, 2015b; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, &
Pieters, 2011b). A consistent pattern is that the measures of
benign and malicious envy did not predict the consequences of
the respective other form, supporting that they are independent.
The nomenclature of benign versus malicious envy might
invite the interpretation that benign envy is the adaptive, socially
desirable, permissible form of envy (D’Arms, 2017) or merely
unites “constructive” outcomes, whereas malicious envy unites
“destructive” outcomes (Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017b; Tai
et al., 2012). However, from a functional perspective, both
forms of envy are reactions to threat, involving different self-
defensive strategies. Whether these are constructive depends on
context, time point, and level of analysis (e.g., envier, envied, or
social group). As scientists, we should avoid evaluative and
moral assumptions about such phenomena (Paulhus, Fridhandler,
& Hayes, 1997).
Specifically, benign envy might be benign in the sense that its
proximate goal of self-improvement does not imply harm against
others. Neither this end nor its means are necessarily construc-
tive, however. For example, scholars attribute irrational deci-
sion-making and economic and environmental problems to the
envy-driven pursuit of status-related goods, such as luxury prod-
ucts (Belk, 2011; Frank, 1999; Veblen, 1899; Zheng, Baskin,
& Peng, 2018). Unitary measures of envy also predict adverse
consequences of comparisons with idealized media images,
including cosmetic surgery or risky diet pills (e.g., Arnocky
et al., 2015). A dual approach implies that benign envy causes
such maladaptive outcomes. Furthermore, along with malicious
envy, benign envy predicts morally questionable behavioral
inclinations, including deception, strategic compliance, and
other forms of manipulative interpersonal behavior directed at
self-interested outcomes (Lange, Paulhus, & Crusius, 2018;
Vrabel, Zeigler-Hill, McCabe, & Baker, 2019). Malicious envy
involves hostility against superior others. However, a social-
functional account suggests analyzing the adaptiveness of mali-
cious envy’s consequences—without equating them with low
social desirability or destructive behavior. The hostility in mali-
cious envy may nevertheless carry adaptive social implications.
For example, being the target of malicious envy can increase
prosocial behavior to reduce envy’s harmful consequences (Van
de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2010). Thus, malicious envy may
be functional in interpersonal interactions.
Malicious envy may also serve group-level functioning. For
instance, malicious envy predicts gossip (Lange et al., 2016).
Gossip is self-protective for those who receive it (Martinescu,
Janssen, & Nijstad, 2014) and ensures cooperation by inducing
reputational concerns (Feinberg, Willer, & Schultz, 2014).
Malicious envy also predicts schadenfreude (Lange, Weidman,
& Crusius, 2018), having partly functional consequences:
Expressed by maliciously envious persons, schadenfreude
undermined the social status of dominant targets (Lange &
Boecker, 2019). Thus, via superficially malicious outcomes
such as gossip and schadenfreude, invidious comparisons may
fulfill interpersonal and group-level functions (e.g., Inoue,
Hoogland, Takehashi, & Murata, 2015; Wert & Salovey, 2004).
Question 4: How Should Envy Be Measured
and Studied?
The Unitary Approach
Measures of envy should reflect its complexity. Like our coau-
thors (see also Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018), we do not see
one- or two-item envy measures as valid. We also view measures
that mainly capture one component of envy (e.g., motivation,
cognitions) as deficient. Instead, to better integrate and compare
research findings, we advocate for using validated and compre-
hensive measures of envy (for a fuller discussion, see Cohen-
Charash & Larson, 2017a). This critique applies to both the
unitary and typological approaches, and contradicts the call to
use different measures in different contexts (Van de Ven, 2016).
We maintain that measures of envy should capture its feeling,
cognitive, and motivational components, but not its antecedents
or outcomes (see Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017a, 2017b, for
reviews). For example, in the typology approach, researchers
have used “benign” envy items such as “I tried harder to achieve
my goals,” and “malicious” envy items such as “I criticized the
person” (Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018; Van de Ven et al.,
2009), which reflect reactions to envy. Unsurprisingly, given that
these outcomes are embedded in the measures, “benign” envy
predicted self-improvement and “malicious” envy predicted
harming in some of these studies.7 Some researchers have even

Crusius et al. Envy 9
operationalized benign and malicious envy directly as effort and
harming, respectively (e.g., Smallets et al., 2016). Thus, while
researchers from both approaches likely agree that measures of
envy should capture its motivational qualities, we feel that it
must be accomplished without conflating envy with its out-
comes. Instead, researchers should measure envy holistically as
a complex, unitary construct (Cohen-Charash, 2009), and avoid
tautology by omitting antecedents and reactions to envy from the
measure.
We further believe that the measurement of envy, like that of
any construct, should stem from its theoretical conceptualiza-
tion (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2016), and that
methods to study envy should be theory-based, rather than pri-
marily data-driven (see Block, 1995, for an analogous discus-
sion regarding personality). For example, Lange, Weidman, and
Crusius (2018, Study 1) factor-analyzed responses to an envy
item pool originated from previous theory-driven research and
found a dimension that they interpreted as meaningless (see
Table 2, Factor 3 in Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018), but that
we view as resembling envy’s conceptualization in the unitary
approach (i.e., feeling envious, longing for the resource, per-
ceiving the envied other as lucky and better off than the self).
This envy factor did not appear in Lange, Weidman, and
Crusius’s Study 2 (2018), in which participants generated the
item pool (a data-driven approach), the majority of which repre-
sented behavioral reactions to envy, rather than envy (e.g., “I
put on a false smile,” “I invested more effort to also obtain X”).
Thus, methodological choices, such as how items are generated,
can shape the factor structures obtained. Our previous example
also shows that data-driven research, just like theory-driven
research, is still subjective, can yield interpretational differ-
ences, and nevertheless needs sound, theory-driven methodolo-
gies and operationalizations. For additional best practices
recommendations for studying and measuring envy, see Cohen-
Charash and Larson (2017a).
In their response to this question, our coauthors critiqued our
methodology of averaging across all the items in the Episodic
Envy Scale to create a single composite envy score. As stated in
Question 1, we view envy as a complex and formative construct,
and we argue that examining its components individually is
inappropriate. Like other formative constructs, envy does not
require highly intercorrelated components (e.g., Coltman,
Devinney, Midgley, & Venaik, 2008), and aggregating from
these components is appropriate if the measure is developed
with theoretical and empirical rigor and with clear inclusion cri-
teria to ensure that items capture critical aspects of the construct
(Johnson, Rosen, & Chang, 2011).8 Regarding our collabora-
tors’ critique in their response to this question, the choice to
look at a construct as formative or reflective should be guided
by a theoretical rationale. While it goes beyond the scope of this
article to test such a model here, previous work has laid out a
theoretical rationale that supports envy as a formative construct
(Cohen-Charash, 2009).9 Therefore, we think it is methodologi-
cally sound for researchers using the episodic envy measure
(Cohen-Charash, 2009) to average across envy’s components,
and we reiterate the recommendation to do so. Furthermore, the
result of an exploratory factor analysis showed that the Episodic
Envy Scale explains 75.9% of the variance in envy (Cohen-
Charash, 2009).
The Dual Approach
Research on the distinction between benign and malicious envy
shows that careful, validated measurement is crucial to prevent
conceptual confusion and empirical inconsistency. A dual envy
conceptualization and PaDE theory in particular imply that the
distinct constructs of benign envy, malicious envy, and their
shared pain component need to be taken into account, as they
describe the nature of envy comprehensively (for a more com-
plete discussion, see Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018).
Thus, we recommend measuring all three constructs in all
envy studies, even if the predictions regard only one or two of
them. From PaDE theory follows that it is crucial to specify
this focus of analysis. It can be on painful inferiority as shared
element. It can also be on the specific forms of envy to clarify
the impetus of envious responding. Many variables will pri-
marily affect the pain of envy, leading to common predictors of
benign and malicious envy. For example, social comparison
orientation (e.g., Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) predicts measures
of benign and malicious envy at the state (Lange, Weidman, &
Crusius, 2018) and the dispositional level (Lange & Crusius,
2015a; Meier & Schäfer, 2018). Other variables increasing the
impact of contrastive comparisons, such as counterfactuals
(Van de Ven & Zeelenberg, 2015), will likely increase the pain
in envy. Measuring only pain, however, will not capture the
whole trajectory of envious responding, leading to less inform-
ative findings.
This analysis implies that painful inferiority and the forms of
envy should be measured with conceptual accuracy, that is,
requiring discriminant validity. For example, when measuring
benign and malicious envy, researchers should avoid items
likely to result in opposing loadings on the two constructs.
Benignly envious persons will be more likely to agree to an item
measuring whether they “like the other person” (Crusius &
Lange, 2014). However, because malicious envy will reduce
agreement to this item, it risks conceptual clarity. Similarly, this
item is problematic because it also measures admiration, which
is conceptually and empirically distinct from benign envy
(Schindler, Paech, & Löwenbrück, 2015; Van de Ven et al.,
2011b). For this reason, we avoided terms from neighboring
emotions when constructing a scale for episodic envy based on
PaDE theory (Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018).
We also advise against using single items such as “envy,”
“envious,” or “jealous.” First, single items are often unreliable
and unlikely to reflect emotions comprehensively (Weidman,
Steckler, & Tracy, 2017). Second, while laypeople may use the
label “envy” for both benign and malicious episodes, employing
it in an inclusive sense for measurement may be fraught with
peril. People could be inclined to avoid the term in self-descrip-
tions. We also suspect that context disambiguates whether peo-
ple refer to benign or malicious envy when using this label.
Thus, single-item measures might render cross-contextual com-
parisons invalid. As an indication of the difficulties attached to
them, the loadings of such items on the factors measuring envy

10 Emotion Review
were not entirely consistent across studies when we developed
PaDE theory (Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018).
Finally, we advise to use scales of envy as they were vali-
dated. For example, the Episodic Envy Scale by Cohen-Charash
(2009) and the dispositional Benign and Malicious Envy Scale
(Lange & Crusius, 2015a) were validated with two factors. One-
factor solutions did not fit the data and the shared variance of
the factors was small (see Question 1). Similarly, the state meas-
ures of pain, benign envy, and malicious envy as part of the
PaDE theory were conceptualized as three separate factors.
Thus, when using these scales, their factor structures should be
respected.
Contrary to the present claims of our coauthors (Question 1),
the formative model they propose was neither tested in Cohen-
Charash (2009) nor in the second-order model mentioned in
Endnote 4. All models constitute variants of a reflective latent
variable model. Fitting the formative latent variable model
requires specifying indicators as causes and not consequences
of the latent variable. Furthermore, the model is identified only
when adding at least two external variables caused by the latent
variable (e.g., Bollen & Bauldry, 2011). These requirements,
however, undermine the substantive interpretation of the forma-
tive latent variable, questioning the usefulness of such models
in general (Howell, Breivik, & Wilcox, 2007). As the proposed
formative model was neither fitted to data nor rendered inter-
pretable, averaging across the two factors of the Episodic Envy
Scale (Cohen-Charash, 2009) is methodologically inappropri-
ate, even though this has been done and been recommended
repeatedly (Cohen-Charash, 2009; Cohen-Charash & Larson,
2017a; Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007; Hill et al., 2011; Khan
et al., 2014).
Question 5: What Are the Advantages of
Each Approach to Studying Envy?
The Unitary Approach
We will discuss six advantages of the unitary approach over the
typology approach. First, based on principles of process count
parsimony (Dacey, 2016), the unitary approach offers a parsimo-
nious model of the process of envy, in which the appraisal of an
event leads to envy (Step 1), which subsequently leads to various
reactions depending on personal and situational moderators
(Step 2; see Figure 1 in Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017a). We
see the process in the typology approach as more complicated:
an event leads to pain (or general envy; Step 1), then appraisals
of control potential and deservingness cause “benign” and/or
“malicious” envy (Step 2), which then lead to their respective
reactions (Step 3). Thus, our model is more parsimonious, in that
it contains two major processes that explain three major reaction
categories, whereas the typology model contains three major
processes and predicts two major reaction categories.
Different from our coauthors, we see moderators as neces-
sary for delineating a model’s boundary conditions and increas-
ing its predictive utility (Bacharach, 1989). Furthermore, we do
not view the number of unique moderators that influence a
given process link as detrimental to parsimony. We see theoretical
and practical meaning in identifying when people will use dif-
ferent strategies to deal with their envy, and we do not believe
these moderators can be distilled down to a set of core con-
structs (e.g., control potential and deservingness in the typology
approach). Furthermore, in addition to the distal moderators
theorized to influence appraisals of deservingness and control
potential, the typology model is still relatively young and may
eventually need to invoke moderators that affect how people
react to benign or malicious envy, and pain/general envy.
Therefore, arguing against identifying boundary conditions
(moderators) seems counterproductive for both approaches.
Second, despite being parsimonious, the unitary model
accounts for more strategies and reactions designed to fulfill the
motivational goal of envy than the typology approach (see
Figure 2), thus offering more empirically testable hypotheses
regarding possible strategies and reactions to envy. The two
approaches disagree on how broadly to conceptualize the goals
of the envious. Figure 2 depicts our (Cohen-Charash and
Gonzalez) view that “benign” and “malicious” envy reflect
labels for two of several different strategies for fulfilling the
motivational goals inherent in envy of alleviating the pain and
eliminating the gap (i.e., elevating the self and demoting the
other; see Question 3). While these strategies and their subse-
quent behaviors vary across situations, people, and time, they
all serve the same adaptive goals.
Relatedly, we believe that the current debate cannot be
resolved merely by examining the magnitude to which benign
and malicious envy are correlated. If benign and malicious envy
represent regulatory strategies of envy, as we believe they do,
we would expect their correlations to vary across contexts, such
that they correlate strongly in some contexts (e.g., zero-sum; see
Question 3) and weakly in others (e.g., one can self-promote,
but cannot demote the other, or vice versa). Indeed, research
documents a wide range of correlations between benign and
malicious envy.
Third, the unitary approach offers a holistic understanding of
envy. Emotion researchers generally agree that emotions include
cognitive, neurophysiological, feeling, expression, and action
readiness/tendency components (e.g., Scherer, 2005). In
Question 1, we discussed envy’s feelings, cognitions, and moti-
vations within the unitary approach. In the typology approach,
benign and malicious envy are often defined and operational-
ized primarily by their motivations, whereas the characteristics
of the other components (feelings and cognitions) are either
unclear or under debate (Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018;
Van de Ven et al., 2009). For example, both types are described
as unpleasant, but benign envy has also been described as uplift-
ing (Van de Ven et al., 2009).
Fourth, the unitary approach has a stronger theoretical
rationale than the typology approach. To start, based on
appraisal theory, their different appraisals may make “benign”
and “malicious” envy two entirely different emotions, rather
than two types of envy (see Ellsworth & Tong, 2006, for a
similar argument regarding “self-anger” and “other-anger”).
Whereas “malicious” envy may resemble envy (but see the dif-
ferences discussed in Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017a),
“benign” envy seems to resemble emulation. Furthermore, we

Crusius et al. Envy 11
do not understand how benign and malicious envy can co-occur
if they require opposite appraisals of high (vs. low) deserving-
ness and control (e.g., Van de Ven et al., 2012; see Figure 1 in
the present article). Since appraisals are necessary for an emo-
tion to occur (e.g., Lazarus, 1991), it is unclear to us how an
event can be simultaneously appraised as low and high in con-
trol, or as low and high in deservingness. Lastly, despite claims
of non-English terms for “benign” and “malicious” envy (see
their response to Question 1), these words lack a common root,
and our attempts to translate them into English rendered differ-
ent emotion terms, such as “envy” and “grudge” in German,
and “desire” and “resentment” in Dutch (see also Cohen-
Charash & Larson, 2017a).
Fifth, studying envy as a unitary construct reduces concep-
tual proliferation (Podsakoff et al., 2016). Although Van de Ven
et al. (2009) increased awareness of the fact that envy can lead
to nonhostile strategies and reactions, such theory and findings
existed earlier within the unitary approach (e.g., Berman, 2007;
Cohen-Charash, 2009; Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004). Thus, sepa-
rately studying “benign,” “malicious,” and “general envy” (or
“pain”) seems neither theoretically nor empirically justified,
when a unitary conceptualization of envy predicts the same
strategies and reactions and more.
Sixth, we believe the terminology of “benign” and “mali-
cious” envy creates a value judgment (Cohen-Charash, 2019),
making one envy type perceivably more desirable than the
other. This potentially perpetuates symmetrical psychology,
limiting science’s power to explain human behavior (e.g.,
Cohen-Charash, 2019; Lindebaum & Jordan, 2014). For exam-
ple, with few exceptions (e.g., Crusius & Lange, 2014; Lange,
Paulhus, & Crusius, 2018; Van de Ven & Zeelenberg, 2015),
many typology researchers tend to hypothesize about malicious
envy’s relationship with hostile outcomes, and benign envy’s
relationship with nonhostile outcomes (even if all of these vari-
ables are measured in the same study).
The Dual Approach
The strength of a dual conceptualization lies in its capacity to
describe envious responding in a comprehensive way. First, the
distinction between benign and malicious envy has greatly
expanded the scope of envy research. It has allowed to generate
a wide variety of novel predictions not only going beyond the
idea that envy is an essentially hostile emotion but also based on
the notion that envy can be functional in different ways. Thus,
by expanding envy’s conceptualization, the distinction between
benign and malicious envy contributes to a more complete
understanding of envy, its determinants, and its consequences
(also see Van de Ven, 2016).
Secondly, a dual conceptualization of envy increases clarity by
offering an explicit definition of what envy is and how it should be
operationalized. Past research is characterized by highly inconsist-
ent and often atheoretical operational definitions of envy (for an
extensive discussion and evidence, see Lange, Weidman, &
Crusius, 2018). These resulted in empirical discrepancies. In par-
ticular, different measures employed under a unitary approach
have tapped into benign or malicious envy to differing degrees,
leading to inconsistent relationships with certain outcomes.
Consider envy and schadenfreude. Some research suggests
that envy predicts schadenfreude (Smith et al., 1996; Van Dijk,
Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, Nieweg, & Gallucci, 2006). Other
research contradicts these findings (Feather & Nairn, 2005;
Feather & Sherman, 2002; Hareli & Weiner, 2002).
Manipulating benign versus malicious envy supports that only
malicious envy causes schadenfreude (Van de Ven et al.,
2015). Furthermore, a meta-analysis of the research on envy
and schadenfreude confirmed that prior studies found a rela-
tionship the more their envy measure reflected malicious envy
(Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018). Thus, accounting for
envy’s systematic diversity in its operationalization increases
conceptual clarity and empirical consistency.
Third, the central advantage of studying envy from a dual
perspective is that it accounts for the evidence that the experi-
ence of envy is not unitary (Falcon, 2015; Lange, Weidman, &
Crusius, 2018; Van de Ven et al., 2009). Instead, the evidence
shows that there are two qualitatively different classes of envi-
ous responding (see Question 1).
A criticism of proponents of the unitary conceptualization
holds that some of the research on benign and malicious envy is
tautological because measures of benign and malicious envy
partly include items assessing upward motivation and hostile
intentions. Supposedly, these are then merely linked to corre-
sponding behavioral outcomes. To begin with, this argument does
not do justice to the breadth and scope of the measures nor the
outcomes that have been investigated in this research. Of course,
not all links between self-reported emotion and behavioral out-
comes are surprising. Crucially, however, this is irrelevant to the
question whether different motivations should be part of how
envy is conceptualized. It is not a tautology to account for system-
atic variance within envious responding with respect to motiva-
tional inclinations going along with specific thoughts, feelings,
and appraisals—in light of the evidence, it is a necessity.
Fourth, a dual conceptualization of envy is a parsimonious
theory of envious responding. It holds that key appraisal dimen-
sions (e.g., similarity, domain relevance, deservingness, and
personal control) shape how envy unfolds. These appraisals
can be affected by distal dispositional and contextual modera-
tors (see Question 2; Crusius & Lange, 2017). As these distal
moderators are not part of the model (see Figure 1), it incorpo-
rates a limited set of constructs, yielding parsimony. The uni-
tary model (see Figure 2) is silent about the mechanisms that
govern its varied goal hierarchy. Thus, it implies additional
moderators without attempting to clarify which of them are
essential. Therefore, this model actually incorporates an
unknown number of additional constructs. Of course, both
approaches cannot be exhaustive in specifying possible mod-
erators. Furthermore, it is likely that research will identify
more appraisal dimensions related to benign and malicious
envy. Nevertheless, the notion that by ignoring systematic vari-
ance, a unitary model can simultaneously be more parsimoni-
ous and have more predictive power in explaining the
complexity of envy strikes us as paradoxical.

12 Emotion Review
Table 1. Side-by-side comparison of the unitary and dual (typology) approaches.
Question Unitary approach Dual approach
How should
envy be
conceptualized?
• A complex, painful, and hostile emotion consisting of various feelings
(e.g., resentment, shame, guilt), cognitions (e.g., lacking, inferiority,
longing for the resource), and motivations (e.g., reducing the pain,
improving the self; Q1).
• Envy involves burdensome pain about being inferior to another person. It
occurs as benign envy, entailing a longing to improve oneself and emulate the
envied person, and malicious envy, entailing hostile thoughts and intentions
directed at harming the other (Q1).
What are the
appraisals that
lead to envy?
• Envy occurs when (a) a relevant comparison other (b) has a resource that
one wants, but does not have, and (c) this resource is important to one’s
self-evaluation (Q1).
• Research on other predictors of envy is limited. Possible predictors of
envy that have been offered include the following (Q2):
○ Unfairness and deservingness: Mixed findings, possibly due to many
different conceptualizations and operationalizations of unfairness/
deservingness.
○ Control potential: Mostly outlined in theoretical work, but findings
are mixed.
○ Dispositional self-esteem and dispositional envy.
○ Resource scarcity and zero-sum contexts.
○ Attitudes and stereotypes (Q2).
• Benign and malicious envy occur when upward comparisons are painful, for
example: status-relevant domain, similar other, upward counterfactuals (Q1).
• Perceiving high/low control about self-improvement and that envied others
deserve/do not deserve their superiority are more likely to turn envy benign/
malicious (Q2). Deservingness has greater relative importance than control
potential for malicious envy, and vice versa for benign envy (see also Figure 1).
• Dispositions (e.g., basic motivational tendencies, facets of narcissism) and
contextual variables (e.g., whether the envied person shows authentic or
hubristic pride) affect the form of envy via these appraisals (Q1, Q2).
What are the
consequences
of envy?
• Envious individuals can use various strategies to eliminate the
inferiority-causing gap and alleviate the pain, including demoting the
other, elevating the self, withdrawing from the situation, and more (Q3,
Figure 2).
• The previous strategies can motivate envious individuals to engage in a
number of cognitive, behavioral, and emotional reactions, which can be
grouped into:
○ Other-demotion (e.g., harming the envied other).
○ Self-promotion (e.g., improving the self).
○ Additional cognitive, emotional, and regulatory reactions (e.g.,
reappraisal, withdrawing from the situation, and seeking social
support). Additional empirical work is needed (Q3).
• Envy can lead to any of the previous reactions, despite their qualitative
differences, and reactions from different categories can occur
simultaneously (Q3).
• The extent to which envy leads to a given reaction will depend on both
personal and situational moderating variables (Q3, Q5).
• Benign envy predicts variables relating to upward goal pursuit (Q3), for
example:
○ Attention directed toward means for self-improvement and toward role
models.
○ Increased risk-taking, approach motivation, effort, and performance.
○ Antisocial (e.g., Machiavellian) behavior when it serves upward goal
pursuit.
• Malicious envy predicts variables relating to a strategy of undermining superior
others (Q3), for example:
○ Attention directed toward superior others.
○ Aggressive behavior against superior others.
○ Social undermining of superior others (e.g., via gossip or public
schadenfreude).
• Benign and malicious envy can share consequences (e.g., increased attention to
others); as the forms of envy are largely uncorrelated, their specific outcomes
can occur simultaneously (Q1, Q3).

Crusius et al. Envy 13
How should
envy be
measured and
studied?
• Researchers in the unitary approach should examine a composite measure
of envy, rather than examining its individual components (i.e., feelings,
cognitions, motivations). This is because envy is a formative construct,
in that it does not occur unless all of its components are simultaneously
present (Q1, Q4).
• Use a single, validated, and comprehensive measure of envy across all
studies, so as to better compare findings (Q4).
• Omit antecedents, specific outcomes, and behaviors from measures of
envy, so as to prevent tautology (Q4).
• Envy measures should not consist of one- or two-item measures (e.g.,
envy and jealousy; Q4).
• Consider personal and situational moderators that can influence the
extent to which envy relates to variables of interest (Q3, Q4, Q5).
• Envy measures should be theory-based, rather than data-driven (Q4).
• Measure the three distinct constructs: benign envy, malicious envy, and their
shared component of pain (Q4).
• Use a measure that reflects the spectrum of (benign vs. malicious) envious
thoughts, feelings, motivations, and action tendencies (Q4).
• Envy measures should reflect the systematic variance in envious responding
(Q4).
• Envy measures should not rely on single-item measures intended to capture
benign as well as malicious (“general”) envy in an abstract sense. (There is
disagreement about this point between researchers who investigate the duality
of envy; Q4).
• Consider personal and situational moderators that can influence painful
inferiority, benign envy, malicious envy, and their underlying appraisals (Q2,
Q3, Q4, Q5).
What are the
advantages of
each approach?
• Offers a balanced consideration of the different components of envy,
without focusing on envy’s action tendencies (Q5).
• Is parsimonious (based on process count; Dacey, 2016), in that it (a) has
few stages in the envious episode, (b) discusses only one envy type that
leads to a wide variety of reactions, and (c) enables a broader array of
goals and outcomes stemming from various categories to co-occur (Q3,
Q5, Figure 2).
• Reduces conceptual proliferation by studying a single envy construct
(Q5).
• Uses moderators to explain the conditions under which the various
outcomes can occur, without hurting the parsimony of the model (Q3,
Q5).
• Has a clear theoretical basis within appraisal theory, social comparison
theory, balance theory, and the self-evaluation maintenance model (Q1,
Q2, Q5).
• Reflects the empirical duality in which people experience episodes of “envy.”
This is necessary in light of converging evidence from different lines of
research that contradict a unitary model (Q1, Q5).
• Is parsimonious, in that it can describe the diversity of envious responding
with a limited set of constructs (Q5).
• Can reconcile empirical inconsistencies and debates by disambiguating
the forms of envy (e.g., the relationship of envy and schadenfreude,
the relationship of narcissism and envy) at the theory level and at the
measurement level (Q2, Q3, Q5).
• Broadens the investigation of envious responding by:
○ Expanding research to (benign) envy episodes not involving hostility
(previously considered to be essential to envy) (Q1, Q3, Q5).
○ Expanding the view on how the forms of envy can be functional at the
individual, interpersonal, and group level.
Note. Q# at the end of each bullet point refers to the sections of the article in which a given point is discussed.

14 Emotion Review
Joint Discussion: Agreements,
Disagreements, and Outlook
Thus far, we have shown that our disagreements revolve
mainly around (a) the conceptualization and measurement of
envy, (b) the necessary and sufficient conditions leading to
envy, and (c) the moderators of the envy process (summarized
in Table 1). Still, we agree that envy is an important emotion
that, despite being unpleasant, can be functional, and that
researchers should identify circumstances under which envy,
however conceptualized, is adaptive or maladaptive for the self
and for others. We also agree that self-promoting reactions are
not necessarily socially desired or adaptive, and other-demot-
ing reactions are not necessarily maladaptive (see our answers
to Question 3). Thus, regardless of how researchers conceptu-
alize envy, they should avoid value judgments about envy by
studying both hostile and nonhostile reactions. Relatedly, we
agree that categorizing envious reactions with vague and sub-
jective terminologies like “constructive”/“destructive,” and
even “functional”/“dysfunctional” could be presumptuous
without clarifying the context in which the reaction occurs
(Cohen-Charash, 2019; Lange, Paulhus, & Crusius, 2018).
We also agree that envy researchers should carefully con-
sider which measures they use. As elaborated here and else-
where (Cohen-Charash & Larson, 2017a; Lange, Weidman, &
Crusius, 2018), we recommend using validated measures that
depict envy holistically and reflect its complexity, and using
various research methods and samples. Even though in this arti-
cle we do not resolve the debate on how to conceptualize and
measure envy, we argue that researchers should at least present
an explicit, theoretically grounded rationale for their specific
operationalization of envy.
Finally, regardless of the approach, it is clear that much
remains to be learned about envy. Our joint analysis underlines
that envy cannot be reduced solely to harming others or elevat-
ing the self. Instead, envy can explain a wide variety of psycho-
logical and social reactions to upward social comparisons.
However, we have little data about the psychological mecha-
nisms shaping how people deal with painful upward compari-
sons, what moderates these underlying processes, or how
envious episodes evolve and change over time. Irrespective of
the approach, it is striking that experimental process evidence
in particular, such as about fundamental appraisals and other
processes, is lacking (though for exceptions, see e.g., Leach &
Spears, 2008; Smith et al., 1996; Van de Ven et al., 2012).
Furthermore, there is only scant knowledge about ways to
encourage people to react to envy-eliciting situations in certain
ways versus others. Additionally, we noticed a scarcity of
studies examining the social perception of envy and how the
envious individual is viewed by the self and others (e.g.,
Cohen-Charash et al., 2013; A. H. Fischer & Cohen-Charash,
2009; Lange, Hagemeyer, Lösch, & Rentzsch, in press;
Rodriguez Mosquera, Parrott, & Hurtado de Mendoza, 2010;
Silver & Sabini, 1978a, 1978b). More research on the social
and personal implications of envy is thus needed.
The debate on what is envy is likely to remain. Until its reso-
lution, however, we encourage researchers to prevent further
conceptual confusion by explicitly stating their theoretical
approach to envy and carefully describing how this translates to
their measurement of envy. We hope that our joint review helps
in navigating the intricate landscape of research on envy.
A final note: We adopted a theoretical, rather than empirical,
version of the “adversarial collaboration” format used by
Latham, Erez, and Locke (1988) and Mellers, Hertwig, and
Kahneman (2001). We anticipated that writing this article would
be relatively simple. Instead, it required extraordinary effort,
intellectual openness, and mutual respect in an, ultimately,
rewarding process. Despite our differences in opinion (which,
through the process, lessened at points), we have discovered
great colleagues that we would happily collaborate with again.
Acknowledgements
Yochi Cohen-Charash thanks Jonathan Barsade for suggesting the question–
answer format for this article and Paul Spector for his helpful advice. The
four of us thank Christine Harris for encouraging us to join forces in this
adversarial collaboration and supporting us throughout the process.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the
research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
Writing of this manuscript was supported by a grant from the German
Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [DFG]) awarded
to Jens Lange (LA 4029/1-1) and a University of Cologne Advanced
Postdoc Grant to Jan Crusius.
ORCID iD
Jan Crusius https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9403-6084
Notes
1 There can be various reactions to the better fortune of the other,
some pleasant (e.g., vicarious pride, admiration) and others not (e.g.,
depression, shame, and resentment; for an extensive discussion, see
Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Smith, 2000). Envy has been theo-
rized and shown to be distinct from other emotions. For example,
enviers have been reasoned to respond to both others’ advantages and
the self’s inferiority, unlike people experiencing resentment, depres-
sion, and shame, which tend to involve only one of these foci (Smith,
2000). As another example, research shows that envy requires social
comparisons, whereas resentment, for instance, is dominated by
thoughts about intentional immoral actions of others that are not
essential to envy (e.g., Smith & Kim, 2007; Smith et al., 1994; Van
de Ven et al., 2009), even if these characteristics overlap (as in some
conceptualizations of the related state of relative deprivation; e.g.,
Smith & Kim, 2007).
2 In the joint sections, we use “envy” to denote all its potential con-
ceptualizations—envy as a unitary construct, benign envy, malicious
envy, general envy, and pain of envy. We also use citations that are
relevant to both conceptualizations.
3 While we have not used this specific terminology before, the same
underlying rationale has been laid out in past work (e.g., Cohen-
Charash, 2009).

Crusius et al. Envy 15
4 In response to our coauthors’ critiques of the Episodic Envy Scale’s
factor structure, we combined all of the data from Cohen-Charash
(2000) and examined whether both envy components loaded onto a
second-order envy factor using confirmatory factor analysis. Because
the second-order factor had only two indicators (i.e., the feeling and
comparison components), we needed to constrain unstandardized fac-
tor loadings to 1, and therefore could not examine relative model fit.
However, both the comparison component (β = .78, p < .001) and the
feeling component (β = .50, p < .001) loaded significantly onto the
higher order envy factor. For more information, please contact Yochi
Cohen-Charash and Manuel Gonzalez.
5 Cohen-Charash (2009, Study 2) presented the results of both com-
ponents separately for the purpose of construct validation; in Study
3, she presented the components and the combined score to show the
internal dynamics within envy.
6 We thank the editor for raising this point.
7 We note that some researchers in the typology approach have linked
benign and malicious envy to reactions that are neither benign nor
malicious, such as counterfactual thinking (Van de Ven & Zeelenberg,
2015) and attentional bias (Crusius & Lange, 2014).
8 But see Edwards (2011) for another opinion regarding formative
constructs.
9 Regarding our coauthors’ questioning of the usefulness of formative
models in general, causality inference is a function of methodology,
not statistics (Stone-Romero, 2011). Factor analytic data are obtained
cross-sectionally, making these data correlational. Combined with the
lack of an independent measure of the construct with which to test for
causality between the construct and the items, it is currently impos-
sible to truly know the causal direction between a construct and its
indicators in both formative and reflective models.
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