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Will H. Moore’s enduring contribution to peace and conflict studies
Abstract
This special issue is dedicated to Will H. Moore’s enduring influence on peace science research and the community of peace science scholars. The five pieces in this special issue exemplify Will’s dedication to the development of rigorous concepts and theories that generate testable hypotheses about political violence and are evaluated using novel, fine-grained data. Will’s pioneering contributions to the study of peace science were both direct—through his scholarship—and indirect—through the mentorship of his students. All of the articles in this special issue were written by former students or scholars directly influenced by Will’s research and mentorship.
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When do Americans support the government’s use of torture? We argue that perceptions of threat undermine the extent to which American public opinion serves as a bulwark against government torture. Although surveys demonstrate that a slim majority of the American public generally opposes torture, using a nationally-representative survey experiment, we show that Americans are considerably more supportive of government abuse when it is directed at individuals who they perceive as threatening: specifically, when a detainee has an Arabic name and when the alleged crime is terrorism. Given the malleability of public opinion as a potential constraint on abuse, our results underscore the importance of institutional protections of human rights.
What are the limits of democracy’s positive influence on human rights? In this article, we argue that contested elections and powerful courts provide leaders with different incentives with regard to hiding torture. Because government torture is generally targeted at individuals that voters find threatening, institutions that reflect public opinion – like electoral contestation – are associated with higher levels of government abuse that leave scars on the victim’s body. Other institutions – like powerful courts – protect the rights of political minorities. Leaders in countries with powerful courts prefer plausible deniability of rights violations and consequently employ higher levels of clean torture, which leaves no scars. We test our hypotheses using data from the Ill-Treatment and Torture (ITT) Data Collection Project that distinguish between Amnesty International (AI) allegations of scarring and clean torture. We employ an undercount negative binomial that accounts for AI’s (in)ability to obtain information about torture. The model assumes that some incidents of torture go unreported and allows the extent of underreporting to vary across countries/years. Estimates from the model yield considerable statistical and substantive support for our hypotheses.
Our knowledge of the set of concepts that influence the number of terror attacks experienced by different countries is rudimentary. Existing work on the incidence of terror focuses upon the structural characteristics of polities, economies, and societies, and fails to place competition between dissidents and states center stage. It also tends to treat terror as isolated from other tactics that dissident groups might use to pressure the state. This study addresses these shortcomings by placing government and dissident group behavior at the center of the analysis. Drawing on arguments from the larger literature on dissent and repression, we argue that government behavior and dissident behavior are likely to be more important determinants of terror attacks than structural factors. We scour the literature for existing arguments to round out our model specification, and evaluate hypotheses using Bayesian statistical techniques and a broad scope of relevant data. For many of our independent variables we construct indices using measurement models that are able to account for measurement error and missing data, resulting in a more comprehensive set of data than previous studies. The results demonstrate that measures of government and dissident behavior have more explanatory power than measures of the concepts that populate existing research.
Participation in organized violent collective action against a government carries significant penalties should one be apprehended. Further, because such actions generally pursue collective goods, the participants will receive that good (if the action is successful) regardless of whether they participate. The free-rider hypothesis suggests that rational people will forego partici pation in large “N” collective action, unless they receive side payments of some kind. Yet, large numbers of people have periodically engaged in the type of behavior the free-rider hypothesis suggests they would not. This essay examines the solutions to this apparent paradox that have been pro posed in the literature and asks whether there has been any progress or cumulation of knowledge. Using Lakatosian criteria to evaluate this research program, the essay contends that there has indeed been progress. Further, I argue that future efforts should be invested in strategic models of collective action and that more empirical work needs to be done to flesh out the utility of recently proposed solutions.
The Ill-Treatment and Torture (ITT) Data Collection Project uses content analysis to measure a number of variables on more than 15,000 public allegations of government ill-treatment and torture made by Amnesty International (AI) from 1995 to 2005. The ITT specific allegation (SA) event data use the torture allegation as the unit of observation, thus permitting users to manipulate them for a wide variety of purposes. In this article, we introduce the ITT SA data. We first describe the key variables in the SA data and report a number of bivariate descriptive statistics to illustrate some of the research questions that might be usefully investigated with the data. We then discuss how we believe the ITT SA data can be used to study not only AI's naming and shaming behavior, but also states' (lack of) compliance with the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). We conclude with an empirical analysis using the SA data that investigates the effect of domestic political institutions on formal complaints, investigations, and adjudication of torture allegations. We show that legislative checks are positively associated with complaints, investigations, and trials; elections and freedom of speech are positively associated with investigations and trials; and powerful judiciaries are associated only with investigations.
Peace scientists such as Kenneth Boulding, Ted Gurr, Thomas Schelling, and Charles Tilly were fastidious in their use of abstract concepts free of the political baggage that politicians, policymakers, and pundits necessarily foist upon the terms in the rough and tumble world of politics. Too much contemporary peace science fails to follow their lead. This essay describes this problem and proposes a useful heuristic to help us improve.
The Ill-Treatment and Torture (ITT) Data Collection Project uses content analysis to measure allegations of government ill-treatment and torture made by Amnesty International (AI) from 1995 to 2005. ITT's country-year (CY) data quantify AI allegations of ill-treatment and torture at the country-year unit of observation and further across different responsible government agents and across different econo-socio-political groups of alleged victims. This paper introduces the Ill-Treatment and Torture country-year data, describes quantitative patterns likely to be of interest to researchers focused on the study of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and human rights, and suggests a number of theoretically motivated questions that can be explored using the ITT country-year data.
Political protest and rebellion by communal groups has become a major impetus to domestic and international political change. This study uses new coded data on 227 communal groups throughout the world to assess a general model of how and why they mobilize to defend and promote their collective interests. Statistical analysis shows that cultural identity, inequalities, and historical loss of autonomy all contribute substantially to their grievances. Political mobilization, grievances, and the international diffusion and contagion of communal conflict jointly explain the extent of political action in the 1980s. Democracy, state power, and institutional change help determine whether conflict takes the form of protest or rebellion.
The spread of cell phone technology across Africa has transforming effects on the economic and political sphere of the continent. In this paper, we investigate the impact of cell phone technology on violent collective action. We contend that the availability of cell phones as a communication technology allows political groups to overcome collective action problems more easily and improve. in-group cooperation, and coordination. Utilizing novel, spatially disaggregated data on cell phone coverage and the location of organized violent events in Africa, we are able to show that the availability of cell phone coverage significantly and substantially increases the probability of violent conflict. Our findings hold across numerous different model specifications and robustness checks, including cross-sectional models, instrumental variable techniques, and panel data methods.
This paper presents a typology that is used to classify the appeals that are issued by rebel groups to mobilize mass publics to take up arms against the state. This typology is developed by building a bridge between relative deprivation and resource mobilization theory. Secondly, this paper reports the findings of a pilot study that analyzes the Chimurenga songs from Zimbabwe's rebellion.
States whose agents engage in torture in a given year have a 93 percent chance of continuing to torture in the following year. What leads governments to stop the use of torture? We focus on the principal–agent relationship between the executive and the individuals responsible for supervising and interrogating state prisoners. We argue that some liberal democratic institutions change the probability that leaders support the creation of institutions that discourage jailers and interrogators from engaging in torture, thus increasing the probability of a state terminating its use of torture. These relationships are strongly conditioned by the presence of violent dissent; states rarely terminate the use of torture when they face a threat. Once campaigns of violent dissent stop, however, states with popular suffrage and a free press are considerably more likely to terminate their use of torture. Also given the end of violent dissent, the greater the number of veto points in government, the lower the likelihood that a state terminates its use of torture.
Although scholars have made considerable progress on a number of important research questions by relaxing assumptions commonly used to divide political science into subfields, rigid boundaries remain in some contexts. In this essay, we suggest that the assumption that international politics is characterized by anarchy whereas domestic politics is characterized by hierarchy continues to divide research on the conditions under which governments are constrained by courts, international or domestic. We contend that we will learn more about the process by which courts constrain governments, and do so more quickly, if we relax the assumption and recognize the substantial similarities between domestic and international research on this topic. We review four recent books that highlight contemporary theories of the extent to which domestic and international law binds states, and discuss whether a rigid boundary between international and domestic scholarship can be sustained on either theoretical or empirical grounds.
Conflict consortium standards and best practices for observational data
- C Davenport
- W H Moore
Davenport C and Moore WH (2015) Conflict consortium standards and best practices for
observational data. Available from https://conflictconsortium.weebly.com/standards-best-practices.
html
- W H Moore
- Siegel
- Da
Deprived, rational or both? “Why Minorities Rebel” revisited
- R Lindström
- W H Moore
- T R Gurr
- Jaggers K Moore
Gurr TR, Jaggers K and Moore WH (1989) Polity II Codebook. Boulder, CO: Center for Comparative
Politics, University of Colorado.